

ASPECTS OF THE ANGLO-HANSEATIC CONFLICT

IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

by

John D. Fudge

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree Master of Arts.

Department of History
McGill University, Montréal
March, 1983

© John D. Fudge
March, 1983

ABSTRACT

This study examines the economic and political disputes between England and the German Hanse in the fifteenth century, with the aim of assessing the impact of the Anglo-Hanseatic War (1468-74) on the Hanse's trade with England and evaluating the war's political repercussions within the Hanseatic community. Essentially this war was a conflict between an English merchant community intent on mercantile expansion and the Hanseatic confederation, which was determined to preserve its commercial monopoly in northern Europe, but which also was torn by the particularism of civic and regional economic interests. The exclusion of the Hansards from English foreign trade during the war years resulted in significant, but not necessarily all pervasive or identical, consequences in each of the principal trading ports of eastern England. Though the English government eventually acquiesced to virtually every Hanseatic demand in order to end the war in 1474, the conflict, nevertheless, also had far-reaching effects on political unity within the German Hanse. Most notable was Cologne's attempt to disassociate herself from the Hanse, but no less important to the once formidable trading confederation were the diverse responses of other leading Hanseatic cities to the challenge of England's commercial elite.

RESUMÉ

Cette étude examine les rivalités économiques et politiques entre l'Angleterre et la Hanse Germanique au quinzième siècle dans le but de déterminer l'impact de la guerre Anglo-Hanséatique (1468-74) sur les échanges commerciaux entre la Hanse et l'Angleterre et d'évaluer les répercussions politiques de cette guerre au sein de la communauté Hanséatique. Essentiellement, ce conflit opposait le désir expansionniste de la communauté marchande Anglaise et la détermination de la confédération Hanséatique à préserver son monopole commercial dans le nord de l'Europe; une confédération déchirée par le particularisme des intérêts économiques des villes et régions. Les conséquences de l'exclusion des Hansards du réseau commerciale anglais durant les années de guerre se révélèrent significatives mais pas nécessairement similaires pour chacun des principaux ports commerciaux de l'est de l'Angleterre. Même si le gouvernement anglais éventuellement acquiesça virtuellement à presque toutes les demandes Hanséatiques pour mettre un terme à la guerre en 1474, le conflit eut, aussi, de sérieux effets sur l'unité politique au sein de l'Hanse Germanique. Le plus notoire fut la tentative de Cologne de se dissocier de l'Hanse, mais il ne faut pas pour autant diminuer l'importance des différentes réactions des autres villes Hanséatiques au défi de l'élite commerciale anglaise.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the guidance, assistance and salutary criticism offered by Professor Peter C. Hoffmann, and the friendly counsel of Professor Charles C. Bayley of McGill University, Montréal. My thanks are also due to 'die Schlange', who read the original typescript and offered many helpful suggestions. Any errors which have eluded their vigilance are my own responsibility. I am indebted also to Professor Mary E. Rogers and Mr. David Howie of the University of Guelph for their suggestions and unfailing encouragement with regard to this project. Finally, I extend my thanks to the staffs of the Guildhall Library and Public Record Office in London, the Universitätsbibliothek and Historisches Seminar at the Westfälische Wilhelms - Universität, Münster, and the McLennan Library at McGill University, Montréal, for their efficient service and courteous assistance.

J.D.F.

ABBREVIATIONS

Akten : Akten der Ständetage Preussens 1233-1535.

CCR. : Calendar of the Close Rolls.

CLB. : Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London.

CPR. : Calendar of the Patent Rolls.

CPMR. : Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London.

ECHR. : Economic History Review.

Foedera : Foedera, conventiones, literae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae....

HGbl. : Hansische Geschichtsblätter.

HR. : Hanserecesse.

HUB. : Hansisches Urkundenbuch.

LUB. : Codex Diplomaticus Lubecensis: Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck.

PRO. : Public Record Office.

Quellen GKH. : Quellen zur Geschichte des Kölner Handels und Verkehrs im Mittelalter.

Rot. Parl. : Rotuli Parliamentorum.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I	
DIVERSE DEPREDACTIONS : THE ANGLO-HANSEATIC CONTROVERSY 1405-1468	9
The Baltic monopoly in the fifteenth century.	
Burgundian Rule in the Low Countries and Holland's challenge to the Hanse.	
English traders in the Baltic and their grievances.	
North Sea pirates.	
Licences to keep the sea.	
Robert Wenynghton's 'coup' and the Hanseatic response.	
Warwick's attack on the Bay Fleet and the reaction of a divided Hanse.	
Poland's victory over the Teutonic Knights; the rise of Danzig's merchant oligarchy.	
English ships arrested in the Sound, 1468.	
Map of the consolidation of Burgundian possessions.	
Map of the redistribution of Teutonic possessions after the second Peace of Thorn.	
CHAPTER II	
PERFIDITY, PRIVATEERS AND PEACE INITIATIVES : ENGLAND AND THE HANSE AT WAR; 1468-1474	39
Warwick's schemes and the anti-Hanse sentiment in England.	
Reprisals against Hansards; Cologne's special status.	
England's insecure monarchy, and civic particularism within the German Hanse.	
The 'verdict' of the King's Council; protests from the continent.	
Edward IV, Richard Neville and Duke Charles of Burgundy.	
Privateers in the North Sea; Paul Beneke, the 'Grosse Kraweel', Sir John Howard.	
Peace initiatives and the Peace of Utrecht.	
Map of the German Hanse.	
Chapter III	
COMMODITIES, MERCHANTS AND THE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ANGLO-HANSEATIC WAR	66
Renewal of ancient privileges and conveyance of the Steelyard properties.	
Partnerships, commodities and shipping.	
The woolen trade of England's east coast ports.	
Effects of the Anglo-Hanseatic War on cloth exports.	
The trade in merchandise paying the petty custom.	
Hanseatic entrepreneurs in England.	

(The Steelyard at King's Lynn and Hanseatic warehouses at Lübeck.

CONCLUSION

101

BIBLIOGRAPHY

110

INTRODUCTION

The German Hanse, whose rise and decline spanned almost four centuries, was a rather unique institution in late medieval Europe. Unlike Italian or south German city leagues, which were established primarily for military purposes, the Hanse was a confederation of trading cities created to promote and protect the economic interests of its membership. As its influence increased, the Hanse eventually came to monopolize trade and commerce in northern Europe during the later Middle Ages, and in doing so played an integral role in the development of the medieval European economy. It maintained trading links with all regions of Europe, and benefited from preferential legislation in many foreign lands, while at the same time dominating domestic production, trade, transport and finance within Scandinavia and the northern German territories. The extensive economic and political power which accrued to the Hanse was only gradually destroyed by a multiplicity of historical conditions, especially the combined effects of particularism within the membership and the emergence of competitive nation-states capable of industrial and mercantile expansion. The Hanse then faded from existence as Europe entered a new era of economic growth in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Illustrative of the principal internal and external pressures which eventually exhausted the Hanseatic confederation is the erratic course of its relations with England throughout the fifteenth century. In the international political arena the middle years of the century in particular were fraught with violence and provocation on several fronts. Transformations in western Europe's geo-political structure were affected profoundly by civil war in England, the rise and fall of Burgundy, the final phases of the Hundred Years War, and the decisive defeat of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. Moreover, this period of monarchical state development saw the emergence of an increasingly nationalist mercantile elite in England,

where for decades merchants of the Hanse had benefited from preferential customs privileges. In the major cities of the German Hanse a correspondingly parochial form of particularism based on civic and regional economic interests also emerged. English mercantile expansion posed a new threat to Hanseatic trade monopolies on the continent, while the fiscal immunities enjoyed by Hansards in England caused bitter resentment within the native merchant community.

The dispute simmered for several decades and finally erupted into an open sea-war between England and the Hanse. It spanned a period of five years, and ended in 1474 with the Peace of Utrecht. A century after it had reached the zenith of its political power by dictating peace terms to the King of Denmark, the Hanse now extracted fresh fiscal concessions from the government of England.

In the interim, however, much had changed within the Hanse. Its internal cohesion had been challenged by the rise of the nation-states and weakened irreparably by the new civic particularism. Inasmuch as the Hansards fought England in order to preserve ancient privileges and safeguard their established monopolies, the treaty signed at Utrecht signified a Hanseatic victory. Indeed, the Hansards maintained and at least temporarily enhanced their status in England. Yet this was a mediate rather than ultimate consequence of the fight, for although it revealed the extent to which England's foreign trade depended on the Hansards, and resulted in the reaffirmation of their privileges, it also served to illuminate the decrepitude of the Hanse and accentuate the fundamental internal divisions which ultimately contributed so significantly to its dissolution.

A number of archival sources and published compilations render possible the investigation of the political and economic relations of England and the Hanse in the fifteenth century. From the twelfth century onward royal officials in each of England's major ports recorded day by day the arrivals and departures of foreign ships. Details such as the ship's name,

captain, and port of origin, as well as a complete description of merchandise, duties payable, and the name of the merchant dispatching the cargo all were recorded in the Particulars of Customs. Annual summaries (enrolments) were sent to London and included in the Exchequer Enrolled Customs Accounts which listed imports and exports subject to charges in each port. These informative and remarkably complete customs documents are stored now at the Public Record Office in London. There is no Hanseatic equivalent to the Customs Accounts, and therefore, even though gaps exist in the Particulars, they, along with the more complete series of Enrolled Accounts, provide most of the detail pertaining to England's trade with the Hanse.

Since G. Schanz's extensive compilation of figures for English trade under the early Tudors first was published in 1881, the use of the Customs Accounts has been relatively limited with regard to the study of Hanseatic trade. In Englische Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters, Schanz provided a history of customs administrations and revenues, plus quantitative estimates of English exports. However, in limiting himself to the Enrolled Accounts he was not concerned with detailed information regarding individual merchants, ships, and cargoes.

Other partial tables of the Enrolled Accounts have been appended to specialized studies of English foreign trade such as Alice Beardwood's Alien Merchants in England, which examines trade in the late fourteenth century, and H.L. Gray's "English Foreign Trade from 1446 to 1482" in a collection of essays first published in 1923 and entitled Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. Again, however, only tables from the Enrolled Accounts are reproduced, and the quantitative statistics focus largely on wool and cloth exports. Finally, E.M. Carus-Wilson summarized the extant Enrolled Accounts in England's Export Trade 1275-1547. Basing her statistics on figures from the Accounts, she fully documented England's export of wool

and cloth from the late thirteenth to the mid-sixteenth century. The study ends with the year 1457, when documentation of the Enrolled Accounts becomes fragmentary.

Though the incompleteness of similar Hanseatic records prohibits a thorough quantitative examination of trade in the Hanse's main ports, there are ample documentary sources for an assessment of political and more general economic relations between England and the Hanse. Actually, one of the earliest source compilations for Hanseatic history focuses on the Hanseatic presence in England. Urkundliche Geschichte des hansischen Stahlhofes zu London, published in 1851 by the Hamburg archivist J.M. Lappenberg, consists of a selection of statutes in Latin, English and Low German collected from a variety of archives, and illustrating the historical development of the German trading community in England. It also contains Lappenberg's own narrative outline of the Hanse's history in London, accentuating the Hanse's cultural impact in England and its "mächtigen Einfluss" on English mercantile development.

Two essential source collections, the Hanserecesse and Hansisches Urkundenbuch, published in conjunction with the Historische Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften and the Hansischer Geschichtsverein, were largely complete prior to World War I. The Hanserecesse comprise twenty-four volumes covering the period 1250 to 1530. A number of archives were consulted, and texts were copied in their original Latin and Low German. They include extraordinarily complete records of Hanseatic assemblies, as well as related treaties, documents and letters which passed between Hanseatic towns (especially Lübeck) and merchants, municipalities, 'Kontore', and foreign governments. Concise expositions pertinent to individual documents outline historical circumstances.

The Hansisches Urkundenbuch was the major editorial project of the Hansischer Geschichtsverein, established in 1870. Eleven

volumes were published, each containing 800 to 1300 documents, letters, ordinances, and source narratives resurrected from archives across northern Europe. They touch on several topics including piracy, political developments, commodity structures, credit, prices, and litigation proceedings. As in the Hanserecesse, the material is published in the original Low German, English, and Latin of the day.

Three other German collections are of particular importance with regard to Anglo-Hanseatic history in the fifteenth century. The Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck is an eleven volume compilation of documents that passed between Lübeck city authorities and various other national, territorial, and civic governments beginning in 1139. A wealth of material relating to Cologne's trade history, some of it not published in either the Hansisches Urkundenbuch or the Hanserecesse, is contained in Quellen zur Geschichte des Kölner Handels und Verkehrs im Mittelalter, a four volume set edited by B. Kuske. Finally, Akten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens affords considerable insight into the political and economic developments in Teutonic Prussia during the later Middle Ages. Copied in the original Latin and German, these documents are of special value in outlining mercantile disputes brought to the court of the Grand Masters of the Order, and the key role of Danzig in Baltic commerce.

These documentary sources are augmented by a number of contemporary chronicles. The most informative of these for Anglo-Hanseatic trade in the fifteenth century are Casper Weinreich's "Danziger Chronik" published as part of Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der Preussischen Vorzeit edited by T. Hirsch et al., and "Die Chronik Christians von Geren" in Die Lübecker Bergenfahrer und ihre Chronistik edited by F. Bruns.

Of the voluminous sources available in English, the most relevant are contained in the Rolls Series'. The Calendar of the Close Rolls, Calendar of the Patent Rolls and the Calendar

of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London all contain numerous references to the Hansards in England, as does the Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London, edited by R.R. Sharpe. Thomas Rymer's Foedera and the Rotuli Parliamentorum shed further light on political currents in England and how they affected the Hansards there.

As German historians attempted to create a great maritime tradition from the history of the Hanse in the early years of this century, three important monographs appeared which dealt specifically with Anglo-Hanseatic relations in the later Middle Ages. Walther Stein's Die Hanse und England: Ein hansisch-englischer Seekrieg im 15. Jahrhundert, and Die Hanse und England: von Eduards III. bis auf Heinrichs VIII. Zeit by Friedrich Schulz, as well as Karl Engel's "Die Organisation der deutsch-hansischen Kaufleute in England im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert bis zum Utrechter Frieden von 1474" are thoroughly researched, and manage to keep distortions of historical truths to a minimum. In each of these commentaries there is some discussion of particularism within the Hanse, but nevertheless the Peace of Utrecht is seen as a clear victory for the Hansards. Only over the past three decades have Marxist historians, in deference to socialist sensibilities, seriously examined the deficiencies of the Hanse's internal political structure and how it was affected by international developments. With regard to the Anglo-Hanseatic controversy, Walter Stark offers a most interesting analysis in Lübeck und Danzig in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts.

The principal English contribution to Anglo-Hanseatic historiography is M.M. Postan's "The Economic and Political Relations of England and the Hanse from 1400 to 1475", published in Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. It provides an excellent overview of the period, though the author's interpretation of the Anglo-Hanseatic War is derived largely from that of the earlier German works. Aside from an admittedly less comprehensive section in the English translation of Philippe

7

Dollinger's general history of the Hanse, Postan's monograph remains the only extensive examination of fifteenth century Anglo-Hanseatic relations available in the English language.

Hence, though it is certain that international economic and political developments in the fifteenth century accelerated the deterioration of Hanseatic unity, historiography of the dispute with England has been sporadic, and few studies have attempted to examine critically the relationship between the Anglo-Hanseatic War and the fragmentation of the German trading community. The tentative explanation frequently has been offered that the war actually united the Hanse, and thus helped prolong its existence. In addition, no attempt has yet been made to examine the economic implications of the war for the foreign trade of individual English cities where Hanseatic interests were concentrated.

The effects of the conflict on the Hanse's trade with England, and the central interpretative issues pertaining to Hanseatic unity will be the focus of this study.

While no absolute line of demarcation can be drawn in the turbulent history of the Hanse's relations with England, a brief sketch of conditions existing up to 1468 brings to light the main aspects of the bitter and prolonged controversy. A subsequent examination of the trade of specific English ports from 1461 to 1482 and an outline of the activity of individual Hansards participant in this trade will clarify the role of the Hanse in the regional economies of England, as well as the impact thereon of the Anglo-Hanseatic War.

The critical examination of the war itself, and the course of events leading up to it, reassesses some of the traditional interpretations of Hanseatic historiography to date, and emphasizes the failures of political institutions within both the Hanse and the English Realm. In an era when profitable commercial violence was an integral part of the maritime trading industry, the English government, plagued by foreign wars, dynastic struggles, and inter-baronial conflicts, proved

incapable of providing constructive direction to the Realm's expanding merchant community. Consequently, the biases of that community and those of the egoistic English aristocracy found ultimate expression not only in the expansion of trade, but also in a state of near anarchy on the high seas. Similarly, the political institutions of the Hanse failed to keep pace with changing economic and political trends. Throughout the fifteenth century the mercantile expansion of England and Holland seriously threatened the established Hanseatic predominance in the Baltic region, and the preservation of the Baltic monopoly became one of the key issues in Hanseatic politics, fostering dissent and division within the confederation long before Cologne's startling defection from the Hanseatic community in 1468. The controversy with England, in which piracy played a major role, was decisive in sharpening internal divisions and hastening the disintegration of the great 'firma confederatio'.

I DIVERSE DEPREDACTIONS : THE ANGLO-HANSEATIC CONTROVERSY

1405 - 1468¹

In the fifteenth century the Prussian city of Danzig equalled and then surpassed Lübeck as the dominant port of trade in the Baltic, and became western Europe's largest supplier of cereals and forest products. Consequently, markets in England and Holland became very important to Danzig's export trade. But foreign contact with the Prussian hinterland was actively discouraged by the city's merchant community and by successive Grand Masters of the Teutonic Order, in practice the sovereign rulers of Prussia and Livonia, with supreme control over all the major trading ports of the eastern Baltic.

The only significant English import in this region was woolen cloth, and almost all of that which came to the Prussian ports was destined for the interior, where regional markets were jealously monopolized by agents of the Order and intermediaries from Danzig.² Although much of it still arrived via the short sea route to the continent (ie. to Amsterdam), from where it was transported overland to Lübeck and thence to Danzig,³ the direct sea route via the Sound was also well established and very popular. For the westward shipment of Danzig's bulky export cargoes this 'Umlandfahrt' unquestionably was more practical. To the merchants of Lübeck, however, the direct importation of English cloth overseas to the Baltic constituted a potentially serious threat. Often partners in the North Sea grain trade to England and the Lowlands, they were also the major distributors of Flemish cloth in the Baltic region.⁴ Any English competition in this area would challenge a long-established monopoly. Moreover, movement of any cargoes westward through the Sound necessarily circumvented the overland route across Holstein, the very foundation of Lübeck's prosperity.

Hence, in addition to Danzig and the other Prussian ports, Lübeck and her Wendish neighbours, Stralsund, Wismar, and Rostock also favoured restriction of English and Dutch trade in the Baltic. Their motives varied superficially according

to the character and commodity structure of trade in each geographical area, but did not differ in any fundamental sense. Neither Lübeck's attitude, nor that of Danzig reflected an overriding concern for the comprehensive interests of the Hanse. They were dictated by a spirit of self-interest tied to the preservation of specific regional and civic merchant communities.

Holland's challenge to Hanseatic domination of the northern European economy often paralleled that of England, and a brief overview of this sometimes violent struggle helps establish a broader historical context for the Anglo-Hanseatic conflict. Hansards in the Baltic ports often employed carriers from the Lowlands for the transport of grain to western Europe, and ordinances intended to limit the participation of Holland's merchants in direct trade were largely ineffective. In 1422 they were prohibited from residing in Prussia, and the following year were forbidden to trade to Livonia, where the towns of Reval, Riga, and Dorpat had replaced Lübeck and Visby as the Hanseatic intermediaries for trade to Novgorod and Russia.⁵ The restrictions accomplished little, but did lead to a sustained campaign of obstruction and piracy by the Hollanders who, although officially neutral, were highly sympathetic toward the Danes when Denmark and the Hanse were at war from 1426 to 1435.⁶ Although ships from Holland were attacked during these hostilities, the Hollanders persisted in running the Wendish blockade of the Baltic. Recognizing temporarily the futility of the situation, Grand Master Paul von Rusdorf granted the merchants of Holland, Zealand, and England access to Prussia in 1427.⁷ While the Wendish ports advocated exclusion of foreigners, the Grand Master attempted instead to restrict the trading activity of 'guests' once they had entered Prussian territory. To their economic advantage, Lübeck and the Wendish towns did succeed in diverting much of northern Europe's commerce to the old overland routes, but Prussia's seemingly irresolute attitude toward the Anglo-Dutch incursion negated the possibility of a totally effective Hanseatic blockade of the Sound.

Another development of concern to the Hanse was the consolidation of territories in the Low Countries by the Dukes of Burgundy in the first quarter of the century. No longer could the Hanse impose economic policies on small, politically vulnerable duchies and counties, and play one off against another. Holland, Zealand, and Brabant were added to the Burgundian possessions between 1430 and 1433, after which the continuing quarrels with the Hollanders regularly brought the Hanse into contact with the relatively strong, centralized authority of Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, already frequently annoyed by litigations involving Hansards at the Flemish staple of Bruges.⁸

A fierce rivalry developed between Holland's expanding merchant sector and its German counterpart. Finally, the activity of Dutch pirates led the Hanseatic diet or 'Hansetag' at Lübeck to suspend commerce with Holland in 1436.⁹ Again this severe restriction was rejected by the eastern Baltic cities, but antagonism in the west eventually culminated in a state of war between Holland and the Wendish towns from 1438 to 1441.

Meanwhile, the question of reciprocal trading privileges for English merchants in Prussia and Livonia also had evolved as a contentious issue in Hanseatic affairs. Hansards had long enjoyed a privileged status in England. Often referred to there as Esterlings, they formed a firmly established corporate body with rights of jurisdiction over members, and through a series of charters, including Edward I's 'carta mercatoria',¹⁰ benefited from various customs exemptions. Yet, although English merchants frequently complained of arrest and harassment in the Wendish ports,¹¹ by the late fourteenth century they too were well established at Königsberg, Elbing, and Danzig, engaging in wholesale and retail trade with foreigners as well as Prussians. They were especially active as financiers, and in Danzig had formed a society with an elected governor.¹² This organization seems to have been tolerated by the native community

until the turn of the century when Hanseatic 'Englandfahrer' objected to changes in English customs regulations. The Prussian ports responded by prohibiting Englishmen from trading with non-Hansards, restricting their rights of residence, and eventually expelled them outright in 1403.¹³ English attacks on Hanseatic shipping were so numerous in the ensuing two years that the Hanse attempted a trade boycott in retaliation.¹⁴ Its effectiveness again was severely hampered by lack of co-operation within the trading confederation, and because Hansards really could not hinder the marketing of English cloth in Flanders, Brabant, and Holland.

In 1405 the King's ambassadors to Prussia and envoys of the Grand Master agreed:

...all liege marchants of England whatsoever, shall have free licence and libertie to arrive with their shippes, goods and marchandises whatsoever, at any Porte of the land of Prussia and also the sayd goods and marchandises farther unto any place of the sayd land of Prussia to transport, and there with any person or persons freely to contract and bargaine, even as heretofore, and from auncient times it hath bene accustomed. Which liberty in all respects is granted unto the Prussians in England.¹⁵

A number of east and south coast merchants were ordered to make restitution for illegal seizures of Hanseatic ships and cargoes. A commission was appointed to hear disputes involving Hanseatic, Prussian, and Dutch claims. But the "divers homicides, depredations of goods and merchandise and other damages" perpetrated on and by the Hansards and Hollanders continued, rendering precarious the situation of English traders who returned to the Baltic ports.¹⁶ Unlike their Hanseatic counterparts in England, they did not benefit from fiscal exemptions, and without permission to form a corporate body with elected officials, they remained subject to the jurisdiction of the Order and the Prussian municipalities.

