SOME RECENT ETHICAL TENDENCIES
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PERIODICALS.


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ETHICS OF IDEALISM.
The purpose of this Thesis is to give a brief outline of the different contributions made by Philosophical, Evolutionary, Sociological and Reforming Ethics, towards furnishing the first principles of a philosophy of Ethics on which to base an Ideal. The Idealist's position is well put by Thomas Hill Green. Therefore, we have started with a statement of "Green's" Ethics as given in his prolegomena, and appended some slight criticisms thereto, the intention being chiefly to find out how far Green's Ideal is a true and lasting one, and how it can be made applicable to the needs of men. Had we in our quest found the "criterion" in the Metaphysics of Green, further search would have been rendered unnecessary in the other sections. Green, however, leads us, we think, well on in the search and furnishes us with many important and workable ideas, though he does not give a final solution. We are forever indebted to him for such a lofty presentation. The evolutionary point of view also helps, though not so adequately as the former, and we leave it with the impression of a physical standard being put forward as
the "ens realissimum." It served its purpose, however, and drew attention to what otherwise might have been neglected. With the sociological, we feel ourselves in living contact with the present once again and are carried along in a practical way with some of Green's conclusions. Here we meet the socialistic propaganda, which has to be reckoned with, and see the strength and the weakness of a movement that claims an ever-growing body of adherents who see in it the panacea for all social ills and a sure hope for the future. The sociological aspect naturally leads us to a consideration of the Ethics of Reform, and our goal comes very near as we begin to see what keeps many men from a more earnest pursuit of the Ideal.

In conclusion, our fifth section asks what our position is at the present day and tries to show how far the former strivings after the Ideal, as given in the different sciences, have been realized, and how our problem now stands. We thus, at the beginning, see that there are many competing authorities, and the solution is expressed very differently by each. Our study, how-
ever, is of real practical value, for out of so many attempts to give a criterion for the discovery and attainment of "The Ideal," one or more will be found of real help in deciding the attitude a moral man should adopt in dealing with practical problems.
Every art and system, and in like manner every action and choice, aims, it is thought, at some good; for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of the Chief Good is, "that which all things aim at." Such are the opening words of Aristotle's treatise on Ethics, and this ideal, according to him, is nearest of attainment in those who "act with a rational soul in accordance with virtue."

1. All forms of Idealism are common in refusing to look upon the material process as the ultimate character of reality—so far as reality is known or knowable. This holds true of the Great Idealists of all time e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc., and coming very near to our own day we find Green practically voicing the same sentiment as Aristotle did in his remote age. "For" says Green, "the essential element in the nature of man is the rational or spiritual principle within him." We will endeavor to shew in these next few pages how, according to Green, this rational principle is to attain the "Chief Good" of Aristotle.

2. Sorley, p. 87.
Green's problem starts from the apparent opposition between the scientific conception of the world as a system of casually connected objects in space and time, and the fundamental ideas of morality and religion; ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality. The basis for his ethical theory is sought in what he calls a "Meta-physic of Morals," and a conclusion in regard to the relation between man and nature is reached, that man knows nature by "something" which is not nature— a consciousness of nature as an object of thought. This consciousness, Green terms, "the spiritual nature of man." Green argues that nature itself implies a spiritual principle— something in which plurality is held in unity— an all embracing unity. Sidgwick's criticism of this is that Green passes from the affirmation of analogous action to the affirmation of identical quality, and says that nature in its reality implies not only an all-unity agency, which is not natural, but a thinking, self-distinguishing consciousness like our own.

From these two postulates of his metaphysic, Green thinks he has sufficient data to say, "This uniform
order of nature, and our knowledge of that order, have a common source in a Spiritual knowledge." He therefore states Kant's version of the metaphysic in these words, "Nature, then, implies a non-natural principle, which we may call a self-distinguishing consciousness, and which cannot be subject to the relations it establishes between phenomena, e.g., cannot be in time and space—cannot be material or moved. This is very vague, and does not form a very sure foundation for him to build his Ethic on, and we will see as we progress that this is a constant source of trouble to him.

On such slender basis Green then goes on to say that "this consciousness as active even in simple perception is not a series of phenomena." So he argues, "there exists an eternal consciousness in man, the basis of acts which all admit he can perform." Green endeavors to make this eternal principle harmonize with the fact of a gradual growth of consciousness, but there seems to be no reason in creating a part, the whole of which already exists, and the eternal consciousness is necessarily conceived as "unalterable." It is eternally, in reality, all that the human spirit is in possibility, and there are no
conceivable perfections that could be added to it: so the process of man's moral effort is surely futile if it is to end in nothing but the existence of that which already exists. Green is partly right in his ascribing only a potentiality to man's consciousness working under the limitations of time and animal organism, but he does not really separate man's consciousness and the Eternal consciousness, which he would have to do, to make his point good. According to Green, the universe is an inheritance into which we gradually enter, final possession being not yet, and the "self communication" to us of the eternal consciousness can never be complete because made in time through the series of sensuous events. The connection, however, between the series and the eternal consciousness is a matter that would be hard to demonstrate on his own theory— that nature and the eternal consciousness are quite separate. This Spiritual principle in nature, and man's relation to it, are not as clearly shewn as Green thought he had done.

Thus Green endeavors to base his ethic on a lofty metaphysical theory of one conscious Intelligence,
by whom revealed unity of nature is created, and for whom it exists, the spirit of man being a reproduction of this eternal timeless spirit. Though Green does not prove his first contention, yet we feel he is right to a certain extent in his idea of man being a reproduction of the eternal timeless spirit, or some ultimate ground like this, otherwise nature could not be the same for every person in unity and objectivity, and morality have its root in the same principle.

From the Metaphysic we turn to the Ethical portion of Green's enquiry. For Green, the freedom of man is intelligence. Man a "free cause," "Cause" because he is operative in this world; "Free" because not operative as a link in a chain of cause and effect in the ordinary sense of the term. Man is free, in the sense except that his activity cannot be explained by reference to itself. It is self-originated. We understand it only through our own exercise of it." When Green comes to the Freedom of the Will, we see his idea of will and reason being intimately connected, but not completely coinciding until the ideal is realized. The question of moral

1. Fairbrother, p.55.
2. Ibid, p.55.
freedom is referred to the origin of motives, the form conditioned by past presentations, these presentations being timeless acts, in which the self identifies itself with some desire. We would ask, what does Green mean by a timeless act? Can there be such an act? How are such presented to us? Empirically conditioned functions and processes are as much essential to man, and as much a part of him as his knowledge is. Man's very essential nature consists in the self-consciousness which distinguishes itself from what is around him. A timeless act can have no meaning for sentient beings. Green leaves the question in a very vague fashion.

From the Metaphysic and Freewill side of the Prolegomena we turn to what after all was the real purpose of Green in his writing, viz.—to a consideration of the "Moral Ideal" and "Moral Progress." Green has taught to this point, "that the essential element in the nature of man is the rational or spiritual principle within him," and that in all man's appetites there is always present more or less implicitly, the consciousness of an end, the reason of man helping to seek out the end

1. Rogers, p.283
2. Mackenzie, p.248
desired." The significance of the moral life, therefore, consists in the constant endeavor to make this principle more and more explicit, i.e., to bring out more and more completely our rational, self-conscious, spiritual nature.

This, then, is the problem Green puts before us, and we will endeavor to see what is his ideal and how far it is valid and realizable. We spoke in a previous passage of Green's theory of the will. The distinction between the "good" and the "bad" will, is, he says, the basis of Ethics. A criterion is necessary to tell us what is a good, and what a bad, will. Green criticizes the Hedonists and Kant. "The Kantian theory, which derives the goodness of the action from the nature and ignores the effect, cannot be accepted in its entirety, because a will is not completely good unless it realizes its objects." Green's criticism is well founded, "For," 1 says he, "it is on the specific difference of the objects willed under the general form of self-satisfaction that the quality of the will must depend." The motive and the effect cannot be totally separated, for a fanatic seeking to injure others, according to Kant, would have a good

1. Rogers, p. 284. Prolegomena, p. 175
2. Prolegomena, p. 175
will though his motive would result in bad effects to some persons. The Hedonists, on the other hand, lay stress on the pleasurable effects, regarding the motives as of secondary importance. This only needs to be stated to see its inadequacy, for "although in all desire self-satisfaction is sought, and although in self-satisfaction there is pleasure, it does not follow that the object desired is pleasure." Many desire things that will really bring a certain amount of pain. Hedonism involves the denial of an intrinsic difference between the good and bad will. The grounds of this denial will not bear examination. "Good", therefore, being defined by Green as that which satisfies desire, "true good" or "moral good," will be that which satisfies a moral agent as such. But we would ask what is the criterion for telling a moral agent from an immoral one? Green states that this good, in its "fulness", is present to a divine consciousness, that the idea of it has been the spring of progress hitherto and is the condition of further moral effort; but he does not show us here the process of the union of the human and the divine consciousness by which the "end" or the "fulness"

3. Green, p.179.
4. Ibid 194.
is known to man. The only real and lasting satisfac-
tion we can get, is not in selfish ends or mere
pleasure, but in the search for satisfaction in de-
votion to an end absolutely desirable. This would
imply the "union of developed will with developed
reason;" reason being given a certain preference,
because as rightly developed it has the initiative
of all virtue, but no first principles on which to
base action are given.

