Anti-Terrorism Discourse and the War on Dissent: A Critical Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines the criminalization of dissent that is occurring through official anti-terrorism discourse (and associated policies) in Canada. While there is vast scholarly work on the war on terrorism and attendant anti-terrorism campaigns, research on the discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism is urgently needed, not least because discourse is a key medium of power and social control. To date, very little research exists on Canadian anti-terrorism laws and the criminalization of dissent. By examining the Canadian context and focusing largely on policies, this dissertation adds two important dimensions to the critical study of the war on terrorism. Employing Critical Discourse Analysis, a methodology designed to expose the ideological effects of discourse, the study reveals the hidden power at work behind anti-terrorism discourse in Canada, and the processes by which it hides and reinforces itself. Through a multi-text, critical discourse analysis of official anti-terrorism documents (parliamentary speeches, anti-terrorism laws, and public police documents on terrorism), the research demonstrates how these documents, purportedly aimed at combating terrorism, discursively serve to criminalize particular types of dissent and opposition by conflating it with terrorism and/or terrorist violence. By deconstructing various discursive practices (i.e., Canadian anti-terrorism texts), the study’s critical analysis uncovered the larger socio-historical practices, contexts, and interests that inform and guide these practices.

The study employs leading CDA scholar Norman Fairclough’s three-part analytic method (description, interpretation, analysis) to build a descriptive analytic base, which is then used to build and inform the other two levels of analysis. The novel analytic framework developed—that of threat and threatened—unifies the different texts as well as Fairclough’s different stages of analysis. By critically examining who/what the texts construct as a threat and as threatened (i.e., as villain or victim), and how each category is constructed, the study sheds light on the power and interests behind Canadian anti-terrorism discourse. Analytically, the duality of threat and threatened constitutes a powerful motif that can be used descriptively, interpretively, and for larger explanation and social analysis. By uncovering who and what the anti-terrorism texts target, the research reveals who and what it actually serves to protect.

Overall, the dissertation demonstrates that Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and associated policies ultimately protect the power and relations of global capitalism, by specifically targeting and criminalizing opposition and/or resistance to it. This has serious implications for civil liberties and political participation in Canada.

In addition, the study is related to and informs the field of Educational Studies insofar as it expands the notion of “education” to include the ideological functions of public policy. The anti-terrorism laws and associated discourses illustrate the manner in which the Canadian State is engaged in a broader educational project aimed at shaping individuals’ hearts and minds over how to interpret and understand what constitutes terrorism. One intention of anti-terrorism discourse and policy appears to be to “normalize” a particular way of thinking about both terrorism and dissent (in a manner that conflates the two), and thus promote public support for the war on terror abroad and war on dissent at home.
Résumé

Cette étude examine la criminalisation de la dissidence qui se produit à travers le discours officiel anti-terroriste (et des politiques associées) au Canada. Même s’il existe beaucoup de travaux de recherche sur le terrorisme et sur les campagnes contre le terrorisme, la recherche sur le discours du terrorisme et de l'anti-terrorisme devient une nécessité urgente, étant donné que le discours est un moyen de pouvoir et de contrôle. Actuellement, il existe peu de recherches sur les lois anti-terroristes et la criminalisation des dissidences au Canada. En examinant le contexte canadien et en se concentrant en grande partie sur les lois anti-terrorisme, cette thèse ajoute deux dimensions importantes à l'étude critique de la guerre sur le terrorisme. S’appuyant sur une analyse critique du discours – une méthodologie conçue pour exposer les effets idéologiques du discours – cette étude révèle le pouvoir dissimulé derrière le discours anti-terrorisme au Canada, et les processus par lesquels il est voilé et renforcé. Se fondant sur divers textes, l'analyse critique du discours des documents officiels anti-terrorisme (discours parlementaires, lois d'anti-terrorisme, et documents publics de police sur le terrorisme), cette recherche met en évidence les contextes et les intérêts socio-historiques qui influencent ces pratiques.

L'étude utilise la méthode analytique tripartite de Fairclough Norman (description, interprétation, analyse) pour établir une base analytique descriptive, qui est ainsi employée pour établir et informer les deux autres niveaux de l'analyse. Le nouveau cadre d'analyse développé dans ce travail – celui de la menace et de ces victimes – applique les différentes étapes d’analyse employées par Fairclough sur un corpus varié. En examinant de façon critique qui et ce que les textes considèrent comme menaçant et menacé (c.-à-d., comme vilain ou victime), et comment chaque catégorie est construite, l'étude dévoile le pouvoir et les intérêts derrière le discours canadien anti-terrorisme. L’opposition entre la menace et l’objet de la menace constitue un motif puissant qui pourrait être employé d'une manière descriptive, explicative et analytique. En dévoilant qui et ce qu’est la cible des textes anti-terrorisme, la recherche démontre qui et ce qu’ils servent réellement à protéger.

En somme, cette thèse montre que le discours canadien anti-terrorisme et les politiques associées protègent en réalité la puissance et les structures du capitalisme mondial, visant et criminalisant particulièrement toute opposition et/ou résistance. Ceci a des implications sérieuses pour les libertés civiles et la participation à la vie politique au Canada.

De plus, cette étude aura une importante contribution en matière d’éducation en permettant d’y inclure les fonctions idéologiques des lois sociales. Les lois anti-terrorisme et les discours associés illustrent la façon dans laquelle l’état canadien est engagé dans un plus large projet éducatif visant à façonner l’esprit des individus et à influencer leur interprétation et compréhension de ce qui est considéré comme terrorisme. Un des objectifs du discours et des politiques anti-terrorisme semble être la normalisation d’une manière particulière de penser le terrorisme et la résistance comme étant identique, et ainsi encourager le soutien public dans la guerre contre le terrorisme à l’étranger et dans la répression de la dissidence domestique.
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Producing a doctoral dissertation can be a very arduous and long process; one that takes many unexpected turns. Without the generous support of friends, family and mentors the completion of this dissertation would not have been possible. I want to deeply thank Thom and Layla, my dearest friends and confidants, for their tireless friendship and emotional support. They have helped me in ways that I can never fully express, nor repay. This is a collective achievement that I share with each of you. I am eternally in your debt. Thank you also to my family.