Although another similar accord was agreed to in 1409, it did little to moderate the bitter enmity of the two factions,

and piracy and commercial reprisals continued unabated.¹⁷ The next decade saw no end of claims and countercharges. Merchants of the Hanseatic 'Kontor' at Bergen in Norway were accused of robbery and murder of English traders and fishermen, while Hansards in London complained of tolls contrary to the 'composition' of their charter in England.¹⁸ Finally, as Henry V requested the Grand Master to encourage the export of Prussian corn in order to compensate for a shortage in England, the capture of a Hanseatic salt fleet by English pirates in 1417 sharpened animosity still further.¹⁹

Several Englishmen did, however, return to the Baltic ports; their transactions with hinterland markets soon drawing the ire of rival Hanseatic merchants. At least fifty-five English traders were established in Danzig when renewed persecution curtailed their commercial activity severely in 1422. New decrees limited the length of their stay in Prussian territory, and together with all other non-Hanseatic guests they were denied direct trade with the interior.²⁰ This further provoked England's mercantile sector which, enjoying solid representation in the Commons, lobbied persistently to curtail the privileges of foreign merchants during the 1420's.²¹ Conversely, the war between Holland and the Wendish towns afforded the latter an opportunity to stifle English as well as Dutch trade to the Baltic by blockading the Sound. But frequent attacks on English shipping only led to renewed tension,²² and, while Dutch, English and Wendish privateers clashed on the high seas, the pleas heard at Westminster and Danzig became as predictable as they were frequent. Hansards complained that sheriffs in London were "anew troubling and distraining" them, and sued for discharge from customs dues.²³ In Prussia, delegations of English traders repeatedly appeared at the court of the Grand Master to seek parity, complain of depredations, and request permission to elect aldermen and occupy a common house.²⁴ But by ruling that English merchants "sullen alle recht und gewonheid als ander geste hyre in lande haben", the Grand Master carefully reaffirmed the status quo

in Prussian territory.²⁵

There may well have been some justification for demanding reprisals against Hansards in order to emphasize the struggle for parity, but the English government could not afford to overlook entirely the Hanseatic contribution to England's mercantile prosperity. A proclamation made in all major English ports in March, 1430 called for a halt to the harassment of Hansards and their ships because:

...by reason of the arrest in England of certain citizens and merchants of Hamburg and of their goods, merchants not only of Hamburg but others in the parts of the said Hanse have since abstained from coming to the realm as they used to do, fearing that hindrance or arrest might be laid upon them, and the king's will is that their suspicion be removed....²⁶

While this is an indication of some official concern for the state of Anglo-Hanseatic relations, subsequent developments reflect the futility of such an attempt to curb maritime violence. Proclamations did not necessarily constitute effective law, and did not guarantee redress.

Despite intermittent negotiations,²⁷ piracy flourished and complaints multiplied. When the Wendish towns did not reply to letters requesting restitution for the capture of a large ship from Boston in 1432, the King, at the urging of his Council and the Commons, authorized the arrest of goods and ships belonging to merchants of Lübeck, Wismar, Hamburg, and Rostock.²⁸ Hansards in England also objected to paying new tonnage and poundage dues, and by the mid-1430's Anglo-Hanseatic relations had degenerated to the point of bitter impasse.²⁹

But 1435 saw England's fortunes on the continent sustain a sharp reversal. France and Burgundy were reconciled with the Treaty of Arras, and within a year England was feuding with a former ally, Duke Philip of Burgundy. Markets in Flanders and Brabant were closed to English exports, jeopardizing the wool and cloth trade on which England's national

finances depended, and necessitating an appropriate revival of interest in somewhat more cordial dealings with the Hanse. Serious bargaining ensued, and in 1437 England and representatives from the major Hanseatic cities and the Teutonic Order agreed on a general policy of reciprocity.³⁰ Restrictions on English trade in Prussia were to be lifted, and Hanseatic privileges in England, including exemptions from increased tunnage and poundage dues, were reaffirmed.

The events of the mid-1430's were crucial to the long-term deterioration of Anglo-Hanseatic relations. While shifting allegiances on the continent temporarily eliminated the Flemish market, and dealt England's military ambitions in northern France a serious blow, the accord with the Hanse secured the other principal continental market for English cloth. But the agreement, by which England appeared at last to have gained parity for her merchants in Prussia, eventually proved vague enough to be of little consequence. Danzig refused to endorse it, and never recognized it as binding.³¹ Danzig's attitude notwithstanding, the English government itself established a precedent for the keeping of the seas during the 1430's which quickly nullified the concessions it had so long sought to achieve, and eventually pushed the Realm closer to open war with the Hanse. Piracy already had played a significant role in Anglo-Hanseatic politics up to 1430, but in the middle decades of the century it came to displace England's clamour for parity in the Baltic as the dominant issue.

By 1436, when England lost her Burgundian ally, English ships did not control the Channel, and the continental foothold at Calais was in jeopardy. The wartime navy which Henry V had established in 1416 to ensure a successful defence of northern France had become an expensive liability for his son, and between 1423 and 1430 the fleet of about thirty ships had been sold to pay royal debts.³² As it had in the past, the government then relied on private individuals to keep the sea. But indentured captains and crews also were expensive and not entirely effective. Hence, in 1436, licences were issued to

merchants and shipowners to "resist the king's enemies on the sea" at their own expense.³³ Captured "enemy" ships and cargoes became property of licencees. This mercenary legislation, coupled with the suspension of a 1414 statute which had made violation of safe-conducts at sea and receipt of pirated goods treasonable offences, only aggravated the already volatile situation with the Hanse. The official recognition of the profit motive in sea keeping was tantamount to licencing piracy on the high seas. Encouraged by this new freedom, shipowners petitioned for, and received licences in London and various other ports of call for foreign shipping, including Hull, Ipswich and Lynn.³⁴ Eventually about thirty ships were active off the coasts of Flanders and France, and soon "friendly shipping was almost in as much danger as the enemy from men intent on what was virtually a business venture."³⁵

In attempting to govern a nation economically and spiritually drained by a century of intermittent war with France, and further weakened by the in-fighting of a self-seeking aristocracy not easily amenable to law, the English Crown frequently was unwilling or unable to police the activity of the sea-faring population. Preoccupation with the wars in France resulted in more neglect of the problems of lawlessness and disorder. Even Henry V's 'navy' had been used primarily for the transport of troops rather than for any concerted campaign against pirates. Under young Henry VI, who held virtually no control over the aristocracy, perversion of the law by those who enjoyed the favour of the ruling council increased. In England's harbour towns there was no shortage of individuals willing to receive stolen goods, and law of the sea was meaningless to influential offenders who routinely threatened plaintiffs, paid off government officials, and bribed juries. Anarchy on the high seas could flourish because there was no central government in England strong enough to stop it.³⁶ The situation has been summarized concisely by M.M. Postan, whose appraisal concludes:

The mercenary interests of the ruling magnates in, and out of, the King's council were allowed full licence. Matters of state policy were made to serve the private gains of party chieftains. And as there were easy and substantial gains to be derived from attacks on Hanseatic commerce, the anti-Hanseatic piracy developed with every successive stage in the disruption of English government. Persons with grievances, real and imaginary, found it easy to obtain letters of marque against the Hanse. With these letters or without them, attacks on Hanseatic shipping became more frequent than at any other period in the fifteenth century.³⁷

Licences were granted infrequently after 1436, and in 1442 the Commons pressed for, and succeeded in establishing a small fleet of privateers to keep the sea, but the illegal captures of Hanseatic, Dutch and Flemish ships continued with striking regularity.³⁸ Although it was but one of the numerous instances of willful disregard for authority, the seizure of a Prussian vessel, 'la Isabell' of Danzig, perhaps best exemplifies the irreverent mood of England's merchant - shipowning community by 1440. The ship was boarded while at anchor (!) in Plymouth harbour. Ruffians forced the captain from his ship, the crew under 'les hacches', and carried away a cargo belonging, for the most part, to Flemish merchants.³⁹

The Commons ushered in the 1440's with new restrictions against foreigners which further reflected the temperament of the merchant community and its growing influence in political affairs. The King was granted a subsidy in 1440 only on the condition that foreign merchants be subjected to a new poll tax.⁴⁰ The Hanse maintained a privileged status in England, and this enabled its enemies in Parliament to mobilize the biases of an expanding middle class, and channel anti-foreign sentiment into an anti-Hanse campaign. The familiar requests for parity were common, and in the Baltic ports of Stettin and Danzig Englishmen complained of "uncertain taxes and tribute", extortion, robbery and imprisonment. "We marvel at the complaints of the merchants..., which repeatedly assault our ears about the oppressions, injuries and hurts inflicted

on them..." lamented the English King in his protest to Lübeck, and again in 1442 the Commons advocated revocation of Hanseatic privileges in England if the situation in Prussia was not soon remedied.⁴¹ In truth, however, the manipulation of economic policy in England showed little sincere concern for English traders in the Baltic. The three year war between Holland and the Wendish towns had not prevented the rapid re-establishment and growth of English trade in the region, despite Lübeck's attempt to blockade the Sound. Complaints by Danzig merchants at the turn of the decade indicate that in spite of restrictions, Englishmen in that city were trading openly with non-Hansards and keeping their warehouses open all day, to the detriment of local businessmen.⁴² When the Wendish dispute with Holland ended with the Peace of Copenhagen in 1441, ships from Zealand, Holland, and England returned to the Baltic in increasing numbers. The Wendish towns had failed to stem the tide against maritime interlopers from the west, and could defer no longer the fate of the Hanse's erstwhile predominance in the Baltic trade. But English pressure for 'reciprocal' privileges kept the situation unsettled and provided a rationale for the proposed revocation of Hanseatic franchises in England and piratical attacks on Hanseatic shipping. Indeed, after Parliament succeeded in having the King formally demand that the Prussians recognize the 1437 treaty, the English government did not make itself available for discussion until after the ultimatum had lapsed. So, by 1447, when litigation involving Hansards and Colchester merchants again resulted in wholesale arrests in England, the Hanse stood on the brink of forfeiting all its immunities there.⁴³

A 'Hansetag' at Lübeck reacted to the maltreatment and arrest of Hansards in England by hastily recommending the immediate apprehension of Englishmen in Hanseatic territory. The Order and the Prussian towns declined to comply, preferring instead to have their own representatives clarify the situation in England before taking action.⁴⁴ To the English the lack of consensus within the Hanse was clearly evident, but the political

leverage achieved with the cancellation of Hanseatic charters in England soon was nullified by another Burgundian boycott and the resumption of war in France. Again faced with possible economic isolation, England dispatched envoys to the diet at Lübeck in 1449, and resumed negotiations with Hanseatic officials.⁴⁵ However, in May of that year the most astounding privateering feat to date eliminated any possibility for agreement.

At sea under official sanction, English privateers commanded by Robert Wenynghon captured the combined Flemish-Dutch-Hanseatic salt fleet as it returned from Bourgneuf in early summer 1449. The Anglo-Hanseatic controversy escalated accordingly. With the fleet of more than a hundred ships in custody at the Isle of Wight, Wenynghon claimed he and his fellowship had sustained "£2,000 worth harm", and further suggested that, since he had captured "all the chief ships of Dutchland, Holland, Zealand and Flanders", the time had come "to treat for a final peace as for these parts". But the sixty ships of Holland and the Lowlands soon were released, while the Hanseatic vessels, including sixteen from Lübeck, were auctioned.⁴⁶

The incident placed incalculable stress on relations between England and the Hanse. In light of Wenynghon's nonchalant attitude, and the probability that certain royal councillors profited from his caper, it is not unreasonable to presume that the attack was condoned, if not actually instigated by members of the government.⁴⁷ This is plausible, given that the Hanse's relations with Burgundy were not particularly amiable at the time. The Hansards could scarcely contemplate a simultaneous breach with both England and Burgundy.

But in presuming that this latest episode in maritime gangsterism might pressure the Hansards into a hastily concluded peace, Wenynghon and his cohorts seriously misjudged the temperament of those affected by the capture. Wendish and

Prussian towns incurred the heaviest losses, but unlike Danzig, Lübeck was not able to compensate her merchants by confiscating English goods.⁴⁸ Consequently, Lübeck's resistance to any compromise with England intensified, further contributing to the deterioration of Anglo-Hanseatic relations, as well as to the long-term disintegration of the Hanse from within. In addition to the reprisals in Danzig, English traders in the Low Countries were arrested, and Burgundian authorities extracted a considerable sum in compensation from the English government.⁴⁹

From this point onward, division within the Hanse began to play an even more appreciable role with respect to England. In 1450 Danzig, Elbing, Thorn, Königsberg and Kulm did not send representatives to the diet in Bremen at which Lübeck attempted to align other member cities in support of her compensation claims against England.⁵⁰ The Prussian towns and Cologne were not prepared to sacrifice their lucrative English trade for a dispute between England and the Wendish towns. In a prelude to what was to follow in the 1460's, Cologne's envoys in Flanders hastened to clarify the city's status vis-à-vis England with English officials.⁵¹ While her defection from the confederation in 1468 eventually would prove to be a decisive factor in the Hanse's dissolution, it certainly was consistent with a protectionist approach already established much earlier. In this respect Cologne's expression of particularism was not any more 'un-Hanseatic' or illiberal than that of Danzig or Lübeck.

Frustration in Lübeck peaked in the late summer of 1450 when the English, recognizing the divisions within the Hanse, and hoping to negotiate directly with the Grand Master, attempted to send a delegation to Prussia. To avert any Anglo-Prussian compromise, Lübeckers captured the envoys at sea and cast them into prison. This deliberate affront to the Prussian towns and the Grand Master eliminated any chance for an accord, and constituted still another blow to the concept of a Hanseatic

'firma confederatio'. Furthermore, when news of the outrage reached England, Hansards and their goods were arrested, and worst affected were the Prussians and Cologners.⁵²

Lübeck had succeeded temporarily in forcing her will on the other Hanseatic towns, and they agreed to deal with her claims against England at a diet to be held at Utrecht the following spring.⁵³ In England, customs officials in the major ports were instructed to make proclamation:

...forbidding any person on pain of forfeiture and imprisonment to inflict any injury on any persons of Prussia or the Hanze, until the diet be finished between the king and the master of Prussia and the proconsuls and consuls of the cities of the Hanze at Utright in May next touching the reformation of offenders against the ancient leagues between the king and them of Prussia and the Hanze.⁵⁴

- The mandate was issued amidst a rash of illegal attacks on Flemish, Hanseatic, and Italian shipping during 1450 and 1451,⁵⁵ while the session which convened at Utrecht produced no agreement. Delegates from the eastern Baltic still were determined to restrict expansion of English trade to the hinterland, but preferred to ease the tension by offering a short-term safe-conduct for English traffic. Prior to the meeting Cologne again distanced herself from Lübeck's cause, and her representatives and those from Hamburg, Bremen, and Prussia were able to achieve a resumption of trade.⁵⁶ Lübeck's refusal to endorse the new arrangement and her subsequent attempts to obstruct the maritime and overland traffic in English cloth compounded confusion and resentment within the Hanse. Her contempt for Cologne was dramatized in 1450 by the capture of the ship transporting the English delegation to Prussia and the confiscation of its cargo. A substantial quantity of cloth and money belonging to merchants of Cologne was seized, but Lübeck offered no recompense.⁵⁷

While some historians of the Hanse such as Walter Stein, Friedrich Schulz and, more recently, Philippe Dollinger have

maintained the traditional view that Lübeck held the Hanse together by taking a firm line against England, other recent commentaries by Eric Weise and Walter Stark emphasize the limits of such an interpretation.⁵⁸ Lübeck, the vigilant guardian of Hanseatic interests, actually had isolated herself from much of the rest of the community, and no longer was able to command the compliance of recalcitrant members. Prussia, Livonia, Cologne, and even Hamburg and Bremen rejected her uncompromising attitude, and welcomed another extension of the safe-conduct agreement with England in 1452. England's written acceptance of the accord excluded Lübeck, and not until 1456 was the city included in a new long-term safe-conduct pact.⁵⁹ Lacking the unanimous support of other major cities within the confederation, Lübeck was incapable of pressing the issue of compensation. Her pretensions to the political leadership of the Hanseatic community, however cherished, were illusory. The presence of Hollanders and Englishmen in the Baltic had altered perceptibly commercial relationships in northern Europe, and had encouraged regional particularism. Estrangement within the Hanseatic sphere, and the decline of Lübeck's political authority were but two manifestations of this larger and more fundamental process.

In England the demands for rights in Prussia had become little more than a pretext for piracy, and the government, shaken by dynastic uncertainties which soon would engulf the country in the Wars of the Roses, was powerless to stem the tide of violence and indiscriminate attacks on foreign shipping. A large hulk from Danzig bound for Hull in 1453 was seized and diverted to Newcastle where the cargo was disposed of "contrary to the friendship between the king and them of Prussia renewed of late".⁶⁰ The following year a kop from Middelburg was taken, and another hijacked while at anchor off Colwater.⁶¹ By 1456 Hansards in Ipswich dared not attempt to leave port, claiming:

...Subjects of the king in ships of war intend to spoil [Hansards] of goods and merchandise shipped in their ships... under colour of search,

asserting that the goods are not customed,
contrary to the friendship between the king
and them of the Hanze.⁶²

Meanwhile, war had broken out between the Kingdom of Poland, the Prussian towns and the Teutonic Order, increasing the danger to foreign shipping in the Baltic. The defeat of the Teutonic knights at Tannenburg in 1410 had ended German expansion in the eastern Baltic, and was a grim prologue to an era of political instability fatal to the Order and profoundly important to the political destiny of the Hanse. Thenceforth, the towns east of the river Oder were to have an even greater share in state affairs.

For its wholesale cereal exports, the Order had depended not only on its demesnes, but also on substantial quantities of grain collected as rents from the peasantry. But the almost continuous wars with Poland during the first half of the fifteenth century decimated the rural population. There was widespread emigration to the towns, and many vacated land holdings were taken over by the gentry. More and more economic and political power accrued to the landlord and merchant bourgeoisie.⁶³ In 1440 the estate owners and some twenty towns, including the prominent trading centres of Danzig, Elbing and Thorn, formed a confederation to protest the Order's abusive taxation and arbitrary boycotts of merchandise. Fourteen years later, in 1454, this league allied with Poland in an attempt to break the power of the Order. The conflict disrupted trade in the region for thirteen years, and the Wendish towns offered no military assistance to either the knights or the Prussian towns. As the war raged in the east, the quarrel in the west between England and Lübeck worsened steadily.

The Earl of Warwick - 'kingmaker', privateer, and governor of Calais - instigated an attack on another Hanseatic salt fleet in 1458. His English sea-rovers seized eighteen of Lübeck's ships and, in so doing, revived animosities in the Wendish sector.⁶⁵ Despite this and other attacks on Hanseatic shipping, other cities of the Hanse offered Lübeck only scant

support for any naval action in the North Sea. And, although privateers from Lübeck ambushed an English ship off Bornholm in 1463,⁶⁶ English access to the Baltic already had been restricted severely by the wars in Poland, limiting Lübeck's opportunities for retaliation. When young Edward IV came to the throne in 1461 Hanseatic privileges were confirmed and extended, but it was not until 1465 that a Lübeck delegation, backed by other Wendish towns, met with English envoys in Hamburg to discuss the outstanding claims for compensation.⁶⁷

Had the Hanse been able to display some semblance of unity, England's predicament might well have been more serious. Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, had imposed a boycott of English goods in 1464, and the closing of his dominions to English cloth exports again made friendly relations with other major consumers, such as the German Hanse, almost imperative. The English representatives might well have been forced to re-evaluate their options had they been confronted with a 'united' Hanse and the possibility of virtual exclusion from the continental trade.

However, Lübeck's demands obviously were not consistent with the wishes of other Hanse members, and certainly did not reflect the position of Cologne's merchants, who were responsible for the largest portion of the Hanse's trade in English woolens. Aware of this, the English delegates at Hamburg declined to discuss Lübeck's claims, and the diet adjourned without agreement.⁶⁸ Two years later the dramatic change in Anglo-Burgundian relations rendered the city's co-operation even less essential to England. Charles the Bold succeeded Duke Philip, rescinded the boycott of English merchandise, and allied himself with Edward IV against Louis XI of France. But throughout the 1460's Hanseatic privileges in England were reaffirmed for short periods, and, despite his strengthened position in 1467, King Edward was not eager to provoke a dispute with the Hanse. Such a conflict would only cause further disruption of the sealandes essential to the contemplated invasion of France.

Instead, peaceful relations with the Hanse were threatened by the continuance of piracy and the anti-Hanse faction of the King's Council, which was led by Warwick and drew support from the Commons and the City of London.

A quarter century had passed since the Peace of Copenhagen had ended the war between Holland and the Wendish towns in 1441 and compelled the Hanse to reopen the Sound and accept mutual free trade. In the interim, however, a 'Hansetag' had voted to strengthen the Hanseatic staple at Bruges by granting it a special tax on goods purchased in Holland, Zealand, and Brabant. The ordinance was contravened routinely by Hansards and non-Hansards alike, and was vigorously opposed by Cologne. Hansards in Bruges also complained that their special trading privileges were not respected by the local authorities. Off the North Sea coast, meanwhile, persistent attacks on Hanseatic shipping by Hollanders and Flemish pirates had been little affected by the peace treaty. The Hanse, therefore, resorted to a boycott of the Low Countries in 1451, and also briefly transferred the Bruges 'Kontor' to the independent bishopric of Utrecht. But by the mid-1450's Hansards were obliged to return to Bruges, and in 1457 the boycott was lifted. To the detriment of the Hanse, Holland's trade had benefited, Cologne had been further alienated, and many foreign merchants never returned to Bruges.⁶⁹

Elsewhere, King Kasimir IV of Poland and the Prussian league had prevailed, and the war against the Teutonic Order ended in 1466 with the second Treaty of Thorn. Poland gained full sovereignty over all of western Prussia, and the King granted Danzig virtually exclusive authority in matters of trade.⁷⁰ Already the largest and most prosperous of the eastern Baltic ports, Danzig ensured her long-term mercantile ascendancy by forbidding transactions between foreign traders and interior markets, except through the agency of one of her citizens.⁷¹ Hence, although they had collaborated with the towns against the Order, the landed estates which produced many of Prussia's exportable raw products acquiesced, in the end, to the authority of Danzig's merchant elite. The chronic disorder of the previous

decade and the final demise of the Order had indeed allowed members of the trading community in the eastern Baltic ports to preserve, consolidate, and enhance their political and commercial predominance.

Even so, the author of one of the more recent and popular histories of the Hanse has argued that the collapse of the Teutonic Order "was not altogether prejudicial to Hanseatic interests". Professor Philippe Dollinger commits himself to the conclusion that:

To some extent the Hansa suffered from the backlash of the disrepute into which its most illustrious member had fallen, but she was also freed from commercial rivalry and from the selfish policies of a principality whose ambitious plans had often given her just cause to fear.⁷²

This view has the appeal of simplicity, but if the defeat of the Teutonic Order injured Hanseatic prestige, what then of the ignominious failure of the Hanse's great Wendish towns against Holland in 1441? The implications of that struggle and the Treaty of Copenhagen which ended it went far beyond matters of prestige and reputation, and so too did the ruin of the Teutonic Order. It had coincided with, and contributed to, the rise of increasingly powerful and strong-willed merchant oligarchies in the Prussian towns, where interests were bound up with the maintenance and increase of civic mercantile authority. The same was true of the Livonian trading centres.⁷³ As a natural consequence, subsequent disagreements with the Wendish towns accentuated regional diversity. It is in this sense that the collapse of the Teutonic Order can be seen as having further imperilled Hanseatic cohesion. The "selfish policies" of the Order had been removed, only to be replaced by the equally narrow particularism of Danzig's commercial bourgeoisie. Upon being accorded full authority in affairs of trade and commerce by Kasimir IV, Danzig continued to restrict the activities of foreigners, resolving that:

...keyn Nuremberger, Lurbarth, Engelscher,
Hollandir, Flamigk, Jude, adir welcherley

wezens fremden wsz reichen unde landen eyn
 iderman ist,privilegia addir freiheit
 haben sal zcu kouffslagen adir zcu wonen an
 willen,⁷⁴

Throughout the fifteenth century the trading centres of Prussia and Livonia had, like their neighbours to the west, adopted attitudes of independent protectionism regarding political and commercial policy. This approach was manifest both in open confrontation with the Teutonic Order, and in persistent quarrels with the Wendish towns vis-à-vis trade with western Europe through the Sound and the protection of wholesale raw product markets in the eastern European hinterland and beyond. Of the Prussian ports, only Königsberg was subject to the rule of the Order after 1466. The others, led by Danzig, contributed appreciably to civic particularism within the Hanseatic sphere.

