ISMA'IL RUSUHI ANKARAVI AND TZE'HUL-HIKEM

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by

Bilal Kuspinar

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University, Montreal
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ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to bring to light an important Ottoman Turkish work of theosophy entitled Īzāhūl-Ḥikem (Elucidation of Wisdoms), written by Ismā'īl Anḵaravī (d. 1631) as a commentary on the treatise Hayākil al-Nūr (The Temples of Light) by Shīhāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1191). The study consists of three main parts. The first part provides a detailed account of the life and works of the author, Anḵaravī, with an emphasis on his scholarship in the context of the Ottoman learned class. The second part, which is the main body of this research, presents a chapter by chapter analysis of the significant issues discussed in Anḵaravī's commentary, in comparison with the commentary of Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (d. 1502), by whom he seems to be influenced. This section is an investigation of Anḵaravī's reformulation of Ishrāqi wisdom within the framework of his orthodox mystical views. In the last part, on the basis of all available manuscripts, which are collated, a reliable text for edition is established.
RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude est faite dans le but de faire connaître un travail important de théosophie, intitulé Īzhāḫūl-Ḥikem (Élucidations des Sagesse) écrit par Ismā'īl Anḵaravī (m. 1631) en turc ottoman comme commentaire du traité intitulé Hayākil al-Nūr (Les Temples de Lumière), écrit par Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrāwardī (m. 1191). Cette étude consiste en trois parties. La première partie traite en détail de la vie et des livres de l’auteur Anḵaravī, en insistant surtout sur sa personnalité intellectuelle dans le contexte de la classe des intellectuels Ottomans. La deuxième partie est la partie la plus importante de cette recherche, elle présente, chapitre par chapitre, une analyse des sujets significatifs discutés dans le commentaire d’Anḵaravī d’une façon comparée avec celui de Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (m. 1502), par qui il semble avoir été influencé. De plus, cette section est un approfondissement de la compréhension d’Anḵaravī, dans le cadre de sa vision mystique et orthodoxe, de la sagesse ishrāqie. Dans la dernière partie, tous les manuscrits accessibles sont collationnés en vue d’une édition critique.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

It is indeed not only a pleasure but also a duty for me to acknowledge the debt that I owe to numerous dear colleagues and several distinguished scholars whom I have consulted in many areas before and during the preparation of this study. First and foremost, I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Hermann Landolt for having been my guide in understanding many intricate problems of both Ishraqi philosophy and mystical doctrines, and in kindly locating as well as translating the Persian couplets in the text under study. It was he whom I interrupted many a time with questions, and it was he who has been most generous and patient in answering them. His contribution to the thesis was immense, particularly his critical comments and profound insights at the last stage of the work certainly deserve special appreciation here. All in all, without him this work would never have taken its present shape. Again his keen interest in promoting the study of Ottoman thought was extremely encouraging.

I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Ahmet Karamustafa for his valuable comments on the technical aspects of the Ottoman translation as well as on the first part of the thesis. I am also grateful to Alparslan Akıkgenc, for having kindly supervised my academic pursuits at different levels in Turkey, and also to Mr. Selahaddin Hidayetoğlu, the distinguished Instructor in the Ottoman Divan Literature, Selçuk University, for having kindled in me a love
for the Mesnevi of Mevlana Jelal al-Din Rumi and for having clarified some complicated parts of the manuscript at hand.

My sincere appreciation is due to the faculty and staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, particularly to its director, Dr. A. Üner Turgay, and to the members of the Faculty of Theology, Selçuk University, especially its rector, Prof. Halil Cin. Both these institutions provided much-needed grants and welcome encouragement during my Ph.D. program. Thanks are also due to the members of the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, the Mevlânâ Museum Library, and Yusuf Ağa Library, Konya, for extending to me their kind permission to use the materials and facilities there.

At this time, I would like to take the opportunity to extend my thanks to Mr. Adam Gacek, Head of the Institute of Islamic Studies Library, McGill University, for helping me in sorting out the calligraphic styles of the Ottoman Turkish scripts; also, to Mr. Stephen Millier for reading the whole of my thesis in typescript and thus bringing to my notice the technical flaws and the linguistic shortcomings therein. I would also like to thank the Public Services Librarian, Miss Salwa Ferahian, Mr. Wayne St. Thomas, and all the other staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies Library for their generous help in finding the required sources. Furthermore, I wish to express my gratitude to my close friend Dr. Fevzi Günüç, who used to be the Director of the Library at Mevlânâ Museum, Konya, and who is now the Professor of Islamic Fine Arts and Calligraphy at Faculty of Theology, Selçuk
University, as well as to Dr. Bekir Topaloğlu, Professor of Kalam at the Faculty of Theology, Marmara University and vice-director of the Centre for Islamic Studies, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi, Istanbul, for their assistance in helping me to obtain microfilms from the Libraries of Mevlâna Museum and Suleymaniye, respectively.

Above all I am forever indebted to my wife for her wholehearted support in many unselfish ways and for her encouragement in the most challenging circumstances.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td><strong>I-H.</strong></td>
<td>Ankaravi, Ismail Rusūhī. ّ declarations. Suleymaniye Library, Istanbul. MS. 1747 (occasionally citations refer to the section of appendix for the textual variations.)</td>
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The system of transliteration adopted in this study for Arabic, Ottoman and modern Turkish languages is that of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*, with slight modifications.

The title of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī’s work, *Mathnawi*, unless otherwise indicated or quoted from elsewhere, is always transliterated as *Mesnevi*.

Finally, the titles of the references are usually cited in abbreviated forms after their first appearance.
PART ONE

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ANKARAVI
CHAPTER ONE

THE LIFE OF İSMĀ'ĪL ANKARAVĪ

1. His Early Life

Ankaravī's full name is İsmā'īl b. Aḥmad Rusūhiddīn Bayrāmī, Mevlevī, Ankaravī. He is also referred to in biographical sources under a variety of brief appellations: Rusūhī Ankaravī, Rusūhī Dede, İsmā'īl Efendi, İsmā'īl Dede, Şeyh İsmā'īl and Kasım-i Şārih. Among them,
Rusûhî, from the Arabic, *rusûkh* meaning "being well rooted in knowledge", was used by Anîkaravî himself as a pen-name (*mahâla*) in his poetry, while Hzret-i Şârih (the Excellent Commentator) was fairly attributed to him by his contemporaries as well as his successors as an honorific title because of the wide-spread reputation that he had gained through his celebrated commentary on the *Mesnevî* of Mevlâna Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî. These two complimentary epithets which took precedence over the others, were referred to in the laudatory couplets of the renowned poet of the Ottoman Divan literature of the eighteenth century, Şeyh Gâlîb:

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8 Qur’ân, 3:7

9 Banarlı, *Resimli Türk Edebiyatı*, p. 700. One of his outstanding verses that contains this pen-name is as follows:

Gel (Rusuhi) nin sözünün dinle semâ'a âşık ol
Key tekûne beyne ehilasıklı min ehlişserefi.

See Bursaî Mehmet Tâhir Efendi, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (Istanbul: Meral Yayınevi, 1974), vol. 1, p. 120.

Ey kâşîf-i esrâr-i nihân Ḥaẓret-i Şâriḥ
Rû-puş-i tecelli-i'îyân Ḥaẓret-i Şâriḥ
Olmuş lağabîn-îmî ledûnîde Rusûhî
'Irân ile memdûh-i cihan Ḥaẓret-i Şâriḥ

O! the Excellent Commentator, the uncoverer of the hidden mysteries
The Excellent Commentator, the coverer of clear theophany
Your nickname was declared as Rusûhî in divine knowledge
The Excellent Commentator, You are celebrated all over the world
with gnostic knowledge.

As his surname suggests, İsmâ'îl Rusûhî was born in Ankara. His
exact date of birth is still unknown to us. Nevertheless, it is recorded in
some reliable sources that he was born around the late tenth century
A.H.12 Except for his father's name, Aḥmад, nothing is known about his
family.13 After having learned Arabic and Persian to an exceptionally high
level, Ankaravî began to study the exoteric sciences related to the Shari'a
such as tafsîr, ḥadîth, kalâm, fiqh, and ḥikmah (theoretical wisdom). Later
he studied the esoteric sciences related to the taşawwuf (mysticism) and
ṭârîqa in which he became a unique master of his time.14

11 Banarlı, Resimli Türk Edebiyatı, p. 700.
12 Şâmî, Ḳâmûs, p. 439.
13 Büyük Türk Klasikleri Ansiklopedi, vol. 5, p. 101. Only one source,
whose reliability will be discussed later, tells us that his father was an Imam.
See, Necati Elgin, "İsmail Ankaravî (Mesnevî Şârihi Rusûhî Dede)," Anit 30
14 Şâmî, Ḳâmûs, p. 439; 'Umar Rîdâ Kaḥîl-a, Mu'jam al-Mu'allifîn
During his sojourn in Ankara, İsmâ'îl Dede first became acquainted with the Bayrâmi order in which he was later to be promoted as far as the post of the şeyhlik. In the meantime he is also said to have obtained an icâzet (authorization) from the Khalvatiyya Order. No indication has been found in the sources as to how or through whose influence he became affiliated with the latter Tarîqah. As Erhan Yetik has argued, though it is easy to account for his relationship with the Bayramiyya because of the fact that it was the predominant order of his time and region, and also because his family was then closely connected to it, it is difficult, however, to establish even his affiliation with the Khalvatiyya, let alone his icâzet therefrom.

Towards the end of his stay in Ankara as a Şeyh of Bayrâmî order, İsmâ'îl Rusûhî contracted a severe eye disease that prevented him from


16 İsmâ'îl Rusûhî Ankaravî, Mecmû‘âtî-ʻl-Leţâ‘îf ve Meştîrûratu‘l Meʻârif, known as Şerhû‘l-Mesnevî (İstanbul: Maṭbaʻa-i ʻAmire, 1289/1872), vol. 1, p. 11. This is the only reference in which Ankaravî is reported to have held a certificate from the Khalvatiyya, a Sunnî order that appeared first in Anatolia with the lodge of Akhî Yûsuf Khalvatî in Niğde at the end of the thirteenth century. Cf. M. Fuad Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, trans. and ed. by Gary Leiser (Albany: State University of New York, 1992), p. 101

17 Erhan Yetik, İsmail-i Ankaravî Hayâtı, Eserleri ve Tasavvufî Görüşleri (İstanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1992), p. 53.
pursuing his studies. It is reported that he had long suffered from this painful disease and had begun to despair of his situation, so much so that he thought that it would be impossible for him to recover and continue his studies. Then, upon receiving "spiritual illuminations" (ışârât-i ma'neviyye), he immediately headed to Konya where first he made a visit to the sacred tomb of Mevlâna with a supplication for healing his eyes, as is well-articulated in his own couplet below:

It is these people who by their glance turn the earth into life,
It is hoped that they render at least the edge of the one eye seeing.

Consequently his prayers were answered when he met Bostan Çelebi I (d.1040/1630), one of the descendants of Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî and the then chief Şeyh of the Mevlevî lodge, who not only miraculously restored Ankaravi's eyesight by the "elixir of his effective glance" (naẓar-i iksîr) but also played a vital role throughout the remainder of his life. His encounter with Bostan Çelebi I has been characterized by some prominent writers as

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18 The disease is specified as "cataract" in some of the classic biographical sources. See, for instance, Enver, Semâhane, p. 81.


21 Enver, Semâhâne, p. 81.
"a turning point", simply because from then onwards he, having given up the chief position of Bayrānī Şeyh that he had held for a long time, entered into a new environment, which was to shape his career from that point onwards.

Ismā'īl Anḵaravī now became a faithful disciple of Bostan Çelebi, who instilled in him the fundamental principles and teachings of the Mevleviyye, including its ritual and devotional practices. And under the auspices of this celebrated Sūfi Şeyh in the Mevlevīhâne (Mevlevî Dervîş Convent) of Konya, he fully and successfully passed through what is called the çile, a kind of spiritual training, which is a prerequisite for a novice, and which consists of engaging in religious ascetic exercises for a period of forty days before admission to the order of Mevleviyye. Right after the completion of his çile, he was appointed as halîfe to the Galata Mevlevî Convent\(^2\) of Istanbul in 1019/1610, a position which he took over from 'Abdi Dede who was then holding the chief post (postnîşin) and who also had founded the Kasım Paşa Mevlevî Convent of Istanbul.\(^3\)


\(^3\) This was the first Mevlevî Lodge, built at the time of Bāyazîd II by Iskender Paşa in the year 897/1491, which coincides with the numeric value of the term "al-rusûkh", a pen-name attributed to Anḵaravī. See, Mehmet Tâhir, Osmanlı Müellifleri, vol. 1, p. 120; Kerameti, Galata Mevlevihanesi, p. 30.

\(^4\) Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravi," p. 33; see also Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi, vol. 7, p. 359.

\(^5\) Mehmet Tâhir, Mesâyiḥ-i 'Osmâniye, p. 21.
Before embarking upon a review of his life as a chief Şeyh in Istanbul, it should be noted that a few Ottoman sources relate somewhat different accounts with regard to his first association with the Mevlevi Ṭanīqah. In his eminent work, Sicill-i 'Osmāni, known also as Tezkira-i Meşāhir-i 'Osmāni (The Biographical Scroll of the Prominent Ottoman Dignitaries), Mehmet Süreyya records that Ankaravī became a Mevlevī after he had come to Istanbul and further adds that he served for some time as "a chief lecturer on the Mesnevi" (mesnevîhân) at the Galata Mevlevihâne, then acceded to the post of Şeyhlik in lieu of 'Abdi Dede.26 But such an anecdote is not only inconsistent with the preceding accounts but also its factuality is disputable on two grounds: in the first place, as all other reliable sources unanimously narrate it, he, long before his arrival in Istanbul, had been affiliated with the Mevlevî Order especially in Konya, though, as will be indicated shortly, one additional account interestingly predates it even prior to Konya.27 There is further evidence, as Yetik shows,28 that he went to Istanbul not at his own will but was sent there by his master, Bostan Çelebi I, to take up the position of halîfe. In the second place, it should be recalled again that in search of a remedy for his eyes, he proceeded to Konya from his home city, Ankara, where he had been

26 Süreyya, Sicill-i 'Osmāni, p. 352.

27 Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravî," p. 33.

28 Yetik, Ismail-i Ankaravî, p. 54.
serving as a committed preacher for the Bayrāmī Order. So, in contrast to what Süreyya claims, most sources agree that he entered into the Mevlevī Order in Konya.

However, in the introduction to his work entitled Futūḥat-i ‘Ayniyye, Ankaravī himself cites the following brief story, which contains considerable information about his eye-disease:

During the time when I had sound eyesight, I was occupied commenting on the Mesnevi... Once I had completed the third volume, by Divine Destiny, an ailment contaminated my eyes; a cataract fell upon them, which so severely affected the pupil of my eyes that it curtailed their sight for a certain span of time, as if they had ceased to see and read. After some time, so faithful to the Almighty but so depressed as I was, fortunately I found expert optical help from the people of the Spiritual Path, whose affectionate medical preparation removed the curtain from my eyes, and thus rendered them bright and full of light...29

Apparently the text quoted above tells us that Ismā'īl Ankaravī had become infected with the serious eye-disease while in the process of writing his commentary on the Mesnevi. So it suggests two possible implications: either he, long before being initiated into the Mevleviyye, might have begun to study the Mesnevi possibly in Ankara (because, as has already been shown, his eyes were cured in Konya); or he might have been contaminated a second time with the same eye-disease after he had joined the Mevlevī Order. The first assumption sounds too weak on the ground that Ankaravī,

29 Ankaravī, Futūḥat-i ‘Ayniyye (İstanbul: Maṭba‘a‘-i Aḥmed Kāmil, 1328/1910), pp. 3-4.
as will be seen later, commenced composing the commentary during his sojourn as a Mevlevî Şeyh in Istanbul and completed it around 1037/1627. However, the second possibility, indicating that he had the disease twice, once in Ankara and the other time in Istanbul, is relatively more tenable and is still in line with Evliyâ Çelebi’s brief remark, which imparts that “he remained blind for seven years, yet he continued unfailingly to deliver lectures on the holy Mesnevi.” A similar conclusion is also drawn in Yetik’s monograph solely on the basis of Ankaravi’s own words in Fütûhât-i ‘Aynîyye, which were quoted above. On the other hand, basing himself on the same passage, Ali Cânib, who has written a short essay on Ankaravi’s life, presumes that the painful disease might have lasted for quite a long time.

Incidentally, another short article, written by Necati Elgin and


31 Evliyâ Çelebi, Seyhâtname, pp. 101-102.

32 He also cites Ankaravi’s lamentation and invocation to God in his couplet:

O my Lord! Shed light on my eyes out of Your Grace.
Grant pleasure in my heart out of Certainty.
Quoted in Yetik, Ismail-i Ankaravi, p. 54.


34 See note 13 above for biographical details. Mr. Necati Elgin’s succinct research paper, published in the periodical Anit, comprises, besides some of Ankaravi’s poems, a few fragmentary letters transcribed from the original manuscripts in the archives of the Museum of Mevlânâ in Konya.
based on the information derived from an unknown classical source, yet for some reason either overlooked or not consulted by Yetik, informs us that Ismāʿīl Anḵaravī went to Egypt in 1008 for a period of seven years to study various disciplines, entering during this time into the Mevlevī Order in which he was eventually promoted to the lectureship of the Mesneviī. Moreover, during that period, the report continues, tobacco emerged for the first time, and among the Egyptian ʿUlema there began to take place serious debates as to whether smoking is lawful, in which Anḵaravī also took an active part, sometimes arguing very harshly with the muftis (jurisconsults) of the four legal schools (madhāhib). Afterwards, he departed from there to Ankara.35

More surprisingly, the same article goes on to relate that while residing in Ankara, he initiated courses on reading and teaching the Mesneviī; but he at the same time became a target of accusations and of relentless attacks by a group of envious and mischievous people. So, because of these unfair allegations, he suffered a great deal and consequently fell victim to an eye disease.36 The rest of the story gives more or less the same information as was presented above, namely his visit to Konya, his encounter with Bostan Çelebi I, and his appointment as halife to Istanbul, etc.

Be that as it may, despite its ever questionable authenticity, it is the only report I have ever found that casts considerable light not only on

35 Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravī," p. 33.
36 Ibid.
Ankaravi's life prior to Ankara but also on his former education. One can quite reasonably believe that he spent a long time in Egypt, given the fact that he has authored, besides Persian and Turkish works, at least few remarkable Arabic writings, which will be discussed later. Given however the extreme confusion that exists surrounding Ankaravi's early career, it is best to exercise maximum caution in drawing conclusions as to the circumstances of his joining the Mevlevi Order.

2. As a Mevlevi Şeyh in Istanbul

Needless to say, the important but at the same time critical part of Ankaravi's career began with his appointment to the position of şeyhlik at the Galata Mevlevihane in 1019/1610. From this time up until his death in 1041/1631, he held this prestigious post, occupying himself mainly with reading and teaching the Mesnevi to his novices, preaching and delivering lectures, composing his treatises and works, and so forth. During his tenure of 21 years as a şeyh, Ismail Ankaravi, having displayed a simple, humble and pious personality, became an exemplary model both to his disciples and to the lay adherents who would come to the centre for his sermons. Almost all the classical and modern sources attribute to him a number of excellent moral qualities and hold him in remarkably high esteem. They also confer on him world-wide fame for his overall knowledge of both exoteric and esoteric disciplines. Kâtib Çelebi, for instance, portrays
him as "a highly knowledgeable, religious and ascetic person". Similarly, Evliyâ Çelebi sums up his major characteristics as follows: "He is extremely humble, derviș and erudite, like an ocean of spiritual treasure; and he is also well-grounded in the knowledge of the Sharī'a, and always careful not to commit sins." His remarkably profound knowledge and commendable integrity singled him out as "a unique person in the ṭariqa (mystic order) and taşawwuf (mysticism) of his century". Some other sources too cite more or less the same remarks but in conceptually different forms; for the sake of space, we avoid repeating them here.

Despite his notable position among the venerable scholars of his time, like some other Sufis, Ismā'īl Rusūhī was at times at the centre of controversy and became the target of vehement criticism on the part of his colleagues. As we know, the epoch in which he lived witnessed so many intense struggles and even bitter clashes between the doctors of the Shari'a, known as "Ülemā", who taught the Scripture and the Islamic sciences on a strictly formal basis in the medreses, and the people of ṭariqas, known as Sufis, who cultivated spiritual and mystical knowledge in private ṭariqa convents. The confrontation between these two groups took

37 Kātib Çelebi, Fezleke, p. 148.
38 Evliyâ Çelebi, Seyâhatnâme, p. 103.
39 Sāmī, Kâmūs, p. 439.
on various forms, depending on the circumstances and people involved. They are described in historical accounts of this period under such headings as "Ülemâ' versus 'Ürefâ' or Meşâyiîh" and "Medrese vs. Târîqa".

Throughout the seventeenth century, a similar confrontation erupted between the advocates of the Khalwati and Mevlevi orders and the followers of Kadizade, known also as the "Kadizadeliler" or "fakilar". It was these people who became notorious in Ankarâvi's time for having adopted extreme negative attitudes towards not only the adherents of those two Târîqa but the cemetery caretakers as well. The leader of these people,

41 The term "kadizadeliler", composed of two components, "kadi" (judge) and "zade" (son), means literally "the followers of judge's children, while the term "fakilar", derived originally from the Arabic term, "fâkîh" (jurist), but afterwards ironically deformed to "fakîlar", signifies "jurists". Both of these names were simultaneously given to a group formed by Mehemet Efendi of Balikesir (1582-1635), best known as "kadizade". The members of the group were preachers by profession. The Kadizadeliler, under the direction of Kadizade Mehemet Efendi, adopted for themselves the famous work, Tarih-i Muhammediye by Mehemet Efendi of Birgivi (d.1573) as a code of ethics for acting and preaching. Although the ideas and theories presented in the book were severely criticized and some parts of it even rejected by the prominent scholar, Ebussuûd Efendi, the Şeyhülislam (chief-jurisconsult) of that time, it remained continuously in circulation among those preachers. Kadizade Mehemet Efendi became increasingly active at the time of crisis and tribulation that arose immediately after the death of Sultan Ahamed I. At this particular time he acted in disguise as a real protector and defender of the Shari'a. Ironically, he claimed that all the miserable events of that time were happening because of the negligence of the Shari'a and because of the practices exercised by the People of Tariqa which were contrary to the Shari'a. Moreover, he is reportedly said to have supported the sanction decreed by Sultan Murad IV against smoking by issuing a verdict (fetva) for its prohibition. See for more information, Muştafa Nûnî Paşa, Netâyicül-Vukûât [Kurumlar ve Òrgütteriyle Osmanlı Tarihi], transform. into modern Turkish by Neset Cagatay (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1979), vol. 1-2, pp. 341-2.
Kadizade Mehmet Efendi, according to Kâtib Çelebi, used to deliver simple and superficial lectures, since he had no knowledge of natural sciences. He would also scorn particularly the Mevlevis by portraying them as "the holy ones who kick the floor-boards and blow the whistle..." Because of the insulting language he employed in his sermons, he was condemned by Sivâsî Efendi and Ankaravî as "a heretic and infidel who denied the Saints".42 Not only Kadızade himself but all his followers under the pretext of the defending of the Shari'a, voiced loud opposition to almost all the mystic practices, ranging from "supererogatory prayers" to "derviş ritual ceremonies", audition (semâ') and whirling (râkî), by maintaining that these are violations of Islamic teachings. Ismâ'îl Ankaravî exerted his utmost effort in order to counter such attacks and hence composed a book on this controversial subject in which he attempted to prove the legitimacy of semâ' from a religious viewpoint.43 According to some sources, upon the order of the sultan he began to write this book and completed it "in a lucid and convincing style" within three days, submitting it to a committee headed by Şeyhülislâm Yaḥyâ Efendi, who approved it with great admiration.44 Moreover, due to his strong support for the ritual practices of the ṭa'rîqas in


43 The title of the book is Huccetû's-Semâ', a work which will be discussed in the section of this thesis devoted to Ankaravî's works.

44 Sâkıb Dede, Nefîse-i Mevleviyân, p. 38.
general and "performing semâ" in particular, he earned special courtesy and commendation from some venerable Sufi leaders especially from Azīz Mahmūd Hūdāī (d.1038/1628), then şeyh of the Celvetī order and tutor of Sultān Ahmed I (d.1617).45

The supporters of Kadızade, clinging to a narrow definition of Islam, gradually gained popularity and prestige among the state authorities. So much so that they persuaded them to implement a restrictive form of Islam based merely on hadith and law and influenced them to close Sufi centres and imprison some Sufi şeyhs. Ismā‘īl Rusūhī himself suffered from these persecutions, as he laments in his commentary on the Mesnevi:

While I, as a humble person, had been teaching and preaching in our abode, I found myself in an unpleasant situation and charged by a group of selfish and envious people with false accusations and then driven out of my domicile to exile. Even they made an attempt to kill me. Fortunately, my Lord saved me from their plot and conspiracy.46

No further account is supplied there as to when and how this incident occurred; but it is a historic fact that it was only the Kadızadeliler at that


time who attacked Sufi convents.\textsuperscript{47}

In spite of these hardships and afflictions, Rusühī Dede carried on his undertakings with remarkable success and gained progressively more popularity in his milieu through his lectures and writings. During his long tenure in the post as a Mevlevī Şeyh, he conquered the hearts of not only the murids (novices) who were reading the Mesnevi under his supervision but also so many other people, young and old, who used to come regularly to the Tekke to listen to his sermons.

Ismā'īl Rusühī, while still holding his post of şeyhlik, died in 1041/1631 and was buried in the courtyard of the Galata Mevlevihâne. The year of his death, 1041 coincides with the term "hitām" (completion) according to the abjad numeration.\textsuperscript{48} Over his tomb was built the present


The following sources, however, record his death as 1042/1632: Kâtib Çelebi, Kashf al-Zunûn, vol. 1, p. 630; Kaḥbâla, Mu'jam al-Mu'allîfîn, vol. 1, p. 259; Mubibbi, Khulâşät al-Āthâr, vol. 1, p. 418; Brockelmann, GALS, vol. 2, p. 662; and some others indicate 1040/1630: Evliyâ Çelebi,
türbe (dome) by Hālet Sā'd Efendi (d.1239/1823) in 1235/1829, then şeyh at the Centre. And the following lines, composed by Selim Recāi, known also as Bīğānī Dede, as a tribute to Anḵaravī, are inscribed over the entrance gate of his tomb:

Rāh-i Mevleña da ey Gālib budur Şeyhüş-Şûyûh
Hażret-i Şāriḥ Rusûhî ḳıdve-i ehl-i Rusûh.⁴⁹

O Gālib! Here is the Master of the Masters in the path of Mevlâna
He is the Excellent Commentator and Rusûhî, and he is the exemplary model for the people of Rusûh.

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CHAPTER TWO
THE WORKS OF ANÇARAVĪ

Preliminary Remarks

İsmâ'îl Rusûhî Dede wrote, especially while presiding as the Şeyh over the Galata Mevlevî convent, numerous books on a variety of subjects ranging from mysticism to poetry. His main interest, however, lied in his interpretations of the major works, besides the selected segments of the Qur'ān and Prophetic sayings, of prominent mystical thinkers and poets such as Rûmî (d.672/1273), Ibn al-'Arabi (d.639/1240), Ibn al-Fârîd (d.632/1235), Jâmi (d.898/1492), etc. At present, despite the fact that figures varying from 20 to 40 are cited in several reliable documents, we are unable to determine the exact number of his entire writings. In his noteworthy study on the life and works of Ançaravî, Dr. Yetik has been able to trace, after personally visiting many of the libraries in Turkey, and mainly in Istanbul, the titles as well as locations of twenty-four books written by

50 In Semâhâne-i Edeb (p. 82), A. Enver indicates that Ançaravî authored more than forty books, yet there he specifies no more than three titles. M. Tâhir, on the other hand, attributes to him in one place (Osmanlı Müellifleri, vol. 1, pp. 118-120.) twenty books, and in another twenty-two. (Meşâyih-i Osmâniye, pp. 23-6). However, in both he is inconsistent not only with regard to the numbers but also the titles of a few books.
Ankaravi.\textsuperscript{51} My present research, however, with the substantial aid of the newly documented and computerized catalogues of those libraries, and with the help of a number of western biographical sources of which Yetik seems to have had no knowledge, increases the number of the titles to as many as thirty three. In what follows, I will annotate the 24 books I have examined and I will list the remainder at the end of this chapter.

1. Şerhü'l-Mesnevi or Mecmû'atu'l-Leťâ'if ve Meṭmûretu'l-Me'ârif

This is Ankaravi's vast commentary on the Mesnevi, which appears under several different names in some sources, though its exact title, as he himself has specified it, is *Mecmû'atu'l-Leťâ'if ve Meṭmûretu'l-Me'ârif (The Collection of Subtleties and the Hidden Store of Knowledge).*\textsuperscript{52} For instance, Kâtip Çelebi and some other writers, including Reynold Nicholson, named it *Fâtiḥü'l-Ėbyât,*\textsuperscript{53} which, as will be seen from its own heading, is wrong, for this is, though attached by Ankaravi to the *Mecmû'at*, a separate book in its own right, devoted to an explanation of the first eighteen couplets of the Mesnevi and of certain difficult concepts.\textsuperscript{54} Meanwhile,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravi*, pp. 65-121.
\item Ankaravi, *Şerhü'l-Mesnevi*, vol. 1, p. 2.
\end{thebibliography}
Mehmet Tâhir entitles it "Şerh-i Mesnevi Şenif el-Mûsemma Mefâtihü'l-Ebyât"; while Ismâ‘îl Paşa (al-Baghdâdi) designates it as "Fâtihü'l-Ebyât fi Şerhîl-Mesnevi", both of which are incorrect, in so far as Ankaravi’s own title is concerned. However, for the sake of convenience, I will henceforward call it briefly Şerhîl-Mesnevi or only Şerh.

Owing to his enormous commentary on the Mesnevi, Ismâ‘îl Rusûhî occupied a central place not only in Mevlevî circles but in the entire world of Ottoman literature as well. Even after his death, this work has long played a significant role as being the primary authority for teaching the Mesnevi; and his name and work have always been demanded in the certificates (icâzetnâmeler) issued for candidates who seek to be appointed to the position of mesnevilîhan (i.e. a lecturer on the Mesnevi).

Despite this, Abdulbaki Gölpınarlı, a contemporary researcher on the Mesnevi and the Mevleviyye, though he has great respect for Ankaravi’s commentary in comparison to those of others, yet asserts that the celebrity it gained in the Mevlevî milieu in the past is disputable on several accounts. First of all, Gölpınarlı thinks that Ankaravi perhaps did not consult other important works of Mevlânâ Jalâl al-Dîn, or that he did not study them with due care and attention. Secondly, as it appears from Ankaravi’s work,

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55 Mehmet Tahir, Meşâyihi ‘Osmâniye, p. 23.
continues Gölpınarlı, he has not looked into the *Maqālāt* by Shams al-
Tabrīzī, which could have been in fact of great use to him in explaining
some of the stories in the *Mesnevī*. Moreover, he seems to have been
ignorant even of Rūmī’s own explanation of one of the couplets of the
*Mesnevī*, illustrated fully in the latter’s *Fihī Ma Fiḥ*. One other reason why
Anḵaravī does not merit such reputation is, Gölpınarlı goes on to say, that
he has not shown due care in the selection of an authentic version of the
*Mesnevī* amongst a number of others as a basis for his commentary. For
this reason, the text he has chosen, he claims, is replete with defects and
is even distorted in many places. Besides, since he was not well-educated
in the Persian language, or rather, since his knowledge of Persian was
merely based on books, he failed to comprehend some of the complex
idioms in the *Mesnevī*. The last discrediting factor is that Anḵaravī made an
additional commentary on an alleged seventh volume of the *Mesnevī* and
falsely ascribed it to Mevlānā Rūmī. It is for all of these reasons, concludes
Gölpınarlı, that the wide recognition Anḵaravī gained from his commentary
was not duly deserved.\(^{58}\)

All of these criticisms are of course important and yet need to be
ascertained in the light of careful analysis, an analysis which would base
itself on all the volumes of Anḵaravī’s *Şerḥ* comparing it with other reliable
commentaries. But such an extensive study lies beyond the scope of the

present research and above all it certainly requires at least more than a couple of independent dissertations. Nevertheless, only some important facets will be highlighted in a summary fashion.

When one puts aside the issue of An̄karavī’s "false ascription" of an additional volume to the Mesnevi, which is indeed controversial, and confines oneself only to various investigations of his commentary, one can acquire a fair evaluation with regard to its credibility as well as its adequacy. A cursory glance at the introduction to the Šerṭ reveals that An̄karavī, as he declares there, long before embarking on its composition, made a thorough study of a number of eminent books in a variety of disciplines, ranging from Qur’anic exegesis {e.g., Anwar al-Tanzil wa Asrār al-Ta‘wil by Qādi Bāyḏāwī (d.791/1388), Irshād al-‘Aql al-Salīm ilā Mazāyā al-Qur’ān al-Karīm by Abū al-Su‘ūd (d.982/1574), Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm by Ibn Kathīr (d.774/1373)}, al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā‘iq al-Tanzil by Ibn ‘Umar Zamakhsharī (d.545/1144), Majma’ al-Bayān Fi Tafsīr al-Qur’ān by Ibn al-Ḥasan Tabarsi (d.540/1153)}, to ṣadīth {e.g., al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣahīḥ by Bukhārī (d.260/870) Mishkāt al-Maṣābiḥ by Kāṭib al-Tibrizī (d.647/1237), Mashāriq al-Anwār by Ibn Muḥammad Saghānī (d.560/1257), al-Jāmi‘ al-Ṣaghīr by Shaybānī (d.210/804)}, to taṣawwuf {e.g., al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam by Ibn al-‘Arabī, Dīvān by Ibn al-Fāriḍ, ‘Awārif al-Ma‘ārif by Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Ḥāfṣ al-Suhrawardī (d.640/1243), Kitāb Iṣṭilāḥat al-Ṣūfī by Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshi (d.730/1330)}, to kalām {e.g., Sharḥ al-Mawāqif, Sharḥ al-‘Aqā‘id},
to ḥikmat {e.g., Hayākil al-Nūr by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī}, to Shari‘a {e.g., Mishkāt al-Anwār by al-Ghazālī (d.512/1111)},59 to Islamic Jurisprudence {e.g., Kitāb al-Hidāya by Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim (d.891/1489), Šadr al-Sharī‘a by Burḥān al-Dīn Maḥbūbī (d.744/1347)}, to lexicography {e.g., al-Ṣiḥāḥ Tāj al-Lughah by Isma‘īl ibn Ḥammād al-Jawhari (d.404/1003), and al-Nihāyah Fī Gharīb al-Ḥadīth wa al-Āthār by Ibn al-Athīr (d.630/1232)}.60 So no doubt that this commentary, according to its author, is the product of a long survey based not only on his own opinions but also on knowledge and wisdom derived from those sources enumerated above. Moreover, in the ensuing lines he stipulates that, unless fully equipped with the knowledge of those books, no Mesneviān should engage in teaching the Mesnevi.61 This alone may be good enough to show the care he took in preparing his Serh, not to mention his 21 years of service in the Mevlevihâne where he would have had the opportunity to become closely acquainted with the various versions of Rûmî’s work.

Nonetheless, against Gölpinarlı’s serious criticism, many scholars and those, in particular, who are experts in the Mesnevi, present or past, have acknowledged the importance of Ankaravī’s commentary. R. Nicholson, for example, has referred to it as “the complete translation of the Mathnawi in


60 Ibid. p. 2.

61 Ibid.
Turkish and has placed it in the first rank of those commentaries from which he profited most in preparing his English translation. Similarly Tahsin Yazıcı describes it as "the most popular work, until recent times, explaining the Mathnawi". Again in his book entitled Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir (Prose in Ancient Turkish Literature), Fahir Iz cites Ankaravi’s Şerh, in addition to that of San Abdulla (d.1071/1661) and that of Ismâ’il Hâkki of Bursa (d.1137/1727), as the most celebrated of commentaries. It should also be recalled again that owing to his Şerh, he has been honoured by Şeyh Gâlib with the title of "Hazret-i Sârih", which has already been quoted above.

One problem which still needs to be resolved is that of the aforementioned apocryphal seventh defter (volume) of the Mesnevî, which was commented upon by Ankaravi and for which he has become the target

63 Ibid., p. xvi. Some other commentaries listed by Nicholson are as follows:
- Şarh-i Mathnawi-yi Mawlânâ-yi Rûmî (Persian) of Wali Muhammed Akbarabadi,
- Murâshafât-i Rađawî of Muhammad Riđâ (Persian),
- Şarh-i Mathnawi of Muhammed ‘Alî (Bahru’l-Ulûm) (Persian),
- al-Manhaj al-Qawî of Yûsuf b. Ahmad al-Mawlawî (Arabic),
- Şarh-i Mathnawi-yi Şarâfî of ‘Abîdin Pasha (Turkish).

64 Yazıcı, "Ismâ’il Rusûkh," p. 190.
65 Iz, Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir, p. 148.
66 Refer to footnote 11 above.
of severe criticism by so many followers of the Mevleviyye, including some Şeyhs as well as other Mesnevi commentators. According to Kâtib Çelebi, or as he is better known in the west, Hâjjî Khalîfa, the apocryphal seventh volume of the Mesnevi appeared around 1035/1625 at the time when the fifth volume of An karâvî’s commentary was still in progress. Then An karâvî reportedly set aside the fifth volume and embarked upon a commentary on the supposed seventh volume of Rûmî’s work, the colophon of which claims that it was copied in the year 810/1407. There has been a long debate and even sometimes heated discussions among scholars about not only the authenticity of this volume and its questionable place among the other volumes, but also over how and by whom it was written. All in all, two main propositions have been advanced regarding this complicated matter, one for its acceptance as formulated by An karâvî himself in his preface to his commentary on that volume, the other for its rejection as dictated by several authorities in their various writings. Rather than going into detail, which is impossible for us to do here, we would like to talk about only one aspect of the whole issue, which will shed considerable light on An karâvî’s confrontation with the Kadizadeliler.

In a letter composed by Cevdet Paşa (d.1311/1893), one of the famous Ottoman historians, in response to ʻAbidîn Paşa (d.1325/1907),

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another commentator on the Mesnevi, who had requested that the former read and send him his remarks regarding his commentary, valuable information is supplied as to the composition of the "seventh volume". Cevdet Paşa states in his letter that the "seventh volume" of the Mesnevi, with its many strange ideas and theories disparaging Sufi precepts, was deliberately forged by a person called Hüsameddîn in an attempt to attack directly the doctrines of Şeyhü'l-Ekber (the greater Şeyh), Muḥy al-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabî. The same letter further adds that although the volume in question is essentially incompatible with the rest of the Mesnevi, İsmâ'il Rusûhî had to write a separate commentary on it, acting apparently in a seemingly conciliatory mood towards the Kadızadeliler, for whom Şeyhü'l-Ekber, Ibn al-'Arabî was no doubt "a greater enemy" ('adûv-i ekber).69 In other words, İsmâ'il Arıkarağî, according to Cevdet Paşa, certainly knew that the entire Mesnevi consists of six volumes, yet because of the circumstances he lived in, particularly because of the Kadızadeliler's adversarial attitude against him, he had not only to defend its validity but to comment on it in order to reconcile the ideas presented there with those included in the other volumes.

With such an assertion, some writers are in disagreement at least to some extent. In his short essay written in Ottoman Turkish, 'Alî Cânîb finds

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Cevdet Paşa's allegation that Ankaravī commented on the "seventh volume" in order to appear "seemingly kind" (cemîle) to the Kadızadeliler unfair and baseless and even incompatible with reality. For, as his contemporary Kâtib Çelebi has shown, Ankaravī spent most of his later life in confrontation with the supporters of Kadızade Meḥmet Efendi, whom he courageously condemned as a "heretic" (müllhid) and an "infidel" (zindîk), and against whom he composed the work Hüccetü's-Sema' with the aim of proving the legitimacy of the mystical practices. The same idea is supported by Yetik with a rather balanced assessment. He says "it is admissible that Ankaravī was wrong in his acceptance of the seventh volume, but it is not appropriate to claim that he did so just because he wanted to be kind to the Kadızadeliler. On the contrary, he was always in conflict with those people."

However this might be, Ismâ'îl Rusûḥî Dede, due to his approval of this pseudo-volume of the Mesnevi, has become a target of criticism especially among the Mevlevî Şeyhs. For instance, during Ankaravī's own lifetime, Şabûhî (d.1088/1667), the Mevlevî Şeyh of Yenikârı in Istanbul, reportedly declared that "for some unknown reason, he has commented on the false volume, but if he attempts to to read it, I would come at once and"

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72 Yetik, Ismaîl-i Ankaravî, p. 69.
destroy the pulpit over his head".  

Throughout his whole commentary on the *Mesnevi*, Ismâ'il Ankaravî made extensive use of Ibn al-'Arabi's doctrines in explaining Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî's teachings. For this reason, as Ahmed Ateş aptly remarks, it is extremely difficult to perceive Rûmî's own mystical thoughts as distinct from those of Ibn al-'Arabi, so intimately has Ankaravî blended the two. Moreover, even after Ankaravî, his influence continued to prevail over succeeding commentators on the *Mesnevi*. In this connection, one can cite, as an example, Sari 'Abdullah (d.1071/1661), whose commentary entitled *Cevâhir-i Bevâhir-i Mesnevi* is equally composed in the light of Ibn 'Arabi's theosophy of "waḥdat al-wujûd".

There is no doubt that in order to reach a fair and complete judgment about Ankaravî's commentary on the *Mesnevi*, an independent study is indispensable; nonetheless, in face of the critical comments of Ateş, one must inevitably concur, if not with all, then at least with some of the charges of Gölpinarlı against Ankaravî, such as for instance that he did not show

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due care in explaining the text in accordance with Rûmî’s own ideas. In fact Ankaravî adopts a similar approach, as we shall see below, in his commentary ʻIzâhû’l-Ḥikem, to the extent that he fails to interpret the text of the Hayâkil within the framework of Suhrawardî’s Ishrâqi philosophy.

Ankaravî’s Șerhû’l-Mesnevi was translated in rather abridged form into Arabic by Çengi Yûsuf Dede (d.1080/1669) and published under the title al-Manhaj al-Qawî fi Sharḥ al-Mathnawî in Cairo, 1289/1872. The complete work was also translated into Persian by Ḥismat Sattârzâde and published under the title Șerh-i Kabîr-i Ankaravî bar Mathnawi-yi Ma’nawi-yi Mawlawî, Tehran, 1348(solar)/1970. Meanwhile, although it has not yet been rendered into English, nevertheless, Nicholson has used it extensively in the footnotes of his translation of the Mesnevi.

The original Ottoman version of Șerhû’l-Mesnevi, has up to now been published several times, yet none of these editions have included the apocryphal seventh volume. The first edition came out in 1221/1806, the second in 1241/1845, and the third in 1251/1835 in Egypt. It was thereafter published twice in Istanbul, 1257/1841 and 1289/1872 respectively. All of these editions appear in six volumes with the exception of the last one which divides the sixth volume into two parts.76

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2. Câmi'ü'l-Āyât (The Collection of the Qur'anic Verses)

As is narrated in the preface to his Şerh, İsmâ'îl Ankaravî, during his short visit to Mevlâna’s tomb, composed the present work upon the order of the chief Mevlevî Şeyh Bostan Çelebi. In this book, he explains all the Qur'anic texts and Prophetic sayings as well as other Arabic phrases scattered throughout the Mesnevi. Written in Ottoman Turkish, the work chronologically precedes both the commentary and his work Fâtihü'l-Ebyât, which will be reviewed immediately after the present one. When compiling the work, Ankaravî utilized a variety of Qur'anic exegesis; among them, those of Bayḍâwî and Zamakhsharî take precedence.

Interestingly enough, the book under examination, despite the fact that its author assigned to it a specific title, is cited in Hadiyyat al-‘Arifîn under the title "al-Fâtiḥat al-‘Aynîyya Sharḥ Mâ Waqa‘a Fî Kitâb al-Mathnawî Min al-Abyât al-‘Arabiyya", which is incorrect, and in Mu‘jam al-Mu‘allisîn by the somewhat extended title, "Câmi’ul Âyât Fî Sharḥ Mâ Waqa‘a Fî Kitâb al-Mathnawî Min al-Āyât wa al-Aḥâdîth wa al-Abyât". This whole confusion possibly arises from Ankaravî’s integration of this book into the forthcoming one.

Up until now, this very important work of Ankaravî has not been

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published, nor has it been made the subject of inquiry in academic circles. A number of manuscript copies are available in various libraries.  

3.  Fātiḥū’l-Ebyāt (The Opener of the Verses)

From the preface to this work, written in Ottoman Turkish, one can obtain an account as to when and how it came to be written. There it is related that Ismâ‘îl Anḵaravî, while lecturing on the Mesnevî, was requested by his disciples to commit to writing his comments upon the first eighteen couplets (bayts) of the Mesnevî. During that time, he was deeply engaged in the preparation of another work. So, as soon as he had finished it, he embarked upon this formidable task and thus completed it around 1034/1623-4. Afterwards, he integrated his previous work, viz., Câmi’u’l-Āyāt, first into the present one, and then both into the Şerhū’l-Mesnevî.  

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80 Some of the copies are as follows: Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Pertev Paşa, MS. nos. 239, 255/1, Sehid Ali Paşa, 1159, and Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, MS. no. 341.


83 Anḵaravî makes a metaphorical analogy between these three works and three verses from the Qur’ān. He says, in brief summary: though Câmi’u’l-Āyāt and Fātiḥū’l-Ebyāt are in fact two separate books, yet I have combined them in accordance with the wisdom behind this verse; “he has made the two seas to flow freely so that they meet together.” (Qur’ān, 55:19). However, in so far as they are distinct from each other in their contents, they represent the hidden secret of the verse, “between them there is a barrier which they cannot pass”. (Qur’ān, 55:20). Consequently, out of these two sources (books), came forth numerous subtle realities and beautiful knowledge, just as the following verse intimates: “There come forth
Due to its attachment to the first volume of the Şerh, in some classical sources, like Kashf al-Żunún, the Fâtihü'l-Ebyāt is wrongly recorded as the title of the commentary.\(^\text{84}\) In another book,\(^\text{85}\) it is again misidentified as "Fâtihü'l-Ebvaḥ".

In this treatise, the author has expounded not only the first eighteen verses but also certain difficult words scattered throughout the whole poem.

In the meantime, it should be noted that in the short essay by A. Ateş, the present work is the subject of investigation in comparison with several other commentaries. There Ateş notes that Ankaravi and other commentators, though they exerted their incredible skills and efforts and thus explained every word and even every letter of those eighteen couplets in a fascinating manner, nevertheless failed to interpret them within the framework of Jalāl al-Din Rūmī's system.\(^\text{86}\)

This book is available in print as an annex to the beginning of the

\(^\text{84}\) Kâtib Çelebi, Kashf al-Żunûn, vol. 1, p. 1587.

\(^\text{85}\) Türk Ansiklopedisi, vol. 3, p. 66.

first volume of Şerhû'î-Mesnevi. 

4. Minhâcû'î-Fuṭarâ (Method for the Dervîses)

Probably this is Ankarâvi’s most important work next to his commentary on the Mesnevi. Written around 1034/1624 in an eloquent Ottoman style, it consists of three principal chapters, each having ten subheadings. The first one delineates the main characteristics of the Mevlevî Order, its practices as well as its central concepts such as "halîfe", "şeyh", "ţâlib", "mûrşîd", "sefer", "semâ", "muşabele", etc. The second part attempts to cultivate in the dervises the pre-requisites of the Tarîqa with an emphasis on the observance of the fundamental obligations of the Shari'a, ranging from "tawhîd" (unity), "prayer", "alms giving", "fasting", and "pilgrimage" to such issues as "celibacy", "marriage" and struggle with "nafs", and so on. As for the last chapter, it concentrates on the progressive stages and degrees of the Sufi path (sûlûk), e.g. "wakefulness", "repentance", "reckoning", "fleeing from creation to God", "fear", "humility", "sincerity", "perseverance", "chastity", "gratitude", "knowledge", "wisdom", "certainty", "inspiration", "ecstasy", "compassion", "purity", "vision", "unveiling", and so forth.

87 Manuscript copies may be found in Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütûphanesi, Hacı Mahmud Efendi, MS. no. 2638; Istanbul Nuruosmaniye, MS. nos. 343-4; Konya Mevlâna Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 2083.

A thorough examination of the present work, which was actually already done by Dr. Yetik, unveils the fact that it is a product of extensive research based on various eminent sources, ranging from those of tafasir (exegeses of the Qur'an), of ḥadīth, to those of taṣawwuf (mysticism). Among other books, Manāzil al-Sā'irīn of 'Abdullah al-Anṣārī (d.481/1088-9) forms the basis of Ankaravi's present work.90

Minhācū'ī-Fukara was published first at Bulak in 1256/1840 and later in Istanbul in 1296/1869.91 To the end of the latter edition, which has a list of contents according to subject, another work of his entitled Ḥuccetū's-Semā' is annexed.

5. Ḥuccetū's-Semā' (The Proof for the Audition)

This succinct treatise was composed around 1027/161792 with the aim of defending such Mevlevi practices as "semā" (singing) and "raḵš" (whirling), both of which, besides other rites, were harshly condemned by the Kadızadeğiller. It consists of three main parts, all of which attempt to prove by various Qur'anic verses and aḥādīth that "raḵš", "semā" and "def"...
(drum) respectively are permissible from the Shari'a point of view.

In compiling *Hüccetü's-Semâ*, İsmâ‘îl Rusûhî was largely inspired by the work of Majd al-‘Dîn al-‘Tûsî al-Ghazâlî entitled *Bawâriq al-ilmâ‘ī fî al-Radd Man Yuḥarrim al-Samâ‘*. ⁹³

This work of Ankaravî, which is also cited in other sources as "Ḥujjat al-Samâ‘ī fî Ḥall Istimâ‘ al-Ghinâ,", ⁹⁴ was originally written in Arabic, ⁹⁵ later translated by the author himself into Ottoman Turkish and published twice only in the latter language together with the *Minhâcü‘l-Fukarâ‘* in 1256/1840 at Bulaq, and in 1286/1869, at Istanbul. ⁹⁶

6. *Fütûhât-i ‘Aynîyye (Ocular Conquests)*

As we are told in the introduction to this work, while he was busy completing the third volume of his commentary on the *Mesnevi*, İsmâ‘îl Ankaravî suddenly contracted a severe eye-disease and hence became

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⁹⁴ Brockelman, *GAL*, vol. 2, pp. 590.

⁹⁵ Dr. Yetik refers us for the original Arabic version to Sûleymaniye Library, Pertev Paşa Section, MS 255/2. (*İsmail-i Ankaravî*, p. 87, n.1.)

⁹⁶ T. Yazici indicates that it was printed in a separate edition too, but so far I have not been able to trace it. (Yazici, *İsmâ‘îl Rusûhî*, p. 190.)
unable to continue this laborious task. After some time, thanks to his
spiritual physician, he recovered from the pain and was able to see as
before. Thereupon, with the aim of showing his gratitude to God for
providing such efficient healing, he set out to write a commentary on the
first chapter of the Qurʾān; and after having completed it around 1037/1627,
he named it Fūtūḥat-i ʿAyniyye.

The whole book is made up of seven main chapters, the first dealing
with the virtues of the Qurʾān, the second and third with the exoteric as well
as esoteric meanings of the "istiʿādha" (seeking refuge in God) and
"basmala" (beginning with the name of God) respectively, the fourth and
fifth with the meanings of "fātiḥa" (opening) and "sūra" (chapter)
respectively, the sixth with the various names of "Surat al-Fātiḥa", and the
last with a full explanation of the whole Sūra, including the external reasons
for its revelation.

Notwithstanding its title as such, assigned by the author himself,
Kātib Çelebi calls it somewhat erroneously by the name of "al-Fātiḥatü'l-
ʿAyniyye",96 while İsmāʿīl Paşa cites it under two wrong titles, one, like
Çelebi’s but with some additions, "...Sharaḥ Ma Waqaʿa Fī Kitāb al-
Mathnawi" and the other, "al-Fātiḥatü'l-'Ayniyye".97 M. Ṭāhir, in addition to
referring to it under its correct title, calls it in one instance "al-Fātiḥatü'l-

96 Kātib Çelebi, Ḳaṣḥ al-Zunūn, vol. 1, p.1214.

‘Ayniyye fi Tefsir-i Süret-i Fatiha’,
and in another “Tefsir Süret-i Fatiha el-Musemme bi-l-Fatiha’l-Gaybiyye”.

Futuhat-i ‘Ayniyye, written in Ottoman Turkish and inspired by various prominent interpretations of the Qur’an, was published in Istanbul, 1328/1910.

7. Zubdetu’l-Fuhum Fi Nakshi’l-Fusus (The Core of the Investigations on the Portrayal of the Bezels)

The book under review was written as a commentary on Ibn ‘Arabi’s abridged version of Fuusus al-‘Hikam, entitled Naqsh al-Fusus, and based largely on ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jami’s Persian translation of the latter, called Naqd al-Nusus.

Apart from Serhu’l-Mesnevi, the present work can be taken as another indication of Ankaravi’s interest and love for Ibn ‘Arabi’s theosophy. In the book, while explaining the wondrous characteristics of every prophet, Ankaravi masterfully embellishes them with the relevant couplets from the Mesnevi. Therefore, from this angle, the book represents a kind of combination of two conceptually diverse but mystically identical doctrines, maintained by two great thinkers of Islam, Jalal al-Din of Afghanistan and Ibn ‘Arabi of al-Andalus.

Another striking aspect of the book is that it masterfully delivers its


message in three languages, Arabic, Persian and Ottoman, which of course
confers further credit upon the scholarship of its author, namely Ankaravi.

This work was published in Istanbul in 1328/1910.100

8. Mi'tfahü'l-Belâga ve Mişbahü'l-Fesâha (The Key for the Accurate
Expression (Eloquence) and The Lamp for the Oration)

The very first pages of this book give a substantial account as to how
it came to be written. There it is related that once a few "spiritual sons" of
Isma'ili Ankaravi, among them the derviş 'Amil 101 and Muḥammad Şadiq
Çelebi, the descendants of Jalāl al-Din Rūmî, commenced, with their desire
to learn the science of articulation and poetry, to read under his guidance
the book called Talkhis by Khâṭib Dimashqī.102 However, since they were
then not mature enough to comprehend it, they became frustrated and
distressed. So in order to help them, Ankaravi, basing himself mainly on
that book by Dimashqī, compiled his own work and thus entitled it Mi'tfahü'l-

100 Ankaravi, Zûbdetü'l-Fûhûs fi Naksî'r-Fûşûs (Istanbul: Metin Matba'âsi,
1328/1910). Manuscript copies may be found in Istanbul Süleymaniye,
Şehid Ali Paşa, MS nos. 1215, Halef Efendi, MS. no. 256.

101 Katib Çelebi identifies as him "derviş gânem," not "derviş 'amil." (Kashf al-Zûnûn, vol. 1, p. 1769.)

102 The full title of the book is Talkhis al-Mifţah fi al-Ma'ānî wa al-Bayân,
compiled by Jalâl al-Dîn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Rahmân al-Qazwînî
(739/1338), known as Khâṭib Dimashqī. (Gölpinarlı, Mevîlânâ Müzesi
Yazmalar Kataloğu, vol. 2, p. 275). Besides Talkhis, Ankaravi also utilized
Manâzir al-Inshâ of Maṭfûm b. Muḥammad al-Gîlânî, known as Hâce-i
Beläğa ve Mişbâhü’l-Feşâha,103 which represents the first scholarly work of its kind, written in Turkish on Ottoman philology (edebiyât-i osmâniye).104

The book consists of four chapters, the first one dealing with the meanings of words and terms, called "me'ânî"; the second with the science of style in speech (‘ilmü’l-beyân); the third with the subject-matters of the science of verbal embellishments in rhetoric (‘ilmü’l-bedî); and the last imparting certain instructions about the art of letter-writing.

So far it has been published only once in Istanbul, 1284/1898.105

9. er-Risâletû’t-Tenzîhiyye Fī Še’ni’l-Mevleviyye (The Treatise of Clearance on the Position of the Mevleviyye)

This succinct treatise, composed in Arabic, aims at repudiating the objections of a preacher, known as Şeyh Ibrâhim (1033/1623), on the ritual ceremonies of the Mevlevî Order. It contains, besides an introduction, three epistles and five responses to the critical questions about semâ’ in reference to the aḥādîth of the Prophet about "the singing and dancing" of the "habaş" (Ethiopian) that took place during the "happy days of the two

103 Ankarâvî, Miḥâḥü’l-Beläğa ve Mişbâhü’l-Feşâha (İstanbul: Tasvîr-i Efkar Matba’ası, 1284/1898), pp. 2-4.

104 M. Tâhir, Meşayîh-i ‘Osmaniye, p. 25, n. 74.

105 See footnote 103 above. Some of the manuscripts of this work are located in: Konya Mevlâna Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 2252; Istanbul Sûleymaniye ハウス Mahmûd Efendi, MS. no. 2872.
feasts".106

Dr. Yetik, basing himself on Brockelmann’s statement, mistakenly assumes that it was published in Leiden,107 when in fact it is only available in manuscript at Leiden University Library MS 1892.

10. Miṣbāḥü‘l-Esār (The Lamp of the Secrets)

This is a short mystical commentary, composed in Arabic, and inspired largely by Ghazālī’s (505/1111) Mishkāt al-Anwār, on the famous Qur’anic verse 24:35, known as “the verse of light” (āyat al-nūr). Besides an introduction that gives, after a statement glorifying God, preliminary information about its preparation as well as some of the names of the commentaries of the Qur’an utilized therein (e.g. those of Bayḍāwī and Zamakhsharī), the treatise has four small parts, the first dealing with light and its nature, the second with the notions of "miṣbāḥ" (lamp), "mishkāt" (niche) and "zuṣāj" (glass), the third with the nature of “the sacred olive tree” (al-shajarat al-zaytūna · al-mubārakah), and the last with the subject of guidance (hidāya).

This invaluable treatise, which appears in Brockelmann’s work, in

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106 Katib Çelebi, Kasf al-Żunūn, vol. 1, p. 856. The two happy days are the two occasional feasts, i.e. that of Ramadan and that of sacrifice.

107 Yetik, Ismail-ı Ankaravi, p. 90. For the manuscript copy, see Süleymaniye Nafiz Paşa, 395/2.
contrast to the author's own identification, under the title "Mašābih al-Asrār", has not yet been published.\footnote{GALS, vol. 2, p. 662.}

11. Şerh-i Hadīs-i Erba'în
(The Commentary on the Forty Hadiths)

In this work, Ismâ'îl Rusûhî Dede has commented on forty hadîths related exclusively to a variety of Sufi practices such as audition, singing, whirling, etc.\footnote{For manuscript copies, Süleymaniye, H. Mahmud Efendi MS no. 2872/1; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat.Turco), MS no. 137/1-2; Königliche Bibliothek Zu Berlin ( Türkischen Handschriften), MS no. 26.} By doing so, he sought to defend the Mevlevî tariqa against those who claimed that these practices were an innovation (bid'a) and corrupt (žalâlet).\footnote{Kâtib Çelebi, Kashf al-Żunûn, vol. 1, p. 1037.}

The work, compiled in Ottoman Turkish and not published, features a number of quotations from the Mesnevi.\footnote{Yetik, Ismail-i Ankaravi, p. 106.}

12. Hall-i Muşkilât-i Mesnevi
(The Resolution of the Difficulties in the Mesnevi)

Ankaravî composed the present work at the request of his companions who asked him to resolve, as he had attempted in his previous \footnote{See for the various manuscripts, Süleymaniye Nâfiz Paşa, MS. no. 184, Lala İsmail, MS. no. 15/2.}
work, *Fatihü'l-Ebyât*, some of the more obscure lines\textsuperscript{113} in the rest of the *Mesnevi* other than the first eighteen couplets, as well as to reveal Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî's intent in the stories related throughout the *Mesnevi*\textsuperscript{114}.

So far only one copy of the work, and an incomplete one at that, has been discovered is in manuscript form.\textsuperscript{115}

13. *Mağâsid-i 'Aliyye Fî Şerhî't-Tâ'îyye*  
*The Commentary on the Poem of Tâ'îyye*

As its title implies, this work in Ottoman Turkish was written as a commentary on Ibn al-Fâriq's famous poem entitled *al-Tâ'îyya*.\textsuperscript{116} In the *Mağâsid Ankaravi* first analyzes the whole according to the rules of Arabic grammar and later explains them one by one.\textsuperscript{117}

A number of manuscript copies are preserved in different libraries.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{113} Algar, "Amqaravi Rosûk," p. 100.


\textsuperscript{115} Istanbul Bayezid Üniversite Kütüphanesi, Veliyyüddîn, MS no. 1672. (See, Yetik, *ismail-i Ankaravi*, p. 110).