The Moral Ideal, says Green, has a

By "personal" Green means the divine principle of
improvement operates in individuals. It must be
personal, "progress of personal character to person-
al character," but it is also true that man is part
of a whole, and apart from the whole, or nature, the
individual is an abstraction. Yet it is equally
ture that a nation, and national spirit, represent-
ing a whole, is also an abstraction unless it exists
in persons. The realization of human personality
means its realization in a society. This, of course,
we cannot get away from. Of these different person-
alities, we may say each has a difference of function, yet each function finds its unity in the end aimed at, viz., the fulfilment of the idea of humanity, i.e., devotion to the perfection of man. Green here sees the "form" of that end to be realized, as identical with the idea already realized in the Eternal mind, becoming operative in us by presenting to us an unconditioned good, and also by laying on us an unconditional law of conduct. The good, is the good will, or the object of the good will. The circle is inevitable for the good will necessarily appears as both end and means in an agent whose development is governed by an ideal of his own perfection. The practical value of the idea of good as a criterion will be dealt with later.

This brings us logically to Green's central idea - i.e., self-realization as the idea of the end or unconditioned good. This includes the good of others, as well as of ourselves, and this general social requirement we now know enough of to be in entire agreement with Green. On the question of the end to be aimed at, being self-realization we will have some criticism to offer.
Green traces the extension of the area of common good, from the few, to the many. This is the humanitarian idea, and perhaps best expresses the great advance of modern ethics over Greek ideals, the two having much in common, yet differing widely in extent of application. The Kantian maxim "Treat humanity as an end," and the increased sociological outlook in our times, are expressions of this wider ideal which the Greeks lacked.

Now, this "Moral Progress" is not only the widening of the range of persons whose common good is sought, but the gradual determination of the content of the idea of good. This is not, says Green, the idea of a greatest sum of pleasure, for a sum of pleasure cannot be enjoyed; each successive enjoyment of pleasure brings us no nearer to the good pursued. This quarrel with Hedonism, as Sidgwick points out, leads Green to many "that a paradox, especially the "greatest sum of pleasure," is intrinsically devoid of meaning." Sidgwick says, "The man who has philosophized himself into so serious a quarrel with the conditions of human existence that he cannot be satisfied with the prospect of never-ending bliss because

1. Prolegomena, p.177, f.f.
its parts have to be enjoyed successively, and under the conditions of being successively desired, such a man, I venture to think, is not a typical, right-thinking man."

Green shews that a common basis in the social well-being is due to an interest in persons capable of a like interest, i.e., an interest in Virtue.

The only good that is really common is the good will, and furthermore, Green says, "If the idea of the community of good for all men has even now little influence, the reason is that we identify the good too little with good character and too much with good things."

In working out the development of the moral ideal and considering the Greek and modern conceptions of Virtue, we see Green's agreement with Plato and Aristotle, who insist that the condition and unity of all virtue lies in the conscious direction of the will to the human good, an exercise of the virtues themselves, the spring of action being a "final" not an "efficient" cause.

There are many points in Green which admit of criticism. Green teaches that the essential element in the nature of man is the rational or spiritual principle within him, but, for Green, the true, or real iden-

2. Prolegomena, p.287.
tity of the self is not present "prima facie" in the intermittent consciousness of man, yet according to him it is essential.

1. The description of the one Divine mind, which gradually reproduces itself in the human soul, is not represented with any other constant characteristics, beyond those of being a unifying, self-distinguishing, "self-objectifying consciousness." If this is the

2. "Ideal" for human consciousness, then it certainly does not give an ideal of holiness, of an infinitely and perfectly good will, and it is open to the charge of being too intellectual.

We have seen that Green wrongly affirms identical quality for analogous action in his idea of a spiritual principle in nature corresponding to a spiritual principle implied in all human knowledge. As for the ideal as "Self-Realization" Sidgwick asks pertinently, "How is this self-realization of the Divine Principle in man—i.e., of the one divine mind, which gradually reproduces itself in the human soul, philosophically known?"

1. Bosanquet P.A.S. 1902, p.22,
2. Prolegomena Ch.2. Bk 3.
and "What definite and reasoned content can be given to this notion of a divine spirit?" Green in Bk.1, intends to show this, but I do not think it can be claimed that he is successful in his attempt.

Moral good, too, he defined as "an end in which the effort of a moral agent may really find rest;" moral good, and a moral agent, what is to be the criterion of each, and when we find it, is the end to be rest? We are unable to imagine any permanent satisfaction in a state of rest. It is not what our natural experience leads us to estimate very highly as a lasting state of affairs. Happiness is a continual fresh emergence of desire. We are like Alexander sighing for more worlds to conquer. Green says, "I cannot realize good for myself without promoting the good of others to some degree," but this does not make the good of humanity my good. As Sidgwick also remarks, "It remains true that to most persons the dissatisfaction caused by the idea of the imperfection of other beings, not connected with them by some special bond of sympathy, is at any rate an evil, very faintly perceptible, and the question why in this case they should sacrifice any material part of their own

good or perfection to avoid it remains unanswered." Again
Green says, "The idea of a true good does not admit of the
distinction between, good for self, and good for others," but
Green in his example of the ideally just man shews that
there is a need for investigation before every action, but
why, if there is no distinction?

Sidgwick criticises Green's moral ideal, of
"habitual self-denial" and the "self-sacrificing will."
"If", says Sidgwick, "all self-conscious agents are always
aiming each at his own good, or self-satisfaction, and the
most virtuous man only differs from the most vicious in
that he seeks it with a truer insight into its nature, how
can he, in the strictness of philosophical discourse, be
said to "deny" or "sacrifice" himself in so seeking it."

This is chiefly an attack on Green's Psychology as expounded
in Book 2, but we fancy that Green means here the sacri-
ficing of the present desire for a future good, and this
often requires highly developed powers of self-denial, for
it is ever true, "facilis descensus Averni" and the road to
the stars is not always at first sight an inviting one.

Following on the philosophy of Kant and Hegel,

Green uses the principle of the rational self, which is, after all, almost purely intellectual, but hardly moral, for many things can be done knowingly and yet be wrong.

Green, however, admits the vagueness of this principle and this rational self. He always refers to it as being only fully present in the Eternal consciousness, and is therefore for man an "Ideal."

MacKenzie says, "The true self is best described as the rational self. The universe we occupy in our moments of deepest wisdom and insight" and "to live completely in that universe would be to understand completely the world in which we live and our relations to it," and "to act constantly in the light of that understanding." "This Mackenzie admits" would be impossible."

All that we can do is to endeavor to promote this understanding more and more in ourselves and others, and to act more and more in a way that is consistent with the promotion of this understanding. This would be best accomplished by making known to all, the full content of that universe. We do not see here any real moral principle.

2. " p.252.
As to the Ideal, as self-realization, this is easily seen to be only partially true. This, according to Green, is put off until we reach out into the eternal self-consciousness. Little is apparently made of the present active self, which, as Dewey well says, "is always a concrete specific activity." The self is here and now. One idea of this self which is here criticised is that of its being a "supposed fixed outline-schema, while realization consists in filling up this schema- a self "to be" realized," while all the time the only self I am, or anybody else is conscious of, is the living present self; and in respect of realizing capacity, it means to act "concretely, not abstractly" to make the act which has to be performed an activity of the entire present self. As Dewey puts it, we must "cease conceiving of Education as mere preparation for later life, and make of it the full meaning of the present life. Let every act be an outlet of the whole self." So therefore self-

different ways, not all of them moral." This is a mistake Green makes at the beginning and the criterion for self-realization is lacking, Green's great omission. He does suggest that good can be distinguished from evil by its permanence, but we would have to see the end of acts to know of their permanency, and it does not supply us with a working ideal for the present, and some, Shakespeare, for example, seem to think the permanency is on the side of evil. "The evil that men do, lives after them, the good is oft interred with their bones." In any case, "this true good is not a part of experience, for we never attain to it."