Once again English ships returned to the Baltic. Also, in deliberate defiance of a 1465 Anglo-Danish agreement prohibiting trade there, except by special licence, Englishmen frequented Iceland, where their behavior precipitated a series of events which eventually led to a decisive confrontation with the Hanse. Fishing crews from Bristol and Lynn put ashore in Iceland in the autumn of 1467, robbed and burned several houses, and murdered the Danish governor.⁷⁵

A few months later, in June 1468, a handful of English merchant ships interrupted their voyage to Prussia in order to pay customs to the Danes at Helsingør. While at anchor in the Sound, the English were encircled by a squadron of eight ships, including two allegedly from Danzig, and obliged to surrender their ships and cargoes without offering resistance. English accounts of these and subsequent events include stories of Danzigers dividing up the merchandise in Copenhagen, and of English cloth being unloaded in Danzig under cover of darkness.⁷⁶ The Danish King claimed that the confiscations were in response to the atrocities committed in Iceland the previous autumn, while "othir men of Denmarke saide, that the Kyng of England

had writene unto the kyng of Denmarke, to take and do his best with Englisshmen, and that was the noise thorowe all the lande.⁷⁷

Among those identified as leaders of the adventure were three Prussian captains, Henry Sterneburgh, Vincent Stolle, and Michael Ertmann.⁷⁸ That they participated in the event is undeniable, but their affiliation with the city of Danzig was perhaps not so obvious as the English testimony implied. They were among several who, having served on the side of Poland during the Thirteen Years War, were faced with a difficult transition to peaceful maritime enterprise upon its conclusion. They chose instead to serve the King of Denmark in his continuing dispute with Sweden. They did so against the wishes of Danzig's council, and as a result had forfeited citizenship of the city. When Ertmann returned there in September he was imprisoned temporarily.⁷⁹ Not without some justification, Danzig complained the responsibility for the Sound incident rested with Christian I of Denmark and a few Prussian expatriates, rather than with Danzig or the German Hanse. However, English testimony also implicated several other prominent Hanseatic merchants, including two from Lübeck and eight more from Stralsund.⁸⁰

King Christian's acknowledged responsibility for the arrest of the English ships, and his insistence that they were sequestered in retaliation for the raid in Iceland, did not soothe England's injured pride. Nor did it pacify indignant members of the merchant community who, hitherto content to engage in piracy as the occasion suited them, clamoured for redress. Injured parties found eager spokesmen in Warwick and other councillors of the King such as Thomas Kent, a long time enemy of the Hanse and leader of the delegation imprisoned at Lübeck in 1450.⁸¹

Edward IV's protests to King Christian brought no satisfaction to the English, and the absence of Danish ships and goods in England virtually eliminated the possibility of economic retaliation against Denmark. As a result, the alleged involvement of the Hanseatic city of Danzig assumed an exaggerated

importance. There would follow a new wave of persecution and retaliation in kind; age old remedies which compensated for immediate losses, but did nothing to alleviate a problem for which the merchants themselves were largely responsible.

Casual commercial violence had plagued Anglo-Hanseatic relations for more than half a century, and as councillors pressed the King for harsh reprisals, and the audacious spirit of England's expanding mercantile sector was channeled anew into anti-Hanse hatred, a decisive confrontation loomed ever closer.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

¹ Unless specifically indicated, references to England and the Hanse prior to 1468 are based on the accounts in E. Daenell, Die Blütezeit der deutschen Hanse. 2 vols., (Berlin/New York, 1973); K. Engel, "Die Organisation der deutsch-hansischen Kaufleute in England im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert", HGbl., XIX (1913), 445-517, XX (1914), 173-225; M.M. Postan, "The Economic and Political Relations of England and the Hanse from 1400 to 1475", Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. ed. E. Power and M.M. Postan (London, 1933) pp. 91-153; W. Stein, "Die Hanse und England beim Ausgang des hundertjährigen Krieges", HGbl., XLVI (1921), 27-126, and Die Hanse und England: Ein hansisch-englischer Seekrieg im 15. Jahrhundert. Pfingstblätter des hansischen Geschichtsvereins I, 1905.

² W. Stark, Lübeck und Danzig in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts. Abhandlungen zur Handels- und Sozialgeschichte XI (Weimar, 1973) p. 44.

³ Ibid., pp. 41-42; HUB. IX no. 39.

⁴ W. Stark, op. cit., p. 94; HUB. XI no. 445 #1, 6, 7, 8.

⁵ K. Fritze, Am Wendepunkt der Hanse. (Berlin, 1967) pp. 55-56, 69; HR. (1) VII no. 397, 609 #23, 800 #1, VIII no. 4, 26; HUB. VI no. 489; Akten I no. 302.

⁶ K. Fritze, op. cit., p. 70.

⁷ Akten I no. 378.

⁸ K. Fritze, op. cit., pp. 50-51; P. Dollinger, The German Hansa. trans. D. Ault and S.H. Steinberg (London, 1970) pp. 283-84, 298-300.

⁹ K. Fritze, op. cit., p. 71; HR. (2) II no. 11, 94, 146. Also see F. Vollbehr, Die Holländer und die deutsche Hanse. Pfingstblätter des hansischen Geschichtsvereins XXI (1930) pp. 26-46 and K. Spading, "Zu den Ursachen für das Eindringen der Holländer in das hansische Zwischenhandelsmonopol im 15. Jahrhundert", Neue Hansische Studien. ed. K. Fritze, et al. (Berlin, 1970) pp. 227-42.

10

R. Hakluyt, ed., Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation. vol. I (London, 1962) pp. 112-17.

11

In 1438 merchants from Lynn, Yarmouth, Norwich, Boston, Hull and London complained that men of the Wendish towns had arrested their servants and merchandise. However, subsequent arrests in England were not confined to traders from the Wendish sector. Several of those detained came from Cologne and Dortmund. All were released after promising that the English would not be harassed in the Wendish towns. CPMR. 1381-1412 pp. 143-44, 149-50. A similar situation occurred again in 1397. CPR. 1396-1399 pp. 309-10.

12

T. Hirsch, Danzigs Handels-und Gewerbsgeschichte unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens. (Stuttgart, 1969) pp. 99-101; F. Schulz, Die Hanse und England von Eduards III. bis auf Heinrichs VIII. Zeit. (Berlin, 1911) pp. 49-50; K.H. Ruffmann, "Engländer und Schotten in den Seestädten Ost- und Westpreussens", Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, VII (1958) p. 12; HR. (1) III no. 403 #4, IV no. 5, 397 #8, 537 #2-6, V no. 100 #4, 101 #2-3; HUB. IV no. 928, 1042.

13

F. Schulz, op. cit., pp. 50-51; HUB. IV no. 1054, V no. 617, 629, 651; HR. (1) V no. 101, 198 #3-6, 203 #5-9.

14

HR. (1) V no. 130, 209 #3-6, 211, 212, 225 #3-5; HUB. V no. 603, 613, 615, 618, 620, 621, 633, 634; CPR. 1401-1405 pp. 424, 432, 433, 508, 509, 1405-1408 pp. 59, 60; Akten I no. 65, 70.

15

R. Hakluyt, op. cit., p. 140; also CPR. 1405-1408 p. 153. J.L. Kirby reviews this episode in Anglo-Prussian diplomacy in "Sir William Sturmy's Embassy to Germany in 1405-06", History Today, XV (1965) pp. 39-47.

16

The commission to hear disputes involving Hansards was appointed in summer 1406. CPR. 1405-08 p. 234. Merchants in Hull and Lynn were ordered arrested, Ibid., pp. 230, 232, 236, and restitution ordered for the robbery of ships from Lübeck and Greifswald, Ibid., pp. 302, 305. Within a year, however, merchants from the east coast ports were being sought in connection with the capture of a ship from Hamburg. Ibid., pp. 352-53.

17

R. Hakluyt, op. cit., pp. 163-70; HR. (1) VI no. 76,

399 #7, 451, 556, 581, 582, VII no. 592 #7-10; HUB. VI no. 371, 418, 447, 635, 678, 689, 789, 934, 942, 964; CPMR. 1413-1437 pp. 70-71; CPR. 1413-1416 p. 65.

18

HUB. V no. 756, 1012; HR. (1) VI no. 385; CPR. 1408-1413 pp. 383-85, 500; CLB. (1) 1400-1422 pp. 95-96, 198; Foedera VIII pp. 70Q-01, 722-25, IX pp. 325-26.

19

CLB. (1) 1400-1422 p. 174; Rot. Parl. IV p. 192.

20

K.H. Ruffmann, op. cit., pp. 22-23; Akten I no. 302.

21

J.S. Roskell, The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments 1376-1523. (Manchester, 1965) pp. 183, 186, and The Commons in the Parliament of 1422. (Manchester, 1954) pp. 51-53, 125-29; HR. (1) VII no. 592, 671, VIII no. 452, (2) I no. 169, II no. 76; HUB. VI no. 504, 517, 529; Rot. Parl. IV p. 348, V p. 65.

22

Rot. Parl. IV pp. 348, 403, 493; HR. (1) VIII no. 452 #9, (2) I no. 385 #20.

23

CCR. 1422-1429 pp. 49-50, 53, 140, 192, 257, 311; Rot. Parl. IV p. 192.

24

Akten I no. 385, 397, 484.

25

Ibid., no. 385.

26

CCR. 1429-1435 p. 55.

27

Foedera X pp. 605, 627-28; Rot. Parl. IV p. 493.

28

CPR. 1429-1436 p. 220; CCR. 1429-1435 p. 155.

29

HR. (2) I no. 50; HUB. VI no. 1011. Tunnage and poundage was first levied by order of Council in 1347, and year by year following, by agreement with merchants. From 1373 on it took the form of a parliamentary grant of 2s. tunnage and 6p. poundage for keeping of the seas and support of a navy. However, most of the revenues were spent on the wars in France. M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration

of the Royal Navy. (Hamden, Conn., 1961) p. 10. When enjoying full privilege, Hansards were exempt from paying the subsidy of tannage and poundage. N.S.B. Gras, The Early English Customs System. (Cambridge, Mass., 1918) p. 112. The controversy in the 1420's stemmed from Parliament's grant of 3s. per tun of wine and 6d. per pound worth of goods.

30

J.M. Lappenberg, Urkundliche Geschichte des hansischen Stahlhofes zu London. (Osnabrück, 1967) p. 57; H. Buszello, "Die auswärtige Handelspolitik der englischen Krone im 15. Jahrhundert", Frühformen englisch-deutscher Handelspartnerschaft. ed. K. Friedland (Wien/Köln, 1976) pp. 71-73; HR. (2) II no. 26, 29, 46-47, 63-71, 76, 79, 81, 84-86; English Historical Documents. vol. IV, ed. A.R. Myers (London, 1969) pp. 1035-36. Foedera X pp. 666-70; CPR. 1436-1441 p. 62; J. Ferguson, English Diplomacy 1422-1461. (Oxford, 1972) p. 96. Some of the economic repercussions of the conflict between Burgundy and England are reviewed in N.J.M. Kerling, Commercial Relations of Holland and Zealand with England from the late 15th Century to the close of the Middle Ages. (Leiden, 1954) pp. 48-52.

31

T. Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 113-14; Akten II no. 40.

32

C.F. Richmond, "The keeping of the Seas during the Hundred Years War 1422-1440", History, XLIX (1964) pp. 285-90, and Royal Administration and the keeping of the Seas in the fifteenth Century, 1442-1485. unpublished Ph.D. thesis, (Oxford, 1963) pp. 31-66.

33

Ibid., and CPR. 1429-1436 pp. 509, 608-09.

34

Rot. Parl. IV pp. 376-77, 452, 493; CCR. 1429-1436. pp. 509, 510, 512, 515, 603.

35

C.F. Richmond, "The keeping of the Seas during the Hundred Years War 1422-1440", op. cit., p. 295.

36

C.L. Kingsford, Prejudice and Promise in Fifteenth Century England. (London, 1962) pp. 77-78.

37

M.M. Postan, op. cit., p. 122.

38

CPR. 1436-1441 pp. 64, 85, 86, 90, 202, 270, 408, 480;

English Historical Documents. vol. IV, ed. A.R. Myers (London, 1969) pp. 446-47.

39

CPR. 1436-1441 p. 409.

40

CCR. 1435-1441 pp. 310-12; J.S. Roskell, The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments 1376-1523. (Manchester, 1965) p. 220.

41

HR. (2) no. 318, 346, 380, 539, 644; English Historical Documents. vol. VI ed. A.R. Myers (London, 1969) pp. 1036-37; Foedera X pp. 753-55; Rot. Parl. V pp. 64-65; Akten II no. 318.

42

Akten II no. 87, 332, 370.

43

HR. (2) III no. 283, 286-89, 294-95, 316, 318. Also F. Schulz, op. cit., p. 89.

44

Akten III no. 11, 13, 14 18.

45

HR. (2) III no. 503-05; LJB. VIII no. 334, 411; Akten III no. 51.

46

A.R. Bridbury, England and the Salt Trade in the later Middle Ages. (Oxford, 1955) pp. 90-91; A. Agats, Der hansische Baiehandel. (Heidelberg, 1904) pp. 76-78; HR. (2) III no. 196; C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. pp. 193-97. Wenynghon was a merchant and ship owner at Dartmouth who had been pardoned for piracy and murder in 1445-46 and was indented to serve in keeping the sea in April 1449. CPR. 1446-52 p. 270; J. Wedgwood, ed. History of Parliament. vol. I: Biographies of the Members of the House of Commons 1439-1509 (London, 1936) p. 934. He was Mayor of Dartmouth, 1447-48, and Member of Parliament, 1449-50. In 1452 he was pardoned for the attack on the salt fleet, and he was Mayor of Dartmouth again in 1456-57. For his own report of the capture see "Robert Wenynghon to Thomas Daniel - 25 May 1449" in The Paston Letters. vol. I, ed. J. Warrington (London, 1961) p. 26.

47

J. Ferguson, op. cit., p. 101; HR. (2) III no. 638, 647, 669, 670. C.F. Richmond refutes the idea that the English government instigated the attack, but agrees that some members of the Council did profit by it. C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. pp. 197-202.

48

HR. (2) III no. 536, 555 #2; HUB. VIII no. 34 #71.

49

C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration, pp. 119, 202;
Foedera XI pp. 235-36.

50

Akten III no. 73; HR. (2) III no. 563, 570, 607.

51

HR. (2) III no. 567.

52

CPR. 1452-1461 p. 119; HR. (2) III no. 647, 666-67;
Akten III no. 75. In early September 1450 bailiffs in Lynn, Ipswich, London, and Colchester were instructed to "arrest the persons and wares of any merchants of the Hanse Almain, and to keep them safely until further order". CPR. 1446-1452 pp. 430-31. Later the Hansards, Lübeckers excepted, were released, and their goods and ships restored. CPR. 1452-1461 p. 123.

53

HR. (2) III no. 651; J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., pp. 76-86; Akten III no. 103-05, 131, 149.

54

CPR. 1446-1452 p. 445. Also Foedera XI pp. 281-82.

55

CPR. 1446-1452 pp. 434-36, 438-39, 440-42.

56

HR. (2) III no. 661, 693 #1, 694 #1-3, 10, 712 #1, 2, 9;
Akten III no. 103-05, 164.

57

HR. (2) IV no. 14, 71; HUB. IX no. 285; Quellen GKH. I no. 36, 37; H. Buszello, op. cit., p. 78.

58

P. Dollinger, op. cit., pp. 302-05; W. Stein, Die Hanse und England: Ein hansisch-englischer Seekrieg im 15. Jahrhundert, pp. 17-18; F. Schulz, op. cit., p. 199, and W. Stark, op. cit., pp. 183-211; E. Weise, "Die Hanse, England und die Merchant Adventurers: Das Zusammenwirken von Köln und Danzig", Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins, XXXI-XXXII (1956-57) pp. 151-53.

59

Akten III no. 164, 285; HUB. VIII no. 280-35, 298, 380, 446; HR. (2) IV no. 168-70, 176-77, 399-401, 450; Foedera XI p. 274.

60
CPR. 1452-1461 p. 174.

61
Ibid., pp. 221, 223.

62
Ibid., p. 299. A linen cargo belonging to Hamburg merchants in Ipswich also had been seized, taken to Harwich, and "exposed for sale". Ibid., p. 311. There also was considerable hostility directed against Italians in England at this time. See R. Flenley, "London and Foreign Merchants in the reign of Henry VI", English Historical Review, XXV (1910) pp. 644-55.

63
 H. Rosenberg, "The Rise of the Junkers in Brandenburg Prussia 1410-1653", American Historical Review, XLIX (1943-44) pp. 1-22, 228-42.

64
Ibid., pp. 234-36. For more comprehensive analysis of the decline of the Teutonic Order in the fifteenth century see K.E. Murawski, Zwischen Tannenberg und Thorn. (Göttingen, 1953) and particularly E. Weise, Das Widerstandsrecht im Ordenslande Preussen und das mittelalterliche Europa. (Göttingen, 1955). Lübeck's role in the conflict is reviewed in M. Biskup, "Das Reich, die wendische Hanse und die preussische Frage um die Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts", Neue Hansische Studien. ed. K. Fritze, et al. (Berlin, 1970) pp. 341-57.

65
HR. (2) no. 666, 667; HUB. VIII no. 769; CPR. 1452-1461 pp. 436-43, 1461-1467 pp. 231-32, 349-50.

66
LUB. X no. 81.

67
 W. Stark, op. cit., p. 191; HUB. IX no. 196; J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., pp. 124, 26.

68
HUB. IX no. 211-12.

69
 W. Friccius, Der Wirtschaftskrieg als Mittel hansischer Politik im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. (Lübeck, 1932) pp. 52-82; F. Vollbehr, op. cit., pp. 54-61.

70
Akten IV no. 367; HUB. VIII no. 563.

71 Ibid., and H. Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 235.

72 P. Dollinger, op. cit., pp. 294, 293.

73 M. Malowist, "Poland, Russia and western Trade in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century", Past and Present, XIII (1958) pp. 26-41; G. Hollihn, "Die Stapel-und Gästepolitik Rigas in der Ordenzeit 1201-1561", HGBll., LX (1935) pp. 128-36, 165-76.

74 Akten IV no. 367.

75 Foedera XI p. 551; E.M. Carus-Wilson, "The Iceland Trade", Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. ed. E. Power and M.M. Postan (London, 1933) pp. 179-90.

76 HUB. IX no. 519 #7-8.


77 Ibid., no. 468, 519 #4.

78 Ibid., no. 519, 520, 523.

79 Ibid., no. 471, 495; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum. vol. 4, ed. T. Hirsch (Frankfurt, 1965) p. 730; HR. (2) VI no. 95, 97, 108.

80 HUB. IX no. 471, 476.


81 P.M. Kendall, Warwick the Kingmaker. (London, 1963) pp. 223-24; K.A. Fowler, "English Diplomacy and the Peace of Utrecht", Frühformen englisch-deutscher Handelspartnerschaft. ed. K. Friedland (Köln/Wien, 1976) p. 12.



CONSOLIDATION OF BURGUNDIAN POSSESSIONS
1384 - 1452

∴ Additions to Burgundian Possessions

▨ Ecclesiastical Principalities



REDISTRIBUTION OF TEUTONIC POSSESSIONS
AFTER THE SECOND PEACE OF THORN - 1466

▨ West Prussia under Polish rule

▨ East Prussia ruled by Grand Master
as vassal of the Polish crown

II PERFIDITY, PRIVATEERS AND PEACE INITIATIVES : ENGLAND AND THE HANSE AT WAR; 1468-1474

Much of the pressure for reprisals against the Hanse originated from within the King's Council, where Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick was one of the principal protagonists. In his colourful biography of the 'Kingmaker', P.M. Vondall goes so far as to call the Anglo-Hanseatic dispute "Warwick's war". Neville's personal contempt for the Hanse had been amply illustrated a decade earlier, and there is no doubt that he owned at least one of the ships taken at the Sound in 1468. But unlike many other Englishmen who suffered material losses, Warwick's motives for seeking hasty action against the Hansards were essentially political. His political ambitions coincided with the commercial concerns of London's increasingly militant merchant community. He favoured Louis XI of France, and sought to undermine the Anglo-Burgundian alliance. Reactionary measures out of all proportion to the seriousness of the original dispute certainly would embarrass King Edward to his new Burgundian ally and at the same time appease London's merchant sector from whom Warwick might expect support. Moreover, if an open conflict with the Hanse could be provoked, it no doubt would stall a joint Anglo-Burgundian invasion of France.¹

However, by 1468 Warwick no longer dominated the will of the man he had made king of England, and he certainly did not control the King's Council. Other advisors to the King also were affected by the latest confrontation in the Baltic. Warwick's brothers, the Earl of Northumberland and the Archbishop of York, held shares in the confiscated cargoes, and another of the ships likely belonged to Sir John Howard, a Yorkist supporter whose influence at court can not be dismissed as insignificant. He too was especially active in maritime trade. Sir John Wenlock and Thomas Kent also could be counted among the councillors unfriendly to the Hanse.²

Aside from the King's men, the most militant anti-Hanse agitation in England derived from London's merchant fraternities.

Though the east coast ports were still visited regularly by the Hansards, and continued to be important distribution points for continental imports, they were not great exporting centres for cloth as they previously had been for raw wool. By mid-century an ever larger share of the cloth trade had begun to accrue to London, which also became a much more permanent centre of court and royal administration under Edward IV than it had been during the reign of his predecessor. The King frequently turned to the foreign and native merchant communities for financial assistance. As a consequence, wealthy and influential businessmen enjoyed ready access to King Edward, and often were consulted before commercial legislation was tabled in Parliament.³ Furthermore, London's parliamentary representatives in the fifteenth century were drawn exclusively from the city government "controlled throughout by a mercantile elite, with the acquiescence and assistance of the rank and file of the wholesale merchants".⁴ The civic authorities no doubt resented Hanseatic autonomy within the city walls, while the native mercantile sector on the whole objected to paying higher customs charges than Hansards for the export of English cloth. These merchants maintained significant representation at the parliamentary level in an era distinguished by blatant political partisanship in which members of the Commons were openly patronized by rival factions and influential individuals.⁵ During the late 1460's the interests of this anti-Hanse lobby coincided with those of a faction centring around the Neville clan, whose involvement in the dispute with the Hanse stemmed from a curious combination of contempt for the foreign trading community, legitimate claims for damages resulting from the seizure of ships in the Sound, and not a small amount of political brinkmanship.

Yet King Edward, himself a participant in oversea trading ventures, seldom had allowed commercial pressures to interfere with political and diplomatic objectives. Prior to 1462 he had ensured that protectionist and nationalistic commercial legislation did not unduly restrict the Hanseatic community in England. In 1462 for example, London received a charter

which included the right to tax foreigners, Hansards excepted. During the early years of his reign Edward IV appeased some of the anti-alien prejudice by confirming Hanseatic privileges only for short periods, but he nonetheless refused to deprive the Germans of their exemption from tunnage and poundage when it was granted to him for life in 1465.⁶ However, in 1468 his monarchy still was not secure. The threat of a Lancastrian insurrection backed by France remained very real so long as Margaret of Anjou went unapprehended. In addition, Edward's secret marriage and his alliance with Burgundy had alienated Warwick, perhaps the wealthiest and most influential man in the entire Realm. The King also continued to rely heavily on the London business community to help finance his schemes on the continent. By 1468 therefore, it became expedient for the English monarch to pacify the militants in London by evoking more drastic measures against the Esterlings.

In late July representatives of London's Hanseatic community were summoned before the Council at Westminster and informed that as a result of the seizures in Denmark England was demanding £20,000 compensation from the German Hanse. On July 28 the King ordered the arrest of all Hansards in England and the confiscation of their ships and property. Hansards, caught unawares and unable to warn their ships' captains, were hauled off to the gaols. In Boston, Lynn, Ipswich, Colchester and "allen plaetsen in England" their goods and ships were seized.⁷

However, England could ill afford to obstruct Hanseatic commerce completely, and the Cologne connection remained vital. The city dominated the importation of Rhine wines and metalwares into England, and her merchants were equally prominent in the Hanseatic share of London's cloth trade. Cologners, as well as non-Hansards, objected to the artificial fiscal maintenance of the Hanseatic entrepôt at Bruges, where Flemish cloth was increasingly unable to meet the growing continental demand for woolens. The fast-developing cloth industries of

England, Brabant and Holland had filled the void, and Cologners deliberately circumvented restrictions in Bruges by diverting much of their trade with London over Antwerp. From there they redistributed English woolens throughout Hanseatic territory, along the Rhine, and eastward over Leipzig, Breslau, and Cracow. Cologne even linked some of the trade between England and Italy. Since the Hundred Years War often rendered unsafe for cargo transport both the Rhône valley and the Atlantic coastal waters, the Italians, who were also large consumers of English cloth and suppliers of luxury goods, frequently employed the Rhineland route via Cologne.⁸

The city's obvious disillusion with her northern neighbours regarding the Bruges 'Kontor' and affairs in the Baltic certainly invited English exploitation of Hanseatic disunity. A Commons' petition of 1441, which protested at length about alleged crimes by Hansards, had demanded suspension of Hanseatic privileges on condition that such measures should not apply to "Merchauntz, Citezeins, nother Inhabitantz of the Citee of Coleyn, whiche that untrewely colour not other Merchauntz of Pruse and the Hansze...."⁹ Throughout the middle decades of the century Cologne had consistently dissociated herself from Anglo-Wendish disputes, and England was careful to consider the city's special significance in this regard.