\textsuperscript{117} Yetik, *ismail-i Ankaravi*, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{118} Istanbul Belediye Kütüphanesi, MS nos. 1755; Süleymâniye Hâlet Efendi, MS no. 220; Biblioteca Vaticana (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/5.
14. Şerîh-i Kaşîdetî’l-Mîmiyye’l-Hamriyye  
(Commentary on the Poem of “al-Mîmiyya al-Khamriyya”)  

Just after the composition of the preceding book, Ankarâvî again was requested by his close friends to commit to writing his comments on another poem of Ibn al-Fârîd entitled Kaşîdat al-Mîmiyya al-Khamriyya. As in the case of Makâsid, he also analyzes here the entire poem in the light of Arabic grammar, and then provides a detailed mystical explanation for each of the couplets therein.\(^{119}\)

The book, written in Ottoman Turkish about 1030/1620-1,\(^{120}\) has never been printed.\(^{121}\)

15. Cenâhû’l-Êrvâh (The Wing of the Spirits)  

This Ottoman Turkish study was realized by Ankarâvî during one of his visits to Konya. The principal aim of the book, which is replete with couplets from the Mesnevî is to acquaint people more with the unity of God.\(^{122}\)

This work, like many others by Ankarâvî, has never been

\(^{119}\) Yetik, Ismail-i Ankarâvî, p. 99.  


\(^{121}\) For its copies; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/6; Süleymaniye, Halet Efendi, MS. nos. 727/2, 796.  

\(^{122}\) Yetik, Ismail-i Ankarâvî, p. 101.
published. 123

16. Simāṭū’l-Mūkinīn (The Rank of the People of Certainty)

The present work, written in Arabic, deserves special attention, for it provides us with an example of Anḵaravi’s proficiency in that language. In this succinct commentary devoted to the introduction of the Mesnevi, the author aims to explain Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī’s initial remarks in a nice and lucid fashion.

The work, which is recorded in some sources under rather a long title, 124 is available in manuscript form in various libraries. 125

17. el-Ḥikemū’l-Munderice Fī Şerhi’l-Münferice 126
(The Scroll of Wisdom on the Commentary on al-Munfarija)

This is Anḵaravi’s commentary, composed in Ottoman Turkish, on

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123 Manuscript copies are located in; Süleymaniye, Re’sü’l-Küttāb, MS. no. 1188/4; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/11.


125 For some of its manuscript copies, Istanbul Topkapi Sarayi Revan Kōşkü, MS. no. 451; Süleymaniye H. Hüsnü Paşa, MS. no. 659; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/2.

126 Dr. E. Yetik reports that this book was designated in M. Tāhir’s short essay Mesāyih-i ‘Osmāniye as “Şerh-u Kaṣidetü’I-Münferide” instead of “münferice,” which, based on my verification, appears to be an incorrect statement on Yetik’s part, for it bears exactly the same title as it is here. Besides, the page number he refers to, p.25 is supposed to be p.24. (Yetik, Ismail-i Ankaravi, p. 85 and n. 1.) In addition, the same author, i.e., Mehmed Tahir, in his other eminent work, gives its full title as “Şerh-u Kaṣidetü’l-Münferice el-Müsemma bî ḫikemi’l-Münderice”. (Osmanlı Müellifleri, vol. 1, p. 119)
the famous classical poem of Abū al-Faḍl Yūsuf b. Muḥammad (513/1119) entitled *al-Qaṣīdat al-Muntarija*, which consists of some 35 couplets.

It was printed three times, first in Bulaq, 1300/1882, and a second and third time at Istanbul, 1314/1896 and 1327/1909 respectively.\(^{127}\)

18. *Derecätû's-Sâlikîn (The Degrees of the Sufi Initiates)*

Taking the work *Manāzil al-Sārin* by ʿAbdullah b. Muḥammad al-Harawi (481/1088) as a prototype for himself, Ismāʿīl Rusūhī has set down in Ottoman Turkish the present tract under ten chief headings, and each in turn dealing with ten progressive stages in the spiritual development of a dervis. As Dr. Yetik indicates, it seems more or less a recapitulation of the third chapter of the *Minhâcu’s-Fuṣara*.\(^{128}\)

The text of *Derecätû's-Sâlikîn*, which has been identified under a number of disparate titles,\(^{129}\) is preserved in manuscript form in various libraries.\(^{130}\)

\(^{127}\) Yetik asserts that it was published only twice (*İsmail-i Ankaravi*, p. 86); thus he seems to have no knowledge of its publication in Istanbul by H. Hüseyin Efendi Maṭbaʿa′ası, 1314/1896.


\(^{129}\) In both *Asmā al-Mu'allifin* (vol. 1, p. 218) and *Meşāyiḥ-i ʿOsmāniye* (p. 26), it appears as "Minhâcu’s-Sâlikîn", while in the *Topkapı Sarayi Müzesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu* (vol. 1, p. 57) it appears under the title of "Irşadu’s-Sâlikîn".

\(^{130}\) Topkapı Sarayi Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS. nos. 175, 271. (*Topkapı Saray Müzesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu*, vol. 1, p. 57.) British Museum, MS no. Harl 5490/3. (*Catalogue of the Turkish
19. **Risâle-i Üyûn-i Isnâ Aşere**  
*(The Treatise on the Twelve Distinguished States)*

This treatise, written in metrical verse form in Ottoman Turkish, consists of twelve chapters, each having an Arabic title of its own. The following subjects, involving mainly the various means to accomplish spiritual perfection, are treated in the work: purification of the soul, abstinence, the nearness to the verifiers (*ehl-i tahkîk*), mystical maxims of the celebrated Sufis, love and passion, unity, knowledge, hidden knowledge, remembrance of God, prayer and supplication and so on. These topics have been at times adorned with the author's own beautiful Persian poems.\(^{131}\)

This fascinating work has not yet been published.\(^{132}\)

20. **Risâle-i Uşûl-i Tarîkat-i Mevînâ**  
*(The Treatise on the Foundations of the Path of Mevâna)*

As can be seen from its title, the present study, compiled again in Ottoman Turkish, is a brief historical exposition of the Mevlevî Order. Initially, it was written in response to a question with regard to the

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Manuscripts in the British Museum, p. 235); Süleymaniye, Haci Mahmud Efendi, MS. no. 2674.

\(^{131}\) This description has been extracted in summary from Yetik's book, *Ismail-i Ankaravi* (p. 105).

\(^{132}\) For manuscript copies, see Istanbul Universite Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Bölümü, MS. no. 6394 (Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravi*, p. 105); Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/9.
prerequisites and necessary procedures for the initiation into the aforementioned ǧarīqa. In addition to such matters as the methods of the Mevleviyye, the tasks and proper conduct of the novices (murîds), and entry into the semâ', it also explains that by virtue of an unbroken chain of transmission by Sufi masters prior to Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî, that the Mevlevî Order is connected directly with ʿAlî b. Abî Ṭâlib, the fourth caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet.

Up until today, it has not been printed. 133

21. Tuḥfetü'l-Berere (The Gift of the Righteous)

İsmâ'il Ankaravi wrote this book as a gift for his close Mevlevî fellows, and expounds in it a variety of couplets selected from the Mesnevi in the light of the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet. He also occasionally illustrates his points with quotations from his own poetry. 134

This Ottoman Turkish work has not yet been published. 135

22. Sülüknaame-i Şeyh İsmâ'îî (The Instruction for the Path of Şeyh İsmâ'îî)

This is a short description of the principles and practices of the

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133 Konya Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 1661/16 (See also Gölpinarlı, Konya Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar Kataloğu, vol. 1, p. 246.) Istanbul Süleymaniye, Nâfiz Paşa MS. no. 352.


135 Süleymaniye, Hacı Hüsnü Paşa, MS no. 736.
Mevlevî Tarîqa, which explains in Ottoman Turkish how the zikr should be performed and how to seek help from the deceased spirits of the venerated Sufi Masters such as Hasan al-Baṣrî (d.110/728), Dhû al-Nūn al-Miṣrî (d.248/859), Junayd al-Baghdādî (d.298/910), Ibn al-'Arabî and Mevlânâ.\textsuperscript{136}

Like the previous work, this has not been published either.\textsuperscript{137}

23. \textit{Nişâb-i Mevlevî (The Origin and Status of Mevlevî)}

This book, composed in Persian at the request of the Şeyhülislâm Yaḥyā Efendi (d.1053/1643) in the year 1041/1631,\textsuperscript{138} -thus the latest of all- is of great concern to us, simply because it discloses Anḵaravî’s full competence in that language. In its content and style, it has close affinity with the \textit{Minhācül-Fuṣṣāram}, which was, as noted before, composed in Ottoman Turkish. It is on this account that some contemporary writers, like Gölpinarı, have assumed wrongly that it was an Arabic translation of the latter or vice-versa.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{136} Yetik, \textit{İsmail-i Ankaravî}, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{137} Istanbul Üniversite Kütüphanesi, Turkish Manuscript Section, MS. no. 6394.

\textsuperscript{138} Gölpinarı, \textit{Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar Kataloğu}, vol. 2, p.163.

\textsuperscript{139} Gölpinarı, in his catalogue, records the title of the book \textit{Nişâb-i Mevlevî} as "Nişâb al-Intisâb" and asserts that the latter is an Arabic translation of \textit{Minhācül-Fuṣṣāram}. (Idem, \textit{Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar}, vol. 2, p. 241).
The whole book comprises three major chapters, first explaining the "Ta’riqa, second the "Shari’ā", and last the stages and states of the Path.\footnote{Yetik, Ismail-i Ankaravi, p. 117.}

It is available in manuscript form in various libraries.\footnote{Konya Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 2104 (Gölpinarlı, Mevlânâ Müzesi, vol. 2, p. 163); Süleymaniye, Lala Isma’il, MS. no. 231 (Yetik, Ismail-i Ankaravi, p. 118), Süleymaniye, Serez MS. no. 1524.}

24. Dīvān

The present book, which, in some reference sources, appears also under the title of "Murattab Dīvān",\footnote{M. Tahir, Meşâyih-i ‘Osmâniye, p. 26; idem, Osmanlı Müellifleri, vol. 1, p. 119.} is the sole collection of Ankaravi’s poetry. As we have remarked before, he wrote under the pen-name of "Rusūhī" numerous couplets and poems in different forms and in three languages, Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish.

As far as I have been able to discover, the only extant manuscript copy of the Dīvān has been preserved among the Turkish Collection of the Vatican Library, registered under the MS no. 137/8, folios 365-367.\footnote{Ettore Rossi, Elenco Dei Manoscritti Turchi Della Biblioteca Vaticana (Città Del Vaticano, 1953), p. 118.}

In addition to the works which have been enumerated above, the following titles are also attributed to Ankaravi. However, since I was not able
to have access to them, I will only cite their titles and locations.

His Other Works

25. Müntebahat Min Minhâci’l-Fukarâ
26. Risâle Fi Hakî-i Semâ’-i Mevlevi
27. Tarikatname
28. Mefatlûh’-î-Gayb,
29. Miftâhu’r-Rahîm ve Keşfû’l-Kerîm,
30. Hasıyetname,
31. Kîta’ Min Şerhîl-Mesnevi,
32. Taşavvûfî Bir Gazel.

Mention should be made in this connection that Brockelmann ascribed mistakenly to Ankaravî two more books, Kitâbû’l-Hîtâb and Tühfe-i Hassâkiye, both of which were in fact composed by İslâmî-î Hâkî Bursâvî (d.1138/1725).

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144 This work, located in the Süleymaniye Library, Hacı Mahmûd Efendi, MS no. 2987 and also registered in the computerized list of the Türkiye Diyanet Vakfî, İslami Araştırmalar Merkezi (IAM) (Centre for Islamic Research) (no. 40762), is a kind of synopsis of the Minhâcû’l-Fukarâ. Although it is catalogued under the name of Ankaravî in these two records above, its authorship, nevertheless, is not certain. Based on the date of its transcription, 1100/1688, Dr. Yetik has reached the conclusion that it was composed as a handy manual for the Mevlevî novices by someone else, not Ankaravî. (Ismail-i Ankaravî, p. 120).

145 Biblioteca Vaticano, (Vat. Turco) MS. no. 137/7 (folios. 349-364). See for the reference n. 143 above.


147 These four works located in Süleymaniye Kütüphane are documented in the new computerized list of the collections of the manuscripts under the following numbers respectively: (IAM), MS nos. 39003 (28), 39004 (29), 81917 (30), 48826 (31), 21537 (32).

CHAPTER THREE

ANKARAVİ'S INTELLECTUAL PERSONALITY

In the light of the preceding detailed account of Ankaravi's life and works, we shall attempt now to determine first his intellectual status within the Ottoman context, a difficult task due to his multifarious personal involvement and literary activities, and then his primary purpose in composing the commentary under study, İzahü'l-Hikem, which is to be thoroughly examined in the next part. In this endeavour, we shall refer, wherever needed, to the actual text of İzah so as to establish at least with some degree of precision the academic preparation of the author.

First of all, three distinct factors can be discerned in the intellectual background of Ankaravi: sufism, orthodox Islam¹, Islamic dialectical theology (Kalâm) and philosophy. Each requires particular consideration, for each seems to have played a notable role at various levels in his scholarly engagement in general and in the structural preparation of his commentary in particular. As was clearly seen in our survey of his life and works, and as will also be noted in the coming analysis of the Ottoman text, these three

approaches are manifested in somewhat paradoxically intermingled fashion.

To begin with, there can be no doubt that Sufism as a system of thought, and particularly that of the Mevleviyye order, to which Ankaravi was intimately attached, provided him with the basic framework for the majority of his principal concerns and scholarship. Of course the man who had the greatest influence on his mystical training was Mevlana Jalal al-Din Rumi, the spiritual progenitor of the Mevleviyye, whose Mesnevi contributed the most significantly to shaping Ankaravi's mystical life. Although the bulk of his mystical writing consists of works explaining the theoretical and practical aspects of the Mevleviyye as well as its principles and regulations for its initiates, nevertheless, a number of them are commentaries on certain important Sufi treatises and poems, e.g. Ibn al-'Arabi's Naqsh al-Fusus and Ibn al-Farid's al-Taiyya. Thus, besides the teachings of Jalal al-Din Rumi, we find the doctrines of several venerable Sufis, and particularly those of Ibn al-'Arabi, forming substantial elements in his mystical background.

In addition, Ankaravi, as will be noticed later in the second part of this study, holds such prominent mystics as Junayd al-Baghdadi (d.909), Mansur al-Hallaj (d.923), BAYAZID al-BISTAMI (d.873), etc., in great reverence whenever he speaks of their respective controversial statements. He appears to have studied them and to have used them at times for various purposes. With respect to their seemingly conflicting views over the literal
meaning of religious texts, he, as a committed Sufi, advocates their esoteric meaning, which can be grasped not by naive reasoning, but through mystical experience; yet at the same time he continues to maintain, as a "staunch orthodox," complete reliance on the Scripture, thus trying to achieve harmony between the views of Sufis and of upholders of Shari'a.

However, due to his overriding concern for such reconciliation, his state of mind seems unsettled and rather filled with anxieties and uncertainties with respect to the major issues related both to mystical and philosophical doctrines. As a concrete example of this, one can cite his brief treatise entitled ʿl;Luccetū's-Sema in which he attempts vigorously to defend "performing and listening to music" not with a rational and critical approach but by bringing ample proofs from the aḥādīth of the Prophet as well as by making references to the favourable statements of some great Sufis. The very same conciliatory yet ambivalent attitude of Ankaravi, as will be seen, permeates almost all his thinking throughout the commentary under discussion.

Orthodox Islam occupies, after Sufism, a secondary, but nevertheless fundamental, position in the intellectual background of Ankaravi. As has already been mentioned, he lived at a time when the Kadizadeliler, "shari'a-minded preachers of Islam," enjoyed great popularity among the Ottoman state dignitaries. But in spite of the common similarities between all that these people advocated and what Ankaravi defended in the name of Islam,
both maintaining for instance a belief in the "unquestionable authority" of the Qur’an and hadith, the latter differed drastically from the former in supporting an eclectic orthodoxy that accommodates Sufi doctrines. This sort of eclectic, orthodox Islam can be regarded as a kind of "orthodox sufism," which gives legitimacy not only to the controversial statements of the prominent Meşāıyih but also to all the rituals practised in Sufi circles such as "zikr-i cehrî" (chanting God’s name aloud), performance of the semâ‘ and the devrân and râks. Therefore, Ankaravî’s aversion to the Kadızadeliler, as far as it appears to us, was not due to their adherence to the Shari’â, but because of their "rigid and narrow-minded" interpretation of the holy texts and thus their complete rejection of Sufi doctrines and practices.

In addition to these two domains above, Sufism and orthodox Islam, one can also discern elements of kalām or Islamic theology, and philosophy, particularly Ishrâqi philosophy, in the background of Ankaravî’s intellectual life. Despite the prevalent negative attitude to the rational sciences among the Ottoman Ülemâ during the seventeenth century, Ankaravî along with some others took an interest in those areas. Kâtib Çelebi, for instance, as G.L. Lewis points out, displayed his overt loyalty to the philosophy of Suhrawardî, when he remarks in his Kashf al-Żunûn on Shirâzî’s commentary on Hikmat al-Ishrâq:

It has been said that this book contains certain statements that
cannot be reconciled with the sacred law. I say that those who hold this view are perhaps incapable of reconciling them with the sacred law. They should not say, because they are incapable of doing it, that it is impossible.²

Kâtib Çelebi also states that from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire up to the time of the Suleyman the Magnificent, scholars did not fail to read and study the philosophical sciences and even combined them with the study of the sacred sciences such as tafsir, hadith and fiqh.³ But later, especially in Ankaravî's time, the Kadizadeliler's strict adherence to the basic Islamic sciences and their desire to return to and follow the practices of the Prophet and his companions led them to adopt a new formulation of sciences. These were classified by their intellectual master, Birgivî, in his Tarikat-i Muhammediye, as (i) the sciences whose study is obligatory, e.g. the essentials of religious duties (catechism), (ii) the sciences whose study is contingent upon certain conditions (otherwise it is forbidden), e.g. astronomy and kalam, and (iii) the sciences whose study is recommended, e.g. medicine.⁴ Moreover, Kadizade himself denounced in his sermons those who were involved with the study of logic and philosophy, saying: “who'd give a farthing for philosophy? Before it what shrewd banker bows

³ Ibid., pp. 25-6.
the knee? and who sheds a tear if a logician dies?5

In spite of such vehement opposition on the part of the Kadızadeliler, Ankaravi, following the tendency of his time, to combine the study of philosophy with that of the Islamic sciences, courageously undertook the task of commenting on Hayâkil al-Nûr and hence of accommodating it within the confines of orthodox Islam, albeit coloured with mystical notions. His conciliatory position in this respect, namely being a defender of Sufism and an advocate of orthodox Islam, is more or less reminiscent of Ghazâlî’s, who already found a place for Sufism in the latter, especially in his voluminous work Ihyâ’ Ulûm al-Dîn (Revival of the Religious Sciences). But, as we have noted before, Ankaravi paradoxically refers, without basis, to Ghazâlî’s Mishkât al-Anwâr as a product of Shari’a, while describing Suhrawardî’s Hayâkil al-Nûr as a book of wisdom.

Such an arbitrary treatment is of great interest to us in ascertaining Ankaravi’s literary standing. However great the differences between the two works in their approach and contents, there are a number of areas in which their views coincide, some of which will be seen below. For now, suffice it to say that the main theme of these two books lies in their common thesis, that “the reality of all things can be perceived only through light (nûr).” Probably the most noticeable difference between them is that Ghazâlî’s work begins with the famous light-verse of the Qur’ân and the Prophetic

hadith concerning the light and the veils of the light, and then goes on to concentrate extensively on describing the people who seek the truth, listing then under four successive categories: (i) the theologians, (ii) the esoteric (al-bāṭīniyyah) or those who follow the infallible imam (al-imām al-mašūm), (iii) the philosophers, and (iv) the Sufis. Ghazālī ends his discussion by eliminating the former three and favouring the last, i.e., the Sufis, who can attain knowledge of the reality of things with certainty.

It is most likely therefore that Anḵaravī based his exceptional identification of the *Mishkāt* as "a book on Shari'ā" upon his personal reading, and certainly not upon a careful examination of it⁶, which would have led eventually to a fairer assessment. However arbitrary his treatment may be, it leaves us with two immediate implications: one is that this book, inasmuch as it speaks authoritatively of Shari'ā or on behalf of Shari'ā, would require, as an authority, full submission to all that it contains. The other is that since it defends a kind of Sufism which seemingly fits into the limits of Shari'ā and serves as the only way to lead to the truth, it would likewise demand a whole-hearted acceptance of Sufism on the part of the upholders of orthodox Islam. In addition, this would imply that Anḵaravī sought the same praiseworthy status for his own treatise *Miṣbāḥu'l-Esrār*, which is similar in style and content to the *Mishkāt*. Of course such a claim

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would depend on the reader acknowledging that the authenticity and credibility of the work Miṣbāh, like Mishkāt, cannot be questioned at all.

Now with these considerations in mind, one can understandably ask as to why Anḵăravī chose to write a commentary on a work to which, in terms of its subject-matter, he attached considerably less value. As will be seen shortly, the introduction to Ṯzāḥūʾl-Ḥikem contains a brief statement setting forth Anḵăravī’s purpose in composing the work. According to this statement, the work was written in response to a request from a student of philosophy, who happened to be among the followers of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib that the difficult and ambiguous points in Hayākil al-Nūr be explained and resolved.

However, a full analysis of the contents of the commentary shows us that the statement of purpose as declared in the introduction seems less than satisfactory and even appears to be nothing more than a literary device whereby the author exhibits his humility before undertaking this task. For, as will be discerned in the following chapters, a statement as such hardly reflects the extent of the author’s real purpose in drafting the work.

Besides one passage where Anḵăravī makes an explicit confession with regard to his real purpose, several other considerations strongly suggest that he intended Ṯzāḥūʾl-Ḥikem to serve not necessarily to elucidate the crucial and complicated matters in the Hayākil but mostly to remove the stigma of the heretical scent of ittiḥād (unification) and ḥulūl (incarnation)
from the notorious utterances of certain renowned mystics, and thus to justify the coincidence of their doctrine with "Islamic orthodoxy." As a matter of fact, this aim is expressly pronounced by Ankaravī himself towards the end of the second temple, where he comments on the relation of the rational soul to God: ".... it was because of this particular reason that this humble person felt compelled to set down the present commentary..."7

Thus even from this perspective alone, Ţzāhū'ī-Hikem, like Hūcctū's-Semā', appears to have been composed with a view towards the circumstances with which Ankaravī was confronted in his time. In other words, the real objective that he seeks to achieve in the entire book, rather than the one that he pretends to profess in the introduction, is to prove to the Shari'a-minded people, like the Kadizadeliler who opposed not only the rituals and practices of the mystics but also their doctrines, that these are in complete harmony with Islam.

With these considerations in mind and without in any way wishing to underestimate his achievement as a leading figure and prolific writer, particularly in Mevlevī tradition, we turn now to embark upon a careful inquiry into his commentary Ţzāhū'ī-Hikem, comparing it with Dawwānī's commentary, and observing at the same time how faithful or unfaithful he was to the philosophy of Suhrawardī.

PART TWO

THE TRANSLATION OF HAYAKIL AL-NUR

AND ANALYSIS OF IZAHUL-ḤIKEM
CHAPTER ONE

İZĀḤÙ'L-ḤİKEM (ELUCIDATION OF WISDOMS)

1. Remarks on Hayâkîl al-Nûr and İzâhû’l-Ḥikem

To begin with, Hayâkîl al-Nûr, which is the subject of investigation in Ankaravi’s above-titled commentary, is in fact one of the most important works of Shihâb al-Dîn Yaḥyâ Suhrawardî (1155-1191) in it he presents an overview of the essentials of his own mystically oriented philosophy in a very concise but at the same time extremely complicated fashion. This is, as H. Corbin indicates, one of the earliest books of his that "delivers in its brevity an excellent and rapid view of the entire Ishraqi doctrine."¹ In terms of its style and content, it has a distinctive place not only among his other works but also in the whole tradition of Islamic philosophy in general and that of Sufism in particular.

Apart from a prologue and an epilogue, the treatise on the whole consists of seven main chapters, the first dealing with terrestrial objects, especially with the definition of body, the second with the inquiry of the soul and its faculties, the third with three logical and ontological modes (necessary, impossible and contingent), the fourth with God, His attributes and the hierarchy of the worlds, the fifth with the celestial spheres and souls as well as the process of illumination, the sixth with the immortality of the

¹ Corbin, Les Temples, p. 33.
soul, and the last with issues related to prophecy and eschatology. Each chapter is called a *haykal* (body or temple), the meaning and significance of which will be discussed in detail in its due place.\(^2\)

To date, the Arabic text of this important work of Suhrawardī has been published in two editions\(^3\) as well as an edition of an early Persian translation.\(^4\) There have also appeared French,\(^5\) Turkish -both Ottoman\(^6\) and modern-\(^7\) and Dutch\(^8\) translations. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, 

\(^2\) Refer to Suhrawardī's Prologue below.


\(^6\) Yūsuf Žiýā, who wrote extensively on Suhrawardī's philosophy in the periodical *Mihrāb* (1339-1340/1923-1924) vol. 1, pp. 27-36, 54-59, 73-76, 118-123, 145-150, 213-215, 245-248, 348-350, 379-381, 456-462, 483-486, 657-685), rendered *Hayākil al-Nūr* into Ottoman Turkish in the year 1339/1923 and published it in the same periodical. (See, *Heyākilû'n-Nūr*, in *Mihrab* 1 (1340/1924) pp. 578-595) It is surprising that, although Ziya occasionally makes references to Dawwānī's commentary and also is aware of the existence of that of Shīrāzī, yet he seems to have no knowledge of Ankaravi's *Īzāhū'l-Ḥikem*.

it has not been fully rendered into English up until now. The present work, therefore, will undertake this formidable task.

Meanwhile, it should be noted also that long before Ankaravi, two prominent Persian thinkers wrote commentaries upon the *Hayākil al-Nūr*. Jalāl al-Dīn Dāwānī (d.1502) composed a remarkable work under the title *Shawākil al-Ḥūr* (*the Shapes of the Houris*), the Arabic text of which was critically edited and published by M. Ṣādūq and M. Yousuf Kokan in 1953. Indeed, we shall make extensive use of this work not only for the purpose of comparison with Ankaravi's but also in order to elaborate on the issues overlooked in the commentary of the latter. Sometime after Dāwānī, Amīr Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maṣūr Shīrāzī (d.1542) wrote another commentary in Arabic, which appears to be somewhat of a reply to Dāwānī's, entitled *Ishrāq Hayākil al-Nūr li Kasf Ẓūlamāt Shawākil al-Ḥūr* (*Illumination of the Temples of the Light for the Discovery of the Darkness of the "Shapes of the Houris")). However, no attempt has been made to undertake a study of the latter work. Both of the commentaries by Dāwānī and Shīrāzī reflect the extent of the influence of Suhrawardī in Persia, as Ankaravi's does in Anatolia.9

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The commentary under examination, i.e., Ḥāṭēṭ-i Hikem, besides its intrinsic value for the study of Islamic thought, has, in spite of its conciseness, at least three fundamental aspects to its credit: firstly, it is an evidence of the interest in the philosophy of Suhrawardī on the part of a member of the Ottoman learned class in the seventeenth century; secondly, it throws considerable light on the philosophical as well as mystical activities of Ottoman intellectuals during that period. Lastly, as a product of a prominent Sufi, it provides a different insight into the understanding of the Hayâkil, which is in turn considered to be a conspectus of the whole Ishraqi philosophy.

2. A Note on Editing and Rendering

The method used for the editing of the manuscripts is more or less the same as that which was followed in the dissertation of Dr. Ahmet Karamustafa, submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, now available partly in publication, entitled Vâhidî’s Menâkib-i Ḥvoca-i Cihân ve Netîce-i Can,10 which is also, like mine, a critical study of another Ottoman Turkish text. I was able to obtain four manuscripts of Ḥāṭēṭ-i Hikem, which I have collated on the basis of one of them (S= Şehîd

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This manuscript, which has been paginated and numbered in lines, is reproduced here in order to facilitate the access to the original text.

My choice, among others, for Şehîd 'Alî Paşa MS, is not simply due to the fact that it bears the date of its transcription and the name of its scribe, but mainly for practical reasons, and even rather for its pure appearance and excellent condition. That is to say, this particular manuscript, i.e., S 1747, despite its numerous minor errors, and slight additions and omissions, is considerably more clear, neat and legible than the others. At the end of the thesis I have indicated the textual differences of the other manuscripts as well as modifications and corrections required in the annexed facsimile reproduction.

Now I would like to state briefly the method I have followed in the translation of the Hayâkil as well as in the analysis of the commentary of Ankaravî. Needless to say, the study of the text of the Hayâkil, due to its complicated style and highly sophisticated technical language, is fraught with immense difficulties. In spite of its bewildering complexity, I have attempted to render it fully into English. I have based my translation on the already published edition by Abû Rayyân, including its footnotes, Dawwâni's commentary, Persian version as well as on the text of Süleymâniye

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11 This manuscript copy is also cited in the list of H. Ritter's early article on Suhrawardî's works. See, Helmut Ritter, "Philologika IX: Die vier Suhrawardi." Der Islam 24 (1937), p. 284.
manuscript annexed here. In rendering the text, I have exerted my full capacity in order to meet two requirements: (i) faithfulness to the text, and (ii) intelligibility of the English expressions. In order to maintain accuracy, I have tried to stick as closely as possible to the original text, while making a sincere attempt at presenting the ideas there in a simplified and straightforward manner. All in all, being well aware of my shortcomings, I have exercised all my skills in order to approximate the original in form as well as in content. In addition, I have divided each temple into various numbered paragraphs so that the reader can easily compare the rendered text of *Hayâkil* with its corresponding interpretation.

As to the analysis of the contents of *Tāḥiṣ'ī-Ḥikem*, due attention has been paid to bringing out Anḵaravi's own views as differing from and concurring with Dawwānī's in interpreting Suhrawardī's ideas in the *Hayâkil*. To be more specific, my primary role in this endeavour has been mostly analytical rather than critical for one simple reason, that is, the desire of presenting Anḵaravi's formulation of Suhrawardī's Ishraqi teachings side by side with Dawwānī's in a comparative manner. Thus such a systematic and comparative presentation will enable the reader to see, without external intervention, the points of divergence and concurrence between these two commentators in their respective interpretations of the *Hayâkil*. My overall and critical assessment of Anḵaravi's commentary, however, will appear under its own separate heading entitled "A General Evaluation," placed at
the end of the second part of the thesis.

3. Brief Descriptions of the Manuscripts

The following four manuscripts of İzāhū’-i-Ḥikem were consulted for the purpose of establishing a critical edition.

S Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, Şehîd 'Alî Paşa, no. 1747

25x15,7 cm., 43 folios, 17 lines. Headpiece in late style. Stitched in light red paper. Arabic text in red and clear nesih, Turkish in bold black and clear nesh-i taʿlîk, copied, according to the colophon, by Ḥâcî Muṣṭaftype Kaṣṣabpaṣazâde in Zuʿl-kaʿde 1045/1635. In the margins of some pages there are notes, some of which are comments and others corrections by the copyist.

C Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, Çarullah Efendi, no. 993/1

22x13,5 cm., 31 folios, 23 lines. Nesih in small size, neat and very nice round hand. The Qurʾanic verses, hadiths, headings, and names in red. Arabic text and poems underlined. Some letters added in red. Some comments and corrections in the margins. Name of copyist not mentioned.

V Biblioteca Vaticana, Turchi, no. 137/10

28,3x15 cm., 19 folios (375-394ff), 33 lines. Written in clear and small rikʿa but exhibiting also many features of kıurma. Rubrication in red. Some comments in the margins of some pages. Ownership statement dated 1223/1808-1809. Name of copyist not mentioned.

M Mevlâna Müzesi Yazmalar, Konya, no. 2039/5

24x13,5 cm., 33 folios (197-229ff), 19 lines. Clear nesih displaying many elements of dîvān and rikʿa. Arabic text in red. Subtitles underlined. Name of copyist not mentioned.
CHAPTER TWO

PROLEGOMENA

It has been customary among Muslim writers to commence their work with an initial statement of glorification to God and salutation to the Prophet, as is the case with the present author of the commentary on Hayâkil al-Nûr. But just after having praised God, and before extending his greetings to the Prophet and his family, Ismâ'îl Ankaravi, basing himself mainly on the Qur'ân, sets out to characterize the distinguished aspects and states of "the people of wisdom" (eshāb-i ḥikmat). It is God, he says, to whom alone countless praises are due, the all-Wise (Ḥakîm), Donor (Vehhâb), Clement (Ḥalîm), Unlocker of the Doors (Müfettihü'l-Ebâb), and the Cause of all Causes (Mûsebbibü'l-Esbâb), who has made "the people of wisdom" and "the people of natural insight" (erbâb-i fiṭnât) the honourable recipients of His beautiful favours, as has been illustrated in the following two verses: "He (God) grants wisdom to whom He pleases; and he to whom wisdom is granted receives indeed a benefit overflowing. But none will grasp the Message except men of understanding."¹ "... (it is for them) the Beatitude (ṭūbâ) and a beautiful place of return".²

Ankaravi continues by stating that God, who is the Absolute Creator

¹ Qur'ân, 2:269

² Qur'ân, 13:29.
and Master of the "Nun" and "Qalam" (pen) by which men can record", 3 made the "people of wisdom" along with "the scholars of Scripture" (‘ülemā-i dīniyye), and "the gnostics of certainty" (‘üretā-i yakīniyye) who are the disclosers of the hidden wisdom, worthy of this divine message: "We gave him wisdom and sound judgment in speech and decision." 4

Anḵaravī's intent in quoting all the verses above, which underscore first and foremost the notable place of the people of "ḥikma", might have been to establish, although he has not stated it expressly, a legitimate ground for engaging in the study of "ḥikma" in general and undertaking the present commentary in particular from a Qur'anic standpoint. It is not clear at this point, however, what he means by the term "ḥikma", which is usually rendered in English as "wisdom" in order to avoid any confusion that can easily arise in mind due to its equivocal nature. "Ḥikma" which originally derives from the Arabic word "ḥukm", meaning, according to al-Jurjānī, "to put the thing in its right place", 5 has been sometimes used interchangeably in the sense of "philosophy" (felsefe), which, in turn, denotes only

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3 Qurān, 68:1. "Nun means either a fish or an ink holder, or it may be just the Arabic letter of the alphabet... The reference to ink would be an appropriate link with the Pen in the verse..." Abdullah Yūsuf 'Ali, The Holy Qur'ān, Text, Translation and Commentary (Brentwood, Maryland: Amana Corporation, 1989), p. 1506, n. 5592.

4 I-H. 1a4-12; Qurān, 38:20.

"Hellenistic philosophy". ⁶ "Ḥikma", which is more spiritual in its nature and broader in its content than "felsefe", was taken by the majority of the early Muslim philosophers to embrace the whole field of knowledge within the bounds of human endeavour, ranging from the theoretical sciences to the practical ones. In his outstanding treatise on the classification of rational sciences, Ibn Sīnā, for instance, who has exercised tremendous influence upon succeeding generations of philosophers, considered "ḥikma" to be an art by means of which man acquires the knowledge of every being, a knowledge which he puts in practice in order to elevate himself to the level of the intelligible world. ⁷ So, "wisdom", according to him, inasmuch as it comprises necessary knowledge and necessary action, is indispensable for the perfection of the human soul.

As for Anḵaraḵāt, as far as the present commentary is concerned, he adopts in its entirety, as will be seen shortly, Ibn Sīnā's definition, subject-matter and divisions of "wisdom". In his principal work, Minhācūl-Fuḵārā, however, he offers a somewhat more extensive description of "wisdom" that goes far beyond Ibn Sīnā's present account. In one particular passage of the same book, he states that "wisdom", in the eyes of a "divine sage" (el-ḥakīmūl-ilāhī), is twofold: (i) explicit wisdom (manṭūk 'anhā), i.e., the wisdom about which one can talk, and (ii) implicit wisdom (maskūt 'anhā), i.e., the

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wisdom about which one remains silent. The first group for its part consists of two subdivisions, (i) the sciences of religion (‘ülüm-u şerîyye), and (ii) the rational sciences (me’ārîf-i əkliyye), which, in turn, are further divided, in accordance with Ibn Sînâ’s scheme, into theoretical and practical wisdom. As to implicit wisdom, it contains mainly two kinds of significant knowledge: (i) intuitive or mystical knowledge (‘ülüm-u lêdünîn), and (ii) knowledge of the truth behind the hidden secrets (esrâr-ı hâkîkî), such as the afflictions of certain people, the death of children and their eternal dwelling along with their fathers in hellfire, etc. Since all of these events have been concealed to us, Ankaravi says, we ought to keep silent about them.8

Thus he extends the scope of "wisdom" to cover all the branches of general sciences (whether they be theoretical or practical), the sciences of religion and the knowledge of mystical and spiritual truths. It is perhaps on this ground that he, as we have noted above, has assigned "Qur'anic wisdom" to all three classes of people, i.e., the doctors of religion, philosophers, and sages or sufis, for all of them, as far as the Qur'ân is concerned, partake in "ḥikma".

It is evident that Ankaravi has so far displayed no interest or desire in discussing the status of "philosophy", particularly the question of its legitimacy from the point of view of shari‘a, a controversial issue which had

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8 Ankaravi, Minhâcül-Fûkarâ, pp. 214-5; also cf. al-Jurjâni, Ta’rifât, p. 125.
already received wide-spread publicity in the Islamic world. Nor has he attempted to reconcile religion and philosophy or mysticism and philosophy. On the contrary, he has taken it for granted that wisdom, regardless of whoever possesses it, is, as the Qur'ān says, "an overflowing benefit" to its owner.

Since my purpose here is not to enter into a detailed study of wisdom, which merits extensive research on its own, I will continue to present Ankarāvi's introduction in a summary fashion.

In extending the salutations to the Prophet Muḥammad, our author employs considerably subtle yet lucid language in which he epitomizes some of the qualities of the prophet as follows:

He is the intercessor for all creatures.
He is the Imam of Guidance.
He is just like a pupil of the eye for all Prophets.
He is the Luminous Light for the eyes of all Saints. (In his ascension to God) "his sight has never swerved." 11
"He says nothing out of his own desire". 12
He was selected as an exemplary model.

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10 1-H. 1a14-1b2.

11 Qur'ān, 53:17.

12 Qur'ān, 57:3.
Then Ankaravi, in accordance with Sufi terminology, sees Muhammad, fully invested with such beautiful traits, as someone who sheds on the entire world drops of the water of life (ma’ūl-ḥayāt) and the ocean of wisdom (deryāy-ı ḥikmet). So, the dead hearts of all children of Adam are brought into (new) life out of this “life-bestowing drop of water”, so to speak.13 In saying so, Ankaravi merely makes an allusion to one of the frequently cited hadīth in Sufi circles, that reads: “the first thing created by God was Intellect (al-‘āql and the rest of all human beings bear flashes radiated from that intellect.”14

After these preliminary remarks, Şāriş Rusūhī goes on to explain why and how he has composed this commentary. In addition, he also gives us a brief summary of the study of wisdom developed by the earlier Muslim thinkers. In what follows, I will try, confining myself exclusively to the Ottoman text, to give at best an approximative translation of Ankaravi’s own words. This is significant, for it will certainly reveal his literary style and method as well as his scholarly personality. My own remarks will be confined to the footnotes.

**Introduction**

Let us turn to the topic. This ailing and thirsty, poor and humble derviş, namely Şeyh İsmā‘īl Mevlevi Ankaravi -may God facilitate

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13 *I*-H. 1a14-1b5

14 *I*-H, 27b1-3; see also chapter seven, p. 180, n. 68.
both mundane (ṣūrī) and spiritual (ma'nevī) wisdom\(^{15}\) for him and his this-worldly and other-worldly brethren-states: while the Wise and Benefactor, the Clement and Judge bestowed upon Luqmn of the heart (or Paradise) the gift of the mystery of the verse "We indeed gave wisdom to Luqmân,"\(^{16}\) this ailing one, thirsty and craving (for wisdom), could never be content and continuously opened the narcissus of my days and violet of my nights in the

\(^{15}\) In his Minhācū'l-Fukarā, which was written primarily, as noted in the preceding chapter, in order to help the dervishes to learn and follow the teachings of the Mevlevî path, Ankaravi employs these two terms, i.e., ṣūrī and ma'nevī, in conjunction with the gradual stages of a dervish's personal development. There he ascribes two principal journeys to a fakîr (derviş) to undertake. The first one, called sefer-i ṣūrî, meaning simply to travel from one place to another, is a journey on which the dervish sets out to seek and circulate knowledge. During this pursuit, he visits some eminent masters and receives therefrom the knowledge of Shari'a, namely the knowledge of religious commandments and prohibitions. In a sense it is a kind of formal knowledge, which is, as the Prophet pointed out, incumbent on all Muslims so as to enable them to practice properly the religious duties. The second type of journey, designated by Rusūhî as sefer-i ma'nevī, is a long and toilsome journey experienced by a dervish when he is traversing through the spiritual stages in his attempt of internal development. Such a journey, he emphasizes, is exclusive to the people of God alone, comprises four gradual stages:

(i) Seyr-i ilâlāh (journey to God): the mystic passes from the level of selfhood (nafs) to that of real existence (vücûd-i ḥakîkî). At this early state, he removes the veil of multiplicity and arrives at the state of unity.

(ii) Seyr-i āllâh (journey in God): at this stage, the mystic assumes and appropriates all the divine names and attributes.

(iii) Seyr-i ma'allâh (journey with God): this is a stage by which the mystic develops such close intimacy with God that he feels united with Him. Therefore it is also named "union" (aḥadiyyat) and "...of but two bow-lengths or (even) nearer" (qāba qawsayn aw adnā). (Qur'ān, 53: 9)

(iv) Seyr-i 'anillâh (journey away from God): after having passed beyond all the stages and attained union with God, the sufi returns to the world of multiplicity where he begins training the novices of the spiritual path. This journey is referred to as the state of abiding after annihilation (bekâ ba'de'l-fenâ) or the state of self-awareness after being intoxicated (ṣelḥ ba'de'l-mahv) or the state of separation after union (fark ba'de'l-cem). In the final state, the mystic is able to observe unity in diversity and vice versa. See for more details, Minhāc, pp. 47-53.

\(^{16}\) Qur'ān, 31:12.
rosegarden of my life with the breeze of the meaning of "O my Lord, increase me in knowledge."\textsuperscript{17} Then, that Donor of gifts and Uncoverer of veils bestowed on me so many jewels and ornaments of wisdom and (so many) gems of the benefits of grace and munificence that it was preposterous to think that this imperfect one had the worthiness or the aptitude for them. Rather, this was because I knew the tutty-like dust of the feet of the dervishes of Celâlu’l-Haḵḵ ve’l-Millet ve’l-Dîn Mevlânâ, the master of gnostics\textsuperscript{18} -that king of lovers and proof of wayfarers, treasure (and) storehouse of symbols of truth and certainty, beholder of the beauty of the unity of the Lord of the worlds- to be collyrium mixed with ground pearls for the eye of my heart and (because) their elixir glances worked alchemy on the copper of my existence.\textsuperscript{19} Afterwards, this humble and imperfect one, while celebrating the name of God and remaining ever grateful to Him for His favours, and being in compliance with the verse "call to the way of Your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching,"\textsuperscript{20} used to call people, after preparing a (substantial) remedy through the mixture of the (spiritual) liquor of "wisdom" with the medicine of "admonition," from the narrow and defiled path to the straight. Moreover, while taking inspiration from (the verse) "they spend out of what we have provided for them,"\textsuperscript{21} I would take

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. Qur'ān, 20:114.

\textsuperscript{18} Ankaravi of course refers to Mevlânâ Jelâl al-Dîn al-Rûmi, the founder of the order of the Mevleviyye Derviṣes.

\textsuperscript{19} The "elixir" stands for, in the Mesnevi, the "şeyh", while "copper" represents the "needy" or "despicable evil". Mathnawi, II/3343-3345, trans. by Nicholson. In Diwân-i Shams-i Tabrizî (verse n. 9003), however, "love" is regarded as "elixir", whereas "sensuality" as "copper". "Your sensuality is copper, and the light of Love is the elixir. Love’s light transmutes the copper of your existence into gold." W. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Love (Albany: State University of New York, 1983), p. 215.

\textsuperscript{20} Qur’ān, 16:125. The complete verse was commonly referred to by both theologians and philosophers in support of what G. Hourani calls "three Aristotelian reasoning": "al-ḫiḵma", meaning "wisdom" but suggesting also philosophy; "al-maw‘iţa", meaning "preaching" but suggesting also oratory and rhetoric (al-khiţāb); and "jadal", meaning "debate" but suggesting dialectic. See, Ibn Rushd, On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy, p. 49, 92, n. 59.

\textsuperscript{21} Qur’ān, 2:3
pleasure in delivering the desired subsistence as well as the unrevealed accounts of the Lovers to the disciples according to their capacity. Finally, one day, a student of wisdom among the virtuous and tenacious followers of the "Father of Dust"²², requested me to compose a commentary on the Hayākil of Şeyh Shihāb al-Dīn, the Excellency, so that the difficult matters and ambiguous points therein should be determined and thus resolved. As a humble dervish, I first refrained for some time from such an undertaking. Then the meaningful content of the following holy saying compelled me to do it: "Explain as much as you can. Do not keep it in your memory; God warns you..."²³ For this reason, I, though being weak in knowledge and lacking the capacity, decided to comment on that book, lest I might contravene to the admonition: "Do not repulse the petitioner".²⁴

To begin with, having carefully examined a few commentaries²⁵ and having also studied several works on geometry, I derived therefrom numerous pearls of wisdom along with the knowledge of inward and outward matters. Thus I have composed it in the Turkish language; yet it would have been quite possible for me to put it in Arabic or even in Persian. However, since I was admonished by the ḥadīth, "make it easy, do not make it difficult, for God rebukes those who

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²² This is a nickname attributed to the fourth caliph, ‘Ali b. Abī Ṭālib, the son-in-law of the Prophet. According to one ḥadīth, narrated by Sahl Ibn Sād, this was the most cherished name for ‘Ali, for it was given to him by the Prophet himself. "Once ‘Ali got angry with his wife, Fāṭima, and went out of his house and slept near a wall in the mosque. The Prophet came searching for him, and someone said: He is there, lying near the wall. The Prophet came to him, while ‘Ali’s back was covered with dust. The Prophet started removing the dust from his back, saying: "Get up, O Abū Turāb!" See, Sahīh al-Bukhārī, trans. M. Muḥsin Khān (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), vol. 8, p. 143, ḥadīth no. 223.

²³ I was not able to verify it.

²⁴ Qur’ān, 93:10

²⁵ Although Ankaravī does not specify, it seems clear that by commentaries he means Shawākil al-Ḥūr (SH-H) by Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī, to which we shall refer here a great deal in this study, and Ishrāq Hayākil al-Nūr Li Kashf Zulumāt Shawākil al-Ḥūr (Illumination of the Temples of the light for the Discovery of the Darkness of the "Shapes of the Houris") by Ghīyāth al-Dīn Mansūr Shīrāzī, as well as the Persian version of Hayākil.
make it difficult", I have found no better language than Turkish to interpret it in a clear and eloquent way so as to make it easy to the weak and fatigued mind. I have chosen this way in particular, because it would be easy for a teacher to articulate it, and it would be equally easy for a student to memorize it. I have given no preference to sophisticated expressions, nor have I utilized metaphorical words, so that even men of little understanding may enjoy and conceive of it. I have entitled it Ḳizāḥū'I-Ḥikem (Elucidation of Wisdoms), and have set down at the beginning three different introductions with the aim that the disciple of wisdom become acquainted with what the science of wisdom is, for it is an obvious fact that a science cannot be known unless its introductory principles be established at the outset.

Thus the first introduction lays down the definition of "the science of wisdom", since it would be futile to study a science unless its definition has been specified.

The second introduction explains the use and benefit of the science of wisdom, for it is only when this aspect is known that its pursuit will be more desired. That is to say, the specification of its use and benefit would be an impetus for research into that science.

The third introduction explains what the subject-matter of the science of wisdom is.

1. **The Definition of Wisdom:**

To begin with, "wisdom is a science which is concerned with the real natures of things as they are, as well as with the appropriate action required". That is, the science of wisdom consists of the knowledge of the concrete and contingent beings emanated in order from the Necessary Existent Being. These (contingent) beings are composed of spiritual substances and corporeal ones, namely (i) intellects, (ii) souls, and (iii) bodies. The last category includes the nine celestial spheres, the four main elements, and the three kingdoms of nature; mineral, vegetable and animal. One has to study

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27 These spheres will be mentioned one by one very shortly.

28 (i) Fire, (ii) air, (iii) water and (iv) earth.
carefully the precise natures, characteristics and properties—be they interior and exterior—of all the above-mentioned things. Also their advantages and disadvantages must be well understood. Moreover, all of them should be examined entirely in their own context and boundaries. It must be recalled here that the beloved Prophet has pleaded as follows: "O my Lord! show me things as they really are."

1.1 The Use and Benefit of Wisdom:

As to the use and benefit of wisdom, it is to perfect the human soul with the aid of gnosis. In so doing, the soul, when separated from the body, may be safeguarded from suffering for its false beliefs and preoccupations with worldly vanities. "Every heart attains happiness by wisdom. Every problem finds solution by wisdom."

1.2 The Subject-matter of Wisdom:

The science of wisdom deals with the matters proper to its own subject-matter. The science of medicine ("ilm-i ṭibb), for instance, takes the human body as its own subject-matter, since the physician occupies himself with the matters proper to the human body, like certain diseases attached to the human body. In like manner, the subject-matter of astrology or astronomy ("ilm-i nūcūm) is the heavenly bodies, since the astrologer or astronomer deals with the issues related to the structure of these bodies and their observations. Again the science of (Islamic) jurisprudence ("ilm-i fiqh) is involved with judicial matters and religious obligations such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage and so on.

2. The Science of Wisdom:

Now let us return to the science of wisdom. It is of two kinds: (i) practical ("amali) wisdom, and (ii) theoretical (nazari) wisdom. The latter is also subdivided into two: (a) divine science ("ilm-i ilāhi),

29 It is interesting that Ankaravi, unlike Ibn Sīnā, gives precedence to "practical" over "theoretical" wisdom.

30 This is called at the same time ilāhiyyāt, viz. metaphysics as is the case with Ibn Sīnā, or falsafa al-ūlā, viz. first philosophy, as is the case with al-Kindī. But both two names have been used by the former
and (b) physics (‘ilm-i ṭabī‘ī).

2.1 Divine Science:

The subject-matter of divine science is absolute Being (vücûd-u mutlak), since the sage (ḥakīm) of divine science deals with the matters that are proper to absolute Being. According to the sages, absolute Being is the Truth by itself (zāt-i ḥaḵ), and is entirely free from matter and form; and it is one and eternal. They proclaim as well that incorporeal intellects too are devoid of matter and form and beyond any dimension; and they are designated, in the terminology of the Scripture, as angels. Furthermore, the heavenly and human souls are also free from matter and form, while yet having control over these two.\(^3\)

\(^3\) As is seen in his brief presentation of the contents of divine science (‘ilm-i ilāhī), Anḵarāvī touches upon mainly three subjects: the Absolute Being (vücûd-u mutlak), incorporeal intellects (‘ukūl-ū mûcerred), and celestial and human souls (nûfüs-ū semâvi ve beşeri). In fact, this is a summarized but somewhat modified version of the early Muslim philosophers’ account of metaphysics. Al-Kindī, known as the first Arab philosopher, defines philosophy as “the knowledge of the real natures of things” and deems what he terms falsafa al-_ULā (first philosophy) “the noblest part of philosophy”, and discusses therein mainly the First Truth (al-Haqq al-Awwal) and some other matters almost similar to what has just been mentioned. For details, see, al-Kindī, al-Kindī’s Metaphysics: A Translation of al-Kindī’s Treatise “On the First Philosophy (fī al-Falsafa al-ULā)”, trans. with intro. and commentary by Alfred L. Ivry (Albany: State University of New York, 1974).

Likewise, al-Fārābī, renowned as the Second Master after Aristotle, in his short epistle, Ḩusahaan’Ulūm (The Enumeration of the Sciences), has assigned three primary divisions to divine science, the first dealing with the existing things and their properties and accidents, the second with the incorporeal beings as well as the principles of other sciences, and the last with the First Being (al-Mawjûd al-Awwal) or the Truth (al-Ḥaqq) and its attributes. Al-Fārābī, Ḩusahaan’Ulūm, (Beirut: Centre de développement national, 1991), pp. 35-36.

Ibn Sīnā also proposes more or less the same aforementioned subjects for the study of metaphysics. But his presentation seems to be more systematic and elaborate. For him, the most important question to be...
2.2 Physics:

The subject-matter of physics is body, for the sage of this science inquires into the matters proper to corporeal body such as primary matter (heyülā), shape, nature, finiteness, motion, rest, time, place and the like. So the sages who deal with the science of nature claim that each corporeal body, composed of (primary) matter and form, possesses its own natural property. What is intended by nature here is the cause of motion or rest of a being. Every corporeal body is par excellence finite, and so are the spheres (eflāk).

The sphere of Atlas,32 called the Throne33 in the language of the Scripture, encompasses all the spheres. There lies no other sphere beyond the Throne. All the spheres, on the contrary, are located in the hollow of God's Throne. The eighth sphere, which is termed by the sages the starry sphere or the sphere of the Zodiac,34 is situated inside the Throne. This sphere is designated, in the language of Scripture, as the Seat (Divine Pedestal).35 It is also called the sphere of the fixed stars,36 in the hollow of which the sphere of Saturn37 is situated. After this comes the sphere of

32 This is the ninth sphere.

33 ‘Arş.

34 Burūc.

35 Kūrsī

36 Felek-i Sābit.

37 Felek-i Zūḥal.
Jupiter\textsuperscript{38} under which the sphere of Mars\textsuperscript{39} falls. Beneath Mars, there comes the sphere of the Sun,\textsuperscript{40} which is followed by the sphere of Venus\textsuperscript{41}. Then the sphere of Mercury\textsuperscript{42} comes, underneath which the sphere of the Moon\textsuperscript{43} falls. Just after the Moon, there comes the Fire,\textsuperscript{44} below which the Air (atmosphere)\textsuperscript{45} is located. Under the Air, there is Water,\textsuperscript{46} which is followed by the Earth.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, all these nine spheres and the other four sub-lunary spheres are situated in a geocentric hierarchy where each preceding one encircles the ensuing one, as has been clearly shown in the circular diagram.\textsuperscript{48}

Each body has a motion peculiar to itself. Motion is defined as the transition of a body from the place which it formerly occupied to that which it presently occupies. Time consists of the motion of the spheres. A year comes about as a result of the sun's turning round its own sphere only once. A month consists of a single rotation of the moon around its own sphere. Winter takes place when the sun is far from the earth, while summer occurs when it is close to it. The season of spring happens when the sun is close to the earth at the equinox, while that of autumn takes place when it is far from it at the equinox. Each body has a place pertaining to itself. Place is said of a thing, a certain amount of which makes a line, if it is long. If it has length and width, then it is called a surface. If, on the other hand, it

\textsuperscript{38} Felek-i Müşteri.

\textsuperscript{39} Felek-i Merrih

\textsuperscript{40} Äfitāb.

\textsuperscript{41} Felek-i Zühre

\textsuperscript{42} Felek-i 'Utārid.

\textsuperscript{43} Felek-i Ċamer.

\textsuperscript{44} Kürre-i Nār.

\textsuperscript{45} Kürre-i Hevā

\textsuperscript{46} Kürre-i Āb.

\textsuperscript{47} Kürre-i 'Arż.

\textsuperscript{48} See, I-H. 5a8-16.
has length, width and depth, in this case, it is named body, which will be delineated, God willing, in detail.\textsuperscript{49} Place is likewise said of the inside of a body, which touches the upper surface.

It becomes evident then that the sphere of Atlas has no place, while being itself a place for all the other spheres. Each sphere with respect to another which it either contains or encircles is considered as a place. The sages term this world the "world of generation and corruption". Here generation means that an object comes into existence in a given form, whereas corruption means that the existing object is stripped of its form, and thus is transformed into another. All the elements can be transmuted into one another, except the primary matter of the celestial bodies. That is, since the primary matter of the celestial bodies is completely free, it never turns into another form. But other elements, in contrast, are susceptible of transformation, as in the case of fire when it is in the workshop of the blacksmith, which turns into air. Likewise, the earthenware pot which fire is set over, is transformed into air. It is on this ground that they have named the world of elements the world of generation and corruption, which we have so far discussed. All of these things which are attached to bodies accidentally are accidents. To sum up, it is evident that the subject-matter of physics is body, whereas that of divine science is Absolute Being. God who is the ultimate resort knows what is best and most correct.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{49} That is, in the First Temple whose subject matter is concerned exclusively with the body.

\textsuperscript{50} This whole text has been translated from \textit{I-H.} 1b12 to 5b15,
CHAPTER THREE
SUHRAWARDĪ’S PROLOGUE

O Deity of the worlds.¹ O eternally Subsistent! Strengthen us with (the aid of) the light, maintain us in the light, assemble us under the light. Make the end of our pursuits in accord with your will. May our ultimate aim be the one which prepares us to meet you. We have troubled our own souls,² though You are never avaricious with your superabundance. Those who are imprisoned in darkness stand at Your Portal, awaiting mercy and seeking liberation from captivity.³ Good is your custom; and evil, O my God, is (because of) your destiny. By Your exalted Glory, You make those things which are noble, and human beings are not in a position to exact vengeance. Bless us in our remembrance (of You) and remove evil from us. Give success to the right-doers. Peace be upon the chosen (Muṣṭafā)⁴ and all his family. This is the treatise of Temples of Light. May God sanctify the souls receptive of the guidance as well as the intellects leading to it (i.e. guidance).⁵

¹ This initial phrase exists only in I-H, 5b16. Although it appears neither in Dawwānī’s commentary nor in Shīrāzī’s, H. Corbin seems to have included it in his French translation. (Les Temples, p. 41)

² “They said: ‘Our Lord! We have burdened our own souls. If You do not forgive us and bestow Your Mercy upon us, we shall indeed be in loss.” (Qurān: 7:23)

³ Abū Rayyān gives the following reading for the last part: “...seeking good”. (H-N. p. 45.)

⁴ Anḵarāvī (I-H. 7a13) and Abū Rayyān (H-N. p. 47, n. 4, MS B) have: muṣṭafīn (those who are chosen). Again in I-H 7a12, the phrase “give success” (waffiq) appears to be “be courteous” (raḍīq).

⁵ H-N. p. 46; I-H. 5b16, 6a2, 10, 12, 13, 6b2-4, 7-9, 11-12, 17, 7a1-3, 8, 10, 12-14, 7b1; SH-H. pp. 6, 10-17. It should be noted here that this whole prologue is missing in the Persian version of Hayākil. As far as I have been able to determine, no justifiable ground for such omission can be found either in Suhrawardī’s own writings or in the studies so far carried out on him by others. For instance, H. Corbin, a distinguished authority in this field,
The Concepts of Light and Temple

O Deity of the worlds!

Ankaravi first translates this phrase as "O Worshipped by the worlds" and then explains the term "ālam", which has been rendered above as "world". He says that "ālam", according to the sages, is a general name that denotes "everything besides God". It is so comprehensive that it includes in itself all the intellects, souls, the four elements, i.e., water, air, earth, and fire, the three kingdoms of nature, i.e., mineral, vegetable, and animal, and the like. From all of these, one can infer the existence of God.6

O eternally Subsistent!

At this juncture, we encounter a crucial term, that is, "qayyūm", which is, as was first explained by al-Dawwānī7 and re-emphasized by Ankaravi,8 the active participle form of "qāṭīm". It technically means, says Ankaravi, "self-subsistent". With respect to existence, it would signify the Necessary Existent (Wājib al-Wujūd) on which all other beings depend for their existence. To put it another way, all of existence is of two types: the self-

6 I-H. 5b17-6a2.
8 I-H. 6a3-10.
subsistent, i.e., that which necessarily exists by virtue of itself, and existence by virtue of another. All existing beings fall into the latter category, in so far as they derive their existence from the former, which needs nothing for its own existence. In effect, Ḥanāfa expounds "qayyūm" with the aid of Ibn Sīnā's famous division of being as "the necessarily existent by virtue of itself" (wājib al-wujūd) and "the possibly existent" (mumkin al-wujūd) whose existence becomes necessary by virtue of another.

*Strengthen us with the light!*

Both commentators, i.e., Ḥanāfa and Dawwānī, unanimously agree on the apparent meaning of "light" as "knowledge", yet they differ in their further interpretation. The former, approaching the term from a Sufi perspective, reads the whole phrase as follows: "fortify us with the shining lights radiated from the gnosis of Your Essence; make our souls powerful with the profound mysteries of the knowledge of Your attributes." Dawwānī, however, remaining mainly in the line of Ishrāqī tradition, notes that "knowledge" is light by which the true natures of everything become manifest; and the human soul possessed of such knowledge, becomes perfect after having attained the stage of spiritual conjunction with the separate intelligibles (al-mufaraqāt). These intelligibles are, according to the

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9 I-H. 6a11-2.
Peripatetics, ten intellects, whose natures are nothing less than "light" for the Illuminationists.¹⁰

Maintain us in the light!

To this Ankaravi suggests only one exegesis: "Keep us firm in the light of Your oneness (τεριτ)."¹¹ Şarih Dawwānī, for his part, once again identifying "light" with "knowledge", offers several explanations for it. In sum, the phrase stated above first has the sense of seeking help from God to make us free, by means of "nūr", from all doubts and fancy ideas so as to reach absolute knowledge by journeying upwards from the certainty of knowledge (‘ilm al-yaqīn) to that of sight (‘ayn al-yaqīn) and finally to that of truth (ḥaqq al-yaqīn). All of these three stages will be touched upon in our analysis of the commentary on the next sentence from Suhrawardī’s text.