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This work is dedicated to my dear father, Maher Chehade. Thank you for instilling in me the values and courage that led me to this mode of research. Your own bravery and integrity, both throughout your life and in your courageous struggle against illness, have inspired and empowered me forever. My endless love and admiration baba.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCLA</td>
<td>Canadian Civil Liberties Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICLMG</td>
<td>International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-20</td>
<td>Group of twenty</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area of the Americas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPPs</td>
<td>Internationally Protected Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMO</td>
<td>Genetically Modified Organism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDS</td>
<td>Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLQ</td>
<td>Front de libération du Québec</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

My doctoral research examines how the official discourse of anti-terrorism limits and/or criminalizes particular types of dissent and opposition in Canada. The aim of my research is to demonstrate that the so-called war on terror is simultaneously a war on dissent, and that the most powerful weapon being deployed in this war on dissent is the discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism. While there have been thousands of scholarly works on the events of 9/11 and the concomitant war on terrorism and anti-terrorism campaigns, examinations of the discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism are urgently needed, not least because political discourse (and its associated language) is a key tool of power and social control – a point I elaborate on in other parts of the dissertation.

War on Terror as Pretext for Tyranny

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, various powers around the world have seized on the US-led global war on terrorism as justification for the increasing tyranny of life within their own countries (“Imperialism and Terrorism Part I,” 2004, p. 3). Anti-terrorism legislation has sought to repress open debate (Finch, 2005). “The ‘global war on terror’ has fueled anti-terrorism legislation that has been used to quash dissent and to criminalize activists within countries whose states claim a particular affinity with human rights” (Flesher Fominaya & Wood, 2011, p. 2). In the current war on terror, global justice activists find themselves up against the Canadian national security state in a multitude of ways (Kinsman, 2006), not least of which is through the construction of dissent as terrorism, or a subset of the terrorist threat, in official anti-terrorism discourse.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees everyone in Canada the right to assembly and the right to freedom of expression. It also assures all individuals the right to be free from arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure (CCLA & NUPGE, 2011). These constitutional liberties and guarantees matter “because, without them, even the most democratic society could all too easily fall prey to the abuses and excesses of a police state” (CCLA & NUPGE, 2011, p. 12). Increasingly, these constitutional liberties and guarantees are being ignored and undermined in the name of national security and combating terrorism. While the trend toward Canadian state
repression began before the events of 9/11, the post-9/11 war on terror and concomitant anti-terrorism laws and the larger anti-terrorism discourse have served to further enhance police state measures (see Warren, 2004).

My interest is in the language and discursive strategies of the texts, and the larger social practices and historical contexts that produce them. One can gain access to the policy making process (i.e., to the workings of power) through an examination of official documents and texts. Critical discourse analysis posits that power uses various tools to achieve its ends and maintain its advantage, and language is one such tool; as a result, it deserves close attention (see Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough & Graham, 2002; Jackson, 2005a, 2005b).

As an exercise of power, political discourses attempt to become hegemonic or dominant by discrediting and/or silencing rival or alternative discourses, and promoting themselves as the complete and final truth (see Fairclough, 2001; Jackson, 2005a; Van Dijk, 1995). This is especially true of the discourse of the war on terrorism:

The ‘war on terrorism’ is currently one of a great many kinds of political discourses, and it is attempting—with considerable success—to become hegemonic over alternative discourses, such as pacifist, human rights based, feminist, environmental or anti-globalization discourse (Jackson, 2005a, p. 19). In this respect, critical scholarly work on this particular political discourse is urgently needed. My research attends to this need.

**National Security Discourse Rooted in Meta-narrative of Capitalist Imperialism**

Capitalism is “the most totalizing system the world has ever known” (Wood, 1995, p. 2). Around the globe, governments of different political types bow to the hegemony of an ever-globalizing neo-liberal economy; a political project that re-structures and re-scales social relations in accordance with the requirement of an uncontained and unabated global capitalism or capitalist imperialism (Fairclough, 2002; Starr, 2000). With rare but salient exceptions, the political predominance of neoliberal capitalism in the West (and globally) has led to the disarming of social, political and economic forces committed to radical alternatives (Fairclough; 2002; Fairclough & Graham, 2002). This in turn has contributed to a shutting off of public debate and a deterioration of democracy (Fairclough, 2002). In this way, global capitalism functions as a type of meta-narrative.
This meta-narrative functions as a hegemonic discourse, and it uses discursive practices and processes, among other things, to maintain its hegemonic status (see Fairclough & Graham, 2002; Jackson, 2005a).

Increasingly, so-called national security is categorized with the protection of the US-led bureaucratic and financial institutions of capitalist globalization (see Fernandez, 2008; Kinsman, 2006) and capitalist power relations, such as the interactions and alliances between policy makers and Big Business. For this reason, growing criminalization of political dissent, especially dissent against capitalist globalization, is essential to capitalist globalization (see Kinsman, 2006). The economic and social relations of US-led capitalist globalization—i.e., the larger discourse or meta-narrative of capitalist imperialism—are written into and guide western anti-terrorism discourse. As my analysis of official Canadian anti-terrorism discourse illustrates, “simply opposing capitalist social relations is enough to make one a risk to national security” (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010, p. 440) and, increasingly, a terrorist threat or a potential terrorist.