As Gerhard von Wesel, secretary of the Hanse in London, prepared to relinquish custody of the Hanse's 'Steelyard' dwelling and warehouse compound in August 1468, Chancellor Robert Stillington enquired about the composition of the Hanseatic fellowship. Of course the makeup of the German community in London was not likely unknown to the government, but Wesel nonetheless answered that some Hansards came from Cologne, others from Prussia, Westphalia, Nijmegen, Hamburg, and various other places. When asked how Cologne stood with Denmark, the secretary, himself a Cologner, needed no further prompting to reply that Cologne too had been at odds with Denmark in the past. Upon his departure, Stillington suggested

that the King might take this into consideration.¹⁰

Within days of this conversation the merchants of the city of Cologne were released.¹¹ Other Hansards would remain imprisoned throughout the winter of 1468-69. In November the Council pronounced its 'verdict', and the impounded goods, except those belonging to Cologners, were divvied up to Englishmen who claimed losses at the Sound. A London mob stormed the Steelyard, and an envoy of the Emperor was murdered in the street. Control of 'Hanseatic' commerce in England reverted exclusively to the merchants of Cologne.¹²

This series of events has prompted speculation that the Council's verdict, and more specifically Cologne's exemption from it, not only challenged the Hanse's privileged status in England, but also constituted a calculated attempt to undermine Hanseatic unity.¹³ Within its own terms of reference this explanation is satisfactory enough, but it should not be taken to imply that the English government displayed an inordinate capacity for daring and imagination. True, on the basis of past precedent the English might guess that the Cologners would opt for a privileged status which excluded other Hansards, and therefore maintain an integral link in the export trade. But had Cologne elected to close ranks with the rest of the Hanse, there still would have been ample opportunity for serious negotiation. Certainly England risked nothing in attempting to exploit a Hanseatic weakness, which for several years had been self-evident to all concerned. Also, in view of such overriding concerns as the chaotic state of domestic politics in England and the constant political intrigues involving France and Burgundy, it is difficult to imagine that Cologne's exemption reflected a thoroughly contrived 'policy' designed to split the German Hanse. In London the merchants of Cologne were predominant among the Hansards engaged in cloth export. Their prominence in this trade, and London's significance as the focal point of commerce and government and as the major centre of anti-Hanse agitation were responsible for the otherwise largely inexplicable policy of the English government in 1468.

The preferential treatment accorded Cologne was less a deliberate attempt to challenge Hanseatic unity than a compromise aimed at appeasing powerful interest groups in and around London, while at the same time preserving an important cog in the national economy and a source of loans for the royal treasury.

By 1468, unity within the Hanse existed only so far as it served individual interests. Lübeck and the Wendish towns had chosen not to support Danzig during the Thirteen Years War, and likewise, Cologne and the Hanseatic towns in Prussia and Livonia had shared little of Lübeck's enthusiasm for confrontation with England. While the burgers of Lübeck continued to delude themselves regarding the city's political pre-eminence within the confederation, the changing realities of the European trading economy had led the other wealthy cities such as Bremen and Hamburg, and particularly Danzig and Cologne, in diverse directions.

In matters of significant economic and political importance, all had adopted a particularism based on control of regional markets and centres of production. Cologne objected to the expensive maintenance of the Bruges 'Kontor', strengthened her hold on the Rhineland trade in wine, metal products and cloth, and cultivated her special relationship with England. Bremen, too, remained detached from the Wendish sphere, and strove to control grain transport on the Weser and along the North Sea coast. The city's quarrels with the Duke of Burgundy during the 1440's resulted in separate peace agreements which did not always apply to the Hanse as a whole, and indiscriminate attacks by Bremen's pirate fleet did not make it less awkward for the rest of the Hanse to negotiate amiable relationships with England and Holland.¹⁴ Though still often bound by the attitudes of the Wendish group, Hamburg also had asserted herself in opposition to Lübeck and had prospered through monopolistic ordinances regarding the grain trade. Far to the northeast, Reval and Riga severely restricted access to the Livonian hinterland, and monopolized the Hanseatic trade to the Russian emporium at Novgorod. Finally, Danzig, aided

by the demise of the Teutonic Order, had succeeded in dominating the trade of the Vistula and the Prusso-Polish interior. At one time or another all of these rising civic and regional powers had enforced their own 'Stapelrecht' regulations not only against foreigners, but against other non-resident Hansards as well.¹⁵

Conversely, Lübeck's authority within the Hanse had been weakened irreparably by circumstances which had developed during the course of the fifteenth century. The Hanseatic boycott, so effective in the past, had produced few positive results in the quarrels with Flanders and Holland, but Lübeck could offer no new innovative countermeasure to arrest the rapid mercantile expansion of the Hanse's competitors in western Europe. In addition, the civic particularism which permeated the Hanse by mid-century was noticeably limited in nation-states such as England and France and also, though to a lesser degree, in the newly consolidated Burgundian territories. Within the Hanse, however, there existed no central authority. Lübeck, the erstwhile leader of the Hanseatic community, was increasingly unable to enforce constraints on the membership. In ridding themselves of the administrative tyranny of the Teutonic Order, the Hanseatic cities also found themselves without even a nominal sovereign authority through which they could conduct diplomatic negotiations with rival states.¹⁶

The most obtrusive challenge to Lübeck and to the Hanse's *raison d'être* came in 1468, and is manifest in the actions of Cologne's merchants after their release in England. Cologne thanked the King for his consideration and advised her merchants not to lend money to the towns of the Hanse or become involved in the conflict in any way.¹⁷ Cologners duly assumed absolute control of the Steelyard, and for the next half decade England and the 'Hanse' were embroiled in a sea war, perhaps a predictable, if not inevitable, result of more than half a century of intense controversy.

A succession of insecure monarchies in the fifteenth

century had been powerless to affect the demeanor of England's maritime trading community, and the violence which marked the deterioration of Anglo-Hanseatic relations throughout the middle decades was symptomatic of acute economic and political weaknesses within the Realm. The warlike proclivities of the English did not stem entirely from the quest for commercial parity in Hanseatic territories. In London, English merchants were more interested in restricting or even revoking the fiscal privileges of their German rivals than in achieving parity in Prussia for their colleagues from the ports of England's east coast. In this context, the anti-Hanse agitation in England can be seen, at least in part, as a struggle for more equitable application of customs regulations wherein Hansards would pay a larger share and, thus, forfeit their advantage in the highly competitive cloth trade. Native English merchants trading to foreign lands, who by the mid-fifteenth century were commonly referred to as 'Merchant Adventurers',¹⁸ reinforced anti-Hanse sentiment with often legitimate complaints of exclusion from, and persecution in, the Baltic region. But their arguments were offset as often as not by the epidemic of piracy for which they themselves were largely responsible, and which the hundred years of conflict with France had encouraged.

During the middle decades of the century the emergence of powerful mercantile interest groups schooled in commercial violence combined with a belligerent aristocracy to challenge further the authority of a government already handicapped by political turmoil and a perpetually exhausted treasury. It was hardly mere coincidence, for example, that Thomas Kent was among those appointed to investigate Warwick's attack on the Hanseatic fleet in 1458.¹⁹ Yet a decade later the depredations at Helsingor, in themselves no more cowardly or less legal than in any number of previous instances, provided the English with a pretext for continued 'reprisals'. The escalation of hostilities which followed ushered in another critical phase in the Anglo-Hanseatic legacy of conflict.

Merchants of the Hanse could not have anticipated the extraordinarily severe measures instituted against their fellowship by the English government in the summer of 1468. Nor had they foreseen being abandoned so totally by the city of Cologne. But dismayed and angered as they were, the delegates who gathered for the Hanseatic diet at Lübeck in August could do little except initiate a diplomatic campaign for the prompt release of their imprisoned colleagues.

Hence, prior to issuing its verdict in late autumn the government at Westminster was deluged with appeals from the Hanseatic community. The official protest of the 'Hansetag' was followed by separate letters from major towns such as Stralsund, Soest, and Duisburg. Typically the pleas stressed that the piratical encounter which had precipitated the English reprisals was orchestrated by the King of Denmark, and that the Hanse could be implicated only insofar as a handful of Baltic pirates apparently had been willing accessories. Nijmegen reminded King Edward of that town's friendship with England and affirmed that her merchants were innocent of any involvement in the recent Baltic skirmish. Likewise the town of Kampen pointed out that her citizens recognized the Bishop of Utrecht as territorial sovereign, and denied any connection with the Danish king or his attack on English shipping.²⁰

Not all protests originated so far afield. Imprisoned Hansards also occupied themselves in soliciting the support of their English business associates. The Duisburg merchant Joris Tack later recounted:

... doe hadden wy gefangen gemeynlich al den
lackenmackers int lant geschrieven to London
to kommen, omme ons bystant to doen....²¹

The clothiers of Gloucestershire responded in October 1468 with a petition to the King. The appeal not only reminded the government that the Hansards were, and ever had been friends of the Realm, but also expressed genuine alarm at the harmful repercussions caused by their arrest and detention:

...your seid besechers been and have been deferred and delaied of paiement of ther dettes owyng to theyme by the seid [Hanse] merchauntes, which drawith among theyme to the summe of £5,000 and more to ther full grete damage and likly undoyng, if it this long shold stond.²²

Moreover, with so many purchasers of English cloth confined to gaol, these textile manufacturers from Gloucester were understandably concerned for their own livelihood.

The royal councillors seem to have been little moved by such practical considerations. According to their command, goods belonging to Hansards were redistributed to Englishmen, and only the property of the merchants of Cologne was exempt. The Cologners thanked King Edward, and in a written summary of the prevailing situation at the end of the year scornfully indicted the rest of the Hanseatic confederation for causing such grave misfortune to befall the German 'Englandfahrer'.²³

Another wave of diplomatic protests followed in the new year. Appeals from several territorial princes as well as letters from the Emperor and the King of Poland already had reached London. Now came a plea from the Bishop of Utrecht and another from the Archbishop of Cologne on behalf of the merchants of Nijmegen. A letter from Flanders admonished the English government for jeopardizing the entire "reipublice communis mercature", and William Caxton, then secretary of England's Merchant Adventurers in Bruges, is also said to have voiced support for the Hansards.²⁴

Yet it was not until March 1469, following repeated requests by the Duke of Burgundy, that the English government relented. The vague charges against the Hanse were reiterated, but finally, after paying a sum of 4,000 nobles into the royal coffers, the Hansards in England were released.²⁵ The Hanse was allowed until the end of August to pay a fine substantially less than the £20,000 originally demanded, and was invited to treat with English envoys at Bruges in late May or early June so that the dispute might be resolved.²⁶

But the lengthy confinement of German merchants had hardened attitudes within the Hanseatic community during the winter of 1468-69, and England's refusal to retract charges of Hanseatic complicity in the Sound incident was an indignity that could no longer go unchallenged. The 'Hansetag', which convened at Lübeck in the spring of 1469, was well attended. Buoyed perhaps by the release of the hostages in England, it now issued a scathing twenty-six point rebuttal of the English allegations, concluding:

Quibus concessis et obtentis, si serenissimus rex Anglie subditis suis per civitates Anse Theutonice putaverit injuriatum (et) illatum injuriam aut quamcumque spoliacionem in suos commissam doceat, libenter competentis judicis sentencie obtemperabunt ac arbitrio boni viri illatam injuriam, postquam de ea legitime constabit, condigna satisfactione reparabunt.²⁷

Freed from prison, the Germans in England were recalled to their home cities, while the Hanseatic secretary in Bruges was instructed to reject the English claims and press for nullification of the Council's sentence.²⁸ Although their privileges in England were indeed restored, the Hansards now would settle for nothing less than full compensation for all damages suffered as a result of the English reprisals. Predictably the demands presented at Bruges were rejected, and subsequent political events in England soon diminished still further any possibility of negotiated settlement. By the end of July, the disaffected Warwick had made prisoner his cousin Edward IV. With royal administration in the hands of the Neville faction, prospects of compromise with the Hanse all but vanished.

The significance of this turn of events was not lost on Duke Charles of Burgundy, to whom King Edward's insecure monarchy was a source of constant concern. Cognizant of the probability that a protracted Anglo-Hanseatic dispute would destabilize the North Sea trade and jeopardize his own plans for war with France, and acutely aware of Warwick's French affiliations, the Burgundian duke had urged restraint in England's

quarrel with the Hanse. But an English administration friendly to France was of no political use to him, and the waning fortunes of his Yorkist ally now dictated a somewhat more sympathetic attitude toward the Hansards. The Germans themselves must have realized the futility of further discussions with an English government alternately too preoccupied with political intrigue to deal responsibly with disputes involving international trading partners, or controlled by a faction openly hostile to the Hanseatic community. After a year of diplomatic initiatives, moderate attitudes, which were particularly evident within the Wendish sector, gave way to more militant ones. Nothing more could be achieved through negotiation. The quarrel now would be settled on the high seas. In March 1469 English merchants who had been in Danzig returned home, and in the autumn, without the formal consent of the 'Hansetag', the Hanseatic merchants in Bruges instigated an escalation in hostilities by fitting out two privateers for action against the English. The ships were commanded by captains from Danzig, Paul Beneke and Martin Bardewik, and operated out of Flemish ports with the tacit approval of Duke Charles of Burgundy.²⁹

The privateers deployed in the North Sea throughout the ensuing four years were essentially merchant ships manned by extra levies of soldiers. As might be expected, the owners and crews often were as interested in profit as in forcing a settlement with England. There were attacks on French ships as well as English. Skirmishes occurred at close range, the object being to overpower an opposing crew rather than destroy a ship and prized cargo. The refitting of a vessel for military service primarily attempted to create additional space for soldiers and their weapons, and accommodate whatever rudimentary cannon might be available.³⁰ Because they had to be revictualled frequently and were in constant need of repair, ships of this era remained at sea only for short periods usually not exceeding two or three weeks.

The first victim of the new Hanseatic initiative was a large English ship, the 'Joan' of Newcastle, taken by Beneke and Bardewik on New Year's Day 1470. Soon after this success, Danzig dispatched yet another ship to join the hunt. It was captained by Eler Bokelman, a Danzig shipper well established in the trade between England and the Baltic. His own vessel and a valuable cargo belonging to a number of Hanseatic merchants had been seized in Hull in 1468. In late May he and Bardewik engaged a far superior English flotilla off the coast of Scotland. Though eventually defeated, they did manage to inflict considerable damage on their opponents.³¹

English shipping incurred substantial losses during the summer of 1470,³² even though Danzig and Hamburg appeared to be the only major Hanseatic cities interested in an active campaign. No official boycott of English merchandise was instituted until autumn 1470, despite Danzig's vociferous insistence as early as 1469. With this measure the Kings of Poland and Denmark readily concurred.³³ The 'Hansetag' of August-September 1470 also introduced trade sanctions aimed at isolating the merchants of Cologne, and threatened the city with expulsion from the confederation. Unswayed, the Cologners remained in England. They were formally expelled from the Hanse in February 1471.³⁴

The Cologners were victimized further by the pirates from Danzig and Hamburg, who already had begun to roam the North Sea in increasing numbers. In addition to hindering the trade of Englishmen and Cologners, attacks by these sea-raiders on other foreign ships rekindled old animosities in Holland. Eventually as many as eighteen Hanseatic ships became involved in the disruption of commerce between England and the continent, even though Duke Charles forbade his subjects to aid the Hansards soon after Beneke's initial foray.³⁵

In September 1471 the political turmoil in England had assumed a new magnitude as Warwick forced Edward IV to flee the Realm. The fugitive King and his stall following departed from Lynn, and were closely pursued by Hanseatic privateers

as they crossed the sea to the Lowlands, where they were received by William Caxton. Edward's sister and her husband the Duke of Burgundy sponsored his return to England late that same winter. Duke Charles' support was virtually assured when Warwick succeeded in concluding an alliance with France in February 1471.³⁶ This constituted a declaration of war on Burgundy, and made Edward IV's speedy restoration essential to the Burgundians. Prodded by the Duke, and apparently encouraged by a suggestion that should he safely regain his crown the King would reconfirm Hanseatic privileges in England, the Esterlings were persuaded to provide a substantial naval escort for his return to England in March 1471.³⁷

The crossing was uneventful, and Warwick's death at Barnet on April 14 and the subsequent defeat of Queen Margaret at Tewkesbury at last removed two of the most serious threats to Edward's monarchy. Upon regaining the throne, however, his indebtedness to the Hansards was forgotten at least temporarily, and only the franchises of Cologners were guaranteed for a further year.³⁸ Hence, the maritime conflict continued. Off the coasts of England, Beneke and his raiders prowled unmolested, taking two more prizes and capturing the Lord Mayor of London aboard one of them. The boycott of English wares was tightened, and in August 1471 the 'Grosse Kraweel', a mammoth French-built caravel, sailed from Danzig, accompanied by still another ship captained by the free-lance privateer Michael Ertmann.³⁹

The 'Grosse Kraweel' was actually the 'Saint Pierre de la Rochelle', which had come to the Baltic in 1462 as part of the Bay salt fleet and was abandoned in Danzig as unseaworthy. In 1470 the city authorities decided to repair and arm the vessel to join the fray against the English. When the ship finally left port a year later, commanded by Danzig councillor Bernt Pawest, it was armed with seventeen canon and carried a veritable small army of three hundred and fifty men. Unwieldy, expensive to maintain, and barely seaworthy at the best of times, the caravel had a less than illustrious history under Pawest. Lightning destroyed the mainmast, more than once the ship ran

aground, and the crew was mutinous. Despite all its impressive physical credentials the 'Grosse Kraweel' spent a great part of its military career immobilized in the Swin estuary, more a curiosity to visitors than a threat to English shipping until Beneke assumed command in summer 1472.⁴⁰

During the first two summers of the Anglo-Hanseatic War only Danzig, Hamburg and, to a lesser extent, Bremen had been inclined to underwrite expensive privateering ventures against England and the merchants of Cologne. Lübeck was reluctant to follow suit until the spring of 1472 when it was announced that four ships had been fitted out and soon would join the fight. Lübeck's captains also were empowered to stop ships from Flanders, Zealand and Holland, and confiscate cargoes belonging to, or destined for the enemy.⁴¹ By May 1472 the Lübeck contingent had joined Beneke, Ertmann, and several other Hanseatic privateers in Sluys for what promised to be a very lucrative, if not decisive campaign.⁴²

The devastation of English maritime commerce, which the addition of the Lübeck squadron might have ensured, was prevented in part by the timely stabilization of the political situation in England. With his monarchy on a more secure footing and the menace of Warwick's private navy removed, Edward IV now was able to muster a formidable force to safeguard his oversea trade. At least eighteen English fighting ships were at sea in the summer of 1472, probably under the overall command of the King's trusted councillor, Lord John Howard.⁴³ In early July, only two weeks after being severely mauled by a French squadron, the Hansards encountered Howard's flotilla and were soundly defeated. The ships from Lübeck were burnt, and Ertmann numbered among the captured Hansards.⁴⁴

With the Yorkists secure in England, Duke Charles' interest in the Anglo-Burgundian alliance also was reawakened. Hanseatic attacks on neutral shipping already had prompted him to forbid his subjects to revictual the German privateers. In 1472 pirates from Bremen stranded in Holland were rounded up and

executed by the Burgundian authorities.⁴⁵

Thus was the Hanseatic threat repelled and England's maritime trade preserved. Within the Hanse the reversals of 1472, which also included the death of Martin Bardewick off Calais, served to further accentuate diverse attitudes. In particular the defeats dampened Lübeck's enthusiasm for confrontation, which had been no more than moderate to begin with, and in July 1472 overtures for peace came forth both from the the Wendish sector of the Hanse and from English authorities in London.⁴⁶ But militants within the Hanse were not yet prepared to yield. Though the city of Danzig declined to sponsor any new privateering ventures, ships already sent to engage the English did not return to the Baltic. Hamburg continued to equip fighting ships, and in the autumn of 1472 privateers from that city took two English and Spanish ships sailing from Flanders and brought them back to the Elbe.⁴⁷ Yet to be reckoned with also was the 'Grosse Kraweel', now commanded by perhaps the most resourceful and redoubtable of Danzig's captains.

During the winter of 1472-73 the 'Grosse Kraweel' was purchased by three prominent members of Danzig's civic council, Johann Sidinghusen, Tydeman Valand, and Heinrich Niederhoff. All three were prosperous merchants, and both Valand and Niederhoff had substantial trading interests in England.⁴⁸ They duly instructed Beneke to continue his efforts against the English. The conflict at sea then resumed for a brief period, and in the spring of 1473 culminated with the most celebrated of all Hanseatic privateering exploits.

In a skirmish off the Isle of Wight in March Hamburg's raiders captured a cargo belonging to Genoese merchants,⁴⁹ and in an even more spectacular encounter a short time later, Beneke and his cohorts, who had spent the winter in Hamburg, attacked two Italian-built Burgundian galleys which had been chartered by the Medici merchant bankers in Bruges for a voyage from Zealand to Florence. The ships also were to call

at London in order to unload alum and take on a quantity of wool. The remainder of their very valuable cargoes consisted of woollens, linens, tapestries, and furs belonging to the Italians and a number of eminent English merchants in Bruges. Also aboard were two altarpieces intended for Florence, the more notable of which was Hans Memling's 'Last Judgement', commissioned by the former manager of the Bruges branch of the Medici, Angelo Tani. Heedless of Burgundian warnings not to harass the ships, Beneke captured one of the galleys and a small English escort vessel. He then took them to Hamburg where the booty was divided among the crew, captain, and the ship's owners. Memling's famous altarpiece eventually was given to the Church of St. Mary in Danzig.⁵⁰

Even other Hanseatic towns were shocked by Beneke's latest caper. Hamburg, fearing reprisals from Duke Charles, hesitated to allow the Danzigers to unload their spoils there. The English merchants immediately sought the help of their King, but neither Edward IV's letter of protest to the Duke of Burgundy nor the outrage expressed by the Italian merchant community in Bruges could accomplish anything more than the temporary arrest of Hansards in Flanders.⁵¹

Though merchants from Middelburg complained in June that Hamburg's privateers had seized their cargoes coming from England,⁵² Beneke's notorious escapade was essentially the last major engagement of the Anglo-Hanseatic War, and most certainly expedited a negotiated solution to the quarrel. The principals apparently had tired of their disruptive and costly maritime struggle.

Edward IV's consolidation of power in 1472 had permitted him to become more independent of political factions within the Realm, and indeed he had destroyed the enemies who once stood between him and an ambitious military alliance with the Burgundians. Such an agreement now took precedence over a maritime commercial dispute which, in any case, had been reduced to stalemate. Royal interests now would be better

served if vessels attempting to defend English commerce against Hanseatic corsairs could be deployed against the French. Moreover, the speedy stabilization of England's national economy was another essential preliminary to the impending struggle with France, and necessitated commercial agreements with Burgundian and Hanseatic trading partners.

Resolve within the Hanse was also in question. Even Danzig, a leading protagonist in the war, stood accused of violating the boycott of English merchandise which the city had advocated so strongly.⁵³ More generally, the high cost of maintaining privateers and the defeats sustained during the previous summer had had a sobering effect on the German cities. The Hansards too were weary of the conflict.

Already in January 1473 English envoys had been instructed to co-ordinate a cessation of hostilities with Denmark and the Hanse, and initiate serious discussions with the Burgundians. A truce with the Danes was agreed to in May, and by mid-summer negotiations with the Hanse were set to begin. A small entourage headed by the King's secretary, William Hatchlyff, first journeyed to Bruges in an initially unsuccessful attempt to conclude a new alliance with Burgundy, and then continued on to Utrecht and a meeting with the Hansards. They were confronted by a delegation numbering twenty-seven in all, and led by Lübeck burgermeister Heinrich Gastorp. The cities of Bremen, Hamburg, Danzig, Dortmund and Münster were represented, as well as the 'Kontore' in London, Bruges and Bergen.⁵⁴

Discussions commenced on July 14, and heated debate ensued as the Hansards pressed for nullification of the verdict imposed on them by the King's Council, protesting, as they had previously, that the entire German Hanse had been held accountable unjustly for crimes perpetrated by the King of Denmark. To this the English replied that the Hanse indeed was collectively responsible, and that the sentence was both legal and just. After establishing this point, however, they were at a loss to explain why Cologne had been exempt from

punitive measures. They suggested instead that the conference not dwell on the legality of the judgement, but rather concentrate on solutions to the situation at hand.⁵⁵

The initial Hanseatic request for reconfirmation of ancient privileges in England presented no great obstacle. But the Esterlings also expected restitution totaling £20,000, return of the Steelyard in London, and property for the establishment of permanent facilities at Boston and Lynn. The Hanseatic delegation was amenable to Hatchlyff's proposal that recompense take the form of exemptions from England's national customs dues, though the English ambassador insisted that he was not empowered to fix the sum. Nor could he make any commitment regarding the request for 'houses' in Lynn and Boston, claiming such serious matters required the consent of the King and Parliament. His predicament was complicated still further by a Hanseatic stipulation that Cologne be excluded from all Hanseatic privileges in England until such time as the city was readmitted to the German Hanse. The Hansards at Utrecht intimated that if this request were granted and the houses at Boston and Lynn turned over to them, the other claim for fiscal compensation would be lowered substantially.