The standard, as self-realization according to Green, involves the complete realization and satisfaction of the capacities of the individual, also involving the idea of a common good in the attainment of which all moral beings may co-operate, "the identification of himself with others, in whose continued life he contemplates himself as living." This was true in primitive society and remains true today as an ideal of social good. The self to be realized is fundamentally a social self.

1. Sorley, p. 89.
4. Rogers, p.284.
Goodness, however, cannot be confined to the realm of ends, or of the self-realized, and both Bradley and Green are at fault here.

We have seen that Green represents the Ethics of Idealism and that he has two definite theories, (a) Metaphysical, (b) Personal Idealism. Green works upon the first much in the same way as Kant's Synthetic Unity of Apperception, or as he would put it, The eternal consciousness representing itself in us. This in its bald literalism may easily be, and has been, attacked, but I am not prepared to give it up altogether. Green's fault here is undoubtedly that he placed far too much emphasis on the metaphysic. Ethics should not be founded on a particular theory of philosophy. It has facts of its own, which can be stated and also interpreted in its own way, though beyond experience there is something upon which the ethical theory stands. It also has in its "Intellectual self as subject and as object" an element that is disintegrating, and the source of many of the actual disorders of society, and also the source of the practical contradiction which was the stimulus to modern ethics, for "if each person is of infinite worth he is entirely justified in pursuing his own good; and for the same reason, he should
sacrifice himself for the good of others, since they likewise are of infinite worth."

1. In the personal Idealism, Green gives us an ideal which you think out to the fullest extent before your Ideal is reached, which is a far too intellectualistic method of reaching an Ideal and one which is not based apparent­ly on the Volitional side of man. All the time we feel that the eternal consciousness is according to Green working silently and effectively in humanity. This philosophy, is inclined, we think, to make man too passive. The stren­uous effort of man, absolutely necessary if true growth is to be attained, finds only a limited outlet here. By this method man may come to be merely a quiescent part of the directing whole. The definite choice of man between different motives has a rather vague meaning in such a philoso­phy. Are "Right" and "Wrong" thought of as possible defini­tions for conduct? We think that on Green's own state­ments, the eternal consciousness can only choose the right.

The Ideal is called the Good. Modern Ethics has advanced from this position of a vaguely defined good to one which brings out very definite distinctions between actions which can never be neutral, but which are either

1. Rogers p.239.
right or wrong. Though Green previously has said the distinction between the good and the bad will is the basis of Ethics, the distinction is not brought out clearly at all.

We, however, are indebted to "Green" for an Idealism which lays very special emphasis on things which are not material. Still more valuable was it in a day when Evolution and Materialism were very much in evidence. He made a definite attempt to base philosophy on first principles. The moral life is shewn to be more intrinsic, and less of a pursuit on Hedonistic lines. The performance of duty gives the highest satisfaction to a rational being who really thinks about the matter, while merely pleasure-able feeling may leave a man dulled to all the finer impulses of his nature. Green's conclusion that the ultimate good or human perfection is "desirable consciousness" contains much truth in it, even though the "desirable consciousness include some pain, for

Better to stem with heart and hand
The roaring tide of life, than lie,
Unmindful, on its flowery strand,
Of God's occasions drifting by!
Better with naked nerve to bear
The needles of this goading air,
Than, in the lap of sensual ease, forego
The Godlike power to do, the Godlike aim
to know.

1.

1. Whittier "Last Walk in Autumn."
ETHICS OF EVOLUTION.
Evolutionary theories when first brought forward caused not a little stir in many circles. They seemed to be subversive of teachings almost hallowed by time. We can look back on the period with dispassionate air now and view the results of Evolution with calm consideration, especially as the science is now capable of some measurement, and some very definite results can be tabulated. In its widest sense, "Evolution signifies the unfolding or development of the manifestly complex from apparently simple forms. The seed, for example, in its Evolution becomes a tree, though to human eyes it is a far less complex structure; and the modern state is "evolved" from simpler and more primitive forms of government. We also might describe Evolution as a transition from a possibility to an actuality. This term "Evolution" as used by Darwin and Spencer, includes growth of races and institutions as well as of individuals. The only thing wanting to give definiteness to the term is to state some "principle" by which this growth takes place. This principle may be either a purely mechanical law, such as "The survival of the fittest" or an
ideal end, which the mind in nature is aiming at. With Darwin, who was chiefly interested in the physical evolution of species, the process is a struggle for existence and the unfit are eliminated by a process of natural selection. He also drew attention to the possibility of accounting for the existence of moral instincts in the same way. Herbert Spencer endeavored to apply this idea of Evolution, not only Biologically but Ethically and also Sociologically. According to Spencer, the objective end imposed by Nature is Life; of the individual organism, and of the race. Spencer defines Life as the "continuous adjustment of internal relations to External relations." He develops the idea of the Evolution of Conduct at some length from the physical, the biological, the psychological and the sociological points of view. In each of these, we are told that in the course of Evolution through survival of the fittest, organisms acquire the useful power of adapting their actions to various ends, such as the acquisition of nourishment or the avoidance of danger. These adaptations are "Conduct" — which again evolves further as the ends multiply. In the last stages of the Evolution, which is represented by the human race, Ethics has for its

1. Spencer, The Data of Ethics.
subject matter, the form which conduct takes. Actions are called good or bad, according as they tend to further or to hinder the completeness of human life. Spencer holds a hedonistic view, saying that Life is good or bad in respect to the pleasure in it; pleasure being the test of conduct. Around the Evolutionary theory there sprang up many ideas of the growth of conduct. It seemed to open up new possibilities altogether of tracing the genesis and growth of morality. There was also a corresponding widespread belief that the evolutionary descent of man meant levelling him with the brutes, and some thought this theory would be destructive of ethics. Darwinism, at the time, seemed to say "yes," and certainly Evolutionary writers tried to minimise very much the gap between man and the lower animals, though they quite forgot that when all had been said and done, man was man, and brute was brute still, and if they were akin, it made very little difference to our estimate of morals, for "whatever the brute may be, we know what man is; and our estimate of our own moral experience could not logically suffer should we discover that all animate nature shared it with us."  

1. Nature had seemingly been reduced to some very simple,

direct, unchanging principles. But on further investiga-
tion what was thought simple, revealed a marvellous com-
plexity, and so the attempt to strip morality of its veil
of peculiar mystery by bringing its phenomena into re-
lation with the concrete facts of biology, and the state-
ment of some simple principles, was not successful, for
the concrete facts were not so easily analysed as at
first sight seemed possible. Both Herbert Spencer and
Leslie Stephen had said, that the essential part played
by intelligence in the moral life is simply the recogni-
tion of certain forms of co-operation which had existed
prior to the supervention of intelligence, but they had
committed the dangerous error of conceiving the signifi-
cance of morality as exhausted in its material conditions.
They confused the external limits of morality with its
inner content and also they had an idea of the "imper-
manence of the sentiment of moral obligation;" "morality," they claimed, "was a mode of re-adjustment!" These gener-
al conceptions of organic evolution, especially those of
the Darwinian Theory, hardly provide adequate principles
for the statement and solution of the problem of Ethics.
We might almost say of conduct on their supposition, that

it just "grows" especially in view of their opinion that "good conduct in general, represents a more advanced stage of Evolution than bad conduct."

The difficulty regarding Darwin's tracing of morality to the social instinct, is, that in the genesis of a moral consciousness all the secondary factors, religious feeling, instruction, habit, etc. are not accounted for - he admits that morality is really too complex to be followed out, and we have no reason to suppose any of the lower animals have this moral capacity - while we can make certain affirmation that man has. Darwin admits this moral sense is man's possession alone, and its genesis is not explained by him. He admitted the inconclusiveness of his findings for the field of ethics. As we have already stated the essence of life according to Spencer, as seen in its lowest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations, i.e., the constant effort of an organism to adapt itself to its environment, progressive adjustment making for "good conduct," and this good conduct bringing a surplus of agreeable feeling; the end desired being

1. Laguna, P.R. 1905 Vol.4.
2. Descent of Man "Darwin" Chap.4.
gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure in some manner is a very definite element of the conception. Spencer in his "Inductions of Ethics" thought that Evolutionary Ethics could tell a man definitely what actions he ought to do to bring about certain results, but when we look into his four points of view previously mentioned, we find them most confusing. He bases too much on the theory of adaptation, and the apparent influence of environment, but both these differ very much in their application to man and the lower animals, for "our environment is not fixed, and we may be adapted to-day and not to-morrow." Where do we get the standard for adaptation? Moreover, if nature compels us to go in a certain direction, we have no power of choosing one line of conduct rather than another. In this light, his statement, "The performance of every function is in a sense a moral obligation," has no basis for giving a criterion between right and wrong, for morality implies a definite choice of different lines of action, and also this moral obligation is, according to Spencer to disappear. "The sense of duty, or moral obligation in transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases."