**Revealing the Power Behind Anti-Terrorism Discourse**

The theory that I draw on (Marxism)—both in my general worldview and in my methodology (critical discourse analysis)—begins in the belief and assumption that global capital, in the form of social elites, uses its power over legal, political, economic, and media resources to maintain and expand its control. More specifically, in the case of my research topic, there is a belief that resistance to those elites is discredited and criminalized by conflating legitimate protest and dissent with violent terrorism and, moreover, that this process of conflation can be seen at work in official documentation such as laws and police documents.

My study is a close examination of such documents that intends to expose that process, and the discursive strategies at work therein. My study aims to help readers *see* and understand the process that CDA is specifically designed to uncover (i.e., how power conceals itself in discourse and how public discourse serves and reinforces dominant power). My study takes several sample texts, extensively analyzes them using CDA, and demonstrates how they are working to obscure the truth and develop authorization to crush resistance.
Ultimately, CDA is concerned with both textual analysis and with the relationship between texts and social practice. It is, “at once both a technique for analyzing specific texts or speech acts, and a way of understanding the relationship between discourse and social and political phenomena” (Jackson, 2005b, para.10). In my analysis, I take up this dual function of CDA in a manner that lays bare how larger social practices and socio-historical contexts are connected to and written into the discursive practices of anti-terrorism in Canada.

Generally, my point of entry into research is the anti-terrorism legislation of Canada and related political speeches and public police documents. For my critical discourse analysis of the anti-terrorism texts, which I take up in chapters four, five, and six, I rely on primary sources. Specifically, I examine two important pieces of legislation that form part of the Government of Canada’s overall anti-terrorism strategy: the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA)—formerly Bill C-36—and Bill C-35 (An Act to Amend the “Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act”). I also examine parliamentary speeches (in support of and against these Bills) obtained online from House of Commons and Senate proceedings, as well as public documents produced by two Canadian police agencies, CSIS and the RCMP. The CSIS Annual Public Reports were retrieved in hard copy from McGill University’s McLennan Library’s Government Archives section, while the RCMP document was obtained online.

**My Position and Why This Topic Interests Me**

Critical discourse analysis emphasizes that scholarly endeavor is rooted in social and political life, and that therefore the study of discourse (the methods, the selection and analysis of data, etc.) is always political. Rather than attempt to be objective, CDA stresses the need for the researcher to be open with their readers about where they stand, and to classify and state their persuasions or the political position from which they write (see Fairclough, 2001; Van Dijk, 1995, p. 19).

My interest in this particular research emerges from my personal experiences as an activist against neoliberal globalization. My specific standpoint or political position is that of the socio-political activist and non-mainstream, socialist researcher interested in social justice and social change. As a global justice activist and as a long-time critic of capitalism, I have a personal interest in the increased efforts by the capitalist state to use
the legal structure to criminalize and silence opposition and dissent. For my Master’s dissertation I examined the anti-corporate globalization movement. I completed my dissertation right around the events of 9/11; I now wish to assess the dangers posed to activists from its fall out.

My theoretical framework, Marxist historical materialism, and methodological approach, critical discourse analysis, each represent a type of oppositional stance against dominant power and/or the power of capital. In this respect, and given my own oppositional stance as both activist and researcher, I rely very heavily on subaltern and/or critical authors and literature throughout the dissertation.

While my point of entry into research, and my research focus, is Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and official texts; I approach my analysis of these documents from the activist perspective. Rather than examine whether or not post-9/11 anti-terrorism legislation is good or bad, as an ideological issue or debate, I am concerned with \textit{how} these laws and associated documents and speeches discursively construct and formulate activism and dissent in particular ways. The manner in which activists and dissidents interpret and experience anti-terrorism discourse and legislation will be different from non-activists or police officers, for instance. Thus, my particular reading and analyses of these laws and official texts are ultimately concerned with how these laws criminalize dissent, and “anti-globalization” dissent in particular.

As Kinsman and Gentile (2010) aptly asked, how did it come to pass that defence of the institutions of global capitalism (such as the WTO), “became part of the defence of Canadian national security and that global justice protesters became enemies of the nation-state?” (p. 430). Why are protestors, they continued, “denied basic rights and constructed as security threats”? (p. 430). As a global justice activist and oppositional researcher, these are the types of questions that led me to and underlie my particular research topic.

While Canadian anti-terrorism legislation claims to be concerned with combating terrorism, my dissertation demonstrates that it is simultaneously (or even more) concerned with criminalizing dissent. In this way, the state’s policies “teach” that dissent and protest are wrong and criminal, even while freedom of expression and assembly are guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. My research presents a type
of counter-pedagogy that seeks to question the official Canadian discourse on anti-terrorism, and expose the ideological aims of these measures.

Overall, in the name of so-called national security, anti-terrorism legislation and official texts orchestrate a policy structure that establishes a particular discursive framework beyond its immediate aims, which shape and define other areas of the law, public policy, and public discourse. Thus this legislation, and the larger contexts and social practices that guide and inform it, demand critical scholarly attention.

Describing the Movement(s) Against Capitalist Globalization

Before continuing it is useful to briefly define and discuss the “anti-globalization” movement. Critics of globalization reject the neo-liberal idea of globalization—understood as capitalist globalization—as they believe its material manifestation to be detrimental and oppressive to a vast majority of the world’s population and the environment (see Rupert, 2001; Starr, 2000).

While commonly referred to as such, the term anti-globalization is a pejorative phrase coined by the mainstream media and is rejected by many members and/or supporters of the movement (McNally, 2006; Starr, 2000). Callinicos (2003) held that applying the phrase anti-globalization to this movement is “plainly an absurd appellation for a movement that revels precisely in its international character and that has been able to mobilize highly effectively across national borders on all five continents” (p. 13). Because of its focus on and struggle for global justice, I prefer to use the term global justice movement to describe a movement whose “grievances are vast and widespread” (Fernandez, 2008, p. 35). That said, I also refer to it at various places throughout the dissertation as the anti-globalization (as this is the most commonly used public description) or anti-corporate globalization movement, and the three are therefore used interchangeably.