According to another meaning, it indicates yearning for the persistent conjunction (ittiṣāl) with the sublime lights.¹²

Gather us under the light!

"May God unite us with the sublime incorporeal lights just after our souls have departed from our bodies!" This is how it is explained by Rusūhī

¹⁰ SH-H. p. 10.
¹¹ I-H. 6a12-3.
and Dawwānī. Nevertheless, the latter’s further exegesis raises a more problematic issue, debated particularly among the medieval thinkers of Islam, that is, the separation of the soul from the body and its conjunction with the “splendid principles (al-mabādi‘ al-‘āliyah). Dawwānī states that the human soul, during this conjunction, may go through three successive stages. At the first one, owing to the lights which issue forth from the first principle (al-mabda‘al-awwal), the soul is able to see objects which can be known (ma‘limat); this is called the certainty of knowledge (‘ilm al-yaqīn). At the second stage, it may have a vision of the separate Substance or Intellect (mutāriq) and all the beings that exist therein, which is named the certainty of sight (‘ayn al-yaqīn). At the final stage, the human soul culminates in a full conjunction with that Intellect.

Ṣāriḥ Ankarāvī, in his commentary on this sentence, discusses the notion of “light” and its divisions, and does so exactly in the terms in which they are defined and classified by Suhrawardī in his Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. To begin with, “light” can be defined as “that by which things become visible”. For Suhrawardī, it is a self-evident reality which need not be made known nor explained, for “there is nothing more manifest than light

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13 This echoes undoubtedly Ibn Sīnā’s concept of “Active Intellect” (al-‘Aql al-Fā‘āl).

14 SH-H. pp. 11-12.


16 I-H. 6a15.
itself", yet it is the one which renders all else manifest. This is in a certain way reminiscent of Ibn Šīnā’s primordial concepts of "existent" (mawjūd), "thing" (shay) and "necessary" (darūnī) whose intentions, he declares, are so essentially imprinted in the human soul that they do not need definitions at all. So it seems that, as some modern researchers have claimed, Suhrawardī has substituted "light" for "existence".

It is true that the origin of Suhrawardī’s notion of "light" goes back to that of Ibn Šīnā’s on "existence". It also goes without saying that he, strictly following the latter, has neither assigned a definition to nor given any explanation for "light". Furthermore, just as "existence" has become the very foundation of Ibn Šīnā’s so-called rational philosophy, known as Peripatetic, so did "light" become the very basis of Suhrawardī’s intuitive tradition, known as Illuminative. Whatever they may have in common, no one can identify the one with the other, because, as some contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy have pointed out, the metaphysical nature of "light"

17 H-I. p. 106.
18 H-I. p. 113.
19 Ibn Šīnā, al-Ilāhiyyāt II, p. 29.
21 J. Walbridge treats such an identification with caution on the ground that Suhrawardī denies any objective reality outside the mind to existence. What is real for him is only the light itself, not the concepts that are found in the mind. See his The Science of Mystic Lights (Cambridge: Harvard
as conceived by Suhrawardī remains far distinct from that of "existence" as set out by Ibn Sīnā. Nevertheless, it is extremely interesting to observe how Anḵarāvī presents Suhrawardī’s concept of "light" in terms of Ibn Sīnā’s concept of "intellect," and in what follows we will highlight the similarities and differences between these two.

In accordance with Suhrawardī’s terminology, Anḵarāvī divides light into two chief categories:

(i) Accidental light or material light (nūr ḥay’ef), like the sun and its like. Were the sun, for instance, not to exist, no object in the world could be seen.

(ii) Abstract light or immaterial light (nūr mūcererred) or pure light (nūr mahd), like the immaterial intellects devoid of bodily association, and the rational souls acting upon and governing bodies.22

At the very root of Suhrawardī’s division of light there lies his division of "thing" (shay’) into two:

(i) That which is light (nūr) and beam (daw’) in its own self (nūr fi ḥaqīqat nafsīh), which is further subdivided into two:

(a) Accidental light (al-nūr al-ʿārif), which is a "form" (hay’a) for something else; e.g., the sun.

(b) Immaterial light (al-nūr al-mujarrad), that is not a "form" for


22 I-H. 6a15-6b2.
something else.

(ii) That which is not light and beam in its own self, which is further subdivided into three:

(a) Dark substance (*al-jawhar al-ghāsiq*), which is independent of place.

(b) Dark form (*al-hay’a al-żulmāniyya*), which is a form for something else.

(c) Isthmus or interval (*al-barzakh*), which is body.²³

The above scheme might be ultimately reduced, again in congruence with Suhrawardi’s own terminology, to two main categories:

(i) that which is self-sufficient and whose perfection depends on nothing else except itself, which is called “independent” (*ghanī*).

(ii) that which is conditional on something and whose essence and perfection rests exclusively on something else; this is called “dependent” or "indigent" (*faqīn*).²⁴

Thus the pure or immaterial light falls, according to Suhrawardi, under the first category, whereas the accidental or material light comes under the last one.

A thorough analysis of Suhrawardi’s whole ontology in which “light” becomes the main principle for determining the interrelationship of things,


clearly demonstrates that it owes much of its origin to Ibn Šīnā's ontology in which, as we have already pointed out, "existence" determines the network of relations among beings. What is more, even Ibn Šīnā's division of things with regard to "existence" into "necessary" (ṣarūrī) "possible" (mumkin) and "impossible" (muntani) corresponds more or less to Suhrawardī's two-fold division of things on the basis of "light" into "independent" (ghanī) and "dependent" (faqīr). Hence, as Ziai has aptly pointed out, the notions of "the Necessary Existent" (wajib al-wujūd) and "the non-existent" (ma'dūm) in Avicenna's system find their counterparts in Suhrawardī's as that of "the Absolute Independent" (al-ghanī al-mutlaq) and that of "the absolute dependent" (al-faqīr al-mutlaq) respectively.

The second possible ground for Suhrawardī's aforementioned division might have been his conception of the cosmic roles of Orient (Mashriq) and Occident (Maghrib), a conception which Ibn Šīnā originally formulated about two centuries before him. In Suhrawardī's view, sacred geography,
whether real or symbolic, consists of two principal regions; (i) the Orient which is the origin of light and thus represents the source of knowledge, and (ii) the Occident which is the world of darkness or matter (ghāsiq) and so typifies ignorance.  

May our ultimate aim be the one which prepares us to meet you.

Anḵaravī is now concerned with the question of how each man can prepare his rational soul for its meeting with God, which will take place, as Dawwānī indicates, in the Mahšhar, the arena of congregation on the Day of Resurrection. The best way to succeed in this, Anḵaravī proclaims, is to replace human attributes with the Divine Attributes and human self with the Divine Self, and finally to reach a state of permanency with God. While putting it in a Sufi context, he speaks of the two stages in man's preparation to encounter God. The first is the complete negation or annihilation of self (fenā ve maḥv), which leads eventually to the second


31 I-H. 6b4-7.
stage, which is subsistence (beṣā) in God. Hence with such a conspicuously mystical interpretation, Ankaravī no doubt attempts to place Suhrawardī as well as his Illuminative doctrine in the Sufi tradition.

*We have troubled our own souls.*

This means, for Mevlevi Rusūhi, that we have wronged our souls, since we have become so preoccupied with physical matters and so addicted to worldly desires.\(^{32}\) For Dawwānī, however, it signifies that we have burdened our souls because we have adopted for them a kind of conduct tainted with evil habits, which will eventually become an impediment for us in our attempt at reaching true perfection.\(^{33}\)

*You are never avaricious with Your superabundance.*

In spreading the rays of His Light, God never acts niggardly. On the contrary, Ankaravī comments, all that exists in reality is just like a drop from His gracious ocean and a piece of ray from His luminous courtesy.\(^{34}\) On the other hand, "stinginess" (bakhī), as Dawwānī puts it, is an imperfection peculiar to man only; therefore it is by no means found in God, who is the

\(^{32}\) *I-H.* 6b7-8.

\(^{33}\) *SH-H.* p. 13.

\(^{34}\) *I-H.* 6b9-11.
most generous.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{Those who are imprisoned in darkness stand at Your Portal, awaiting mercy and seeking liberation from captivity.}

Man, in the eyes of Suhrawardî, lives in this world as a captive of darkness and is in desperate need of God's mercy so that he can be set free. Dawwānī explains in his commentary on this passage that man is in such a miserable situation because of his excessive indulgence in physical pleasures and lustful desires, and that without God's benevolence he will not be able to save himself from the severe consequences of that situation.\textsuperscript{36}

Anṣaravī goes further and reminds us of the fundamental ingredients of the external world, namely matter and form. Thus only when man has become liberated from the bondage of the passions and vanities of this world, a world which is made up of matter and form, then will he be able to join the sublime incorporeal lights.\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{Human beings are not in a position to exact vengeance.}

God, as Suhrawardî has already pointed out, is absolutely generous and independent (\textit{ghanī}); but man, in contrast, is simply nothing as

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{SH-H.} p. 13.

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{SH-H.} p. 13.

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{I-H.} 6b13-16.
compared to God and totally dependent (faqīr) on Him, let alone in a position to exact vengeance for wrongs which he has suffered. Ankaravi, following partly Dawwānī, comments that since the human soul has become so obsessed with base and sensual desires that it cannot attain knowledge (ʿulūm) and gnosis (meʿāriḥ), both of which enable him to realize true perfection. Suhrawardi has made this explicit in the following invocation to God:

O God bless us in our remembrance (of You) and remove evil from us. Give success to the right-doers. And peace be upon the chosen one.

Ankaravi offers two meanings to “remembrance” (zikr). One is "knowledge" and "gnosis"; the other is to remember the beginning and the end of the world (mebde ve meʾād). Therefore he interprets the whole phrase as follows: May God grant man "knowledge" and "gnosis" in abundance or may God make him remember his beginning and end.

"Knowledge" (ʿilm), according to Ismāʿil Rusūhī, is to know a thing along with all its concomitants (levāzimihī), whereas "gnosis" (maʿrīfe) means to comprehend the same thing just as it is, its nature (ḥakīkatihī), its essence (zātihi) and its properties. Precisely speaking, in "ʿilm" we

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39 I-H. 7a9-11.

40 See for a detailed explanation, Ankaravi, Minhācūʾī-Fuṣarāʾ, p. 267.
conceive of something by means of its form, but in "ma'rifah" we perceive it just as it is.

Anцикл continues his commentary by stating that man ought to supplicate God to eradicate all barriers, like "ignorance" and "laziness", which hinder man from gaining "knowledge" and "gnosis". 41

Contrary to Dawwānī, who restricts God's peace and blessing to the Prophet Muḥammad only, 42 Anцикл, reading the phrase as al-muḥsīfīn (the chosen ones) instead of al-muṣṭafāfīn (the chosen one), extends it accordingly to all the rulers (sultāns) who were designated by God to carry out the Divine mission (risālet). 43

This is the treatise of the Temples of Light.

The title which Suhrawarī himself assigns to his work, has two components: one is "hayākil", the plural form of "haykāl", meaning literally "temple"; the other is "nūr", denominating merely "light", which I have already discussed at some length and which I will continue to deal with throughout this study.

Ṣāriḥ Rusūnī as compared to Dawwānī, explicates the notion of


42 SH-H. p. 14. He makes it very clear that he, as the most perfect and dignified messenger, was sent for all mankind.

43 I-H. 7a13-14.
"haykal", basically identifying it with "šūra:" (form), and thus labelling the book under discussion as "The Book of Forms". He also asserts that "since Şeyh Suhrawardī -may God sanctify his secret- has expounded in this treatise the forms of the sublime abstract lights, of the rational souls and of the Divine lights, he has conveniently named it Hayākīl al-Nūr".44

As for Dawwānī, he provides us with a relatively detailed account with regard to the historical development of the term "haykal":

Haykal originally means shape or form (al-šūrah). The ancient sages had assumed that the stars constitute the shadows and forms (hayākil) of the incorporeal lights. Therefore, they had set up for each of the seven planets (stars) a theurgy (ṭiṣlīm), made of a metal, which was suitable to its own structure and time. And they would place each of these theurgies in a house built, in conformity with a horoscope, in a location appropriate to the star. Then they used to go to the houses at certain times and execute there certain (theurgical) activities such as fumigations and others, which correspond to the star and its respective time. Thus, they would gain an advantage from the theurgical activities, and (moreover) they would make those houses magnificent and then call them (precisely) the Temples of Light (Hayākīl al-Nūr)45 because of their being the sites of these theurgies (or theurgical affairs), which were the forms of the stars which themselves were the temples of the supreme lights. Therefore the author has accordingly named this treatise Hayākīl al-Nūr (Temples of Light), whose purpose is to set out the moods (al-aṭwāl) of the incorporeal lights. So, each chapter of this treatise, together with the explanations as well as the terms that it

44 I-H. 7a15-7b1.

45 Suhrawardī himself has used the term temple in the same sense, i.e. house, in his Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt, wherein he says: "They visit the Divine Temples (al-hayākil al-ilāhiyya) and the dwellings of the Saints (al-masākin al-anbiya) and their like. Suhrawardī, Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt, in Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I, ed. H. Corbin (İstanbul: Məā rif Matbaası, 1945), p. 96.
contains, would resemble a place of theurgy whose contemplation would lead inevitably to the contemplation of these lights. This is the opinion I have, yet God does know best what is concealed in (the hearts of) His servants.46

In his major work, Ḥikmat al-Ishråq, Suhravardī uses the term "haykal" in connection with the human body. In one particular place, for instance, he says that all the internal faculties in the body are in a way a shadow of what is in "the managing light" (al-nūr al-isfahbad), which is the rational soul, or an icon within the temple, which is the body. In other words, the temple, i.e., the body, becomes a theurgy for the rational soul, just as the imaginative faculty becomes an icon or image for the faculty of reasoning of the same soul.47

On another occasion, he emphasizes that once the rational soul has become illuminated by the supreme lights, it becomes like a governing light (al-nūr al-mudabbir). Then all the illuminations it receives are reflected on the corporeal temple, namely, on the body, as well as on the psychic spirit (al-rūḥ al-nafsānī).48


48 H-I. p. 254. Also cf. "al-ṣūltān al-nūrī" to be examined in the second Temple of the present study and also H-I. p. 207.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE FIRST TEMPLE

I. All that can be pointed to by sensible perception or indication is (called) body, i.e. that which is possessed of length, width and depth. Bodies partake in the (concept of) corporeality. It is indispensable that any two things participating in one thing should be differentiated from each other by virtue of something else. (Accordingly, all bodies should be distinguished from one another by some other things.)

Those things by which bodies are distinguished are the (accidental) forms (hay'â).

II. The essential concomitant is that which is inseparable from (the essence of) an entity. To ascribe a quality to something is either necessary, like the quality of "even" to the number four or that of "corporeality" to man, or possible, like the position of "standing" or "sitting" to man, or impossible, like ascribing "horseness" to a man. That which is indivisible in the imagination can have no dimension nor can it be pointed to; because, otherwise the side of a thing in one direction would be other than the side of that thing in another direction. Thus it would become divisible in the mind.

As one can easily see, this temple, the shortest of all, deals on the whole with two important issues: one is concerned with the question of "body," a question which is the most essential and occupies a relatively

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1 The text in parenthesis exists only in I-H. 8a11 and in H-N. p. 47, n. 6, MS 2M.

2 H-N. pp. 47-8; I-H. 7b5, 8a2-3, 6-7, 8-9, 11, 13-14, 8b3-5, 7, 8, 10-12; SH-H. pp. 17-21; Hayâkil, pp. 84-5.
central place here; the other, which is in a way a corollary of the former, involves the theory of definition (al-ḥadd).

1. The Nature of Body

I. In the first place, the concept of "body", (translating, for the most part accurately the Arabic term "jism") generally denotes something corporeal like man, bird or tree, etc., as distinguished from something incorporeal like God or soul. Broadly speaking, it is a term that stands for every object of experience which, for Suhrawardī and other philosophers, constitutes a point of departure in the formulation of metaphysical as well as epistemological doctrines.

Before proceeding to Suhrawardī's conception of body, Ankaravī, following Dawānī, introduces some geometrical definitions about "point", "line", "surface", and "body":

(i) A thing which can be perceived by the senses but which cannot be divided into any dimensions at all is called point. It is termed also an individual existent (vūcūd-i ferd) or an atom (cūz-i lā yetecezzā);

(ii) if that thing is amenable to being divided in only one dimension, then it is called a line;

(iii) if it is divisible in two dimensions -length and width- it is called a surface;

(iv) if it is capable of receiving division in three dimensions -length,
width and depth—then it is called a body. In addition, there are six
directions, two for each of these three dimensions, all of which—length,
width and depth—are deemed by Suhrawardi as accidental.

As regards the nature of body, there are basically two different
doctrines which prevailed in medieval Islamic philosophy prior to
Suhrawardi.

(i) The Peripatetic thinkers maintained that body is composed of
matter (hayülā) and form (ṣūra). This doctrine has its origin in Aristotle’s
famous distinction between matter and form, which is known as
hylomorphism. According to this theory, matter as a substratum is passive
but receptive of the form which in turn is active. In other words, the former
is the principle of potentiality, while the latter is that of actuality.
Furthermore, both of them are incorporeal and indivisible in themselves, yet
their composition, the body, is corporeal and divisible.

(ii) The Mutakallimûn (doctors of theology) held the view that body
is composed of what they call “the smallest particles”, namely atoms. More
precisely, in the eyes of these people, as will be elaborated further by
Anšaravī below, what makes up a body is the combination of some particles
which are indivisible and homogeneous in themselves.

The first view, viz. the Peripatetic conception of body, was repudiated

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3 I-H. 7b1-16.

4 Suhrawardi, al-Talwiḥāt, p. 9.
by Suhrawardi and replaced with what Dawwani terms "the corporeal form (al-šūratu'l-jismiyya) or "the form itself"('ayn al-šūra). As both two commentators put it, this is also the view of the School of Plato.

One of the reasons for Suhrawardi's repudiation of the Peripatetic view of body, could be the fact that, as Majid Fahkry has noted, a combination of matter and form as such does not fit into the system of Ishraqī tradition, least of all into the process of "illuminative emanation" according to which all existing beings proceed from the principal source of all reality, namely from the Light of Lights, through a downward process of gradual illumination from the higher to the lower. Even Suhrawardi himself claims that the duality of matter and form does not enter in the process of illumination at all.

Thus, for Suhrawardi, body is not a composite of matter and form. On the contrary, it is pure magnitude (al-miqdār). And the magnitude of the entire world by no means augments nor diminishes. A mustard seed,

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6 I-H. 8a3-6; SH-H. p. 18.


8 This is to be discussed in the fourth temple.


10 H-I. p. 75.
for instance, possesses no "matter" capable of receiving the whole magnitude of the world, as the Peripatetics contended.\textsuperscript{11}

To sum up briefly, according to Suhrawardī, body is but "self-subsistent magnitude". No thing exists in the world which is liable to admit "magnitude" and "form", not even matter. In fact matter as such does not exist, and its substantiality is "pure" or rather a "mental entity" (\textit{\textit{ittibār ‘aqliyyī}}).\textsuperscript{12} Therefore the body, as perceived by the senses, is not to be identified with the Peripatetic "substance".

With regard to the second doctrine about body, An̄karavī at once declares that the Mutakallimūn rejected the idea of hylomorphism as maintained by the Peripatetics and affirmed instead the view of atomism. In their view, he proceeds, body is not a combination of matter and form, but is rather a composition of atoms.\textsuperscript{13}

An̄karavī goes on to illustrate the atomist view with a concrete example. Let us suppose a body (\textit{cīsm}), he says, is divided into the smallest units or monads, to the point where it can be in no way further subdivided in the mind or in the imagination. In the end there would remain at least one single tiny "particle" (\textit{cūz}) or "single substance", which is designated in the terminology of the Mutakallimūn as an "atom" (\textit{cevher-i}

\textsuperscript{11} H-I. p. 79.

\textsuperscript{12} H-I. p. 80.

\textsuperscript{13} I-H. 8b-14-5.
This smallest particle, according to the Mutakallimûn, is not amenable to further division whether in mind or in imagination. Therefore an atom as such would become completely incorporeal and imperceptible. Such an atomist view of body appears inappropriate and totally unacceptable to both Avicenna and Suhrawardî for one reason in particular. Since nothing which is indivisible in mind and imagination can assume any dimension, it cannot actually exist. In other words, only those things which are found in dimensions and thus are called bodies can be perceived by the senses. And division of bodies into length, breadth and depth would be

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14 The orthodox Mutakallimûn developed a metaphysical system based on atoms and accidents and made it the basis of their proof for the world’s creation. According to them, the world as a contingent being is composed of both atoms, the indivisible particles, and accidents. Each atom is a substance but, contrary to Aristotle’s view of the infinite divisibility of matter, no longer divisible ad infinitum. Atoms, created continuously by God, when united with one another, make up bodies which are one and identical in themselves but different in their accidents. The ultimate cause for their divergent accidents is again God. The interesting point is that, in the eyes of the Mutakallimûn, atoms are neither material nor permanent; on the contrary, they have momentary existence. In short, they are every moment created and annihilated by the direct intervention of God. A doctrine as such allowed the Muslim theologians to vindicate the existence of God and the creation of world by Him. (For the atomistic theory of the orthodox theologians, one may refer to these primary sources: Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī, The Summa Philosophae of al-Shahrastānī: Kitāb Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī 'Ilmi al-Kalām, ed. and trans. A. Guillaume (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī, al-Ibāna‘ an Uṣūl al-Diyāna (Hyderabad, 1948); for a critical analysis see, Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Kalām (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 472-490; Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas (London: George Allen & Unwin ltd., 1958), pp. 22-55).
possible only on a potential, not on an actual level.\textsuperscript{15}

However, Rusūhī An̄karavī, who seems to have intermingled Suhrawardi’s physics with the Peripatetics, especially when explaining how the bodies are differentiated from one another -holding that what is common in bodies is the matter, but that what is distinct in them is the form-\textsuperscript{16} continues to maintain the same confusion and hence ascribes division not to the body itself but to its matter alone:

...of the body, that which is capable of receiving division is called matter. It is known that the matter cannot be separated from the form and vice-versa. Both of them on the contrary exist (simultaneously) in the body. But a statement as such, which belongs originally to the philosophers (ḥūkemā), would entail necessarily that the world is pre-eternal (kadīm). This theory (delil), however, is unacceptable to the Scripture (Šeṅa). Therefore, the explicit theory that holds that body is a compound of atoms, belongs to the scholars of Kalām. They adhered to this view of atomism (i.e. cevher-ı ferd) so that they avoided having the idea of “the pre-ernity of the world”.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus An̄karavī, having made no distinction between the Peripatetics and Suhrawardi on the question of body but rather combining both under one category as philosophers, displays overt sympathy towards the Mutakalimūn, for he finds their view agreeable to the precepts of the Scripture. Furthermore, he reinforces his appreciation by the following

\textsuperscript{15} See for Ibn Sīnā’s elaboration, Ilāhiyyāt II, pp. 63-65, 111-114; and for Suhrawardi’s criticism of atomism, H-I. pp. 88-89.

\textsuperscript{16} I-H. 8a12-13.

\textsuperscript{17} I-H. 9a9-15.
2. The Theory of Definition (al-ḥadd)

II. The second part of this temple deals with the question of "essential concomitant" (lāzīm al-ḥaqīqa) a concomitant which is inseparable from the essence of the thing.¹⁹

To elucidate this, Ankharavī, having taken the term "ḥaqīqa" in logical context as "māhiya" (quiddity), has recourse to the definition of man proclaimed first by Aristotle and adopted after him by almost all the logicians, particularly by the Peripatetics. According to Aristotle, "man" is defined at best as "rational animal" (ḥayawān nāṭiq). For "rationality" and "animality" constitute the two real ḥaqīqas of man. Whenever "man" is envisaged, these two major characteristics occur to mind forthwith. Without them, "man" cannot be conceived of at all.²⁰

In referring to this celebrated example, Ankharavī's principal aim, so

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¹⁸ I-H. 9a17-9b2.

¹⁹ H-N. p. 47.

²⁰ I-H. 8a15-8b3.
far as it appears, is to make it a worthy basis for his elaboration of
Suhrawardī's statement regarding the inseparability of the "essential
concomitant" from the essence of an entity." In other words, he, interpreting
the whole text strictly in terms of Aristotelian logic, takes lāzim al-ḥaqīqa as
"quiddity," which instead is supposed to be "essential concomitant, as is
from clear Suhrawardī's attribution of "corporeality" to man. In doing so,
therefore, Ankāravi seems entirely incognizant of the fact that the latter
launched a relentless attack against this conventional theory of definition
and substituted it with what Ziai has termed "the illuminationist theory of
definition". It is for this reason that Dawwāni, being fully aware of this,
makes no mention of Aristotle's definition of man; on the contrary he
explains the phrase in question in the same context as did his master
Suhrawardī. 21

A brief survey of Suhrawardī's repudiation of the Peripatetic theory
of definition would be useful at this point. According to him, Peripatetic logic,
in the first place stipulates that a thing to be defined must have two
predicable universals, one a "differentia" (al-faṣl) and the other a "proximate
genus" (al-jins al-qanīb). In the case of "man," "rational" stands for the
former and "animal" for the latter. These two, insofar as "man" is concerned,
become, according to the Peripatetics, inherent in and inseparable from
him.

But for the Ishrāqī master, Suhrawardī, neither "rationality" nor "animality" can give the exact definition of "man" on two grounds: first of all, these two, leaving aside many other essential characteristics of "man", would be insufficient for a true definition. The most complete definition, contends Suhrawardī, is the one which contains a synthesis of all the necessary constituents of the thing to be defined altogether in a synthesis. The second reason for the insufficiency of the classical definition is that it takes as the "differentia" for "man", that of "rationality", which is posterior to "man" himself. How intelligible is it, Suhrawardī argues, to define "man" with something which comes after "his existence"? 22

Therefore any particular object to be defined may be qualified with essential (dhatī) as well as accidental ('araḍī) attributes. If an attribute as such is essential, like "parity" for the number "four" or "corporeality" for "man", then it would become necessary for and inseparable from it. So much so that, as Dawwānī articulates it very eloquently, inasmuch as it exists either in the mind or in reality, it would be an indispensable

22 H-1. pp. 20-21. According to Suhrawardī, one of the two components of the definition of man, "animal" represents the general essential (al-dhātu'l-ʾām), called genus (jins), while the other represents the particular essential (al-dhātu'l-khāṣṣ), called differentia (faṣḥ). This is the simple understanding of the Peripatetic philosophers. However a definition as such, leaving aside all necessary constituents of man, does fail to convey the true nature of man which is, according to Suhrawardī, the soul itself. In fact, rationality, the capacity of reasoning, which is posterior to the soul must be replaced by the latter. See, for a detailed account, Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, pp. 118-127.
concomitant for it.\textsuperscript{23}

If the attribute, on the other hand, is accidental to the object, like "sitting" or "standing" postures for "man", in that case it would become only contingent, for neither the object's subsistence (\textit{thubût}) nor its annihilation (\textit{intifâ}) would depend on that attribute. Strictly speaking, no position, -for instance, sitting or standing- has anything to do with man's very existence.\textsuperscript{24}

Consequently, there are only two possible modes of attribution, necessary and contingent. Beyond these two, no other mode of attribution is possible. An example of this, as illustrated by Suhrawardî, is the attribution of "horseness" to "man," which is categorically false and absurd, because the former is distinct in its very nature from the latter.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{SH-H.} p. 20.

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{SH-H.} p. 21.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECOND TEMPLE

One Proof:
I. You are never unaware of yourself, while there is no part of your body of which you are not occasionally forgetful. The whole is perceived only through its parts (together). But if you yourself were an aggregation of all of your bodily parts, then you would remain constantly unheedful of yourself, while forgetting them (i.e., the parts). Therefore, you are beyond this body and its parts.

Another Proof:
II. Your body is subject to a continuous dissolution and cessation. Had your body not eliminated (but stored) the foodstuffs that the nutritive faculty had supplied before, then it would have become over-enlarged in proportion to the newly incoming foodstuffs. And if you yourself were a body as such or a part of it, your very self identity would change at every instant; whereas there is with you always a cognizant substance through which you are yourself, and not through your body. For if the latter were true, how would you be (identical with) the body which is constantly dissolving, and yet be unaware of it? Therefore you are far beyond these things.¹

A Further Proof:
III. You perceive an object only through the occurrence of its form in your mind. In that case, it is necessary that whatever object you perceive, that which occurs in your mind should correspond to that object. Otherwise, you would not perceive it as it is.² On the other hand, you comprehend concepts (maʿāni), shared by a multitude of things (like animality). You comprehend it in such a way that it becomes equally applicable to both "elephant" and "fly". Hence the form of the object, which occurs to your mind (e.g. animality), is free from any consideration of measure, for it corresponds equally to the small as well as to the big. (Not only the

¹ H-N. p. 49 including footnote 4, MS B; I-H. 9b17, 10a5-6, 11-11, 15-16, 10b10, 12-13; SH-H. pp. 24-25, 30; Hayākil, pp. 85-6.

² H-N. p. 50.
form) but its substratum in you is also free from the measure. Thus the substratum is your rational soul, since that which is not measurable cannot be inherent in a body. Therefore, your soul is neither body nor corporeal. Since it is beyond any dimension, it cannot be perceived (by senses) at all. It is one (ahadiyya) and unfathomable (samadiyya); it cannot be divided in the imagination (al-awhām) at all.

Since, as you know, it is not said of the wall that it is either blind or seeing, because blindness is attributable only to those who have the capacity to see, God and the rational soul, and some other beings besides these two, which will be mentioned, are neither bodies nor corporeals. They are neither interior to the world nor exterior to it, and neither inseparable (muttaṣil) nor separable (munfaṣil) from it. All of these (characteristics) are in fact some of the accidents of the bodies. But that which is not a body is free from them (i.e. the accidents). So, the rational soul is a substance which can by no means be indicated by the senses. It is the very nature of the rational soul to govern the body and conceive of its own essence as well as of objects. Then, how would it be fair to conceive of this sacred quiddity (al-mahiyya al-qudsiyya) as a body, while it moves the spiritual joy and emotion and thus makes haste to abandon the world of bodies, seeking the world of infinity?

The External and Internal Senses

IV. This rational soul has perceptive faculties some of which are external. These are the five senses: touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight. There are also some other perceptive faculties which are internal: one is the sensus communis. This is, with respect to the five senses, just like a pool into which flow five streams. It is by this sense that the forms dreamt are perceived by direct vision and not by means of fantasy. Another internal faculty is that of representation. This is a store for the sensus communis, which

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3 Dawwānī reads this sentence as: "That which is not measurable cannot be inherent in a body which is measurable". (SH-H. p.36)

4 H-N. p. 50; I-H. 11a15-12a8; SH-H. pp. 35-37; Hayākil, 86.

5 By others he means intellects, celestial as well as terrestrial souls, which will be discussed later. (H-N. p. 64).

6 H-N. pp. 50-51; I-H. 12a10-11, 16-17, 12b1-2, 7-8, 15, 13a10, 11-12, 13b1-3; SH-H. pp. 37-39; Hayākil, pp. 86-87.
preserves the forms, after they are absent from the senses. Next is
the cogitative faculty whose function is to combine and separate
and invent. Another one is the estimative faculty which, due to its
judgments, may come into conflict with the intellect. Suppose, for
instance, a man who stays at night alone with a dead corpse. Now
his intellect assures him that there is nothing to worry about, yet his
estimative faculty strikes him with fear. Moreover, it may conflict with
the intellect particularly on matters beyond the sense perceptions. So
much so that people who strictly follow the judgments of the
estimative faculty may reject all that exists beyond the perceptible
realities. However, these people never think that their own intellects,
estimative faculties, their imaginations as well as souls cannot be
perceived by the senses. Even what is perceived in the body is not
its essence but only its outward appearance. Among the internal
senses, there is also a retentive faculty by which all the particular
events and situations are recalled. Each of these internal senses has
a proper location in the brain. Should the location of a particular
sense be damaged, its function would become deficient, while the
functions of all other senses would remain intact. From this one may
conclude that all the faculties differ from one another and that each
possesses its own proper location.\footnote{H-N. pp. 51-53; SH-N. pp. 39-40, 43-45, 47-50, 53-54, 56-58, 60-61,
63-64; I-H. 13b7-9, 14b2-5, 10-11, 16, 15a1, 5-7, 10-13, 16-17, 15b1, 4-5,
12-13, 16-17; Hayākil, pp. 87-88.}

V. The animals have the faculty of appetence \textit{(shawqīyya)} which
consists of two parts: One is the faculty of desire \textit{(shahwāniyya)}
which was created to acquire convenient things. The other is the
faculty of anger \textit{(ghagabiyya)} which was created to repel
inconvenient things. They (animals) have also the motive faculty
which causes movement (of the limbs). The bearer of all the motive
and perceptive faculties is the animal soul \textit{(al-rūl al-ḥaywānī)}. It is
a subtle steamy body, generated from the subtlety of the mixture,
and issued forth from the left ventricle of the heart. After having
received the governing light \textit{(al-ṣultān al-nūrī)} from the rational soul,
it begins to spread throughout the body. If this animal soul
possessed no such subtlety, it would not circulate in all the areas
where it penetrates. If an obstacle were to prevent it from penetrating
into a certain limb, that limb would die. The animal soul is the mount
on which the rational soul exercises its governing activities. So long
as the animal soul is in a healthy condition, the rational soul exerts
its control and power over the body. But once the former is broken
up, the latter's control of body would cease.\textsuperscript{8}

The animal spirit is different from the Divine Spirit (al-\textit{rūh} al-\textit{ilāhī}), which was included in the discourse of the Prophets.\textsuperscript{9} What is meant by this, (i.e. Divine Spirit) is the rational soul, which is one of the Lights of God the Exalted, a light to which no place can be assigned, which springs forth from God and which returns to Him.\textsuperscript{10}

The First Assumption:
VI. A group of people, having once realized that it (i.e., the rational soul) is immaterial, considers it to be God the Exalted. They have indeed strayed away (from the right), for God is One, yet souls are multiple. Otherwise, were the soul of Zaid and that of 'Amr one and the same, then one of these two would perceive all that the other perceived. Similarly every single person could become cognizant of whatever all other people know. But this is not the case. How can the faculties of the body capture the Deity of the Deities? How can they hold Him hostage to the passions and blindly make Him a target of trials under the haphazard blows? Again how can the movements of the heavens have control over Him?\textsuperscript{11}

The Second Assumption:
Another group has assumed that it (viz. rational soul) is a part of Him (God). This is false too, because, as it has been demonstrated, God is not corporeal. Therefore, how can a non-corporeal being as such be divided and partitioned? Besides, who can divide Him?

The Third Assumption:
VII. Other thinkers have assumed that the rational soul is pre-eternal (qadīm). But they have not realized that if this were so, they would encounter the question: What propelled the soul to quit the spiritual

\textsuperscript{8} H-N. p. 53-54; I-H. 16a8-10, 15-16, 16b11-14, 17a5-7, 10-11; SH-H. pp. 69, 77, 80; Hayākil, 88-89.

\textsuperscript{9} Hayākil adds: "in the Holy Qur’ān". (p. 89); and SH-H. (p. 81) and H-N. (p. 54, n. 5) include: "in divine revelation".

\textsuperscript{10} H-N. p. 54; I-H. 17a14-15, 17-17b1; SH-H. p. 81; Hayākil, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{11} H-N. p. 54-55, including p. 55, n. 5, ms. B; SH-H. p.81-82; I-H. 17b5-6, 19b16-17, 20a13-15; Hayākil, pp. 89-90.
world and life and join in the world of death and darkness? Who would dominate and capture such an eternal soul? How could it surrender to the attraction of the faculties of even a suckling infant so as to be brought down from the spiritual as well as luminous world? Moreover, how would it happen that all the souls have become distinguished from one another in pre-eternity, though once they had been one and the same in genre, and had no substratum, nor place nor activeness nor passiveness before entering the body, as they do after entering the body? It would be impossible for it to be first one and then be divided and distributed (proportionally) amongst the bodies, for that which is incorporeal is not capable of having divisions. On the contrary, it is originated simultaneously with the body at the moment when the latter has full aptitude to receive the former. For instance, when the wick of a lamp becomes ready to receive flame from the fire, as you see, no diminution in the intensity of the fire will take place. By the same token, it is not surprising that when the rational soul comes into being at the very moment of the preparedness of the body, no diminution would arise on the part of the Giver of the soul.  

Şeyh Suhrawardī, having delineated the notion of body in the preceding temple, now moves on to inquire into the question of soul. His current investigation evolves mainly on two successive levels, which may be termed briefly (i) "the demonstration of the soul" and (ii) "the elimination of some opinions about its nature".

In his discussion of the first level, he begins by attempting to establish the existence of the soul by referring to the proofs already utilized

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12 H-N. pp. 55-6; I-H. 21b10-11, 16-22a1, 4-5, 8-10, 22b8-10, 14-16; Hayākil. pp. 90-91. Incidentally, Dawwānī elaborates his commentary on the Giver to the effect that He is of two kinds: The Near Giver that is the Active Intellect, and the Remote Giver that is the Superior Principle, or in Corbin's rendering "the First Principle". SH-H. p. 95. Les Temples, p. 77, n. 23.
particular by Avicenna. Later he proceeds to show, again in the light of Avicenna's arguments yet with some modifications, that the soul is not a physical entity but entirely immaterial.

In his discussion of the second level, he tries to refute several theories on the question of soul maintained by some philosophers and mystics whose names are not specified.

1. The Proofs for the Existence of the Soul and Consciousness

I. Suhrawardi, like Avicenna, initially adopts not the term "soul" but that of "self" or "essence", which is designated by the former as "anā'īyya" and by the latter as "inniyya" or "anniyya". Nevertheless, the further elaboration of these three notions by both thinkers gives rise to one and the same reality.

In the first place, an attempt is made by Suhrawardi to demarcate between "ana'īyya" (human self) and "badan" (human body) with an implicit reference to Avicenna's concept of the "floating man". Man's


14 Based on this particular concept, Avicenna develops a significant theory about the soul, especially in his al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt, (vol. 2, pp. 319-320). There he refers to an individual man, supposedly suspended in the air in such a state that his eyes do not see his limbs and his limbs do not touch one another. Even in this adverse situation, Avicenna adduces, he still remains conscious of his "inniyya" (himself). Incidentally, Avicenna's doctrine of "floating man" has been an inspiration not only for eastern thinkers, like Suhrawardi, but for western thinkers as well. Amongst the latter, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), for instance, who has been recognized
introspective contemplation, both Avicenna and Suhrawardī argue, leads
him ultimately to the very existence of a profound inner reality, a reality
which makes him ever conscious of himself. A reality as such is not
something dependent on the body. Nor is it a part of its constitution. On the
contrary, it is very subtle in its nature and in fact transcends the physical
body.

II. One of the ways in which Suhrawardī aims to vindicate his claim
that the soul is wholly immaterial and totally distinct from the body is by
demonstrating, as was shown in the text translated above, that the former,
as opposed to the latter, is in no way amenable to transformation (taḥallul)
or dissolution (sayalān). Actually it is the body which is vulnerable to these
processes in the course of which it digests and assimilates the materials
supplied by the nutritive faculty. Without these two systems the body would
end up as an enormous hulk.

Thus the soul that makes man feel conscious of himself cannot be
identical with the body nor even a part of it. Otherwise, it too would

as the founder of modern thought, has emulated this theory and formulated
it in his own celebrated expression: "I think; therefore I am"; or in latin
"Cogito ergo sum." This is the starting point of his scepticism about his
personal existence at the end of which he comes to a realization of the
existence of God. Refer for the various usages of the term "inniyya" to A.M.
Goichon's French translation of al-Ishārāt, Livre Des Directives et
Remarques (Paris, 1951), pp. 304-307; see also Shlomo Pines' article "La
Conception de la Conscience de Soi chez Avicenne et chez Abūl-Barakāt
al-Baghdādī," in his work entitled Studies in Abūl-Barakāt al-Baghdādī
undergo, like the body, a constant process of transformation. However, in so far as it keeps man aware of his essence, not by means of physical sensation but by its very nature, it stands far beyond the change and transformation of the body.\(^{15}\)

The soul is therefore neither the body nor one of its constituents, simply because it is not affected at all by the alteration of the latter. Besides, any possible change in the body, both Dawwānī and Anḵarāvi comment, such as increase or decrease in its shape, takes place due to its natural heat (ḥārāra) and humidity (ruṭūba).\(^{16}\) If the heat becomes effectively dominant over the humid, Anḵarāvi notes, the humid decreases; but if the case is the reverse, then the heat diminishes.\(^{17}\)

All that has been said so far about the human soul is, according to both commentators, also true of the animal soul. Even Suhrawardī himself, as both commentators declare, made a clear indication to this effect.\(^{18}\) In other words, besides man, an animal too has a permanent soul (nefs-i bākiye). If the horse, for instance, possessed no such permanent soul, it would at every moment be transforming and changing. But this is not so,

\(^{15}\) *H*-\(N\). p. 49; *I*-\(H\). 10a5-16.

\(^{16}\) *SH*-\(H\). p. 24; *I*-\(H\). 10a1-2.

\(^{17}\) *I*-\(H\). 10a3-5.

\(^{18}\) *I*-\(H\). 10b2-5; although Dawwānī refers to the *Talwiḥāt* (*SH*-\(H\). p. 29) of Suhrawardī, there seems to be no direct statement of this nature therein. Probably Dawwānī wants this meaning to be read into the passage.
no mention is made of the existence of the inanimate soul in his above-stated works. Dawwānī, however, records a dialogue which he says took place between Avicenna and one of his disciples by the name of Bahmanyar. In this anecdote, the latter poses questions to the former about the difference between the essence (dhāl) or the soul of man and that of animal; whereupon the former, i.e. Avicenna, distinguishes between these two with difficulty.23

Be that as it may be, one still remains dubious as to whether plants and inanimate entities can perceive of their existence. Even if it is admitted that they possess souls apart from their bodies, how can they become aware of the dissolutions and transformations of these bodies?

On the other hand, it should be noted that Suhrawardī's main concern here, as it appears in the text, is simply to contrast "the permanence of the perceiving substance" (al-jawhar al-mudrik) of man, which is called "human soul", with the change (tabaddul) of the human body. Despite this fact, the commentators, Dawwānī and Ankaravī, as has been noted, have gone too far and have without any basis attributed to him and to Avicenna the idea that animals, vegetables and even inanimate entities have, like human beings, permanent souls by which they become aware of themselves. As far as Avicenna is concerned, he first divides souls, in his book of psychology, into three categories: vegetative, animal

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23 SH-H. p. 29.
and rational, and later assigns to each several faculties. Yet, he, in contrast to what Dawwānī and Anḵaravī claim regarding him, has never ascribed the faculty of perception to the vegetative soul, but only the following three faculties: nutrition, growth and reproduction. Therefore, inasmuch as they lack the perceptive faculty, the vegetables cannot perceive themselves.

Possibly for the same reason, the two editors of Dawwānī’s Shawākil al-Ḥūr, M. Abdul Haq and M. Yousuf Kokan have given the following explanation: “The growth of the plants is manifest, yet their consciousness (shu’ūr) is unknown. There is no ground for the existence of the perpetual consciousness in animals; and it is known that there is no transformation (tabaddul) in an inanimate entity.”

2. The Rational Soul and Its Characteristics

III. One of the fundamental functions of the human soul as conceived by the Peripatetic philosophers is the capacity to obtain knowledge by virtue of its external as well as internal senses. This is generally known as the acquisition of knowledge, which involves two different processes: (i) abstraction (taj̱rid), and (ii) perception (idrāk). Both of them operate in a reciprocal interaction between the knower, called subject, and the thing to be known, called object. In such a relation, the knower first abstracts the

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25 SH-H. p. 29. n. 2.
image of an object in the external reality by means of the external senses of the soul, and then perceives it as a form by means of its internal cognitive faculties.

Taking a position more or less similar to that of the Peripatetics at least on the question of sense-perception, Suhrawardī stresses the principle of the correspondence between the form of the object perceived in the mind and the object itself in reality. Should a correspondence as such not occur, the perception in its true sense cannot be actualized.

Ṣarḥ Anḵaravī illustrates this with the following example which he has borrowed from al-Dawwānī: let us suppose, he argues, that you saw a figure (šūḥ) far off in the distance and perceived it, say, as a horse, yet it turns out to be a man. In that case you perceived the figure according to the form that occurred in your mind, not according to the object itself. Therefore, the rational soul does not perceive a thing as it is, unless the form of that thing should correspond to it.26

According to Suhrawardī's statement regarding the rational soul in the Hayākil and elsewhere, it may be stated that he believed it to be:

1. Conscious of itself,
2. Independent of the body,
3. Free from measure,
4. Immaterial,
5. Occupies no place,
6. A substance
7. Monadic (aḥadiyya),

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26 I-H. 11a11-14; SH-H. p. 35.
8. Unfathomable or impenetrable (ṣamadiyya).

Although the first six characteristics have already been set out, even if not in every instance explicitly, in some of Avicenna's works,\(^{27}\) nevertheless, the last two, related to the immateriality of the soul, seem to be Suhrawardi’s own.

In tackling the issue of the unity of the soul, İsmâ'îl Ankaravi at first adheres to Dawwânî’s exegesis of Hayâkil in which the latter states: "the soul is not divisible into proportional pieces".\(^ {28}\) Afterwards, the former goes further and places it in strictly theological scheme, while characterizing it as an "atom" (cevher-i ferd) which subsists by virtue of its own essence.\(^ {29}\) Such a little but significant addition exhibits once again his close empathy towards the school of orthodox Kalam.

As to the "ṣamadiyya" of the soul, which is rendered here, though somewhat inaccurately, as "unfathomable," or as Corbin puts it, "impenetrable," Ankaravi suggests almost the same interpretation as Dawwânî’s:

The soul is unfathomable. That is to say, it is free from matter


\(^{28}\) SH-H. p. 36.

\(^{29}\) I-H. 12a4
(hey útila). (Properly speaking) it is neither matter nor form. And "şamad" literally signifies that which has no hollow (cevî); in this sense matter is like a hollow, inasmuch as it becomes the bearer of both the form and parts (of the body).30

Dawwānī goes even further than Ankārvī, stating:

...the bearer (maḥall) is analogous to the interior (al-bāṭin) (of the body) just as the dweller (ḥāll) is to the exterior (al-żāhir). Similarly, with respect to existence, the perceived form is manifest, while the matter is hidden, which requires proof.31

Thus, according to their interpretation of Suhrawardī, the soul, inasmuch as it is one and aloof from matter and form, is not even divisible in the imagination (al-wahm), let alone in reality. But the body, in contrast to the soul, is infinitely divisible in the imagination, though not in reality.

In this connection, Dawwānī turns his attention to the function of the estimative faculty, one of the five internal senses which both commentators deal with in more detail later. The perception of the faculty of estimation, he states, would be applicable only to matter and form, the two components of the body.32 Or as Ankārvī paraphrases it more precisely, this faculty perceives only "the particulars" (cûz'îyyâţ).33 That is why, they both argue,
it usually stands in opposition to the intellect (al-‘aqî) about "the existence of the abstract entities" (thubût al-mujarradât), for it builds its judgment entirely on the basis of the existing beings (mawjûdât). It follows accordingly that every existing being would be either inside or outside the other being; no other possibility exists. But an adjudication which recognizes no other possibilities would be inconclusive, even misleading, because it would lead its practitioners to go so far as to deny all that exists beyond sensible objects (al-maḥṣūsât).\textsuperscript{34}

Suhrawardî, in order to substantiate this argument, proceeds Anâravî, has appealed to a simple illustration, according to which, no one can say about the wall that it is seeing or that it is blind, for these two properties, viz. "vision" and "blindness", would be attributable only to the beings peculiar to them.\textsuperscript{35} Then exactly in the same manner, since the soul remains exclusively beyond such a dichotomy -inside/outside- it would not be even perceptible to the estimative faculty, let alone be divisible.

Again for Suhrawardî, alongside the other immaterial beings such as God, the intellects, the celestial and terrestrial souls, the rational soul has no association with any of the accidents, like interiority (dâkhiî), exteriority (khâriî), separability (munfaṣîî) and inseparability (muttaṣîî). All of these

\textsuperscript{34} SH-H. p. 37; I-H. 12a13-14. Actually, both commentators try to paraphrase Suhrawardî’s own words, quoted in the beginning of this chapter. (See also, H-N. p. 52.)

\textsuperscript{35} I-H. 12a15-16.
accidents can be attached only to bodies, not to incorporeal entities, which are absolutely transcendent and incommensurable. As it has already been noted, the rational soul is an abstract substance; and in being so, Anḳaravî stresses, "it is clothed in an unremovable garment of subsistence (kaḅāy-i bekā)."\(^{36}\) Since it is neither a form nor an accident, it is totally immune from annihilation (fenā) and destruction (zevāl).\(^{37}\) Furthermore, Dawwānī asserts that it is a self-evident truth that the rational soul subsists by itself and never becomes an accident to the others.\(^{38}\)

The notion of "nuṭq", one of the two ingredients of \textit{al-nafs al-nāṭqa} (the rational soul) is also a subject of discussion in Anḳaravî's commentary. There it is recorded that this term, in the Arabic language, is evocative of two different meanings: one is "speaking" and the other is "reasoning". Despite the fact that the former, which signifies merely the "sounds" made by the pronouncement of the various letters, is immediate and ostensible (\textit{al-zāhir}) in its connotation, nevertheless it is not the meaning intended here but rather the latter. This is because what constitutes man, Anḳaravî indicates, is not the ability to talk but the power to comprehend the intelligibles and distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad. In other words, the essence of man is his ability to reason, not simply to speak.

\(^{36}\) \textit{I-H.} 12b11.


\(^{38}\) \textit{SH-H.} p. 38.
Otherwise even the parrot, which can learn to talk by training, would be a man too. On the other hand, there are some people in the world who cannot speak, like those who are dumb, yet who can still think and reason.\textsuperscript{39} Man, by this noble substance, viz. \textit{al-nafs al-nātiqa}, is thereby distinguished from the rest of the beasts. It is by this soul, again, that he comprehends the existence of the intellects, pure souls, celestial bodies, the four elements, the three kingdoms, as well as all the signs on the earth, in the sky and in the oceans, thereby acquiring virtues and attaining happiness.\textsuperscript{40}

Among the functions of the rational soul, Ankaravī adds, there are two more. One is to exercise control over the body and safeguard it. The other is to choose, as much as its capacity permits, what is best and

\textsuperscript{39} I-H. 13a1-4. This issue in fact involves the theory of definition, a subject which was discussed in the first temple. It must be noted, however, that, long before Ankaravī, some outstanding thinkers such as like Abū Najā al-Fārid (d.
\textsuperscript{40} I-H. 13a6-9.
suitable for its own perfection. Furthermore, the soul knows by itself not only its own essence but those of all other things. This means, Ankaravi elaborates, that it conceives of both all the existing beings in external reality as well as their quiddities by various means and through explicit proofs. In fact in its own perceptive substratum it retains the concepts (taṣavvurāt) and assents (taṣdiqāt).

Hence, such a sacred and noble substance always wishes to return to the place of its spiritual origin, a place whence it has first come into the physical world. Dawwānī, however, is not concerned here with the return of the soul to the world of infinity, as Suhrawardī articulates it, but rather with the spiritual joy and emotion that occurs to it during its contact with the Divine illumination. Hence he describes it in terms of “the brethren of separation” (ikhwān al-tajrīd) as “ease” (al-basīt). The brethren, according to Ankaravi, are the gnostics (aṣḥāb-i meʿārif) and saints (erbāb-i šūhūd), for in their experience, the soul easily quits the body and joins the infinite world.

3. The Faculties of the Rational Soul

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41 I-H. 13a13-14.
42 I-H. 13a15-13b1.
44 I-H. 13b6-7.
IV. After having delineated the main characteristics of the rational soul, Suhrawardī moves on to examine the faculties affiliated with the soul. As will now be seen, his classification, as well as description of the faculties, seems quite similar to Avicenna's. To begin with, he, like Avicenna, assigns mainly two groups of senses and faculties to the rational soul. The first group, called "external", consists of five senses:

(i) Touch (al-lams),
(ii) Taste (al-dhawq),
(iii) Smell (al-shamm),
(iv) Hearing (al-sam'),
(v) Sight (al-ba$arj).

The second group, named "internal", is also composed of five:

(i) Sensus Communis (al-biss al-mushtarak),
(ii) Representation (al-khayāl),
(iii) Cogitative faculty (al-fikriyya),\(^45\)
(iv) Estimation (al-wahm),
(v) Retentive faculty (al-ḥāfīza).

3.1 External Senses:

(a) Touch:

This is a faculty which is spread over the entire surface of the skin. It senses basically four diverse circumstantial states: hot and cold, moist

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\(^{45}\) Avicenna refers to this faculty in two different contexts: in the first context, it is applied to animals and hence called "mutakhayyyila" what Fazlur Rahman has translated "sensitive imagination"; in the second context, it is attributed to man and thus labelled "mufakkira" again what Rahman has rendered "rational imagination". See for a detailed treatment of these faculties by Avicenna, Rahman's translation in Avicenna's *Psychology*, pp. 26-31 and commentary, pp. 73-83.
and dry. In addition, it also gives an impression about the following: light and heavy, smooth and rough, soft and hard.46

(b) Taste:

This sense is located in the nerves spread out over the tongue, and perceives the taste through the moisture that comes out of “the squeezed juice”.47

(c) Smell:

This faculty, which is located in the two lobes (zāidatayn) of the front part of the brain, perceives smells and odours by means of the air.48

(d) Hearing:

This sense is located in the nerves dispersed over the surface of the ear cavity. It perceives the sounds by means of the air which enters the ear.49

(e) Sight:

This faculty is located in the nerves of the two pupils of the eyes. It perceives lights and colours as images imprinted on the humours of the eyes. An example of this would be a mirror, which reflects images.50

46 I-H. 13b15-14a1.
48 I-H. 14a6-7.
49 I-H. 14a7-9.
50 I-H. 14a16-14b1.
3.2 Internal Senses:

The internal senses too consist of a hierarchy of five faculties. Each of them, like the external ones, becomes an instrument of perception for the soul, each occupies a distinct place, although, unlike the others, only in the brain, and each has a separate function in the process of receiving information. In what follows, based on the data gathered from Dawwānī's and Anḵaravī's commentaries, I will present a brief exposition of these faculties:

(a) Sensus Communis (Common Sense):

It resides in the forepart of the front ventricle of the brain.\(^1\) This faculty behaves as a sort of "pool" into which flow all the sensible forms transmitted from the external world by the five "streams", i.e. the five external senses.\(^2\) All the forms of objects -whether perceived through touch, smell, hearing, sight, or taste- are first received by the common sense, which, among the other internal senses, is the closest to the external ones.

In addition, Suhrawardī ascribes one more function to this faculty, that is, it visualizes (yushāhidu) the forms, even in dreams, in a direct and

\(^1\) SH-H. p. 48; I-H. 16a5.

\(^2\) This example, which is included in H-N. p. 52, n. 1, MS B, exists in Anḵaravī's and Dawwānī's commentaries, H. Corbin's French translation, the Persian translation (I-H. 14b3-4; SH-H. p.49; Les Temples, p. 44, Hayākil p. 87) as well as in the Ottoman translation by Yūsuf Žiyā (pp. 580-581).
visible manner without the interference of the imagination. "As it combines in itself the images (muthul) of all the transmitted forms, it perceives them by direct vision." In other words, as Ankaravi puts it, the common sense perceives the forms, not only in wakefulness but also in sleep or in a dream, by way of designation (al-ta'yun) rather than by representation (al-takhayyul). In the former case, the person who falls asleep can envision an individual form away from its referent in external reality. This he does, in the absence of the five senses, due to his common sense, and not by virtue of his intellect, which conceives only universals, and not particulars.

(b) The Representative Faculty:

This faculty is situated in the back part of the front ventricle of the brain. The major function of this faculty is to act as a storehouse (khizâna) for the forms received from the sensus communis in the absence of the sensed objects.

(c) The Cogitative Faculty:

In the first place, it should be noted that in his present commentary on the Hayâkil, Ankaravi places the cogitative faculty in the fourth place

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after the faculty of estimation. This may also have been the case in the Persian version, which omits this faculty, although it speaks of "five." Nevertheless, Suhrawardî himself often presents the same order adopted here by Ankaravî, thus placing the cogitative, or what Corbin qualifies, the "active imagination," before the estimative faculty.

As for the location and function of the faculty in question, "it is situated in the middle ventricle of the brain near the vermis process." Its main task is to work on the images and forms stored in the faculty of representation, and thus separate and combine them in various ways. In general it takes on two different roles, depending on its respective functions, one with respect to the intellect (‘aqî), when it is called "cogitative" (mutafakkira), and the other with respect to the estimation (wahm), when it is termed "imaginative" (mutakhayyila). Moreover, at all times and in all

57 l-H. 15b5-6.

58 Hayâkil, p. 87.

59 Corbin, L’Archange Empourpré, p. 113. Since the active imagination would be serving the intellect that has control over it, it would be accordingly termed "intellectual imagination". (Ibid. p. 129, n. 79.)

60 Hermann Landolt, "Suhrawardî’s Tales of Initiation", J.A.O.S. 107 (1987), p. 479. However, Suhrawardî’s Hayâkil and also in his “Risâla fî l’tiqâd al-Ḥukamâ’, (Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques II, p. 269) the hierarchy of the faculties appears to be in the same order as Avicenna’s.

61 Neither Dawwâni nor Ankaravî indicate the location of this faculty. Here we have quoted from Avicenna’s doctrine of al-Nafs which was formulated briefly in his al-Najât and translated by Fazlur Rahman into English. (Avicenna’s Psychology, p. 31.)
conditions, -day and night, awake and asleep- it remains constantly active and in motion without reposing.\textsuperscript{62} Besides, in sorting out certain images and combining them with others, it is able to imagine even nonexistent entities such as "a man who has two wings or a horse without a head and two legs".\textsuperscript{63}

(d) The Estimative Faculty:

Next in the hierarchy of the internal senses comes the faculty of estimation (\textit{wahm}), which resides in the rear part of the middle ventricle of the brain.\textsuperscript{64} As already explained in detail, the estimative faculty, due to its close dependency on the particular "meanings" and "intentions" inherent in the sensible objects, is highly inclined to make judgments, which are, though seemingly acceptable and convincing to itself, yet in most cases in contradiction to the wise decisions of the intellect. In addition to the aforementioned illustration of the wall, Suhrawardī cites at this stage another remarkable example to reinforce the current point. Imagine, he says, a person who stays one night in company with a corpse; such a person would be subject to two disparate states of mind: fear and security. If he acts upon the misleading counsel of his \textit{wahm}, he would experience fear and worry, unless he has given a feeling of security by the prudence

\textsuperscript{62} I-H. 15b6-12; SH-H. pp. 54-55.

\textsuperscript{63} SH-H. p. 53.

\textsuperscript{64} Ankarāvī says: "It is located in the middle of the brain". (I-H. 16a7) In asserting this, he differs both from Dawwānī and Avicenna.
of his intellect. That is why Suhrawardī cautions people not to fall into the pitfalls of their *wahm*, which would lead them eventually to the denial of the existence of the intelligibles as well as the spiritual beings such as heavenly souls and intellects. As far as its function is concerned, it perceives, as stated above, "meanings" or "intentions", not forms, derived from individual objects. It also performs, particularly in man, the additional task of assessing these "meanings" and "intentions", thereby letting him make inferences with reference to the outward appearance of objects, not to their essence.

(e) The Retentive Faculty:

This is situated in the rear ventricle of the brain. Its primary function, as outlined in the *Hayākīl*, is "to recollect the individual incidents (*al-waqā'ī*) and situations (*al-aḥwāl*). The retentive faculty, termed also "memory" and "recollection", acts as a storehouse for "intentions" and "meanings" transmitted from the estimative faculty and retrieves them for it when needed. In terms of the function it performs, according to

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66 *H-N.* p. 52; *I-H.* 15a11-16.

67 *I-H.* 15b1-4; *H-N.* p. 53.


69 *H-N.* p. 53.

70 *I-H.* 15b14-16; *SH-H.* p. 63.
Dawwānī, it is analogous to the representative faculty whose task, as explained before, is to store the "images" and "forms" of the common sense.\textsuperscript{71}

To sum up, each of these internal faculties, invested with a specific function, occupies a distinct location on its own in the brain. Should damage occur to anyone of these locations, Suhrawardī warns, the respective faculty would fail to function, whatever the rest remained intact or not.\textsuperscript{72}

The following diagram can give the reader a clear picture of how these faculties are arranged:

\textbf{The External Senses}
(Touch, Smell, Hearing, Sight and Taste)

\textbf{The Sensory Data}

\textbf{The Internal Senses}
1. Sensus Communis
   Receptive of Sensible Forms,
2. Direct Visualization of sensation
   (Storehouse of the forms and images)
3. Cogitatation
   (Sorting out the formes and images)
   (Contrast, separate and recombine)
4. Estimation
   (Apprehension of "meanings" and "intentions")
   (Judgment in conflict with the intellect)
   (Evaluation and inference)
5. Retention
   (Storehouse of "meanings" and "intentions")
   (Serving for the estimation)

Before concluding this part, it should be pointed out that, in his


\textsuperscript{72} H-N. p. 53.
extensive exposition of the internal senses, Şârîh Dawwânî draws attention to one significant matter. There he notes that in contrast to his present treatise, Hayākil, Suhrawardī in his other works seems to abandon the traditional classification by combining the three faculties, representative (khayāl), cogitative (mutakhayyila or fikriyya) and estimative (wahm) in one single identity. This is most obvious in his magnum opus, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, where he clearly remarks: All these three faculties, though taken conceptually in various descriptions, are in reality one and the same faculty.