Messengers were dispatched to England, and discussions at Utrecht were suspended during August, as English delegates awaited King Edward's instructions regarding "the 3 grete difficulties, the somme which was to excessive, the howses which wer other mennes and not the kinges, the Coloniers which had not offended".⁵⁶ Aware that Edward IV was attending to other concerns in Wales, and that a Parliament would not be summoned before October, Hatchlyff cautioned the Hansards not to expect an immediate or conclusive reply. Indeed, when the messengers returned and talks resumed during the first week of September, the Germans were advised that the King would make no decision regarding their claims until he had consulted Parliament.

Troubled by this additional delay, the increasingly

impatient Hanseatic contingent countered with a list of essential articles "from which they wold in no wise departe", namely £20,000 compensation, the properties in England, and the exclusion of Cologne.⁵⁷ The particularly strong stand taken against Cologne reflects the resentment that the city's defection had caused within those areas of the Hanse represented at Utrecht, and the danger it posed:

Thay said finally in this wise: the citees of the Hanse be confedered and have advised among hem self to have no commune with the Coloniers ne to be joyned with thaim in no rome ne place ne to dwell, wher thay shuld enjoye as grete privilegges as thay have. They knew well that and thay abode in England and thaires or like privilegges, it wer certain, that thay shuld be destroyers of the Hanse.⁵⁸

A truce between England and the Hanse extending to March 1474 was agreed to, with the stipulation that the meeting at Utrecht reconvene in January 1474, by which time Edward IV was expected to have formulated a firm reply.

The claims of the Hanse did not go unchallenged when the delegates finally did meet for a third time in February 1474. The exclusion of Cologne was resisted, but eventually the English consented to it and thereby managed to reduce the grant of customs exemptions to £10,000. With calculated reluctance, Edward IV and the English Parliament conceded to every essential Hanseatic demand. On February 28, 1474 an agreement was signed at Utrecht, signifying the end of the war between England and the German Hanse.⁵⁹

REFERENCES

CHAPTER II

1

P.M. Kendall, op. cit., pp. 223-25; C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. p. 388; K.A. Fowler, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

2

C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. p. 388; C. Ross, Edward IV. (Los Angeles, 1974) p. 365; HUB. IX no. 478; Wenlock was a councillor in Warwick's circle. J.R. Lander, "Council, Administration and Councillors 1461 to 1485", Bulletin of Historical Research, XXXII (1959) p. 160.

3

C. Ross, op. cit., pp. 353-55; Acts of the Court of the Mercers' Company 1453-1527. intro. L. Lyell (Cambridge, 1936) pp. 63-138.

4

S.L. Thrupp, The Merchant Class of Medieval London 1300-1500. (Chicago, 1948) p. 84.

5

Ibid., pp. 56-59, 83-84; M.S. Giuseppi, "Alien Merchants in England in the Fifteenth Century", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, new series IX (1895) pp. 75-98.

6

C. Ross, op. cit., pp. 356-65; J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., pp. 127-29; Rot. Parl. V pp. 501-03, 508-09; CLE. (L) Edward IV - Henry VII p. 18; CPR. 1461-1467 pp. 109, 261, 276-77. For King Edward's involvement in overseas trade see E. Power, "The English Wool Trade in the reign of Edward IV", Cambridge Historical Journal, II (1926) p. 23.

7

HUB. IX no. 480, 482, 490, 524 #4, 5, 7; HR. (2) VI no. 119. Many Hansards apparently sought sanctuary in churches.

8

R. Davis, "The Rise of Antwerp and its English Connection 1406-1510", Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England. ed. D.C. Colman and A.H. John (London, 1976) pp. 6-10; H. Buszello, "Köln und England 1463-1509", Mitteilungen aus der Stadtarchiv Köln, LX (1971) pp. 431-34; H. Ammann, "Deutschland und die Tuchindustrie Nordwesteuropas im Mittelalter", HGbl., LXXII (1954) 49-55; Quellen GKH. I no. 950, 992. Also see B. Kuske, "Die Kölner Handelsbeziehungen im 15. Jahrhundert", Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, VII (1909) pp. 226-308.

- 9
Rot. Parl. V pp. 64-65.
- 10
HUB. IX no. 482; H. Buszello, "Köln und England 1468-1509", op. cit., p. 437.
- 11
HUB. IX no. 467 #5, 482 #5.
- 12
Ibid., no. 471, 501-07, 511, 527-28, 530, 549; HR. (2) VI no. 119-24, VII no. 34.
- 13
F.R. Salter, "The Hanse, Cologne and the Crisis of 1468", EcHR., III (1931) pp. 93-101.
- 14
J. Müller, "Handel und Verkehr Bremens im Mittelalter", Bremisches Jahrbuch, XXX (1927) pp. 48-49; HR. (2) V no. 319.
- 15
The ordinances and staple regulations of these Hanseatic cities are reviewed in W. Stein, Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Hanse. (Giessen, 1900) pp. 41-43, 123-41. For Riga see G. Hollihn, op. cit., particularly pp. 113-36, 165-76.
- 16
J. Ferguson, op. cit., pp. 84, 107.
- 17
HUB. IX no. 491, 519; HR. (2) VI no. 100, 114-15, 164.
- 18
E.M. Carus-Wilson, Medieval Merchant Venturers. 2nd ed. (London, 1967) pp. 142-45.
- 19
Foedera XI pp. 415-16.
- 20
HUB. IX no. 495, 501-06, 509.
- 21
Ibid., no. 541 #VI-4.
- 22
Ibid., no. 525.
- 23
Ibid., no. 537, 555. HR. (2) no. 119, 121, 124, 163.
- 24
HUB. IX no. 542-45, 549, 554. For Caxton see HUB. IX

p. 431, footnote #1.

25

HR. (2) VI no. 165.

26

HUB. IX no. 569-70, 577.

27

Ibid., no. 584.

28

Ibid., no. 585, 588.

29

"Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 731; P. Simson, Geschichte der Stadt Danzig bis 1626. vol. 1 (Aalen, 1967) p. 288; CPR. 1467-1477 pp. 101, 168-69.

30

O. Lienau, "Danziger Schifffahrt und Schiffbau in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts", Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, LXX (1930) p. 74. But already since 1447 all Hanseatic ships were required to be armed in order to ward off pirates. Large vessels carried weapons for twenty men. E. Daenell, "The Policy of the German Hanseatic League respecting the Mercantile Marine", American Historical Review, XV (1909-10) p. 49; P. Simson, op. cit., p. 289.

31

"Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., pp. 731-32; HR. (2) VI no. 314.

32

C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. p. 348; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 733; "Die Chronik Christians von Geren", Die Lübecker Bergenfahrer und ihre Chronistik. ed F. Bruns (Berlin, 1900) p. 360.

33

HR. (2) VI no. 161, 202, 249 #12, 284, 356 #61-73, 360-61, 418-20. For the campaign of 1470 see also H. Fiedler, "Danzig und England: Die Handelsbestrebungen der Engländer vom Ende des 14. bis zum Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts", Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, LXVIII (1928) p. 95.

34

HR. (2) VI no. 356 #61-73, 106, 114, 115, 358.

35

Ibid., (2) VI no. 316, 347, 352, p. 26, footnote 4; Quellen GKH. I no. 513; HUB. IX no. 796.

36

A.R. Myers, "The Outbreak of War between England and Burgundy", Bulletin of Historical Research, XXXIII (1960) 114-15.

37

"Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 733.
"Die Chronik Christians von Geren", op. cit., p. 359.

38

CPR. 1467-1477 p. 272; J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., p. 134.

39

"Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 733.

40

O. Lienau, op. cit., pp. 72-80; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., pp. 731, 733. HR. (2) no. 529-59 consists of a series of letters written by Bernt Pawest when he commanded the 'Grosse Kraweel'. They provide considerable insight into the difficulties he and the other Hanseatic privateers encountered during 1471-72. See also H. Fiedler, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

41

HR. (2) VI no. 507, 524; HUB. X no. 109. Cologne again complained of attacks on channel shipping by Hamburg's privateers in January 1472. Quellen GKH. I no. 560, 568.

42

HR. (2) VI no. 525, 526, 548; "Die Chronik Christians von Geren", op. cit., p. 360.

43

C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. pp. 349-50; CPR. 1467-1477 pp. 299, 318, 340, 355. Warwick's own 'navy' had consisted of some ten ships. John Howard too, owned at least six. G.V. Scammell, "Shipowning in England 1450 - 1550", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series XII (1962) pp. 119-21.

44

HR. (2) VI no. 557-58; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., pp. 734-35; "Die Chronik Christians von Geren", op. cit., p. 360.

45

HR. (2) VI p. 473, footnote 1; HUB. X no. 100, 107, 119, 138, 173; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 734.

46

HR. (2) VI no. 547, 548, 550.

47

HUB. X no. 166; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 735.

48

HR. (2) VI no. 642-43; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 736; HUB. IX no. 39, 541.

49

HUB. X no. 192.

50

HR. (3) III no. 176, 183; "Casper Weinreichs Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p. 736; F.L. de Roover, "A Prize of War: A Painting of fifteenth century Merchants", Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, XIX (1945) pp. 3-12; P. Simson, op. cit., pp. 291-94.

51

Acts of the Court of the Mercers' Company 1453-1527. intr. L. Lyell (Cambridge, 1936) pp. 68-76 outlines English efforts to gain restitution. For the Italian reaction see F.L. de Roover, op. cit., pp. 3-12; and Hamburg's reluctance, W. Stark, op. cit., p. 201.

52

HUB. X no. 218; CPR. 1467-1477 p. 282.

53

Ibid., no. 122; HR. (2) VI no. 170 #5, 470 #5.

54

For the peace initiatives see H. Buszello, "Die auswärtige Handelspolitik", op. cit.; K.A. Fowler, op. cit.; and G. Neumann, "Hansische Politik und Politiker bei den Utrechter Friedensverhandlungen", Frühformen englisch-deutscher Handelspartnerschaft. ed K. Friedland (Köln/Wien, 1976) pp. 25-29.

55

The report of the English ambassadors is contained in HUB. X no. 241.

56

HUB. X no. 241 #67.

57

HUB. X no. 241 #86; HR. (2) VII no. 44.

58

HUB. X no. 241 #86.

59


HR. (2) VII no. 142.

100 1000

The Hanse in Northern Europe ca 1450

- Major Hanseatic Towns
- Towns frequented by Hansards
- Hanseatic Kontore
- Limits of the Empire and the Teutonic Possessions

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 km
Scale 1:6000000



III COMMODITIES, MERCHANTS AND THE ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ANGLO-HANSEATIC WAR

Hanseatic liberties and privileges were reconfirmed by the King and Parliament within a short time of the agreement at Utrecht, and Hansards were not long in resuming their trade with the English. Before the year was out, a ship from Danzig carrying lumber, chests, cables, and pitch was reported wrecked by storm off the Essex coast.¹

Cologners were allowed until the end of October 1474 to vacate the London Steelyard.² The King then purchased the property from the City of London and conveyed it to the merchants of the Hanse in perpetuity at an annual rent of £70. The English Parliament endorsed the arrangement in March 1475:

It is ordeigned by oure said sovereigne lord by thadvise and assent of his lordes spirituelt and temporelt and the commens in this present parlement assembled and by thauctorite of the same, that...the said Duche Hanze, otherwise called merchauntes of Almayne, havynge an hous in the cite of London, comunly called Gildhalla Teutonicorum, that nowe be or hereafter shal be, shall have, hold, enjoie and possede to theym and their successours for ever more the said place called the Stilehof, otherwise called the Stileyard....³

The Hansards also received their quay, garden, and houses at Lynn in April 1475, and soon thereafter an agreement was concluded giving them facilities at Boston.⁴

The working environment in which individuals or groups of Hansards conducted business likely did not vary significantly from one east coast port to another. Although no physical evidence of the great London kontor has survived, the recently restored buildings of the Lynn Steelyard do afford some insight into the character of day to day life for Hansards in that port. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the facility is, in most respects, a scaled-down version of the London depot, and it seems quite probable that its essential character-

istics are not markedly different from the surroundings that Esterlings created for themselves in other ports such as Boston, Hull, and Ipswich.⁵

Before the terms of the Peace of Utrecht granted them use of the Steelyard site, Hanseatic merchants based themselves in other sections of Lynn, renting various gardens, cellars, houses and storage facilities along the waterfront. The present Steelyard property, situated between St. Margaret's Churchyard and the river Ouse, did not develop into the focal point of Hanseatic trade until spring 1475.⁶ Two years after the signing of the peace treaty a memo from the London kontor authorizing repair of buildings in Boston and Lynn described the latter as a very old structure comprising seven 'houses' and ten rooms with eight chimneys. A kitchen, hall, and courtyard are listed as being among its other distinguishing attributes.⁷ Although some buildings have been altered considerably since their initial construction, much of the original Steelyard has survived. It occupies a long rectangular site adjoining the south quay on the right bank of the river Ouse. Built round a quadrangle with about twenty-two metres of frontage on the river, the structure extends a length of sixty-one metres to its eastern end where the dwelling units were located. The three-story north wing is constructed of brick, and while much of it was rebuilt in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, some sections are much older. The long south side of the quadrangle consists of two-story warehouses constructed of brick and timber. Constant dampness and frequent flooding in years past have ensured that little remains of the original timber work. The west quarter adjacent to the quay also is entirely of brick. It contains a small hall with a collar-beam roof, and most likely served as a dining area.⁸

The Steelyard was but one of several commercial - domestic 'houses' in the port of Lynn. Together with neighbouring mercantile establishments, such as Hampton Court and Clifton House, it is representative of the general character and

physical continuity of the waterfront district at the close of the Middle Ages. Here the Hansards lived and worked. Within the confines of the Steelyard they took their meals, socialized, slept, stored merchandise and transacted business. At the wharves along the river ships unloaded the forest products of the Baltic region, stockfish and herring from the North Sea, and the manufactured wares of Flanders, Holland, and the German Empire. They set sail for continental Europe laden with English cloth and wool for the Calais staple. The very nature of the Hanseatic trade in England would take the Esterlings to other ports, trade fairs and industrial centres throughout the Realm, but in major harbour towns, where significant numbers of Hansards congregated, their business activities often centred around places like the Steelyard at Lynn. It was counting house, dwelling unit, warehouse and distribution centre, and focal point for their trade to England.

To facilitate diversified and voluminous trade over long distances, Hansards, like other entrepreneurs of the period, frequently entered into business partnerships. Common among such partnerships, in ports like Lübeck and Danzig, were those consisting of kinsmen jointly involved in mercantile enterprise. Aside from these 'Familiengesellschaften', however, merchants also formed temporary contractual relationships with other colleagues, ships' captains or, as was common in the timber and grain producing regions of the Prusso-Polish hinterland, with members of the landed gentry. Yet these trading associations seldom specialized in specific wares, concentrating instead on particular trade routes or markets. Danzigers, for example, periodically combined their resources for ventures in England, Scotland, and Scandinavia, while the wider dispersion of Lübeck's trade fostered the creation of an even greater number of associations in that city. Partnerships notwithstanding, prosperous Hansards also employed agents, often fellow merchants, as business representatives or 'Vollmachten' in distant cities or foreign lands.⁹

An indication of the diversity of the Hanseatic export trade is provided in the Libelle of Englyshe Polycye, a fifteenth century treatise on English trade and sea power, which includes a review of the commodities brought to England by the Hansards:

Now bere and bacone bene fro Pruse ibroughte
 Into Flaunders, as loved and fere isoughte,
 Osmonde, coppre, bowstaffes, stile and wex,
 Peltreware and grey, pych, terre, borde and flex,
 And Coleyne threde, fustaine and canvase,
 Carde, bokeram; of olde tyme thus it was....¹⁰

Grain from the eastern regions also helped sustain a growing European population. Particularly after the Thirteen Years War the export of grain from the Baltic began to accelerate, and Danzig, since it was the principal harbour for the Prusso-Polish interior, became the major distribution point.¹¹ From the fertile districts of western Masovia, Dobrzynerland, Curland, and greater Poland, cereals were transported to Danzig, whence they were carried to Scandinavia, the Lowlands, and less frequently, to England, either through the Sound or via Lübeck. Chief among grain exports were wheat, rye, and barley, shipped by the 'Last', a unit of measurement equalling about 2,250 kilograms.¹²

Of greater importance to the Anglo-Hanseatic trade were the bulky forest products exported by Danzig, Elbing, and neighbouring centres in the Baltic. English bowmen needed bowstaves, and wood and other materials for ship construction were constantly required in maritime England, Zealand, and Holland. From north east Masovia and Podlasia, wood was floated to the Baltic coast via inland waterways like the Vistula. Some also came from Lithuania, where Kovno was an important distribution centre. Danzig's own shipyards took a substantial portion of the lumber, but greater quantities were shipped westward.¹³

Wood was graded according to type and quality. Especially important for the ship-building industry was 'Vagenschoss', large oaken beams three to five metres long, or heavy broad

boards of the same material and length. Remainders from 'Wagenschoss', as well as poorer quality oak and some beechwood, were cut into boards about one and a half metres long and twelve to twenty-two centimetres wide. Referred to as 'Klappholz', it was used in carpentry and house construction. Other types included 'Dielenholz' (floorboards), 'Riemenholz' (for ship construction), and 'Mastholz' (ships' masts). England too was the leading purchaser of bowstaves made of yew imported from the Carpathian forests.¹⁴

Byproducts of the lumber industry also were important to the Hanseatic export trade. These included pitch and tar for ship construction, and ashes used in cloth dyeing and the manufacture of soap.¹⁵ Merchants from Thorn were key middlemen in the pitch and tar trade along the Vistula, while ashes came from Masovia down the Vistula or from Lithuania over Kovno. All three commodities were shipped by the 'Last' from Danzig.¹⁶

Another product exported by Danzig was wax. The major sources were in Lithuania, and again Kovno was one of the principal outlets: Wax was shipped by the 'Stro', a large block weighing two hundred to two hundred and forty kilograms, but retailed in much smaller units such as the 'Schiebe' or 'Stein' weighing about fifteen kilograms.¹⁷

'Faserstoffe', which included flax, hemp, and yarn, augmented other exports from the eastern Baltic. Flax was shipped in 'Fässer', 'Packen' or, as was usual in Danzig, by the 'Last', containing one hundred and twenty bundles, each weighing one half 'Stein'. Hence, one 'Last' flax exported from Danzig weighed approximately eight hundred and eighty-eight kilograms. 'Packen' weighed close to one thousand, while 'Fässer' were equal to three quarters of a 'Last'. Again the English were primary customers, often sending purchases through Hanseatic agents who benefited from lower customs charges in England.¹⁸

Finally, both Danzig and Lübeck were major redistribution points for high quality Swedish bog iron exported in small bars

and referred to as osmund. Lübeck supplied the western Baltic, and Danzig shipped through the Sound to markets in England and the Lowlands. Also, quantities of Hungarian iron and copper came to the Baltic via Crakow and Thorn, and were re-exported to the west.¹⁹

Other significant products imported into England from the Baltic centres included furs, honey, canvas, yarn, cable and cordage, anchors, and various other naval supplies. Lübeckers shared in this trade and also brought fish from Norway and Iceland. Hamburg exported fish as well as beer. Westphalia and the Lowlands contributed finished cloth and an assortment of manufactured wares, while the merchants of Cologne sold wine, linen, thread, stoneware, metal products, and luxury goods from the Rhineland and southern Europe.

By 1450, the Hanseatic cities likely employed about one thousand of their own sea-going vessels with a combined displacement of perhaps forty to fifty thousand tons. Probably half of these ships were engaged in the east-west trade from the Baltic to the Atlantic coast, with Lübeck and Danzig each maintaining about one hundred vessels.²⁰ Among them were various small craft used for coastal traffic, such as the crayer or barse. Larger ships, the Hanseatic kog or hulk, were the main carriers in the long distance trade. It is difficult to distinguish precisely one type from the other, though prior to 1450 kogs were single masted vessels and generally smaller than the ships of the second half of the century, which were clinker-built, and featured forecastles, poop decks, and stern rudders. Three masts eventually became more common, and a typical hulk of the later fifteenth century would have a displacement of about one hundred tons. It would have a kiel length of about seventeen metres, a beam of almost six, and an overall length of about twenty-five. The high risk of shipwreck, due to winter storms, prompted the Hanse to forbid ships to go to sea between November 11 and February 2. When they did leave port they were crewed by Hansards and frequently sailed in convoys.²¹

For the principal imports into the Baltic region in the fifteenth century Danzig's trade again provides a gauge. Using the extant 'Pfundzollbücher' from Danzig for 1460, 1470, and 1475, S. Samsonowicz has computed the total worth of all major commodities imported. Salt accounted for one third to one half of the total in any of these years, and large quantities of herring also were imported by sea. Another 'Zollbuch' shows that for the year 1465 grain and forest products, great portions of which must have been destined for western markets, constituted about 73 % of all imports coming in via Thorn and the Vistula.²²

The English, of course, played no part in Danzig's salt or herring trade. The main source for salt was the Bay of Bourgneuf, and the herring fisheries which supplied the Baltic region still were controlled by Hollanders or the Hansards themselves. Nor was the Hanse a factor in England's substantial wool export trade. It was controlled almost exclusively by English merchants of the Calais staple.²³ However, England's expanding woolen industry certainly contributed appreciably to the supply of another important commodity. In 1460, as the Thirteen Years War restricted Baltic traffic and civil war disrupted the English export trade, cloth represented only 11 % of the total value of Danzig's imports. In 1475, after normal relations with England and Holland were restored, the figure tripled to almost 36 %.²⁴ The long-established Flemish manufacturing industries continued to furnish much of it, but Holland and England also exported large amounts. Some English cloth was shipped directly to Danzig, though greater quantities were sold in the Lowlands, reaching the Baltic via Lübeck.²⁵

England manufactured and exported several varieties of woolen cloth, ranging from heavy worsteds to light 'kerseys' from Yorkshire, Gloucestershire, Norfolk, and Kent. The English standard of measurement was the 'cloth of assize' or 'broadcloth', a double-width cloth twenty-four yards long and one and a half to two yards wide. Many shorter and narrower single-width cloths also were exported, but were converted to cloth of assize equivalents for customs calculations.²⁶



< King's Lynn: The
Hanseatic Steelyard.
The south wall with
'jettied' upper
story. 15th century.