1. Mackenzie, p.239
2. Rogers, p.263.
3. Spencer Ph of Ethics, Ch.7.
Both Darwin and Spencer are at fault in not making a clear distinction between the origin and growth of moral ideals and judgments, and their validity. The earliest beginnings of the moral consciousness are hidden in obscurity: and on the other hand we can scarcely form a clear conception of a perfectly developed moral life, "we know it only in the course of its development." There is, moreover, a very definite moral judgment between right and wrong which has no satisfactory account given of it by Spencer. However, though he does not state it in so many words, yet he still has a governing "ideal" clearly implied in the distinction he makes between absolute morality and relative morality; absolute morality being the morality of the completely adapted social state of the future, and relative morality our present state—Where we get an Ideal in Evolution after this statement is hard to see. It seems just the opposite; that we judge evolution by an Ideal which is present in and for ourselves apart from Evolution altogether.

2. The term "The survival of the fittest" is one that seems to sum up a great deal of Evolutionary teaching, and is one that can be attacked on the ground of its

1. Mackenzie p. 236.
2. Rogers p. 275.
undue emphasis, as later found in Nietzsche, on the physical side of life. The biologically "fittest to survive" are not necessarily the ethically best, and this needs no further argument we feel in these present days. Even if Spencer could prove that actions biologically good, and actions ethically good, coincide in the limits of evolution, the two conceptions are radically different. For Ethics it is the character of life, not life "per-se", that is good or bad. The defect in this type of Naturalism is that it lays stress on the origin, and possible effects in prolonging or shortening the life of the human race, and has little or no concern with the true worth of ethical ideals. This attitude may well be compared with Nietzsche, who would have us believe that the world as a whole is amoral, and without a goal or purpose. It is an artistic phenomenon that will recur eternally. Certainly if we adopt such an attitude, we could agree with him that the chief thing is to get the most out of life that is possible, in the way of producing the superman, and with this end in view all lesser lights must act as servants if possible, and where no service can be exacted, be destroyed, as hindering the onward march of the superman. At what is

the superman to aim? The far distant joy of this future superior being will surely not be consummated unless the goal he reaches is a final one, and it passes comprehension that a race of supermen will remain long without some falling behind the others, and so come under the same pitiless law which is supposed to enable the superman to come into his own. The ruthlessness of all Nietzsche's teachings in this direction come home to us with especial force, at a time when it would seem that an attempt to create a superman, or a race of supermen, with the "will to power" as a leading idea was, in actual process of being worked to its fullest extent. It is all so easy to attack, and our first inclination is to do so, but we realize that Nietzsche had a very sheltered life, that he never had to work hard, to "slave," that he had no insight into the lives of the humble and poor, and his frail health probably made him write things he did not give his full mental assent to. To him morality would appear at times as simply a question of physical strength, for every religion, every system of morals or politics, which is hostile to life, that is, which delays the coming of the superman, must be abolished. Man's "Will to power" is the essential thing to be striven for. However, Nietzsche's philosophy is to
some extent only intended for the "higher man." The present day morality is still to exist for the masses, it supplies them with "the pillars of their existence and the soporific appliances towards happiness." While many of his precepts ought to be ideals to the masses, yet to follow his teaching would lead inevitably to a reign of anarchy such as the world has never yet seen. War is started as a biological necessity, an indispensable regulator in the life of mankind. "War" said Heraclitus, "is the father of all things." Nietzsche's own words are "War and courage have done more great things than the love to the neighbor," this being said with the idea of a certain fitness of the stronger nation, but is this borne out? War selects the fittest, but selects them for destruction, and an appeal to history will surely prove that nations who were most warlike are not in the ascendant—either morally, spiritually, or physically. Nietzsche surely forgot that the greatest victories are moral ones, that "Vincit Qui Se Vincit," and that history records countless instances of victorious emperors and generals who were moral wrecks. "Better is he that ruleth his spirit, than he that taketh a city." Clearly

1. Nietzsche Maxmillan Mugge p.146.
3. Proverbs 26/32.
"the survival of the fittest" needs some qualifying statements before it can be accepted as a criterion for morality. Evolutionary ethics are inconclusive in their account of morality, and they are not at all agreed among themselves. The mental nature of man is not satisfactorily accounted for, and Huxley himself definitely rejected the idea that morality is explained by Natural Struggle and Natural Selection. The problem as viewed by Evolutionists might be only a descriptive one. The question of definite "rules" for practical guidance receives scant attention, except by Spencer in his social ethics. To describe Ethics is not to give the moral ideal. The two are quite distinct. The purpose of Ethics is to give us this ideal. We are, moreover, always conscious of the dualism between the pursuit of "life" as viewed by Science, and the pursuit of "goodness" as viewed by Ethics. The morality we now have is a reflective morality, even if we grant the past rested upon force, superstition, or anything of a like nature. A point we dealt with elsewhere is that the genesis of mind and also of conscience is not explained by Evolution. The instincts etc. in the lower animals do not seem to merit such terms being applied to them. The superior intelligence and will of man are of a vastly different order. The Ideal
is not shown by any process of Biological Evolution, rather do we interpret Evolution by the ideal of something higher and by which we also can judge Evolution. We agree with Huxley that "sub human nature is not a model for human initiation," for "morality imposes upon the struggle conditions which favor the development and selection of types which in a non moral environment could not survive." "There is a veil of peculiar mystery around morality which cannot be taken away by attempting to bring the phenomena of morality into relation with the concrete facts of biology. Morality is not so to be exhausted in its material conditions. They confuse the external limits of morality with its inner content." The impermanence of morality which they express by saying "morality is a mode of readjustment" is disproved by the fact "that the good man's conscience pricks him for many a fault of which the coarser individual takes no account." The more complex life becomes, the easier becomes the derangement. "Civilized man is in a true sense much more dependent on the good will of all than was the savage—"a much narrower departure from the altruistic norm is sufficient to produce suffering." The truth is as T. De Laguna well puts it

1. Phil. Rev. 1905, July - Nov.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
"that Evolutionary Ethics as a peculiar variety or school has almost ceased to exist. What has emerged from the half century long discussion is a method of research that is used, with more or less freedom, by almost every recent ethical writer of importance. In a word, the time has passed when a moralist can afford to be either for or against Evolutionary Ethics. The term has meant and still means, far too much to be accepted or rejected in the mass—one might as well believe or disbelieve in democracy or socialism."

SOCIological ethics.
The study of conduct leads us inevitably into the study of social life, since we cannot imagine an entirely solitary human being. A man is always a member of some kind of community, and the society to which he is related may help or hinder the development of his life. The virtues of the individual must be considered in respect to the society to which he belongs.

The method of approach must be to some extent historical, for the customs and usages of society have grown both in the inner life of the individual and the collective life of the group. The genetic study is necessary, for we must start with the simple material, and from it seek to know the moral life of to-day in the light of earlier morality. Early group life shows these comparatively simple elements, and the connection with to-day is that these same elements exist but in a finer and more complex form. The three levels of conduct as Dewey and Tufts state them, are:—

1. That which arises from instincts and fundamental needs.
2. Conduct regulated by standards of society—custom.
3. Conduct regulated by standards of social and rational conscience.

This group morality largely controlled its members by custom—"customary morality"—It is "ethical" or "moral" in the sense