Locating the global justice movement “is overwhelming because the movement seems to be nowhere and everywhere at the same time” (Fernandez, 2008, p. 35). Overall, the movement is a loose coalition of many groups, whose mobilization is transnational, amorphous, and often ad hoc (see Bates, 2002). Generally, there is not a lot of agreement on the origins of the movement: “Some feel it sprang from the 1999 World Trade Organization protest in Seattle” (Fernandez, 2008, p. 35). While others place its
origins “in the International Monetary Fund riots in Asia, Latin America, and Africa some thirty years ago” (p. 36). Still others situate its origins in the five hundred year old anti-colonial struggles of the Americas (see Callinicos, 2003).

In his work, Fernandez (2008) is concerned with how the state controls the global justice movement as it appears in the context of global bureaucratic and financial institutions, which he refers to as globacracies (p. 32). These globacracies include the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as well as “lesser known groups” such as the Group of Eight (G8) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) (p. 36). To this list one can also add the Group of Twenty (G20). Fernandez locates the movement as it confronts, through protest, “those global and regional institutions [globacracies] whose main task is to promote, develop, or implement corporate globalization through neoliberal free-market policies” (p. 36). This is the manner in which I locate it as well; as the global justice movement confronts these institutions through protests and demonstrations.

In very general terms, the main concerns and/or issues of the global justice movement is that economic globalization is a chief cause of global problems, and the aforementioned institutions force economic globalization (see Starr, 2000). Thus, starting in the late 1990s, the global justice movement coalesced around WTO, IMF, WB, WEF, G8, and G20 meetings and summits as locations of protests (Fernandez, 2008). I demonstrate through my analysis that opposition to the actions and policies of these institutions is currently being criminalized by the capitalist national security state, especially through the anti-terrorism legal framework.

Criminalization of Dissent as an Educational Project

The criminalization of dissent can be loosely understood as an educational project, through which the state is trying to educate its citizenry in a broad sense about how to think about these issues (i.e., terrorism and dissent), about what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. This is not formal education per se, but rather “socio-political education,” loosely understood. Gramsci (1973) said that all social relations are
educational projects. In addition, Foucault (1982) described government as “the conduct of conduct,” or the “power to act on the actions of others” (pp. 220-221). Foucault stated:

Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term conduct is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the specificity of power relations. For to ‘conduct’ is at the same time to ‘lead’ others (according to mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. (pp. 220-221)

Increasingly, as dissent and protest become criminalized through the law and official discourse, the “educational message” to the public is that dissent and protest are deviant acts that will not be tolerated by the state. Public opinion about dissent and opposition, therefore, may increasingly become one of deviance and criminality.

Moreover, the political and economic context and climate in which this happens, that of neoliberalism, is itself an educational project or public pedagogy. Giroux (2004a) argued that neoliberalism has to be understood “as both an economic theory and a powerful public pedagogy and cultural politics” (p. xxv). For Giroux, the neoliberal ideology of the state is complicitous in reproducing the conditions and relations for a new type of domination and proto-fascism. Fascism, he contended, resides in “the lived relations of a given social order” (p. 16); and the manner in which such relations weaken a sense of individual and social agency, aggravate the material conditions of inequality and usurp democratic values.

Giroux (2004b) maintained that neo-liberal cultural politics work as a form of public pedagogy to, among other things, devalue the meaning of citizenship. Neoliberalism has become a wide spread cultural and political movement that obliterates public concerns and “makes politics everywhere an exclusively market-driven project” (Giroux, 2004a. p. xxiii). More than this, neoliberalism’s supporting political culture and pedagogical practices also enact a social structure that sustains a particularly barbaric and repressive notion of authoritarianism, set in motion, Giroux argued, “under the combined power of a … market fundamentalism and anti-terrorism laws that suspend civil liberties” and “provide the security forces necessary for capital to destroy those spaces where democracy can be nourished” (Giroux, 2004a, p. xxiii) and expressed.
Overall, neoliberalism is not merely an economic policy designed to pursue free-trade policies, cut government spending, and free the market from government regulations; it is also an official public pedagogy and political philosophy “that affects every dimension of social life” (Giroux, 2004a, p. 52). It and other dominant public pedagogies are producing political and social agents in a society driven by corporate and/or commercial values, which increasingly dismisses as a constraint, and as deviant, any perception or criticism of society that emphasizes social responsibility, public goods, and/or social justice (Giroux, 2004a).

Anti-terrorism legislation is a component of, and an example of, dominant public pedagogy. Through its laws, the state enforces social and political norms and entrenches dominant discourses while it suppresses others. Following Marx, Corrigan and Sayer (1981) have noted that law is central in the struggle between the classes, “giving enforceable definition and fixity to the wider moral classifications” of capitalism (p. 33). Central to the law, they argued, “is a moral topography, a mapping of the social world which normalizes its preferred contours and, equally importantly, suppresses or at best marginalizes other ways of seeing and being.” For the authors, this amounts to a coded denial of experience (p. 33). The state orchestrates this coded denial through, among other things, its public policies and policy reforms.