Lübeck: Hanseatic
warehouses on the
river Trave.
15th-17th century.

v

J.D.F. 1982



J.D.F. 1978

Most precious of the many types were the 'in grain' cloths coloured with expensive scarlet dye imported from the Mediterranean. Commonly called 'scarlets', these cloths were subject to the highest customs charges in England. Next in value were the 'half grain' or 'part grain' varieties dyed only partially with grain, and often violet in colour. The majority of England's cloth manufactures, however, were those 'without grain'. They were dyed instead with madder or basil and were available in reds, blues, greens, and white. Of these less expensive cloths 'kerseys' and 'Essex straights', manufactured in East Anglia were, together with raw wool, the mainstay of eastern England's export trade. Kerseys, generally red, black, or white in colour, were only eighteen yards long, and rated by English customs officials at three kerseys to one broadcloth.²⁷

The thriving industrial city of Coventry was one of the leading producers of woollen textiles, specializing in 'Coventry blues' which were woven, dyed and finished in that city. Though the Coventry cloth merchants also traded to London in order to obtain imported luxury items, Boston was another main port for trade to the Baltic.²⁸ Cloths were identified and priced according to their quality and where they were manufactured. At Danzig, woolens from London, Lynn, Colchester and Beverley were distinguished from common English and kersey cloths.²⁹ England's cheaper cloths were exported primarily by Hansards and denizens, English subjects or foreign-born merchants privileged to pay customs at native rates. Their average value has been calculated at about £2 per cloth. More expensive types generally were bought by non-Hanseatic aliens, of whom the most important to England's trade were the Italians.³⁰

A review of these cloth exports is indispensable for any evaluation of the impact of the Anglo-Hanseatic War on English and Hanseatic commerce. The extant Exchequer customs enrollments, which indicate both the volume and distribution of England's foreign trade have been used by H.L. Gray in his study of the English export trade between 1446 and 1492. Complete tables of the accounts from the late thirteenth century to the middle

of the sixteenth century also are published. Differential customs rates distinguish Hanseatic shipments from those of denizens and alien merchants.³¹

The export figures show that the English cloth trade already was depressed well before the quarrel with the Hanse erupted into open conflict. Renewed fighting in France from 1448 to 1453 and civil war in England a decade later contributed to the decline, reducing the yearly volume of woolen exports to about 75 % of the pre-1448 level. Over this period Hanseatic merchants annually exported an average of 10,000 cloths from England.³² For the period under review a number of trends are discernible in various English cities whence cloth was exported. In one of England's busiest ports, Southampton, strong commercial links were maintained with Spain and Italy, and Hansards were of little consequence in the cloth trade. They did ship small quantities from there, as well as from Sandwich and Yarmouth, in the early 1460's, but aside from these rare instances, the Hanseatic cloth trade was concentrated entirely in London, Lynn, Boston, Hull and Ipswich.³³

During the six year span immediately prior to the tumultuous summer of 1468 exports from the port of Lynn fluctuated radically, but averaged 427 cloths. Likewise the Hanse's share in this trade varied, climbing from 11.3 % of all cloth exports in 1464-65 to 80 % the following year. On the average, Hansards annually exported about 155 cloths, thus accounting for approximately 36.6 % of the trade in any given year. The remainder was in the hands of denizen traders. Other alien merchants played no significant role.

In the fiscal year 1467-68 Lynn's exports peaked at 963 cloths, but Hansards in England were arrested and their share in this admittedly marginal trade was reduced to a mere 5.4 %. The next year saw the cloth trade totally devastated by the conflict with the Hanse. With the Esterlings expelled from England and the North Sea trade routes more unsafe than ever,

Lynn's cloth exports dwindled to an annual average of only 49 cloths between 1468 and 1474. The trade was revitalized, however, by the customs exemptions granted to the Hanse at Utrecht. Hansards flocked back to Lynn during the next two years and shipped 578 cloths representing 78.5 % of the total volume.

The pre-1468 volume of trade was re-established, and in the following six years annual exports averaged 445 cloths before a pronounced, but again temporary, slump in the trade commenced in 1482. Resuming their former presence in Lynn, the Hansards were remarkably consistent in their yearly exportation of cloth during this post-war period. The annual average reached 158 cloths, closely approximating the pre-war volume, and the Hanse's share in the total trade for any one year again averaged 35.5 %.

Though severely injured by the Anglo-Hanseatic War, Lynn's cloth export trade indeed survived, and recovery was rapid following the return of the Esterlings. The yearly volume and the Hanseatic share in it were reattained within half a decade, and only after 1482 did Lynn's export trade begin to falter appreciably.

A much different scenario unfolded in the neighbouring port of Boston, where cloth exports during the pre-war era also varied considerably from year to year. Hansards shipped 82.5 % of 771 cloths exported from Boston in 1461-62. When total exports dropped drastically to only 189 cloths in the following year, Hansards were absent from the trade. They returned to export 59 % of the port's total output over the next two years. From 1461 to 1467 figures for cloth exports from Boston are not dissimilar to those of Lynn, averaging 481 yearly. But at Boston the Hansards were more prominent in the trade, and exported usually about 300 cloths per year, or approximately 62.5 % of the total, though in the two years preceding their arrest in England the Hanseatic portion had been reduced to well under 20 %.

Worthy of note too is the involvement of other alien merchants in Boston's cloth trade. In most years they were responsible for less than 1 % of the exports, but when the Hanseatic share dropped from 88.6 % in 1464-65 to only 15.2 % the following year, that of alien traders rose sharply to 33 %. As in Lynn, 1467-68 brought the Hanseatic share in Boston's cloth trade to its low ebb at 8.8 %, while overall cloth exports reached a six year high of 633.

The parallel with Lynn ends with the outbreak of the Anglo-Hanseatic War. Throughout the period 1468-74, when Lynn's trade was reduced to a trickle, Boston's cloth exports actually increased slightly to an average of about 500 yearly. Initially the denizen merchants gained the Hanseatic share of the trade, but from 1470 to 1472 aliens shipped about 10 %. In the next year they controlled nearly one quarter of the exports, and by 1474-75 shipments by aliens accounted for almost 46 % of Boston's cloth trade. However, the return of the Hansards caused the alien share to plummet to less than 2 % in 1475-76, and it remained negligible for years to come.

In the decade beginning 1474-75, cloth exports from Boston averaged only 318 cloths, substantially less than in the pre-war era. A total of only 90 cloths were shipped from Boston in 1476-77, and the Hansards were not involved. Yet a year later they shipped 548 of 662 cloths. Throughout this initial post-war period Hanseatic exports now averaged 224 cloths per year. While the volume of the port's cloth exports had been reduced to about three fifths of that attained during the war and pre-war period, the Hanse's average yearly exports had diminished by only about 25 %. Consequently the Hansards inherited a greater percentage of the trade, exporting ca. 70 % of all the cloth coming out of Boston from 1475 until the port's cloth export trade began to decline irreversibly in the mid-1480's. But Boston was second only to London in wool exports, and was the main outlet for the sheep farming areas of Lincoln-

shire, Leicester, Derby and Nottingham. English merchants, who virtually abandoned Boston's cloth trade to the Hansards, clung instead to the port's sporadic but as yet not entirely depressed wool trade.

Before the exclusion of Hansards in 1460, the cloth export trade at Hull had declined steadily from 2,156 cloths in 1461-62 to just 375 in 1466-67, and the Hanseatic share fluctuated from 4.7 % to 50.6 %. As in the other east coast ports, total exports from Hull recovered temporarily in 1468 to 1,663 cloths, while the Hanse accounted for but 11.4 %. The alien share in the trade seldom exceeded 5 % of the total. Hence, Hull's cloth trade remained largely controlled by denizen merchants.

Cloth exports stabilized somewhat during the war years, averaging 693 cloths annually. Though this figure does not approach the yearly average of 1,323 achieved from 1461 to 1464, it exceeds that of 1464-67. Exports by aliens became entirely insignificant, and henceforth they ceased to be a factor in Hull's cloth export trade.

The peace with the Hansards and their subsequent return to England appear to have benefited Hull enormously. In 1474-75 the port sent 1,250 cloths to foreign markets, and the Esterlings shipped 35.5 % of that total. During the next seven years Hull exported an average of 2,822 cloths annually. The Hanse accounted for around one fifth of the trade during this period, and in each year from 1473-80 to 1483-84 distributed roughly one quarter of Hull's cloth, even though the port's total exports began to taper off again in the early 1480's.

Hull's cloth exports over a span of two decades indicate that the Hansards became much more firmly established in this trade after the war than they had been immediately prior to it. The trade itself, which had slumped badly before the war, was revived after 1474-75, and Hansards, mindful of the advantageous customs privileges they had wrested from the English king, controlled one quarter of Hull's revitalized cloth trade within a half decade of the war's end.

Perhaps worst affected by the Anglo-Hanseatic War and its aftermath was the port of Ipswich in Essex, where the Hanse would ship an average of 1,533 cloths or about 85 % of the total exports in any given year between 1461 and 1467. This volume was halved to 852 cloths in 1467-68, while the port's total output stood at 1,377.

The war years brought about a depression of trade to rival that experienced in Lynn. The yearly average for total cloth exports up to 1474-75 was only 426, and the free Cologners in Ipswich managed to ship less than half this amount in the entire six year period. Nor was the slump in the port's cloth trade remedied with the return of the Hanseatic merchants, as it apparently was in Lynn. In 1474-75 a group of seven Hansards did export 349 cloths from Ipswich,³⁴ and in the next year, as the total output rose again to 1,341 cloths, merchants of the Hanse accounted for 63.6 %. But this apparent recovery was short-lived, and after 1475-76 there was a sharp decline in the cloth trade at Ipswich. The annual average slipped to 645 cloths between 1475-76 and 1481-82, a decrease of 64 % from that of the pre-war period. The Hanse now accounted for only 23.8 % of the port's cloth trade, and the volume of Hanseatic exports was a mere 10 % of what it had been before the war. Even though it was severely reduced, the number of cloths exported from Ipswich still exceeded that of Boston and Lynn. However, the cloth trade at Ipswich, and the Hanseatic share in it, always had been much larger than in any other east coast city between Hull and the river Thames, and so its demise is all the more significant.

London's cloth exports far surpassed those of the other ports, and increased dramatically in 1467-68. The 25,921 cloths shipped that year exceeded by a large margin the annual average of 16,523 during the previous six years. Prior to the 'verdict' in 1468 Hansards in London, among whom the merchants of Cologne were the most conspicuous dealers in woolens, normally would export an average of 6,005 cloths per year, and thus account for about 33.3 % of the trade.

In 1468-69, when merchants of the Hanse were imprisoned and the status of Cologners both within the Hanse and in England was the subject of controversy, Hanseatic shipments of cloth from London constituted only 2.5 % of the city's total. Yet throughout the ensuing six year period, which included a Hanseatic boycott of English goods, Cologne's expulsion from the Hanse, persistent attempts to disrupt maritime commerce, and prolonged negotiations at Utrecht, the merchants of Cologne, who were the only Hansards free in England, consistently managed to export an average of 3,211 cloths each year from London. This represented about half the annual average for the pre-war period. Moreover, total cloth shipments from the capital increased twofold in 1472-73, beginning a surge which would see annual exports reach 40,000 cloths or more within half a decade.

In 1475-76 Hanseatic traders appear to have re-established their business at Boston, Lynn, and Hull much more promptly than they were able to do in the English capital. Cologners were obliged to vacate the London Steelyard depot, and Hansards sent only 80 cloths oversea from London that year. But total annual cloth exports from London during the first six years after 1475-76 averaged more than double what they had been in a similar six year span prior to 1468-69. The average annual volume for the Hanse did not quite keep pace. Nevertheless, it now stood at 10,424 cloths, a 73.6 % increase over the pre-war figure of 6,005. It rose to double the pre-war volume not until the mid-1480's when exportation of woolens from Boston and Lynn declined correspondingly.

Hence, the fight with the Hanse did not have an identical or all pervasive effect in each of the ports where Hansards traded. Prior to the war Ipswich was the only port in south eastern England, aside from London, with a cloth export trade of any national significance, shipping an average of 1,800 cloths yearly. However, when the Anglo-Hanseatic War virtually shut the Hansards out of the town, English producers and middlemen continued the trend of distributing more and more cloth

from nearby London. Likewise, when the Germans were readmitted into England, their participation in the crippled woolen trade out of Ipswich never again approached its pre-war level. Enticed by new customs privileges awarded to them in 1474, they did make a brief appearance immediately after the war. But before the decade was over, large numbers of them either had diverted their cloth exports to London or were shipping out of Boston or Lynn. In Lynn they revived exports to their former levels, while in Boston they sustained the city's meagre cloth trade for another decade before London again drained off a significant share.

Neither the Anglo-Hanseatic War nor the increased concentration of the cloth trade in London chased the Hansards permanently from England's east coast. Indeed, they were not nearly so hasty as their English counterparts in forsaking the export trade of ports such as Boston and Lynn. They had, after all, demanded and received property in each of these cities, whose attraction lay not in a thriving cloth trade. Both cities were well within London's sphere, so far as the distribution of cloth to foreign markets was concerned, but were distant enough from the capital to necessitate their maintenance as distribution centres for bulky raw products provided by the Hanse. This is exemplified further by the Hanseatic presence in the north east of England, specifically in Hull and Newcastle. At least two Hanseatic ships with cargoes of considerable worth were seized in each of these ports in 1468. Yet, except for 1462-63 and 1465-66, the Hanse's share in Hull's cloth trade never exceeded 14% of the total in any given year, and Newcastle's trade in woolens was wholly insignificant.

Therefore a true assessment of the character and importance of the Hanse's trade to England cannot be based entirely on fluctuations in English cloth exports, which imply that London's expanding trade encroached on the mercantile prosperity of the eastern and northern ports. Cloth exports were but one facet of a larger and more intricate system of trade. Oversea commerce was not so vital to England's east coast ports as the flourishing

and expanding coastal traffic. Newcastle, for example, sent coal, salt and salmon southward to London and the East Anglian ports whence it might be reshipped. The ports of Yarmouth and Lynn sent grain and herring to the north-east. In a study of east coast shipping, G.V. Scammell concludes that the coal trade in particular "was of immense importance in compensating for the decline in provincial overseas commerce, and in stimulating the growth of shipping".³⁵ Moreover, the increased foreign trade of London created a demand for extra tonnage, and thus provided employment for coastal vessels. The herring fisheries off Yorkshire, South Lincolnshire, and Norfolk continued to prosper also.³⁶

The Hanseatic role in England becomes clearer then if the distinction is drawn between the local economies of the other coastal cities and that of London, which now commanded the greater share of England's trade to foreign markets. As English merchants concentrated more and more of their cloth trade in the capital, Hansards would follow in order to purchase and export the textiles. But their business of importing products into other parts of England was not nearly so strongly affected by this trend. In East Anglia and ports to the north, like Hull and Newcastle, the exportation of English woollens by Hanseatic merchants was incidental to their importation of commodities from the Baltic. The Esterlings came to these areas not primarily as buyers of cloth, but rather as the sellers of the timber, iron, and naval supplies essential to eastern England's fishing and ship-building industries and the coastal trade.

The Hanse's presence in eastern England and the effects of the war on the foreign trade of these major coastal cities is illustrated by the value of merchandise paying the 'petty custom' of 3d. on the pound. This 'ad valorem' tax did not distinguish between imports and exports, but aside from cloth and wool which were subject to different rates, England exported little else save small quantities of tin, lead, hides, and corn.

The rate did apply to all of the principal Hanseatic imports except wax and wine.³⁷

From 1461-62 to 1466-67 the value of alien merchandise paying the petty custom in the city of Lynn averaged £698 yearly. For the subsequent seven year period, when the Hanseatic trade was eliminated from the town, the average was £389, a drop of 54.5 %. It rebounded to about £876 annually between 1474-75 and 1481-82.

In Boston, dependence on the Esterlings was even more evident. Aliens acquired the Hanse's share of the cloth trade during the war, yet were unable to import the commodities essential to Boston's trade in miscellaneous merchandise, the annual value of which averaged £952 in the six years prior to 1467-68. This declined by a full 75 % during the war years to an average of £275 per year, and recovered to only £714 for the post-war period. From these fluctuations, it is apparent that the Hansards were indispensable to Boston's trade. The rather sudden and unusual appearance of aliens dealing in cloth during the war, and the regularity with which Hansards seem to have violated their own boycott of English wares, also points to the possibility that the Esterlings continued to ship textiles from Boston through non-German agents. Already Hollanders were important carriers for the channel trade to the Lowlands. During and after the war, they did bring Baltic goods to Antwerp where they could be purchased by English merchants. From March to December 1469, seventeen of thirty-four ships calling at Boston were from Holland or Zealand. Twenty ships came to Boston between June 1471 and May 1472, and of these, seventeen again came from Holland or Zealand.³⁸ In the absence of direct trade to the Baltic, the importance of the Lowland ports and their shippers, particularly for the distribution of English cloth to continental markets, was enhanced. Yet after 1474-75, the aliens in Boston's cloth trade vanished almost as suddenly as they had appeared a half decade earlier. Regardless of who actually owned the cloth sent oversea from Boston during the war, the fluctuations in

the value of goods paying the 3d. custom confirm the integral importance of the Hansards in Boston, and the extent to which the Anglo-Hanseatic War disrupted commerce there.

Following the war, the value of the miscellaneous goods traded by Hansards and other aliens in the city of Hull averaged £2,580 per year, or double what it had been in the six years before 1467-68. In the interim, with Hansards excluded from the trade, it had slipped to £838 annually. The trade in iron was particularly noteworthy here. Hull was eastern England's busiest port for the importation of iron, and over half of it was osmund from the Baltic. Imports into Ipswich, Yarmouth, and Lynn were modest by comparison, and 95 % of the iron brought into London came from Spain. Prior to the war Hanseatic shipments of osmund into Hull were very regular.³⁹

Not surprisingly, the quarrel with the Hanse, and London's growing predominance as England's trade capital, precipitated a decline in the foreign trade of Ipswich. From 1461-62 to 1466-67 the value of miscellaneous commodities exchanged at Ipswich averaged £1,922, though in 1465-66, when the Hanse also was responsible for 95 % of the city's cloth exports, merchandise paying the petty custom was worth £3,148. The average of £620 for the years 1467-68 through 1473-74 represents a decrease of more than two thirds that of the pre-war level. A post-war recovery never materialized. The Hansards, like the English cloth merchants, took their trade to London, and from the war's end until 1481-82 Ipswich's trade in miscellaneous commodities struggled to average £913 annually, despite the figure of £1,968 for 1474-75 when they returned briefly.

By contrast, London, centre of court and commerce, beneficiary of the denizen exodus from the east coast ports, and English home of the merchants of Cologne, actually saw a 5 % increase in the value of goods paying the 3d. custom during the Anglo-Hanseatic War. After its conclusion, when trade with the Hanse and then with France was restored, the increase was even more substantial, and London's ascendancy

as England's trade capital was assured.

Although the fluctuations in trade indicated by the customs records shed considerable light on commodity structures and the importance of the Hanse to England's foreign trade, it remains to be determined whether the fundamental commercial relationships between the Hansards and England had been altered to any appreciable degree. It is quite evident that merchants of the Hanse began to concentrate their cloth trade in London after the war, continuing a trend started by their English competitors some years earlier. Their absence from the ports of south-eastern England between 1468 and 1474 undoubtedly served to accelerate this general shift. On the other hand, their import trade in these same ports flourished as ever, throughout the post-war period.

But the conflict affected more than ships, cargoes, and customs privileges. This also was a time fraught with peril for those Hansards closest to the trade. What were the consequences for them and their links with the Realm? Further understanding of the Hansards' trade to England and the economic and political stresses caused by the conflict is afforded by a look at some of the individuals, aside from the merchants of Cologne, who were directly involved in the Anglo-Hanseatic trade both before and after the war. They ranged from ships' captains to wealthy Danzig patricians, but participation in some aspect of the trade to England was common to each of them.

Of the thirty-two Hansards rounded up by the English authorities in London in July 1468, at least fourteen were citizens of Cologne, and, as such, were detained for only a short time. The high percentage of Cologners, as well as the arrest of two merchants from Dinant, Joris Tack from Duisburg, and two more from Nijmegen, again indicates London's heavy dependence on trading links with the Lower Rhineland.⁴⁰

Among those arrested and not released were four Danzigers. For one, Albert Valand, this was not the first time that the mischief of Danzig's pirates had caused considerable inconvenience.

In 1466 he and a fellow Danziger happened to be in Bremen when cargoes belonging to merchants of that North Sea port allegedly were pirated by corsairs from Danzig. Though not implicated directly, Valand and his colleague were arrested and detained until Danzig satisfied the injured parties. Correspondence relating to the incident shows that a fair degree of animosity existed between the two cities, with Danzig reminding Bremen that in times past merchants of Prussia had suffered at the hands of Bremen's pirates.⁴¹ Valand's fate illustrates one of the numerous hazards to which a traveling businessman might be exposed, and the importance attached to a merchant's civic affiliations.

Two years after his confinement in Bremer, the unfortunate Valand was a resident of Ludgate Prison in London, where he remained throughout the winter of 1468-69. The extent of his business connections in England are revealed in part by his later appeal for compensation. Of the sum 'loaned' to King Edward by the Hansards in 1468, Valand's contribution had been £30. Various other losses in London, Lynn, and Newcastle, including the ransoming of his brother, totalled a further £90.⁴² The fact that he claimed losses in London and was arrested there, as well as his substantial loan to the King, suggest that the English capital city was the centre for Valand's trading ventures.

Albert Valand claimed exemptions from royal customs in each year from 1475 to 1480. However, he did so in no fewer than five different ports: London, Lynn, Boston, Ipswich, and Hull.⁴³ This points to an active partner or partners in the eastern coastal towns, likely a 'Familiengesellschaft' involving Danzig councillor Tydeman Valand, who was shipping English cloth to Danzig via Amsterdam and Lübeck as early as 1463. He imported osmund and various other goods into Hull, and, in the Exchequer year 1466-67, shared with another important civic figure, councillor Herning Buring of Hamburg, a cargo of lumber, tar, iron, fish and linen brought into the port of

Lynn.⁴⁴ The 'verdict' of 1468 cost both of these men heavily, and each had a role to play in the war that ensued. Tydeman Valand eventually became part owner of the 'Grosse Kraweel', and Buring represented Hamburg at the Utrecht peace negotiations.⁴⁵

Albert Valand's business connections were extensive and fairly widely dispersed prior to, and following the Anglo-Hanseatic War. He was involved in mercantile transactions in every major port from London to Newcastle. His mobility, imprisonment, and the wide distribution of his business contacts in England and on the continent reflect some of the common characteristics of the Anglo-Hanseatic trade, in addition to the day to day perils encountered by Hanseatic merchants in an era when they had become prime targets for anti-alien resentment, and vulnerable to arbitrary arrest for the misdemeanors of others. One final anecdote illustrates, however, that the callous civic particularism which had done so much to corrode loyalties within the Hanse, had not destroyed completely the common mercantile bond between the German merchants, which in former times had been the cornerstone of the Hanse. Himself twice victimized, Albert Valand was one of several Hansards who vouched for Fredrich Sneppel, a fellow merchant who had left England in April 1468, but found himself under arrest in Antwerp in 1473.⁴⁶

The movement of another one of Albert Valand's associates further exemplifies the structure and international character of the Hanseatic sea trade in the later fifteenth century and England's role therein. In 1482 Valand shared in a cargo plundered by French pirates on its way to Dieppe.⁴⁷ One of his partners was shipper Hans Stutte of Danzig who had conducted transactions in at least five English ports - Lynn, Ipswich, Hull, Sandwich, and Yarmouth - between 1475 and 1481, and was actively employed in hauling salt from the Bay of Bourgneuf.⁴⁸ Captains like Stutte brought iron, lumber, and assorted other products from Danzig or Lübeck to eastern England. These cargoes could be disposed of readily by resident Hansards like

Valand or his partners. In ports such as Lynn, Hull, or London, a ship could be refreighted with English cloth destined for the Lowlands and the Bruges staple or French ports like Dieppe. Hans Stutte then could follow the French coast to the Bay, and then take on salt for the long return journey to his home port in the Baltic.

Another Hansard who was apprehended and spent the winter of 1468-69 with Albert Valand in the English capital, and whose voluminous correspondence apparently roused the Gloucestershire clothiers, was Joris Tack. After the war he submitted one of the more detailed appeals for compensation, and touched specifically on the money extorted from the Hansards by King Edward:

dat wii hem lennen mosten £484 daerto ick gesat
inde gedrongen wart to lennen £40...ick weder
ontfangen heb van den here konynghe, als der
vrede gemackt was inde weder int lant quam £32
15s....⁴⁹

Tack's other claims indicate that his business interests were concentrated in and around London and focused primarily on the cloth industry. He was a resident of the London Steelyard, and in nearby Colchester, where his brother Fredrich also was jailed, he claimed losses in excess of £150 for cloth, ashes, and madder. Additional expenses were incurred for what no doubt was a thoroughly unpleasant confinement until spring 1469. Joris Tack rejoined the Hanseatic fellowship in London five years later to collect most of the sum owed him by the English sovereign, and was among those exempted from customs charges at London and Sandwich.⁵⁰

Away from London, but also active in the trade with England prior to 1468, was Kersten Nissel, a merchant from Stralsund whose servant Gerard was among those Hansards specifically accused in the Sound controversy.⁵¹ Curiously, Nissel himself apparently did not appeal for compensation after the sea war ended. This suggests that he avoided arrest in 1468, though a London Steelyard account shows that in April 1469, shortly

after the Hanseatic hostages in England were released, Missel was given a sum of money...

wylck hey vertert hadde van syne eygen gelde
in der reyse, in de gemeyn coupman oystwart
gesant hadde....⁵²

In any case, it is certain that he was trading in England as early as 1464, when he was listed on a customs certificate as being a member of the Hanseatic fellowship at Lynn.⁵³

During his lengthy stay in England, Kersten Missel's trading activity, unlike that of Albert Valand, was confined to the ports of the Wash, Lynn and Boston. In 1466 he and several other merchants from Stralsund and Lübeck, trading to England and Bergen, encountered extreme difficulty aboard the ship 'Gabriel' off Lynn. The men prayed for deliverance and pledged a substantial donation to the church of St. Nicholas in Stralsund. Evidently they reached port safely, for ten years later, whilst Missel was taking advantage of customs exemptions in Lynn and Boston, the custodians of St. Olav's Altar in the Nickoliakirche at Stralsund acknowledged receipt of two hundred marks from the 'Bergen - Englandfahrer' at Boston.⁵⁴ Missel's continued presence in England during the 1470's is apparent from his exemption from customs dues at Lynn in 1474-75 and again at Boston in 1477-78.⁵⁵ By 1476 he had assumed a position of some responsibility, for the Hanseatic secretary in London authorized him to oversee the immediate repair of the Boston Steelyard. Missel and others also were given joint responsibility for maintenance of the seven houses of the depot at Lynn, where the courtyard was to be well kept and the quay improved. Missel and his company received a 'rewurde' for their efforts.⁵⁶

Missel's harrowing encounter at sea in 1466 affords a glimpse of his spiritual and psychological make-up, thereby adding another element of detail to the portrait of the Hanseatic merchant in England. Off the coast of East Anglia, a frightened company of German merchants huddled in prayer on the deck of

a storm-battered kog. Duly reprieved, they undertook to raise a donation for their church and the glorification of God. A decade later, despite a conflict which saw their livelihood severely threatened by the arrests of Germans in England and the suspension of direct trade for a period of five years, they fulfilled their pledge. Apparently undaunted by the dangers of the North Sea or by the disruption of the Anglo-Hanseatic trade, Kersten Nissel resumed his mercantile career. Though at least indirectly implicated in the incident which had triggered the hostilities, he returned to the same English ports where he had done business previously, benefited from newly won customs exemptions, and rose to prominence within the Hanseatic fellowship at Boston and Lynn.