1. Dewey and Tufts Ethics.
of conforming to the "ethos" or "mores" of the group, and
the great advance that is made is from "Custom" as an ap­
peal, to "conscience"— from group morality to personal
morality. The sociological aspect manifests itself very
early in the case of co-operation in the varied ways of
human life— gradually emerging in the shape of definite
organization for all the many works in which men engage.
At the same time, there is present the psychological as­
psect which tends to make men feel as individuals and to
assert what we have come to call personality. This
individual appeal to reason, or conscience, results in
newer and better bases for the family, newer moral prin­
ciples for all conduct; a real conception of moral char­
acter and moral personality being brought to conscious­
ness. This has worked out in different ways according
to political development, economic factors and religious
agencies of different peoples, for example—: In the case
of the Hebrews, "Righteousness" was the dominant note,
and this with the Hebrew conception of a personal lawgiver
raised conduct from the level of custom to the level of
conscious morality, a conception such as this tending to
create a sense of personal responsibility, sincerity, and
purity of motive; and finding its expression if not in the
generality of the nation, at least in "The remnant"—The Greek to a large extent lacked this personal appeal. Though the idea of "harmony," "nothing in excess" was a good one, it had in itself very little if anything that would tend to build up racial consciousness. Aristotle has asserted that the state is not merely the goal of the individual's development, but the source of his life. The state of the sphere within which the life of the individual is to be realized; and it is quite late before the stoics begin to think of "the wise man" as one who is bound by no particular social ties, but lives an independent life of his own. The lack of the personal appeal, however, brought about the corresponding lack of a very definite national consciousness. Other instances might be given of an advancement or a retarding of this moral personality by emphasis on the individual or sociological aspect, but it will be sufficient to say that we have learned from studying the moral life through typical epochs of its development something of the social situations in which morality arose, and that we know from Evolutionary Ethics, that the social factor has played a very definite part in the evolution of morality. The individ-

ual and social points of view are still with us, and present an apparent antithesis, but as we shall see in the following pages, that both have elements of right in them. The Sociological idea of Modern Times is connected with the great change from the Individualism of the Eighteenth Century to the Collectivism of the Nineteenth Century. Evolution and heredity seemed to be everything, the individual next to nothing. The broadening out of the several sciences also made for the point of view of society as a whole. The eighteenth century writers emphasised the conscience of the individual, or moral sense, while doubtless believing in man as a social being— but the wider view summed up so well in the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the dominant note of the nineteenth century. The Political Economy of the times also led somewhat naturally to an emphasis upon direct sociological questions, and we have only to read J.S.Mill to realise the very definite transition from the individualistic idea to a new collectivism. The necessity for a science of Social Philosophy receives great emphasis in Mill's writings. In psychology the same tendency can be traces, the individualistic point of view gave way to Herbert Spencer and others, who saw that

the racial factors and those of hereditary influence in mental development must receive due attention. In fact the whole of Experimental Psychology in Germany and England tended to bring about a much broader view of mind than the individualistic. Men were beginning to realize that the true self is not only the rational self, but the social self. The position is summed up by Baldwin who states

1. that the "Ego" is a socius. The Biological and Evolutional conceptions of Sociology find expression in Spencer's idea of the "Social Organism", Society being likened to an organism struggling for life. Prof. Alexander's statement of this, somewhat modifies the idea of the struggle, but the victory has still to be gained. In his case the mind of one man wins rather than the physical superiority of one individual over another.

3. The "Laissez faire" idea of Mill and Adam Smith was also to give way to the larger idea that the state is not only a protector, but a developer and perfecter of the lives of its citizens. This wider view was also emphasised in Religion, Sir R.J. Seeley in "Ecce Homo" defining religion as "a divine enthusiasm for humanity" marking a great advance from the idea of the Salvation of the indiv-

idual soul, an idea not very new to us at the present day, but coming as something quite strange and unfamiliar when Seeley first emphasised it. We have then before us a good deal of evidence to show that the Sociological idea was beginning to occupy the minds of thinking men, and by the end of the century it was paramount. The speculation of previous centuries had given way to a "positive" aspect of life. This aspect finds its expounder in Comte and his positivist philosophy; and to-day there are not wanting many who seek out the ideal through his ideas.

Comte in his Chapters on Social Statics brings out the truth that society forms a whole— the parts standing in closest relation, so that each part acts and re-acts upon the other. Everything is organically connected, and we become socially moral by connecting ourselves and all our actions, with the whole of human existence. Society will become stable when each individual regards himself in connection with the spirit of the whole and acts accordingly. Comte's idea of Social Dynamics rests upon the fact that Society as he saw it was going over to the positive and social point of view— an opportunity should in his opinion be given to all classes in society for mental and moral development. This positive idea brought out the practical application of all things to the life of Society for the purposes of progress and stability. It was a herald of the social

1. Comte "Positive Phil."
trend of to-day and expressed the need of some definite
theory of the social order and of social progress. It
ran riot in its attempt to banish Theology and Philoso-
phy which are just as positive sciences as Sociology can
ever be. Comte's philosophy was bound to have influence,
and we are not surprised to find J.S. Mill's writings shew-
ing some of Comte's influence and bringing forward the
idea of Sociology as social physics, Mill stating that "The
backward state of the moral sciences can only be remedied
by applying to them the methods of physical science duly
extended and generalized." Mill, however, went deeper and
saw that a great change would have to take place in the in-
tellectual convictions of mankind before any definite
science of sociology could be written out. Mill marks
another change of view from the individualistic to the
broader ideal. With Herbert Spencer the Evolutionary
point of view is brought out- His "Ethics" tries to deter-
mine what we mean by conduct and what we mean by calling
conduct good or bad.

The essence of life according to Spencer
consists in "the continuous adjustment of internal relat-
ions to external relations, i.e., the constant effort of

an organism to adjust itself to external relations." He thought it was the business of Ethical Science to present a picture of the conditions of the perfect social life, and his inductions, general hints as to activity, culture, etc., are precepts for the individual life. He claims there are Ethical sanctions for all actions which affect individual welfare. Spencer's Sociology deals with the Evolution of groups of organisms, Society itself being an organism starting like living bodies, as germs, and growing into larger masses. He takes the idea not in its literal sense, but as shewing a similarity in the relations of the parts. Spencer wants, however, to shew Social Evolution as a part of Evolution in general, so he makes society out to be an organism. His aspect was of use in shewing society to be a complexity in unity, and this, not a static but an organic unity; also that the determination is from within. As Mackenzie puts it, "Society is an organism because it is a whole whose parts are intrinsically related to one another, and because it grows from within, and because it is adapted to an end that is involved in its own structure." Spencer himself stated some differences between society and an organism— and Huxley

1. Mackenzie 238.
2. Spencer "Date of Ethics and Justice."
condemned it on Spencer's own writing, proving that Spencer had a weak grasp of Government— for said Huxley "If society were an organism it should have a strong governing centre," and Spencer does not admit the necessity of this and therefore does not attempt to shew what the governing centre is. Spencer is not clear here. The organic conception also subordinates the individual too much, forgetting that nearly all progress comes from individuals.

Mr. Bateson in adopting the biological conception of a social organism, discussed its bearing on the ideals of Socialism and democracy. He argues that the conception demands a society articulated in permanent classes, each content with its function. This view has its affinities with the teachings of Plato, and also as Mr. Bateson shews, with the mediaeval idea of a system of "Estates." It issues in a criticism of democracy and in a comparatively favorable attitude to Socialism, ideals which are argued to be incompatible. On the other hand he criticises socialism on the ground that it would be adverse to the emergence of those exceptional variations or "mutational novelties" which are necessary to the progress of society. The organic conception of Society could not, owing to its inconsistencies, stand for long. The contract theory of

Hobbes worked out at greater length by Rousseau endeavored to make of society, an individual giving up freedom in exchange for protection etc., but this savours too much of a business idea and does not explain ethics. A truer view than either of the foregoing is, that Society is not a mere organism nor a mere contract, but an organization; as Burke said "Society a great mysterious incorporation existing before the individual was born, and destined to live after he has passed away." The State exists for practical and for ideal ends— for the perfection of the life of all its citizens.

The "motives" of men keep them together and make up what Leslie Stephen calls the "Tissue of Society."


The emphasis has passed from The Biological to the Psychological aspect of society. We have come to learn that the characteristic fact about society is not struggle, adaptation, survival, but "consciousness of kind," and this will show itself in a connection between scientific reform and psychology; not a haphazard attempt to remedy obvious defects in society. As Mr. Giddings well says "There is no radical cure for degeneration but in a pure and sane family life. A sound philosophy of life is need-

ed, "Will" and not "Intellect" require organization. The Social Philosophy of the future will begin where so-called Evolutionistic Philosophy has generally been content to end, with the fact of the moral control that is as real a fact in the simplest human society as is the fact of innervation or inhibition in the moral human brain. This, it seems to me, is the fundamental weakness in the present day Socialistic propaganda of all their different schools, and is one with which they have not attempted to deal. No reader of Mr. Bellamy's Book can but be struck with the unerring way in which he puts his finger on the weak spot in Socialistic theories. Socialism today presents a number of strands of thought some of which if distinct, are difficult to distinguish, and some of which are being tied and twisted together in efforts at mediation and conciliation. Marxism, Fabianism, Syndicalism, and Guild Socialism—to mention but four, are in wide divergence as to methods to be pursued, and their attitude to the State; and in European Socialism at large there is still a cleavage between the Revolutionary and the Reformist parties. The one, believes in the accomplishment of all the aims of Socialism simultaneously as a system; the other, in the realization of those aims successively and piecemeal. The one, thinks in terms

2. Barker, Political Thought from Spencer to To-day. p.205 f.f.
of the class-war, the other, in terms of the Solidarity of classes.