This is especially the case in education in Canada. Corrigan, Bruce and Lanning (1987) maintained that nineteenth-century educational reformers in Canada sought to go beyond simply the creation of students who accepted certain political relations: “They sought something more active and more elusive at the same time, something they referred to variously as ‘cheerful’ obedience, ‘willing’ obedience or ‘implicit and cheerful’ obedience” (p. 24). What educational reformers sought was the transformation of the students’ consciousness to the degree where existing political arrangements were lived as inherent and obvious. The authors elaborated that:

‘Implicit and cheerful’ obedience was located in the student; it was not a choice, or a conscious reaction to a set of political possibilities. The self was to be constructed and structured in such a way that only one set of political arrangements would be livable. ‘Implicit’ obedience was a form of subjectivity in which the parts of the self composed an entity highly resistant to any kind of
circumstance that might call the process of subjectification into question. Moreover, obedience was active; not a passive acceptance of social arrangements, a willingness to participate in and to support them. (p. 24)

Typically, suggestions that elements of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, or of the governing classes more broadly conceived, attempted intentionally to organize the world in their own interest is labeled conspiracy theory. On the contrary, the authors pointed out that the method of educational practice in which the school was perceived, “as a politically productive space for the creation of human subjects was a visible nineteenth century public discourse” (Corrigan, Bruce & Lanning, 1987, p. 25). For instance, all European and North American countries published and popularized plans for school design and “school management.” Institutions for teacher training taught people how to organize and govern schools. Ontario’s early educational administrators handed out a monthly periodical to all school districts which was concerned with methods for building productive or “efficient” schools, training students, and addressing certain school “difficulties,” such as non-attendance (Corrigan, Bruce & Lanning, 1987, p. 25). Simply put, the cultivation of so-called implicit and cheerful obedience (to capitalist social relations) in students was a highly organized and documented process.

Within CDA, Fairclough (2001) has noted that analyses of “the ways in which education and other institutions train children to fit into and accept the existing system of class relations are very persuasive” (p. 27). This supports the above arguments about how the state uses the educational system to create obedience and acquiescence to the socio-political and economic status quo in youths. While this is done through formal schooling, as I state above, the Canadian State also teaches proper conduct and acquiescence (to the adult citizenry) informally, through its public policies and public discourse. I maintain that individuals who have gone through the formal process of indoctrination and acquiescence—i.e., the cheerfully obedient political selves—may be even more receptive to particular informal educational projects. This includes the non-formal educational project put forth through Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and policy, which normalizes particular ways of thinking about terrorism and dissent, and which employs policy to criminalize unacceptable behaviour such as opposition to dominant power and politico-economic elites.
Technical Issues to Keep in Mind

It should be noted that, for the discourse analyses in chapters four, five and six, I quote all texts directly. Moreover, in my own usage, I often employ the abbreviation “9/11,” and use it interchangeably with “September 11, and “September 11, 2001.” While I appreciate Jackson’s (2005a) argument that the abbreviations of “9/11” or “September 11” serve to erase the context and history of the events “and turn their representation into a cultural-political icon where the meaning of the date becomes both assumed and open to manipulation” (p. 7), I nonetheless employ these abbreviations at times throughout the dissertation. This is done only for the sake of brevity and not to further divorce these events from history and context. Last, I use the terms war on terror, war on terrorism and global war on terrorism interchangeably throughout the dissertation. In some instances, when I employ these words, quotation marks appear around the designation. This is done in order to signify what Jackson (2005a) aptly describes as the war on terror’s special and artificial quality, and in order not to “contribute to its normalization by leaving it undistinguished” (p. 7). That said, however, I often also put theses phrases in italics or leave them undesignated rather than use quotations marks.

Chapter Summaries

In chapter two I present the historical and present context in which the contemporary criminalization of dissent is occurring. I begin with an examination of the history and formation of the national security state—employing Marxist analysis of state-forms as part of the relations of production—and examine whose interests are being protected by the national security agenda. I then move on to critically and historically locate the global war on terrorism within the historical trajectory of western imperialism. Here, I identify the war on terror, and war making in general, as a component and manifestation of capitalist imperialism. I also chronicle the history of national security campaigns against subversion and dissent in Canada, focusing on the labour revolts of the early nineteenth century, the “red scare” and campus monitoring during the Cold War years, and the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s. This serves to anchor my analyses, in other chapters, of the current repression of dissent within Canada’s long history of the criminalization of dissent and protest. At the end of chapter two, I make
some comparisons between anti-communism and anti-terrorism discourse by officials in the US, in order to further demonstrate a connection between the past and present. This situates and bolsters my arguments, in chapter three, against the theory of the state of exception, which fallaciously posits post-9/11 state authoritarianism as a unique state of exception. A comparison of anti-communist era and anti-terrorist discourse suggests that both ideologies are used as mechanisms of social control and to deter and stifle dissent and opposition to government policy.

In chapter three I discuss the theoretical framework and the methodology of the dissertation, which are historical materialism and critical discourse analysis. I begin the theory discussion with an exploration of the theory of the state of exception, a popular theoretical explanation of post-9/11 authoritarianism and draconian anti-terrorism measures, and its limitations. I explore the ways in which Marxist historical materialism is more useful for understanding and explaining post-9/11 state repression as part of a long historical trend toward greater authoritarianism and social regulation. From this conceptual framework, one is able to problematize the rule of law as a social historical product and form of social control, which engenders and bolsters draconian security measures, rather than being threatened by them. I then discuss the ways in which historical materialism can be employed for a critical and historical analysis of the current national security agenda. Much of the discussions of Marxist historical materialism and Marxist analysis serve to theoretically situate arguments made in chapter two.

Given that critical discourse analysis is both a theory of discourse and a method for its analysis, in the second part of chapter two I discuss both the theoretical assumptions and contributions of CDA and its methodological approach and techniques. As a theory of discourse, CDA offers an explanation of what discourse is, how it functions and what its relationship to language, reality, social relations, and power is. For my purposes, CDA is especially useful as a means for critically understanding the relationship between discourse and social power. This is explored at length in the chapter. As an oppositional stance against power, CDA is compatible with, and draws upon, Marxist theory. These connections are discussed in the chapter.

Following the discussion of the theoretical assumptions and points of departure of CDA, I present CDA as a method of research and discuss the particular ways in which I
employ it for my study of anti-terrorist discourse. I describe the three-part CDA model—
description, interpretation, and explanation (Fairclough, 2000; 2001)—that I employ to
analyze Canadian anti-terrorism documents. This is followed by a discussion of the
various CDA technical tools and/or analytic concepts that I apply to deconstruct the texts.
In this chapter I also describe the document selection process, providing a brief set-up for
the subsequent analysis chapters.