4. The Animal Soul

V. It again seems unusual that Suhrawardī’s investigation of the soul vis-à-vis that of the Peripatetics advances in the opposite direction in so far as the present epistle is concerned. The latter group, whose most prominent representative was no doubt Avicenna, who first classified the souls into three, vegetative, animal and rational, later scrutinized them one by one but in a strict order, beginning with the first one, the simplest, and culminating with the last, the most complicated, Suhrawardī, however, has altered this conventional approach in giving precedence to the rational soul, which has already been discussed, then proceeding to set out the

73 SH-H. p. 65.

specifications of the animal soul, which we will now review in the light of Ankaravi's and Dawâni's commentaries.

Animals possess principally two kinds of faculties: (1) that of appetence (shawqiyya), which in turn has two sub-branches, that of desire (shahwâniyya) and that of anger (ghâdabiyya); and (2) that of motion. The task of the faculty of desire is to draw one closer to the things which are beautiful, useful and convenient, while that of anger is to impel one to repulse the things which are ugly, harmful and inconvenient. As to the motive faculty, it causes the physical movement of the limbs.

In addition to all of the above, there are three more faculties, which are common to both animals and vegetables. These are as follows: (1) the nutritive faculty (ghâdiya), whose function is to supply food and substitute it with what has been dissolved; (2) the faculty of growth (al-namâ'), whose task is to enlarge the various parts of the body without which they cannot reach their due perfection, and (3) the reproductive faculty (muwallid) which separates a part from the body out of which it generates another individual body. Moreover, many other supplementary faculties perform some kind of ancillary service to the nutritive faculty. Among them, the following play

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75 This faculty, according to Avicenna, again has two sub-branches: (1) active (fâ'îl) and (2) impulsive (bâ'îtha). The function of the former is "to contract the muscles and to pull the tendons and ligaments towards the starting point of the movement, or to relax them or stretch them so that they move away from the starting point". (Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, p. 26.) The function of the impulsive faculty is twofold: to provoke what is desirable and to repulse what is harmful. (Ibid.)
important roles: attraction (cāzībē), retention (māsīkā), digestion (hādīma), and expulsion (dālī'a), etc.\textsuperscript{76}

All of these faculties, including the perceptive ones, are located wholly in the animal soul or in Suhrawardī's own precise terms, in "the animal spirit" (\textit{al-rūḥ ḥaywānī}), which is a subtle steamy substance (\textit{jirmūn laṭīlūn bukhāriyyun}), generated from "the mixture of the subtle (laṭīn) humours", just as the limbs are made up from the mixture of the dense (kaṭīn) humours.\textsuperscript{77} The animal soul is split into two divisions, one ascending to the brain and thus cooling it, i.e the so-called spiritual soul (\textit{rūḥ nafśānī}); the other moving down through the liver and thus providing it with the nutritive, growth and reproductive faculties, i.e. the so-called natural soul (\textit{rūḥ ṭabīḥī}).\textsuperscript{78}

Next, based on his own notion of "the governing light" (\textit{al-ṣūlṭān al-nūrī}), Suhrawardī somehow develops an intimate relationship between the animal spirit and rational soul. In this context, he says that when the animal spirit has acquired "the governing light" from the rational, it spreads out throughout the body. That is to say, the former circulates and operates in the human body at the behest of the latter.

It is interesting, nevertheless, to note that in Suhrawardī's own

\textsuperscript{76} I-Ḥ. 16a-16b11.

\textsuperscript{77} I-Ḥ. 16b16-17.

\textsuperscript{78} I-Ḥ. 17a2-5. See also SH-Ḥ. p. 78
Persian text of Hayākil, the concept of "al-ṣultān al-nūrī" appears in a somewhat different form as kiswat-i nūr, meaning "the cloak of light", which is, in H. Corbin's view, relatively more exoteric. Similarly Ankaravī, who has no comments on this controversial concept, replaces, without any justification, the term "yaktasiba" (received) as recorded in both Dawwānī's versions and the text of Hayākil al-Nūr as edited Abū Rayyān, with that of "yaktasī" (clothed), which fits exactly the above-mentioned Persian term, "kiswat". This merely shows either that Ankaravī, as noted on several occasions, might have taken as a basis for his commentary the Persian Hayākil, or that the Arabic original text should read "yaktasī" in spite of its printed form as "yaktasiba". However, the last possibility may be easily discarded in so far as the term "yāqbalu", the synonym of "yaktasiba", is recorded in a similar argument in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.

With regard to the significance of this crucial notion of "the governing light", Dawwānī presents two discrete explanations:

By al-ṣultān al-nūrī, is meant the mode of the light which it (the animal spirit) obtains from the soul (i.e. rational soul). By this mode of the light, it is prepared to receive faculties from the Giver of the Forms (wāhib al-ṣuwar). For the relationship of the rational with the

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79 "After having received the cloak of the light from the rational soul..." Hayākil, p. 89.

80 Les Temples, p. 76, n. 16.

81 I-H. 17a1-2; Hayākil, p. 89.

82 H-I. p. 207.
animal soul equips the latter with subtlety and light. Or what is meant by it (i.e. \( al-\text{sultan al-nur} \)) is the animal faculty itself which is ready to receive the other faculties...\(^{83}\)

So in his view, the concept in question comes to denote either "a type of light", receptive to "the so-called faculties" or merely "a separate animal faculty", prepared to accommodate the other faculties. Irrespective of its two possible denotations, its main function, as underlined here, is to prepare the animal spirit to receive the faculties, which are still to this point left unstated, from the Giver of the Forms, viz. the Active Intellect ('\( Aql al-Fad\'al \)). But interestingly enough, Henry Corbin at this juncture has taken the phrase "those faculties" (\( tilka al-quw\)\( a \)) as "those forms" (\( tilka al-\text{\-suwar} \)), partially because he might have been inspired by the notion of "\( w\text{\-}ah\text{\-}ib al-\text{\-}\text{\-}suwar \)" (the Donor of the Forms), a notion which belongs originally to Avicenna.\(^{84}\) Therefore, such an understanding would be valid in so far as Avicenna's epistemology is concerned, according to which all the forms that constitute the foundation of knowledge proceed from the Active Intellect by way of communion (\( itti\text{\-}\text{\-}\text{\-}il \)) between that Intellect and the rational soul. However, this kind of interpretation seems distant from Dawwānī's present intention, which, though not specified, is to indicate that the faculties of both

\(^{83}\) SH-H. p. 78.

\(^{84}\) His rendering of the text is: "Il faut entendre par ce term la modalité de lumière qui est actualisée pour le pneuma depuis l'âme pensante. Par cette modalité, le pneuma devient apte aux formes émanant du Donateur des Formes." (Les Temples, p. 76, n. 16.)
motion and perception, essential to the animal soul, are bestowed upon it by the Giver of the Forms. Meanwhile, Suhrawardî himself in another place designates these faculties as “luminous” (*al-quwā al-nūriyya*) without enumerating them. ⁸⁵

It is interesting to note in this context that Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, another outstanding commentator of the Hayākīl, proposes a somewhat different explanation to Dawwānī’s, one which reads, in Corbin’s French translation, as follows:

L’auteur entend par ce terme la chose (*amr*) qui est le principe des activités. C’est ce qui est reçu de l’immatériel (*mojarrad*) qui est la Lumière... On peut également supposer que l’auteur entend une force vitale qui rend apte à recevoir ce que dispensent les autres énergies de l’âme. Quant à la modalité de lumière dont fait état le commentateur (Davani), elle est ici complètement inopérante. ⁸⁶

Shīrāzī, having ruled out Dawwānī’s exegesis on “*al-sułṭān al-nūrī*” which holds that it is a mode of light, offers two plausible alternative interpretations for it. In the first place, taking inspiration from the famous Qur’ānic verse; “they ask you about the Spirit. Say: The Spirit is (something) from the command (*amr*) of my Lord and of knowledge you have been given but little,” ⁸⁷ Shīrāzī identifies “*al-ṣułṭān al-nūrī*” with the

⁸⁵ *H-I.* p. 207. “This spirit (animal) is the bearer of the luminous faculties”.

⁸⁶ *Les Temples*, p. 76, n. 16.

⁸⁷ Qur’an, 17:85.
"amr" of God. In so doing he wishes to suggest somehow, though not explicitly, the idea of its unknowability. That is to say, it would be a waste of time for a human being, possessed with limited knowledge, to speculate, as does Dawwâni, on the nature of such a delicate entity, which is entirely hidden in God's own treasure. This is the first explanation submitted by Shīrāzī to the concept of al-nūr al-ṣultānī. In the second alternative, he describes it as a "vital power", a power which is able to receive all that the soul disposes for it. In doing so, he seems to draw closer to Dawwâni's second view, viz. that it is an animal faculty. In this sense, the governing light would be, for both commentators, a physical force that puts the animal spirit into operation over the body.

The whole discussion to this point leads us inevitably to one of the most complicated questions, long debated among philosophers as well as mystics in the Muslim world. That is, "what is the relationship between the soul (nafs) and spirit (rūḥ)? Are they identical?"

At first one should admit that it would be impossible to deal with such a complex and difficult question within the limited scope of the present dissertation. Besides, much research on this specific subject has already been carried out by several distinguished scholars. Moreover, one can find both in the Qur'ān and in a variety of collections of the Prophet's

ḥadīths that these two concepts, i.e. "rūḥ" and "nafs" have been sometimes so interchangeably used that it is impossible to distinguish clearly their respective meanings. Roughly speaking, the Qurān, besides the verse narrated above which underscores the unknown aspect of the spirit, refers elsewhere to the souls (anfus) that will be taken away from human beings at death,89 and also to the three stages of the soul's development, i.e. (i) the soul inclined to evil (al-nafs al-ammāra bi'l-sū'),90 (ii) the blaming soul (al-nafs al-lawwāma),91 and (iii) the soul at satisfaction (al-nafs al-muṭma'īnna).92 In view of these two apparently inconsistent usages, one still awaits a tenable answer to the question of which one of them, "rūḥ" or "nafs", will be removed from the body and kept away till the Day of Resurrection.

Ignoring this dilemma for the time being, let us revert to Suhrawardi's own doctrine of the soul. As has been observed, he has so far spoken of the animal spirit (al-rūḥ al-ḥaywānī). But he uses the term "ḥayawān" in the present context not as "a genus", under which all living beings, including men, might be subsumed. It is, in contrast, restricted exclusively to animals per se, as distinguished from vegetables and human beings. And even after

89 Qurān, 39:42.
90 Ibid., 12:53.
91 Ibid., 75:2.
92 Ibid., 89:27.
having been invested with and ennobled by "the governing light", the animal spirit becomes operational, penetrating throughout the body at the prerogative of the rational soul.

Thus regardless of the function that it performs in the human body, the animal spirit, according to Suhrawardi, is different in origin from the rational soul. It is in effect, as he points out in the Hayākil, other than the Divine Spirit (al-rūḥ al-lāhī), which is often referred to in the Prophet's hadith, and as well as the Persian translation indicates, in the Holy Qur'an. On the other hand, he makes it very clear in the Risāla fī Iʿtiqād al-Iṣlāma'ī that the Divine Spirit is nothing less than "the human spirit" (rūḥ al-insān), whose origin is not in this world. It is the rational soul itself, constituted of light from the Lights of God from whom it originally springs and to whom it ultimately returns. So in Suhrawardi's complex terminology, the three concepts, "divine spirit", "human spirit" and "rational soul" are one and the same thing, and are peculiar only to human beings, as opposed to the animal spirit peculiar only to animals.

To reinforce this, Dawwānī repeats the same Qur'anic verse

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93 Hayākil, p. 89.


95 Ibid., p. 268.

96 H-N. p. 52.
above, while Ankaravi makes it more specific by stating that it is “the breath of the Lord” (nefha-i rabbānī) and thereby implies another verse: “When I have made him and breathed unto him of My spirit, do you fall down by prostrating yourselves unto him.”

Furthermore no permanent place or location in this world can be appointed to the rational soul at all, simply because it is a “divine immaterial light” which originates in God and returns to Him, as is indicated in the verse: “O soul! in satisfaction! Return to thy Lord.”

5. The Relation of the Rational Soul to God

VI. Having thus formulated the main characteristics of the rational soul, Suhrawardi next moves on to correct some of the mistaken notions and assumptions with regard to its nature. To begin with, as has been already firmly established, the rational soul, in his view, is a sheer light and has nothing to do with matter and place. In this sense, it may have at least some sort of affinity with God, who is also pure light, immaterial and beyond time and space. But this does not mean that it is identical, as some people have falsely assumed, with God Himself. Nor can it be termed God at all.

97 Qur’ān, 17:85; SH-H. p. 81.


99 I-H. 17b4-5. Hayākil, p. 89. It is significant that Ankaravi, as has been stated on several occasions, seems to depend almost entirely on the Persian translation of Hayākil as the basis for his commentary.
In fact these two, irrespective of their similarity in so many aspects, are absolutely separate from each other.

In the first place, God, Suhrawardī contends, is one, while the souls are multitudinous. The evidence is the fact that the perceptions of two different persons are never alike; if they were, they both would perceive the same reality in exactly the same manner, and hence they would have exactly the same knowledge, which is impossible; these facts prove the multiplicity and diversity, not the unity, of the souls.

At this juncture, Ankaravī intervenes in the discussion by making the somewhat groundless allegation against some of the commentators of the Hayākil al-Nūr, without revealing their names, of having misinterpreted Suhrawardī's intention in claiming that certain people, having once accepted the soul to be immaterial, have named it God.100

O you who seek the infinite lights. You should know that in some of the commentaries of this book it is explicitly mentioned that Şeyh Shihāb al-Dīn's allusive blame here aims at such eminent Muslim Sufī Şeyhs as Bāyazīd al-Bistāmī, Junayd al-Baghdādī, Mevlānā, Abū Saʿīd and the like, who all are the possessors of the (spiritual) powers (zevīl-iktisāb). But in doing so they have indeed committed a grave error and are utterly at fault (galat-i mahz). Assuming such a baseless allegation would mean that thousands of the respected and sincere saints have gone astray from the right path. Again it would imply the denial of Saints' annihilation in God as well as of their realization of the secrets of His unity. As a matter of fact, it was because of this particular reason that this humble person felt compelled to set down the present commentary on this book. For

100 I-H. 17b5-6. Abū Rayyān's edition reads: "they imagined it to be God." (H-N. p. 54)
each of these sultans (i.e. Sufi Masters) is in effect a true Divine Sage and also a King of limitless secrets.  

In the succeeding lines, Anšaravī expresses once again his fidelity to the path of these eminent mystic gnostics and asks somewhat sarcastically how those anonymous commentators, whose inconsistent theories which in effect resemble the web of a spider, could vilify people who distinguished themselves with the profound knowledge of the hidden realities?

Having said so, Anšaravī commences to paraphrase a number of remarkable sayings and couplets, articulated usually in a state of rapturous ecstasy, by several renowned mystic saints, some of whom were executed for those theopathic utterances. Among them, he cites first the following statement: "there is naught inside my cloak except God." This he wrongly attributes to Junayd al-Baghdādī's, which was in reality uttered by Abū Saʿīd ibn Abī al-Khayr (d.1049). The same exclamation, continues Anšaravī, is recounted with some additional variation in the work entitled Yūsuf-

101 I-H. 17b9-18a1.

102 Cf. "The parable of those who take protectors other than Allah is that of the Spider who builds (to itself) a house but truly the flimsiest of houses is the Spider's house if they but knew". (Qur'ān, 29:41)

103 I-H. 18a1-2.

Zuleyha by Hamdi Celebi, the son of the renowned Aksemsettin: "The world is the rays of the light of God/ In the cloak of the existence there is nothing besides God." Then comes Bayazid-i Bistami’s notorious utterance: "Glory to me! How great is my Majesty! There is no deity save me, therefore worship me." Next follows Mansur al-Hallaj’s astonishing proclamation: "I am the Truth". Finally, Ankaravi quotes the following verses:

The vessel is subtle and fine, so is the wine,
They look like each other, the matter then is intricate,
It looks as if it is only wine without a vessel,
Or as if it is only a vessel without wine.

I am the one whom I love, and the one whom I love is me,
We are two spirits incarnated in our body,
When you see us, you will also see him,
When you see him, you will see us too.

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105 I-H. 18a11
106 I-H. 18a12-13
108 This couplet was wrongly attributed by Ankaravi to the Sufi Seyh Junayd; it in fact belongs to the eminent poet Abu Nuwas who died around 200/815; see, Ghazali, Le Tabernacle Des Lumières (Michkât al-Anwâr), trans. by Roger Deladrière (Paris: Editions Du Seuil, 1981), p. 104, n. 52. Ankaravi also gives its Persian version in his commentary, 18a16-17. Nevertheless, Junayd too articulated a statement to this effect: "The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel containing it." (Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism, p. 159.)

109 I-H. 18b1-2. This verse of al-Hallaj is found in his Divan with a slight difference in the personal endings in the second part of it: "when you see me, you see also him; when you see him, you see me as well. See, Husayn Mansur Hallaj, Le Divan D'al-Hallaj, ed. and trans. by Louis Massignon
Ankaravi admits that to the adherents of discursive philosophy, who rely only on pure reasoning, these verses and the like may appear, at least outwardly, to be suggesting both the incarnation (ňulûl) and unification (ittiňâd) of the soul with God. However, this is not the case for the people of vision or intuition (eshâb-I şûhûd), for they, in contrast to the rational thinkers, comprehend them not simply in their literal sense. In the eyes of these people, mystical expressions such as these connote neither of those notions, i.e. "ňulûl" or "ittiňâd", both of which pose danger to the unmitigated unity of God,110 for the former would cause alteration (mugãyeret) in His Essence, while the latter would yield duality (isniyyet).111

On the other hand, according to the mystics, continues Ankaravi, all things that exist besides God, are the appearance or rather phenomena of the names; and all the names are the manifestations of the essence (zâl) and of the attributes; yet the names represent neither the essence nor something other than the essence. However, since the name is nothing other than what it denotes, it may be identified with the essence itself.112

At this point, Ankaravi, who avoids giving any further account with

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110 I-H. 18b12-17.
111 I-H. 18b17-19a1.
112 I-H. 19a2-4.
respect to the nature of the relationship between the names and the things named, refers us to some of his other writings such as Miṣbāḥu’l-Esrār and Cenāḥū’l-Ervāh,¹¹³ both of which, he claims, furnish an adequate explanation of this matter.¹¹⁴

In the Miṣbāḥu’l-Esrār, a mystical treatise devoted to the interpretation of the famous Qur’anic verse known as āyat al-nūr (verse of light), Anḵaravi defines light along similar lines as do Ghazālī in his Mishkāt al-Anwār and Suhrawardī in Hayākil al-Nūr. There he declares that “the light is the cause of the appearance of the names that represent the essence, attributes, actions and the true natures of the beings“.¹¹⁵ Thanks to the light, things become visible and known. By means of such an analogy, he wants to show implicitly that what the Sufi perceives in external reality are not things themselves nor their true essences but rather their manifestation through the radiation of the light. In other words, two things, (i) God and (ii) whatever things exist other than He should be demarcated sharply from each other. In the eyes of the Sufis, what is absolutely real is the former, while the latter are merely the phenomena. On no ground can these two separate entities be united nor indwelt into each other.

¹¹³ See for their bibliographic descriptions, Part One, Chapter II, Anḵaravi’s works, pp. 41, 44.

¹¹⁴ I-H. 19a5-6.

¹¹⁵ Anḵaravi, Miṣbāḥu’l-Esrār, Biblioteca Vaticana, MS. no. 137/1, folio. 2, lines. 31-2.
Despite this, says Ankaravi, some of the prominent theologians and traditionalists (ehlul'-usul), attempted to flatly reject the profound expressions of the Sufi masters (mesayih) on account of the fact that they smack of hulul and ittihad. Among them, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, for instance, has formulated the following argument:

If two things are united, in such a union, then either both must be simultaneously everlasting (baki) or temporal (fani), or one of them; must be everlasting and the other temporal. If they both were everlasting, then there would arise a duality between them, in that case they would not become united. If both, in contrast, were temporal, (which is impossible) since God is absolutely everlasting, then again no union would take place between them. On the other hand, if one of them were everlasting and the other temporal, in the same manner, they would not become united at all, because an existing being cannot be a non-existing one. This is (the argument) for the rejection of union (ittihad). As for the incarnation (hulul), it is taken by those who repudiate it in the sense of nuzu. The dweller (hul) means the descending (nuzu), while the bearer (mahal) is the abode (mekan) of the dweller. So every dweller either needs a bearer or not. If it is in need of a bearer, then it would not deserve to become the Necessary Existent (Vacibull-Vucud). If it needs not, it would be exempt from being a bearer. Therefore, hulul and ittihad are false. No doubt that the doctrines of hulul and ittihad as well as of tenasuh (transmigration) are groundless and unacceptable not only to the intellect but also to the Scripture.116

Against Razi’s above assertion, Ankaravi contends that when the words of the mesayih are taken in their profound context rather than in their bare appearance, it will be discerned that none of them smack of either of

these two concepts, ǧulūl and ittiḥād. And again he emphasizes that each of those expressions requires a deeper understanding and interpretation. Although it would have been possible for him, he argues, to put forward numerous proofs for both philosophers and theologians, in order to show the concealed meanings of these words, he avoids doing so and instead prefers to let his master, Mevlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī speak for him:

If the intellect could discern the true way in this question, Fakhri Rāzī would be an adept in religious mysteries; But since he was (an example of the saying that) whosoever has not tasted does not know, His intelligence and imagination (only) increased his perplexity...

When expounding Suhrawardī’s statement that reads that “God is one, yet the souls are various” Ankaravī at once comes to grips with the question of whether the rational soul is identical with God or not, a question that again directly concerns the Sufis’ rapturous expressions, especially Ḥallāj’s exclamation, "I am the Truth". Ankaravī’s intent at this juncture is mainly to prove that the words of the meşāyiḥ would not endanger at all the unity of God.

According to him, these superior people, i.e., the Sufis, do not assert

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that the rational soul is identical with the Truth (Haḵ); neither do they claim that it is separable from It. But they consider it rather "a sheer Divine light" (pūr nūr-i Raḥmānī) and "a breath from the Glorious Majesty" (neṭha-i Subḥānī). So, for them, the soul in its essence is not distinct from the Truth.\textsuperscript{118}

On the other hand, Anḵaravī maintains that the multiplicity (kesreṭ) of the souls, in contrast to what some people allege, never involves any defect or flaw in God's essence. Multiplicity as such can be better understood in the parable of a man standing in front of several mirrors and seeing himself in manifold images there. But, despite his multiple representations, he is still one and the same person, because what is reflected in those mirrors is not his essence, which is one, but his image, which appears multiple.\textsuperscript{119} By the same token, from the rays of the sun, which shine over many houses, it cannot be inferred that the sun is multiple. Nor can it be said that the rays reflected in those houses do not effuse from the sun. Nor even can it be claimed that the light shed on one particular house is different from the light on another. All in all, the multitudeness of the rays posits no multiplicity in the sun.\textsuperscript{120}

Finally all of these arguments lead Anḵaravī to another question

\textsuperscript{118} I-H. 20a2-4.

\textsuperscript{119} I-H. 20a5-6.

\textsuperscript{120} I-H. 20a7-10.
raised in Suhrawardī’s statement: “The souls are multitude, because what Zaid perceives is different from what ‘Amr does.” In reply to this, Anḵaravī writes:

That the soul is one does not necessarily entail that all men should partake in the same perception, because God the Almighty, the Lord of men, has granted perception and knowledge to them in accordance with their aptitudes. Therefore, it is not possible for someone to perceive in exactly the same way that another perceives. It is nevertheless true that every one can perceive what others can but on different levels, because each individual possesses on his own a different body and a different power of estimation and imagination, and he may happen to be in a different occupation and position towards the luminosity and darkness and so on. So all of these may of course become a hindrance to accurate perception. Therefore, one’s perception is not the same or identical with that of others.121

So, for Șânīḥ Anḵaravī, the diversity of perceptions cannot form the basis for the claim that souls are myriad. The diversity as such is due not to the multitude of souls, but rather to the varying degrees of the powers of imagination and estimation that people possess as well as the accidental situations they are in. All may play a considerable part—positively or negatively—in the process of perception. In some cases all these elements may even constitute to certain extent what Anḵaravī calls "a thick veil" for the seer. The more he removes the veil from his eyes, the more he increases his power of perception.122

121 I-H. 20b2-9.
122 I-H. 20b9-10.
Sâriḥ Dawwānī likewise finds Suhrawardī's aforementioned argument too weak for the simple reason he believes that the diversity of perceptions arises out of the tools (al-ālāt), namely the external and internal senses, as well as their limitations, and not because of the multiplicity of souls. Strictly speaking, all perceptions are dependent upon those tools. Certain tools produce certain perceptions, and because some perceptions require a variety of tools, perceptions may vary in their content. 123

Thus one may infer from the arguments which both commentators have set forth that, although people do differ in perception, they, however, may partake in one and the same rational soul. But whereas Dawwānī stops short of stating this explicitly. Anḵaravī, by contrast, approaching the issue strictly from a Sufi standpoint, takes an overt position in support of the oneness of the soul by quoting a verse from the Qur'ān: "O! People. Fear your Lord who created you from one soul." 124 Immediately after this, however, he acknowledges that his investigation may fall short of proving the unity of the souls. Therefore, without prolonging the discussion, he wants to conclude it with the couplet: “The animal spirit is myriad/ The

123 SH-H. pp. 82-3.

human soul is one.\textsuperscript{125}

In parallel to the issue of the unity of the souls, An\char26\char19aravi\char26 once again draws our attention to Suhraward\char26's words: If the rational soul were one, as they proclaimed, then the physical faculties of the body would seize "the Lord of Lords" and control It\textsuperscript{126}. By this statement, he says, the philosophers aim directly at the utterances of the me\char26\char19ay\char26 such as "I am the Truth", "Glory to Me! How great is my Majesty!", and "There is nothing under my cloak except God". The real obscurity lies in this very simple question: who utters such exclamations? who is "ana" (I), for instance, in \char26\char19alla\char26's expression of "ana'li-\char26\char19haqq"? According to An\char26\char19aravi\char26, it was definitely the Truth Itself which made them utter those expressions. This can be better illustrated by the example of a coin whose middle part remains in the flames of the fire until it gets fully red. When taken out from the fire, if it could cry out, it would utter: "I am the Fire" (Ana al-N\char26\char19). And its utterance would be real to a certain extent, though its essence has not become entirely that of fire. Likewise, he proceeds, when the me\char26\char19ay\char26 are completely drowned in the manifestation of God, at that stage, anything that issues forth from them emanates directly from God.\textsuperscript{127} After all, this is indeed an extraordinary state and exceptionally unusual mystical experience.

\textsuperscript{125} I-H. 20b12-15.

\textsuperscript{126} I-H. 20b16; H-N. p.55.

\textsuperscript{127} I-H. 21a5-11.
that can be discerned and at best appreciated by only those who attain it.\footnote{128}

In continuing his analysis of the second Temple, Ankaravi, based on his failure of understanding correctly the text, finds inconsistency in Suhrawardi's two statements with regard to the nature of the rational soul. While on the one hand Suhrawardi holds that the soul is an immaterial substance, he on the other hand implies that it may be captured and controlled by the physical faculties of the body. These two statements, however, cannot be reconciled, since an immaterial entity in no way falls under the dominion of the material. Thus according to Ankaravi, it would seem that Suhrawardi has confused the function of the animal spirit, which has a direct access to the body and its organs, with the rational soul which dominates and governs them.\footnote{129} However, this is not the case, simply because Suhrawardi's intent at this point, contrary to Ankaravi's reading, is to show those identifying the soul with God that, despite their immaterial nature, the former, as opposed to the latter, are multiple and variable in its actions due to its affiliation with the physical perceptive faculties.

6. Is the Rational Soul pre-eternal?

\textbf{VII}. In the last part of this Temple, Shih\=ab al-Din Suhrawardi deals
mainly with two critical, inter-related questions about the rational soul. First, is it a part of God? Second, is it pre-eternal (qadîm)? In the first place, he firmly states that, as opposed to what certain people assert, the rational soul is not a part of God because the latter, as an utterly immaterial Being, can suffer no division or partition in His Essence. Not only is the soul distinct from God, it is also, again unlike Him, not pre-eternal.

Both Ibn Sīnā and Suhrwardī argue that the soul is indivisible and that it is, nevertheless, not pre-eternal; on the contrary it is originated simultaneously together with the body. Therefore, body is the principle of individuation (mummayyiz) which accounts for the apparent multiplicity of souls.

However, for Anḵaravi, there is nothing wrong in considering the rational soul to be part of God, provided that the former should be taken as a light effused from the latter, which is the absolute Light.¹³⁰

On the other hand, Anḵaravi opposes the idea of the creation of the soul concurrently with the body on the basis of the Qur'ān and ḥadîths of the Prophet. Yet far from bringing any concrete evidence from these two sources, he rather takes it for granted that it is undoubtedly true that "the creation of the souls took place thousands years before that of the bodies or even that of the heavens (esmān) and earth (zêmîn)".¹³¹

¹³⁰ I-H. 21b15.
¹³¹ I-H. 22b1-2.
In doing so, Ankaravi seeks to form, though by no means explicitly, a scriptural ground for the pre-existence of the soul. This becomes more obvious when he speaks of the concept of pre-eternity within the framework of the medieval Muslim philosophers. The notion of eternity, he says, is generally looked at in one of two ways. According to the first one, it is attributed to that which has no first cause, like the Necessary Being (vācibûl-vûcûd), which is eternal (ezelî). Eternal in turn denotes that which has no beginning nor ending. According to the second interpretation, eternity is ascribed to that which has no beginning in time such as intellects, rational souls, heavenly souls, spheres, planets, stars, the four elements, and so on. These are also designated as "beings generated in essence" (muḥdath al-dhâtî). In the terminology of the philosophers, the term "muḥdath" is said of something, which is preceded by time.132 Then the rational soul, like intellects and some other heavenly bodies, exists in pre-eternity, simply because it is not originated in time.

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132 I-H. 22b2-8. "Something eternal would be either in essence or in time. Eternal in essence is something that has for its essence no beginning by which it comes into existence. Eternal with respect to time means something that has no beginning for itself in time. Similarly, temporal (muḥdath) is of two kinds: one of them is the thing that has a beginning by which it exists; the other is the thing that has a beginning in time..."(Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, pp. 532-33.) In brief, eternal would be: 1) eternal in essence, 2) eternal in time; finite would be: 1) finite in essence 2)finite in time.
CHAPTER SIX
THE THIRD TEMPLE

I. Rational modes (of describing existence) are of three kinds: necessary, possible and impossible. Necessary is said of the one whose existence is of necessity. Impossible is said of the one whose non-existence is of necessity. Possible is said of the one whose existence and non-existence are not of necessity.

II. Possible becomes either necessary or impossible by virtue of another. The cause is that which necessitates the existence of another. Possible cannot become existent by itself; if for instance it necessitated the existence of itself, it would become necessary, not possible. In that case, it (i.e., possible) needs a cause that preponderates its existence over its non-existence. Once the cause is fully complete, then the caused comes into existence without any delay.\(^1\) All things that condition the existence of a thing are determining factors in the causality of that thing,\(^2\) whether they be will, time, place, conjunction and receptive substratum or other than this. Should the cause not exist completely or should one or more parts of it be lacking, the thing caused does not come into existence. Therefore, once all the required conditions are fulfilled and all the redundant ones eliminated, the existence of a thing would become

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\(^1\) Here I prefer Corbin's translation, which I find more suitable than the others. For example, in one of two modern Turkish translations, it is rendered: "When the cause is completed, the existence of the maker of the cause does not change." (Ülken, "Şehâbeddin Sühreverdî, Nur Heykelleri," in Türk Feylesofîanı Antolojisi I, p. 68. In the other, the rendering is similar to Corbin's: "once the cause is completed, the caused one which is necessitated by the former, comes into being." (Yetkin, Nur Heykelleri, 1988 ed., p. 12.) In the printed Ottoman translation, however, it reads: "when the cause has been completed, the existence of the caused does not differ from that cause." (Ziyâ, Hayâkilü'n-Nûr, p. 583.)

\(^2\) H-N. p. 57, n. 7.
The Rational Modes

1. At the very outset, I should like to note that throughout the whole chapter, İsmail Ankaravi makes no substantial comment of his own but merely renders the text as literally as possible into Ottoman Turkish. In spite of this, I will refer to his translation, whenever the occasion demands.

To begin with, it is a well-known fact that it was Avicenna who, for the first time in the history of Islamic philosophy, developed "a new kind of cosmological theory" based on these three metaphysical notions: necessary, possible (contingent) and impossible. This theory was systematically devised in an attempt to prove the existence of God and differed a great deal in its distinctive style and content from the other two celebrated theories, the "cosmological" and the "ontological".  

Suhrawardî, clinging to Avicenna’s terminology, here articulates these three modes in his own terms rather than in those of the latter. First of all, he maintains, like the latter, that necessary (wājib), impossible (mumtani’) and possible (or contingent) (mumkin) are mental modes (jihāt). Among

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3 H-N. pp. 57-8; I-H. 23a3-6, 14-5, 16, 23b4-6, 12-4; SH-H. pp. 96-103; Les Temples, pp. 46-7; Hayâkil, p. 91.

them the first one is attributed to something whose existence (wujūd) is necessary, the second to that whose non-existence (‘adam) is necessary, and the last to that whose existence and non-existence are not necessary.\(^5\)

In Anḵaravī’s simple language, “necessary” is said of something whose existence is certainly necessary, and “impossible” is said of something which has no existence at all like “the partner of God” (ṣerīk-i bān).\(^6\) It is surprising, in this case, that while he illustrates the mode of impossible with the notion of a “partner of God”, he seems to avoid, at least in the present context, qualifying God as necessary. He might have been hesitant, for whatever reason, to characterize God in the terminology of the philosophers.

II. As for the mode of possible, it is defined by Suhrawardī as something which is necessary or impossible by virtue of something else. The word “something else” becomes more clear and meaningful in Anḵaravī, when it is substituted with the notion of “cause” (sebeb). Possible

\(^5\) H-N. p. 57. These primary concepts, according to Avicenna, though not strictly definable, can be, nevertheless, conceivable to us by means of “a designation (ism) or clue (‘alāma). (Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt I, p. 29.) Thus he explains them first in the terminology of logic: “Necessary signifies the perpetuity of existence, impossible the perpetuity of nonexistence, and possible signifies no perpetuity of existence and nonexistence”. (Idem, al-Najāt, p. 29). In metaphysics, however, he stresses particularly the term “necessary” and thus invests it with much the same meaning as Suhrawardī does in the present context: “Necessary denotes certitude of existence. And existence is conceived better than nonexistence.” (Ibid, Ilāhiyyāt I, p. 36.)

\(^6\) I-H. 23a8-9.
existence would become necessary existence by virtue of the existence of another, which is called a "cause". It is again this cause by virtue of which a thing could be non-existent. In other words, the possible, as Anḳaravī sees it, comes into existence out of non-existence by virtue of that cause. And when this cause disappears, it turns back to the state of non-existence from that of existence. So, cause by itself implies an existent being. The existence of the cause necessitates the existence of something else.

On the other hand, possible existence is not existent of itself, for, if it necessitated the existence of itself, it would no longer be possible, but wholly necessary. Hence, it demands something that enables it to exist, or as Suhrawardī puts it, something that gives preponderance to its existence over its non-existence. This means that the cause that brings it into existence cannot be possible, otherwise, it would lead to a vicious circle. Consequently, it should be dependent on a cause which is necessary by itself.

In the next stage of his argument, Suhrawardī examines "the relationship between the cause and the caused." In any causal process, there are some conditions and elements which play an essential role. Among them, Suhrawardī cites the following: will (irāda), time (waqt), place

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8 H-N. p. 57.

9 I-H. 23b2-3.
(makān), conjunction (muqārin) and receptive substratum (maḥall qābil). When the cause is complete, those conditions fulfilled and the impediments removed, the thing caused immediately and necessarily comes into existence.¹⁰

Ṣāriḥ Dawwānī provides a good explanation of what receptive substratum means. A substratum is receptive of something by whose existence it becomes existent. Strictly speaking, a substratum would become necessarily existent by virtue of the existence of what it receives. This may be more clearly seen in the reciprocal relationship between matter (al-hayūlā) and form (al-ṣūrah). The former occupies the position of recipient of the latter. That is to say, the existence of matter becomes necessary through the existence of form.¹¹


¹¹ SH-H. p. 102.
I. It is not admissible that two (different) things be necessary with regard to existence, for, in this case, both of them would become partners in the necessity of existence. This therefore requires that between the two there should be a separating factor on which the existence of either one or both of them would depend. Yet that which is dependent on something is (only) contingent being. If (on the other hand) there is no separating factor between them, then they are not two different things but only one thing.¹

II. Bodies and (accidental) forms are multiple, whereas, as we have shown, the Necessary Existent is one. (Since they are multitude) they cannot be necessarily existent but contingent and they all need a preponderating agent, which is the Necessary Existent by virtue of Itself.² The Necessary Existent is not composed of parts; otherwise it would be caused by them. Moreover, these quasi-compounding parts cannot be necessary, because, as we have already explained, as far as existence is concerned, there cannot be two different Necessary Existents at the same time.

III. An attribute is not necessary by itself; if it were so, it would not be in need of a substratum. Thus the Necessary Existent is not a substratum for attributes. Neither is it possible for It to bring those attributes into existence in Itself, for the thing which is one cannot be affected by Itself. When we move one of our limbs, the agent (fā'il) that moves it is one thing,³ and the recipient (qābil) is another thing.⁴ But the Necessary Existent is absolutely one in every


² "Bi dhātihi" (by virtue of itself) which exists in ms. B of H-N. (p. 59, n. 4), appears in Anḵarāvī as "li dhātihi" (I-H. 24b8.)

³ i.e. intellect. (Les Temples, p. 48.)

⁴ i.e., limb. (Ibid.)
respect.\footnote{H-N. pp. 59-60; I-H. 24b6-8, 11-12, 13, 15, 17-25a1, 6-7, 8-9, 12; SH-H. pp. 113-17; Hayākīl, pp. 92-93.}

Out of two opposites, the one which is nobler belongs to Him (viz. the Necessary Existent).\footnote{Persian translation (Hayākīl, p. 93, l. 7.) and ms. B of H-N. (p. 60, n. 6.) insert here: "Because He is the giver of the full perfection." See for another connotation of the same statement, Suhrawardī, \textit{Kalimat al-Taṣawwuf}, in Three Treatises by the Master of Illumination (\textit{Sa Risāla az Shaykh-i Ishrāq}), ed. N. Gholi Ḥabībī (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1397/1977), p. 98.} How could it be possible for someone, who is deficient, to confer perfection upon the one who is perfect? Anything that involves plurality such as partition and composition is impossible for the Necessary Existent. It is the Truth who has no opposite nor peer to Himself. He cannot be related to anywhere. To Him belongs the supreme Glory, the most complete Perfection, the most exalted Nobility, and the most intensive Light. He is not an accident, for it would then need a bearer by which His existence subsists. Neither is He a substance, for He would partake along with the other substances in (the nature of) substantiality and need something that particularized Him. It is the bodies that signify Him by their diversified forms. Had the bodies not particularized them, there would have been no diversity at all in their shapes, magnitudes, forms, accidents and movements, and none even in the stages and orders of the chief elements of the universe. Had the corporeality necessitated the forms of the bodies, then the forms would not have been diverse but rather identical with one another in those bodies.\footnote{H-N. p. 60; I-H. 25b1-2, 6-7, 10-14, 16-17, 26a1-4; SH-H. pp. 117-122; Hayākīl, pp. 93-94.}

IV. All bodies (\textit{ajsām}) participate in corporeality, yet they differ from one another in enlightenment\footnote{"According to the light they do or do not receive." (Les Temples, p. 49.)} This means that the light is an accident in the bodies, and the luminosity of the bodies is their manifestation. Since the accidental light is subsistent in something
else and existent not for itself, it is not manifest to itself. Were it to subsist by itself, it would become light to itself (and manifest to itself, and also it would become cognizant of its essence).

V. Our rational souls are manifest to themselves; that is why they are subsistent lights. We have explained that they are originated (hādīth) and that they need definitely a preponderant principle and that they cannot come into existence through bodies, because one thing cannot bring into existence another thing, which is nobler than itself. Therefore, their preponderant principle must be an immaterial light. If this light is the Necessary Existent, then this is exactly what is desired. If, on the other hand, it is not so, in any case it the accidental light subsists by something else and does not exist by itself, it is called manifest.

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9 Dawrānī’s commentary reads: “and does not exist by itself” (SH-H. p. 123), whereas Corbin’s French translation reads: "and does not exist by itself for itself". (Les Temples, p. 49) It is rendered in the Persian version as "its existence does not belong to itself." (Hayākil, p.94, l. 7.)

10 Ańkarāvī’s text reads (I-H. 26a15): "it is manifest to its essence", which is in stark contrast to all the other editions. In SH-H (p. 123) it reads: "it is not manifest in essence" (fa layṣa zāhir al-dhāt), whereas in H-N. (p. 61) it appears as: "it is not manifest by indication" (fa layṣa zāhir al-dalālat). The latter is probably a misreading for "zāhir an idhātīhī". The Persian version has "zāhir-i khūd". H. Ziya Ülken, however, who partially rendered Hayākil al-Nūr into modern Turkish script, seems to have committed a grave mistake in the interpretation of this phrase: "Arizi olan nur, başkasi ile kaim olduğu ve vücudu kendisile olimadiği için zahir demektir." (Since the accidental light subsists by something else and does not exist by itself, it is called manifest.) (Idem, "Şehābeddin Sühreverdi, Nur Heykelleri," p. 60.)

11 The phrase in brackets is missing in H-N probably by mistake.

12 "Anwārun qā'imatur bi nafṣihā" (self-subsistent lights). (Les Temples, p. 49.)

13 See above in the Second Temple.

14 "They have a beginning in time". (Les Temples, p. 49.)

15 Corbin renders: "Our problem has been resolved." (Les Temples, p. 49.)

16 I-H. (26b12), Hayākil (p. 95) and Les Temples (p. 49) read: "If it is the possible being", which is also accurate and appropriate to the context.
chain of causes) will end with the Necessary Existent, the Living and Subsistent.  

VI. Soul is a living and subsistent entity; and thus it signifies the Living and Self-subsistent. The Self-subsistent is manifest {to its own essence}. It is the Light of Lights, free from both bodies and all those (things) which are affiliated with them. And It is concealed because of its utter manifestness.

VII. The One in every respect is so unique that in Its Essence It never permits any plurality, engendered by diverse motives and wills all of which not only necessitate plurality but also demand a cause, as do the bodies. Therefore, Its direct action must be necessarily one. (If there were two,) the demand of the one from the two different things would be distinct from that of the other. In that case, there would eventually arise multiplicity without there being any intermediary in the exigency of two different things. Therefore, the first which is necessitated by the first would be also one without having any plurality in itself. It is not a body that involves diverse forms, neither is it a form that requires a substratum, nor is it a soul that needs a body. But on the contrary, it is self-subsistent and cognizant of itself as well as of its Creator.

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18 "Lidhāthihi", which exists in I-H. (26b16) and appears as "bidāthīhi" in SH-H. (p. 127). In Les Temples (p. 49) it reads: "it is essentially manifest by itself to itself."

19 "It" in the Arabic text appears to be "huwa" not "hiya"; therefore, it refers to directly the Necessary Existent, not the soul.


21 "Self-subsistent substance". (I-H. 27a15; SH-H. p. 132; Hayākil, p. 95, l. 8; Les Temples, p. 50.)

VIII. It is the first (originated) light\textsuperscript{23}, and nothing is nobler than that light, to which all contingent beings finally return. It is a substance, which is possible in itself and necessary by virtue of the First (i.e. God). Its relation to the First as well as its vision of the Glory\textsuperscript{24} of the First results in another sanctified substance. In contemplating both its own contingency and deficiency in respect to the First Grandeur, it gives rise to (the existence of) one other heavenly body. Similarly, the second sanctified substance, in its turn, by contemplating the one above itself generates another immaterial substance, and by contemplating its own deficiency a heavenly body. (And this process thus goes on) as far as the sanctified immaterial and intelligible substances multiply, as do the simple celestial as well as terrestrial bodies too.\textsuperscript{25}

IX. The sacred intelligible substances, though they are (independently and constantly) active, serve, nevertheless, as mediators for the generosity of the First (Light), which in turn becomes active by them. Just as the stronger light prevents the weaker one from illuminating independently, the Necessary Predominant Might, because of Its abundant effusion and perfect power, does not equally permit the mediators to become independent. So, It remains beyond the infinity, and It is by itself out there in every (new) state and affair.\textsuperscript{26}

X. You must know that the worlds are three in number.\textsuperscript{27} (1) The

\textsuperscript{23} French translation adds this: "without an intermediary", which exists in none of the versions of the \textit{Hayākil}. (Les Temples, p. 50.)

\textsuperscript{24} "Jalālihi". But \textit{I-H}. (27b6) gives "jamālihi" (His Beauty). \textit{Hayākil} has both. (p. 95, l. 14.)

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{H-N}. p. 63. See also with slight textual variation, \textit{I-H}. 27a16-17, 27b5-10; \textit{SH-H}. pp. 133-4; \textit{Hayākil}, p. 95.


\textsuperscript{27} Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī claims that the number of the world, according to Suhrawardi, and his Ishraqi as well as Sufi followers, is four, and that for the majority of the philosophers it is three. He enumerates four kinds of worlds as follows: 1) the world of intellects, separated from the bodies. 2) the world of bodies, which encircles the Spheres and elements. 3) the world of Souls attached to the celestial as well as elemental bodies. 4) the world
first one is what the philosophers call "world of Intellect" (ʻĀlam al-ʻAql). Intellect, in their terminology, is a substance which remains beyond the sensory designation. As such it exercises no control over the bodies. (2) The (second one is the) world of the Soul (ʻĀlam al-Nafs). The rational soul, though it is neither a body nor any dimension, (certainly) exercises control over the world of bodies. The rational souls are divided into, (i) those which act in the heavens, and (ii) those which act in human species. (3) The (third one is the) world of bodies. It also is divided into (i) the ethereal world (athîrîn), and (ii) the world of elements (ʻunṣûrîn). 28

XI. Among the dominant lights, namely the intellects, there is one which is our father, the lord of the theurgy of our species and the donor of our souls as well as the consummator of their both theoretical and practical perfection. This is the Holy Spirit or in the language of the philosophers, the Active Intellect. All of these dominant intellects are the divine immaterial lights. The First Intellect is the first on which rests the existence 29 and upon which illuminates the light of the First. 30 While descending, the intellects continue to redouble and multiply (their numbers) along with the increasing illuminations.

XII. As for the other intermediary intellects, in terms of causality and their intermediate position, they all are nearer to us; however, amongst them the remotest one is the nearest because of the intensity of its manifestness. So, the nearest of all is the Light of lights. Do you not see that out of (two different colours) black and white on one and the same surface, only white appears closer to us, for it corresponds most to the manifestation? The First Light stands
at the highest height and at the nearest nearness. Glory be to the
One who is at the remotest remoteness with respect to His rank, but
He is at the nearest nearness with respect to His penetrating light of
infinite intensity.31

XIII. The First (Being) as a preponderant principle is perpetual and
always necessitates whatever is other than Itself. Accordingly, Its act
of preponderance constantly perseveres because of the necessity of
Its existence. As to the contingents, they are altogether dependent
on nothing else than It. Moreover, there was nothing prior to them
but only It (i.e., the First). It is dependent upon neither time nor
condition, -as is the case (for instance) with our own actions, which
we may delay, say for instance, until Thursday, or subordinate to the
condition of the arrival of Zaid or that of the availability of an
instrument- because none of these (conditions) was there before the
contingents. The First, the Almighty, is in no way changeable, for,
otherwise this would make Him desire something, which in fact He
does not, or render Him potent, when He was never not so
(impotent). Once you know that the rays radiate from the Sun, not
the Sun from the rays and that the rays persevere by the perpetuity
of the Sun, then you must never wonder at how the Truth (God)
takes care of justice. So, what sort of damage can the Sun suffer
from the perpetuity of its rays and the constancy of the small
particles in its light?32

1. The Attributes of God

I. Having borrowed the concept of Necessary Existent (Wājib al-
Wujūd) from Avicenna, who originally devised it to serve a fundamental
function in his proof of the existence of God, Suhrawardī proceeds to
analyze the same concept within the framework of his illuminative

31 H-N. pp. 65-6; I-H. 29a4-7, 12-14, 17-29b1, 4-5, 6, 9-10; SH-H. pp.
137, 140, 142-143; Hayākil, pp. 96-97.

32 H-N. pp. 66-7; I-H. 29b12-13, 16-17, 30a1-2, 5, 7-8, 10-11, 13-14;
philosophy. His analysis, which has its sources again in the thought of Avicenna, outlines the essential descriptive “features” of that notion. He initially seeks to establish the oneness of the Necessary Existent, and hence God, based on several hypotheses.

The argument which Suhrawardī puts forward for the uniqueness of the Necessary Existent runs as follows: if we imagine that two separate entities were to share in the same necessity of existence simultaneously, then without doubt there would have to be a distinguishing element (fāriq), or in terms of logic a differentia, (faṣl) between them. But this will lead us eventually to the unavoidable conclusion that the existence of either one or both of them would be dependent upon this differentiating factor, which is impossible, simply because, in such a case, neither of them would any longer be necessary but contingent. Therefore, the Necessary Existent is solely one.

Such an argument, which takes at least its mains features again from Avicenna,33 is not adequate, according to Ankarāvī, to prove the oneness

33 Avicenna has dedicated a chapter exclusively to the oneness of the Necessary Being in his enormous work, al-Shifā', Ilāhiyyāt I, under the chapter entitled “on that the Necessary Being is One”. Therein he, after having eliminated various possible assumptions about the nature of the Necessary Being, has arrived at the conclusion that God as a Necessary Being by virtue of Himself is absolutely one. In addition to this, in the following parts of the same book, he also derives from an extensive analysis of the same concept a number of traits of God such as simple, incorporeal, pure intellect, truth, most beautiful, etc. (See, idem, Ilāhiyyāt I, pp. 43-54.)
of God, for it has been forcibly deduced from philosophers' malicious doubts and fanciful imaginations, which are not immune to confusion and blunder. It would even be worthless as a proof, he stresses, for the people who have already attained the vision of the Necessary Being, the Almighty, by the profound intuition of their sound minds and pure hearts.\textsuperscript{34} In saying so, Ankar\v{a}vi undoubtedly seeks to remind us of the significance of the Sufi's self-ecstatic experience of the unity of God.

Dawwâni, on the other hand, remains rather on the borderlines of the philosophical tradition within which he first analyzes the notion of \textit{wujûb} in conjunction with that of \textit{wujûd}. In referring to al-Fârâbî's and Avicenna's explanations, he says that the Necessary Being is the real and incommensurable existent. It is an existent, although not in the sense that it necessitates the existence of a subject, nor in that it appends or superadds existence to necessity or to other than necessity. By contrast, the Necessary Existent is by Its very nature purely and absolutely distinct in Itself and completely free from all external peculiarities. Furthermore, Its existence is the very essence of Itself.\textsuperscript{35}

Dawwâni, having elucidated the concept of the Necessary Being from the Peripatetic point of view, embarks upon an explanation of what he describes as "the taste of the people of Ishrâq". In the eyes of these

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{I-H.} 24b3-6.
\item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{SH-H.} p. 110.
\end{itemize}
people, he says, the light is in reality only one entity and not multiple in number at all. Yet in terms of its intensity, weakness, perfection and imperfection, it could be graded in variable degrees ranging from the most complete level of perfection, which is necessarily independent, to the most deficient level, which is fully dependent.36

II. Next Suhrawardī discusses the relationship between the Necessary Existent and possible beings. He once again underlines the fact that in contrast to the former, which is One/single in every respect, the latter are multiple and comprise all heavenly as well as terrestrial entities. In addition, these contingents continuously require, for their actual existence, what he has termed "a preponderating principle" (murajjih), which is nothing less than the Necessary Existent Itself.

But how can one relate such a Unique Being to its so-called attributes? Or to put it in simpler terms, if God possesses attributes, how can it be possible that One God is associated with manifold attributes? And do they have the same nature as does the Former? These and similar controversial questions occupied a central place in the works and writings of both theologians and philosophers, especially in medieval times. Regardless of the extensive discussions and arguments both for and against elaborated in those books, these problems still remain unsettled and enigmatic.

In his approach to the problem, Suhrawardi takes a negative attitude and establishes firmly that God, due to His very unity and necessity, does not allow Himself to be a substratum for attributes. This is because God, as a Necessary Being, is self-sufficient and independent, whereas the attributes are dependent and always need an abode, so to speak, for themselves.

To use Ankaravi’s own expression, the attributes of God are contingent and therefore not necessary, because they exist by virtue of something else not by virtue of themselves. As long as they are contingent, they stand in need of a preponderating principle, i.e. God, for their existence. In this case, God would be both acting and receiving, as in the case of a man whose intellect is in command and whose body responds to it. This is impossible for God on account of the fact that this would make His immaterial essence composite.

Dawwani, in his turn, remarks that the soul as an acting agent would sometimes be in a receiving position too. For instance, in the case of a person, he argues, who is treating his soul in order to safeguard it from spiritual diseases, the soul will be functioning simultaneously as both an agent and a recipient, which would mean that it is no longer one. In fact it

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37 I-H. 25a10-11. Dawwani takes the agent as soul (nafs) and recipient as body (badan). (S-H. p. 116). But the Persian translation, as in Ankaravi’s, reads it as “intellect” instead of soul. (Hayakil, p. 93, l. 6.)

38 I-H. 25a3-6.
is not really one in the true sense of the term, in so far as it comprehends many modes in itself. Furthermore, the real "one" is by definition a single entity that has no multiplicity in its essence nor in its attributes at all.\(^{39}\)

### III

It is, then, only God as a Necessary Existent, who indeed deserves to be described as true unity. That is why Suhrawardi clearly isolates Him by all means from the attributes, which, not only by their plurality but by their obvious need of a substratum, definitely jeopardize His unmitigated unity. Meanwhile, it seems extremely difficult for one who believes on the one hand that God is absolutely one and maintains on the other that He possesses attributes, to reconcile the two, i.e., the unity of God and the diversity of His attributes. As has been already pointed out, this serious but exceedingly complicated issue had been the focus of long debates mainly among the two contending groups, theologians and philosophers in the medieval Islamic epoch, the former, as they classify themselves, being the supporters of the so-called orthodox Islam, while the latter representing pseudo heretical position.\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\) *SH-H.* pp. 116-117.

\(^{40}\) For example, see Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), vol. 1, pp.186-221. In this remarkable book, the sixth chapter is devoted to a discussion of the attributes of God in which Ibn Rushd first resumes Ghazali's attack against the philosophers and then enunciates his own understanding of the issue. See also for a good summary of the differences between the doctrine of the Sufis and that of philosophers on the attributes of God, 'Abd al-Raṭmān al-Jāmī, *The Precious Pearl al-Jāmī's al-Durrah al-Fakhirah Together with his Glosses and the Commentary of*
Clearly aware of this paradoxical situation, Anārādī chooses to declare his stance in favour of what he himself terms “the people of orthodox order (mezheb-i sünnet ve ehl-i cema’at)”. He states that from what philosophers have said as regards the attributes of God, it can be inferred that the attributes are regarded as something other than God and that they are, moreover, all originated (mūḥdes). However, according to the orthodox school, they are neither God Himself nor other than Himself. The latter school, he adds, is also in agreement with some other theological sects (firka) on the co-eternity of those attributes with God.

Be that as it may, in Suhrawardī’s succinct formulation God is unequivocally and absolutely one. Such a uniqueness brings in itself another attribute to Him: Perfectness (kamāl). His perfectness is in no way analogous to that of man. He is above any sort of deficiency and beyond any given location. He is the Truth who has no peer or rival. After all, He merits the possession of what is the nobler of two opposites, namely, as Dawwānī shows in a diametrical contrast, existence vis-à-vis absence, potency vis-à-vis weakness, knowledge vis-à-vis ignorance, perfection vis-a-vis imperfection. Since God, as Anārādī puts it, is the creator of Perfection


41 I-H. 25a15.

(Kemal Āferin), crowned with every excellence, He bestows perfection upon all incomplete and caused beings.\(^43\)

Dawwānī goes on to comment that in so far as He is the cause for uncovering the objects, God has the Knowledge; in so far as He is the principle of efficacy for the contingents, He has the potence; in so far as He is the principle of His overall Knowledge, identical with His essence, He has the will to particularize that which is the more proper of two contingents.\(^44\)

Another feature which Suhrāwardī ascribes to God in the *Hayākil* is the fact that He, because of His simplicity and unity, disavows any sort of "composition" (*tarakkub*) or "embodiment" (*tajassum*). The former represents, in Suhrāwardī’s thought, Dawwānī says, "mental composition" (*al-tarakkub al-dhihnī*), whereas the latter stands for something more than the simple body or corporeality. By virtue of this, the cardinal idea that the Necessary Existent is one is further supplemented.\(^45\)

For a wise man, Dawwānī adds further, it is quite evident that God is the most perfect and most noble Being, because He himself is the real source of all goodness, perfection and nobility.\(^46\) This could be better illustrated by the relationship between the sun and the world, where the

\(^{43}\) *I-H.* 25b3-6.

\(^{44}\) *SH-H.* p. 117.

\(^{45}\) *SH-H.* p. 119.

\(^{46}\) *SH-H.* p. 120.
former in itself is fully light that enlightens the latter. Similarly, God in Himself is utter perfection that perfects all beings.

2. The Function of Light in the Metaphysics of Suhrawardī

IV. We have indicated on several occasions that the notion of light constantly stands as the cornerstone of Suhrawardī's philosophy of illumination. The fundamental role it plays in that system can be fully observed particularly in his magnum opus, Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. Nonetheless the book which forms the subject of Anḵaravī's commentary, Ḥayākil al-Nūr, highlights the principal aspects of its function rather in a terse style.

Suhrawardī, having postulated explicitly that light is the very basis of all reality, proceeds to formulate his initial proposition that light enters bodies accidentally and makes them appear and thus exist in reality, this in accordance with the degrees of its intensity. There may be bodies, however, which do not come into existence because of a shortage of the light. In the meantime, it should be noted as well that Suhrawardī has

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elsewhere substituted the body (*jism*) for isthmus (*barzakh*), a notion which plays a somewhat cryptic role in his philosophy.\(^8\)

V. According to Suhrawardî, since bodies are not naturally capable of subsisting and thus actually existing by themselves, they are not found in a state of manifestation unless they are accidentally enlightened by an

\(^8\) The term "isthmus" is suggested by H. Ziai and M. Fakhri as a translation for "barzakh" (pl. *barâzikh*) in the passage where Suhrawardi states: "the isthmus is the body" (*al-barzakh huwa al-jism*). (Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, p. 170; Fakhri, A History of Muslim Philosophy, p. 332.) It seems to me, however, that Suhrawardî is in fact inconsistent in his use of the term, which he employs in several instances. In the first place, he applies it to the bodies falling between that which is not light in itself and is independent of substratum, called "obscure substance" (*al-jawhar al-ghāsiq*) and that which is again not light in itself but a form for something else, called "dark form" (*al-hay'at al-zulmāniyya*). If the light is removed away from the bodies, they remain dark. (H-I. p. 107.) When it is a consideration of the location of the bodies, Ziai interprets it as "intermediary". In other place, however, Suhrawardi claims that "every barzakh is dark substance". (H-I. p. 108.) In this sense, although it initially is not a body, nevertheless later it may turn into body when it becomes receptive of light. In another place, he first makes divisions of the *barâzikh* and then says that "every monodic body is that which is not composed of two different barzakhs (H-I. p. 187), which implies that it is something more basic than body. Therefore, as far as the relevant contexts in which Suhrawardî uses the term *barzakh* or its plural form, *barâzikh*, are concerned, it plays a triple role in the Ishraqî system: (i) it is simply a body receptacle of light; (ii) it denotes, as Prof. H. Landolt has suggested, "the physical world", regardless of whether it consists of terrestrial or celestial bodies, (see his "Suhrawardî's 'Tales of Initiation'," p. 477.); (iii) it has an eschatological function too, as H. Corbin pointed out: "...le barzakh a une signification eschatologique: c'est l'entre-deux-mondes, entre ce monde-ci et le saeculum futurum..." (See his translation of Suhrawardî's treatise "Strophes Liturgiques et Offices Divins (Warîdât wa-Taqīsât)," chapter in L'Archange Empourpré, p. 510, n. 92.) Cf. also its occurrence in the various contexts of the Qur'an, 25:53, 55:20, 23:100.
extraneous source that makes them visible. This is because by their very nature they are unable to perceive themselves. More accurately speaking, they in themselves possess no perceptive power that could enable them to subsist and exist by themselves, for, as Dawwānī and Anḵaravī have remarked: "a thing's perception of its own self, in Suhrawardi's view, means manifestation of that thing to itself".⁴⁹ If this is the case, then what kind of entity or being is able to conceive of itself? To this question, Suhrawardi responds, it is the rational souls which are manifest to themselves; therefore, they are all subsistent lights.