After their release from English gaols in spring 1469, Hansards had returned to the continent to reconstruct and redirect their trade as best they could. For Danzig shipper, Eler Bokelman, the continuance of his mercantile vocation entailed active participation in the sea war against England. In early 1470 he was authorized by Danzig's civil authorities to attack English shipping. He survived one skirmish, and was still with Pawest and the 'Grosse Kraweel' the following year.⁵⁷

For Bokelman, there was no shortage of incentive to plunder English shipping. He had been hauling Baltic products into Scarborough, Grimsby, and Hull in the mid-1460's, and was arrested and imprisoned at Hull in 1468.⁵⁸ In addition to the ship he captained and was part owner of, Bokelman also was relieved of a sizable cargo in which at least a dozen other Hansards, including Henning Buring, held shares. Yet Eler Bokelman is not listed as being among those exempted from customs charges in any English port during the post-war period.⁵⁹ Thus it remains uncertain if he resumed his former trading connections with England. He did not disappear completely, though, for in 1481 his ship was pirated in the Baltic near Elbing.⁶⁰

Another colleague of Bokelman who shipped to England and Scotland prior to the Anglo-Hanseatic War was Peter Kosseler, also from Danzig.⁶¹ At Lynn and Hull, he too was deprived of payment for merchandise typical of that normally brought to England by the Esterlings:

... int jar 68 verkoffte ick in Engelandt in der stadt Kantelberge... Willm Breibrock, borger in Linden, 1 schip mast - unde segellos, dar hadde ick mit mynem swager Hoppenbruwer 16 schepeslast ther, 2 schepeslast pick, 7 schepeslast assche, 1,000 wagenscotes, 100 clapholtes, 1 last osemunt... Dat schip mit dat gudt gaf ick vor 100, darauff entfange ick 130, so wart dat guth gerasteret by Willm Braybrock, so dat ick de 170 nalaten muste. Item so nemen se my, dat Hinrick Vinkenoge mit sick to Hulle hadde in schipper Eler 112 an geredem gelde, dat he hadde gemaket van 21 acntendel als unde 18 tunnen theer....⁶²

Kosseler, though, returned to England, and from 1476 to 1478 he traded in Lynn but did not pay customs there. In 1476 he also was busy as an envoy of the Polish King, carrying a warning to the King of Scotland that unless the harassment of vessels from Danzig by Scottish pirates was remedied, reprisals could be expected.⁶³

To maintain his English trading connections, Kosseler went to considerable risk and expense in subsequent years. In July 1492 he was being sought out by a Dundee shipper, Nicholas Fleiser. Kosseler apparently had offered Fleiser 140 to arrange for the release of four imprisoned Englishmen, who quite probably were business associates. The Scotsman kept his end of the bargain, but didn't get his money. Danzig's council refused to intervene, and suggested that it was up to Fleiser to deal with Kosseler or his goods when and wherever he could, but not in Danzig. Eventually he did catch up with Kosseler's captain, Martin Mienkirk, at Helsingor, and brought him before the Danish 'Reichsrat' at Copenhagen. Mienkirk's promise to pay the 140 failed to satisfy the plaintiff, so a second Danziger consented to deposit the money at the Hanger-

meister's house in Helsingor, and Fleiser would have until the following Easter to collect it.⁶⁴

The Danes again were at odds with England, and a few weeks after his initial appearance in Copenhagen, Nienkirk was back in Helsingor accused of trying to smuggle English merchants and wares through the Sound. When questioned by Danish officials, he declared that "cynen loszman, eyne armen scamel schipman, eyne halve last pekes, eyne kiste mit flassee und two heveke deme loszman tobehorende" were aboard, but that otherwise he carried no English merchants or goods.⁶⁵ However, the "armen scamel schipman" was recognized as an English trader, and further inspection of the cargo revealed three 'Stro' wax and various other chests bearing Peter Kosseler's mark on top, but that of Englishmen on the bottom. It is not difficult to imagine a rather nervous Nienkirk prevaricating before the 'Reichsrat' for a second time within two months. Both the ship and the cargo were impounded, and two years later Kosseler still was trying to get them back.⁶⁶ In the meantime, Fleiser, the Scotsman who delivered Englishmen from captivity for a fee, authorized two of his colleagues to collect Kosseler's debt at Helsingor.⁶⁷

Always one step ahead of his creditors and government authorities, Peter Kosseler was still in business five years later and exposed, as ever, to the dangers of oversea trade. In 1487 four ships from Hamburg and Danzig were attacked, and their cargoes taken to France by pirates. Wax, ashes, and herring were aboard, but there was also wool and cloth, indicating that the ships may have called at some English port prior to the incident. It was a particularly brutal attack, and the damaged ships were left to drift helplessly on the open sea after being plundered. Thirteen Danzigers besought the King of France to seize and return the pirated merchandise. Among them was the part-time envoy of King Kasimir and occasionally devious Hanseatic entrepreneur, Peter Kosseler of Danzig.⁶⁸

Like his colleagues, who also had been victimized previously by the dispute with England, Peter Kosseler had rejoined the Hanseatic trade to England.

Despite noticeable adjustments in the redistribution of English woolens to foreign markets, the Hansards were not eliminated from the cloth trade. They maintained a substantial share in it, even though the trade now was centred in London, where the Hansards had been the object of so much resentment. In the east coast ports north of the Thames, the importation of Baltic goods had resumed, and trade flourished once again. Moreover, this trade was reintroduced by many of the same entrepreneurs who had participated before the war. Kosseler, Valand, Nissel and the others had not forfeited their share in the trade to England or abandoned it to the Hollanders or Hanseatic newcomers. Though certainly not unaffected, the Hanseatic trade to England had weathered the most serious disruption of Anglo-Hanseatic relations during the fifteenth century. Within the Hanse, however, the restoration of political cohesion would prove not so easy.

REFERENCES

CHAPTER III

- 1 J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., p. 138; CPR. 1467-1477 p. 494.
- 2 CPR. 1467-1477 p.445; HUB. X no. 257, 368-69; HR. (2) VII no. 211, 279-80.
- 3 J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., pp. 141-45; also CLB. (L) Edward IV - Henry VII pp. 127-29; CPR. 1466-1477 p. 509; Rot. Parl. VI p. 123-24.
- 4 J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., pp. 209-12; CPR. 1466-1477 pp. 519, 540.
- 5 E.M. Carus-Wilson, "The Medieval Trade of the Ports of the Wash", Medieval Archaeology, VI-VII (1962) p. 196. The physical characteristics of the London Steelyard are documented in T.G. Werner, "Der Stalhof der deutschen Hanse in London in wirtschafts-und kunsthistorischen Bildwerken", Scripta Mercaturae, II (1973) p. 127 ff.
- 6 D. Purcell, "Der hansische Steelyard in King's Lynn, Norfolk", Hanse in Europa: Brücke zwischen den Märkten 12.-17. Jahrhundert. (Köln, 1973) p. 109; HUB. X no. 407.
- 7 HUB. X no. 477. This letter also describes the Hanseatic house at Boston as quite old, and consisting of ten houses with seven chimneys.
- 8 D. Purcell, op. cit., p. 110, and W.A. Pantin, "The Merchants' Houses and Warehouses of King's Lynn", Medieval Archaeology, VI-VII (1962) p. 179.
- 9 H. Samsonowicz, Untersuchungen über das Danziger Bürgerkapital in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts. | Abhandlungen zur Handels-und Sozialgeschichte VIII (Weimar, 1969) pp. 45-46. Most of Danzig's ships were owned jointly by associations of up to twelve partners.
- 10 Libelle of Englyshe Polycye. ed. G. Warner (London, 1936) pp. 16-17.

11 W. Stark, op. cit., pp. 87-93; H. Samsonowicz, op. cit.,
p. 35.

12 W. Stark, op. cit., pp. 88-94.

13 Ibid., pp. 99-105.

14 Ibid., pp. 96-98.

15 W. Millack, "Danzigs Handelsbeziehungen zu England", Danzigs Handel in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. ed. H. Bauer and W. Millack (Danzig, 1925) p. 81; E.M. Carus-Wilson, "The Oversea Trade of late medieval Coventry", Economies et Sociétés au Moyen Age. Mélanges offerts à Edouard Perry (Paris, 1973) p. 376.

16 W. Stark, op. cit., pp. 113-14.

17 Ibid., pp. 118-21.

18 Ibid., pp. 124-26.

19 Ibid., pp. 137-40; H. Samsonowicz, op. cit., pp. 36-37. See also F. Irsigler, "Hansischer Kupferhandel im 15. und in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts", HGbl., XCVII (1979) pp. 15-35.

20 O. Lienau, op. cit., p. 72, and W. Stieda, "Schiffahrtsregister", HGbl., 1834 (1885) pp. 77-115.

21 O. Lienau, op. cit., pp. 74-75; F. Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 263-64; E. Daenell, "The Policy of the German Hanseatic League", op. cit., pp. 50-51; H. Winter, Das Hanseschiff im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert. (Rostock, 1961) pp. 1-33.

22 G. Samsonowicz, op. cit., pp. 33-34, 39-40, and M. Biskup, "Die polnisch-preussischen Handelsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts", Hansische Studien. ed. G. Heitz and M. Unger (Berlin, 1961) pp. 1-6.

23 E. Power, "The English Wool Trade in the reign of

of Edward IV", Cambridge Historical Journal, II (1926) pp. 17-35; E.M. Carus-Wilson, England's Export Trade 1275-1547. (Oxford, 1963) pp. 12-13.

24

S. Samsonowicz, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

25

W. Stark, op. cit., pp. 41-43.

26

E.M. Carus-Wilson, England's Export Trade 1275-1547. pp. 14-15.

27

Ibid.

28

E.M. Carus-Wilson, "The Oversea Trade of late medieval Coventry", op. cit., pp. 371-76. However, W.I. Haward dismisses Boston's role in the cloth trade, claiming the port was not a natural outlet for English woollens, "The Trade of Boston in the 15th Century", Lincolnshire Architectural and Archaeological Society Reports and Papers, XLI (1936) pp. 169-79.

29

F. Hirsch, op. cit., pp. 251-53.

30

H.L. Gray, "English Foreign Trade from 1412 to 1492", Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. ed. E. Power and M.M. Postan (London, 1933) pp. 7-12.

31

Ibid. and E.M. Carus-Wilson, England's Export Trade 1275-1547.

32

H.L. Gray, op. cit., pp. 24-27.

33

E.M. Carus-Wilson, England's Export Trade 1275-1547. and H.L. Gray, op. cit. The statistical analysis which follows is based on tables of enrolled customs found in these two publications. The figures are not representative of calendar years but rather of Exchequer years running from Michaelmas to Michaelmas (September 29).

34

The tables for enrolled customs accounts indicate that during 1474-75, 349 cloths were sent abroad from Ipswich. The receipt of the customs collectors in the port indicates that only seven Hanseatic merchants were involved, and hence were exempted from customs charges. HUB. X no. 438.

35

G.V. Scammel, "English Merchant Shipping at the end of the Middle Ages: Some East Coast Evidence", EcHR., 2nd series XIII (1961) pp. 328-31.

36

Ibid. Also H. Clarke, "King's Lynn and east coast trade in the Middle Ages", Medieval Archaeology. ed. D.J. Blackman (London, 1973) pp. 277-90; P. Heath, "North Sea Fishing in the Fifteenth Century: the Scarborough Fleet", Northern History, III (1968) pp. 53-69; N.J.M. Kerling, op. cit., p. 122; and D. Burwash, English Merchant Shipping 1460-1540. (Toronto, 1947) pp. 151-58.

37

The tables of enrolled customs printed in Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. ed. E. Power and M.M. Postan (London, 1933) also show the value of goods paying the petty custom. The following statistics are taken from these charts.

38

N.J.M. Kerling, op. cit., pp. 222.

39

W. Childs, "England's Iron Trade in the Fifteenth Century", EcHR., 2nd series XXXIV (1991) pp. 25-47; PRO. E 122 62/4, 62/5, 62/6, 62/7.

40

HUB. IX no. 482. Several more Cologners normally resident in London already had departed England temporarily in order to attend the 'Aachener Heiltumsfahrt'.

41

HUB. IX no. 270.

42

HUB. IX no. 541 #9.

7

43

HUB. X no. 433 #3, 5, 12, 15, 19, 22, 24, 28.

44

HUB. IX no. 39; PRO. E 122 62/7, 97/7. The particulars of customs for Lynn 1466-67 are printed in N.S.B. Gras, op. cit., pp. 607-24. Buring also had shipped osmund to Lynn in the previous year, and was involved in the trade at Ipswich. PRO. E 122 52/17, 52/48, 97/4. His claim for compensation for merchandise lost in England in 1469 exceeded £244. Aside from the east coast ports he also listed the manufacturing centres of Norwich, Stratford, and Colchester as places where he was deprived of goods or payments owed to him. He was exempted from paying customs at Lynn, 1475-76. HUB. X no. 438.

250. ⁴⁵ HR. (2) VI no. 642, 643; VII no. 17, 34 #6 and 114,

⁴⁶ HUB. IX no. 541 #4; X no. 221.

⁴⁷ HUB. X no. 983.

⁴⁸ HUB. no. 438, 1250; XI no. 427, 629, 640, 669, 671; 754; HR. (2) VII no. 311; (3) I no. 265.

⁴⁹ HUB. IX no. 541 #5. Tack was not repaid immediately, however, for in October 1475 the Hansards in London reported that the Cologners were still in England and that the King had not yet given back the ~~4~~484. HR. (2) VII no. 311.

⁵⁰ HUB. X no. 438 #3.

⁵¹ HUB. IX no. 519, 523 #1.

⁵² HUB. IX no. 638 #15.

⁵³ PRO. E 122 97/4.

⁵⁴ HUB. X no. 599.

⁵⁵ HUB. X no. 438.

⁵⁶ HUB. no. 477 #56-58:

⁵⁷ HR. (2) VI no. 314, 529, 539.

⁵⁸ PRO. E 122 62/7; HUB. IX no. 541.

⁵⁹ HUB. X no. 438.

⁶⁰ HUB. X no. 1000.

⁶¹ HUB. IX no. 303, 539.

62
HUB. IX no. 541 #9,10.

63
HUB. X no. 438 #14,22, 482; HR. (2) VII no. 311.


64
HUB. X no. 985.

65
HUB. X no. 1003.


66
HUB. X no. 997, 1003, 1036. Also "Casper Weinreichs
Danziger Chronik", op. cit., p.745; HR. (3) I no. 547 #38,
550 #20.

67
HUB. X no. 1047..

68
HUB. XI no. 153.



E HEMPEL



J.D.F. 1982

^ Bruges: The Town Hall 1376-1420.

< Danzig: St. Mary's Parish Church 1343-1465. (From E. Hempel, Geschichte der deutschen Baukunst, 1949.)

CONCLUSION

There were other developments aside from the peace agreement at Utrecht which obviously helped facilitate the full resumption of trade in northern Europe in the mid-1470's. Cordial relations between the Hanse and France also were re-established. Moreover, the grand schemes of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance never came to fruition. Charles the Bold was slain at Nancy in 1477, and by 1482 the cloth manufacturing towns of Picardy were subject to French rule. With French and English privateers less active in the Channel, the Hansards were able to reintroduce their trade in England promptly. Their ships were attacked by English pirates from time to time, but incidents were infrequent.¹

The Hansards resumed shipments to England's east coast ports, even though the woollen trade now was centred firmly in London. For cloth export the short Channel crossing to the continent had assumed a greater importance during the war years, and such cloth as now reached the Baltic arrived in the ships of Holland or the Hanse, or came overland via the Lowlands and Lübeck. Again direct English trade to the Baltic was restricted. In the first two years following the war, only nine English ships came to Danzig. Twelve more arrived in 1476, but four of them brought no cargo.²

The Hansards indeed had preserved their ancient liberties and had returned to reassume their integral place in both London's cloth trade and the local economies of the coastal cities. The war had much broader implications, of course, although modern English scholarship has devoted scant attention to the actual conflict, concentrating instead on related political developments within England and the Burgundian territories and relying, perhaps, on Professor Carus-Wilson's suggestion some years ago that the campaign itself was a "half-hearted" exercise.³ In a more recent commentary on the keeping of the seas in the fifteenth century, C.F. Richmond concurs, reasoning that prior to 1472 the English were too preoccupied with domestic political

intrigue to carry the war to the Hansards.⁴

In a somewhat similar vein, German scholars have, until quite recently, consistently emphasized what they viewed as a unifying, and hence positive, effect of the war on the Hanseatic confederation. This interpretation was pioneered by Walther Stein at the turn of the century. It was shared by his contemporary, Friedrich Schulz, and since then has attracted a number of adherents, including England's Michael Postan and the French historian of the Hanse, Philippe Dollinger. They all conclude, to a greater or lesser degree, that the quarrel strengthened Hanseatic resolve, resulting in an aggressive and united campaign against the English enemy.⁵

In view of the lengthy history of maritime violence prior to 1468, and the serious flaws in Hanseatic unity which Anglo-Hanseatic disputes already had revealed, a re-examination of these interpretative issues is appropriate.

There seems little doubt that the King of England acquiesced to the will of the Neville faction and the London merchant community in 1468. Yet it must have been apparent at the time to all concerned that, given the record of piracy in peacetime, the verdict of the Council was bound to provoke some sort of naval confrontation with the Hanse. The special treatment accorded the merchants of Cologne virtually guaranteed it.

However, insofar as Warwick and his associates were concerned, it is unlikely that there ever was any intention of challenging the Hanse in an all-out sea-war. Rather, the Council's verdict was intended to trigger a series of essentially predictable punitive actions, which in turn would create a state of anarchy on the high seas and destabilize the Realm's political relations with the northern continental powers. For the native merchants and influential royal advisors engaged in oversea trade the situation presented a long-coveted opportunity to curtail the activity of their principal business rivals and, if the Hansards felt obliged to resist, engage in their favorite part-time vocation of piracy.

The campaign of 1470 reflects Warwick's intent. The Neville faction held sway in England, and did not lack the resources for a major confrontation with the Hansards, yet none materialized. It sufficed that the sealanes were disrupted and that the insecure monarchy could not contemplate an alliance with Burgundy. The native merchant community, despite the losses it suffered during 1470, seemed content enough to have the Germans out of England.

But in the year following his return from exile, Edward IV was able to consolidate power within the Realm, and alter dramatically government policy toward the Hanse. The King no longer was entirely susceptible to the whims of baronial factions, and there was a conscious effort to bring the conflict with the Hanse to a decisive conclusion. First, Howard's fleet drove the Hanseatic pirates from the Flemish coast and eased the pressure on English maritime commerce. The English victory also caused some of the less militant elements within the Hanse to become even more amenable to a peaceful settlement. Yet, although it strengthened England's bargaining position, Howard's success was by no means decisive. Hanseatic privateers continued to operate with or without the expressed consent of their home ports, and so long as there was no agreement between England and the Hanse to end the piracy, harassment of English shipping could go on almost indefinitely. Moreover, at Westminster, France again was perceived as England's real enemy, not the German Hanse. The Anglo-Burgundian alliance had reemerged as the overriding priority of the English government.

Hence, as Richmond has suggested, there was really no sustained attempt to engage the Hansards at sea until 1472. On the other hand, Howard's efforts and the subsequent negotiations at Utrecht were anything but half-hearted. They reflected an earnest attempt to end the conflict quickly and by whatever means possible, either militarily or through negotiation.

Professor Postan's conclusion that the Hanse's quarrel

with England was "a joint concern of all the Hanseatic towns from Westphalia to Livonia"⁶ is essentially a reiteration of an interpretation which has been part of Hanseatic historiography since the early decades of this century. The supposition, however, is not confirmed by the evidence.

By 1468 the major German trading centres east of Danzig already had demonstrated their independence with protectionist legislation regarding foreign contact with the Livonian hinterland. The important Hanseatic cities of Riga and Reval were involved only nominally in direct trade with England, and were largely unaffected by the arrests there. Though requested by Danzig to do so, there is no indication that they sent any ships to fight the English, and their representation at Utrecht was negligible.⁷

The Wendish sector's initial reluctance to resort to military means stemmed in part from the nature of its trade with England. Lübeckers were important middlemen in the Icelandic fishing industry for which England remained a key market, and in the distribution of English cloth to the eastern Baltic. A conflict which jeopardized the traffic in English woollens necessarily would cause considerable anxiety in the Wendish community, especially in view of the state of affairs which had developed in the early 1450's when Lübeck had challenged the English openly.

When the new crisis arose, Lübeck from the outset preferred to negotiate a resumption of trade without investing in another costly naval struggle. On the other hand, the Lübeck patriciate must have realized that unless they were prepared to abdicate their pretensions to leadership of the Hanseatic community, a resolute response to the English monarch was essential. It was difficult, indeed, to compromise the city's own economic interests by invoking retaliatory measures against a principal supplier of a commodity so important to Lübeck's commercial prosperity. The conservative, indecisive diplomatic course, which the city did adopt, not only failed to impress the as

yet unstable English government, but also drew contemptuous criticism from the city's strong-willed detractors within the Hanse.⁸

The expanding North Sea ports of Bremen and Hamburg carried the war to the English with belligerent enthusiasm. Bremen's pirate fleets already were notorious for their indiscriminate provocations. That they were eager to take on the English is not surprising. Hamburg's proximity to the crowded North Sea trading routes also rendered excellent the prospects for a profitable privateering campaign. The city's merchants were active in England and stood to gain further if an advantageous settlement could be imposed on the English government.⁹

Most severely affected by the arrests in England were the merchants of Danzig. However, unlike their colleagues from Lübeck, whose prosperity depended significantly on the supply of finished textiles for redistribution, the Danzigers sold commodities for which there was a constant demand. Even if they were banished from England, they could dispose easily of their Prussian timber, iron, and grain in the Lowlands and elsewhere. So, supported by the neighbouring cities of Elbing and Thorn, the Danzigers fought resolutely to recoup losses and avenge the indignity of the 'verdict'. If Hanseatic privateers could force England to negotiate a peace, Danzig could well expect to recover the lucrative English market for Baltic products, and still block any reciprocal privileges for English merchants trading in Prussia.¹⁰

Finally, as far as the military aspects of the war are concerned, participation of the Westphalian cities, many of which had close trading links with Cologne, did not extend beyond intermittent financial support for the sea war.

If there was little unanimity within the Hanse regarding the use of force against England, its lack was exemplified still further by the failure of the other standard Hanseatic weapon, the boycott of English wares. Dortmund resisted it outright, and there were widespread accusations of violations

of the self-imposed restrictions from Westphalia to Danzig. Already by 1471 English cloth was finding its way to Nürnberg, Breslau, and the eastern regions of the Hanse.¹¹

This range of responses, therefore, does not verify the heretofore widely accepted view that by the spring of 1469 the Hanse was "bis auf Köln wieder einig". Nor does it substantiate Professor Postan's similar claim that Cologne's defection and the subsequent controversy "restored cohesion and unity among the Hanse's other parts".¹² Actually nothing of this sort occurred.