**Chapters four, five and six** constitute the descriptive, interpretive and explanatory
analyses, respectively. While I discuss and present them separately, these three stages
(and corresponding chapters) of analysis are at times interconnected and inter-related—
reflecting Fairclough’s (2001) model of nested dimensions of analysis (which I describe
in chapter three). Thus there is at times some overlap between the analyses and
arguments in chapters four, five and six. I begin with a non-critical description of the
texts in chapter four, focusing on the genre or text type (see Huckin, 1997) and the
structure of the texts. I also provide a face value listing of all those things in the anti-
terrorism texts that one can describe as threats and all those things one can describe as
threatened, an analytic dynamic I describe in chapter five. To construct the lists of threat
and threatened, I focus on what is emphasized in each text and list them in the order that
they appear.

In chapter five, I draw on some of the lists developed in the first analytical stage (in
chapter four), in order to undertake an interpretive analysis of the discursive construction
of threat and threatened, focusing on those things which are arguably categorically
strange or incongruous within the context of terrorism, given that they do not generally
fit with common notions of things associated with the threat of terrorism or terrorist
violence. In this chapter, I demonstrate how certain things unrelated to terrorism and/or
not threatened by terrorism, are nonetheless constructed as such in the Canadian anti-
terrorism text. At the beginning of this chapter, I define and explain the discursive
concept of threat and threatened, and explain my use of the *threat and threatened*
dynamic as an analytic framework.

At the explanation stage of analysis, in chapter six, I examine the Canadian anti-
terrorism texts in relationship to one another as well as the relationship between the texts
and the larger context in which they are created and function. In addition, in this chapter,
I construct a hypothesis—drawing on all of previous levels of analysis—about the relationship between the threats and the threatened, which takes into account the larger social contexts and socio-historical practices involved in the discursive construction of threat and threatened in the anti-terrorism documents. This relationship allows me to draw particular conclusions about who or what the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and associated policies ultimately protect and who or what it seeks to target and criminalize.

**Chapter seven** In this concluding chapter I summarize the main points of the dissertation, re-state and elaborate the findings of the multi-dimensional discourse analysis, discuss the limitations of my research, briefly explore avenues for future research, and discuss my contributions to knowledge.
Chapter Two: Context

As I explain in the previous chapter, my research is concerned with the critical analysis of official anti-terrorism discourse in Canada, and how anti-terrorism texts discursively construct dissent in particular ways. Before I present the analysis, it is important to critically explore the socio-historical context in which anti-terrorism discourse exists and functions. This is especially true given my theoretical and methodological frameworks. Both Marxist historical materialism—my theoretical framework—and critical discourse analysis—my methodology—emphasize the importance of context-sensitive analysis, with the former placing great importance on historical conditions and contexts. In this respect, given that Canadian anti-terrorism legislation was introduced as part of a government strategy to strengthen Canadian national security after 9/11 (see Bill C-36 Sponsor Speech, 2001), it is useful to examine the nature and history of the Canadian national security state and national security agenda. Moreover, given that Canadian anti-terrorism measures are part of the wider US-led global war on terrorism (see Chomsky, 2005; Foster, 2006; Parenti, 2005), it is important to critically examine the so-called global war on terrorism and (especially) its relations to US imperialism.

In addition, since, as I argue in other chapters, post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures represent a continuation of the long history of Canadian state repression and criminalization of dissent, it important to establish and examine this history in this context chapter. Towards the end of this chapter I chronicle Canada’s long history of repression against dissent, which dates back to the nineteenth century and the country’s post-colonial beginnings. It should be noted that when discussing context in chapter six, the final analysis chapter, I am only interested in the years immediately preceding the events of 9/11. In this chapter, however, it is important to go much further back in order to demonstrate that the Canadian state has a very long history of criminalizing dissent. This serves to ground and bolster my overall dissertation argument about the current criminalization of dissent that is occurring within the context, and under the guise, of combating terrorism in Canada.

Following my discussion of the history of the criminalization of dissent in Canada, I briefly compare anti-communist rhetoric and anti-terrorist rhetoric in the US. Though my
research focus in on Canada, given that the global war on terrorism is a US-led project and that what happens in the US tends to influence Canada’s anti-terrorism strategies (see Blackstock, 2001), it is useful to examine the US scenario and highlight the similarities between past and present security campaigns and rhetoric. This comparison serves to further demonstrate that, as I argue in chapter three, post-9/11 state repression and draconian measures are not a new or unique state of exception, but are rather a continuation of a long historical trend.

History and formation of the National Security State

The Modern State as a Capitalist State

In order to examine the historical context in which Canadian national security functions, one must trace the history and formation of the national security state, and to examine whose interests and whose security is being protected by the national security agenda. I attend to this in the following section.

The evolution of the modern Western state coincided with the trajectory of a bourgeois capitalist system (Corrigan, 1980; Corrigan & Sayer, 1985). Marxists maintain that the conditions and relations of specific modes of production will, “in their historical development,” engender particular state-forms (Corrigan, Ramsay & Sayer, 1980, p. 5; emphasis in original). For instance, Corrigan (1980) maps the history of the English State as a feature of the developing relations of capitalist production. State forms are related to the relations of production not externally, “as when the state is considered as a coercive set of relations (e.g., ‘bodies of armed men, prisons’) but, rather, internally.” For Corrigan, Ramsay and Sayer (1980) the forms of State are components of a particular mode of producing things, and are indeed a relation of production, “as essential to reproduction as particular kinds of property or technology” (p. 6).