To this group, Dawwānī adds also all the animal souls on the ground that these too are apparent as well as perceptible to themselves but certainly in a different manner from the rational ones, which perceive of themselves by means of consciousness (wijdān), while animal souls do this by means of intuition (ḥads).⁵⁰

The souls as subtle lights do subsist by themselves and not by virtue of something exterior or inferior to them, e.g. bodies. This self-subsistence, as Suhrawardi has emphasized, enables them to become aware of their nature. Such an awareness or rather "self-awareness", which always involves light, marks the starting point of the process of knowledge in Suhrawardi. That is to say, a person only becomes cognizant of his own

⁴⁹ I-H. 26b2-3; SH-H. p. 123.

⁵⁰ SH-H. p. 126.
essence by means of such an immaterial light as rational soul, and he shares this consciousness with all other self-cognizant things.  

In any case, it is by an immaterial light that self-awareness is realized. This is in effect tantamount to what Fazlur Rahman calls "self-luminousness," which finds its real definition in Suhrawardi’s own expression: “Everyone who conceives his own essence is a pure light; and every pure light is manifest to, and cognizant of its own essence”. It can therefore be deduced that the entire system of epistemology in the Illuminative Tradition operates exclusively within the scope of pure light, which may be conveniently identified with "self-consciousness".

It is for this reason that Suhrawardi here expressly confirms that rational soul is an immaterial light, sustained by its own essence, yet preponderated and engendered by the Necessary Existent. In other words, despite its superiority over the body, so long as it continues to be contingent, it needs for its actual existence the Necessary Being, i.e., God, who is all-Living, Self-subsisting and Eternal and the most intensive light (al-nūr al-shadīd). Or as Dawwānī interprets: “He is the most perfect appearance, for He is not only manifest (zāhir) to Himself but also the

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51 Ziai, Knowledge, p. 151.


cause (mużhir) for the appearance of others.  

VI. It is interesting, however, that Suhrawardî attributes more or less the same characteristics of God to the rational soul. He even tries to prove the self-subsistence and eternity of the former through the very nature of the latter. He reasons that although the rational soul is self-subsistent and alive, nevertheless, due to the very nature of its contingency, it is not completely self-existent, and hence requires either another contingent or a necessary being to enable it to exist. But the former also stands in need of either another contingent or necessary, being, producing a continuous chain which goes an ad infinitum. Therefore, the rational soul ought to have an ultimate Necessary Being which causes it to exist, that is God Himself.  

The Necessary Existent or God, nevertheless, is quite distinct from the rational soul in such a way that, although both of them are abstract lights, the former is the Light of all the lights including the latter as well. In other words, being the origin of all lights, it is the most intense light. That is why, for Suhrawardî, (and this is true also for al-Ghazâlî), God, due  

55 SH-H. p.120.  
57 The way Suhrawardî presents his ideas about the intensity of the Light of light corresponds almost exactly to the way in which Ghazâlî set out his theory of light in his later work entitled Mishkât al-Anwâr. There he expressly states: "Glory to the One who hides Himself from the creation because of His utter manifestness; and He is veiled from them because of the illumination of His light". (Idem, Mishkât al-Anwâr, ed. Abû al-'Alâ 'Afîfî (Cairo: Dâr al-Qawmiyya, 1382/1964), p. 64.) In spite of this affinity and many other common views shared by these two Muslim philosophers, they,
to His utter manifestness, remains hidden from the world. This is explained in Dawânî’s commentary by the maxim: “Something that goes beyond its extremity turns back to its opposite extremity”. Hence, God’s extremely intensive luminosity would be the immediate cause of His invisibility.

3. The Emanation of the First Light

VII. Suhrawardî, after having delineated the major features of God with an emphasis on His Unity, Necessity and Luminosity, moves on to inquire into the process of emanation (ṣudûr) as described in the Peripatetic philosophy, or as it is designated in the Illuminative tradition, irradiation (ishrâq). The difficulty for Suhrawardî, as well as for certain of his

however, differ from each other in many ways. To enumerate all the points on which they disagree, unfortunately exceeds the scope of this study. Nonetheless, one significant point should be made here. Suhrawardî was put to death, according to some writers, for putting forward certain “unorthodox” ideas, contrary to the basic tenets of the Scripture. If so, then one could have quite fairly and equally accused al-Ghazâlî, known as the Proof of Islam and the devoted defender of so-called orthodox Islam, of having held the similar opinions at least in his Mishkât. Therefore, Suhrawardî’s sentence was not simply due to his ideas but most likely because of the still obscure political intrigues. For the questionable issue as to what extent Ghazâlî may be considered to have been an orthodox Muslim thinker, see the recently published article by H. Landolt, “Ghazâlî and Religionswissenschaft,” pp. 19-72.

predecessors, such as Avicenna, who has built his doctrine of cosmology upon that process, lies at the root of this theological question: How is it possible that intellects or lights, multiple in number, can proceed from One Necessary Being? How can one compromise the plurality of the former with the unity of the latter?

To begin with, Suhrawardī declares that inasmuch as He is essentially one, God generates by a process of illumination the first incorporeal light, which is also numerically one and immaterial. In saying so, his primary intent consists first and foremost in securing God's unmitigated unity even at this very early stage of emanation. The initial argument he formulates for this purpose comprises two closely interrelated notions: motives (dawā') and wills (irādāt). These two terms, as one can easily discern from his own words, operate at the human level and are thereby related to the psychic functions of mind. But in so far as his psychology is concerned, they are confined mainly to the functions of the rational soul rather than those of the brain or mind. Whatever they may be, the point to be underscored here is the fact that motive and will are by no means attributable to God, for they would generate inevitably in mind a sort of diversity that causes multiplicity. This may be better understood in the light of Dawūdī's comments: "the incentives would induce Him (i.e. God) to various actions, and wishes would either follow these incentives or not."59

59 For "incentives" he uses the term "bawā'ith". (SH-H. p. 128.)
This means that various actions would result from various motives and wills, so both would lead to such an assumption that God is no longer one in His essence.

In this argument, Suhrawardi, according to Dawwānī, aims at refuting both the view of the Mu'tazilite school which denied God's will but admitted the flow of multiplicity from Him by virtue of diverse motives, and that of the Ash'arite school which believed firmly in God's having a will, making it the very foundation of everything including multiplicity, but not by virtue of diverse motives.⁶⁰

Since, Dawwānī goes on, He has no miscellaneous desires and wishes, then whatever action proceeds from Him must be one. In other words, if two different actions did flow from Him, then He would have to have two different demands dependent upon two separate directions in His essence,⁶¹ which is impossible.

VIII. Therefore, from God as such, who is not only unique in Himself but in His actions too, emanates the First, which is also one and resembles Him in many aspects. This First that overflows from Him, designated by Suhrawardi in conformity with his own technical vocabulary as "the First Light", and by Ankaravi in conformity with the Peripatetic cosmology as "the

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⁶⁰ SH-H. p. 129.

⁶¹ SH-H. p. 129.
First Intellect"⁶² should of necessity be both one and immaterial. It cannot be corporeal, in that this would require It to have shape, place, quantity, etc., nor form, which always dwells in object, nor soul, which needs body for its action.⁶³ Moreover it must be an independent substance that subsists by itself and apprehends its own essence as well as that of its own Originator.

Suhrawardi’s whole theory of emanation seems have been modelled mainly on Avicenna’s cosmology. To put it even more explicitly, the latter’s cosmology, which operates entirely within the world of intellects and which features a descending order beginning with the First Intellect and ending up with the Tenth, i.e. Active Intellect, is reiterated in exactly the same pattern in Suhrawardi’s system, albeit with two marginal modifications. The first is that the notion of intellect in the former is substituted for that of light in the latter. The second is that in Suhrawardi, the series of lights overflowing from the Pure Light, i.e. the Light of Lights, terminates not with the Tenth, viz. Active Intellect, as in the case of Avicenna, but, by contrast, far exceeds the number ten. He does believe, nonetheless, that the series of lights is finite in number.⁶⁴

⁶² Ṣabʾ al-Aʿwal (al-ʿAql al-Awwal). (I-H. 27a10.)

⁶³ SH-H. p. 132.

⁶⁴ In the treatise under examination, viz. Hayākil al-Nūr, the author Suhrawardi has of course given a succinct summary, so to speak, of his Ishráqī wisdom, but not in the detailed form one might have expected from the author of Ḥikmat al-Ishráq. Besides, he has shown no great care in the
In his interpretation of Suhrawardī’s account of emanation, Anāravī first outlines the whole system and then substantiates it by referring us to the following Prophetic hadith, which is wide-spread in mystic circles:

God created first the intellect and said to it to draw near, and so it drew near. Afterwards, He commanded it to ponder, and so it pondered. Then He stated: "Upon my Might and Glory! I have never originated a creature more noble than you..."$^{65}$

In his small treatise entitled Mişbâḫü’l-Esrār, Anāravī restates the same hadith in somewhat detailed and elaborated fashion while at the same time displaying his allegiance to the mystical path:

...before the manifestation of His (viz. God) attributes, He displayed first the most apparent of all apparent things, the Light of lights, that is the spirit of his chosen and beloved Muhammad. This spirit is, according to the Sufi Seyhs, the Moḥammadan essence (al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya), is called by the Sages (al-Ḥukamā) the First Intellect, the First Cause and the Supreme Pen (al-qalam al-a‘lā), as was reported in this hadith: "The first that God created was the intellect. The first that God created was the pen. The first that God created was my light, and the first that God created was my spirit."$^{66}$

In the ensuing lines of the same treatise, he notes that, regardless of how

former book, to distinguish clearly his own views from the Peripatetic ideas. Therefore, one should refer, for his comprehensive doctrine of emanation, to the his latter work. (H-I. pp. 131-139.)


$^{66}$ Anāravī, Mişbâḫü’l-Esrār, folio 3, lines. 27-31.
it is referred to by the various schools (Muḥammadan essence by mystics, First Intellect by philosophers, First Pen by theologians, etc.), the ultimate analysis of all these terms, though conceptually diverse, may be conveniently reduced to one and the same reality, i.e. the Light by which all the essential names of God, His attributes and actions, as well as the true natures of the beings, become visible.67

Basing himself on this same prophetic tradition, Anḵaravī goes on to comment that the first light, brought into being by the Necessary Light and then placed at the zenith of all contingents, exhibits on its own three different illuminative roles. At the very outset, it visualizes the Glory (Celāl) and Beauty (Cemāl) of its Originator, thereby giving birth to another dignified light, called the Second Intellect. In its second vision (mūṣāhede), it apprehends its own essence and necessity, so that it gives rise to a heavenly soul (nefs-i semāvi), called the universal soul (nefs-i kullī). At last, it perceives the contingency as well as the inadequacy of its own essence, thereby bringing into existence a heavenly body (cūrm-u semāvī), i.e. is the sphere of Aṭlās, or as it is described in the terminology of the Scripture, the Magnificent Throne (‘arṣ-i mecid).68 Among these three visual roles of the first light, Anḵaravī remarks, the first one, namely its vision of God's Beauty

67 Ibid., folio 3, lines. 31-34.

68 I-H. 27b11-17.
and Glory, holds the most esteemed place.\textsuperscript{69} It is for this reason that this particular vision generates the Second Intellect which takes up its rank just after the first.

The universal soul, he further adds, moves and governs the throne just as the rational soul does the body. In other words, the motion of the throne takes place because of its love and yearning for the First Intellect.\textsuperscript{70}

The Second Intellect, in its turn, also executes a triple function exactly similar to the first one. Through a vision of its creator, it brings about the third intellect. And through the perception of its own necessity, it originates the soul of the starry sphere,\textsuperscript{71} while by the perception of its own contingency it issues forth the body of the starry sphere.\textsuperscript{72} This process is repeated until it reaches the creation of the simple celestial as well as terrestrial bodies.\textsuperscript{73}

Here it must be pointed out that in the original Arabic version of \textit{Hayākil al-Nūr}, Suhrawardī ascribes therein only two kinds of visions to the intellect; vision of its originator and that of its contingency. Ankaravi, however, who bases himself most likely on the Persian translation,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{I-H.} 27b12.
\item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{I-H.} 28a2-3.
\item \textsuperscript{71} "Nefs-i Feleki'\textquoteright i-Būrūc".
\item \textsuperscript{72} "Cūrm-\textquoteright ĩ Feleki'\textquoteright i-Būrūc".
\item \textsuperscript{73} \textit{I-H.} 28a8-9.
\end{itemize}
increases this number to three with the addition of the vision of its necessity.  

The commentator Dawwânî talks relatively less about the process of effusion of the lights. Rather, he offers a meticulous explanation for certain phrases in the text in the light of Suhrawardî's other works. While reviewing the expression, "al-nūr al-ibdâʾī al-awwal," meaning "the first originated light," he draws attention to the four elements which play no role whatsoever in the original existence of the First Light: (1) matter, (2) time, (3) an instrument, and (4) a mediator. To this, Ghiyāth al-Dîn Shīrāzī, according to Corbin's explanatory notes, puts forward a counter-argument, indicating that it is true that the First Light is preceded neither by matter nor by an interval of time, but to say that it is the only one which is brought into existence without an intermediary, as Dawwânî does, would be incorrect. This is because not only that Light but all the Archangelic Dominant Lights can be described as ibdāʾiyya as well (meaning that they

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74 On this matter, Corbin, who follows the Persian version in his translation of these lines, says that the Arabic text omitted the third dimension of contemplation. (Les Temples, p. 78, n. 36.)

75 SH-H. p. 133.

76 Les Temples, p. 78, n. 34.

77 Cf. Ibn Sinā's definition of Ibdā': "If <muydath> {the generated} comes into existence after its sheer non-existence, then this would mean that it emanates from a cause; therefore this type of emanation would be that of origination (ibdā'). (Idem, Ilahiyyāt I, p. 267.)
all were originated without any mediator). Therefore what best specifies the First is the mere fact that it is the First.

IX. At the end of his investigation of the intellects, Suhrawardī touches briefly upon the functions that they perform, saying that the sacred intelligible substances, in that they are all active intellects, serve as mediators for the generosity of the First Existent. But this intimates, though not explicitly, that in order to exercise His generosity the First Absolute Being stands in need of intercessors. This would be inconceivable and even contradictory to the view that God is the uncaused originator of the intellects. This obvious dilemma, overlooked for unknown reasons by Anārāvī, does not escape Dawwānī’s attention, who brings forward a plausible resolution to it. By this, the actual goal of the Sages, he asserts, is to establish viable means for themselves whereby they could justify safely the emanation of the "multiplicity" from the unity, i.e. from the unity of God. In doing so, they do not disavow God’s effect upon the intellects. So, the concept of intermediacy, for Dawwānī, could possibly mean "dependency" in the sense that intellects are made subservient to their Originator inasmuch as they serve as His assistants in circulating His luminosity, so to speak.

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78 This was partly reproduced in the footnote to Dawwānī’s commentary by the editor. (SH-H. p. 133, n. 2.)

79 Les Temples, p. 78, n. 34.

The lights, whose strengths vary with the degrees of their intensity are graded in such a way that the more powerful one becomes dominant over the less powerful when the inter-relation amongst them runs in a downward manner, which is accordingly characterized by Suhrawardī as the order of domination. On the other hand, if the inter-relation operates in the reverse direction, namely, in an ascending order from the lower to the upper degrees of intensity, then it is defined as that of love. Such inter-relations, however, cease to exist ultimately in the "Necessary Dominant Light", because, as an Absolute Independent Being, It may reach anywhere by virtue of Its own unlimited power.

4. The Hierarchy of the Worlds

X. Of the three worlds that Suhrawardī classifies in his Hayākil al-Nūr, i.e. that of ‘uqūl, that of nutūs, and that of ajsām, the first one has no direct connection with the last. The reason is that every intellect, like every soul, is a pure substance; and none of them can be perceived by senses. The rational soul, which unlike the intellect operates as a perceptive power of the universals, governs the human body. All bodies, as

81 "The lower light cannot encompass the higher light, because the higher light dominates the other...When the lights are multiplied, the higher has a domination over the lower, while the lower has a love and desire (shawq wa ‘ashq) for the higher.” (H-I. pp. 135-6.)


Ančaravī puts it, are of two groups: (i) celestial bodies (el-ecsāmū‘l-felekiyye) that constitute the ethereal world, and (ii) elemental bodies, which are composed of the four elements (‘arāšīr-ı erba‘a) and three kingdoms of nature (meväār-d-i selāš). Meanwhile, in Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Suhrawardī adds one more world, called "the world of imagination" (‘ālam al-Mithāl), where exist "the suspended forms and the regent angels".

XI. Suhrwardī has singled out one dominant intellect out of all the others, providing for it about six vivid descriptions:

(a) Our Father (Abūnā),
(b) The Lord of the theurgy of our species (Rabbu Ṭilsimi Naw‘inā)
(c) The Donor of our souls (Muṭfīḍi Nufūsinā),
(d) The Perfecter of them, i.e. our souls (Mukammillāhā)
(e) The Holy Spirit (Rūḥ al-Quds)
(f) The Active Intellect (al-‘Aql al-Fā‘āl)

Interestingly enough, Ančaravī, while commenting on this important matter, specifies the number of these intellects as "ten," calling the last one "the Active Intellect," which is somewhat exceptional to the general Sufi understanding, particularly to the followers of Ibn ‘Arabi, who, as H. Landolt points out, regards as "a lower angel by the name of Ismā‘īl", and not as

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84 I-H. 29a4. Also refer, for a brief account of these worlds, to the Prolegomena of Ančaravī, the first chapter of Part II.


87 Landolt, "Suhrwardī's Tales of Initiation," p. 480.
"a Holy Spirit" or "Gebrail" to which Anḳaravi makes no objection. On the contrary, he takes it exactly in the sense that Suhrawardi gives it, and even goes further when he interprets it as "the governor of the world of elements", which brings him closer to the thinking of the Peripatetics in this area.\textsuperscript{88}

Anḳaravi illustrates the term "muḥiṣ" by the term "bakhshende", a word of Persian origin meaning "the giver", which he has borrowed most likely from the Persian translation of \textit{Hayākil}.\textsuperscript{90} At the same time he identifies all the incorporeal intellects with the Archangels or Cherubim (\textit{Karūbiyyûn}).\textsuperscript{91}

Incidentally, Suhrawardi's description of the Active Intellect as Father might have drawn the criticism of his opponents\textsuperscript{92} for the simple reason that in treating the notions of Active Intellect or Holy Spirit as synonymous

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{I-H.} 29a9-10.

\textsuperscript{89} For the development of the concept of Active Intellect in Peripatetic philosophy, see Herbert A. Davidson, "Alfarābī and Avicenna On the Active Intellect", \textit{Viator} 3 (1972), pp. 109-178.

\textsuperscript{90} \textit{I-H.} 29a10: \textit{Hayākil}, p. 96, l. 20. In the meantime, it is worth mentioning that Suhrawardi himself has designated the Active Intellect as "rawanbakhsh", meaning "the donor of the souls", that exactly corresponds to the present context. (\textit{H-I.} p. 201.) In addition, he labels it as Gabriel, the proximate father, the Giver of the life and virtue, the Governing light, and the lordly agent of the human being (\textit{Isfahbad al-nāsūl}). (\textit{H-I.} pp. 200-201.)


\textsuperscript{92} Corbin, "Le livre Du Verbe Du Soufisme", \textit{L'Archange Empourpré}, p. 176, n. 29.
with that of Father, he may have been regarded as demonstrating to some extent sympathy towards the Trinitarian doctrine of Christianity. However, he was firmly of the opinion that Christians were mistaken in claiming that God has a son. In their books, he alleges, the term "Father" (al-ab) is used in the sense of "Principle Originator" (al-mubdí), that is, the Necessary Being. On the other hand, the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Word (Kalima), viz. the Son, must be understood in the scheme of causal linkage (al-tasabbub). It is just like the relation of our visual perception to the sun. In other words, for Suhrawardi, the Holy Spirit is the Bestower of the human species which informs all human beings, including Jesus, as is seen in the address by the Holy Spirit to Mary, the mother of Jesus: "I am only a Messenger of Your Lord to grant a pure son to you".

Be that as it may, the Active Intellect, in Suhrawardi's view, has several important functions related to the terrestrial world. It is this particular intellect that gives us the souls and perfects them theoretically and practically. Like all other intellects, it is a light with powerful illumination.

XII. Among the intellects, the First Intellect at first, according to

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93 Suhrawardi, Kalimat al-Taşawwuf, p. 115.

94 Ibid.

95 Qur'an, 19:19; Suhrawardi, Kalimat al-Taşawwuf, p. 104.

96 This is in a way reminiscent of Avicenna who already held that the rational soul is perfected through theoretical and practical wisdom but not the Active Intellect. See Ibn Sīnā, "Aqsām al-'Ulūm", p. 225.
Suhrawardi, originally receives illumination (ishrāq) from the Light of lights, while the Second One receives illumination accordingly from both the First and the Light of lights, and hence this gradual process of illumination continues until they are multiplied in number.97

All the intermediary intellects between the First Principle and those which are illuminated, or caused, as Dawwānī puts it, by the Former, seem nearer to us in terms of causality. Yet, as far as the intensity of light is concerned, the intellect at the remotest distance in the above sense is actually the most proximate one,98 because it is the nearest to the source of luminosity, namely the Light of lights.

5. God as a Preponderant Being

XIII. In the last section of this Temple, Suhrawardī concentrates on one particular characteristic of God, i.e. what Suhrawardī calls "Murajjiḥ", and which I have rendered here as "Preponderating Principle"; indicating "an agent tipping the scales of a contingent in favour of its existing".99

By this notion, a great deal of stress is once again laid upon the fact that God, being Self-Subsistent, Alive, Pure Light, and Necessary Existent, is absolutely free in His own actions, and in contrast to the contingents, He

97 SH-H. p. 142.
98 SH-H. p. 142.
99 See for the various usages of this term by several Muslim philosophers in medieval times, Davidson, Proofs for Eternity, pp. 56, 162.
is not dependent upon anything except Himself, nor is He determined by any condition and time as in the case of man. However, this does not mean, according to Dawwānī, that God has no choice. On the contrary, He definitely possesses an eternal will (irāda qadima) that precedes His action not in time but in essence. Nevertheless, Suhrawardī’s primary goal here, Dawwānī specifies, is to substantiate the pre-eternity of God’s own actions.

Finally, the idea that “the rays of the sun persevere by the perpetuity of the latter” raises a serious question, as Ankaravī points out, one which in fact menaces a particular doctrine of Orthodox Islam. In applying the idea of God, Suhrawardī implies that the permanence of all the contingent beings, all of the intellects, souls and both heavenly and earthly bodies, endure by virtue of the permanence of God just as the rays of the sun continue to exist by virtue of the perpetual existence of the sun. This crucial idea is contrary to what the Orthodox Muslim holds. But Ankaravī tries to resolve this issue by making reference to a Qur’anic verse: “...Everything that exists will perish except His own face...” One can avoid, he argues, this inevitable consequence when we take “the thing” (şey) to be “the

100 SH-H. p. 143.
essence of that thing", not the thing itself.\textsuperscript{103} Furthermore, al-Bayḍāwī, the great exegete of the Qur'an, has found it acceptable to refer the personal pronoun "hu" (him or it) at the end of the word "wajhahu" (his or its face) to the thing itself, namely the essence of the thing.\textsuperscript{104} In acknowledging this exceptional interpretation, we can deduce that "everything that exists will perish except its quiddity.

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\textsuperscript{103} I-H. 30b1.

\textsuperscript{104} I-H. 30b2.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FIFTH TEMPLE

I. You should know that every generated event (ḥādīth) requires a generated cause¹. And the same reasoning equally applies to the latter cause too. It follows necessarily then that the series (of causes) would regress (yatasalsa) infinitely without a beginning, so long as the same logic continues to repeat itself for every initial generated cause. But without doubt this (chain) ceases with something, which is necessarily renewed in itself and succeeded by itself.² That which requires renewal for itself is motion. Now, it is enduring circular motion (only), among all the others, that never ceases and thus is proper to be the cause of generated events. This is the motion of the celestial spheres. It is this motion again which is the cause of the events taking place in our world.

II. Given that the First Agent is unchangeable, It cannot be the (immediate)³ cause of the temporal motions. If there were no motions of celestial spheres, no event would take place. On the other hand, the motions of the celestial spheres are not of (their) nature, since a celestial sphere departs from every point towards which it (initially) aimed (to move); whereas natural movement, when it gets to the point where it aimed, stops, because it cannot escape by nature from what it desires. Therefore, its motion (i.e., the motion of the celestial sphere) cannot be other than voluntary motion.⁴

III. What sets the sphere in motion is by all means its own soul. The soul's action in moving the body of the sphere is a kind of choice. But the movement of the body of the sphere through the motion of the soul is of a coercive sort. If we consider the body of the sphere

¹ Instead of "cause", H-N. (p. 68) has "something".

² This complete phrase exists only in SH-H. (p. 148) and ms. M1 of H-N. (p. 68, n. 4.)

³ Les Temples, p. 54.

to be one thing on its own and its soul to be another on its own, (we understand that) the motion of the sphere takes place through the movement of the soul (of that sphere). In this case, the motion of the sphere would be coercive with respect to its soul. But if we assume them (i.e. the sphere and its soul) together to be one and the same thing, its motion (i.e. the motion of the sphere) would be volitional. Therefore, it is alive and perceptive.

IV. The celestial spheres need not be fed nor grow up nor engender. They have no passion nor rival nor resistant for themselves in their existence. They even have no wrath. Their motion is not for the inferior, because the inferior has no value for them at all.

V. Now, when we purify ourselves from the preoccupations of the body and contemplate the grandeur of God, the Light of the Glory that spreads out and the Light that effuses from that Glory upon the beings, we find in ourselves shining flashes and orienting illuminations and we also visualize lights and thus attain our goals.

What do you think about the individuals whose forms (hay’ât) are noble, whose shapes (suwar) are perpetual and whose bodies are changeless, and which are secured from corruption by virtue of their remoteness from the world of oppositeness? They have no impediment at all, and therefore they continuously take illuminations from the Supreme Lights of God as well as aid from the divine

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5 The whole text up to here is omitted both in I-H and Hayâkil.


7 I-H. (31b3-4) and Hayâkil (p. 99, l. 6) read: "Their motion is not for the lower world (al-‘alam al-suflî), because that world has no value for them." The whole phrase is omitted in Les Temples.

8 "al-khurra al-bâsiţa" instead of which I-H. has "al-ajràm al-bâsiţa", does not exist in Hayâkil.

9 Yusuf Ziyâ and H. Ziya Ülken have rendered the last phrase as: "We visualize the lights so that we will be liberated from the needs." (Ziyâ, Hayâkilû’n-Nur, p. 12; Ülken, "Şehabeddin Sühreverdi, Nur Heykelleri," p. 72.)

10 The Persian translation reads: The divine noble individuals (ashkhâss karîm rabbânî). (Hayâkil. p. 99) Ankaravî, accordingly, reads "ilâhiya" for "al-hay’a". (I-H. 31b14.)
subtleties. On the other hand, had their desire been not persistent, their movements would have been discontinued.\(^{11}\)

VI. Each celestial soul has a beloved from the Supreme World, which is different from the beloved of another (celestial soul).\(^{12}\) It (the beloved) is a dominant light and at the same time it is, by its own light, the cause of the existence and perpetuity of the celestial soul. It is also an intermediary between the celestial soul and the First, the Almighty.\(^{13}\) By this intermediary, it (i.e., celestial soul) visualizes the Glory of God and thereby obtains His Blessings (barakātih). From every illumination (ishrāq), originates a movement. And through every movement, it becomes prepared to receive another illumination. And by the renewal of the movements, the illuminations perpetually renew themselves, as do the movements by the renewal of the illuminations. Owing to such reciprocal continuous renewals, the generation of the temporal events in the inferior world take place. If, on the other hand, these illuminations and movements did not take place, then from the generosity of God, no more than a limited amount would emerge, and besides, the emanation from His superabundance would cease, (which is unlikely) for the First Almighty permits no alteration in His own essence even, nor does It cause an alteration (in that emanation). Therefore, owing to the generosity of God as well as the persistent ecstasy\(^{14}\) of the divine lovers (ushshāq al-ilāhīn), the temporal events continue perpetually. The movements of the celestial souls are for the benefit\(^{15}\) of the inferiors (sāfi/ln). These movements, however, do not bring the things into existence, but rather they create aptitudes; and the First Truth


\(^{12}\) That is, each celestial soul has its own beloved.

\(^{13}\) Hayākil reads "God the Almighty" (Haqq Ta‘ālā) (p. 99, l. 18), whereas I-H. has "the First Truth" (al-Ḥaqq al-Awwal) (32a11.) Corbin renders it as "le Premier Etre" (the First Being). (Les Temples, p. 55.)

\(^{14}\) Abū Rayyān’s edition (H-N), in contrast to the text found in Dawwānī (SH-H) and Anḵaravi (I-H), replaces ecstasy (wajd) with existence (wujūd). The Persian translation (Hayākil, p. 100, l. 6), however, mistakenly has "wa ḥaddi", which does not fit the present context properly, and therefore should read "wajdī".

\(^{15}\) "Nafa’a", not "taqa’a" as H-N (p. 71) has it.
grants for everything that which corresponds to its own aptitude. Since the Agent is never altered, the thing caused by that Agent is renewed only by virtue of the renewal taking place in the aptitude of the recipient. A given thing may renew its effect and vary in the course of the renewal of the states of the recipient and by the alterations of those states but not by those of its own state. Consider, for instance, a single man who neither moves nor changes, but appears to be moving to the one(s) facing him, say, mirrors, for example, which reflect him in such various images as small, big, pure or impure (depending on the shapes of the mirrors). So, his appearance (in those mirrors) in diverse figures as such - whether he be small or big or pure or impure- would not be due to the person himself who is the possessor of the image nor due to his change but certainly because of the (variable) capacity of each mirror. Therefore the Grand and Almighty Truth has tied stability with stability and change with change so that He perpetuates the good and maintains the effusion persistently without stopping His benevolence, for His generosity is neither incomplete nor defective nor is it cut off on either side (i.e. it has no beginning and no end).

VII. Generosity means to donate that which is convenient without demanding anything in compensation for it, (because) whosoever donates in order to obtain compensation is penurious. Whereas the rich is the one who is self-sufficient in his essence and perfection and needs nobody other than himself. The absolutely rich is the One whose Existence is by His own Essence, that is the Light of lights (Nûr al-Anwâr). He has no purpose in His creation. On the contrary, His own Essence is indeed overflowing with benevolence. He is the absolute Sovereign, and the absolute Sovereign is the One on Whom depends the essence of everything, though His own Essence

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16 Dawwâni says, “His existence” (wujûdihi). (SH-H. p. 167.)

17 H-N. pp. 70-72; I-H. 32a7-8, 10-13, 16, 33a1-2, 3-5, 7-8, 10-33a1, 2-3, 6-8, 12-14, 33b2, 7-8, 10-11; SH-H. pp. 157-163, 165, 167; Hayâkil, 99-101.

18 Suhrawardî seems to have borrowed this definition of "jûd" from Ibn Sînâ who has already articulated it in his al-Ishârât wa al-Tanbîhât, (vol. 3, p. 555): “al-Jûd huwa ifâdatu ma yanbaghî la li’awadîn”, which was rendered into French by M. Goichon as follows: "La générosité est le don de ce qui convient sans égard à une compensation." (Idem, Livre Des Directives et Remarques, p. 398.)
belongs to nothing.

**VIII.** It is inconceivable that the "existence" (al-wujūd) be more perfect than it is, as it is, because the Essence of the Truth never requires that which is lower in value, (at the expense of) leaving aside that which possibly might be higher. On the contrary, what is indispensable for His Essence is that which is higher and the highest. Similarly, the reverse of the light is higher than the reverse of its reverse. Therefore it is impossible that existence be more perfect than it is as it is. And that which is impossible cannot enter into the capacity of anyone who has potency.\(^{19}\)

**IX.** Those who prolong the discourse on the subject of Good and Evil are the people who assume that the one which is higher turns towards the one which is lower and also imagine that God has no other world beyond this clod of darkness\(^{20}\) and that beyond these creatures\(^{21}\) He has no other nobler creatures. But they know not whether if all what actually happened had happened otherwise, this would have necessarily given rise to wicked events as well as corruption of the world-order in a manner incomparable to what they now imagine. Hence, this is the utmost possible stage of the order. The world that has no scope for diseases and defects is another world to where the pure ones amongst our souls will return. It is not the case that those sacred and sublime beings have no occupation other than uncovering the veils of decency, taking away the sucking (orphan) infants from the arms of their nurses, inflicting sufferings on the innocent, implanting (the seeds of) ignorance, leading the souls astray, honouring the ignorant, and grieving the erudite.\(\text{No}\), their business, in contrast to all, this is to meditate upon the lights of God the Exalted in every respect. The motions of these souls result in some inescapable consequences conducive to harm (of inferior worlds). If, on the other hand, they were in such a position that they would be beneficial for them (rather than harmful), then this could inflict harm on some other worlds, because they move not for the sake of the inferior worlds. However, their motions are indeed due to something that falls on them from the eternal radiations as well as

\(^{19}\) *H-N.* pp. 72-73; *I-H.* 33b13-15, 34a2, 3-4, 6-8, 12-13, 14, 16-17; *SH-H.* pp. 168-171, 174, 177; *Hayākil,* pp. 101.

\(^{20}\) I.e. "ālam al-'anāšir" (the world of elements). (*SH-H.* p. 178.)

\(^{21}\) I.e. "al-ḥayawānāt nāṭiquhā wa ṣāmituhā" (human beings and beasts). (*SH-H.* p. 178.)
from the divine lights. Both the great reverence that seizes them in the divine stations and the sacred dominant irradiations become so overwhelmingly influential on them that they cannot glance at even their own essences, let alone those of others. Nevertheless, they know all that is manifest and hidden; nothing escapes their knowledge and that of their Lord.

X. (All) that has been said regarding the necessary perpetuity of their movements can serve as a proof for the demonstration of the celestial bodies and also for their not being composed of the elements as well as for their being secured from corruption. Were they composed of them, they would eventually disintegrate and their movements would not be perpetual. Therefore, they have nothing to do with elements at all. In this connection, the warm moves only upwards by nature, just because it is light; whereas the cool moves downwards, for it is dense. And the humid admits and quits with ease a formation, conjunction and disjunction; the dry hardly admits them. The celestial spheres are not distorted at all, and they move not in a straight line nor towards the centre nor from the centre. Their movements, in contrast, are circular, turning around the centre. So, they are neither dense nor light nor warm nor cool nor humid nor dry. But they are of a fifth nature and surround the earth. If they were not so, i.e. if the sky did not surround the earth, the sun, when it sets in the west, could return to the east only by doubling the day. So, all the heavenly bodies are spherical, surrounded by one another, alive, rational, lovers of the sacred radiations, and obedient to their Originator; and there is nothing mortal in the ethereal world.22

XI. The first established23 relation that takes place in existence is the relation of the Existing and Subsisting Substance to the First Eternal Self-Subsistent. This relation is the mother and the noblest of all relations. It (i.e. the former) loves the First (i.e., the latter); and the First, due to Its Self-Subsisting Light, is so victorious and dominant over the other that It makes it too incapable to comprehend It and fathom the very essence of Its light. The relation mentioned here comprises two dimensions: Love (maḥabba) and domination (qahr). And one of these two dimensions is nobler than the other.

22 H-N. 73-76; I-H. 34b6-7, 8-9, 10, 11-13, 16-17, 35a1-4, 9, 11-12, 16-17, 35b1, 4-5, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 14-17, 36a3-6, 10, 12-13, 16, 17, 36b1; SH-H. pp. 177-183, 186-187; Hayākil, 101-103.

23 "Established" (thābit) does exist only in SH-H. (p. 189.)
The same relation prevails throughout the universes in such a way that all the various groups of the beings become joined to form a pair. So, all substances are divided into corporeal and incorporeal; and incorporeal is dominant over the corporeal, and it is also an object of its love. Then one of the two sides becomes inferior. Similarly, immaterial substance is categorized into two groups: one is that of the superior and dominant, the other is that of the inferior in rank, dominated and caused. Again, bodies too are classified too into ethereal and elemental. Some of the ethereal bodies are subdivided into those leading to bliss and those leading to domination, even they are further divided into two luminaries, one of which is the like of Intellect and the other the like of Soul. In the same manner, there is a superior one and an inferior, and the one on the right and the one on the left; and there is also the orient and the occident. Among animals, there is male and female. So, the perfect forms a couple with the imperfect so as to conform itself to the principal relation. He knows (this to be true), who understands the word of God: "And of everything we have created pairs, that you may perhaps contemplate." Since the Light is the noblest of the beings, the noblest of the bodies is the most luminous. This is the most sacred father, sovereign, the powerful Hurakhsh, the triumphant over darkness, the master of the sky, the Maker of day, the fully strong and perfect, the thaumaturge (the possessor of the wonders), the most magnificent of divine form, spreading its radiations over bodies but receiving nothing from them. (In this sense) it is the most perfect image of God and His most Magnificent Face. After this (i.e., the sun), ensue some other great sovereign beings, particularly the happiest sovereign and the owner of the good and blessings. Glory be to the One Who originates it, Blessed be God, the best of the Creators.

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24 "and its cause" (SH-H. p. 190; Les Temples, p. 60; Ḫiyā, Heyākilü'n-Nūr, p. 591; Yetkin, Nur Heykelleri, p. 28.)

25 Instead of "caused" (ma'lu'lu), Dāwānī has "passive" (munfa'il).(SH-H. p. 190.) However, Corbin has both. (Les Temples, p. 60.)

26 Qur'an, 51:49.

27 H-N. pp. 77-79; I-H. 36b4, 6-9, 11-12, 14, 17-37a1, 4-5, 8-10, 11-12, 14-15, 17-37b1, 3-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, 14-16, 38a1-4; SH-H. pp. 189-193; Hayākil, pp. 103-105.
1. Kinds of Motion

1. Suhrawardī now begins his inquiry into actual events that take place in the world. The difficulty he faces here, one which thinkers prior to him faced as well, consists in accounting for the relationship of these events with one another within the constraints of time and space as well as with the One, which is beyond those limitations.

The preliminary argument construed by Suhrawardī aims at ruling out the possibility of an endless chain of causes between any two successive events. He begins first by re-confirming the already established physical fact that every incidence (ḥādith) taking place in the domain of time requires a cause (sabab) or, as Dawwānī puts it, a spatio-temporal factor (amat), or a condition (shart) or an instrument (ālat). That cause in its turn needs another cause, beginning a process which goes on without interruption into the infinity. It may well stop, however, with something which is subject to renewal and change by itself. Although time undergoes renewal and change, yet its renewal is not with respect to itself, but with respect to its locus, that is to say motion, because "time is the measure (miqdār) of motion." And motion is said of every state of being which cannot be

28 Suhrawardī defines ḥādith in another place as follows: "all that which was not existent in a certain time and then did exist is hadith". (H-I. pp. 172-3.)


conceived as stable. If this is the case, then the real cause of the events should be nothing other than motion.

But what kind of motion is at work here? Straight or rectilinear motion (al-ḥaraka al-mustaqīma)? Or circular motion (al-ḥaraka al-dawriyya)? According to Dawwānī’s evaluation, it cannot be straight motion, for, in that case, it would be liable to be broken off. That is to say, it would no longer be continuous motion; on the contrary, it must be interrupted or cease somewhere, because every distance or length, irrespective of the direction in which it goes, is limited on the ground that all dimensions are finite. More accurately speaking, there occurs in between every two rectilinear movements a period of time for rest or pause. Although Suhrawardī, as Dawwānī points out, disagrees to a greater or lesser extent with the arguments put forward, nevertheless, he concedes that rectilinear motion, unlike circular, cannot be perpetual.

II. In addition, Dawwānī gives a detailed account of another of Suhrawardī’s proofs as it appears in the latter’s work entitled al-Muṭārahāt. In this book, Suhrawardī first divides the rectilinear motion into three types: (i) natural (ṭabīyya), (ii) coercive (qaṣriyya), and (iii) volitional (irādiyya), and later demonstrates that straight motion is limited and interrupted, while

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31 *H-I.* p. 172.

32 *SH-H.* p. 149.
circular motion is limitless and uninterrupted.\(^{33}\)

Anārāvī for his part reduces these three motions into two main divisions: (i) movement that takes place through someone's force, like the movement of a stone thrown by someone, and (ii) movement that takes place because of the very nature of the moving thing. The latter is also subdivided into two: (i) movement of which the moving thing is conscious, called volitional, like the movement of men and animals, and (ii) movement of which the moving thing is oblivious, called natural, like the movement of a bag made of skin which moves through the wind on the water, or like the movement of a stone that falls on the ground.\(^{34}\) Natural movement always goes towards its centre and never moves far beyond that centre.\(^{35}\) Therefore, since it is not an unceasing motion, it cannot be a cause for events.

If these three types of movement, as Suhrawardī indicates elsewhere, were to remain within the world of elements or corporeals or in the strict sense of the term, within the realm of \textit{barāzikh},\(^{36}\) they would cease to exist in a certain period of time. Moreover, when they occur within the limited boundaries of the dimensions (\textit{abād}), they are not perpetual at

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\(^{33}\) \textit{H-I.} p. 173; \textit{SH-H.} p. 149.

\(^{34}\) \textit{I-H.} 31a5-11.

\(^{35}\) \textit{I-H.} 31a11-12.

\(^{36}\) \textit{H-I.} p. 173.
all. On the contrary, whenever the mover, for instance a physical body, dissolves or passes away, its movements and actions accordingly come to a halt.

In this case, physical bodies by themselves cannot constitute the real cause of the movements of spatio-temporal events, which fail to exist for ever. Thus it would seem that the celestial spheres, which are in ceaseless motion, must be the ultimate cause for these events. Moreover, the motions of the celestial bodies are not only perpetual but are also volitional. They are neither natural nor coercive, for, were they natural, they would cease at a definite point and thus would be rectilinear. Were they coercive on the other hand, they would be dependent on the strength of the mover, and thus once again they would be moving straight and would stop at a particular point. In addition, Dawwānī adds that every coercion in itself involves an evil, but there is no evil whatsoever in the celestial spheres. They are, in contrast, pure good (khayr maḥḍ).38

2. The Motion of the Celestial Spheres

III. As we have seen in the preceding lines, Suhrawardī has set forth that every celestial sphere possesses a voluntary motion on its own. Now he embarks upon an inquiry into the source of this motion and its relation


38 Ibid.
to the body of the celestial sphere.

The soul of the sphere is the real source of the motion of the sphere. This causes a serious problem for Suhrwardī who has already admitted that the motion of the sphere is of a voluntary nature. Is the soul of the sphere something distinct from the sphere itself or its body? If it is separate from the sphere, then the sphere would no longer be moving voluntarily. On the contrary, it would be forced to move by the former, i.e. by the soul.

This may be better understood by the example of the earth, as illustrated by Dawwānī. The body or mass of the earth is one thing on its own and its form or shape another. This being the case, the latter is the cause of the movement of the former. So, the earth has a movement constrained by its form.³⁹ It is for this reason that Suhrwardī states: "on the assumption that both the sphere and its soul would be one and the same, it would have a volitional motion." Besides, Anḵaravī interestingly comments that "the celestial spheres are alive and perceptive of both their essences and their movements."⁴⁰

IV. Celestial spheres have nothing to do with the worldly bodies which necessarily undergo nourishment, growth and generation as well as corruption. Furthermore, they have, as has been already emphasized, circular movement as opposed to the terrestrial bodies which have


⁴⁰ I-H. 31a16-17.
rectilinear movement. Because the celestial spheres are all perpetual, they are never subject to generation and corruption.

Again, passion, anger, oppression and resistance, all of which are characteristics of bodies, cannot be attributed to the celestial spheres which are totally immaterial. All of these qualities cause alteration and passiveness in the beings to which they attach.

Furthermore, all celestial spheres are higher and nobler than the terrestrial bodies; therefore, their movements are not for the sake of the latter. Above all, they are the real agents that affect the terrestrial bodies.

V. Şarîh Ankaravî states that, according to Suhrawardî, once we purify ourselves from the preoccupations of our bodies and meditate upon "the magnificent Truth" (Kibriyāy-i Ḥak), the celestial bodies (ecrām-i etlāk), the terrestrial bodies ('anāšir) and the lights which radiate upon the beings, we will discover in our souls the shining lights (envār-i lāmi'a), the very lightnings (zātū'l-bürük), and also the manifest secrets (esrār-i sā'l'a), that is to say, the very illumination (zatū's-šürūk). As soon as these spiritual joys occur to us, Ankaravî concludes, we no longer have...

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43 Ibid.
44 The very same word exists also in the Persian translation. (Hayākil, p. 99, l. 9.)
45 I-H. 31b7-12.
desire for the corporeal world. 46

Dawwānī, on the other hand, turns his attention to a particular term, al-khurra, which occurs at this point in Suhrawardī’s Hayākil and which I have rendered as "the Light of the Glory". This term was employed by Suhrawardī in several of his other works with almost the same connotation as is found here. 47 Dawwānī relates on the authority of the prominent commentator of the Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 48 that "al-khurra" (=Xvarnah), a term of Pahlavi origin, designates, according to Azerbaijani Zoroastrian who is the author of the Book of the Zend, the Light that radiates from the very Essence of God and determines the hierarchy of the creatures. Again it is this Light by means of which all kinds of arts and activities are facilitated. Furthermore, this term had been compounded with that of "Kayān" 49 by the ancient virtuous rulers, for instance by the ruler Kay Khusraw, as noted by Suhrawardī in his al-Alwāḥ al-‘Imādiyya, and is

46 I-H. 31b12-13. The Persian translation imparts almost the same connotation with a slight difference. "So that we experience the spiritual delights which have no similarities in this world." (Hayākil, p. 99, I. 10.)

47 See, for instance, the following works by Suhrawardī: H-I, p. 157; al-Alwāḥ al-‘Imādiyya, in Three Treatises, p. 70; Kitāb al-Mashāri’ wa al-Muṭārahāt, in Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I, p. 504.


49 "Kayyān" is the name of a dynasty from Kayanides (Iranian Kingdoms); see Les Temples, p. 71.
considered also by those rulers as a light that arises in the soul.\textsuperscript{50} So, these two notions together denote the divine light that radiates from God upon the soul.

Dawwānī states that a profound reflection upon this sort of light, according to Suhrawardī, will enable us to experience and visualize in our souls the very essence of the illumination. And through this illumination we consequently arrive at a stage at which we forsake all the demands of this elemental world and thereby try to attain the world of light. Moreover, all that we find at this stage are the divine individuals whose forms and status in no way resemble the earthly ones, for they are entirely eternal and free from deterioration.\textsuperscript{51}

Anṣaravī however finds this view contrary to the Holy Scripture and the Prophetic Tradition.\textsuperscript{52} One possible reason for this is that he might have read Suhrawardī's text as "\textit{ashkhāṣ kaḥimatin ilāhiyya}" (divine noble individuals) instead of "\textit{ashkhāṣ kaḥima al-hay‘āt}" (divine noble forms). Although such reading, as Dawwānī himself admits, is also acceptable and compatible with some of the manuscripts, Anṣaravī may have misread it deliberately in order to emphasize his objections to doctrines which hinted


\textsuperscript{51} SH-H. p. 157.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{I-H.} 31b17.
at polytheism.

Let us return once more to what Suhrawardī has termed "the divine individuals", which are interpreted by Dawwānī as "celestial bodies" (al-ajrām al-falakiyya). The celestial bodies, as opposed to the terrestrial ones, receive unceasing illuminations from the sublime lights of God and even continuously desire to obtain illuminative assistance from those lights and thus move perpetually.

VI. The dominant light (nūr qāhir), for Suhrawardi, plays a role intermediate between God, from whom it receives its own existence and continuity, and the celestial soul to which it gives existence and continuity. Again it is by this supreme light that the celestial soul can observe the Glory of God as well as His luminous benedictions. Thanks to this mysterious observation, there emerges an illumination which, in turn, originates a movement on the part of the celestial soul. In other words, the celestial soul can attain a vision of God's gracious luminosity only by virtue of its own movement, generated by the illumination of the dominant light.

Whatever movement the celestial soul performs and whatever illumination the dominant light grants to it, the true nature of the reciprocal relationship between these two is, as Dawwānī rightly puts it, still unknown to us, for we live in an alien world. It is certain, nevertheless, that at the

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very bottom of this interaction, there lies one essential impetus, so to speak: the love for the Divine Light. The celestial soul, because of its love for the dominant light, namely the angelic light, and then God, proceeds to move by means of the illumination it obtains. Moreover, every movement enables it to receive another illumination, "as is the case of a man who prepares himself through the religious devotional practices to receive the sacred flashes of lights.\textsuperscript{55}

To explain this movement in more detail, Dawwānī refers us to the ecstatic life of the secluded mystics (ahl al-tajrid), who indeed experience in their souls a sacred but somewhat irksome (muz'ijan) ecstasy, whereby they commence to move by dancing, clapping hands and turning around. Through this joyous movement, they become ready and apt to receive more and more the flashes of the lights till the ecstatic state, for one reason or another, comes to an end. This is the secret of the spiritual musical audition (samâ').\textsuperscript{56} Meanwhile, Dawwānī's explanation of samâ' as such throws some light not only on the cosmological significance of that concept but on the intrinsic connection between Sufis' actual practices and philosophers' theories.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{55} SH-H. p. 158.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Similar mention is made also in Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's Mathnawi: Like ardent lovers, he discerned in the sound of the rebeck the image of God's call to man. The lament of the clarion and the threat of the drum bear a faint
\end{flushright}
Even Plato, the chief of philosophers, is reported to have experienced almost the same ecstasy, particularly when he sought to pray at which time he would set in motion the strength of his soul through the audition of certain melodies which move the soul by the power of domination (qahr) and love (maḥabba).\footnote{SH-H. p. 158.}

It is surprising, however, that no explanation to this effect is given by Anḵaravī, which one would not expect of a Mevlevī Seyh who, as we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis, stood firmly in defense of the performance of the mystical ceremonies, including samā‘, against the judicial authorities of his time. After all, he could have at least made mention of Dawwānī’s remark on this issue, because he, as we have indicated on several occasions, made great use of his commentary in certain places, though without naming him.

Anḵaravī takes Suhrawardī’s expression of “divine lovers” to mean “celestial spheres” (eflāk), and thus goes on to interpret the passage in question along exactly the same lines as Dawwānī does. According to their resemblance to that universal trumpet.

That is why philosophers say that these melodies are derived from the turning of the spheres.

What people sing with bandore and voice is the sound of the heaven’s revolution.

interpretation, it is thanks to both the generosity of God and the perpetual ecstasy \((wajd)\) of the divine lovers, viz. celestial spheres or souls, that temporal events are continuously happening. It is noteworthy that both commentators have read the term \(wajd\) (ecstasy) instead of \(wujüd\) (existence), the latter being reading in Abū Rayyān’s edition of \(Hayākil al-Nūr\).\(^{59}\) Dawwānī further continues to explain that these divine lovers, devoid of all material connections, closely emulate and resemble the divine lights which are the intellects.\(^{60}\)

Owing to the ever-lasting generosity and luminosity of God, every entity receives what is suitable and pertinent to its own aptitude \((al-isti’dād)\), which is generated by the celestial souls. More precisely, it is God who creates things and annihilites them, but it is the movement of the celestial souls that furnishes them with aptitude.\(^{61}\) In addition, this aptitude as such functions as a principle of change in existing beings. This would mean that for Suhrāwardī, God, though being the absolute Agent and Originator of everything, cannot be the cause of change, merely because He is never amenable to change in His essence nor is He changed by anything else.\(^{62}\)


\(^{60}\) SH-H. p. 160.


\(^{62}\) I-H. 33a1-2. "As is known, the dominating lights in no way receive alteration, since their alteration would only be possible via the alteration of (their) Agent that is the Light of lights. This is indubitably impossible, for there is no alteration in Him (i.e. God) nor in them (i.e. the dominating
Therefore objects, as An'aravi comments, are liable to change not by themselves but by the aptitudes bestowed upon them by the celestial souls. A single man, for instance, who does not display movement and change, when he faces several mirrors whose volumes, capacities and qualities are variable, will certainly appear in diverse images such as smaller if the mirror is small, bigger if it is big, brilliant if it is neat and dreary if it is dingy. Nonetheless, it does not show at any rate that he is transforming or transfiguring, since all changes that are reflected in the mirrors take place not because of the various forms of the man but rather due to the positions and states of the receptacles.

For Dawaynī, that man stands for the cause (‘illa), the various mirrors for the objects (mawādd), the diversity of these mirrors for the diversity of the aptitudes, and the diversity of the images for the diversity of forms and accidents. This being the case, all changes and differences observable in the world result from the various manifestations of the Cause, namely the Light of lights. An’aravi gives his support to Dawaynī’s remark by stating expressly that “the diversity of the objects never entails a flaw in the Essence (of God)”.

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63 I-H. 33a9-10.

64 SH-H. p. 163.

65 I-H. 33b1.
By his crucial statement that "in order to perpetuate the good (khayr) and maintain the effusion (al-fayḍ) God has linked stability (thabāt) with stability, and change (ḥudūth) with the change," Suhrawardī intends, declares Anḵaravī, to differentiate between the heavenly bodies and terrestrial or elemental ones in such a way that the former are stable in respect to God whose essence is also stable and who is their perfect cause; and since the caused do not enter into conflict with their cause, they must necessarily be stable.⁶⁶ As for those temporal incidents which occur in the lower world, even though they take place as a result of the movement of the celestial spheres, they are subject to alteration.

3. The Generosity of God in the Creation of the World

VII. According to Suhrawardī, God, as the most perfect Light, is the ultimate source for all the generosity and mercy prevailing throughout the universe. His incomparable generosity, as Anḵaravī articulates it, being in no respect deficient, recognizes no beginning nor end; therefore It is ceaseless".⁶⁷

Generosity consists simply in giving something valuable without taking or even expecting a substitute for it. In practical language, it may possibly be identified with the term charity which consists in making a

⁶⁶ I-H. 33b3-5.
⁶⁷ I-H. 33b12.
donation to a person or an organization deserving it. However, when this notion is employed with respect to God, it has to be taken in such a wider context that it signifies, without exception, every single act of God. That is why, as Suhrawardi explains, it is God who most clearly deserves to be called generous, simply because He is, needless to say, Self-Sufficient, Self-Subsistent and Self-Existent. Above all, He is the absolutely rich (al-ghanī al-muṭlaq), hence He can dispense with whatever exists besides Him.\footnote{One can find obvious affinity between Suhrawardi's definition and that of Ibn Sīnā who describes, in his Ilāhiyyāt, the notion of "jūd" along with that of "khayr". He says that the former applies mostly to the Giver or Agent (Fā'īl), while the latter applies to the recipient (Qābil). Thus the Agent represents the one from whom the act of "jūd" proceeds, whereas the recipient symbolizes the one who accepts it. (Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt II, p. 296.) In another passage of the same work, he makes it even more clear that "jūd" means full benefaction, since it would become "khayr" with respect to the receiver, and "jūd" with respect to the donor. (Ibid. p. 298.) He at the same time identifies wājib al-wujūd (necessary being) with al-khayr al-mahḍ (absolute good).}

In other words, as Ankaravi expounds, God, as the Light of lights and the most affluent Being, is in no need of anything for His own Essence and Perfection except Himself.\footnote{I-H. 34a1.} Moreover, "His Essence is a pure and great distributer of blessings."\footnote{I-H. 34a3.} He has no purpose in His act whatsoever. Therefore, as Dawwānī interprets, "nothing can induce Him to execute His
action for any matters whatsoever."

As a matter of fact, the issue at stake involves one of the great controversial problems of kalam, i.e. whether God is led to act by a motivating or inducing factor (bā’ith) or not. Of course, an affirmative response to this question yields another potential series of questions: What could motivate Him to act at one given matter in preference to another? Or on the other hand, what could prevent Him from acting at a given time? To what extent would these motivating factors lead Him to act? Or simply, is it possible for God to act on one matter but not on another? Leaving aside all these questions of detail, Suhrawardī, like Avicenna,\(^\text{72}\) goes to the heart of the matter and denies any motivation to God by simply noting that "He has no motivation in His act".

VIII. On the other hand, God's overall generosity eventually leads Suhrawardī to affirm his notorious but rather problematic principle of al-imkān al-ashraf (nobler possibility),\(^\text{73}\) according to which, whatever actually exists is the most perfect of all, and it is not conceivable that it would become more perfect than it is. This remarkable but controversial postulate,

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\(^{71}\) SH-H. p. 170.

\(^{72}\) Avicenna, especially when trying to prove the eternity of the world, deals largely with this matter and thereupon concludes that no given moment could have induced Him to bring the world into existence. (See Ilāhiyyāt II, p. 378 ff.)

\(^{73}\) John Walbridge describes it as the "most noble of contingency". (Idem, The Science of Mystic Lights, p. 65.)
which was foreshadowed to a certain extent by Avicenna and also touched on by Ghazâlî in a conceptually somewhat different form, occupies a substantial place in Ḥikmat al-Iṣḥāq. There Suhrāwardî discusses at great length the theory of emanation in conjunction with this principle. But here what concerns us most is not the exposition of that theory, nor even the principle itself, but one of its implications that appears in Hayākil al-Nūr. That is, that existence can be no more perfect than it is.

In Ankarâvî’s comments on the relevant passage, the emphasis is

74 Cf. Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishârāt wa al-Tanbîhāt, vol. 3, pp. 190 ff. In the meantime, Yazdi, drawing a comparison between Avicenna’s understanding of the same principle and that of Suhrāwardî’s, reaches the following conclusion: “To my understanding the Avicennan (principle of emanation) that from one, no more than one can issue forth has actually been the intellectual source of inspiration for Suhrāwardi’s rule of “nobler possibility”. Avicenna assigned the principle of “nobler possibility” to the “descending system”, Suhrāwardi provided his rule of “posterior possibility” (al-imkân al-akhaṣṣ) to the “ascending system”. (Idem, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy Knowledge by Presence, p. 193.)

75 E. Ormsby, who has discussed this subject at length, singles out four different versions of al-Ghazâlî’s crucial statement with regard to the perfection of the actual being. These are as follows: (i)”There is not in possibility anything whatever more excellent, more complete or more perfect than it is”. (Iḥyā’ Ulûm al-Dîn), (ii)”There is not in possibility anything more wonderful (abda’) than the form of this world or more excellent in arrangement or more complete in construction.” (al-Imlâ’ fi Mushkilât al-I Ḥyâ), (iii) “Nothing in possibility is more excellent than they, nor more perfect”. (Kitâb al-Arba’in), and (iv) “All existing things, from the number of the stars and their measure, the earth’s shape and that of animals and everything that exists, exist as they do only because it is the most perfect way to be...” (Maqâṣid al-Falâsîf) (Eric L. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute Over al-Ghazâlî’s “Best of all Possible Worlds” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 35-7.)

76 H-I. pp. 154-167.
put wholly on the connection between the status of this world and the nature of God. There it is stated that all that actually exists in this world is the most complete of all that is possible; if it were otherwise, namely were it possible to be more complete than it is, this would lead to the inescapable consequence that God chose inferior things over superior ones. But, says Ankaravi, this is entirely unacceptable, because God’s Essence is the most dignified, and therefore His Essence must be perfect and noble too.77 This point is more clearly specified in Dawwâni’s comments. According to him, if God can be assumed to have favoured what is less perfect, this would attribute such despicable properties as “ignorance,” “weakness” and “stinginess” to Him.78 Above all, such an assumption would fall in contradiction to His already established incommensurable generosity.

This point has been made more clearly by Ankaravi who illustrates it with the following example: had the body of an idol an aptitude, the Necessary Existent, God, could have given it a rational soul, for He invested everything with the best possible existence that fits best their aptitudes,79 as these verses from the Qur‘ān attest: “the doing of God Who perfected... 

77 I-H. 34a9, 11-13.
78 SH-H. p. 171.
79 I-H. 34b3.
everything".\textsuperscript{80} "...our Lord is He who gave to each (created) thing its form and nature, and further, gave (it) guidance."\textsuperscript{81}

**IX.** But as to Suhraward\textsuperscript{i}, there is no point, for him, in prolonging speculation on this matter. Anyone who does so, he claims, presumes wrongly that superior beings pay attention to inferior ones. Such a person would not think of the existence of another world beyond the present, i.e., the world of elements\textsuperscript{82}, nor would he even assume, apart from the existing things in this world, the existence of other entities such as intellects and celestial as well as rational souls\textsuperscript{83}, which are, because of their emanation from the higher beings, nobler than and superior to the former. Such a person, as long as he remains unaware of this fact, continues to stretch the discourse in vain.\textsuperscript{84}

One world, An\textsuperscript{karav} comments, which is free of any calamity or tribulation, is the world to which our souls will return.\textsuperscript{85} And all heavenly

\textsuperscript{80} Qur\textsuperscript{ān}, 27:88. In fact Suhraward\textsuperscript{i} interprets this Qur\textsuperscript{ānic} verse as confirming the very same idea: "Existence cannot possibly be more complete and more perfect than it is, as is indicated by the revelation: God\textquoteright s handiwork, who has made all things very well (27:88), alluding to the secure and solid order." Suhraward\textsuperscript{i}, al-Alw\textsuperscript{āh} al-\textsuperscript{Imādiyya}, p. 36, trans. by W. Chittick in his work, Faith and Practice of Islam, p. 217, n. 83.10.

\textsuperscript{81} Qur\textsuperscript{ān}, 20:50.

\textsuperscript{82} SH-H. p. 177.