The merchants of Cologne had been all too easily 'bought off' by the English government. Yet, although Cologne's decision was in itself a blow to Hanseatic unity, it did in fact afford an opportunity for the rest of the German trading community to consolidate in the face of England's challenge. The subsequent course of events merely exemplified its inability to do so. Agreement on 'Hanseatic' policy toward England was rendered impossible by civic particularism, and there could be no unified effort to avenge the treatment meted out to Hansards by the King's Council and reacquire ancient privileges in England. Except for Lübeck's disastrous participation in 1472, the sea-war was fought by privateers from Danzig and the North Sea ports, as much intent on profiting from commercial violence as re-establishing the Hanseatic trade with England. Other Hanseatic towns watched from a distance and helped undermine the effectiveness of the boycott.

When the war ended, the internal divisions had become deeper, and the Hanse was powerless to heal them. The independent Danzigers, for example, continued to inhibit English trade in the Baltic, and refused to ratify the Utrecht agreement until 1476.¹³ And what of the contumacious Cologners, whose defection was the most blatant manifestation of particularism and therefore of utmost importance to the Hanse? Despite all the comminatory rhetoric at Utrecht, their punishment was light. Though displaced from their London enclave temporarily,

(they remained in England and were readmitted to the Hanse within two years of the war's end.¹⁴ They again became part of a German Hanse where civic particularism was no less evident than it had been throughout the preceding decades, and where attitudes were as diverse as ever. The verdict of the Council and Cologne's abandonment of her German colleagues had precipitated yet another crisis within the Hanse, pushing it reluctantly into a war with England and, ultimately, one step further toward its final disintegration.

REFERENCES

CONCLUSION

- ¹
CPR. 1467-1477 p. 605; CPR. 1476-1485 pp. 23, 49.
- ²
V. Lauffer, op. cit., pp. 8-22; W. Stieda, op. cit., pp. 85-88.
- ³
E.M. Carus-Wilson, "The Iceland Trade", op. cit., p. 180. However, the conflict has been termed a "savage" sea war in a recent study by K.A. Fowler, op. cit.
- ⁴
C.F. Richmond, Royal Administration. pp. 335-45.
- ⁵
See W. Stein, "Die Hanse und England: Ein hansisch-englischer Seekrieg im 15. Jahrhundert", op. cit., p. 29; F. Schulz, op. cit., p. 113; M.M. Postan, op. cit., p. 134; P. Dollinger, op. cit., pp. 305-10; and W. Stark's partial reassessment of the Hanseatic victory, op. cit., pp. 182-211.
- ⁶
M.M. Postan, op. cit., p. 134.
- ⁷
HR. (2) VI no. 435.
- ⁸
See W. Stark, op. cit., p. 201; and in particular HR. (2) VI no. 283.
- ⁹
J. Müller, op. cit., p. 48, HR. (2) VI no. 434, 467, 524, 526 and VII no. 34 #141, 143.
- ¹⁰
More than half the Hansards who claimed specific damages as a result of the arrests in 1468 were Danzigers. HUB. XI no. 541. For the Danzig council's continued determination to resist English intrusion into the Baltic, see HR. (2) VII no. 44, 63, 131-133.
- ¹¹
HR. (2) VI no. 356 #62, 73, 418, 472, 483 #1, 485 #1.
- ¹²
F. Schulz, op. cit., p. 118; M.M. Postan, op. cit., p. 134. Also G. Neumann, op. cit., p. 57, note 137.

(13

HR.-(2) VII no. 151.

14

J.M. Lappenberg, op. cit., pp. 149-50; CPR. 1467-1477
p. 452; HR. (2) VII no. 323-81, 389, 390, 395, 401; H. Buszello,
"Köln und England 1468-1509", op. cit., pp 447-50.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Public Record Office

Exchequer : E 122 King's Remembrancers (K.R.) Customs Accounts.

PRINTED SOURCES

Acts of the Court of the Mercers' Company 1453-1527. intro.
L. Lyell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936.

Akten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des
Deutschen Ordens. ed. M. Töppen, Aalen: Scientia Verlag,
1973-74, (Leipzig, 1978-86). 5 vols.

Codex Diplomaticus Lubecensis: Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck.
Lübeck: Verein für Lübeckische Geschichte und Alter-
thumskunde, 1842-1939. 11 vols.

Calendar of the Close Rolls.

Calendar of Letter Books of the City of London. (I) 1400-1422,
(K) Henry VI, (L) Edward IV - Henry VII, ed. R.R. Sharpe,
Corporation of the City of London, 1909-12.

Calendar of the Patent Rolls.

Calendar of Plea and Memoranda Rolls of the City of London.
1381-1412 and 1413-1437 ed. A.H. Thomas, 1437-1457
ed. P.E. Jones, Corporation of the City of London,
1932-54.

Die Lübecker Bergenfahrer und ihre Chronistik. ed. F. Bruns,
Hansische Geschichtsquellen, N.F. II, Berlin: Hansische
Geschichtsverein, 1900.

English Historical Documents. vol. IV, ed. A.R. Myers, London:
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969.

Foedera, conventiones, literae, et cujuscunque generis acta
publica inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores,
reges, pontifices, principes vel communitates 1101-1654.
ed. Thomas Rymer, London: J. Tonson, 1726-35. 20 vols.

Hanserecesse. series (1) 1250-1430, ed. K. Koppmann, series (2)
1431-1476, ed. G. von der Ropp, series (3) 1477-1530,
ed. D. Schäfer, Leipzig: Die Historische Kommission bei
der Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, and Verein
für Hansische Geschichte, 1870-1913. 24 vols.

Hansisches Urkundenbuch. ed. K. Höhlbaum, K. Kunze, W. Stein,
Halle/Leipzig: Verein für Hansische Geschichte, 1876-
1907. 11 vols.

Lappenberg, J.M., ed. Urkundliche Geschichte des hansischen
Stahlhofes zu London. Osnabrück: Otto Zeller Verlag,
1967, (Hamburg, 1951).

Libelle of Englyshe Polycye. ed. G. Warner, London: Oxford
University Press, 1926.

Quellen zur Geschichte des Kölner Handels und Verkehrs im
Mittelalter. ed. B. Kuske, Publikationen der Gesellschaft
für rheinische Geschichtskunde XXXIII, Bonn: P. Hansteins
Verlag, 1917-34. 4 vols.

Rotuli Parliamentorum 1297-1503. ed. J. Starchey, J. Pridden,
E. Upham, London: Records Commission, 1767-77. 6 vols.

Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der
Preussischen Vorzeit. ed. T. Hirsch, M. Töppen, E.
Strehlke, Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva GmbH., 1965, (Leipzig,
1861-74). 5 vols.

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES

Agats, A. Der hansische Baienhandel. Heidelberger Abhandlungen
zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte V, 1904.

Ammann, H. "Deutschland und die Tuchindustrie Nordwesteuropas
im Mittelalter", HGoll., LXXII (1964), 1-62.

Biskup, M. "Die polnisch-preussischen Handelsbeziehungen in
der ersten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts", Hansische
Studien. Forschungen zur mittelalterlichen Geschichte
VIII, ed. G. Hertz and A. Unger, Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
1961, pp. 1-6.

"Das Reich, die wendische Hanse und die preussische
Frage um die Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts", Neue Hansische
Studien. ed. K. Fritze, E. Müller-Merters, J. Schildhauer,
E. Voigt, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1970, pp. 241-47.

Bolton, J.L. Alien Merchants in England in the reign of Henry VI,
1422-61. unpublished B. Litt. thesis, Oxford, 1971.

Bourne, H.R. Fox English Merchants. New York: Klaus Reprint,
1969, (London, 1966).

Bridbury, A.R. England and the Salt Trade in the later Middle
Ages. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955.

Bruns, F. and Weczerka, H., eds. Hansische Handelstrassen. Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, N.F. XIII, Teil 1,2,3, Köln/Graz: Hansische Geschichtsverein, 1962.

Burwash, D. English Merchant Shipping 1460-1540. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947.

Buszello, H. "Köln und England 1468-1509", Mitteilungen aus dem Stadtarchiv von Köln, LX (1971), 431-67.

"Die auswärtige Handelspolitik der englischen Krone im 15. Jahrhundert", Frühformen englisch-deutscher Handelspartnerschaft. ed. K. Friedland, Köln/Wien: Hansische Geschichtsverein, 1976, pp. 64-96.

Carus-Wilson, E.M. "The Medieval Trade of the Ports of the Wash", Medieval Archaeology, VI-VII (1962), 182-201.

England's Export Trade 1257-1547. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.

Medieval Merchant Venturers. 2nd ed. London: Methuen and Co., 1967.

"The Oversea Trade of late medieval Coventry", Economies et Sociétés au Moyen Age. Mélanges offerts à Edouard Perroy, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, Série "Etudes" Tome V, 1973, pp. 371-91.

"The German Hanse in the Economy of Medieval England", Aspects of Anglo-German Relations through the Centuries. Publications of the German Historical Institute of London IV, ed. P. Kluge and P. Alter, Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1978, pp. 14-23.

Childs, W.R. "England's Iron Trade in the Fifteenth Century", EcHR., 2nd series XXXIV (1991), 25-47.

Clarke, H. "King's Lynn and east coast trade in the Middle Ages", Marine Archaeology. Proceedings of the Twentythird Symposium of the Colston Research Society, ed. D.J. Blackman, London: Butterworths, 1973, pp. 277-90.

Cobb, H.S. "Cloth Exports from London and Southampton in the later fifteenth and early sixteenth Centuries: a revision", EcHR., 2nd series XXXI (1978), 601-9.

Cowie, L.W. "The Steelyard of London", History Today, XXV (1976), 776-91.

Daenell, E. Die Blütezeit der deutschen Hanse. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973, (Berlin, 1975). 2 vols.

"The Policy of the German Hanseatic League respecting the Mercantile Marine", American Historical Review, XV (1909-10), 48-53.

Davis, R. "The Rise of Antwerp and its English Connection 1406-1510", Trade, Government and Economy in Pre-Industrial England. ed. D.C. Colman and A.H. John, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976, pp. 2-20.

de Roover, F.E. "A Prize of War: A Painting of fifteenth century Merchants", Bulletin of the Business Historical Society, XIX (1945), 3-12.

Dollinger, P. The German Hanse. trans. and ed. D. Ault and S.H. Steinberg, London: Macmillan and Co., 1970.

Endres, F., ed. Geschichte der freien und Hansestadt Lübeck. Lübeck: Otto Quissow Verlag, 1926.

Engel, K. "Die Organisation der deutsch-hansischen Kaufleute in England im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert bis zum Utrechter Frieden von 1474", HGbl., XIX (1913), 445-517, XX (1914), 173-225.

Ferguson, J. English Diplomacy 1432-1461. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

Fiedler, H. "Danzig und England: Die Handelsbestrebungen der Engländer vom Ende des 14. bis zum Anfang des 17. Jahrhunderts", Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, LXVIII (1928), 83-125.

Flenley, R. "London and Foreign Merchants in the reign of Henry VI", English Historical Review, XXV (1910), 644-55.

Fowler, K.A. "English Diplomacy and the Peace of Utrecht", Frühformen englisch-deutscher Handelspartnerschaft. ed. K. Friedland, Köln/Wien: Hansische Geschichtsverein, 1976, pp. 9-24.

Friccius, W. Der Wirtschaftskrieg als Mittel hansischer Politik im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. Lübeck: Albrecht und Vorkamp, 1932.

Fritze, K. "Die Finanzpolitik Lübecks im Krieg gegen Dänemark 1426-1433", Hansische Studien. Forschungen zur mittelalterlichen Geschichte VIII, ed. G. Heitz and M. Unger, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961, pp. 82-89.

Am Wendepunkt der Hanse. Berlin: VEB Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1967.

- Frost, C. Notices relative to the early history of the Town and Port of Hull. London: J.B. Nichols, 1827.
- Giuseppi, M.S. "Alien Merchants in England in the 15th Century", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, new series IX (1895), 75-98.
- Gras, N.S.B. The Early English Customs System. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1919.
- Gross, C. A Bibliography of British Municipal History including Gilds and Parliamentary Representation. Harvard Historical Studies V, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1897.
- Hakluyt, R., ed. The Principal navigations, voyages, traffiques and discoveries of the English Nation. Glasgow: J. MacLehose, 1903-5. 12 vols.
- Hanham, H. "Foreign Exchange and the English Wool Merchant in the late fifteenth Century", Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XLVI (1973), 160-75.
- Haward, W.I. "Economic Aspects of the Wars of the Roses in East Anglia", English Historical Review, XLI (1926), 170-89.
- "The Trade of Boston in the 15th Century", Lincolnshire Architectural and Archaeological Society Reports and Papers, XLI (1936), 169-78.
- Heath, P. "North Sea Fishing in the Fifteenth Century: The Scarborough Fleet", Northern History, III (1968), 53-69.
- Heaton, H. The Yorkshire Woolen and Worsted Industries. Oxford Historical and Literary Studies X, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920.
- Hirsch, T. Danzigs Handels-und Gewerbsgeschichte unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens. Stuttgart: S. Hirzel Verlag, 1969, (Leipzig, 1858).
- Hollihn, G. "Die Stapel-und Gastepolitik Rigas in der Ordenzeit 1201-1561", HGBll., LX (1935), 91-217.
- Holmes, G.A. "The Libel of English Policy", English Historical Review, LXXVI (1961), 193-216.
- Houtte, J.A. van An Economic History of the Low Countries 800-1800. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.
- Irsigler, F. "Hansischer Kupferhandel im 15. und in der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts", HGBll., XCVII (1979), 15-35.

Jalland, P. "The 'Revolution' in Northern Borough Representation in Mid-Fifteenth Century England", Northern History, XI (1976), 27-51.

Jansma, T.J. "Phillipe le Bon et le guerre hollando-wende", Revue du Nord, XLII (1960), 5-18.

Jarvis, R.C. "The early customs and customs houses in the Port of London", Transactions of the London and Middlesex Archaeological Society, XXVII (1976), 271-9.

Kendall, P.M. Warwick the Kingmaker. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963.

Kerling, N.J.M. Commercial Relations of Holland and Zealand with England from the late 15th Century to the close of the Middle Ages. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954.

"Aliens in the county of Norfolk 1436-1485", Norfolk Archaeology, XXXIII (1965), 200-12.

Kingsford, C.L. "The beginnings of English maritime enterprise in the fifteenth Century", History, XIII (1928-29), 97-106, 193-203.

Prejudice and Promise in Fifteenth Century England. London: Frank Cass and Co., 1962.

Kirby, J.L. "Sir William Sturmy's Embassy to Germany in 1405-06", History Today, XV (1965), 39-47.

Kirchner, W. Commercial Relations between Russia and Europe 1400-1800. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966.

Kuske, B. "Die Kölner Handelsbeziehungen im 15. Jahrhundert", Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, VII (1909), 296-308.

Lander, J.R. "Council, Administration and Councillors 1461 to 1485", Bulletin of Historical Research, XXXII (1959), 138-80.

Lauffer, V. "Danzigs Schiffs-und Vaarenverkehr am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts", Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, XXXIII (1894), 1-44.

Lienau, O. "Danziger Schifffahrt und Schiffbau in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts", Zeitschrift des Westpreussischen Geschichtsvereins, LXX (1930), 71-93.

Malowist, M. "Poland, Russia and Western Trade in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century", Past and Present, XIII (1950), 26-41.

- Marcus, G.J. Naval History of England. vol. 1, Boston/Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1961.
- McKisack, M. "The parliamentary representation of King's Lynn before 1500", English Historical Review, XLII (1927), 593-9.
- Millack, W. "Danzigs Handelsbeziehungen zu England", Danzigs Handel in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. ed. H. Bauer and W. Millack, Danzig: A.W. Kafemann GmbH., 1925, pp. 80-97.
- Müller, J. "Handel und Verkehr Bremens im Mittelalter: Teil 2", Bremisches Jahrbuch, XXX (1927), 1-107.
- Munro, J.H. "The costs of Anglo-Burgundian Interdependence", Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, XLVI (1969), 1228-38.
- "An Economic Aspect of the collapse of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance, 1428-1442", English Historical Review, CCCXXXV (1970), 225-44.
- Murawski, K.E. Zwischen Tannenberg und Thorn. Göttingen: Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1953.
- Myers, A.R. "Parliamentary Petitions in the fifteenth Century", English Historical Review, LII (1937), 385-405, 590-613.
- "The Outbreak of War between England and Burgundy in February 1471", Bulletin of Historical Research, XXXII (1960), 114-15.
- Neumann, G. "Hansische Politik und Politiker bei den Utrechter Friedensverhandlungen", Frühformen englisch-deutscher Handelspartnerschaft. ed. K. Friedland, Köln/Wien: Hansische Geschichtsverein, 1976, pp. 25-59.
- Oppenheim, M. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy. Hamden Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1961, (London, 1896).
- Pagel, K. Die Hanse. 2nd ed., Braunschweig: Georg Westermann Verlag, 1963.
- Pantin, W.A. "The Merchants' Houses and Warehouses of King's Lynn", Medieval Archaeology, VI-VII (1962), 173-21.
- Pauli, R. "Die Haltung der Hansestädte in den Rosen-Kriegen", HGBll., 1874 (1975), 75-105.
- "Der Hansische Stahlhof in London", Bilder aus Alt-England. 2nd ed., Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1876, pp. 168-21.

Postan, M.M. Medieval Trade and Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

Power, E. "The English Wool Trade in the reign of Edward IV", Cambridge Historical Journal, II (1926), 17-35.

Power, E. and Postan, M.M., eds. Studies in English Trade in the Fifteenth Century. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1933.

Purcell, D. "Der hansische 'Steelyard' in King's Lynn, Norfolk", Hanse in Europa: Brücke zwischen den Märkten 12.-17. Jahrhundert. Köln: Kölnisches Stadtmuseum, 1973, pp. 108-12.

Ramsey, G.D. English Overseas Trade during the Centuries of Emergence. London: Macmillan and Co., 1957.

Ramsey, P. "Overseas Trade in the reign of Henry VII", EcHR., 2nd series VI (1953), 173-82.

Richards, W. The History of Lynn, civil, ecclesiastical, political, commercial, biographical, municipal, and military, from the earliest accounts to the present time. Lynn, 1912. 2 vols.

Richmond, C.F. Royal Administration and the keeping of the Seas in the fifteenth Century, 1442-1495. unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1963.

"The keeping of the Seas during the Hundred Years War 1422-40", History, XLIX (1964), 293-98.

"English Naval Power in the 15th Century", History, LII (1967), 1-15.

Rörig, F. Wirtschaftskräfte im Mittelalter. Köln/Craz: Böhlau Verlag, 1959.

Rosenberg, H. "The Rise of the Junkers in Brandenburg Prussia 1410-1653", American Historical Review, XLIX (1943), 1-22, (1944), 229-42.

Roskell, J.S. "The Social Composition of the Commons in a fifteenth Century Parliament", Bulletin of Historical Research, XXIV (1951), 152-72.

The Commons in the Parliament of 1422. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954.

The Commons and their Speakers in English Parliaments 1376-1523. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965.

- Ross, C. Edward IV. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.
- Ruffmann, K.H. "Engländer und Scotten in den Seestädten Ost-und Westpreussens", Zeitschrift für Ostforschung, VII (1959), 17-39.
- Rülke, F. Die Verlagerung der Handelswege zwischen 1450 und 1550 und ihre Rückwirkung auf die deutsche Hanse. D.Phil. thesis, Hannover, 1971. .
- Salter, F.R. "The Hanse, Cologne and the Crisis of 1468", EcHR., III (1931), 93-101.
- Salzman, L.F. English Trade in the Middle Ages. London: H. Pordes, 1964.
- Samsonowicz, H. Untersuchungen über das Danziger Bürgerkapital in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts. Abhandlungen zur Handels-und Sozialgeschichte VIII, Weimar: Hansische Geschichtsverein, 1969.
- Scammell, G.V. "English Merchant Shipping at the end of the Middle Ages: Some East Coast Evidence", EcHR., 2nd series XIII (1961), 327-41.
- "Shipowning in England 1450-1550", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series XII (1962), 105-22.
- Schäfer, D. Die Hanse und ihre Handelspolitik. Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1885.
- Die deutsche Hanse. Monographien zur Weltgeschichte XIX, Bielefeld/Leipzig: Velhagen und Klasing, 1914.
- Schanz, G. Englische Handelspolitik gegen Ende des Mittelalters. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1891. 2 vols.
- Schildhauer, J., Fritze, K., Stark, W., eds. Die Hanse. 4th ed., Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1981.
- Schulz, F. Die Hanse und England: von Eduards III. bis auf Heinrichs VIII. Zeit. Abhandlungen zur Verkehrs-und Seegeschichte V, Berlin: Hansische Geschichtsverein, 1911.
- Simson, P. Der Artushof in Danzig und seine Bruderschaften, die Banken. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1969, (Danzig, 1900).
- Geschichte der Stadt Danzig bis 1626. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1967, (Danzig, 1913-24). 3 vols.

Smolarek, P. "Gdansk, sein Handel und seine Schifffahrt vom 14. bis 17. Jahrhundert", Hanse in Europa: Brücke zwischen den Märkten 12. bis 17. Jahrhundert. Köln: Kölnisches Stadtmuseum, 1973, pp. 235-50.

Spading, K. "Zu den Ursachen für das Eindringen der Holländer in das hansische Zwischenhandelsmonopol im 15. Jahrhundert", Neue Hansische Studien. ed. K. Fritze, E. Müller-Mertens, J. Schildhauer, E. Voigt, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1970, pp. 227-42.

Stark, W. "Die Danziger Pfahlkammerbücher 1468-1476", Rostocker Beiträge. N.F. I, Regionalgeschichtliches Jahrbuch der Mecklenburgischen Seestädte, Rostock, 1967.

Lübeck und Danzig in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. Jahrhunderts. Abhandlungen zur Handels- und Sozialgeschichte XI, Weimar: Hansische Arbeitsgemeinschaft der deutschen Historiker-Gesellschaft, 1973.

Stein, W. Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Hanse. Giessen: J. Ricker'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1900.

Die Hanse und England: ein hansisch-englischer Seekrieg im 15. Jahrhundert. Pfingstblätter des hansischen Geschichtsvereins I, 1905.

"Die Hanse und England beim Ausgang des hundertjährigen Krieges", MGBl., XLVI (1921), 27-126.

Stieda, W. "Schiffregister", MGBl., 1894 (1925), 77-115.

Tennenhaus, M. "Hanseatic Merchants in England: I - Boston", Transactions of the Monumental Brass Society, XI (1974), 189-97.

Thiélmans, M.R. Bourgogne et Angleterre: relations politiques et économiques entre les Pays-Bas Bourguignons et l'Angleterre, 1180-1190. Brussels. Presses universitaires de Bruxelles, 1966.

Thompson, P. The History and Antiquities of Boston. Boston: John Noble, Jun., 1866.

Thrupp, S.L. The Merchant Class of medieval London 1300-1500. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

"Aliens in and around London in the Fifteenth Century", Studies in London History. ed. A.E.J. Hollaender and W. Kellaway, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969, pp. 251-72.

Vollbehr, F. Die Holländer und die deutsche Hanse. Pfingstblätter des hansischen Geschichtsvereins XXI, 1930.

Wedgwood, J., ed. History of Parliament. vol. 1 : Biographies of the Members of the House of Commons 1439-1509, London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936.

Weinbaum, M. "Zur Stellung des Fremden im mittelalterlichen England", Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, XLVI (1931), 360-78.

Weise, E. Das Widerstandsrecht im Ordenslande Preussen und das mittelalterliche Europa. Veröffentlichungen der Niedersächsischen Archivverwaltung VI, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1955.

"Die Hanse, England und die Merchant Adventurers: Das Zusammenwirken von Köln und Danzig", Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins, XXXI-XXXII (1956-57), 137-64.

Werner, T.G. "Der Stalhof der deutschen Hanse in London in wirtschafts-und kunsthistorischen Bildwerken", Scripta Mercaturae, II (1973), 127 pp.

Werverke, H. van Miscellanea Mediaevalia. Gent: E. Story - Scientia P.V.B.A., 1968.

Williams, C.H. "A Norfolk parliamentary election 1461", English Historical Review, XL (1925), 79-86.

Winter, H. Das Hanseschiff im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert. Rostock: VEB Hinstorff Verlag, 1961.

Wodderspoon, J. Memorials of the ancient town of Ipswich, in the county of Suffolk. Ipswich/London: Pawsey/Long, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1850.