The Marxist theory of the capitalist state, especially as developed by Gramsci (1973), allows us to understand the true nature of the state, historically as well as at the current juncture of global capitalism. During the historical genesis of capitalist production, Marx (1967) argued, the emerging bourgeoisie needed the power of the state, “that concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten … the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition” (as cited in Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 22). Laws, he continued, “of a most
aberrant kind bore very directly on the transition to capitalism and the creation and confirmation of the economic power of a particular class” (as cited in Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 22).

In class societies, “State-forms will be both involved in coercion of the majority and appear … as separate from day-to-day production” (Corrigan, Ramsay & Sayer, 1980, pp. 5-6). For Marx, the state was a central site for ruling-class oppression and thus another form of alienation (Holst, 2002). At the same time, however, the state must appear to be democratic inasmuch as it is answerable to the contradictory imperatives of democracy and capitalism (Brosio, 1994). As Brosio (1994) explained, Gramsci’s analysis of the state revealed that the central government—in developed, capitalist systems, which are also somewhat democratically representative, or claim to be so—must carry out two important objectives. First of all, and most importantly for our purposes, “the State must help capital in its accumulative process, and in the reproduction of the system itself”; secondly, “it must serve the interests of the larger society…i.e., the State must be answerable to more than just capital if it is to appear legitimate” (Brosio, 1994, pp. 45-46).

In the end, however, the state under capitalism is a capitalist state, and as such will ultimately serve the interests of capital (Brosio, 1994). As Corrigan (1980) reported, “The modern state within capitalist social formations becomes increasingly concerned with forms of regulation that focus upon the reproduction of all those forms and relations necessary to the expansion of production for profit within” (p. xxiii) it (and within the territory of its colonies and client countries). Indeed, “legal forms of regulation are designed precisely to govern societies in which production is not consciously, collectively or democratically administered for the common wealth” (Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 37). One way to regulate the populace is through surveillance, and Buse (2000) maintained that social unrest or competition over the control of the means of production often ushers in state surveillance. For instance, in Europe and Britain, governments began to employ surveillance methods with the emergence of early industrial unrest. And in Canada, state surveillance emerged largely due to post-World War I labour unrest (see Buse, 2000, pp. 12-15).
It is also not surprising that, as capitalism globalized, the defence of what Fernandez (2008) refers to as *globacracies*, the bureaucratic institutions of global capitalism (i.e., the NAFTA, WTO, IMF, World Bank, G20, etc.), became part of the defence of the *national* security of Western capitalist states such as Canada (see Fernandez, 2008; Parenti, 1995). It is also not surprising that those who oppose and resist these institutions and their policies became “enemies of the state” (see Parenti, 2005; Parnaby & Kealey, 2003; Warren, 2004). Such organizations seek, “under the banner of globalization, to impose policies that favour capital and corporate elites over ordinary people” (Warren, 2004, p. 215). Given these realities, I prefer to refer to the modern western state as a *capitalist* national security state and use that term and national security state, interchangeably, throughout the dissertation. Having explored the capitalist nature of the modern state, in the following section I explore capitalism as a global meta-narrative.

**Global Capitalism as a (Messianic) Meta-Narrative**

As I explain in the previous chapter, global capitalism is the most totalizing system the world has ever known (see Fairclough, 2002; Wood, 1995). It can be argued that it functions as a type of meta-narrative that currently serves to solidify the hegemony of the US (see Fairclough & Graham, 2002; Jackson, 2005a). Under contemporary globalization (i.e., global capitalism), the United States is carrying out a systematic strategy designed to ensure its absolute hegemony (see Foster, 2006, 2008; Parenti, 2004). As Amin (2001) has argued, “American ideology is careful to package...the imperialist project in the ineffable language of the ‘historic mission of the United States’” (p. 5). Americans have long had a dualistic view of the world as America the righteous, versus the “world of darkness”—all those evil outside forces not dedicated to peace and liberty (Rupert, 2000, p. 22). This dualistic worldview has been influential among American leaders and in public political rhetoric since before the American Revolution and especially during and after the Second World War (see Chossudovsky, 2007; Harvey, 2005). Woodrow Wilson was its most articulate spokesperson. In the years that followed their WWI victory, he told Americans that, “our objective is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world” (as cited in Rupert, 2000, p. 23).
A wartime propaganda campaign of unprecedented proportions attempted to ingrain this vision into the common sense of Americans in order to mobilize them behind a project of global order. However, it was not fully successful, and it was not until: the socio-political transformations wrought by Fordism and the world-order struggles of the mid-twentieth-century...that this world-view—and its corresponding self-understanding of Americans as ‘champions of the rights of mankind’—became deeply rooted in the popular imagination...the dualistic world-view had come to associate liberty with prosperity and a world order supportive of American-style “Fordist” capitalism.

(Rupert, 2000, p. 23)

Thus, most Americans came to understand both their country and themselves as mission-bound to “save” the rest of the world by making others more like them. It was through the spread of their politico-economic system (i.e., “capitalist democracy”) across the globe that this supposed salvation was to occur. In time, infinite and inevitable progress and/or economic (i.e., capitalist) development became the rationalization and rhetoric for US global hegemony.

In addition, US imperial aggression is often justified on moral or humanitarian grounds (see Bricmont, 2006; Chossudovsky, 2007). No matter how unjustifiable they may be, wars of imperial expansion always require some kind of justification (Foster, 2006). The objectives of dominant capital under US imperialism are the same as they were for earlier stages of imperialism: “the control of the expansion of markets, the looting of the earth’s natural resources, and the super-exploitation of the labour reserves in the periphery” (Amin, 2001, p. 4). However, the ideological discourse designed to secure this latest phase of imperialism has been refurbished and is now founded on a “duty to intervene” that is supposedly justified by the defence of “democracy,” the “rights of peoples,” and “humanitarianism” (Amin, 2001, p. 4). Bricmont (2006) aptly described the new American imperialism as “humanitarian imperialism.”