We despair at the outset of giving one definite statement of Socialism, but in its essence we might fairly say that it is a system of society in which the ownership and control of the instruments of production, i.e., land and capital, shall be invested in the state for the common good. Socialists differ as to whether all, and if not how much of the instruments of production should be socialized, but all would subscribe to the formula "that things which are socially necessary should be socially owned—" i.e., none should use any thing to make private profit out of others, in brief, we might call it "community ownership." Our difficulty arises when we try to find out how this is to be attained, for the widest diversity of opinion exists, and has resulted in the formation of many organizations, and a vast body of controversial literature—all resulting in much futile dispersion of energy. The common good aimed at is one of material wealth, the second great mistake in the Socialistic platform— for although material wealth is a necessity— the conscious pursuit of it does not apparently lead to greater happiness, and we can see no real reason for supposing that men will be any better under a socialistic regime, than under the present, while we
can see that the limiting of individual effort may result in a great loss to the community. We do not wish to be little what is a definite attempt to ameliorate bad conditions which exist in the life of some sections of society at the present day, but to again reiterate what we have already mentioned, "that the chief thing requiring organization is "Will." We cannot expect any real change until human nature is changed and we fail to see what Socialism has to offer to attempt this big task. A very pregnant saying of T.H. Green, was that during the whole development of man, the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," has never varied. What has varied is only the answer to the question, "who is my neighbor?"

"If in the light of this profoundly true reflection we watch the progress of society from primitive conditions to the higher stages it may be observed to possess marked features and these features have tended towards an ever-increasing conception of duty and responsibility to one's fellow-men; this tendency owing much to the spread of Christianity. No longer can we look in a narrow range—for such a conception is foreign to the spirit of progress to an ideal which if not perfectly seen is at least partly known, and ever calls us onward. We feel that

1. Prolegomena p. 238 f.f.
Socialism is not constructive enough, and does not state any clear principles for a philosophy of life. The Sociological movement stands for a broadening out of the several sciences from the individual viewpoint to one of the whole. Sociological Ethics is of great value in helping us to know the origin of Authority, Ethics, Codes, and Social Institutions, and to some extent the genesis of conscience; and the later work of Comte, Mill and Spencer and the Sociological Psychologists in general have all helped to shew the self to be really a social self— one among others.

The organic conception of Society did good in shewing us that we are not separate units— but that being organically related, each individual action is bound to hinder or help others, and further, or retard the general progress. We have also learned that our most intimate relations are not physical, but mental and moral, consisting in the pursuit of a common ideal. The genesis of society too— though of great interest— need not concern us very much, for we know that the present and future progress of society can be only in the Ethical direction, in the pursuit of an ideal. Therefore, Ethics cannot disappear into Sociology because Ethics gives the ideal of a Social
progress. It leads sociology and is above it. The Sociological idea on one side has been undoubtedly over-done — Society is not everything and the individual nothing — Sociology must be made personal. The money, power, size of a society are nothing. The poor man is still a poor man though he be a citizen of a mighty empire. There must be opportunity for happiness and personal progress on real Ethical lines. Socialism does not offer a remedy, but a criticism, and would tend to make life too public, it goes much too far, it would tend to destroy personal ambition, inward righteousness, and responsibility; and man after all must have opportunities of self-development. Perhaps our greatest need is a higher individualism in order to lead the democracy. Sociology cannot merge into itself Ethics and a definite religious personal communion. So far the Sociological movement has broadened Ethics, but has left the idea of conduct where it was.
ETHICS OF REFORM.
The barrenness of many of the discussions of Ethics, the abstractness of many of its theories, have, no doubt, been due to neglect of Sociological considerations. There can be no true understanding of the nature and tendencies of forms of moral judgment and of social institutions apart from the study of their origin and history. We need not be governed by the theories we find, but we must give credit to the genetic and historical study, for if our Ethical notions are ever bringing us to wider and clearer ideas as to the meaning of charity, temperance, and simplicity in life, commercial honesty, the objects and methods of punishment, the meaning and social value of religion, it is because of the stimulation we have received from sociological investigations into the effect of almsgiving, of luxury, of unregulated competition and speculation, of our present system of prison discipline, of the secularization of morality.

If, on the other hand, our minds are still confused as to the demands of the cardinal principles of justice — some desiring to base it on desert, others on need, others on abstract equality, — this is probably because we have hitherto, in our speculations upon it, made too little use of the idea, with which Sociology has fam-
iliarized us, of life, as consisting in the organized ef­
torts of differently endowed individuals towards the rea­
lization of a social ideal, and the ultimate claim of each
individual to the opportunity of contributing to it accord­
ing to his ability. It is on this account that we claim a
moral law exists that each can uphold in so far as the
power and foresight is given him.

There is a very definite idea upon which we
base our argument at the very beginning viz. that the duties
and virtues are personal things—admitting of no develop­
ment apart from personality.

There is no semblance of abstraction here,
Pollock in his book on jurisprudence says "persons are the
subjects of rights and duties and as the subject of a right
a person is the object of the correlative duty, and con­
versely." Martineau thinks the idea of duty had no mean­
ing except as expressing something owed to someone human or
divine. "Duty and obligation both express that relation
between persons indicated by the indebtedness of one to the
other." Any definite list of duties is impossible —
outside of course, of those fairly common to all. It is
not so much a definite specific act as the spirit behind it

1. Bosanquet Phil. theory of the State, p. 50.
2. Hyslop, p. 103.
that counts. As Prof. Dewey says, "It is a common remark that moral codes change from "Do not" to "Do" and from this to "Be." A Mosaic Code may attempt to regulate the specific acts of life. Christianity says, "Be ye perfect." "The effort to exhaust the various special right acts is futile. They are not the same for any two men, and they change constantly with the same man. The very words which denote virtues come less and less to mean specific acts and more the spirit in which conduct occurs." Therefore at the beginning we can frankly confess that "no cut and dried formulas will be given for the guidance of life," but an idea of the spirit in which things ought to be undertaken. The correlative notion of duty is right, for every right brings an obligation— a duty— with it. Not only in the obvious sense that when one man has a right other men are under an obligation to respect it, but also in the more subtle sense that when a man has a right he is thereby laid under an obligation to employ it for the general good. "A man's rights are not merely decorations or ends in themselves. They are opportunities, instruments, trusts, and when any man has them, it means that he is placed on a vantage ground from which, secure of oppression or interference, he may begin to do his duty." All rights are

1. Dewey, Outlines of Ethics, p. 231
strictly social and the individual only has these rights which society thinks it fit he should have. A brief note on the Virtues and we will be ready to apply ourselves to the practical applications of Duties, Rights and Virtues. In general the virtues refer to the attitudes of mind in which we discharge the duties and virtue itself is "the acquired power or capacity for moral action." The Virtues, must not be regarded as mere abstractions, for moral qualities cannot be isolated from the circumstances in which they are exercised. Virtue is character in touch with life, and it is only in contact with actual events that its quality can be determined. Actions are not simply good or bad in themselves. They must always be valued both by their inner motives and intended ends. Courage or veracity, for example, may be exercised from different causes and for the most various ends, and occasionally even for those of an immoral nature.

1. Alexander, Christianity and Ethics, p.184.
2. c/f Wundt Ethik p.147
actions and thoughts, living virtues.

We have seen in a previous section that man is a social being— and in each section the idea has been implied, if not actually expressed, that the most necessary virtue is benevolence or unselfishness, and some reasons have been given why the advancement of the general happiness should be the duty of the individual. Let us now look at some practical aspects of this "good willing" and endeavor to connect it definitely with the individual.

As most writers notice there is a narrow, and a broad sense, of benevolence. The narrow sense of benevolence, almsgiving etc. charity, in the giving sense. In the broad sense, wishing well in all directions. The history of benevolence or charity in the general sense goes back a long way; indeed there can hardly have been a time when some form, however slight, did not exist. To-day we have only to look around at the visible manifestations of charity to see how firmly rooted it is in the social life. Some of it doubtless is ill advised and does harm, but we are strongly inclined to think that on the whole its results are beneficial. The broad sense of benevolence— good will—mood of mind underlying the virtues of Ideal justice; the

desire to do justice for all, is generally acknowledged. Some writers are inclined to think benevolence and justice should not be distinguished. Lorimer in his Institutions of Law says "The principles of justice and charity are identical. Their separate realization is impossible. Their common realization necessarily results in the same action." They are not however exactly identical. Justice is objective— Benevolence subjective. Leibnitz said "Justice was the charity of the wise man." "Caritas sapientis," this best expresses the idea that Benevolence must be guided by intellect and by justice. With these two as a guide we need have little fear that benevolence will be overdone as it sometimes is in the case of its erection into a conscious principle in some things and making it serve to supply rich persons with a cloak for selfishness in other directions. Philanthropy will not be made an offset and compensation for brutal exploitation. No man who pushes to the breaking point of legality, aggressively selfish efforts to get ahead of others in business, will be able if he is guided by intellect and justice, to square it in his own self respect and in the esteem of good men, by gifts of hospitals, colleges, missions, and libraries. Intelligent justice with the help of benevolence will go far towards solving the pro-

1. Lorimer, p. 316.
2. Dewey & Tufts, p. 388.
blems created by the necessity of charity in the broad and the narrow sense. With the question of Dependency we deal with another phase of Charity— We notice first in regard to Dependents that many causes enter in. The causes of poverty are legion, economic and physiological. Each reformer or faddist lays his finger on some one spot, e.g. immigration laws, vagrancy laws, contract labor, the present economic system, etc. etc. The Sociologist and the Statistician all say you cannot lay your finger on one distinctive cause of poverty. Many of the causes of poverty are inherent in human nature; the most frequent or most hopeless is the lack of ability or equipment, of capacity to do something well. A smaller number come to want from prodigality, intemperance, misfortune of various kinds.