\textsuperscript{83} I-H. 35a5.

\textsuperscript{84} SH-H. p. 179.

\textsuperscript{85} I-H. 34b17.
souls that exist in the superior worlds busy themselves exclusively with the contemplation of the divine lights.\textsuperscript{86} Above all, they are illuminated thoroughly by the "luminosity of the First Principle and of the intellects."\textsuperscript{87} Because of their immense preoccupation with illumination by the divine lights, they have no concern for inferior entities.\textsuperscript{88} Despite this, they know all the things that are both visible and invisible and all the incidents that take place in the temporal world.\textsuperscript{89}

X. Again, An̄karavī continues to explain that all the celestial bodies remain entirely secure from deterioration, for they are not composed of the elements. If this were otherwise, they would not be in a perpetual process of movement but rather in a temporal one.\textsuperscript{90}

Further evidence for the incorruptibility of the celestial bodies consists in the fact that they all are free, in their very construction, from being hot, cold, humid or dry. None of these dispositions affect them, because each displays on its own a distinct nature, which is by no means suitable to the celestial bodies. On the contrary, these four dispositions, as Dawwānī

\textsuperscript{86} I-H. 35a10.
\textsuperscript{87} SH-H. p. 180.
\textsuperscript{88} I-H. 35b3-4.
\textsuperscript{89} I-H. 35b6
\textsuperscript{90} I-H. 35b9, 13.
comments, belong exclusively to the four worldly elements.\textsuperscript{91}

All the celestial spheres or planets, for Suhrawardi, are alive, since they, as noted before, exhibit a volitional movement. They are at the same time rational (\textit{nātiqa}), just because they are cognitive (\textit{mudrika}) of universals (\textit{kulliyāt}).\textsuperscript{92} In addition, since they have adoration for their principles, viz. the beloved lights, they desire to resemble them.\textsuperscript{93} Due to this desire, they move continuously, remaining obedient to their originator.

4. The Hierarchy of Existing Beings

XI. The closing section of this temple, which was misplaced by Ankaravi at the very beginning of the forthcoming one, i.e. the sixth temple, concentrates on describing the viable interactive relationship that operates within the hierarchy of the existing entities in general and lights in particular. That system is based mainly on two principal concepts: that of adoration (\textit{īshq} or \textit{maḥabba}) and that of domination (\textit{qahr}).

In attempting to set up the system of correlation in the scheme of lights, Suhrawardi begins first by describing the intimate relation between the subsistent substance, which is the first intellect\textsuperscript{*} for Ankaravi\textsuperscript{94} or the

\textsuperscript{91} SH-H. p. 183.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} SH-H. 186; and cf. Ishārāt, vol. 3, p. 624.

\textsuperscript{94} I-H. 36b5-6.
"first caused" for Dawwānī, and the Eternal Self-Subsistent, which is the Necessarily Existent Being by Itself and Originator for other than Itself.95 This relation as such, being an overall source and representing the noblest one and a unique archetype for all other relations, appears either in the form of adoration (ishq) in which the first caused cherishes the First Cause, i.e. God, by aspiring to resemble Him, -between the two, no obstacle exists at all-,96 or in that of domination (qaht) in which God overwhelms the first light by virtue of His fully intensive and Self-Subsisting Eternal Light, so much so that the latter finds itself incapable of grasping the nature of the former’s Essence and Light.97 This can be further illustrated by the example of the sun as given by Dawwānī. The bright light of the sun dazzles a person’s eyes so intensively that it renders them almost incapable of seeing even the things around that person, let alone the sun itself.98

In other words, the relation just described operates in two dimensions, one descending and the other ascending. The former, characterized here as domination, runs from the one placed above, which is the cause and higher, towards the one below, which is the caused and lower. The latter, designated as adoration, works in the reverse direction,

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95 SH-H. p. 189.
96 Ibid.
97 I-H. 36b9-11.
98 SH-H. p. 189.
namely from the one below upwards to the one above. Nonetheless, the term love (maḥabba), as it is defined in Suhrawardī’s Hayākil and other works⁹⁹, also combines in itself these two dimensions -domination and adoration. For love becomes domination on the side of Cause, and adoration on the side of the caused.¹⁰⁰

This relation, which is portrayed in Dawwānī’s commentary as active (fiʿliḥ) and passive (infiʿāliḥ),¹⁰¹ prevails over all other relations existing in the universe. As Anḵaravi states, for example, corporeal bodies are dominated by souls, souls by intellects, and intellects by the Necessary Being.¹⁰² Each one in turn takes a place either superior to the one below or inferior to the one above. The principal determining factor for such ranking is the intensity of luminosity.

In the tangible world, there appear two existing lights, the sun and the moon. The former resembles the image of intellect, for it is a radiating agent; the latter, however, looks like soul, for it receives radiation and thus stands in a relatively passive position.¹⁰³ The sun is the noblest of all existing beings, because it is the most luminous of all. It is just like the

⁹⁹ “Each superior light has domination over the inferior, and each inferior light has adoration and amour for the superior.” (H-I. p. 136.)

¹⁰⁰ SH-H. p. 189.


¹⁰² H-N. 36b15-16.

sacred father, because "it is the source of light from which life emerges, as well as the fosterer of three kingdoms".\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, the sun is, in the Pahlavi language, the Hurakhsh, i.e. so powerful a light that nothing eclipses it; on the contrary it overwhims all.\textsuperscript{105} This is because it bestows light upon all stars, yet it borrows no light from any of them. In this sense, it is like God who spreads light upon all receptacles and dominates all other lights.\textsuperscript{106} "In brief, (God) the Light of lights is the sun of the intelligible worlds."\textsuperscript{107}

It is interesting to note here that Dawwânî explains the phrase "al-wijhat al-kubrā" (the most magnificent face), attributed to the sun and thus to God, in comparison with the term "Qibla". He states that in ancient religions (\textit{al-nawāmis al-qadīma}) as well as in those which succeeded them, the direction of prayers was towards a fire, called the "daughter of sun", as if it were produced by the latter because of its existence and appearance at all times and in all places, as opposed to the sun.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{SH-H.} p. 192.

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{106} A similar analogy is also drawn by al-Ghazâlî: "..the relation of the sum of things to Allah is, in the visible analogue, as the relation of light to the sun." (idem, \textit{Mishkāt al-Anwār}, p. 112.)

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{SH-H.} pp. 192-3. cf. also Corbin, \textit{Les Temples}, p. 82, n. 72.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{SH-H.} p. 193.
CHAPTER NINE

THE SIXTH TEMPLE

I. You should know that soul does not perish [with the annihilation of body],¹ for it possesses no substratum. So it has neither something contrary to it nor has it a rival to (itself). It continues to exist permanently along with the principle that perpetuates it. In between soul and body, there is but an accidental attachment caused by desire. The annihilation of this attachment does not cause the annihilation of the substance.²

II. You know that the pleasure and pain which each faculty experiences are only measured in proportion to the capacity of its perfection and perception. The pleasure and pain of every object are peculiar to itself. Thus the fragrant objects (perfume) pertain to the sense of odour, and the objects of taste to the sense of taste, and the touchable objects to the sense of touch and the like. So for everything there is something that fits it. As for the perfection of intellectual substance, it is by way of contemplation of the gnostic knowledge: knowledge of God, knowledge of worlds, knowledge of order and in sum all knowledge related to the affairs of origin and return (al-mabda’ wa-l-ma’ād)³. It (perfection) is also (obtained) by way of transcending the faculties of body. Otherwise (if these conditions were not met), it would become imperfect. The pleasure and pain (the intellectual substance feels) are dependent on (the degree of) perfection or imperfection it has.⁴

That which is delightful or hateful (delicious or odious) may sometimes be obtained without sensing pleasure and pain. For instance, a man who receives a blow or becomes greatly intoxicated,

¹ This phrase is omitted in I-H.


³ Translated by Corbin as "genesis and eschatology" in Les Temples, p. 61.

⁴ H-N. p. 80; I-H. 38a17-38b1, 4-6, 9-11, 15, 17; SH-H. p. 199; Hayākil, p. 105.
cannot feel the harm caused by that blow; nor even can he feel the
pleasure resulting from the presence of his beloved. In so far as
soul is preoccupied with body, due to its being intoxicated by nature,
it takes no pleasure in virtues nor pain in wickedness.

III. But when the separation of soul from body takes place,
miserable souls are chastised because of their ignorance and
miserable state in darkness as well as their yearning for the sensory
world, although "between them and their desires is placed a
barrier..." Their faculties have been stripped off; so they no longer
have eyes to see nor ears to hear. The luminosity of the sensory
world remains far beyond their reach, nor can the light of the sacred
world reach them. They stay perplexed in darkness; and darkness
means the absence of light. Once they are cut off from the two
lights, they begin to be overwhelmed by fear, dread, affliction and
anxiety as a necessary consequence of darkness. Therefore,
whosoever alters the mood of his spirit, he will fall in darkness and
sorrow, as in the case of the people of melancholia, upon whom fear
and anxiety also fall. This being the case, it will be even more so
with the states of those who fall in darkness, being desperate for
liberation and experiencing pain and being associated with anguish
(al-ḥasarāṭ).6

IV. As for the virtuous and excellent souls, being in proximity to God,
"they obtain that which no eye has seen and that which no ear has
heard and that which no human mind has conceived," by
contemplating the Lights of God and plunging in the ocean of light.

5 Qur'an, 34:54.

6 This word is substituted with al-ḥasarāṭ (insects) in Ankaravi's
commentary (I-H. 40a1), in Dawwānī's (SH-H. p. 202), in the Persian
translation (Hayākil, p. 106). (H-N. pp. 81-2; I-H. 39a2-4, 10-12, 14-17,

7 The statement in quotation marks alludes to the famous ḥadīth of the
Prophet: "I have prepared for my righteous servants things which have
never been seen by an eye, or heard by an ear, or imagined by a human
being." (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, vol. 4, pp. 307.) Cf. "No soul knows what is
hidden for the delights of the eye." (Qurān, 32:17.), and "...eye has not
seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things
which God has prepared for them that love him." (Bible, I Corinthians 2:9.)
Thus to them occurs by *habitus*\(^8\) the *angelic state* in which happiness lasts forever. These souls return to their father, who, as an irresistible and crushing force as well as the possessor of the excellent theurgy, stands victorious (dominant) over the heads of the dragons in the darkness, and a father who, being a very close neighbour to the Beneficent God, crowned with the coronet of proximity in the Sovereignty (*Malakūt*) of the God of the worlds, is the Holy Spirit. And they (those souls) are drawn by this Spirit, just as an iron needle is attracted by a magnet.\(^9\)

**V.** Just as there is no direct relation between the faculties of sense perception and the soul, -for the perception of the soul is more complete and comprehensive than that of the faculties-nor even between the lights of God, the spiritual entities and sensible objects, there is likewise no direct relation between the intellectual pleasure and the sensuous pleasure.\(^10\)

**VI.** The First loves only His own essence; and His essence is beloved by Himself as well as by others. No pleasure amounts to the pleasure of those who are near to Him. When the virtuous souls come out of the darkness of the temples to the splendour of *Jabarūt* (Might) and thus rise over\(^11\) the nobilities of *Malakūt*, then to them will be revealed by the Light of God all that which has no common measure with what is visible to the eyes by the light of the sun. Anyone who denies (the existence of)\(^12\) the spiritual pleasures is analogous to the one who is impotent and thus denies sexual pleasure. For such a person would regard the beasts as superior to

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\(^8\) I have read the text as "bi’l-malaka," and not as "wa’l-malaka" as it appears in the text. Cf. Suhrawardi’s similar statement in the introduction to *H-I.* (p. 13.)

\(^9\) *I-H.* 40a6-9, 12-3, 16-40b2. The whole passage from the end of this line up to the end of this temple is left out of Anḳaravī’s commentary (*I-H*).

\(^10\) *H-N.* pp. 82-3; *SH-H.* pp. 199-204; *Hayākil* (incomplete), p. 106

\(^11\) Instead of "ashraqat" that exists in both the base text of *H-N* and *SH-N*, I have taken "ashrafat" as it appears in ms. B of *H-N* (p. 84, n. 2).

\(^12\) *Les Temples*, p. 63.
the angels and spiritual beings.\textsuperscript{13}

1. Immortality of Soul

I. This temple, which is integrated by An\c{c}aravi\ddot{\text{"u}} into the beginning of the seventh temple and which is even incomplete in his version, deals at great length with the immortality of the rational soul. It must be immediately pointed out that for this temple An\c{c}aravi\ddot{\text{"u}}, in comparison with the previous ones, provides relatively little commentary and even leaves untouched some passages therein which deserve particular attention.

As we have seen in the second temple, Suhraward\i, like Ibn S\i\n\a yet in different form, first denies the pre-existence of the human soul and later asserts that it comes into existence at the same time with the body. As is well known, the latter's argument for this rests generally on his proposition that the relation between soul and body is one of substance and corporeality. Furthermore, he employs the very same argument to demonstrate the immortality of the soul.\textsuperscript{14} Suhrward\i for his part acknowledges the immortality of the soul, yet develops a new argument based upon his notion of light. But broadly speaking, it is true also for him, as for Ibn S\i\n\a, that the soul does not pass away with the corruption of the body, because it is an immaterial substance and independent of the latter.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{H-N.} pp. 83-4 (including n. 3), \textit{SH-H.} pp. 204, 206-208; \textit{Hay\ddot{a}kil}, pp. 106-107.

\textsuperscript{14} See for Ibn S\i\n\a's detailed account of the immortality of the soul, Rahman, \textit{Avicenna's Psychology}, p. 62 ff.
The apparent attachment between the two is rather of accidental, caused by desire. More precisely, the body, corporeal in its entirety, is not a locus for the soul, which is pure substance. This being the case, the death of the former does not entail the destruction of the latter.

Suhrawardi thus emphasizes that soul persists, even after the death of body, along with its principle (mabda'uhā). Ankaravi explains this point by saying that the cause ('ille) of the rational soul is permanent (bākī), the caused (i.e. the soul) becomes permanent too. Yet he does not specify as to whom or what this cause refers to. For Dawwānī, however, that principle is the intellect (al-‘aqīl), which is also its cause and ultimately finds its source in the Necessarily Existent Being, God. In other words, it is, as Corbin expresses it (basing himself on Suhrawardi’s own terminology), the tenth intellect, the Holy Spirit, the "Donor of forms" or its father.

Dawwānī explains Suhrawardi’s statement that "the rational soul possesses no substratum" by saying that whatever perceives its own essence, is independent and is neither dependent upon, nor a qualifier for, others at all. Besides, the soul, as a self-conscious immaterial substance, has no opposite (al-ṣidd), for it is not an accident inhering in the body. On the other hand, the contrast in fact is applicable only to those things which

15 I.-H. 38a12-3.
16 SH-H. p. 194.
17 Les Temples, p. 83, n. 80.
are accidents and which are amenable to dimension and disparity, like whiteness and blackness. Moreover, it has no rival which could compete with and thus cancel it out, as in the case of two mutually exclusive forms such as water and air.

It is true, Dawwānī continues to argue, that the soul comes into being together with a given body, a body with its proper qualities (ṣifāt) becomes ready to receive the soul. In other words, the body and its qualities are prerequisites for the origination of the soul (ḥudūthihi) but not for its persistence (baqāʾihi).

In Dawwānī's commentary, one can find a comparative analysis of the relationship between body and soul within the two schools of philosophy, peripatetic and illuminationist. On the genesis of the soul as well as its survival after the corruption of the body, these two schools are in complete agreement. The illuminationist philosophers, nevertheless, differ from the peripatetics in identifying the soul as a pure immaterial light (al-nūr al-mujarrad). So, for them, the soul, as an immaterial light, does not perish at all, and nor does it admit of privation ('adam) in itself, for it is manifest to its essence. Since it is linked originally to the superior lights, it continues to

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18 *SH-H.* p. 194.

19 Ibid.

20 *SH-H.* pp. 194-5.
survive so long as the latter do.\footnote{SH-H. p. 198.} Moreover, the soul's degree of perfection is commensurate with its self-consciousness or manifestness to itself. At this point, Dawwānī underlines the significance of the notion of “degrees of luminosity,” a notion which manifests a marked originality in Ḥūṣrāqi philosophy. He states that all what appears as accidents is, itself, a degree of luminosity; the individuality of the soul is, therefore, permanent.

On the other hand, each faculty that the rational soul possesses experiences pleasure and pain on different levels according to the capacity of its perfection and perception. That is to say, all the senses, smell, touch, taste, sight and hearing, as well as the internal senses, whatever fits their respective power of perception and perfection.\footnote{I-H. 38b4-5; SH-H. p. 199.}

II. But as for the perfection of the intellectual substance (al-jawhar al-‘āqiṭ), it is realized through contemplation of the gnostic knowledge of God and His attributes (ṣifātihi), of the worlds (ʿawālim) and the order and events that exist in those worlds, and of the matters which pertain to both the origin and end of life. Moreover, the intellect needs to be released from the faculties of the body as well as all that they are attached to. In other words, the intellect can accomplish its real perfection by two important means: (i) thorough knowledge or gnosis (al-maʿrifa) of those things just mentioned, and (ii) complete remoteness (al-tanazzuh) from the faculties and their
preoccupations.\textsuperscript{23} So, the pleasure and pain that the intellect experiences depends on the perfection that it acquires by those two means.

Dawwānī interprets pleasure (\textit{ladhdha}) as "the perception of the perfection" and pain (\textit{alam}) as "the perception of the lack of perfection".\textsuperscript{24} Both pain and pleasure can be experienced, according to Suhrawardī, even without the help of the senses. In stating this, says Dawwānī, Suhrawardī makes an explicit indication to the pleasure and pain of the intellect as opposed to that of senses. One would be delighted, for instance, at the acquisition of contemplative perfection. Moreover, the pleasure which one receives from such perfection is more complete and delightful than that which he acquires from sensory perfection. By the same token, the loss of contemplative perfection is more painful than that of sensory perfection.

However, the soul, in so far as it is preoccupied with the body, does not feel pain as a consequence of all that is reprehensible and vicious. Nor does it take pleasure in all that is admirable and virtuous. This is because the soul becomes entirely intoxicated by "the natural disposition of the body" (\textit{\textit{\textit{tabī\'at al-badan}}}, which is described, according to some exegetes, as the tree forbidden to Adam.\textsuperscript{25} The soul can be liberated from such intoxication,  

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{SH-H.} p. 199.  
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{SH-H.} p. 200.  
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{SH-H.} p. 200.
Ankaravī remarks, only when it departs from the body.\(^{26}\)

2. The Condition of the Soul After the Death of the Body

III. After its separation from the body, the soul, if it is in a miserable condition due to its ignorance of and desire for the world of senses, would become afflicted with grief. In such a situation, it is deprived of not only the radiation of the sensory world but also the sacred light, which is, according to Dawwānī’s comment, the light of the world of intellect.\(^{27}\) That is to say, the rational soul in this miserable state is cut off from two lights: the light of sense (\(nūr\) al-
\(hī\)\(ss\)) and the light of intellect (\(nūr\) al-
\(‘a\)l\(q\)).\(^{28}\) In Ankaravī’s interpretation, they are the light of hearing (\(sāmī‘a\)) and that of sight (\(bāsīra\)).\(^{29}\)

Whatever these lights may be, once they are cut off, the soul falls into total darkness in which it consequently becomes confused and bewildered by fear, worry and anxiety. As an example of this Suhrawardī points to melancholiacs (\(al-malikholya\)), who fall victim to a kind of spleen or madness which, as Dawwānī interprets, alters their thinking and

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\(^{26}\) I-H. 39a17-39b1.

\(^{27}\) SH-H. p. 201.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) I-H. 39b13.
reasoning from the state of natural flow to that of corruption.\textsuperscript{30} Or as An\c{c}karavî comments, the natural disposition and temperament of their animal spirit would undergo an alteration.\textsuperscript{31}

IV. As for the virtuous and excellent souls (\textit{al-\c{s}âlih\textit{at} al-f\c{d}il\textit{at}}), they are near to God and obtain, according to one of the Prophet’s hadith, those beautiful things which no eye has seen, which no ear has heard and of which no human mind could ever conceive. In his comments on this issue, An\c{c}karavî declares that these are the people who, having ever occupied themselves with doing good deeds (\textit{a'mâl-i salih\textit{a}}), render their souls virtuous. Some of them constitute the following groups: prophets (\textit{enbiy\textit{a}}), saints (\textit{evliy\textit{a}}), well-doers (\textit{\c{s}\c{u}leh\textit{a}}) and believers (\textit{m\={u}min\textit{in}}).\textsuperscript{32}

Dawwânî, for his part, prefers rather to describe these souls in strictly philosophical terminology as the "perfect souls". So, of the two components of Suhrawardî’s phrase above, \textit{al-\c{s}âlih\textit{at} al-f\c{d}il\textit{at}}, the latter, in Dawwânî’s understanding, refers to the souls which attain "theoretical perfection" (\textit{al-kam\={a}l al-\textit{ilmi}}), while the former denotes the souls which attain the "practical perfection" (\textit{al-kam\={a}l al-\textit{amal}}).\textsuperscript{33} These rational souls contemplate the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{SH-H.} p. 201.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} I-H. 40a1, 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} I-H. 40a9-10.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{SH-H.} p. 202. This is reminiscent of Avicenna’s division of philosophy into two theoretical and practical, both of which, according to him, aim chiefly to perfect human soul. (See above n. 7, in the Prolegomena.)
\end{itemize}
Necessarily Existent Being, the superior beings and all the marvellous things of the world of light. Moreover, they come into complete contact with the immaterial lights whose luminosity is never exhausted. They are so deeply submerged, Dawwānî goes on, in the radiations effused from the sublime principles or beings mentioned above that they attain the state of angelicity (al-malakiyya) in which they are completely immune from physical stain, passion and impurity. As a result they begin living there "a sheer contemplative life" (al-ḥayāt al-aqliyya al-ṣirfa).\(^{34}\) At this stage, they can even reach the rank of angels,\(^{35}\) where they enjoy continuously contemplating their beloved supreme lights and thus take pleasure in their illumination. According to Anḵaravī, however, when these virtuous souls happen to be in those two states, they become equipped with the Divine power and delighted with both physical and spiritual pleasures.\(^{36}\) It should be noted at this moment that Anḵaravī, by adding "physical pleasures" to the virtuous souls, not only deviates from the original text of the Ḥayākil, but in fact aims to place its author, Suhrawardī within the fold of orthodox Islam.

Anḵaravī goes on to explain that all of these virtuous and excellent souls ultimately return to their father, the Holy Spirit, who is the principal origin and lord of their species. It is from him that they receive knowledge


\(^{35}\) The term "malakiyya" is substituted in Dawwānî’s commentary with the term "mala‘ika," meaning angels. (*SH-H.* p. 202.)

\(^{36}\) *I-H.* 40a14-5.
of the unseen (gaybiyye), of Scripture (dīniyye) and of the mysterious certainty (esrār-i yakiniyye).\textsuperscript{37} Besides, this Holy Spirit, according to Suhrawardī, "stands victorious over the heads of the dragons in the darkness".\textsuperscript{38}

The phrase "heads of the dragons in the darkness" is elucidated by Dawwānī as follows:

These are the human temples, which are the abode of the dark forces. As for the lord of the species (the Holy Spirit), he is the one who trains these temples until they attain their perfection. Again it is he who pours forth the souls over these temples; afterwards he liberates the former from their lowly (depressing) state, leading them, as far as their capacity permits, towards perfection.\textsuperscript{39}

The Holy Spirit as such, in Suhrawardī's eyes, is "an irresistible and crushing force", which means, according to Dawwānī's explanation, the destroyer of all those dark idols (al-aṣnām).\textsuperscript{40} When it is seen in a mystical sense, as Corbin states, it comes to denote that the father, the Holy Spirit, causes the destruction of the corporeal temple, which is the human body, and thus sets free "the spiritual temple", which is the soul, by leading it to its rank of spiritual individuality and perfection.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{37} I-H. 40b3-5.
\textsuperscript{38} H-N. p. 86.
\textsuperscript{39} SH-H. p. 203; cf. Corbin's translation in Les Temples, p. 84, n. 89.
\textsuperscript{40} SH-H. p. 203.
\textsuperscript{41} Les Temples, p. 84, n. 89.
In this connection, the Holy Spirit, portrayed by Suhrawardī as "the owner of the excellent theurgy," is conceived of by Dawwānī as "the possessor of the human form," which is the best and noblest of all the forms. This interpretation is confirmed by the Qur'anic verse: "certainly We have created man in the best of mould." Being the principle and originator of the human species, the Holy Spirit is very near to God, even the nearest in an absolute sense, according to some Sufi masters. And it dwells in the world of malakūt, namely the world of souls, which is intermediary between the world of jabarūt (i.e., Intellects) and that of mulk (i.e., bodies). The world of malakūt, which is also called the "minor world" (malakūt-u kuchuk) in the Partaw-nāmah, Suhrawardī's other Persian treatise on light, has control over the corporeal world.

V. Towards the end of the present temple Suhrawardī puts emphasis on the dichotomy between the faculties of sense perception and the soul, between spiritual entities and sensible objects, and between the pleasure


43 Qur'an, 95:4.

44 SH-H. p. 203.

of intellect and that of the senses. This important section, however, has been overlooked by Ankaravi for some unknown reason. One can justifiably question his doing so by considering the fact that he, as has been so far observed in this research, made extensive use of Dawwani's commentary, which itself does contain the complete text of the \textit{Hayqkil}. Besides, as we have often noted, he has also consulted to a certain extent the Persian text, which, though not complete, yet does include the section at stake. In view of these two facts, one can presume that Ankaravi's reason for such an omission must have been deliberate. This can be best explained with reference to his position as an advocate of what he might call orthodox Islam. He might have found the content of the rest of this temple, which concentrates largely on the intellectual and spiritual pleasure and pain of the soul after the death, incompatible with the orthodox view of Islam. Although Suhrawardi makes no explicit indication as to whether he would deny bodily resurrection\footnote{In fact Suhrawardi's affirmation of the world of "Suspected Images" (\textit{al-muthul al-mu'allaqah}), which lies between the spiritual and physical worlds, allows him to develop his own theory of eschatology, a theory which differs from that of Avicenna especially in recognizing, though by no means explicitly, the resurrection of the body. It is in the world of images where "imagination takes place of sense perception", and it is there that "the resurrection of the body takes place, the divine figures (such as angels) become real and all the prophetic eschatological statements come true." Fazlur Rahman, "Dream, Imagination and \textit{"Alam al-Mithal}," \textit{Islamic Studies} 3 (1964), p. 170.} - a doctrine which would appear contrary to the literal meanings of the Scripture, and in support of which philosophers had
advanced quite a number of arguments that were later repudiated by al-Ghazālī—nevertheless he insists on purely spiritual states of the soul in the realm of the intelligibles, to the exclusion of the states of the body. Because of this implication, it is most likely that Ankaravi avoided purposely dealing with such a controversial issue and thus neglected this part. But all in all, such an attitude proves once again his attempt at making Suhrawardī appear "orthodox." Now I shall continue to explain the text, relying only on Dawwānī’s commentary.

First of all, Suhrawardī’s contention that there is no direct relation between the sensible faculties and the soul is explained by Dawwānī as saying that what the soul perceives by its rational faculties is more complete, more comprehensive, more ample and more precise than what it perceives by its sensible faculties. The perception of the latter, in contrast to that of the former, involves exterior entities which are finite, not the realities which are interior and infinite. Apart from this, all that is conceived through rational faculties persists along with the survival of the soul, whereas all that is perceived by the senses perishes with the demise of the instruments, namely the external and internal senses.47 Meanwhile the same sharp distinction above is extended also by Suhrawardī to between the pleasure of the sensible faculties and that of the rational faculties. So in brief, not only the rational faculties themselves but also their way of

perception, including all that they perceive and taste, are nobler and more superior than the sensible faculties.

As far as the spiritual entities and Divine lights are concerned, they possess their own distinct form of contemplation, which operates exclusively on the basis of the concept of love or amour (‘ishq). To begin with, the First, i.e., the Necessarily Existent, loves His own essence. Amour, as Dawwānī explains on the basis of Ţūsī’s commentary on the Ishārāt, is the delight (ibtihāj) at the presence of the beloved, while desire (shawq) is the motion towards the realization of that delight, which can be conceived either when the beloved, although absent, becomes present in a certain way or when it becomes present only in the imagination. So in the First Being as well as in other intellects there is only love, no desire, whereas in the celestial souls, love and desire are found together.\(^{48}\)

VI. The essence of God, Dawwānī goes on to comment, which is perfect in every respect, becomes an object of love both for Himself and others. And both of them take pleasure in visualizing that essence.

\(^{48}\)SH-H. p. 203. Dawwānī has extracted this detailed analysis of love and desire from Naṣīr al-Dīn Ţūsī commentary on Avicenna’s Ishārāt. There he explains that the volitional movement emanates either from sensible representation (tasawwur ḥissī) or from intellectual comprehension (tasawwur ‘aqīl). In the case of the former, the incentive (dā’) is either concupiscent (shahwānī) or irascible (ghaḍābī). But in the case of the latter, there is no incentive as such, simply because it is the intellect from which it proceeds. So the movements of the celestial spheres more or less resemble the movements which proceed from our practical intellect. (Ibn Sīnā, al-Ishārāt ma’a Sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn Ţūsī, vol. 2-3, p. 568.)
However, since God's visualization is more complete than that of others, the pleasure He obtains therefrom will be equally stronger and more delightful than that of all others. Furthermore, "there is no one near the splendour of His Majesty, because of other's annihilation in that splendour."\(^{49}\)

At the end of this *haykal*, Suhrawardi, reverting once again to the conditions of the righteous souls, declares that when they are entirely freed from the temples of darkness, they rise towards the splendour and illumination of the worlds of *Jabarūt* and *Malakūt*. The former, which, as noted before, is the world of intellects, is called thus because, as Dawwānī expounds, it is indispensable for the fulfilment of the natural perfection as well as the preservation of the rational soul. In the world of *Jabarūt*, the soul witnesses "the splendid beauty of the Divine lights", while in the world of *Malakūt*, the world of souls, it becomes illumined by the celestial souls.\(^{50}\)

When the souls have ascended to these noble stations, to them will be unveiled by the Light of God all that is immeasurable with all that is visible to the eyes by the light of the sun. This will generate ample spiritual pleasure in the beholder of that Light, which is distinct from any material pleasure and to which Dawwānī brings as an example the following verse: "Is one whose heart Allah has opened to Islam, so that he has received

\(^{49}\) *SH-H*. p. 206.

\(^{50}\) *SH-H*. p. 207.
enlightenment from Allah. To this he adds also the hadith: "I pass the
night with my Lord who provides me with food and drink."

Rejecting such spiritual pleasure is tantamount, in Suhrawardī's view,
to the denial of sexual enjoyment. While commenting on this issue,
Dawwānī, quoting from the Partaw-nāmah, states that after separation from
their bodies, all that these souls will visualize in those luminous stations is
incommensurate to all that they have visualized in the present world.
Nevertheless, there are souls or mystics who visualize in this world what
would be superior or at least equal to what the others will visualize in the
next world. In support of this idea, Dawwānī relates on the authority of Sahl
b. 'Abdillah al-Tustarī that "some gnostics visualize God in this world in a
more perfect way than others visualize Him in the hereafter." But those
who are preoccupied and even obsessed with the physical pleasures of the
world in which they live presently may not be able to perceive the spiritual
pleasure of the angels and the sanctified entities, namely the pleasure of
the intellects and the celestial souls.

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51 Qur'ān, 39:22.

52 Wensinck, Concordance, vol. 1, p. 235.

CHAPTER TEN

THE SEVENTH TEMPLE

I. The rational souls are from the substance of the Malakūt. The faculties of body as well as their preoccupations diverted them from their own world. However, once the soul has become strengthened with (the aid of) spiritual virtues, and once the dominance of the physical faculties accordingly has grown weaker by the diminution of the nourishment and the prolongation of insomnia, it becomes free and even occasionally hastens to join the sacred world. Then it enters into communion with its sacred father and acquires thereof knowledge (ma‘ārif). At the same time, it also communes with the celestial souls, which are cognizant of not only their motions but also the necessary consequences of those motions. Regardless of whether it is asleep or awake, it acquires from them (i.e. the celestial souls) knowledge of the unseen (realities) in the same way that a mirror receives the image of the object facing it.

II. It so happens that the soul contemplates something intelligible to which the faculty of imagination assigns a corresponding form. That form is reflected in the sensory world exactly in the same way as the sensed images are mirrored in the treasure of the representation. In this state, the soul either contemplates various wondrous forms confided in it or hears some words articulated to it [without seeing the articulator] or a hidden reality appears to it or an apparition occurs as if it is ascending and descending. However, in the case of an immaterial entity which is seen in apparition, such ascent and

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1 "From its own cause". (H-N. p. 85.)

2 It is replaced by "sacred spirits" in Hayākil (p. 107, l. 12).

3 The whole text to this point is lacking in Anḳaravi’s commentary. H-N. p. 85; SH-H. p. 209; Hayākil, p. 107.

4 Les Temples, p. 64.

5 Abū Rayyān’s edition reads "a concrete reality". (H-N. p. 85.)
descent would be impossible, for it is released of the concomitants of the material bodies. An apparition in fact is a corporeal shadow which imitates the spiritual states of that entity. As for dreams, they are also an imaginative imitation of what the soul visualizes [in the spiritual world].\(^6\) By this I mean the authentic and genuine dreams, not the muddled ones which emanate from the facetious fantasy of the devil.\(^7\)

III. The divine\(^8\) souls sometimes move with a sacred joy. Then the Light of the First Truth rises upon them to which surrender all the elements in the world. It is evident to you that a piece of heated iron, because of its contact with the fire, takes on (the colour of) the latter, and it also executes the same action [for instance, burning]\(^9\) as does the fire. In that case you should not be astonished at the fact that when the soul is illuminated, enlightened and irradiated by the Light of God, all the creatures obey it just as they obey the sacred beings. Among those who are in quest for the Orient,\(^10\) there are people who turn their faces towards their “Sacred Father,”\(^11\) seeking light. Thus to these people, certain sacred splendours become conspicuous, just as the visit of the guest becomes known by the flashes surrounding him. In fact the guidance of God reaches the chosen people who, raising their hands,\(^12\) await the heavenly sustenance. When their eyes are opened, they find God dressed in the garment of glory. His name is above the domain of the \textit{Jabarūt}, and underneath the beams of His light there is a group of people

\(^{6}\) Les Temples, p. 64.

\(^{7}\) \textit{H-N.} pp. 85-6; \textit{SH-H.} pp. 210-11; \textit{I-H.} 40b5-9, 15-41a1, 5-7; \textit{Hayākil,} pp. 107-108; \textit{Les Temples,} p. 64.

\(^{8}\) In the base text of \textit{H-N.} (p. 87), “muta‘alliha” (divine) is replaced by “nāṭiqā” (rational).

\(^{9}\) This exists only in Dawwārī’s commentary. (\textit{SH-H.} p. 212)

\(^{10}\) “Mustashriqīn”, which is omitted in \textit{Hayākil,} is translated by Corbin as “the pilgrims of the mystical Orient”. (\textit{Les Temples,} p. 64.)

\(^{11}\) “Sacred” is omitted in both \textit{I-H} and \textit{H-N.}

\(^{12}\) This is omitted in \textit{H-N.}
beholding Him.  

IV. It is incumbent upon the one endowed with the faculty of inner perception to believe firmly in the verity of the messages of the prophets as well as in the fact that the parables of the prophets point to the realities, as it is stated in the Qurān: "Such are the parables We set forth for mankind, but only those understand them who have knowledge,"  
and as one of the prophets has admonished as saying: "I would like to open my mouth in parables." Therefore, the prophets are entrusted with the revelation, while the supreme epiphany, [the pure spirit and light], the Paraclete, is entrusted with the interpretation and explanation, as the Christ forewarned when he said: "I shall go to my Father and your Father in order that he send you the Paraclete who will inform you by virtue of interpretation." He also said: "The Paraclete whom my Father will send to you in my name will instruct you in all things." The phrase "in my name" is meant to indicate that He will be called Christ, for He will be anointed [or consecrated] by the Light. To this is made an allusion in the Qurān: "afterwards it is for us to explain it." The term "afterwards"

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14 Qurān, 29:43.

15 Bible, Matthew 13:13, 35.

16 This part is included in both SH-H (p. 215) and Les Temples (p. 65).


19 Les Temples, p. 65.

20 The whole sentence exists in I-H., SH-H. And it also appears in ms. B of H-N. (p. 88, n. 4) but just before the phrase that "..will instruct you in all things."

21 Qurān, 75:19.
(thumma) refers to the passage of time.\textsuperscript{22}

There is no doubt that the lights of the \textit{Malakūt} descend in order to help those who are worried and depressed and that the beams of the sacred light spread upon them and that the Divine path is opened [to the one who knocks upon its door],\textsuperscript{23} -[indeed, the donor of knowledge is "the one who is on the clear horizon, he does not withhold niggardly the knowledge of the unseen"\textsuperscript{24}]\textsuperscript{25} - as in the case of a sudden streak which heralds the real lightning at night when the wind of tornado blows out. [God said to us: "It is He who sends the winds as heralds of glad tidings, before His Mercy".\textsuperscript{26}]\textsuperscript{27} Thus, the beam of light draws near to the one who experiences it, as this person approaches the beam, ascending to it. Then the road to the sacred world is opened for the ascension to the elevated dwellings to which the \textit{barāzikh} are forbidden.\textsuperscript{28} (Most of their attachments cannot reach.)\textsuperscript{29}

1. The Visionary Imagination

I. Among the subjects the last temple generally deals with are the following: the messages of the prophets (\textit{al-nubuwwāt}) and their miracles.

\textsuperscript{22} The last sentence is omitted both in \textit{H-N} and \textit{I-H}. (\textit{H-N}. pp. 87-8; \textit{SH-H}. pp. 213-216; \textit{I-H}. 42a1-3, 7-12; \textit{Hayākil}, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Les Temples} (p. 65.) borrows it from the comments of Dawwānī. (\textit{SH-H}. p.216)

\textsuperscript{24} Cf. Qurān, 81:23-4.

\textsuperscript{25} This whole statement exists only in \textit{SH-H}. (pp. 216-7).

\textsuperscript{26} Qurān, 27:63.

\textsuperscript{27} This whole line exists in \textit{Les Temples}; it is also included in Dawwānī's own comments.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{H-N}. pp.88-9; \textit{SH-H}. pp. 216-217.

\textsuperscript{29} This is quoted from Dawwānī's own comments. (\textit{SH-H}. p. 218)
(al-mu‘jizāt), the wonders of the saints (al-karāmāt), the mystical stations (al-maqāmāt), and dreams (al-manāmāt). As can be seen in the translation above, a considerable part of this temple is omitted both in Ankaravi’s commentary and the Persian translation.

At the very outset, we are emphatically reminded that the rational soul, being an immaterial substance, originally belongs to the world of Malakūt, whence it is being attracted by the faculties of the body and their preoccupations and thus drawn into the transient world (al-‘alam al-suflī). The same rational soul, however, provided that it regains its spiritual strength and purity by adorning itself with excellent virtues and by exercising three ascetic practices -eating less, speaking less, and sleeping less-can liberate itself from those engagements and rejoin the sacred world and so make contact conveniently with its own sacred father as well as with the celestial souls or the sacred spirits (arwāḥ-i qudsī), as the Persian text puts it. At this crucial juncture, the soul receives knowledge from both the father (who is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Holy Spirit or Active Intellect, and the Lord of the human species) and the celestial souls. The communication between the soul and the Holy Spirit is elaborated in Dawwānī’s commentary as follows:

31 To these is also added "less conversation with multitude." (See, SH-H. p. 209, n. 2)
32 Hayākil, p. 107. l. 12.
It is the Lord or Angel of the species to which the soul belongs and from which it obtains knowledge, as Hermes sketched it out in a recital: an entity among the supreme lights has conversed with me of the spiritual realities as well as gnostic knowledge. Then I asked him: "Who are you?" He said to me: "I am your Perfect Nature."\(^{33}\)

This Perfect Nature (\(al-\text{tiba'} \text{ al-tam}\)), a notion of Hermetic origin, serves particularly in Ishrāqī Tradition as a "celestial father", characterizing what Corbin terms \textit{unio mystica} between the superior world of \textit{Malakūt} and our world in general, and between the angel of the human species and the mystic in particular.\(^{34}\)

The soul's contact with its own father at the same time enables it to communicate with the celestial souls, who are conscious of their motions as well as of the consequences of those motions, namely the events taking place in this world.\(^{35}\) As a result of such union (\textit{ittiṣāl}), which may occur both in moments of consciousness and in dreams, the rational soul would be able to acquire knowledge of the unseen realities, which would mean, according to Dawwānī, the knowledge of all matters in the past as well as in the future.\(^{36}\) Suhrawardī depicts it as a reflection of the images in the mirror-like soul, and Dawwānī further specifies it, in complete harmony with


\(^{34}\) See for a detailed account of how this was understood by both Ishrāqī philosophers and Shi'ite theosophers, Corbin, \textit{En Islam Iranien: Aspects Spirituels et philosophiques}, vol. 2, pp. 89, 117, 134, 137-138, 297-307.

\(^{35}\) \textit{SH-H.} p. 209.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.
mystical language, as a disclosure (al-kasht) of the intelligible forms to the soul.\textsuperscript{37}

II. This brings us eventually to Suhrawardī’s doctrine of imagination\textsuperscript{38} and its role in the visionary experience of the prophets and divine sages as well as the mystics. To begin with, once the rational soul enters into communication with the celestial souls and immaterial intellects,\textsuperscript{39} it commences to contemplate (mushāhada) an intelligible entity to which the imaginative faculty attributes a particular form, which in turn is echoed in the sensory world, just as a form transmitted by the senses from that world is reflected in the so-called pool of the faculty of representation. Subsequently, the soul begins to visualize the various forms which are contained in it, which are extraordinary, according to Dawwānī, in terms of beauty (husn), subtlety (laṭâfāt) and sublimity (‘azāmat). The visualization as such takes place more or less in the same way as the divine revelation occurs to the prophets.\textsuperscript{40} In this connection, Dawwānī relates the saying

\begin{center}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{37} SH-H. pp. 209-210.
\item\textsuperscript{38} See for a brief analysis of the doctrine of dream and imagination among the Muslim thinkers such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, Ibn al-‘Arabi, etc., Rahman, “Dream, Imagination and ‘Ālam al-Mithāl,” pp. 167-180.
\item\textsuperscript{39} "Ukūl-ū mūcerrede," a phrase which, although it exists neither in H-N nor in SH-H, is used by Anḵaravī along with nūṭūs-u semāvī (heavenly souls). (I-H. 40b9-10.)
\item\textsuperscript{40} See for various forms of revelation, the Qur’ān, 16:102-3, 26:192-199, 42:51-2, etc.
\end{itemize}
\end{center}
of the Prophet Muḥammad: "the Angel sometimes appears to me in the form of man and thus speaks to me." Ap41 It is also reported, Dawwānī continues, that the Prophet saw the angel Gabriel at one time in the form of Diḥya al-Kalbī, an Arab youth of reputed beauty (jamāl), and at another in His own form. Ap42

Apart from visualizing the forms, the soul, according to Suhrawardī, may hear (yasma') various articulated sounds and formulated words, as in the case of the Prophet to whom the divine message was revealed sometimes as a buzzing sound or sometimes in a written form, like the tablets of the Prophet Moses. Ap43 It is also possible that an unseen reality may be disclosed (yatajalla) to the soul in a form other than those figures or images; for example, it is unveiled directly to the mirror-like soul.

On the other hand, according to Suhrawardī, an apparition or a vision (shabīḥ) may well appear to the soul. An apparition is in effect a shadow imitating the spiritual aspects of a given corporeal entity. Dawwānī explains this completely within the framework of Suhrawardī’s notion of light. He says, it is known that an apparition is simply a shadow of the immaterial light, and all the attributes included in that apparition are equally the shadows of the spiritual attributes of that light. Again the bodies as well as

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42 Ibid.

their attributes are the shadows of their luminous lords and attributes of these lords. Similarly, these luminous entities as well as their attributes are in their turn the shadows of the Light of Lights and of Its perfect attributes; and all of these attributes are identical with the essence of this Unique Light, for they all are exhausted and perish in the unity of Its essence, even while they are being manifested in multiple forms. Therefore, in the final analysis, Dawwânî emphasizes, “the whole universe is a shadow of the Light of Lights”. 44

Next Suhrawardî turns his attention to dreams, which he divides into genuine and confused. He regards the first type as “an imaginative imitation of what the soul visualizes or contemplates” out of the various meanings and intentions (ma’âni) dissociated completely from the sensible forms. 45 “One can enjoy witnessing genuine dreams, provided that one reduces the occupations of one’s external senses and frees oneself from fantasy and thus becomes cognizant of supersensible realities.” 46 The second type, on the other hand, is merely the product of demonic fantasy; and since it is muddled with fictitious images, as Dawwânî explains, it cannot be interpreted. Moreover, because it is whispered by Satan to the soul, it has no cogitative value for anybody. On the contrary, it keeps the soul from

45 SH-H. p. 211.
comprehending the true realities.\textsuperscript{47}

2. The Divine Souls

III. The souls of those who have attained theosophy (muta’alliha)\textsuperscript{48} are occasionally moved to rejoice at the beatitude of the light illuminated by the First Truth, i.e. God. Basing himself on Partaw-nāmah, Dawwānī explains this by saying that regardless of how this light comes to fall upon them, whether it be through a mediator or not, it takes its source from the upper and sublime world, not from the lower and mundane world. And it has nothing to do with knowledge and intelligible forms; on the contrary, it is a kind of sacred irradiation (shu’a’ qudsī), disclosed to the soul engaged in theosophy. In this particular state, a light, which is more luminous than the light of the sun, may occur in the common sense. The light as such is in fact the elixir of knowledge and power (qudrat). That is to say, thanks to this light, so many forms of knowledge and gnosis occur to the visionary theosopher that it would be impossible for him to express them clearly.

\textsuperscript{47} SH-H. pp. 211-2.

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Suhrawardī’s usage of this term in his classification of the philosophers: (i) the divine philosopher (ḥakīm ilāhī) who is efficient in theosophy (ta’alluh) but deficient in theoretical philosophy (baḥth); (ii) the theoretical philosopher who is deficient in theosophy; (iii) the divine philosopher who is efficient in both theosophy and discursive philosophy, etc. (H-I. p. 11-2; cf. Ziai, Knowledge and Illumination, p. 175. See also for a general account of the term ta’alluh in some of the Iranien thinkers, Corbin, En Islam Iranien, vol. 2, pp. 41, 46, 69, 79, 335, 362, vol. 3, p. 288, vol. 4, pp. 21-2, 421.)
Furthermore, in addition to knowledge also occurs to him tremendous spiritual power whereby all the earthly elements are made subservient to his command.⁴⁹

Suhrawardi’s analogy in this context casts considerable light on the issue at stake. He says that a piece of iron, for instance, once having been heated by the fire, not only takes on the colour of the latter but also its action.⁵⁰ Likewise, a soul, as soon as it is illuminated (ashraqa), enlightened (istināra) and irradiated (istiçā’a) by the Light of God, is miraculously endowed, as Dawwānī remarks, with divine power and knowledge. To this soul, then, all the “earthly creatures” (al-akwān) become obedient and subservient.

Whose soul or souls are considered to be in this category? In fact no restriction other than muta‘alliha (attainment of theosophy) is set by Suhrawardi. For him, it is these souls upon which the Light of God radiates. But for Ismā‘īl Anşaravī, these are the souls of the prophets (enbiyā’) and the saints (evliyā’); and not only the earthly creatures, he stresses, but also


⁵⁰ The same analogy is also advanced by Suhrawardi in his treatise entitled, Risāla fī ‘l-‘tiqād al-Ḥukamā’. There he says: “the soul becomes noble and its faculties become strong, so it exercises an immense influence in this world, when it has contact with the Holy Spirit and thereby receives knowledge from Him. Moreover, it acquires from Him a luminous faculty as well as an influential power, exactly in the same way as an iron becomes heated by the fire and thereby acquires a luminous mode as well as a particular property of the fire. This stage finds its realization in the saints or friends of God (awliyā’)...” (Suhrawardi, Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques II, pp. 270-1; cf. idem, L’Archange Emroupré, p. 23.)
the sublime beings (*mevcudat-i 'ulviyye*) are rendered obedient to them.\(^{51}\)

Among those who are in quest after the Orient or Ishrāq (*almustashriqān*),\(^{52}\) or as Corbin renders it, among the pilgrims of the mystical Orient,\(^{53}\) there are people, who, according to Dawwānī, are the divine sages (*muta'allihūn*)\(^{54}\) and, according to Ankarāvī, are the saints and the prophets\(^{55}\). They all turn their faces or, as the former commentator notes, "the direction of their hearts" towards their sacred father, i.e. the Holy Spirit,\(^{56}\) seeking light from Him. Thus by the light they receive from the Holy Spirit, they are inevitably exposed to what Suhrāwārdī terms "the sacred splendours" (*jalāyā al-quds*), which refer, according to Dawwānī, to "the supreme lights" (*al-anwār al-āliya"),\(^{57}\) and according to Ankarāvī, to "the unveilings" (*tecelliyāt*).\(^{58}\)

In the subsequent lines of the same passage, Suhrāwārdī's concern

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\(^{51}\) *I-H.* 41b1-2.

\(^{52}\) The term is currently used to signify "orientalists," i.e. scholars who study Islam particularly in the West. See Corbin, *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, p. 160, n. 40; *Les Temples*, p. 86, n. 106.

\(^{53}\) Refer to n. 13 of this chapter.

\(^{54}\) *SH-H.* p. 212.

\(^{55}\) *I-H.* 41b5.

\(^{56}\) *I-H.* 41b6.

\(^{57}\) *SH-H.* p. 212.

\(^{58}\) *I-H.* 41b7.
is confined rather to the prayers of a certain group of people to God and His bestowal of guidance upon them. According to him, the people whom God's guidance definitely reaches are the chosen people, who, opening their hands, seek "heavenly providence" (al-rizq al-samāwi). "Opening hands" is intended to imply, according to Dawwānī, the full preparation and participation on the part of the members of this praying elite in a mute form of prayer (lisān al-ḥāl), upon which God effuses His light and to which, therefore, He surely responds. In such a concentrated state of worship, they appeal to God to bestow upon them "luminous sustenance" (al-samāwi al-nūri), meaning, according to Qūṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, gnostic knowledge (ma'ārif) and mystical disclosure (kashf). Then as soon as their eyes are opened, they all of a sudden encounter God, clothed in a magnificent garment, i.e. the predominant glorious Light, which prevents all the other lights from reaching it. These select people, according to Anqārāvī, are composed mainly of two groups, (i) the prophets, and (ii) the saints, each of which are distinguished with the honourable status of prophethood (nūbūvet) and sainthood (vilāyet) respectively. Besides, through their own

59 The same statement recurs in exactly the same form in the Ḥikmāt al-Ishrāq. p. 246.
60 SH-H. p. 213.
61 SH-H. p. 213.
62 Corbin, Le Livre De La Sagesse Orientale, p. 427, n. 15.
63 SH-H. p. 213.
personal talent and the gift granted by God, they both acquire knowledge of many gnostic divine sciences. Nevertheless, they, Ankaravi stresses, are still unable to comprehend the essence of God. Therefore, they repeatedly make the following confession: “Glory be to You! We could not comprehend You in the true sense, though You are known”.

The name of God, on the other hand, stands far above the realm of the Jabarūt. This simply refers, according to Dawwānī, to the fact that God’s name dominates the circle of the intellects, which in turn encircle all that fall underneath them. There is another group of people besides which is constantly subjected to the irradiation of God’s light. These people are characterized by Dawwānī as “the perfect hermits or ascetics” (ahl al-tajrīd al-tāmm) who visualize, besides other dominant lights, the Light of Lights. This particular stage is more elevated in rank than the one in which ışhrāq is followed by the power of control over the world of elements, because the people of the former stage are profoundly immersed in their visualization.

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64 I-H. 41b14-17.
65 SH-H. p. 213.
66 Dawwānī refers here to the power exercised by the mustashriqīn, referred to above.
67 SH-H. p. 213.
3. The Function of the Paraclete (al-Faraqli)  

IV. In the last section of the present temple, just before the epilogue, Suhrawardi devotes most of his attention to dealing with the enigmatic nature and identity of the Paraclete in particular and Its mysterious relation to the institution of prophethood in general. He begins first by underlining the necessity and the verity of the messages of the prophets, which, he claims, cannot be doubted by anyone who is invested with insight (mustabšir) or, as An̄aravī puts it, by those who are intelligent (‘ūkela). It is equally true that the messages of the prophets, revealed by God through various means but in most cases by the intermediacy of the Angel Gabriel, are conveyed to people in the discourse of parables (amthāl), all of which refer in their essence to the realities and truths, which in turn

68 I-H. 42a4.

69 The function of a prophet, according to Suhrawardi, is in the first place to call people to worship God (H-I. p. 247), which somewhat differs from Avicenna’s understanding that holds: “the prophet is the link between the celestial and terrestrial worlds, a link necessary for achieving the divine ‘good order’ (nizām al-khayr) in the sublunar world.” Ibn Sīnā, Fi Ḩtbāt al-Nubuwat, ed. Michael Marmura (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1968), p. xiii.

70 Cf. “symbols” (rumūz or marāmiz) and “hints” (imā) in Avicenna’s system of prophecy. For him, it is the primary obligation of a prophet to convey his message in the form of symbols and hints to the masses so that they might grasp it more easily. This is because “God commanded him to speak to people according to the capacity of their intellects.” See for more information, Ibn Sīnā, Fi Ḩtbāt al-Nubuwat, p. 48; idem, Ilāhiyyāt II, pp. 441-443; Peter Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muhammad’s Ascent to Heaven (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 149-169.
are intelligible, as the Qurʾān remarks,71 only to the well-versed in knowledge. The significance of parables in fact was already an established fact in some of the divine books which appeared long before the Qurʾān. "I would like to open my mouth in parables."72

The point to be underscored here is that, according to Suhrawardī, the missions of the Prophets are distinct from that of the Paraclete. He says that tanzīl, which, as Dawwānī explains, means "the revelation of the realities in the form of parables",73 is confined to the prophets, while taʾwīl (interpretation) and bayān (explanation) are confined to the Paraclete, "the most supreme theophany and the spiritual light". In other words, the function of the prophets, Dawwānī goes on, is to perfect human souls which vary from one another in terms of their capacity, through the revelation presented in the form of parables. Since all the prophets are commanded by God to speak to people according to their intellectual capacities, they accordingly transmit the divine truths to them in parables.74

As for taʾwīl, it is defined by Dawwānī as follows: "to trace the Scriptural precepts from their apparent forms to their inward meanings."75

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71 Qurʾān, 29:43.
72 Bible, Matthew, 13:13, refer also to n. 19 of this chapter.
Namely, it is a kind of discovery of the metaphysical truths concealed in the exterior forms of the religious law. Bayān on the other hand is to "explain these truths by removing the veils from those above-mentioned forms".

Both of these two important tasks are attributed to the prerogative of the Paraclete, whose nature is yet to be discussed. According to Dawwānī, the term Paraclete, of Hebrew origin, simply denotes the person who distinguishes (al-fāriq) between truth and falsehood. Here it is applied, he says, to the one who represents the epiphany (maẓhar) of the walāya, that is, the esoteric aspect (bāṭīn) of the nubuwwa, announced by Jesus Christ: "I shall go to my Father and your Father, namely my Lord and your Lord, in order that he send you the Paraclete who will inform you by ta'wil." As Dawwānī suggests, this is an implicit indication of the coming of the Prophet Muḥammad, who would be the seal of the prophets. In other words, "the edifice of prophecy" (nash'at al-nubuwwa) is culminated and thus terminated with Muḥammad, who, therefore, must be the Paraclete at

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76 Corbin indicates that the very same definition of ta'wil is also given by Nasir Khusraw and Isma'īlis. See, Les Temples, p. 87, n. 114.


78 Dawwānī says that the ancients used to call the first principles (al-mabādī) "fathers", but not in the sense that the Christians understand. (SH-H. p. 215.)

least in respect to all the divine revelations prior to his time.\textsuperscript{80} However, the Prophet himself, like other prophets, is, as Suhrawardî has shown in the text above, entrusted only with conveying a literal revelation to the public. This therefore requires the eventual intervention of others, apart from the prophets, who will fulfil the double missions of \textit{ta\'wil} and \textit{bayān} of this exoteric form of revelation, as the Qur\'ān implicitly suggests it: "afterwards it is for us to explain it."\textsuperscript{81} This alludes, according to Dawwānī, to the manifestation of the form of \textit{walāya}, peculiar to the Prophet Muḥammad alone:

To unveil fully the spiritual truths and realities, revealed to the Seal of the prophets, who had uttered them in the forms of laws and commandments (\textit{ṣuwar al-awdā'}, and to uncover those truths and realities from the above-said forms was not convenient in his time. However, this would be actualized by the advent of the one who is the Paraclete and the epiphany of the \textit{walāya} particular to him (i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad).\textsuperscript{82} In fact, the Seal of the prophets disclosed all that was then supposed to be disclosed during the chain of prophecy; so much so that nothing remained untouched from the exterior forms (of the religious laws) save the uncovering of the subtle veils from the eyes so that they could visualize the beauty of those spiritual realities. That is why he has become the Paraclete of all the prophets as well as the discloser (\textit{al-kāšīf}) of the truths imparted to these prophets. Nevertheless, some of those subtle veils still remained (to be uncovered) and they all demanded the prophetic intervention. The (task) of removing these veils is confined to the epiphany of his own particular \textit{walāya} which in turn takes into

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{81} Qur\'ān, 75:19.

\textsuperscript{82} Corbin specifies it as "the Muḥammadan \textit{walāya}". (H. Corbin, \textit{Face De Dieu et Face De L'Homme} (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), p. 331.)
account that which suits the capacity of the time.  

Thus it is obvious that, for Dawwānī, Suhrawardī's intent in ascribing the twofold functions, viz. *ta'wil* and *bayan*, to the Paraclete under the name of "the supreme epiphany" can be conveniently extended to include the chains of the Imams who succeeded the Prophet Muḥammad. However, it is indeed too precarious to extend the same idea of the Paraclete as far as to identify it, as Corbin does, with the twelfth Imām of the Shi'i Traditions, though the quoted text above to some extent alludes to this effect. One can safely deduce, nevertheless, from what Dawwānī has so far stated, that the Paraclete is seen to embody two roles, one as the Seal of the prophets, i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad, the other as the *wali* of the awliyāʾ (the saint of saints) or the Imām of the Imāms. The former is responsible for announcing the literal revelation or "exoteric (zāhir) aspect of the religious precepts" to people mostly in the form of parables, whereas the latter is charged with the task of unveiling the "esoteric (bāṭin)  

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83 Abstracted in a summary fashion from *SH-H*. p. 216.

84 "It can be well understood that Dawwānī, converted to the Shi'ism, identifies the Paraclete whom Suhrawardī talks about with the twelfth Imam, Seal of the Muḥammadan walāya." (Les Temples, p. 87, n. 115.)

realities".  

Incidentally, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, another famous commentator on the Hayākil, regards the Paraclete as "the one in whom is deposited the knowledge of the Book; that is to say, the person who knows both the tafsīr (literal exegesis) and the ta'wil, after the mission of the prophets is completed." Corbin, basing himself on the last-quoted statement, declares that, for Shīrāzī too, the Paraclete is none other than the Imam who has the knowledge of the Book.

The Ottoman commentator Anšaravi, however, who translates the text with some elaboration, specifies the Paraclete as the Prophet Muḥammad:

In fact, the Holy Jesus (Ḥaẓrat-i ʿĪsā), may peace be upon him, having foretold the coming of the Sovereign (Sultān) of the prophets, stated: "I go to my Father and your Father so that he would send you the Paraclete, namely the Prophet who could explain to you every difficulty." He further continued to say: "the Paraclete whom my Father sends to you in my name would teach you the knowledge

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87 Corbin, Face De Dieu, p. 331.

88 Ibid., p. 332.
of all things." Meanwhile, the Holy Jesus' pronouncement of "my Father sends him in my name" is because he is purified by the Light and because he is entirely immersed in the light, which is indicated as a glad-tiding in the Glorious Qur'ān. Therefore it is obligatory for us, O Muḥammad!, to explain the nature of everything that is mentioned in the Qur'ān. Beside, the Holy Christ stated: "I have informed you of this before (he would come), so that all of you should believe in him." That is to say, "I have notified you about the Paraclete before his appearance, hence you ought to believe in him." So, from this it is well understood that to believe in all the prophets is mandatory.

It is evident then that Anḵaravī’s goal lies in stressing the advent of the Prophet Muḥammad, following the Prophet Jesus who had already announced it, saying: "my Father sends him in my name". This is, for Anḵaravī, an explicit indication of that fact, simply because he, i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad, is anointed with the light (yumassih bi’n-nūr), as is the case with the Prophet Jesus, whose name is also Christ (Masīḥ). It is therefore his view that the Paraclete would be the last Prophet only, not the Imam of the walāya at all.

However, Anḵaravī does not comment on the term "afterwards" (thumma) in the Qur'anic verse cited in the Arabic text of the Hayākil, which indeed, as Dawwānī proclaims, bears an allusion to the intervention of a person apart from the Prophet Muḥammad in the matters involving

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89 This is the explanation of the Qur'anic verse, 75:19.