What is to be our attitude towards this?

All appear to agree that a good school system, in which the body and good habits are looked after, as well as the mere mind—proper housing laws—proper accommodation— the prevention of tubercular diseases, etc. all these things will be good for preventing poverty. In the question of relief, this should have as its aim restoration to health, honesty, intelligence. The ethical treatment is firstly preventive, by production of healthy individuals. Secondly, the duty

1. Warner American Charities.  
2. Wright, Practical Sociology, p. 323.
of Society so to administer charity that so called "relief" is as short as possible and as remedial as possible. All this sums up our former statement that benevolence must be supported by Intelligence and by Justice.

We deal with a more hopeless class when we come to Defectives,— from the Ethical standpoint this is obviously an important subject—ranging from just mild incompetency to positive danger to society at large. In this connection we see the marvellous progress that has taken place in the treatment of insanity,— Passing from a period of terrible cruelty and neglect to a period of detention and the present day conception of Insanity as a disease. Dr. Mercier gives us some very illumining ideas, also facts on this subject. The question is an important one, for Society has a real interest in seeing that insanity should be understood and properly dealt with. An insane person is not responsible, for responsibility implies a power of responding to all the normal suggestions of life. Society has an interest in making the criminal, or the intemperate man, or the pauper, or insane persons, responsible to normal suggestions.

As to crime in the past there has been much ignorance. The History of crime and delinquency is largely

1. Dr. Mercier, Crime and Insanity.
the history of punishment. Criminal law is of course an important study, and modern reform is always being applied to criminal law. Punishments are becoming more and more rational. The repressive side of morality is never so important as the positive. Our punishment of criminals is often barbarous, and has a very definite tendency to harden them, instead of softening. We have it is true, advanced from primitive times, and from times not very far off, for even as late as 1813, a proposal to change the penalty for stealing five shillings, from death, to transportation to a remote colony, was defeated in England. But in spite of some advance we still have a technical rather than a moral justice for the culprit. It is clearly the business of the more thoughtful members of Society to consider the evils seriously and to interest themselves actively in their reform.

We have found out that most criminals are "repeating criminals," and the watchword of the new criminology is, there are no such things as crime, only criminals, meaning a crime should never be considered apart from the person who commits it. The whole idea to-day is that the punishment of crime should be proportionate not to the

1. Dewey & Tufts, p.468.
2. Robinson & Beard,Devel. of Mod.Europe, Vol. 11,p 207.
offence, but to the needs of Society— and it is only when
an offender sees the punishment of his crime to be the
natural or logical outcome of his act that he is likely
to be led to any real repentance. Any retributive theory
that does not aim at this, and endeavor to lead to a real
abhorence of crime as distinct from the fear of its con­
sequences is not a very satisfactory theory of punishment.

There is as yet no general recognition of
the possibility of an unbiased scientific investigation
into all the antecedents, hereditary and environmental of
evildoers. We need above all things a change in two res­
pacts, (a) recognition of the possibilities of new methods
of judgment which the sciences of physiology, psychology,
and sociology have brought about, and (b) surrender of the
feudal conception according to which men are divided, as it
were essentially, into two classes: one the criminal, the
other the meritorious. We need to consider the ways in
which the pressure and the opportunities of environment and
education, of poverty and comfortable living, of extraneous
suggestion and stimulation, make the differences between one
man and another; and to recognize how fundamentally one
human nature is at bottom. Juvenile courts, probation

officers, detention officers, mark the beginning of what is possible, but only the beginning. For the most part crime is still treated sordidly and by routine.

The appalling waste of money and time in this direction, needs only to be mentioned to shew the hindrance it is to Society. The cost to the ratepayers, for each convicted criminal, in the Province of Quebec, is estimated at $6,000 each per year. It seems incredible, especially when we get no return from this large expenditure. Is there anything more illogical then, than to turn an unreformed criminal loose, at the end of his sentence, to prey again upon Society? It is unfair to Society, and to the criminal. What is there left for the offender to do but to go back to the old haunts and the same old way of gaining a subsistence. One of many definite known instances to myself is that of a young woman who had fallen,—been sentenced to prison, where she had an excellent opportunity of learning all the vileness human nature is capable of, and then at the end of the period of detention, she was sent back to the city—her sole possession being one car ticket to get to Montreal. Afterwards —? Only one place where she would be received — no opportunity whatever of leaving the path she had unwillingly taken — for

1. Dewey & Tufts, p.470 f.f.
no one wanted to employ a jail bird, and instances of a like nature could be multiplied many times.

"Indeterminate sentences, release on probation, discrimination of classes of offenders, separation of the first and more or less accidental and immature offender from the old and experienced hand, special matrons for women offenders, introduction of education and industrial training into penitentiaries, the finding of employment for those released—all mark improvements. They are, however, as yet, inchoate, and intelligent members of Society need to recognise their own responsibility for the promotion of such reforms and for the discovery of new ones." We close

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the question of Criminology, Charity, Insanity, Crime, etc. by a view of moral pathology generally.

The study of moral disease, as we have seen, is of tremendous importance to Society. We have also seen in the case of defectiveness, insanity, and crime, that much of it results from incapacity or lack of power of resistance. Moral pathology is concerned with finding out the causes of crime and weakness as far as possible, and aims at applying proper treatment. The causes are legion, and no two cases are similar. A wide knowledge of human nature and a genuine sympathetic attitude are necessary qualifications for any

1. Dewey & Tufts, p.471.
one who undertakes to deal with moral defectives. We have travelled a little along right lines, though as yet we are not very far advanced. We need some definite teaching which might act as a preventative. No child should start off with an absolute lack of certain information which might be his guide. The psychological and physiological examination of children must occupy a prominent part of true education— and much more definite parental help must be claimed. You cannot pass children on to some one else for training in everything. The parent must stand in a much more helpful relation than at present. A very definite duty and responsibility rests on parents. In some respects the outlook is not bright, but we have good faith to believe that a sincere and intelligent study of the problems which confront us at this present time, will find an Ethical and Scientific solution. The real difficulty is to rouse the minds of men to put into definite application what the Ethics of reform shew to be necessary. And then in respect to that ever increasing class, which in one way and another, acts as a hindrance to the progress of Society, some definite, scientific and ethical mode of treatment must be adopted, to arrest the spread of crime and disease, consequent upon their wrong doing. We must as far as possible
give the proper help and prevent the criminally inclined, and morally diseased from committing crime, otherwise we shall feel more and more the truth Horace well expressed—

An age degenerate and base
Piles, as it wastes, disgrace upon disgrace.
We, nursed in crime, in folly bred,
Transmit our fathers' taint, the subtle poison spread,

Beget a progeny still worse,
And heap on endless years an ever deepening curse.

1. Horace, Book IV,
THE PRESENT DAY PROBLEM.
We have seen that Ethics has for its subject matter human conduct and character— not only as natural facts with a history and causal connection, but as possessing value in view of a standard or ideal. This marks it out from not only the natural sciences, but from other less universal disciplines of the same class as itself. At the same time each science contributes its quota towards the pursuit of the ideal and we will now endeavor to sum up what the Ethics of Idealism, Evolution, Sociology and Reform have given towards that end.

The Ethics of Idealism did good service in leading us beyond the materialistic viewpoint. Especially is this true in Green, who starts his search, as we saw, by a metaphysical enquiry, and then led us to a Personal Idealism, with an Intellectual Ego or self as Subject: Object. An objective validity thus being claimed at the outset. True he founded Ethics far too explicitly on a metaphysic, seeing that Ethics should be built on its own facts, though at the same time the Ethical standard rests on something that goes beyond experience. This personal idealism bringing in Plato and Browning, and the best side of the Utilitarians, and Christianity, etc. It is the Ethics of Idealism build-
ing on a moral Ideal, and has many merits.