90 Cf. Bible, Deuteronomy 18:15, 19.

91 I-H. 42a12-42b8.
bayān. In other words, the term *thumma* intimates to a certain extent a change in either the person or the time. In either case, however, it may no longer concern the Prophet Muḥammad himself but, as Corbin declares, "his own Paraclete". This may possibly mean, again for Corbin, "the twelfth Imām, who will wrestle with the taʿwil, as the Prophet himself wrestled with the *tanzīl.*"  

92 *SH-H.* p. 216.  
EPILOGUE

O Our Lord! We believe in You.⁹⁴ We confirm the messages of Your prophets. We know that Your Malakūt contains stages.⁹⁵ We also know that You have divine servants⁹⁶ who are seeking to gain access to light by light,⁹⁷ though they sometimes relinquish light for darkness⁹⁸ so as to gain access to the former by the latter. In so doing, they would acquire through the behaviour of the senseless people⁹⁹ some kind of consolation for the eyes of the Sages.¹⁰⁰ In fact You have made promises to them and also sent to them the heralds of winds so as to carry them to 'Illyyîn. Thus they celebrate Your Glory,¹⁰¹ convey Your sacred Books,¹⁰² are suspended on

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⁹⁴ Dawwānī interprets this to mean: We believe in the necessity of Your Existence as well as in the attributes of Your Perfection. This is in effect an indication to the knowledge of both the Essence of the Necessary Being and His attributes. (SH-H. p. 218.)

⁹⁵ “Varying in ascent and descent, and upward and downward.” In lieu of marātib, Dawwānī says, some manuscripts have ma‘āb, meaning return of the souls after being released from their bodies to their abode. This implies the knowledge of the spiritual lights. (SH-H. p. 218.)

⁹⁶ i.e. the people of tajrīd. (SH-H. p. 218.)

⁹⁷ Dawwānī interprets: “They seek to reach the contemplation of the sublime lights through the excellent faculties and the intellectual perfection.” (SH-H. p. 218.)

⁹⁸ Dawwānī comments that they sometimes tend to move or deviate from the superior luminosity to the inferior darkness, namely, to strengthen the physical faculties. (SH-H. p. 219.)

⁹⁹ i.e. the people who are entirely engrossed in the (physical) nature. (SH-H. p. 219.) Or those who do not persist in leading one path. Commentary of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, cited in Les Temples, p. 89, n. 124.

¹⁰⁰ This is an explanation of this Prophetic saying: “the sleep of the Sage (‘ālim) is a kind of worship.” (SH-H. p. 219.)

¹⁰¹ i.e., the lights of Your Glory and Beauty. (SH-H. p. 219.)

¹⁰² Dawwānī interprets this to mean: “So they comprehend the real natures of Your verses and signs, revealed to the people of felicity.” Ibid.
the wings of Cherubs, ascend by the rope of luminosity and seek the aid of solitude in order to obtain acquaintance [with the people of Malakūt]. It is these people who ascend to heaven, while still residing on the earth.

Awaken, o my Lord, the souls who slumber in the beds of insouciance so that they remember Your name and sanctify Your Glory. Perfect our portion of knowledge and patience, for these two are the roots of all virtues. Grant us consent to Your Destiny. Make chivalry the ornament and Ishraq the path for us. You are indeed the most generous and Your

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103 “Karūbiyûn”, the Luminous Angels. (Ibid.) According to Shīrāzī, these sublime Angels have no attachment to the corporeal bodies at all. See Les Temples, p. 89, n. 128.

104 Namely, by the lights that effuse from the supreme principles upon the souls of those people. (SH-H. p. 219.)

105 Basing himself on Dawwānī’s commentary, Corbin includes it in his translation.

106 "By their illuminated souls." (SH-H. p. 220.)

107 I.e. while they are together with their bodies. (Ibid.) The whole epilogue up to this point, including the passage preceding it (i.e. beginning with "it is no doubt...") is completely omitted in Ankaravī’s commentary. (H-N. pp. 89-90; SH-H. pp. 218-220.)

108 "On the tongue and in the heart." (SH-H. p. 220.)

109 This means, according to Dawwānī: perfect the human soul in both theoretical and practical faculties. The former becomes perfect by the knowledge of the natures of things, while the latter by following the middle course between extremism and inextremism. (Ibid.)

110 This is the tranquillity of the soul with regard to the decrees of the predestination. (SH-H. p. 222.)

111 The collection of all virtues and beautiful qualities. (SH-H. p. 223.)

112 It is the ornament that pertains to man. (Ibid.)

113 I.e. the radiation of the sacred lights upon the souls. (Ibid.)

114 I.e. to the perception of the perfection. (Ibid.)
benevolence encompasses all the worlds.\textsuperscript{115} God the Almighty is indeed generous to anyone who seeks aid. May peace, blessing, greetings and pleasure be upon His Messenger.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{115} This sentence is not included in \textit{H-N}.

CHAPTER ELEVEN
A GENERAL EVALUATION

In this thesis, I have examined Anšaravi’s commentary Ḫaṭḥūl-Ḥikem in close comparison with Dawwānī’s Shawākil al-Ḥūr. The two commentaries present to us two different interpretations of the base text, Hayākil al-Nūr, from two different perspectives and with two different orientations. Although, in some places, especially in the explanations of the technical terms such as “qayyūm,” “ḥaykal,” “nūr,” “intellect,” etc., Anšaravi seems to have followed Dawwānī quite strictly in the interpretations of many crucial points, however, he has employed what I may conveniently call “his own conciliatory strategy” in an apologetic manner, a strategy which he begins with an unstated objective and which aims essentially, though by no means very successfully, at placing Suhrwardī in the mainstream of “Orthodox Sufism” with the help of sometimes forcibly developed arguments and sometimes sentimentally quoted verses. In his attempt at elucidating the fundamental terms and ideas embodied in Suhrwardī’s text, Anšaravi makes extensive use not only of Ibn Sīnā’s Shīfā’ and Dawwānī’s commentary Shawākil, but also of his mystical background, in particular his Mevlevī heritage.

Interestingly enough, as has been clearly pointed in the first part of the thesis, Suhrwardī’s Hayākil, for Anšaravi, was nothing less than a book of wisdom, definitely not a book of Shari'a as in the case of Ghazālī's
Mishkāt. Regardless of such contrast, both philosophers and theologians along with the Sufis have, in his eyes, been the honourable recipients of God's beautiful favours on different levels. In accordance with this consideration, Ankaravi reproduces a detailed account of Ibn Sinā's conception of wisdom without discussing there its relevance, if any, to the Hayākil al-Nūr. An account as such in fact constitutes only a part of "wisdom" as he views it in his Minhācū'-Fuḳarā'.

In the first temple a great deal of emphasis is laid on the explanations of "the nature of body" and of "the definition." Against the Peripatetic doctrine that body is composed of matter and form, known as hylomorphism, Suhrawardi proclaimed that it is pure magnitude, which was explained by Dawwani as "the corporeal form" or "the form itself," a doctrine which had its origin in the school of Plato. Ankaravi, mindful of Suhrawardi’s repudiation, instead adheres to the Mutakallimūn’s view of body, which maintains that it is rather a composition of atoms. However, his insistence on atomism has only one justification for him, that is, the avoidance of the idea of the "pre-eternity of the world," which is in apparent conflict with the Shari‘a. In complete contrast to Dawwānī’s extensive explanation of body within the Ishráqi context, Ankaravi at times seems to have mistakenly confused Suhrawardī’s concept with that of the Peripatetics, especially in his ascription of division to matter and not to body itself.

Furthermore, the conventional definition of man as a "rational animal"
appeared so natural to Ankaravi that he wrongly replaced Suhrawardi’s notion of “essential concomitant” (lāzim al-ḥaqīqa), which in fact represents in this context the “corporeality” (jismiyya) of man, with the Aristotelian concept of “quiddity” (māhiya), which in turn stands for “the rationality” (nutq). Thus the whole discussion becomes complicated by his apparent ignorance of the fact that Suhrwardi repudiated this classical definition and substituted it with his own theory, which holds that the most complete definition can be achieved at best through the synthesis of all the necessary constituents and essential concomitants.

In the second temple, Ankaravi, again basing himself upon Dawwānī’s Shawākil, describes in full detail the characteristics of the rational soul, its external and internal faculties, and the respective functions and locations of these latter in the brain. According to Suhrwardi’s description, which rests partly on Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine, the soul is a self-subsistent substance, immortal, and originated simultaneously with the body, which cannot be corrupted with the death of the latter. While Dawwānī focused on the ontological status of the rational soul with a stress on its intimate rapport with the Active Intellect as it was conceived of within the Ishrāqī school but with some blending of Peripatetic concepts, Ankaravi, who in most cases limits himself merely to reporting what the former stated with no interjection of personal opinion, gives weight sometimes to its divine aspect by relying much on the verses of the Qurʾān.
However, An̄karaviš’s extensive intervention was seen especially in the discussion of Suhrāwardīš’s elimination of the three false assumptions on the nature of the soul: (i) that it is identical with God, (ii) that it is a part of God, and (iii) that it is pre-eternal (qadīm). The first assumption was rejected by the Illuminationist master on the ground that while God is absolutely One, the souls are multiple; therefore the unity of the former cannot be compromised in any way by the multiplicity of the latter. The example that he provided for this argument was the case of two different individuals who, owing to their separate respective souls, perceive different things, not one and the same thing at all. The second assumption was also refuted by Suhrāwardī on the basis that since God is not corporeal, He cannot have division or partition in Himself; thus the soul, which is also incorporeal, cannot be a part of It. The last assumption was rejected on the grounds that the idea of pre-eternity of the soul would imply the pre-existence of a possible location for it to have first existed, and then been forced to descend to the world. This however would be impossible, because soul as a pure light has no natural inclination to descend to inferior beings. Therefore, he concluded that it is originated simultaneously with the creation of the body.

An̄karaviš’s extensive analysis of the foregoing three assumptions represents an endeavour, on the one hand, to safeguard the absolute uniqueness of God and to defend, on the other, the venerable status of the
Sufis. This is another instance in which he sought to reconcile two seemingly opposing views, "Orthodoxy" and "Sufism," in the course of his reading of the relevant passages of the Hayākil. However, in the naiveness of this attempt as such, he failed to determine the exact position of Suhrawardī with respect to crucial points. The reason for this seems to lie partly in his efforts at defending and securing Suhrawardī from the so-called "baseless allegations" of the other commentators of the Hayākil, who arguably misinterpreted the former's statement that soul is neither identical with nor a part of God as an attack against the Sufis. This is also partly because of his personal background, namely his profound love and concern for the Sufis, as well as his environment, dominated by Shari'at-minded people. All of these factors with which he was confronted inevitably prevented him from satisfactorily elucidating the notions and ideas of Suhrawardī as manifested in the Hayākil.

In defending Suhrawardī, Anṣāravī claims that the former’s motive in repudiating the identity of the soul with God was not aimed at casting blame on the Sufis for their ecstatic utterances, which are suggestive apparently of that crucial idea. He also argues that none of the mystical expressions as uttered by the prominent Sufis bear, in their profundity, connotations of incarnation or unification, both of which certainly threaten the unmitigated unity of God. Instead of substantiating this point however, he, after criticizing both philosophers and theologians for their inadequacies in
understanding the hidden and mysterious meanings of these words, justifies it simply by a couplet from the Mesnevi.

Again we found Ankaravi taking a strong position in support of the oneness of the rational soul, a position which was contrary to Suhrawardi’s stance and strengthening his argument by verses from the Qur’an. But his unique contribution in this undertaking consists in his counter-example to Suhrawardi’s statement: "The souls are multitude, because what Zaid perceives is different from what ‘Amr perceives." The diversity of the perceptions, according to Ankaravi, is not due to the multiplicity of the souls, but rather because of the powers of the estimations and imaginations as well as the occupations and situations which are variable from one individual to another. Therefore, he concludes, people may share in one and the same soul, yet differ in their aptitude and faculties of perception.

With regard to the creation of the soul, Ankaravi takes issue with Suhrawardi, rejecting the latter’s view that it is originated simultaneously together with the body, and instead clinging to the view that it was created long before the creation of the body.

Throughout the third temple, Ankaravi limits himself simply to the task of paraphrasing all that Suhrawardi has stated with regard to the nature of the three metaphysical modes, necessary, possible, and impossible, all of which had been already amply treated in Avicenna’s philosophy.
In the beginning of the fourth temple, we found Ankaravi to be highly critical of Suhrawardi first for his philosophical argument, which was set forth to prove the oneness of God, and later for his view regarding His attributes. In these two successive stages of his criticism, Ankaravi displays overtly two uncompromising positions, one in support of Sufism and the other in support of Islamic Orthodoxy. According to the first stage of Ankaravi’s criticism, the argument advanced by Suhrawardi for the unity of God, which was based on the assumption that it would be impossible for God, as the Necessarily Existent Being, to share in His Essence the necessity of existence with other being, (which would render Him contingent), is deemed by him insufficient and even worthless vis-à-vis the actual experience of the gnostics who, without the intermediary of any theoretical argument, have attained directly the vision of His unity by their profound intuition and pure hearts. But it is clear to use that his substitution of Sufi doctrine for Suhrawardi’s argument, which was originally formulated by Avicenna, was not due to its lack of a solid foundation, nor because, as he claims, it was forcibly deduced from the fanciful imagination of the philosophers, but rather out of his conviction in the veracity of the Sufi path. This alone compelled him to take it for granted and not bother to offer any further proof for its veracity. All this considered, one cannot afford to belittle, for the sake of love and sympathy for the Sufi path, the value of the philosophical argument which was systematically developed by both
Avicenna and Suhrawardī, and which played essential role in their respective metaphysics.

In the second stage of his criticism, Anḵaravi attacks Suhrawardī's denial of the attributes of God. Suhrawardī's stand on this particular point was purely philosophical and was dictated mainly by his overriding concern to safeguard God's absolute unity by isolating Him from the plurality of the attributes. This time Anḵaravi's point of departure can be found not in his mystical conviction but rather in his commitment and loyalty to "the people of Orthodox Islam," who held that the attributes of God are not He nor are they other than He. Without discussing how these attributes can be properly predicated of God, he rather takes it for granted that the view of so-called Orthodox Islam is valid and acceptable in the light of the Scripture.

In the same chapter, we witnessed that Anḵaravi, after reviewing point by point Suhrawardī's whole system of effusion of lights in conjunction with Avicenna's system of emanation of intellects, substantiates it from the religious standpoint by referring to a hadith widely-cited among the mystics: "God created first the intellect and said to it to draw near, and so it drew near..." This first created intellect, which in fact was supposed to be "the first emanated" in accordance with the terminology of the philosophers, was referred to respectively as "the first light" in Ishrāqī thought, "the supreme pen" in dialectical theology, and "the Muḥammadan spirit" in mystical language. Consequently, all of these conceptually diverse terms are
ultimately reduced by Ančaravi, as was shown in his other treatise Mišbāḥūl-Esārār, to the one and very same reality, i.e. light in accordance with the famous light-verse found in the Qurʾān.

What seemed rather surprising to us at this very point was that, despite his adherence to the school of Orthodox kalam, Ančaravi readily approves of the philosophers’ theory of emanation, a theory which aimed essentially at dissociating God’s unity and His direct relation to His creation from the changing and varied plurality of the world by establishing between the two a series of immaterial mediating intellects or lights and assigning each a threefold contemplative action. But Ghazālī, so-called most prominent representative of Orthodox kalam and a scholar for whom, as we have noted before, Ančaravi had profound respect, deemed the whole theory to be inconsistent with the Qur’anic view of creation and therefore repudiated it. Instead of discussing or compromising the legitimacy of the philosophers’ doctrine of emanation, Ančaravi rather found himself driven to concede to it and affirm it in the light of the above-mentioned hadith.

Another conciliatory position adopted by Ančaravi reveals itself in his interpretation of Suhrawardi’s crucial statement that “the rays of the sun persevere by the perpetuity of the latter.” The implication of this expression is that all contingent beings, besides God, are also permanent. This apparently unorthodox idea is resolved by Ančaravi in his reference to Baydawī’s interpretation of the famous Qur’anic verse: “...Everything that
exists will perish except His own face (wajhahu)."(28:88) By referring "hu" (him or it) at the end of the word wajhahu (his or its face) to the essence of the thing, he accordingly renders it as follows: "everything that exists will perish except its quiddity." In so doing, An'karavi makes an obvious allusion to the fact that the idea of the eternity of the world can be reconciled with the sacred text.

In the fifth temple, An'karavi for the most part summarizes the three types of motion, natural, coercive and volitional, in strict conformity with Dawwānī's detailed account in his Shawākil. In full compliance with Suhrawardī's conception, he notes that the celestial spheres, which are found in perpetual volitional motion, are the ultimate cause for physical events. He also admits that the soul's contemplation of these celestial spheres along with its detachment from the preoccupations of the body would lead to the sudden emergence of illumination in that soul. It should be noted here that while Dawwānī connected the mystics' practice of samā' with the movement of those spheres to which Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, as it was shown, already made an allusion in his Mesnevi, nevertheless An'karavi, though being an adherent of the Mevlevī Path and a follower of Dawwānī in most cases, makes no mention of it.

In his elaboration of Suhrawardī's celebrated conception of al-imkān al-ashraf (nobler possibility), which postulates that owing to God's overall generosity, the existing world is the most perfect of all possible worlds,
Anḵarāvī credits it with some Qur'anic verses, e.g. 27:88, 20:50.

Anḵarāvī’s treatment of the sixth temple, which was partly omitted and partly incorporated into the beginning of the seventh temple in his commentary, merits particular consideration here, for it exhibits a considerable failure on his part to deal properly with some crucial issues. In the first place, he offers here considerably less comment than he did in preceding temples, and shows relatively less care in his approach. In expounding the immortality of the rational soul, for instance, he feels content with saying that since its very cause is permanent, it is accordingly permanent too; yet he provides no further account, as Dawwānī did, as to whether that cause can be ascribed to God or to the Active Intellect.

Again, while interpreting Suhrawardī’s account with regard to the pure states of the souls after separation from their respective bodies, Anḵarāvī not only avoids dealing with the issue in its own context but also for some reason distorts the text by adding more to it which in fact does not fit into Suhrawardī’s system. In other words, he conspicuously errs in ascribing, besides spiritual pleasures, “physical pleasures” to the delights of the virtuous souls, which were conceived by him as the souls of the prophets, saints, well-doers and believers. His purpose in so doing, apparently, was to place Suhrawardī in the circle of “orthodox Islam” by making him approve of bodily resurrection. In fact, the Ishraqī master, as far as the present text is concerned, first put emphasis on the sharp distinction between sensible
objects and spiritual entities, and between sensuous pleasure and intellectual pleasure, and later expressly stated that once the virtuous souls have attained the angelic state, they would be delighted with purely spiritual pleasures, remaining in purely spiritual states. Moreover, he insisted that the denial of such pleasure would on the earthly plane be equivalent to the denial of sexual enjoyment.

We have seen that a considerable part of the last temple, in which Suhrawardi dealt with his theory of visionary imagination, was deleted in both Ḩaṣāḥū'ī-Ḥikem and the Persian translation. In view of the fact that Anāravi made extensive use of Dawwānī's commentary, which itself contains the complete text of Hayākil, his omission certainly demands some explanation. It could have been due to the fact that he might have found Suhrawardi’s thesis of visionary imagination inconsistent with what he regarded as "orthodox sufism," on the ground that such imagination should not be assigned to people other than the prophets and saints. How could anyone, apart from the latter, enter into contact with the supreme divine beings and thus acquire from them a revelation of the spiritual realities? This was more likely the question that agitated Anāravi’s mind, and caused him to be pre-occupied with a certain type of orthodoxy rather than oriented with the true spirit of the Ishraqī philosophy.

His subjective attitude continued to show itself in his delineation of the "identity of the Paraclete" to which Suhrawardi attributed the twofold
mission of \textit{ta’wīl} (interpretation) and \textit{bayan} (explanation), while confining that of \textit{tanzil} (revelation) exclusively to the prophets. Based on the announcement of Jesus Christ -I shall go to my Father to you the Paraclete who will inform you by \textit{ta’wīl}-, Dawwānī had first identified him, i.e. the Paraclete, with the Prophet Muḥammad at least in respect to all the divine revelations preceding him, and then later designated him as "Wali" and "Imām" with respect to his double tasks. However, his careful scrutiny of the term "afterwards" in the Qur’anic verse (75:19) led him rightly to the conclusion that the task of \textit{bayān}, meaning to remove the subtle veils from the spiritual truths confided in the words of the prophets, is confined to the "Imām" or "Wali", the epiphany of his respective \textit{walāya}. Against this reasonable interpretation, Ankaravī, having identified the Paraclete strictly with the last Prophet, ascribes all three functions exclusively to him but without commenting on the crucial term "afterwards," which has a direct bearing on the intervention of persons apart from the Prophet in the matters concerning \textit{bayān}. His concern, as was the case in so many other issues, was concentrated rather on the theological connotation of the term in question, i.e., Paraclete, which represented for him a clear-cut evidence of the advent of the last Messenger. However, this supposedly rational endeavour, on the part of Ankaravī, to vindicate the exclusive validity of the Prophet as a seal of all the prophets, while neglecting at least the possibility of the Imām in the succession of the \textit{walāya}, could hardly be considered to
be a consistent one.

Therefore, all things considered, it is clear that Anšaravī, being a mystic, has made the theosophical text of Hayākil serve his uncompromising position in reconciling the mystical views of Suhrāwarī with Orthodox Islam and in dedicating himself also at times to the repudiation of the so-called heretic views of the philosophers by using the weapons of the Mutakallimūn.
PART THREE

THE TEXT OF ĪZĀḤŪ'L-ḤİKEM

AND TEXTUAL VARIANTS

(FACSIMILE OF MS 1747)
(Istanbul Suleymaniye Library, Şehid 'Ali Paşa)
حميد بن سعد بن مبارك وطه أبو بكر سة وسبب
السبب حمله للسهر كبروبول سابكت دار فتحت
بروكير وسريت نص صدقي وسمو في الغاية
فضح عبيرهان وإغاثة وما يبدو بالابناء
الابناء نظره صدر بالزمر لطهرهم وحسن مساعد
كراوله عاليه باب أولها ونامي وصبره اولان اولن
وتمك لون والقليل وما عسرة وبوب اولان
عالم أسرار بروز كزع كنكس أطع طلبا دينما وشراة
يفسق في صرا فنوع كل صن وطهي خراب
أ scanf لون قنعب على سبيل البال شيخ يناسا
وإناء المكينة ونصسل الخطاب تونك
مطهير حياء يوية شغل في شف دامه
بوقع وصفت صناد خرا وحبه تجاب
فيهما كل سمع البر وامام الصدري ضياء وبدة أولاء
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
بروجعله برز، نام ولدرب، کلیشی، جنگ، در هوا اسرار
ربن سرویس زمزم زیرین، در نیا روحیه و افزایش
ربن روم، به‌دنبال ولدرب هماهنگ، در نیا روحیه و افزایش
ربن سرویس، کلیشی، جنگ، در هوا اسرار

(4)

واکنش: خلاصه، توییپاسی ای، دنبال دولت جمهوری اسلامی

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واکنش: خلاصه، توییپاسی ای، دنبال دولت جمهوری اسلامی

(6)

واکنش: خلاصه، توییپاسی ای، دنبال دولت جمهوری اسلامی
الملون لدز طورهم مرا که جل کردن بزاب اورانیم ایم
فصای ملود، برده کرده که حضار الدین حضرمکن
چون در ائمه دنی و ائمه ابدوب دنیا نمکا مینه هکن
که نزه و مان درسی جا اجبار بر مکرر می‌فرمیم دو و را اجتناب می‌لاید
اوی معرفت ناب به حدیدت فریفک محقق حضرت خزاعیر
اوجایال و اعیان نسبه دنا نبیر دکات دنیا می‌کن
ضرح اکثری رضا و نگین در مکا لی حضور بر مطاویه
وپناکب منتسب مراجعه ابدوب دنیا نیم نیلی می‌لاید
که در ومزه و زئاد کرک حویلز در بر مرم را اخیر در دری
مرکب عبایت ارزش طفیل و مرتب فیلدوم آوروز را می‌پدید
و لان تهابه یادره که دیده بیش‌نمکا ادیکا
نفسه و زیرنده
خونه بیوپ و برف، اجرت آوردن رفع ایلام
وعلا عالمان بعلبیم فرم و بررفی‌ضفای
نیل‌هدی با نبی بنی‌اهلی‌لادّ
ولا على كل حال فإن هذا كلام مرتب في الله تعالى.

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15
أولى

مكنون ك على و حر التناسب واجب ل و ترون ما مربحاً.\\
Lesson 1\\

اجب بيج ي مر دعاو د وصاكم ك مرا عقيقاً و فيون\\
وسامد واجب دن عدد ا مكنه م هو ما رابور\\
وموليدن در بيج مارين يبان وحيوان مهورين

ا حاولد و فوض و لصف داه و عل مان و صال\\
ما سد مقلأ و نور نفشك دفع ما سابه تطقاً\\
وب ك حذونه نجر د وأرز تيدي ليند ان حر ريب

النهم ارنا الاشياء كما اقل ببور دن ريزو\\
ذرو القدن كاكم كايبه د انا بس حكين ولدرك\\
لحل مواز بنك بن بون ف Можно تعني دا فافي و\\
تدعيات تخبتي دن بكب كيشن كم مور قلود

اولور كنيد حاص كام بيردن اولور كنيد فير كنك د انا موضوع علم كنيت اولر كنك كين الأولد معاين\\
عابش اولور اول موضوع كم رديت مثل موضوع علم
طبار بن كا نين نمر طبيب عبار اعضاى كين ارل
عضاری اول بدن اخبار حکم نمود که برخی وعده
وضعی علیکم از اجرام ما ویژه ندارند. در ویرایش عام
کتب‌های اعضا اجرام ما با نکته‌های مشابه و مورد
وضعی علم نیز مکلف اولیه در زرندی نگه‌داری
مکلف اورزه نیلاد. صورتی در اعضا اولیه
سندیا گذشته وصوص همچون دیگر پرکه این بسیار
علم‌کنگر از علم اعضا که بعضی نهایا وزرای در فج اوارها
علمی دارد به‌طور کافی خسته نشان دهن در زکای فرد
کت در فضای اولیه علم اویشدار تصمیم‌گیری سال علمی بی‌پر
بی‌باوری علم‌نما موضعی بهره متفاوت، زبانی
علم عنوان شده با درستی علم اعضا در گروه مطلوب، زبانی
علم عنوان فرآیند رادیکات کت اعضا ویژه مطالعه، زبانی
اوول مشابه که دوگانه گروه مطلوب مراد داشت، عارد
عازار ماه و صورت‌های واحده در جنبه نشوین
دهان عازار ماه و صورت وچیند که ربان عازار
می‌باشد پرکه بر ورهکسها وی به‌درد دانه
وصل برکه و صورتی در کت ترکه
و موضع علم طبیعی سبزی، زبان کم علم طبیعی.
کلمات و عبارات این صفحه نسخه فارسی از نویسنده در نسخه انگلیسی موجود نیست. لطفاً به صفحه بعد نگاه کنید.
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي في الصورة المقدمة.
عقول رفوف يعنى عناصر في ممواد سيقام على أبوابها وواحد...
عالم ويدوكلوت. عادة لم يكن إنطباعاً إيجابياً لدون رنين ثابت. على...
نتفخض بعمق مباني مسجد مثقل تيومة في علم ورغم...
كي لا يحدث من دوَّار ورِيا كاب فوج ووإي إيناء...
قينوم أول يخرج من سنارة. ذهبت نازحة كبرباً وطيرة وعُلا...
كلوريد، وتعتبر كندة. فانينما ما، دواكغ في موقع ديار...
بجني ودست كل نوع، أورنجا، برغي مصمم بالعرز وrobe، ود...
دَّني ديار، فيرجلي بك وثري بالطبيعة. مكانت موجود، كي...
بروز غوث بالوفر، دوار وتقوم بالسفر، حتى دلر زرنا وودي ذات...
وابد لبود منتج أول وغنبرد، ابدينا لما، نور...
ميزو يدفوت روزاري معركة، دابة، وفي دو، ونحو سديد...
امرأة اعلاص مطاوعة، ودَّعنا على إيل دير، نور نوجيك...
نور نوجيك لوز، واحماراً، الدور ذهبياً، نور تريكل...
نور نوجيك لوز، ين في الزي، نوار عالي، نوره، إيل، خات...
بد رفطي ونورا، دامه إيلنج، نورا، ونورا، فونا، إيل...
لي، نور، دامي دير نور، إيلنج، نورا، إيلنج،...
علاذة، مرن، ولذي، وروسي في نورجرد ونورجرد.
من ناحية القدوة، فإن العلاقة بين الفصول والفصول تكون على الأرجح، واجبًا أيضًا، للتحدي والرغبة في متابعيها، بدءًا من الفصول الأولى، مثلاً، فإن الفصول الأولى تكون أقرب إلى الفصول الأولى، مما يشكل جزءًا من التحكيم الأولي. وكي، بشكل عام، فإن الفصول الأولى تكون أقرب إلى الفصول الأولى، مما يشكل جزءًا من التحكيم الأولي.
المرور والمرأة والرجل السببي نقض في المدارس وغيرها.

لا تصدح، مريم، كريمة مكتبة كريستينا وبناء النوايا.

ليسوا برايبة لانقمار، ماسونين مرادات، ماء، معهد.

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حيوانين أخبار، موسيقى نواب، علماء، مارتينيز.

نُنَّكَ كُلَّ مَرَّة، وَمَكْرَكَ الْيَوْمَ، وَلَنَأْتَنَّ الْأَوْلَاد، نَوْلَدَنَّكَ بِقَالَة.

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غير من كُلِّ مَرَّة، وَمَكْرَكَ الْيَوْمَ، وَلَنَأْتَنَّ الْأَوْلَاد، نَوْلَدَنَّكَ بِقَالَة.

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وَرَفَقُ الْحَسَنِينَ، وَقَرَبُ عَسَانَ الْجَمِيعِيَّةَ، وَلَكِنَّ كُلِّ مَرَّة، وَمَكْرَكَ الْيَوْمَ، وَلَنَأْتَنَّ الْأَوْلَاد، نَوْلَدَنَّكَ بِقَالَة.

وصَلَّ عَلَى الْمَلَكِينَ، وُلِدَ كُلُّ مَرَّة، وَمَكْرَكَ الْيَوْمَ، وَلَنَأْتَنَّ الْأَوْلَاد، نَوْلَدَنَّكَ بِقَالَة.

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لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
أول شريك دا بدير بس بنيه دا ندنن حلقينين عشاق دا لب جاوة وسحه مصلحي جوانة اسما دا لدنا نار دا مال موده. انول صفح جوانة دت نور موده. ووصف السنن وذكربن ضرور بالله الوحيبة للعربة والجسمة للناسان بنينك صافي كا نورزري اولبين دا نمك انرزل بينوين روجي وان دين حسبت منطق اولده تيكي. وقد تبدرن سكنا كا الفياه والنهوده وكاهو كا مكنك اولرن كا مكنك ونورن كاهو كا الفياه وكاهو كا سكنا كا الفياه. اولرن كا مكنك ان نورن كاهو كا الفياه دا مكنك كا نورن كاهو كا الفياه. كا اولرن كا مكنك ان نورن كاهو كا الفياه.

ان يكون له جمعة وان سااريه لان صامده اجهه بكون غيره منه الاخير فيقسمهم وها حفرت نج طباقه للعمون نورن كاهو كا الفياه. بناه اليحيني يبوي وصورت بس عشي كاهو كاهو كا معبد. صوريت مكر وكدر كهر جومر فريشن كرب دا زيادزي. اباهه دا نورن كاهو كا نورن كاهو كا الفياه. وهم نورن كاهو كا نورن كاهو كا الفياه. كا اولرن كاهو كا نورن كاهو كا الفياه.
لوله بعرض علی نارود بانیت کرده بطقه نازجا می‌آوریم
پس طلب کمک کریم دانسته به همیکناریایت
لا تکفرا علی نارود بندم از جزئیه اشراف
الاو نزدیک اهی‌نات بوشنت مقدت و جهاد کننده
تقیه به‌سپری بین دلندن سگ، انسداد کردن نفتی
بجمع دکتر اکری بدن دم اکتر کردن درکس دانل کل کردن
واکفان ابدی و جاب اجرا به‌کنن بذر برکری آن اهی‌ناتی
امکن آکری کردن او وریس و لاک‌رد لک‌یل ایمای
باین‌ین جنگ اجرا نام انسدن بین نسبان ایکرد کم‌مرک
اولم‌ای جزء‌الاحمود او رهیج‌هویسی معلوم‌اولر. فلوکس‌انت
هیذرفان مکان نیستم سهوئرک به‌نک هم‌مضایا
فانی و ریاهی این‌بنیان و جزئی آکرک‌سی
بدن‌ی و ابعضی از اکری‌سیدن‌بیگ‌یا یک‌دی کینگ‌کر
امکن اولم‌ین لبیل‌لیی، حاصل‌ین این کهیفی‌لفن‌سن‌ی
مروع‌ین ابیده و بدن‌با‌ینی جبی اوفاست‌ین مسهوئر بیرک‌در
بنفسن‌ین اکری‌سو لیا‌سیدر بپس‌ین افک‌نجم و کردوک‌وی
طیاف‌ی این جنگ‌ین از ری‌یا وسطی و الیسبلان بی‌ددن این
الخزينة في الفراغات المدنية. بعثแสนاً بركة ببئر
نفخانه وداني كبلوب كشم بحرام ببعضك بفلوابل
بينما على يمين الجسر بضع شقات وقتل بعبل
نفخان نوروزاً ودوز ودوز حريصاً على كل جرار
نفخاة زاحرة وولور وذات لقاء بهادعة ما يأتي إن
من بذكك العشاق عند ورواد البجاء هل تعلم
فوت حضور بزوراً ويناريد بكيد البطل بكيند
دوري قدرت بين تقديم نفخان نوروزاً ودوز خصاته
ال략 الأموات غادداً برلوراً بركي جريدة أبا حرك
ربع دوري قدرت بين تقديم نفخان نوروزاً ودوز خصاته
للذكر أن يتلاك كل حين بين كنابات الهياكل الأردن
سلمت بوجه من وداً ونقب بكيند جواحة هداً هافر
فوت حضور بزوراً ويناريد بكيد البطل بكيند
ابن داها كندوك بين ذاكل ببت وفقر وداروي
أب داها كندوك بين ذاكل ببت وفقر وداروي
عن يدرون: ما ضيدهوووالان ذاكل تذكر تذكير
سدرك فتيرة ودوز ونضبي ودا أرما الكيد
ملكت نفتثبت لا بيدانك ونافمك سيد
والان هام ووانان جدرك دانو وداي لبكي تكين
ك
دوران هنگامی که بدرد و خانواده‌ی من بی‌دردست می‌شود، در این زمان‌ها با خانواده‌ی مردم شیراز در نوعی موسیقی و اشعار ترکی بهمراه هنرمندان مشغول به کار می‌شود.

در این زمان‌ها، شیراز به‌عنوان یکی از مرکزهای اصلی موسیقی و ادبیات خیابانی در ایران به‌شناخته می‌شود. هنرمندانی همچون شهاب‌الدین بزرگ‌الدین و علی‌اصغر شیرازی با همکاری و هم‌نشانی مهم‌هایی در این زمینه به‌وجود می‌آورند.

این زمان‌ها نشان‌دهنده‌ی فرهنگ و هنر در شیراز است که با توجه به موقعیت و موقعیت جغرافیایی و تاریخی شهر، محلی برای تولید هنر و موسیقی بوده است. در این زمان‌ها، بزرگ‌الدین بزرگ‌الدین به‌عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین هنرمندان موسیقی در شیراز شناخته می‌شود.

در این زمان‌ها، تالارهای موسیقی و اشعار در شیراز به‌شناخته می‌شود و با همکاری و هم‌نشانی مهم‌هایی در این زمینه به‌وجود می‌آورند. در این زمان‌ها، بزرگ‌الدین بزرگ‌الدین به‌عنوان یکی از مهم‌ترین هنرمندان موسیقی در شیراز شناخته می‌شود.
نفس کرے نفاس کے صفیہان معاصر کا آواز میں خیال کریں، میں اس کے ساتھ اپنا دل بھریں۔ جب وہ ٹھنڈے شہر کا ذکر کرتا ہے، میں اپنا کا دل بھریں۔ مہم کے نقصان میں ہے، وہ میں کا دل بھریں۔ یہ دنیا کا دل بھریں۔ میں اس کا دل بھریں۔
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي من الصورة. يرجى تقديم النص بشكل طبيعي بالأحرف الإنجليزية.
ولايشا راليها لتبريها من الحمر والجهة،عني
واطعاب روزاء جسيم وسماي ولون وحذون
ورأني ودودوز روزى وغني أصيله، وأنا نفقي
فمنصرلي إرزوي غير ريبية توجوزت دروجودي تاني إشا.
وصيدلى ونفسي ذو أسود مثير يبهى، عن بر ير سيلي
وصهرت كي كدر زرى الصب لمنتحب جوني ارفي نحن سابلي
إجزرى قدراجه، وصور لما وردوزي جنبنن لا نفسها
الأوهماء اصلله، ونفسى صلى عليه، وحذوي إشرد
ورودوز ونورى، كي إرژى عدادم يبي وجزى يا، واجي يغلى
وما علّه أن لحائط لايفال له اعي ولا بصبرات
لاعي لايفا للاعلى من مصت كأن بيع، بعض
اوهام نبوت مجران مناحي فيلدز، هزيابير جزئيا كبر
كك ابكر كل موجودات يا طلبه، يا خادم، يرس فورا ما
دندن اوزرى ببوردكرة، ونناكم ملك رهيبة، توجوزته،
دحرزنا باعي بناب الأشول كيواسد، وكلا، كوك، كوك ركا
واودى ودادر اعه ونبا كبيك، مكن ووز فالماري القصر
الناطفذ وغيرهما لنا سيا قذر ليسن حسا
کتابخانه‌ای که در اینجا اشاره یافته شده، به نظر می‌رسد که مربوط به یک تاریخ یا محل می‌باشد که منبعی برای تحقیقات و آگاهی از فرهنگ و تاریخ ایران است. این کتابخانه به احتمال زیاد محتوایی در مورد تاریخ، فرهنگ، ادبیات و آمار ایران در زمان‌های مختلف بستگی دارد.

منابع اطلاعاتی در این کتابخانه می‌توانند شامل مجموعه‌های مختلفی باشند، از جمله کتاب‌های قدیمی، مقالات، اسناد، اطلاعات از لوحات و نقاشی‌ها، و حتی آثار ادبی و هنری باشند. این کتابخانه برای کسانی که به تاریخ و فرهنگ ایران و شایعات آنها می‌.interested باشند، یک منبع بسیار قابلیت است.

در مجموع، این کتابخانه به عنوان یک منبع مهم برای تحقیقات و آگاهی در زمینه‌های مختلف تاریخ، فرهنگ و ادبیات ایران می‌باشد. بهتر است که به آنها مراجعه کنید تا بتوانید اطلاعات ویژه‌ای در مورد تاریخ و فرهنگ این کشور بیابید.
لا يعود الجزء المفقود في النص إلى الأصل.

لا يمكنني قراءة النص بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
مجهود مستمر للمراقبة ومتابعة التغيير والتنمية. يشير النص إلى أهمية القيادة والتحفيز من أجل تحقيق الأهداف. وقد ينطوي هذا النص على محتوى متعلق بالقيادة في الحركة الإسلامية ومكافحة الطرق الكاذبة.

ويعتبر النص جزءًا من مجموعة من النصوص التي يتم تطبيقها في مسيرة الحركة الإسلامية، وهو تحنيط للأهداف والمعايير التي يسعى الحركة الإسلامية لتحقيقها. يذكر النص أن القيادة يجب أن تكون معروفة ومدروسة، وأنه يجب أن تكون هناك مبادئ ومعايير واضحة.

ويمكن أن يكون النص جزءًا من كتابة أو نص مناسبة، حيث يتم تقديم الرسائل والمعاني الداعمة للمبادئ والمبادئ التي يتم اتباعها في الحركة الإسلامية. يمكن أن يكون النص أيضًا جزءًا من مسيرة الحركة الإسلامية، حيث يتم تقديم الرسائل الداعمة للمبادئ والمبادئ التي يتم اتباعها في الحركة الإسلامية.
أول شيء من الأمراء الذين تصدروا هذه المعركة، واعترفون بهم كل من كتب ورواية، هو الأمير عبد الوهاب الحسن. وقع في يديه قسم كبير من النظام والحركة في الدولة، وتم تعيينه نائباً للخليفة فتح بن عبد الله.

كان عبد الوهاب الحسن، بفضل العلاقات والأنتماءات الإقطاعية، يحظى بدعم هائل من الأسر الراقية في الدولة، وقد كان له دور كبير في قيادة الجيش ضد المتمردين.

ظهرت له الأوضاع بعد سقوط مكة، فقرر توحيد الجهود وقيادة الجيش نحو الرياض. ورغم الصعوبات والعقبات، إلا أن عبد الوهاب الحسن استطاع القيادة نحو النصر.

كان عبد الوهاب الحسن يسعى لبناء دولة جديدة، تعزز الطرق والإجراءات التي كان يعول عليها في النظام السابق. وقد كانت هذه الجهود تثمر بمرور الوقت، حيث تحقق العزلة من المتمردين وتحقيق النصر.

Nach dem Fall Mekka, entschloss sich Abd al-Wahhab al-Hassan, das Verdrängen der Macht der Mährer und die Führung des Heeres gegen die Aufständischen. Trotz der Herausforderungen und Schwierigkeiten, gelang es ihm, die Führung zu übernehmen.

Schien ihm, dass durch die Einrichtung eines neuen Staatsmodells, die traditionellen Verwaltungspraktiken und Strukturen in die Zukunft zu führen. Diese Bemühungen trugen zum Sieg bei und sicherten die Position seines Herrschaftsreiches.
نبقى فيه الصور بعد زوالها عن القواسِ، وربما خُفِّفت
نافذة شمس من شمسها سرباً رأسها درن نفيلةً غريبًِا، وذات
الوهام نازع العقل، أوريرى نور قرب، حُلَّ النور، ونزفت
الذكريات، وندمر دؤوب خواصه مدد من غريبٍ يسابيك إبراهيم، وفأ
عفاظة وعصفت، سمعت مغزلة رائلة بشهرة خالدة، حين أن
نفتُد، بيت الله روعمه عقله، وهبه حتى ربا يغذب نحويه.
ذئب الإنسان ٢٣، رعى نعله استناداً إلى الحُر الذي كبره توش،
بتيك، ينذكرك، ولعفل أن كوكب معيين امتنى نوراً، وم
أول كوكب فتومي القدر، ما أدركناه اليوم. البنيتو بسروب، نفر
دير أرازور غابها، دام في متنفساً، وهو هو الف
عقل في أمير محسوساً، ونور أزمورفغضو.
بني مسولين عقولنا الفائلة الملحية. إن أدمنين، يتبعون
فضايا، بنكرونا، ما承载نا، الأكعوسا، هي ينكر
ما زالت حكماً نم سمر، إن نربن، ما نصار، أحمصاً نصاراً.
طيب محصولاً، ودرجات وجوهنا، وولايات وذرونا،
بحضاره، وبروكِنا ورمالِنا. انها أبداءً، و tà، ونذكر
الرَّحْمَ صلوا، رضاهم، ومنهم، نَفَسُهم، وْنَفَسُه.
اینجونه که دانستیم بر اساس زمینه عالی و تربیتی این کشور، دو مسیر اصلی اصلی اول به متعلقی از دو قوی بوده‌اند: به‌طوری‌که هر دو قوی از جهت خود برای قدرت و پیروزی می‌اندیشند.

و به‌دیکتی از قویت اسکندر، جامانده شده‌اند. و قویت دانیالی تصدیق دهیده‌اند. این بار، قویت جامانده‌اند.

بلکه بزرگترین آن‌ها از دو قوی بزرگ، دو قوی بزرگ، جامانده‌اند.

و قویت دانیالی تصدیق دهیده‌اند. این بار، قویت جامانده‌اند.

ولی قوی دیگری، دو قوی دیگری، جامانده‌اند. و قویت دانیالی تصدیق دهیده‌اند. این بار، قویت جامانده‌اند.

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قُلْ لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ خَذُوا مَمَّا رُزِقْتُمُ الْجَهَاثَةَ وَتَلْبَسُوا مَمَّا رُزِقْتُمُ الْجَهَاثَةَ فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْكَفَّارَ مَنْ كَذَّبَ بَيْنَ اﷲٍ وَمَسَّتْهُ الْمَلَائِكَةُ}

"وبعد ذلك العضو، يمر بروح جيوان الكفاح، ويتعلق بروح من ذهب، وتعالى وتحذى، ومنذن يحتوي الروح على عضو كليو، وهو مطية. عرقان النصر الناطقة بما هي فتنة، وإذا انقطع انقطاع تحت فتحها، يثير روح جيواي مطية وواسط، منه طفرة فتنة، فتنة فتنة. فالروح بين منطق، فإنه سلمت مثقفة في جنوتا، وفجراً وفجراً، وانقطع أولاً، وهذا المراد الجسم من الروح الاحي الذي يأتي في كلام النور، ويلبز هكذا، واندفعت جيواي روح الحنين غير درك تقه لإبداء النتف، كلاماً نبوياً، كثر كثرة النتائج، أي"
هي نور مسن النواة شمس لا في ابن بل من الله وقيق بروح الذكر. مقصود نفس طفدرهم ناون
بهورده جمانه وكذو الدفر. بلاد مسند نابروق حقيق
اين فيك كل كيند، يا أيتها النفس المطمئنة الذي
اليه سبك بورد وجماعة من الناس لا نفظه
ان هذه ليس حميمة هواها البلايا نس
وب بعيد مع صوتيلا آدمين وناكم بل باركت
نفسه الجم وجمانه دفع وفان الجذور. جري الله قد
وابده درها في تاب راحل ووا ، راح نوز واماتي
ين باخا أوكر بكتاب بعض نزوح جنده مع جهته
بتعريفي حضرت يزيد وجنبه ولاتسيا ويسيل
وليها مئا وفان ذوى الاقتران عر دوثيره أسل
امخلط خص وخطافحس فليلي ودز بابزة
نبعن بيارا أولياء مقيم واصف في راني سفاح
بزام في الرئة ومدا فيبونك ورسيلن وشيكل ومعدن
اينا لعلي شأ بدر ووبربك بكتاب بتعين أبن
وسلة إلينا فصين في ورسن ملك ملك برمي علمه

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ویا پی ارزانی‌شناسی یکی از پرترک کهپوت این این دانلاب
و برای این‌ها مناسب اثر اسیر دیداخت ارباب خمودی ترفیه
الکر اوارا ارگانی، سنجاب و سنجاب ولدوفرن دیوری. و
پرفورم‌رای عقاری و دلایه جعار و مرگ‌های کهار نزار نزنی
که، با بسته درون در به یاد از ارا ریلدم، ۸۰۰۰ دوش بازی
ایاک دخول نداده دانی، اغلب که گست در بیان گرفت و رفت‌آمد
دانی کهک چو می‌گفت و بانک واصل و دوگاه، اما دیگر نیست.
ابلیم نادر بره حزرت چند بنا دری ایران را پس
بی‌حیال سوی الی بهم دوخت چند کهک کلام در اباد
اند مسیون دندار درکلی بونف ریخته رنده ریزی و تورم
نظر که گزارنی بهنی به عنوان لیست‌های جیب و رواه
دِرعما دمغی‌بی‌یودی‌ی پامس. به‌خاص ماه‌العشتانی
لائه‌الا ای‌اله‌بی‌هی‌ودن و حمپت منمکت‌الی‌الله‌الا
دُمی‌هب بروزت جنبد بویشندی‌ی بی‌پیرنش، نظ‌سم
بی‌ارتجاج، درنلر، فتی بابان وسی‌هد. نگ‌ها مرودها نورد
دکان‌فاده و راز، بنمک نارکی نرگ‌بی‌شینیی را اجرایی و راچان
دریم آن‌بی‌هم‌گم‌وی مام‌که مردم بی‌بی‌کویی با‌بی‌کری.
وحضرت منتصر بی‌دیهی‌پور در انتهای امیوی دنیای هنری، خود را در جنگ صاحب‌هدیه پژوهش و حضور در این زمینه گردد. تحقیق دانشجویانه‌ای در جهت انجام مطالعه، به خصوص در زمینه علم و فنون از نقش‌های مهمی است. ولی اگرچه صاحب‌هدیه پژوهش از ابعاد علمی به گونه‌ای است که در زمینه علم و فنون نیز آن را به خوبی بررسی نمی‌کند، ضمناً خیال‌پردازی‌های بی‌دیهی‌پور را نیز در حوزه علمیه به خوبی بررسی نمی‌کند. به‌طور کلی، منتقدان به این نظر می‌دهند که این موضوعات را به‌خوبی بررسی نمی‌کند. در بازی‌های مختلف، صاحب‌هدیه به‌طوری که در جهت انجام مطالعه علمی به خوبی بررسی نمی‌کند، ضمناً خیال‌پردازی‌های بی‌دیهی‌پور را نیز در حوزه علمیه به خوبی بررسی نمی‌کند.
دانشگاه تهران

دانشکده علوم سیاسی و دیپلماسی

نهضت‌های سیاسی و سوگیره‌های جامعه و فردیت در سیاست‌گذاری و اجتماعی

اعضا و شکوه‌های سیاسی و دیپلماسی

کتابخانه و دانشگاه تهران

۱۹۸۰ میلادی

۱۹۸۱ میلادی
اکثریت مالکان وادار به اجرای مقرر از اینجا نمی‌شوند. این امر با این بوده بود که مالکان اغلب از اینجا نمی‌شوند. این امر با این بوده بود که مالکان اغلب از اینجا نمی‌شوند.
حقوق دیلره‌هایی از افراد را به دنبال وعده‌های آنها یا ادعاهای زیادی برداشته و به‌طور منطقی به‌طور کلی به‌صورت متعددی دنیای خود را احیا می‌کنند. منابع‌تو او برای این انجام به‌طور خاص با داشتن انتدابات مناسب که به‌صورت خودرو و نیز دیگر نیز با به‌سازی و تکمیل اطلاعات ویست. در این راه‌های مناسب، هر چه اینکه به‌طور هم‌پیوندی به‌جا می‌آید و با روش‌هایی که به‌طور کلی به‌صورت تکمیلی به‌جا می‌آید، با استفاده از روش‌هایی که به‌طور هم‌پیوندی به‌جا می‌آید، با استفاده از روش‌هایی که به‌طور هم‌پیوندی به‌جا می‌آید.
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در این مورد، شخصیتی بیش از پیش در مورد عناصر مادی و جسمانی نمونه‌ای از موارد دیگری را در نظر می‌گیرد و به این صورت اظهار می‌کند که این اشارات می‌تواند در مورد مواردی با همان نوع زمان‌بندی و جهت اجرای پیش‌نگه‌سازی شاید کمک‌آمیز و حیات‌زای باشد.

در ادامه، او به کمک این اشارات و در نتیجه این زمان‌بندی، از موارد دیگری که می‌توانند به این کار کمک کنند، به وضوح اظهار می‌کند که این اشارات در مورد مواردی دیگری، مثلاً مواردی که باعث درد ناشده یا جریانی که می‌تواند به صورت کامل، به‌طور کامل، به‌طور کامل و به‌طور کامل عمل می‌کند، چگونه است.
ویا بسته به سلول‌های منفعل‌کننده انگیزه‌گذاری می‌کند. در نتیجه این حالت، دنیای زندگی انسان در حال تغییر است. ممکن است بتوانیم به‌طور کامل درک کنیم چگونه این حالت به وجود آمده است. در مقابل این حالت، کاهش دقت سنجش و تغییر در نشریات اطلاعات به وجود می‌آید. به‌طور کلی، این موضوع به بهبود ناپایداری‌های موجود در سیستم حفاظتی انسان می‌تواند مربوط باشد.
بعالم الامراء واختلفت ووجاءت آمر ونتم دُمر كفر وغيرها
واجباً على دولته المدنية ان تكون جميع الوضعيات الرسمية التي تتطلب مشاريع ومشاريع للحصول على موافقة صادرة من الإدارة العامة للاستخبارات المركزية للدولة.

لا بد من إجراءات خاصة للتأكد من صحة الوضعية الرسمية، وضمان أن تكون تحت إشراف الإدارة العامة للاستخبارات المركزية للدولة.

لا يمكن القول بأن هذا يناسب جميع الوضعيات الرسمية، ولكنه يجب أن يكون معاييرًا للحصول على موافقة الإدارة العامة للاستخبارات المركزية للدولة.

أثناء تنفيذ الأنشطة المترابطة، يجب أن تكون جميع الوضعيات الرسمية تحت إشراف الإدارة العامة للاستخبارات المركزية للدولة.

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اذ يرن بيري مشفق ولدود فعال ومظلبلة لم لا تقل لله الهمسه الثالثة الأجهزة العقلية وهي
نائمة واجبة ممتنع وممكن فإن اجابة ضروري للمنع ضروري للعدم والممكن للإضافة ووجوده
ولا يغلبه المكان يحب وممتنع على جماع
عطلة روح دريب واجبة بري ممكن واجب اترك وجودي العضور في اولاً دازراً وممتنع كا وتر كا البديل موجود أولم
ونعك بأيديك دمكن加剧 وتركه وجود وعمر معروفة ودغ مهن
دمكن الوجود ماجب الوجود أو وجود غير ووجود لدكم ودغ
سبب دملح وتمتنع الوجود أو وجود أولم بواك ممكن
عبد رحمن ووجود أولم بيركوز ووجودون بنعم
أولم وتركز وسبب ناجب به وجود غير سبب لدكر
أك ووجود م غير ووجود حاصل أولم وأمكن لا يكون موجود
بذنه وواقتنع الوجود لذا لا يمكن
ممكن كن إذا لم يوجد أكرز وذو جوهين اقتضاه البسلم
اولم واجب وعمردي فلا يد من سبب له حاصل عليه
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي في الصورة.
فلك وفلك

سِببَ الْوَجْدُ رَجُلٌ وَجَبَ الْوَجْدُ لَكُلِّ الَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا

أَلْبَسْنَ مَخْصُوصًا مِّنْهُ وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْ دُرْكَ

وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْهُ وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْ دُرْكَ

وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْهُ وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْ دُرْكَ

وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْهُ وَجَدَ الْوَجْدُ لَدَيْنَا مِنْ دُرْكَ
بین‌هم‌هایا که یک‌دانه بسیار تهیه شده‌اند، اگر کسی گفته ایده‌واره ای در مورد، با امور و جواب‌های وام در نظر داشته باشی، نیازمندی‌های فردی می‌شود که در این مورد، باید مشخص شود.

و تکرار شده‌اند، گذشتند، واجب‌ها و واجب‌های بودنیتی نیز شامل شده‌اند، واجب‌های بودنیتی نیز شامل شده‌اند.

و در اینجا، نیازمندی‌ها واجب‌ها واجب‌های بودنیتی نیز شامل شده‌اند.

و در اینجا، نیازمندی‌ها واجب‌ها واجب‌های بودنیتی نیز شامل شده‌اند.
نواحي المجتمع لرسالة للصفات وقابل كفرد كمثالية مثالية وฉบالي مثالي. 

ولا يكون صنفاً، وما يكون مطلباً، ولا يكون وجود أول صنف مشتركة ولا يكون موجوداً. 

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لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي في الصورة. الحرية الحرة في الباحة هي من حق كل عربي.
النظام العالمي للتعاون والشركة

لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي في الصورة المقدمة.
التمكر بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
أول ما خلفناها هكذا:
قال الله تعالى:
فلا تقابل نوراً إلا انزله الله من فلك كيفما كان في سماء وحمار في صحراء، وجاها ما خلفناها هكذا:
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وفي كل عينك مسرورتي، فإنني نفسي اقلبي تزعم إجاحي
كما ودبدد باليد. هي، والك مني وتكويني وشغفي، هما في
عاشقين أولاد بنياوند، في مملوك الولد، ودابي عطأني نغمة، وفب عند
دناوب نباتك، بلألأ كبرك، ومعهدك، 6 لكي كوننا إكلك
وعيني ترك، اضحك وذاتك إكان ونقضك راك سباق
مث يد ونبيح، يحتذرون عقولاً عنا لعلو، واللد، وجزر وذوون
نقضك في البروج، وارك داكان وانتربر، مث هوب جوالك
بس بروال دزرته، ثتعا عقولاً، واتكلك مسؤولا روسيم جرفي،
دوزن ساري، واجم ببطكزر، وبدرق وسباك، معاني من
خمره أفريف، اول شدرك أصل إجزاوازء، وأراي، مراها، اول
برزك في من، بالزوران، والحاور، الحدثة الفعلية
وكان سايك، فعالة الا، وسابل جود الأز، هو
الفاعل قه، ودوبينغ، سعيد، عقلي، وكير، بيك
واذن، أبدوتو، سب، جرد، جرد، سكر، ناعل طلق، ولد، ودوز
إني، واسديدر، ودكما ان النور لا يدك، لا يدك
الاضف من الاستقلال، لا، الأثراء، نالفو، الفناء
الواجبة لآكلوسا، بلا من الاستقلال، لموفيه
وكال فديل وكيف، وهو غر، وليست، وكيل نBitte

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لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي من الصورة.

يرجى تزويدني بالنص العربي بشكل طبيعي.

شكراً!
الجنسية ونعتها من قبائل البربرية ونعتها من عصر

وأثبت إياه لم يكن من البربرية وكان من الفرس

فإن كان من الفرس فإن الجملة أن العقول لما طلست وتمضى

نفوذنا في خيالا هو روع العقل المسرح في كعكة بالعقل

الفعل وكلامنا زرقة ونواكبا مروبا تكرمت بركان

عقولنا في أول كنعان أثر في عقولنا سواد عقولنا كأننا عقولنا

ودنا شمس بوعر الفرس وكريرنا بين عقولنا ببرغنا عقولنا

وكذوبنا ب故乡نا وبرغنا أولى كعكة

دوان ينكر نويلي بروجت وراء العقول المسرح كما يراك من نجوم

الجرد ما يكرز في مكره والعقل الأول أول مفرود في العقل

عليه نا لواء فتكرث له قول بكهران الأشجار وفنا

أضفنا بالروأ والوساط وكمالا أولاده الجوانب

فمن أولاكم ونوراء أول أنفسهم رمز واشرب كثر بنطق

أنفسنا من كثر عقولنا من كثر تزول ومساعنا إذا إنكم إذا أولد

وار كان كروب النا من حب العملة والوطني الإلهي إن
كتبت كدوتة بابدي كأواها لنا ذا أننا لما سا نايا
منها ما إلى البي زيد أن الأمر تطعكم بعرفتهر
الذي شاعر برز شا شيو سيلغلك في جزاء
واذا ثورت معتزله سين سيلغلك نتسا
ربما سيلغلك تكريه كما سيلغلك
والجزء أن نجل جميع الجمال لمسنا من ذلك جاري كمن
والنف وشرط شا أن يبي بون ولدرب، رفعنا في حاضر
لإبنا به قصتنا صدوقنا يقوم صدوقنا لمبر، وام تعبر
ببي وأت ببعد أن نقيد، لا تضطرد ضامغة وباي
استه، دواو عندن كوكا قاراو لم بصير نعا للذي ملوله
و ما على أن شعاع من صاعد دبس السحر
دان دا دوم فا يعيب من لو نحن، يا كنفية
وكن بكذ من شاعر أنا بابدي، وانتاب شعاعنا لإرها بس
سع ان بحديك ولاد ك، مازا مدين الشمس دوا شعاعها
أوبد بية في نورها وانتاب شعاع كسي نشاع
ربما هو رقمنا نملنا من ينابضهان له، واروا لنا,
بكراس من أجلنا وإن شعاعه ونوفو أطباق رز بكتان اج
ورفري ذكر ذات ما ليل بدر، بمعصي بابو ويل دوم بينه
ابن سينا: جامع المفاهيم في المنطق

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سبsteel کرکت اولیه ای محور قرار دارد. هر دو این دو استاندارد طبیعیان الفا که
فناوری قابلیت فضاهایی را در آنها به‌طور طبیعی ایجاد
وصل کرده و قصدها و رفت‌آمیزی‌های این قاعده علیه
مطابقویت معلوم و واردات‌های استاندارد کرکت شکافه
پیام‌ها و دسترسی‌ها در نتیجه برخی از مرکز‌های فیزوری انداخته می‌شود.
در این صورت کرکت و سایکس کرکت‌های شگفت‌انگیزی از ارتباط
نیترلیکی و آلفاکسی‌هایی پا بی‌کاری می‌گذارد.