Green also shews this moral ideal is personal and social, and that the good is implied in desire. This erred as we saw in intellectualism, since you are not able according to this to act till the ideal has been reasoned out. The normative will or volitional side in Green is not strong. In many places he implies that the ideal is working itself out in humanity. This tends to make man somewhat passive, does not give enough space to the effort of man. Not enough is made of choice.

The ideal is called the "good," but we now speak of right and wrong. Green does not make enough distinction between these. It is, as we saw, a floating idealism; but the merit of it was, that it shewed a struggle after things which are not merely material. This also we may say is the merit of all forms of Idealism. Green made a strong attempt to base a philosophy of Ethics on first principles, and made up his mind at the very outset, what were the distinctive marks of the moral life. He shewed a correct instinct in examining the nature of man before entering upon his proper ethical enquiry. One must know what man is before one can say what his "good" or his "duty" is. It is only because man's nature cannot be accounted for
as a merely natural or animal product, that the way is open for an idealist Ethics such as Green. He did good service by showing the moral life to be intrinsic, less of a pursuit of pleasure than some had maintained. He shewed the Utilitarian and Hedonist points of view are unsatisfactory. These were valuable additions, and have worked themselves into later systems of Idealistic Philosophy for good. We see also that Metaphysics is based on Ethics, as all abstract sciences must be based on concrete ones. The Metaphysical problem would not exist were there no minds in the world.

The Ethics of Evolution did much service also, in showing a growth of the moral feeling. It also shewed this moral capacity to be the unique possession of man. It could not explain secondary factors, Darwin confessing that morality is really too complex to be clearly followed out. Man alone can with certainty be ranked as a moral being. It also helped to shew that conduct is a whole, an adjustment it is true, but to what end? pleasure? more life? Evolutionary Ethics cannot tell a man definitely what actions should be in order to bring about certain results, though Spencer thought they could. He thought Ethics ought to be a practical science laying down laws of life. It does not, more-
over, explain moral obligation. Evolution has shown us that it can give no conclusive or complete account of morality, and does not give us sufficient data to justify a statement that man's mental nature has been developed by the same causes as developed his physical nature. The problem of Ethics is not clear to the Evolutionist, i.e. is it descriptive or normative? Descriptive Ethics does not explain the moral ideal and until it does this to some extent, Ethics is not complete. The Evolutionists have given us a number of suggestive concepts which partly describe the moral struggle and partly do not. The ideal, the survival of the "fittest," is vague. What is our criterion of fittest? According to Evolution it is a physical one, according to Ethics a moral one. There is, moreover, a sympathy which natural selection could not preserve or vindicate, even in the struggle of communities. This is recognized by Darwin as having a moral value outside of and above natural selection and the struggle for existence, a value of which we have no right to judge.

Darwin thinks if we followed hard reason, and by hard reason he obviously means an imitation on our part of the action of natural selection, we should be led to sweep away all those institutions by which civilized man-
kind guards its weakest members. But this, he says, would be only to deteriorate the "noblest part of our nature."

What is noblest in our nature then, is not that which natural selection has favored or maintained. There is therefore implied in his view a limitation of the Ethical significance of the principles of natural selection; for when we come to this crucial question of conduct, it is not allowed to give any criterion of moral validity. The theory is given up in the Preface to "Principles of Ethics" where he says, "The doctrine of evolution has not furnished guidance to the extent I had hoped." "Right regulations of the actions of so complex a being as man, living under conditions so complex as those presented by a society, evidently forms a subject matter unlikely to admit of definite conclusions throughout its entire range," and the lack of confidence the author himself felt in these parts, there is good reason to extend to the whole structure of Evolutionary Ethics.

The sociological contribution to Ethics was, that it broadened Ethics from an individualistic point of view to the wider range of Society. It is of great value in showing that all conduct, Ethics, codes, etc. are social in their origin, that even conscience has a history. It

widened", as Green well says, "the area of common good." In the social organic phase it was a great thing at the end of the nineteenth century. But while it has broadened Ethics, it has left the idea of conduct where it was. We are by means of its research brought to a very pressing enquiry as to, what there is to remedy, what is the social problem, what is the labor question. We see that humanity is engaged in a great struggle for a higher standard. It seems to point to an inevitable conflict, but does not offer an ideal. We realize that constant formation and reformation of the self is necessary, in the ends towards which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole. Sociology tells us all this, treating social custom and institutions in the same spirit of impartiality, as Psychology treats sentiments, beliefs, and volitions. Ethics on the other hand, is concerned throughout with values. It considers social forms and institutions from the point of view of their completeness, and otherwise, as expressions of human nature. It asks whether the social life is the best or the only life for the human soul. In what way through society, and in what characteristics of society, does the soul lay hold of its truest self, or in short, rise to its inherent possibility?

This led us
naturally to a study of the Ethics of Reform, and this deals more specifically and practically with the organization of society in Ethical principles. We saw that the necessity for reform had arisen in different ways and that the "action" is not everything but the motive prompting it, the real kingdom of desire. And that a man's duties, rights, virtues, are correlative, by reason of which a man is bound to actively interest himself in the general life of society. It also taught us that the Ethical treatment must first be preventative, and then that Society must make charity and relief as short and remedial as possible.

The responsibility of society was clearly shown, and we were brought to a recognition of the possibilities of new methods of judgment which the sciences of physiology, psychology and sociology have brought about. It was also encouraging, in that the study of the "Good old days" was an excellent corrective to pessimism about the present and the future. Our opinion of the badness of the times in which we are living is largely due to the fact that we have come to consider as evil, many things which our predecessors accepted as matters of course. But this critical spirit is one of the very conditions of progress. We have recognized also that society is not divided essentially into

two classes, (1) The Criminal, (2) The Meritorious, and we also recognize how fundamentally one human nature is at bottom. We were brought to a realization of the necessity for a more personal attitude towards all the various problems; the necessity for definite parental care, home training, etc. etc.

The remedies proposed are many and apparently good, but the difficulty is one of application, and this is the real present day problem—resolving itself into a very personal one. The Kantian Categorical Imperative is very near the truth since in all the relations of life personal, social, political, the moral issue must be the supreme consideration. For each individual, after due consideration of the conviction of others, the final authority as to the right or wrong of any opinion, or action, should be his own conscientious and reasoned judgment. The well-being of society must have such economic and other conditions as will afford the largest scope for the moral development of all its members, and in studying the facts of the moral life the scientific method must be adopted. We saw that there had been a development of the dualism between the individual and society on the one hand and the temporal and spiritual on the other, that the metaphysical effort
had been to remove the centre of moral energy to a vision of the eternal good, and that the rationalists of the 18th century in their endeavor to find a natural basis for the moral life, as moralists, were driven to seek for it in the only principle other than revelation that seemed to be available, that of self love.

Kant struck the first note of modern Ethics in pointing to the idea of humanity, or of fully developed human nature as the centre of the moral world. Not only is devotion to this the bond of all social union, the condition of realizing a "kingdom of ends" but in it is to be found the revelation to the individual soul of the ultimate meaning of things. The mistake made was that the psychology of the time reduced all motives to forms of pleasure seeking— and Kant could only escape the result by setting up in its place the barren end of obedience to an abstract command of reason. The task of modern Ethics may be said to be the justification of this transcendentalism in the light of what recent theory has to say on (1) The nature of volition, (2) On the standards of our judgments on Voluntary acts, and (3) on the grounds we have for conceiving of this standard as rooted in the nature of things. The problem, then, is personal. Reflection and intellectual activity, and not merely Evolution, will enable the individual to
get the best out of his own life, and to do his duty to the social whole.

There is no stronger support to moral endeavor than the conviction that the moral life is a realization of the divine purpose, that in all goodness the Spirit of God is manifest, and if we can clearly distinguish the good from the evil— we have an intensely practical ideal. If Green in his Metaphysics did not make clear the distinction we feel that reflection and intellectual activity will give a man all the criterion he needs. To act, so that the self and others are helped physically, morally, intellectually, spiritually, is all a man is called upon to do, and he who runs need suffer no lack of guiding principles—

"Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor."


The first will be granted. The second leaves us as we stated, with the personal problem, which in a world of conflict and progress must ever remain, a struggle and a striving. Who would wish otherwise? To the man who believes the moral life is a realization of the divine purpose, this will be all he needs. If he on his part strives earnestly, the end need trouble him but little, for all his truest self stands revealed—

Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,
Fancies that broke through language
And escaped; all I could ever be,
All men ignored in me,
This, I was worth to God,
Whose wheel the pitcher shaped.

1. Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra.
   Stanza 25.