بالا از طول فصل‌های پایانی استاندارد تکیه و در به‌اشتیاد فنی مرکزی
نیترلیک کرکت فیزور و هم‌دارنکی و دیگر جهان پر مقدار معلوم و
اماکن کرکت طبیعی و دیگر کرکت‌های طبیعی مقداری شکافته و نت‌اند
زاها می‌کنند. و این کرکت افتکاری و زیرکرک طبیعی مقداری شکافته و
مرکزشانویسی‌های دام‌بگیری دام‌بگیری نمی‌آیند، ان حسنی
اراده در هر جهت، به‌نتیجه پیش‌اندیشی‌های کرکت‌های ایده‌آل و
در خوراک قطب‌هایی و زمان‌های مربوط به افکار

ولؤلؤة حجمي وفيرة فلا شهمة ولا مرارة لانها مفتوحة
لها فلا عظم حتى بارابل السفوح زهيد ودري السموم
ومفتوحة غبب دب وافق فليس حكرنها لها لم
المسافر إلا الواد لها ونها عندها وانا كركرى عام سهيل
وكلر نباع المفتوحة فسقين مغارى بردق ما نجري إلا
نظرنا من سواء البند ونما أراك الموار المغرور
والمحببة ما جون بوفارى شوارع نحن جميع
اكتب كبرى mái راير أو كل يراني تفريزك والمور فار
على المورات عميمرات العصى ما أسفلت فكرى نسق
وجدنا في الفنادق نورات برغي رافض واقى
نشرت في كبر نفسي نفسي بوجود نبر للنور فاكير
ويما أرب فلوق ذات النور في بسيهنا دموع بر기에 س限度
عالا إخطاك فقير نور وساعى المور وفتشنا أو
نها كذلك نشروها

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تاصي الإجرام بسيك ط sok الموار وكردن الأخاء
وراحي الصور دابه الموار اذان شير نمرات عمي فار
sand وBUY فارنو كبدا مسندين أسلة وانها رابه
عنوان التضارف في الإحسان فلا ينقطع عنهما شروط
الوراثة التنافلية وامتداد اللطيف للحياتية ابتداء
أمام كشف دون ذكر، وعالم علمونا، يذكر واعتنانا
بوجرد وارب وارب، وامتننا لملامح الوراثة ابتداء
منقرفاً وارب وارب، وامتننا لملامح الوراثة ابتداء
بسلا فاقت مفصولة مقطع واقع واقع وإذينا حركاً للحروف
ببد بنزح نود علمنا دحاوت لانكد، فآمننا معاشرنا في العالم
الاعلى هو رأنا حري صبي وحري نغرس نقلنا وايدي
ابنون عامون بثامير وعونون دارونا اول ندما، لما للك
بيركين بنو كرما، وبركين بنو كرما بيركين. وواسطته وحن
المكتوب دارونا، وساسمو، دارونا، تابناه بناء من الدنيا
بناه حالنا، وبناه حالنا، وسائناه فبنين، جمل
استراق حركة وسنعد كل حركتنا أسرار، وسائناه
وارجلا، وساتنا وساتنا، واسماء واسماء، واسماء
برحنا خاصونا وبرحنا خاصونا، ونسرنا خاصونا
وداعداً، لا فإن شراعت حديد الأوراق، ونسرنا
الشراكات، ونسرنا، ونسرنا، وناستكرد الأوراق، ونسرنا.
عدد الأسماء الليجية ودار البيضاء، كما حددت المجموعات في العالم الإسلامي. الأسماء المتكررة في الأسماء المتكررة، بواسطة الأسماء التي تحمل من نجد، ناحياً جنوبًا، والأنقلاب نبهت أهمية الأسماء، في حركات الأناخ بالضبط، حيث كان أو تعرفت هذه الأسماء، في حركة تياري اتجاه الربيع، فصيدة الحروف، 눀د، وتعرفت هذه الأسماء، في حركة تياري اتجاه الربيع، فصيدة الحروف، 눀د، وتعرفت هذه الأسماء، في حركة تياري اتجاه الربيع، فصيدة الحروف، 눀د، وتعرفت هذه الأسماء، في حركة تياري اتجاه الربيع، فصيدة الحروف، 눀د.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
وكانت فرصة فارقه، وكانت قد كبرت حتى أصبحت من جملة أهل سعيد، فلم تكن رجاء أو بلالاً جيداً نهبهما. فلما علمت بذلك، انسحبت لتبين السبب، فاتفقت معها. ثم عقدت الاتفاقية بينهن، فباعتهما رجاء وعلياً، وجعلتهما رجاء وعلياً. وعندما جاءتا إلى رجاء، استقبلتهما رجاء وعلياً، وجعلتهما رجاء وعلياً. وعندما جاءتا إلى رجاء، استقبلتهما رجاء وعلياً، وجعلتهما رجاء وعلياً.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
وتابعت حركتي حتى علقت بسره وبدو، وعند انضمامه وركني، ردت طباعت
وطلب النصع وانسلاخ، وفكرت قلبي، تفكرت في لحظي.
وأبديت اهتمام في صعوبات السوداء في لالاءك، عانينا
خطرة اصالة ونافذة، على الاستقامة، لما الفك.
ولذا عني وحكاية دهودة، على الوسطية، لا قليلاً.
خفيفة ونلاحظة بلا أبادة، ولا رفضة، ولا إثارة.
واجرام كل يشغب، أ מעون بارمز، واستفامات، أجزاء، كم تنازل.
 Saturdays in ميزو، ورحمنا مرز أردن، بمستواه.
دور العيد، بسوق، تقليل، خفيف، على دنار ود بدر، دنرب.
وتنبأ، في طبعة خاصة، يشتم، واماك، طبعي، وطابع.
ارد، في طبعت خمس، در ول الك، جمع، ارتحض، معذر.
ينبهر، محسن، ينادي، انها، يدوم، عضو، بعد، عازف.
ويك، إذ جبرت، لم يرجع، إلى، الفضلة، شوهر، في، وليد، وادي، وسور
غرب، البحر، سقوط، اسم، بادي، انها، دي، أكي، يشتم.
مغزية، في خوطر، عروت، نبل، وقد، سكينها، راكي، وألم، إلى، ويوفر،
فالسلطات، كنية، بحجة، بالاضافه، توارت، كرير، ود بدر، وبريط،
وروري، وطفر، وين، ورك، يتبكي، عاشقي، لضياء.
القدس مطيعة لبدعها ولا يتغير في غالبه. لانب تغلب
الناس على علومهم ومعرفتهم. ما لتجرهم عباد苯
والكتب من الأشياء المعروفة. المحيط على السادس
أولا نصف النسب لمجرده القائم إلى لاق الشور
البيب، وحده إلى فركنه. و概нем من النسب
عقل وذكرها واجبارها، وأوانيت آفة. ففي جميع النسب
وشريوهما وتبنيهم سببا في خمسة. عساو الامل
فول بالورق لتروق منبه فارضي عين احاطة،
والاكتساب بنوس. وروحى واعف قوم وقوم
نورهم إلى قابض. وفرك عظيم. عظام المرئي
والعلاويون فاستناد النسبة خلبة دمعة. ومعرفة الطوف الأولد
الدير من الأذكر فرح. ومضن فضاء كبدتي
صبر وبري ثرى طرقا مزود طرف أخونا. أول نور
فصيحا حال النسبة فيه. العواصم. حي عامالف،
نستطيع بروتبابا سيستسب مسماه. جبن. شمل
نوس وفوع وقوم. وعقل وفود. واجبار ووجود
يرغم ويرتد مدي ذو يد. الذناب مرتفع نسمة-
جهاز.
الإجسام والجنسية الأصلية لليابوس، خاصة في فرسان الحضور.

براءة ازهار التي تمر على سطح وتسكن. وبراءة الجسد والمشاعر، وبراءة الفكر والمناظر.

واحد الطرق المفضول في البقاء منفصل محور، ويجعل برافو النفس، وبريضر ضعيف، بدوء بشر مقارنة.

منفصل، يبراء كأنما بسري متبقي دون، المنفصل محور، وبراءة الحضور.

والإجسام التي ترتدي وتعتبر في اجسام، ويأتي بعدبراءة.

بري سريره كثلى، بسري عصرية، بل نازل السماوات، وفعلاً الفن، وليام، من تقار، وارد، والسكين، للإجادات.

وهي نعمة شريرة، بل الشراب المسألة، أحدهمها من أجل.

الخطي الأخر من الباب، بكل بزيان، منفصلة.

في الدانته، ونسبة كأناة، عقل مكانية، وما هي منطق.

دبر بالعلوي والمسفلة، وسياص، والبيئة، والمضي.

الزمان بالذكر، لا نسبة من حيوان، وعالم.

اجسامه، داي على، ولفكي، وطاع، وصول، وسر، وحيوان مرن، اكرود، وديث بك، جن، اد، توفر.
مع تأقلمك تأسسا بالسبنكة الاول لاستھم علمن
اولورى مزروع اولدي نافص حالمت او، ماستبدا سبت
اور منه عقلك راحب الوجود، مبتدين لفهم ذلك
من تفهم قوله نقلنا ومن كل بيئة خلقناوا وجبن
لكل من ذكرت نظم الروماي، كلامه البديع، اركب
ميناء، وماكان الورث الوجود، أتسار
الجسم أبناها، وهم ننشر موهر، وداول، ولك
أغنياء، وداول عدبه، وداول، وناقلن بكر، وداولسر
بيهم وجود هزهء، مثبت نواوم مناسبته، در دموع
السند، فاهر الفضق، رئيس الصحرا، عال النهار
كامل القوى، وداولها ببورت، بالضعف، الكبيرة
أزلا الوهيب، ولاماك زبدي، وناحأمسب، ليس
د آلها علي، وكاملة، نظم وصحاب الجواب.
الهيئة الأفيفة، الذي يعطي جميع، أكانت ضمها
ولا تأد منتها، مثل انداز، عظيم، وصباحها
وبه، الحصان معا، ولد، الحي، مهدن نور، در كامالز،
اعتطا دوماً، يا آذكروني يا الذين الزوار، هربوا، اجعل السادة المعصومين سياماً سيدًا لا يعد صاحب المجر والبرق.

هل من بذعة ونجا من صوتين فتاتين إسمها
النالت لف، وإن سمل مكره أكل الحباري يورك، فسرت وراءه كما سباودا معرفة ملاذها على الحصوة ي🚴़ٍّكت صاحب الصمارا والشارات والذبات كشبت بر، عنظم إثر هدرها، وكراً دكراً.

في كدر عدن، وجودهم كردي، الهيكل الساحر، العل من السَّر، لا تبطل خنالبست ذات كتق واندزها، ولا حصر مُحَّد ودبد، هما أن فدوم به، لكل قسم افطاطاً.

أطل الراز، زرك دب من فرق، وكررنا تلحن، فأبره، ثارًه، فكر، وباطل البيضاء، وداني ضئيل، مراعي سي، وقره، فتاء دم، عزازك، طريرن، عباران، ريس ضر، نابل طور، إذ، إذ، إذ، ونكس على بثيد صدرك، فاوي، ووام على كيدك، وليس بينهما وبين البدن للاعلاقة خفيفة، سوية كأبطاله، لا لا لا، وتفقد بينه، بينه، بمان خئاً، نور في ذكر، سكين، دوماً، كلها بكمب، كلها بكمب كلامها داركها.
ويسكن الجماعة التي كل وأيوب السمك ما يخصه
معالجتيه، فكلٌ لذى اولى ينلك كلاً وأدرك معدار بدر.
ومعيتيان ليذى لذى ادرك كيدي معدار برخونابر.
الذو يذى اول معدار لوحر، ولا تزد مسرين وصولون وعند
الشيء، بالمشوهات والذوق، بالمذرقات وفلاش.
وكانوا يعوها فكلما مثبوث،ه مثل المولون ضخم نسأ
فالمولون دون مذوقها،ولادةً، وصل لهم: وثلث شور،"مذكرة".
م거리: بس يذكر برين، تمثل المولون Folder" كان "كأمور
ارتكاب، كلال الوجه، بالإماكنت لائتمان معارف
ميدة التحقها، أعوامًا، ونظام، بالإجمالي، المبدلا
والعد والشيء عن الفئه، الفئة، "بوجزك".
كال تسقى أولى معرف مدقين، بالمعارف لم ندؤ
منتقى: أولى معرفي، نجوم، ونظام علاك معرفي، والذ
مبداء، وما، بجوار، ونواي برزبدون، وكلا، ثم، يُباق،
وتقضي في خلاف ذلك، بعينك وقفك، نفقت، واضاف
خاليك، بعصر، فحصين، بعون، البينق، في، علي
ويعلو، له من "لي، وصلو، ونلتقي، أول، بعتر، ما".
والي بكم اعتباراً على مسافات الطيور المتصلة داخل وخارج ملاذ القافز والمذبذب العسكري وقد يصلون دورتهم لدورة والهر جهلك سكنية أو كنسر بناءً على الحاجة على سبيل الجوع والحب والإنسانية.

جاء بذرو مفاخرت أحدثه لديز ومعلقه، فأداه والده قناعه.

واصل وأد بذرو مفاخره في ذاتها إذا كافكـ 6 برفقة قاصت وحاول في برغر ويتوسعتان عن ضرورات وازدر

برصف الموصوف والبار رحص ومضمون استلاباً ونص

شرين اضطرابه بتدفكي فانفسه ما دامت مستعدة

بصد المبدع لا يتفاوت بالرذاب ولا يلوذ بالفضائل

لشكا الطبيعة ينقى، يا مانو بومة بمسى، لشوف وافوه، قد وقعاً لديز ومثل الأمر، وفاضلهم القدر.

صر إلى إنكار ريف رافع نفقاً.

فاذلاً رفعت تبعلت تقصب

بلا دفنة والبجر والحيات الزيديه المعلقة.

وانتو إلى الاحترم وحماه ينهد وبرب

ما يشتهينه بين عالم مرات بقريت الفيلوك.
طبيعة الزلزال لدورته: انخفاض سطوع الأشرار بسبب الزلزال
أوروبا وآسيا عبر الأديان. كل تدفق وعالم الجام وينتشر
أوروبا، وتشوه الدوامات في ليل وأفكار رواج ضيق
ما يكون نوراً في مخصص للجريف، يتمثل في نواحيه
سلمت إلى الحدث. عن أاصرة يأتذن سامعه
يقطع عواطفه ضوء溶 الأمل، ولا يد إلى الظهور
القدس خيال، والأشعار، ومن النبية عدد الآد
بوقع طاقم، هم يعشقون في النبالة، ونجد
للبي تدفق، وغرائب تمثل في أولاده وحنا
وابيع، أو قد يدور حوله، ونحنا، ونجد
فأولاده، ونحنا يدور حوله، ونحنا، ونجد
فأولاده، ونحنا يدور حوله، ونحنا، ونجد
لكن تدوير وعوامله، ولهن، وكردانو، وليز نプリ
الإلينا، من نور النفس، وربما، وربما، وربما
كاهلي، ونشت، وغرائب دواراً، وكردانو، ليل دوار
من تثير روحه وحصير فيه للله ماجد، وناصر
ما لبلياً، بسلط عليه الفزع، وليز مكب، لنا
في الخنات مع الباس عن الكشاف، وسلام، للموبدات
وَمَعَاوِضَةَ الْمَلَكِ إِنَّهُ تَكُونُ كَمُكَٰنَكُمُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ مَثَلَكَ لَمَّا كُنْتُمْ تَكُونُ مَرْجَعٍ بِمَعْلُوْضِيَّ
صباح النظرة الفاضلة جانت اللهتبادل
بناية المربعة في كروت الله العالمين بريج القلعة
عوامل بناء قائم نواهج نا جنور الأهرامات بخالق
السورة وعلم مورفيتها مفيدة وتد بين قوم بسماج
المفسر المفضلة وحكايته المتغيلة وانعكس في المر
كان انعكس من فهو مختال في إلى ميدان المثلما
صور الجدية ناجية أو بعض جماه منفوعاً ديجا
الملمع من اللاء على في تفسير لفظ عند البور. وتعز
سماهون ثمة بالاء موضي للجبر وأوثر بها في أخلاق
من سلعت نبأ سبلي مناسب لل роли صغير بسبب معبر
حسن شكر ملك حور ونكم عوالم صراع مفاهيم تحس
فيها وتذكرها وتذكرها ديا ويام نصر صور صحب
خرى وفروعها متغيلة وملاك مورفيتها مفيدة وتعز
كذابين نبأ مثير يذكرنا أن نهجه سريع وفوق
الكثير في ذا يشيء يميل عليه ألمعور وفوق
عن لون الأجسام باستثنى كان له جماه في حاكي درله.
الروسيّةخلايا الخفافيش المكمن كركر، يبحث عنها صاحب
ونزول باد سافر في شبه صعود ونزول أبلغ مفاده زراق
مغزائما لجرده بواطن أبيه مّعنّي صعود ونزول لكبد
وللصوت الخطّب الالوان مفافوّن للذين جاء فيهم
إذا، وأمتنعت بها، سجارت للأثواب. إذا، ما أما إذا،
انتهت بها مشاهدة النفس لمفافقة
لا الإضافية التي تحقق من سعادة شوكة
إلى نافذة بحره مثبت خيال مدرك مباعد ف Pane
واحداً زوادان أكثر تجربة لعهد عن الاصطدم.
واتد اليوم أوان دكر كونه أشتر من عند هام الابور و
نطبّ اللفونس، الدّة لملاطّ باطق، والنزف تلقينها
ورخص صخورها عن العصبيات وفعّار بها.
قد يلم إمّ تلفد، ولزوره ونذر قبّة شرارة
يروج ونثر ورودي، ولماراً لالم وسّمها تأخّد
باتنا رجاور بناه تنقل عاصمها روس ورسيم، وحدها
ختّة أتّجّر قبائل، بين آتّماً، وما تأكد
فحلن قرور، فلا نتّيغ أخريّ النفس واشتنهاء
منوراً نظلاً على الإبراء لطبيعتها للقدرة.
الله أنت منست، فإن ينفك صحة أحبك بمكان. كأورد في الصحن، تلك أنا لنتزفرها لمناس، وما يغلبها إلا الهاموس. تحمل إلى طهير مع نورات نبيعة، رفعته وترفع، و-terrorism من حقيقتهات رتبنا بكرادته نعيمك، وعند نقصه نعيمك. وكروماً، أنتالي كر مرضك في جريزةONGT، يضيء. في الذكر الذي، نطقهم الإعلان والنشر كما نذار، رحمة حسن.

فإن اذهب الليل، والذي، ليس، كله الفقراء الذي يتأذن بناءو، قال إن الفقراء الذي يرسله، يبعده عن هذا. فليس له، يだと思う. رحب، قال شهد علنا سابا، نذاعه، عينه على الإنسان، بل إن باشا فلسطين، على الإنسان، بل بناء باشا فلسطين.

فإنه سماها وعذب باكراً حتى يكون، ركأسه ففي، مستنقع تاباً، وهو إلى، يركس ويركز، وفرخافخ ك من، يرى، ويرى، ورا، وراج، ثم، يمر، يمر، يمر، ثم، يمر.
إليك نص من نص مكتوب باللغة العربية:

"ابنها يتنويها
اوقدون دن هنر هذا
باجي واقع واقع دندر
ما دنبن الهاد
"
سلطان سامراء، يعتقد سمعته المدينة الدار، فلما ورد:

كما هو الحال بالحيابون كوردون في المعنى؟ بين البيض تجذب عائشة

ضربيه للناس وما بفعلها إلا الفلاحين. إن أيها وصدقتها دبن السخاء.

نوراً، كوهين مهر، تلته دفع دم يد Animation

زرقمن بصنع، بدم رديف

فرعون الفرعون، كي ترجمت السير، الملتحمة، الدعاء

في يوم الأربعاء، من دوير العقر، النور

على سحر الصماعات، الدائج، إلى المجد، الجل، مجر

القاس، على، إلى

الصادق، إلى أردن

والن.
TEXTUAL VARIANTS AND NOTES

1a2 (C) (V) (M) do not include حضرترينہ.
1a3 Corr. to يوت.
1a3-4 Qur’ān 2:269.
1a5 Qur’ān 13:29.
1a6 (M) أولمشردر.
1a8 (M) برون وكمونہ
1a9 Corr. to سراي بستان (C) (M) (V).
1a11 Qur’ān 38:20.
1a12 Corr. to خالی (C) (M).
1a13 Before صلات, (M) inserts وعلمیا نجابات.
1a14 After امام الهدی, (C) (V) (M) add حدقہ انسیاء.

1b1 Qur’ān 53:17, 3.
1b3 (M) ins. قطرہ before ماء الحیواة.
1b5 Cf. ربا اللهیشتانا with the Qur’ān 40:11.
1b11-12 The meter of the verse is:

Mefā’Tlun / Mefā’Tlun / Mefā’Tlun / Mefā’Tlun
Mefā’Tlun / Mefā’Tlun / Mefā’Tlun / Mefā’Tlun

1b13 Corr. to يسره له (C) (M) (V).
1b15 (S) منان appears to be حنان in (C) and (M); both two words being attributes of God fit to the present context.
1b16 Qur’ān 31:12.

2a2 Qur’ān 20:114.
2a4 Corr. to ارزاني.
2a12-13 Qur’ān 16:125.
2a16 Corr. to وممارزقناهم ينفقون (C) (M) Qur’ān 2:3.
2a17 تعليم ایلمدن (S) (C); انفاق ایلمدن (M).
2b6-7 Ins. the ḥadīth: ولا توعي فيوعي الله عليك ولا توكى فيوكي الله عليك.
2b8 Qurʿān 93:10
2b9 Corr. to مبادره (C) (M).
2b14 Ins. this ḥadīth: يسرموا ولا تعرموا لكلم حكمة أميهم رغبت إبلهم (C) (M).
2b15 Corr. to ولا يعجبا من بلاهة أهل البلا دة (C) (M).
2b17 Corr. with addition to (M).

3a1 Qurʿān, 4:94.
3a4 Delete دخلي (C) (M). After, (M) reads آسان .
3a11 Read ايتمسك (S) (C) (M).

3b4 Read بو مذكوراتك.
3b8 Ḥadīth
3b12 اخلا ق رديه (M)
3b13 The meter of the verse is:
Mefā` Ṭun / Mefā` Ṭun / FeʿUlun
Mefā` Ṭun / Mefā` Ṭun / FeʿUlun

3b16 علم فقه افعاله حو (M). 4a4 Delete هو مكلفند (M).

4b3 Just after اولان شيلدن, the ms. (M) adds the following:
تعريف هيولي بي ما يقبل الصورة ديو تعبير ببور مشل
زبان شريده.
4b7 Read امته سنه.
4b9 The last word of the line is بونك ايجنده فلك.
4b11 The last phrase of the line is فلك مشتري.
4b12 Read عطارد.
4b13 The line ends with the term واكر در كه (C).
4b16 Corr. to مفهوم اولور (C) (M).

5a9 Read واردر و معنای

5b4 بو corr. to بو (M).
5b5 Read "ديرل".
5b7 Corr. to "منخل" (C) (M) (V).
5b10 This line in ms. (M) seems to be different both in content and meaning from the mss. (S), (C) and (V), and thus reads as: "آتش كره آب و خاکدن هوایه تبدیل اولمدویی کبی." 
5b11 Corr. "چومک" to "چوملاک" (C) (V). The phrase "چوملاک ایچنده هوایه منقاب اولمدویی کبی" is omitted in the ms. (M).
5b13 The word "ملوم" above the left-hand side is the last word of that line.
5b16 "یا الله العالمین" is not included in Abu Rayyān’s edition of Hayākil al-Nūr (H-N). However, it appears in the French translation as "Dieu des Mondes". (Les Temples, p. 41).

6a1 "مانند" is deleted in (M).
6a4 The ending word of this line is "الدغم".
6a13 Read the beginning of the line: "نور توحیدک اوزه رینه بیزی ثابت قیل نور توحیدک اوزره".
6a14 Insert "عالمه" and "اولان" (M) (C) (V) between "عالمه" and "اولان".

6b1 Read "بریدرلر".
6b7 "ئنفسنا" is seen as "ئفسنا" in (M) and (C).
6b12 "ئرجون الراحمه و ئرجون فک الا سیر" is seen as only "ئرجون الراحمهن" in H-N.
6b15 Add "بهیمت اولمه" to the begining of the line. (M) (C) (V)
6b16 Persian couplet.
6b17 "والمشر جزینه" (M)

7a1 "وانئت" (M) (C) (V) and H-N.
7a2 "ن素质教育" (M).
7a5 Ins. "قاتوارات" after "نفشلینی" (M) (C) (V).
7a6 Corr. to "فوائد موائد" and "بارک فی الذکر" (H-N, p. 45.)
7a8 "ووفق" appears as "ووفق" in H-N.
7a12 Corr. to "مختار" "القابلا ت لله" (M) (C) (V)
7b2 روحانية يه (M) (C)
7b3 و دخى بونلدن انفاع ایچون نورانية يه (M) (C) does not exist in (M)
7b11 Read قسمت بذیر.
7b15 Ins. بيله before قسمت.
8a2 After سلح, read سمك.
8a8–9 Cf. H–N.
8a10 Read ما بينلري تميز اولونه.
8a11 Corr. to الهئيات (V) (C)
8a12 هيئة does not exist in (M).
8a12–13 (M) omits from line 12, to line 13, اكمايئت.
8a17 Read اكير جيوجان ناطق اولمسه انسا اولمزدي.
8b13 In the place of قدس سره (M) has رضي الله تعالى عنه. Read end of the line as: استديكه اجزائ جسمي.

9a1 Read و نه و همده.
9a5 (M) skipped حسيه ايله.
9a9 The beginning word is منقسم اولوق لازم كلور. Corr. to كلون (M).
9a12 Corr. to حكمتك بو (M) (C) (V)
9a13 عالم is deleted in (M).
9a15 Instead of مناقضًا, (M) contains منازعات.
9a16 Sharh Momentum and صرح مقاصد are the titles of two famous theological works of al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjani and Ibn al-Taftazani respectively.
9a17 After رباعي, read ظلم ايله in (S) (M) (V) and ظلم in (C).

9b4 The last two words are اثبت مجرد.
9b5 Read نفس.
9b6 Ins. at the beginning of the line ايده كه (C) (M) (V)
9b88 ولا يدرك الكل الا باجزائه does not exist in H–N, but included in Les Temples.

9b17 Read بسبب تصرف الحرارة والغرزة في الرموطات.
9b17–10a1 The phrase which does not exist in H–N, appears as Dawwani's own comments in SH–H. (p. 24.)
10a7 Corr. to ورودی فتنه (C) (V) (M)
10a8 Corr. to عظیم اولوردی.
10a9 The first word is هر بار.
10a10 Read نقصان بزیر المه دهد. And after, ins. همین. انتیک.
10a11 In the place of انتیک, the ms. (M) has انتیک.
10a12 Read the first word as سنتک and the last word as اسمک.
10a13 Delete كندک and read it كندک as in (M) and (C).
10a14 Read شمیک سنده. Corr. to شمیک سنده (C) (V).
10a17 Delete دی in دائم.

10b5 (M) omits نفس.
10b6 Read بدن تبدیده ایکن.
10b8 By شیخ Ankaravi means Ibn Sīnā.
10b9 Delete the small dot between رسalah سنده and تلویح. By Shifā', Ankaravi refers to Ibn Sīnā's eminent work, Kitāb al-Shifā'.
10b10 H-N ins. كيف يكون.
10b14 The last word is سبکانسن.

11a1 In (C), الا does not exist.
11a2 Corr. to ولمقل.
11a3 corr. to تحقيق.
11a4 Read ماهیته اول.
11a5 Delete بلدم as in (M).
11a15 (M) has بو دخی instead of بر دخی.

11b3 بر وجا (M)
11b6 Corr. to کچول (M) (V).
11b7 Delete ذبابه from (M) (C) (V).
11b9 Corr. to ایتمدی.
11b12 Delete the small sign over مراد at the end of the line.
11b13 Before دلایل, H-N ins. لان.
11b15 Corr. to كل.

12a1 لتبییها is omitted in (C), which appears as تبییها in H-N and as
للتبرئها in Dawwānī’s SH–H. And the body does not exist in H–N, SH–H and Les Temples.
12a10 Delete ِي in the list.

12b4 In the place of ِبيورنك , ديرك has ِنها .
12b8 Corr. to ِمنه درل .
12b10 Delete the second ِر in ِزوال .
12b11 Read the last word as ِزوال .
12b12 Add ِو to the very beginning of this line.
12b16 Corr. to ِمستغنيدر . Delete the last word and thus read it as ِستغنيدر .

13a1-2 محقق seems to be ِمحقق in ِ(M).
13a3 Instead of ِنیت , رويت , ِ(M) has ِرويئ .
13a5 Between ِجمالك and ِنعمه ins. ِجل لنك .
13a7 Read ِفظيكن ایات .
13a10 In the place of ِ عليه , H–N has ِعليه .
13a12 Corr. to ِيديوك (C) (V), and this word comes to exist as ِيديوك in ِ(M), which would be also meaningful in the context.
13a13 After ِجسم , ِ(M) ins. ِأدراك .
13a14 Between ِکمالنه and ِایق is omitted in ِ(M) and ِ(V).
13a16 ِنظر is replaced by ِطريق in ِ(M).

13b1 Delete ِي in ِقائم .
13b3 After ِمالاینتهی , تطلب , ِ(M) ins. ِأجسام in ِ(M).
13b4 جسم is substituted with ِأجسام in ِ(M).
13b5 The last word of this line is ِأولورکه .
13b10 (M) has ِایده لم instead of ِایید .
13b11 ِ(M) has ِبيورنرلک in the place of ِدرك ِی . Delete the second ِی in ِانسانه ؛ and corr. to ِواردر .
13b15 Delete ِفظيرنده ت in ِ(C).
13b17 Corr. to ِصلا بت ِخشونت , سلا ست .

14a1 The first word appears as ِبونلره in ِ(M).
14a5 Read ِلامین زائدتین .
14a.12 Corr. to مشروحة.

14b.3-5 H-N omits the phrase from line 3, ذي الخمسة H-H, however, is exactly the same as here.
14b.11 Ins. after هم. مشاهده
14b.12 In the place of التنين, (M) has اليقين.
14b.13 The last word is مشاهده.

15a.2 Delete ي in غائب and زائل وهوالذي ينزع الوهم H-N and SH-H ins. وهما حتى ربما يغلب يخوف وهمه تخويفه.
15a.6 The phrase فينفر الإنسان قبل وينتفر, (M) has فينفر and (C) has قبل.
15a.9 Read the last word كرك. كرك
15a.10 Corr. to أن أولوريكن (M) (V).
15a.15 Just after ولايات, (M) and (C) ins. وكرامات.
15a.16 Corr. to شيرى.

15b.1 To the very beginning of the line, H-N and SH-H add بل لايس من الجسم.
15b.2 Delete the last word اوله (M), (C), (V).
15b.5 Read the last word as تونيك H-N and SH-H ins. اولورك اولوريكن. جانوران (M), (C), (V). Read the last word حرفت.
15b.7 Corr. to اندام. حرفت (M), (C), (V). Read the last word اتسا.
15b.8 Delete in اتسا. حرفت
15b.9 After وصور, ins. متتخذه (M), (V), (C). Delete and corr. to ودائم، قادردر، ايمكه. Just after ridhe, delete روزوش ده.
15b.10 Read هريه. روژووش ده.
15b.11 (M) ins. ke right after هريه.
15b.17 Read H-N and SH-H ins. Tegyaeliho یختل after تغيرات القوى اختلاله من الحواس.

16a.2 Corr. to Mختل.
16a.4 Delete ي in سائر.
16a9 In the place of جعلت, H-N has جعلت. The last term appears as لجلب in (C).
16a10 Instead of المنافقين, H-N and SH-H put المالائم.
16a13 Corr. to غضبية.
16a15 Corr. to غضبية.
16a16 Delete the first ي in وبرينه.
16a17 Corr. to الإراده.

16b3 After اولمبيدي, add (M) (C) (V).
16b4 In (M) and (C), النما does not exist. And corr. to بوندن.
16b7 Read بباريه جدا.
16b8 Corr. to جاذبه بر نيهi and to الروح الحيوان.
16b12-13 كثافة الأعضا exists neither in SH-H nor in H-N.
16b14 Corr. to يكتسي or يكتسب.
16b15 Corr. to روح.
16b16 Read لطافتنا.

17a1 The first word كثافتنا does not exist in (C) and (M). متفرقه appears as متصرف in (M). Delete the last word اكتسا.
17a4 Corr. to كيدر.
17a5 Cf. لطافته with H-N.
17a8 Read the last word as نفوذد.
17a12 Right after الناطقة, H-N and SH-H ins.
17a12 Read هر تقن.
17a14 Delete the last الأ.

17b1 After الله تعالى, (M), SH-H and H-N ins. تعالى القائمة. After شرفها والى الله تعالى غبرتها, (M) continues to add which appears in SH-H and H-N as مشرقها والى الله مغربها that is entirely suitable to the context.
18a1 Corr. to كبيوت المناكب. And المناكب is replaced by المناكب.
18a2 In the place of قرار, (M) has زعم.
18a5 Read بلاءة. And Before جواب, ins. (C), (M) and (V). Instead of تجريد الندى, (M) has أشعار قدم.
18a9 See for Abū Sa’d’s saying, Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism, p. 73.
18a9-11 From line 9 up to the end of the line 11, (M) skipped.

18a15-16 The couplet was wrongly attributed by Anḵaravī to Junayd al-Baghdādī; in fact it belongs to Abū Nuwas (d. 200/815). Ghazālī, Le Tabernacle des Lumières (Michkāt al-Anwār), p. 104, n. 52. Ghazālī, however, quotes the same couplet without specifying any name for its ownership. See, Ghazālī, Mishkāt al-Anwār, p. 57.

18a16-17 The meter of the poems:

Fāllātun / Mefāilun / Fālūn
Fāllātun / Mefāilun / Fālūn
Fālūtun / Mefāilun / Fa’lūn
Fālūtun / Mefāilun / Fa’lūn
بيتي

18b1 (M) ins. شريف


Mefûlu / Fällätun / Fâlûn
Fällätun / Feilûn / Feilûn
Feilûn / Fällätun / Fâlûn
Feilûn / Fällätun / Fâlûn.

18b7-8 Ibid., no. 654, p. 259.

Mefûlu / Mefîlû / Mefûlu / Fa'lûn.

18b13 After عقول, (M) ins. Read as عقول اسیه.
18b16 Ins. this phrase into the empty place:

مصرف پراغ بیوه کجا شمع آفتات کجا واین الشریا من ید المتناول

18b17 Read ون
18b18 Delete the last .

19a6 Ankaravî, Miṣbâh al-Asrâr; Janâb al-Arwâh
19a9 Before بعض (M), (C) and (V) ins.
19a10 (M) (C) (V) ins. حصول فنده
19a16 Ins. in empty place (after dictates (M) (V) (C).

19a17 cor. to


Mefûlu / Fällätun / Fâlûn.

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النسخ كثيرة does not exist in H-N.

20a2 After (M) ins.
20a8 Read (M) has
20a11 which is seen over the line is supposed to be between
20a14 Delete in
20b1 Before (M) ins.
20b2 Corr. to 
20b4 Corr. to 
20b8 In the place of the first (M) (C) (V) put 
20b11-12 Qur'an 4:1
20b15 Read . Mevlana, Mesnevi, Book II 188. The meter is:

Fā'ilātun / Fā'ilātun / Fa'lun
Fā'ilātun / Fā'ilātun / Fa'lun

20b16 After (M) ins. And corr. to

21a2 Corr. to
21a5 Read (M) ins.
21a9 Read
21a11 After (M) ins. (C) and (V) ins. 
21a12 Ins. in empty place
21a15 Corr. to . And does not exist in SH-H

21a17 Before ins. (M) (V) (C). The phrase from to the end of the line, 17 is skipped in (M).

21b1 Delete in
21b4 Ins. and (M) (C).
21b5 Ins. before
21b9 The meter is:
21b10 appears as على in SH-H and H-N.
21b12 Read BATILD.
21b15 Read MTHASNDHEH.
21b17 In the place of الجاهما H-N has انجاها.

22a3-4 Delete في in مائل. The phrase from the line 3, غامه موت, is skipped in (M).
22a5 Corr. to the line 4, H-N has instead of الطفل سخره. Instead of جذبها توبا الرضع, ولا مكان precedes ولا محل in H-N.
22a10 Corr. to after which H-N and SH-H add more the following: كما يكون بعد البدن
22a14 Read the last word as محالدر. قبل is skipped in (M).

22b3 Corr. to أبد.
22b4 Instead of ابتداء, (M) has ابتداء. And read the last phrase as اكادرلركه.
22b7 Read the ending part as أول شيء اطلاق أيدراكه.
22b10 The first word is فان. After كل البدن, ins. the following phrase which exists only in H-N: إذاتم استعداده لقبولها.
22b15 Corr. to غير. In the place of ينتقض, H-N and SH-H have شيء.
22b16 After شهها, SH-H and H-N add ولذي.

23a1-2 منتقض which fits as a derivative of to H-N and SH-H. من غيره is replaced with بنيره in H-N and SH-H.
23a6 Corr. to روح. The phrase from 7 up to أولاندر, line 7 is skipped in (M).
23a16 SH-H and H-N add إذ before لم.
After فلا بِدُ, SH-H and H-N ins.

23b4 Read لم يختلف.
23b5 Ins. | after وقناً.
23b6 Delete أوله.
23b8 Corr. to سببْنِ

السبب بِشمال.

23b12 SH-H and H-N ins. after ضرورة. The phrase from الشئ لا يحصل. The following: قولَي بُوكَ دَلائل اِيَّدَر.
23b17 Read the last word as شك يقدر وك.

24a1 Delete the mistakenly repeated phrase in the preceding page, 23b17.
24a4 The last word is قيلٍ.الود
24a5 Corr. to مرجع لازمدْر
24a9 Corr. to لانهُما (C) (V).
24a10 Corr. between لا ذِين
24a12 Read الاِثنتَ.

24b1 Afterشيئائ واحِدً, H-N adds مرتَبَّة شهوده.
24b5 Read باطلية دلالات في is replaced with (M). ي
24b6 Delete Wاجبُ الوجود.
24b7 Instead of SH-H and H-N have Wاجبة.
24b8 Corr. to أجسام.
24b11 Read لازمدْر أول.
24b12 The first syllable is من.
24b13 Suhrawardi's citation is skipped in SH-H.

25a2 أوله is skipped in (M).
25a5 Before لايجوزان يوجد في ذاته, SH-H and H-N add فإن الشيء
25a8 In the place of (M) has متاثر. In SH-H and H-N
25a12 alphabets does not exist in SH-H and H-N.

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25b3 Before, (M) ins.

25b11 After, SH-H and H-N add

25b14 Read

25b15 The phrase from the line 14, up to the line 15, is skipped in (C).

25b16 The phrase to the end of which SH-H adds does not exist in H-N.

26a1 In the place of, (C) has

26a3 is replaced by in SH-H and H-N, which seems more suitable to the context.

26a4 Instead of, SH-HSH-H and H-N have

26a10 Instead of, H-N has, lacking also the estnara.

26a13 After, read.

26a15 Before, SH-H, H-N ins. and in the former the complete phrase reads and in the latter.

26b1 Corr. to,

26b1-2 From the line 1, to the line 2, does not exist in SH-H and H-N.

26b5 In the place of, (C) has and (M) has.

26b11 Read the end of the line as and between these two SH-H, H-N ins.

26b13 Instead of, which is the same as in the Persian translation of Hayakil, SH-H and H-N have

26b15 The whole Arabic phrase reads in H-N:

26b17 Before, ins. (M) (C) (V). Corr. to

27a4 Corr. to the last word,

27a6 does not exist in H-N and SH-H.
يجب أن يكون فعله بلا واسطة واحدة فإن اقتسام أحد الشيْئين غير اقتسام الآخر، فيلزم في مقتضى الشيء بلا واسطة التكاثر فيختلف.

لا هيئة فيحتاج.

لا يمكن اشرف.


النور is substituted with الجوهر in Ḥ-N, SH-H.

جوهر comprises جماله بعد له in M, Ḥ-N, SH-H. The line ends with جمالي الجوهر؟ in Ḥ-N, SH-H. The phrase from the beginning of the line to does not exist in Ḥ-N and SH-H. Read the last word as بنظره إلى.

جوهرة سماوية.

يقتضى بالنظر إلى أن ما فوق جوهرة مجرد بالنظر إلى نفسه جوهرة سماوية.

وجوديتي وجوبيتي is replaced with وجودني وجوبني in M.

وجودني وجوبني appears as وجودني وجوبني in M. And before كندو ذاتنك وجوبني ادراك ايدر وسائر.

لا يشار

لا يقصد في SH-H, Ḥ-N.

The following line that exists both in Ḥ-N (p. 64) and SH-H (p. 136) is skipped: النفس الناطقة وإن لم تكن جرمانية وذات جهة إلا أنها
في السماوات. تتصرف في عالم الأجسام.
28b17 Corr. to 방indle. The phrase is skipped in (C).

29a2 After the word does not exist in SH-H, H-N.
29a3 المثير appears to be أثيري in (M).
29a4 Read من جملة.
29a5 The phrase does not exist in H-N and SH-H. Before (V) ins.
29a6 After SH-H and H-N add ورب.
29a8 After بالكلمات العلمية والعملية
29a12 Read In the place of يبنتنا به.
29a15 Between كثرت و و تشافف ins. (M) (C) (V).

29b1 The first word is اقربها. Just after (V) ins.
29b4-5 The phrase from the line 4, if أقرب, is replaced by
29b7 Read the last word as (V) ins. 
29b9 After the last word is on the line.
29b10 After the last word is SH-H, H-N ins.
29b11 Delete three dots ( ) in 
29b12 The Arabic text reads: وإذا كان الأول هو المرجع والمرجع: 
29b13 To the very beginning of the line, H-N, SH-H add
29b16 Read توقف.
29b17 Just after the Arabic text, ins. this missing phrase:
29b18 Other is replaced by (M) (C) (V). After this ins.
29b19 Other is replaced by (M) (C) (V). Before (M) ins.
30a1 In H-N, SH-H
30a4 is replaced by (M) and (V).
30a5 Read (M) ins.
The phrase from the Arabic word وليس is skipped in (M). After "و ليس، H-N and SH-H ins. الأولى تحايلي". corr. to يرد.
30a6 Corr. to the very first word "قوا،" before "تلاغه و"
30a9 (M) ins.
30a11 Corr. to من كون الحق قائما بالقسط "شانك". درة
30a14 is seen as ذرات in SH-H and H-N. corr. to "شانك". The word is substituted with دومياه in (M) (V) (C), that fits most adequately to the context here. Corr. زياة (M) (V) (C)

30b2 Qur’an 28:86
30b4 In the place of ما حادث، (M) (C), SH-H and H-N have hadath; and in that of شئا، H-N has saba.
30b5 Instead of ينسل, H-N has يتسلس.
30b8 المبدا is substituted with المبدأ in H-N.
30b9 Corr. to عائد.
30b10 To the end of the line, H-N adds لذاته.
30b14 Between the حداثات, H-N (p. 68) and SH-H (p. 148) ins. ولا تنصرم هو مالا فغلاف وهى سبب الحادث.
30b17 Corr. to شئا يه "CB", "CB".
30b17 Separate from "CB", "CB". Read the last word as "CB".

31a1 Corr. to ولميدي.
31a3 Corr. to نقطة. Delete "CB" in (M) (V) (C).
31a4 In the place of حيث قصد، H-N and SH-H have as if that he does not go.
31a6 Corr. to حركت ايتدرسه، (M) (C). Instead of (M) has اتسته. حركت ايتدرسة، (M) (C). Instead of اتسته.
31a8 Corr. to ارادتي ديرلر، (M) (C). ارادتي before "CB", "CB". Before "CB", "CB".
31a16 Read before which the following long passage that exists in H-N and SH-H is missing in all four manuscripts of Ankaravi's commentary:

مغفي حركة الفلق نفسه، فتحريرها لجرم الفلق تحريك اختياري، وتحرك جرم الفلق بتحريرها تحرك قسري، فإن اخذنا جرم الفلق شيئا على حدة فتكون حركةه بسبب تحريك النفس قسرية بالنسبة
31b1 Just before خيراً، H-N ins. فلا شهوة و توليد. (A.R., p.69).
31b2 Before فلي عند وجود هـ، H-N ins.
31b4 In the place of السائل، السائل، H-N and SH-H have have the last word of the Arabic phrase as
31b6 Instead of الإ جرام البديل، the last word of the line، H-N and SH-H have
31b7 Ins. into the empty place (M) (C) (V)
31b9 From لدنه on the line هـ، SH-H. is substituted with which appears as
31b17 In H-N، SH-H. لدنه

32a4 Read هو بالله. يخار مشوق إلا خير، H-N ins. And just after بنوره، H-N، SH-H add
32a10 Corr. to بينه وبين أماداً إديدي أركانه. (M) (C) and to
32a12 does not exist in (M) (V) (C) and H-N، but in SH-H instead
32a13 Between واثراءه، (M) ins. أول.

32b4 The phrase which most likely should be read H-N (p.71) and SH-H (p. 159).
32b9 The last letter is Q.
32b10 Suhrawardy’s citation is replaced by Suhrawardi’s citation. (M) (C) has بوجود دائم لشفاق إلهين in
32b11 In the place of (C) has AndANK CANNOT be found in H-N (p. 71) and SH-H (p. 160). However، in Hayakil (Persian)، p. 100، l. 6، the
32b17-33a1 The Arabic phrase from (C) has not been found in (M)، قابل Fajwad. In the place of لتم تجديد الشيء المتعلق
33a4 (M) ins. before H-N (p. 71) and with استعداد H-N (p. 71) and with

اثري واحده.
33a5 Read the last word asفاعلينك.
33a6 corr. to ليعتُبَر (A.R.) (D) (M) (C) (V)
33a8 the Arabic phrase exists as بالصفر والكبر والصفاء والذكر in (M) (V) (C) as well as in SH-Ḥ and H-N with the exception of the last word that appears in the latter as الكورة.
33a13-14 The Arabic text from line 13، لتنير للقوائم, reads up to line 14, لاختلا فصاحب الصورة وتغيره بل واختلا فه للقوائم in H-N (p. 72) as follows: And is skipped in (M).
33b2 ins. between بالثبات والحداثة التباث و (M) (C) (A.R.) (D)
33b3 the phrase from حدوته ايلدي is skipped in (M).
33b6 ins. before يعني (M) (C).
33b7 corr. to the first word سبب ليدوم ذلك. Between and SH-Ḥ and H-N ins. Corr. to the last word يخض
33b11 in the place of ما يرد النافض, H-N (p. 62) and SH-Ḥ (p. 167) have بالبشر ولا نافض. والجواب.
33b13 corr. to هو.
33b15 between هو المطلق and SH-Ḥ (pp. 72-3) and H-N (p. 170) ins. هو الذي وجوده من ذاته حده ذاتنه.
33b16 read خداي.
34a1 corr. to فياضة الرحمة. غرض من عونه هيج وinstead of يغرض من عونه H-N, SH-Ḥ.
34a4 the phrase from هو المطلق هو الذي له ذات كل شيء وليس ذات شيء to the end of the line is replaced with فياضة الرحمة in H-N (p. 73) and SH-Ḥ (p. 170).
34a5 read the ending part as هيج بر شيدن.
34a6 in the place of H-N has مما.
34a7 does not exist in H-N. corr. to عليه.
34a9 after SH-Ḥ, H-N ins. الممكن.
34a10 بيت (prose) as opposed to نثر Persian verse.
34b2 appears as Wajib واهب in (V) (C).
34b4 Qur'an 27:88.
34b5 Qur'an 20:50.
34b6 Read the first word as وانمايطول and the last as التفات.
34b8 Corr. to ليس before which H-N, SH-H ins. أن.
34b9 After عالم, SH-H, H-N ins. آخر.
34b10 The Arabic phrase exists in H-N (p. 73) and SH-H (p. 178) as وان ليس له تعالى وراء الديدان خلافا اشرف.
34b11 Replace the illegible text with ولم يعلم آت لوقع على غير.
34b13 appears as يمكن in SH-H, H-N.
34b14 Read the end as اختلا ل نظام.
34b16 The last word is القاهرات, which appears in H-N and SH-H as الطاهرات.

35a3 Read علم وايلا م البرئ وغير المل. The word which appears in SH-H as does not exist in H-N. Corr. to إغواء.
35a4 Before كاهل, H-N ins. عن.
35a9 H-N, SH-H ins. كل just before مشهد.
35a11 Corr. to لو عادت before which H-N ins. تؤدي إلى ضرر (p.74).
35a16 Instead of يرتمي, (M) has يوصي and H-N and SH-H have وسلطان اللا هوتية. 35a17 Between وسلطان, H-N (p. 75) and SH-H (p. 180) ins. وما يغلب عليها من الہيبة في المواقف الإلهية.

35b1 Corr. to من النظر. The last word is دونها.
35b3 appears as أولمزم in (M).
35b4-5 Cf. Qur'an, 10:61, 34:3.
35b5 Read لا يعزب باريها شيء (H-N, SH-H). Ins. after باريها
35b6 Corr. to علمى دكدر; and read the ending part: The phrase باريسكن علمى is skipped in (C).
35b7 In the place of ثبات, (C) and H-N have اثبات.
35b9 Ins. before (M) (C) (V).
35b11 Corr. to لتحملت (M) (C) (V). وما دامت does not exist in H-N.
35b13 The ending word is مركب.
35b14 ضعيفا 35b15 must be corrected to خفيفا in (M) (C) (V), H-N, SH-H. Persian Hayakil has سبك (خفيف). And H-N also ins. لابطا between لا and يترك. 35b15 Corr. to يتبيل and to شقيلة.
35b17 Corr. to ضعيفدر. Instead of ضعيفدر, (M) (C) (V) have ضعيفدر.

36a4 Corr. to منحرفة. This word is substituted with منحرفة in H-N.
36a5 Before حركاتها, H-N, SH-H ins. بل.
36a6 Corr. to ولا خارة. Delete the dots over ولا خارة.
36a7 Corr. to (M) (V). The last word is (M) (V).
36a10 After خمسة, read the Arabic citation as فهى محيطه بالآرض, which does not exist in H-N.
36a12 Corr. to الابتداء. The Arabic text appears as الابتداء للسماء بالآرض in H-N, SH-H.
36a13 The illegible Arabic text is إلى المشتره إلا بان ينثني النهار.
36a14 Before SH-H, H-N ins. SH-H. The ilegible Arabic text is skipped in (M).
36a15 Corr. to هل النيار اقيق اوليدي.
36a16 Before SH-H, H-N ins. SH-H, SH-H ins. and after they both again ins. Delete the Arabic citation as (M) (C) (V).

36b1 Corr. to (C).
36b2 Corr. to (C).
36b3 Delete 5 in (C).
36b3 Delete الهيكل السادس، because, according to H-N and SH-H, this is the last part of the Fifth Temple; therefore instead ins. خاتمة الهيكل الموجود.
36b5 Delete the last 5 in (C).
36b8 Between LA and SH-H, H-N ins. Delete the last word.
36b10 Corr. to the last word.
36b11 Corr. to SH-H, H-N ins. 90. The Arabic citation as (M) (C) (V), and in H-N, SH-H, which is rather compatible with the present context. After the ذكورة على طرفين.
36b12 Delete (M) (C).
36b14 Read the ending part as (M) (C).
36b15 Read the ending part as (M) (C). مفهوره.
36b16 Before SH-H, H-N ins. SH-H is skipped in (C).
36b17 Corr. to (M) (C) before which H-N, SH-H ins. until.
37a3 Before مشدوقة, H-N, SH-H ins. Read the last word as مشدوقة.
37a4 To the end of the line, H-N, SH-H ins. للمادة.
37a5 After قسم عال, the whole Arabic citation reads in H-N (p. 78): قسم عال قسم نازل في المرتبة منقه محلول which is the same as Ankarawi's I-H.
37a6 Read أيكي قيمة.
37a7 Delete the small dot over مقهور. 
37a9 Between بل and قابل, H-N (p. 78) and SH-H (p. 190) ins. الأقسام الآثارية إلى قائد.
37a10 In the two places of قابل, H-N, SH-H have قابل.
37a14 Read والمتيامين والمتيسار.

37b1 Corr. to تاسيا.
37b2 Read تامناسب.
37b4-5 Qur'an 51:49
37b10 The whole line from the beginning up to هو is skipped in (M). And corr. to رخش (C) (V). Read the last word قوت قدرت.
37b14 SH-H has is replaced with قدرت (M) (V) (C).
37b15 In the place of الإجراام, H-N has and SH-H has جميع الكائنات.
37b17 Before أوذر, SH-H appears as in (C). Corr. to كائناته and read the last word نوراني.

38a6 Corr. to عظيم (M) (C) (V).
38a7 (M) ins. Between وجوده and عدد من صهر入れ السباق الهيكل السادس (H-N, SH-H).
38a8 Between لا تبطل and SH-H and Les Temples ins. ببطلا ن البدن.
38a10 Read تا ملدن.
38a14 عرضية does not exist in H-N.
38a15 Read همان.
38a17 Before ذلك لا زم. (V) (C). The word كل that precedes does

38b3 The first word is همپنک.
38b5 Between الملوسات والمس and H-N, SH-H ins. مايتعلق.
38b7 Read the first word as الم and the last one as بسرك.
38b10-11 (M) (C) and (V) mss. slip the whole Arabic phrase from line 10, and (M) to line 12, just before ولدانيهما, والموم nàngما.
39b15 Appears as نقية in H-N and SH-H, and as نقية in (M). نقية is substituted with نقية in (M).
39b16 Mentions is skipped in (C).
39b17 Instead of (M) has معاً.

محصول فيصل ن in H-N, SH-H. Corr. to بله كمن التم between الم (C) (M) (V) SH-H, H-N.
39a4 Before ولا يتلذذ SH-H, H-N.
39a5 Read the last word as نفسها.
39a6 Read جفانستى.
39a7 The ending part is بر مرشدوكه.
39a16-17 Qur‘an 54:34.

39b1 Delete طبيعتك.
39b7 معنى الكلمة حيران which appears as حيارة in H-N. The phrase إذا الكلمة لا معنى لها إلا عدم النور in SH-H (p. 201), does not exist in H-N.
39b9 (M) (V) (C) add شنواري to the end of the line.
39b11 Read دلهان.
39b12 Between والثون and H-N, SH-H ins. والثون الفزاع.
39b14 Corr. to (M) (C) (V).
In the place of the خشرات, (M) and H-N have كمسه نك.

خشرات.

The last word is الفاعلات.


ما لا عين رات و لا إذن سمعت (M) كورلر کومش و ققلر اشتمش. Corr. to حقه (M) (C) (V).

Thw second الملكة is skipped in (V) and is substituted with in H-N.

لا يتناهي لذاتها does not exist in H-N.

والملكية is skipped in (M).

قدر أولور (M) (C) is mistakenly repeated twice in (C).

القاهرة does not exist in H-N.

روج appears as in H-N and SH-H.

هوايس.

بابس كه.

و قد يتفق, insert the following long passage that exists in both H-N (pp. 83-85) and SH-H (pp. 203-209):
جوهر الملكت وإنما يشغله عن علها هذه القوى البدنية فإذا قويت النفس بالخصائص الوحانية وضعف سلطان القوى البدنية وغلبتها بتكثير الطعام وتقليل السهر تتناقص أحيانا إلى عالم المقدس وتتصل بأبيها المقدس وتلتقي منه المعاشرة وتتصل باللغوس الفلكية العالية بحركاتها وتبزواح حركاتها وتلتقي منها المغيبات في نومها و يظنه كمرة تنتظم بمقابلة ذي نعمة.

40b7-9 The phrase from line 7, فيشاهد العيبي, up to line 9, (i.e. the whole Arabic citation is slipped into line 13, just before أول وافل in (M), (C) and (V).

40b8 In the place of منظومة الآمر العيني المنطوقة, H-N has قدرة (p.85)

40b9 للأمر العيني (H-N, p. 85)

40b15 Corr. to كنري الشهيد (C) (M). H-N ins. كنري الشهيد المحاكة between and

40b16 Corr. to ذو الشعاب (M) (C) (V).

40b17 Corr. to حاكي يحاكي بل الشعاب. And is replaced with حاكي يحاكي in SH-H, and H-N.

41a2 شخص is substituted with فيبح in (M).

41a3 Corr. to بلكه

41a6 Corr. to لم يشاهد اعتي لمشاهدة فيبح لما يشاهد المضارقة بعد على فيبح نافية the place of which صادقة المنامات الصادقة which H-N has and SH-H does only

41a7 Instead of دعابة ملائكة H-N and SH-H have دعابة التخيل.

41a10 Instead of المنامة المتالهة H-N has الاصطخر FIRSTッチن

41a11 H-N and SH-H ins. الدق الأول after لها العنصريات does not exist in H-N and SH-H.

41a13 Is skipped in (M).

41a14 After فعلها, SH-H ins. من الأحراق مثل من الأحراق مثل

41a16 In the place of H-N has SH-H أشرقت النفس اشرقت النفس and واستنارت, H-N ins. and SH-H ESTINTAR. Before H-N. SH-H.

41a17 الأكورن is replaced with الأكورن in H-N.

41b1 Add to the end of the line متعين (M) (V).
31b2 Add to the end: نيتكم.
31b3 The last word is and: رجال المستشرقين وجودهم.
31b6 Read: انذروا (M) or (C) (V) just after انوار الله.
31b7 The whole line is: ايدرلا و بونله منجل اواعور تاجيات قدسيه.
31b8 The phrase: باعساط ايديهم, does not exist in H-N and SH-H.
31b10 The whole text is: ادركت قوما صطفوا باعساط ايديهم ينتظرون الرزق السماويه, فلما انتحت ابصارهم وجدوا الله مرتديا بالكبراء اسمه فوق نطاق الجبروت. (H-N, p. 87; SH-H, pp. 212-213)
31b11 Read the beginning: بصير امتالي.
31b12 Read: سماوية دررر.
31b14 The last word is: نبوت.
31b15 The unreadable part of the line is: نبيه وويليايا اوياية موهب.
31b16 Read: كيه انى ادرى كنه.

42a1 Delete the illegible word at the beginning of the line and instead ins. يجب على
42a2 Corr. to: امثالهم.
42a-3 The phrase beginning with: العالمون و تلك in line 2 and ending with: في line 3 is a verse from the Qur'an 29:43.
42a4 Read the last word as: امثالى.
42a7 To the beginning of Suhrawardi's citation: وكما انذر بعض النبوات, وكما انذر بعض النبوات. H-N (pp. 87-88) and SH-H (pp. 214-215) add the following: أريد أن افتح فمي بالامثال. فالتوزيل موكول إلى الانبياء والتوزيل والبيان إلى المظهر الأعظم الفارقيطي. حيث قال does not exist in H-N and SH-H.
42a9 is replaced with: يبنكم in H-N, SH-H.
42a10 علم does not exist in H-N and SH-H.
42a12 Qur'an 75:19.
42a13 Corr. to ديدیقه (M) (V).
42a15-16 The phrase from هر شکلی, line 15 up to the end of line 16 is skipped in (M).
42a17 Corr. to تعلیم (C) (V).

42b1 Add the following phrase to the end of the line after deleted كم:
كوندر دیدوکی ممسوً بالنور
42b2 Read the end as مستغرق and then ins. اشارت و قرآن عظیمده (M) (C) (V).
42b3 Read the beginning as الحقيقة بیزکم پر بشارت
اورزیمکه واجددرکه یا محمد
المشدر (M) (V) (C)
42b4 The first word corr. to سکا (M) (V) (C). Read the last word as بهذا قبل أن یكون
42b5 Corr. to دخی حضرت
42b8 Corr. to خاتمہ before which the following long passage that exists in both H-N (pp. 89-90) and SH-H (pp. 216-220) is omitted:
ولا شك أن أی دبع الکلکت نازلة (للغاء) الملوکین وأن شعاع
القدس ينبسط وأن طريق الحق یفتح كما أخبرت الخفیفة ذات الیراق
لیلة هبیت الهجا والنیر یدنوقبله صاحبها وهو یدنی من النیر
صاحبه انفتح له سبيل القدس ليصعد إلى (رحمه) مبعث البرازخ
الاخیرین، ربنا آمنا بك، وأقرنا برسالتك وعلمتنا أن ملکوتك
مراتب، وأن لك عباد یتلقین یتوصلون بالنور إلى النور على
أنهم قد يهجرون النور للظلمات ليوبسلوا بالظلمات إلى النور
فیحصلون بحركة حركات الکائنین قرة عين العقلا وعدتهم فارسلت
إليهم ریاحا مبررات لتحملهم إلى علیین ليجدوا سباحات ولیحملو
اسفارك (ولیعلقوا) باجنحة الكروپین ولیصدروا بحلіة الشعاع
ولیستفیثوا بالوحشة والدهشت لینالوا الآنس أولیک هم الصادرون
إلي السما وهم القاعدون على الأرض.

42b9 النواعسات من النفسین is substituted with in H-N and SH-H.
42b11 كمل appears as in H-N.
42b12 THE رضا و القضا (Abū Rayyān). حليتنا سبیلنا (H-N, SH-H)
42b13 حليتنا سبیلنا (H-N, SH-H)
In the place of مهان (M) has وهاب.
42b14 Delete preceding غفلته and read the last word as بيدار.
42b15 Corr. to نايمة and read the next word as ايله.
42b16 Corr. to تقديس (M) (C) (V). Read the last word as ايدوب.
42b17 Corr. to حصه لريمزى (M) (V) (C).

43a1-4 I transcribe the first four lines which are mistakenly intermingled with those of the preceding page in the process of copying from the microfilm:

فضائل اصليدر و بيزه نصيب ايله قضايه و شاكى يا رب سن:1 بيزه
Line 2: فتوتي طريق ايليوير و روشانلفى رفيق ايليوير تحقيقا
جود و عمل معنى و وهاب سن. آمنا و صدقنا. بيت: 2
Line 3: هر كه خواند دعا طمع دارم زانكه من بندته كنهكار (This does not exist in (M) (V).

43a5 Read the ending part as اللطيفة الشريفة.
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