As alluded to above, for the US, *liberating* and *saving* other peoples frequently involves the introduction of—often through military force—US-style capitalism and neoliberal policies into their nations (see Chomsky, 2005; Colas & Saull, 2006; Foster, 2006; Parenti, 2005). Indeed, for modern proponents of capitalism in the west, capitalism
is often placed ahead of even democracy as a necessary ingredient for peace and freedom in the world. For instance American economic columnist Schramm (2006) argued that, “More than the export of democracy, it is the export of entrepreneurial capitalism that can produce a new birth of peace and freedom around our globe” (para. 12). Similarly, writing for the Economist and Foreign Affairs respectively, Coyne (2007) and Mandelbaum (2007) both emphasized the importance of economic freedoms, which they define solely in terms of so-called “free market” capitalism, for creating political freedoms. Simply put, economic or market freedoms lead to political freedoms (see Coyne, 2007).

This is an example of what I call the meta-narrative of global capitalism and/or capitalist imperialism. As indicated by the aforementioned quotes, within this narrative, global capitalism is re-presented and/or reframed as a benign and even beneficial or messianic force and project (see Rupert, 2000; Wood, 1995). This masks the reality that militarized global capitalism currently threatens to destroy the earth and its natural and social environments (see Parenti, 2011), and is part and parcel of the US-led imperial project of global hegemony and domination. In the following section I examine the US-led imperial project in greater detail, paying special attention to the imperial role of the national security agenda.

**Capitalist Imperialism and the National Security Agenda**

It should be noted that in the following section I focus mainly on the history and trajectory of US imperialism. As the current global hegemonic power, the US has been instrumental in shaping and influencing the security policies and agenda of other Western capitalist states (see Kinsman & Gentile, 2010; Thobani, 2007), especially its neighbour and close ally, Canada. Thus one cannot discuss the Canadian national security state and national security agenda without simultaneously discussing the American national security project. Moreover, given that the global war on terror is a US-led endeavour, the following discussions inevitably reflect on the US imperial project.

Canada’s imperial history and ambitions—first as an outpost of the British Empire then later as a principal ally of US capitalist imperialism—have historically shaped the way the Canadian state formulates “national” security, “enemies of the state,” and its approach to and tolerance of dissent and opposition. Canada followed the global imperial
lead of Britain for the first half of the twentieth century (Engler, 2009). As the US developed into the global imperial leader and Canada’s primary trading partner, Canada followed, frequently acting in full support of US initiatives while projecting an outward image of global peacekeeper (see Engler, 2009; Miles, 2011). It is important to note that unlike pre-World War II empires, the US functions as a type of economic empire without direct colonies, meaning it dominates the world through the often violent and/or forceful spread of its economic system (capitalism) across the globe. The US’ main project after WWII—although it began well before this (see Parenti, 2005b; Zinn, 1980, 2003)—was to continue opening doors to capitalist markets, and thus began the US imperial project of capitalist globalization or capitalist imperialism as it is often referred to (see Colas & Saull, 2006; Foster, 2006; Harvey, 2005).

It is in this respect that David Harvey (2005) defines capitalist imperialism as “a contradictory fusion of ‘the politics of state and empire’ (imperialism as a distinctly political project” which mobilizes “human and natural resources toward political, economic, and military ends) and the ‘molecular processes of capital accumulation …’ (imperialism as a diffuse political-economic process in space and time in which command over and use of capital takes primacy)” (p. 26). With the former, Harvey stresses the diplomatic, political, and military strategies summoned and employed by the state, as it struggles to promote its interests in the world. And with the latter, he focuses on the ways in which “economic power flows … towards or away from territorial entities … through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows … and the like” (Harvey, 2005, p. 25).

For Parenti (2005), capitalist imperialism or neo-imperialism, as it is often referred to (see Colas & Saull, 2006; Foster, 2006; Parenti, 2005), makes the denial of empire easier. Without formal colonies, the US empire and power structure is able to maintain the illusion of behaving, abroad, in accordance with the values of a democratic republic while maintaining control of other nations’ major industries, imports and exports and the economy in general. One example of this, Parenti (2005) argued, is Cuba following the Spanish-American war. Capitalist imperialism or neo-imperialism ultimately entails giving other subjugated nations the husk or shell of independence while taking and
controlling the substance and the economic life blood of the nation (see Foster, 206; Parenti, 2005).

Beyond indirectly controlling weaker or subjugated nations, the US has also historically been able to exert great influence over other Western nations and allies. After WWII the US imperial state managed to absorb its Western capitalist rivals (see Colas & Saull, 2006; Foster, 2006), and thus greatly shape the foreign (and to an extent, the domestic) policies of other “Western democracies” such as Canada. This is especially true of national security policy and agendas. Ultimately, conservative forces in the US largely defined the stance of national security in Western states (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010; Thobani, 2007). Specifically, it was defined by the anti-Soviet, anti-communist, and anti-Third World liberation coalition led by the US government and the Western military network, and by the military, the security police, and concerns over national defence (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010). Canada’s alliance with the US was solidified by its involvement with the international military network of the Cold War era. The Canadian state’s involvement in international security agreements allowed the US national security regime to set standards in Canada (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010; Parenti, 1995, 2004).

The US’ influence over Canadian security standards—and that of other states as well—has only intensified since 11 September 2001. The post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures implemented in Canada support the expansion of the American empire abroad (Thobani, 2007). Increasingly, the United States is:

- attempting to assert its *national sovereignty* as a *globalized sovereignty* in its imperial ambitions. The national sovereignty of the sole superpower, the United States, is being redefined as a globalized sovereignty, and it is the American nation-state which, as the sole superpower, is unilaterally deciding where and when its interests are under threat. (Thobani, 2007, p. 220)

Ultimately the US’ declaration of a “global war on terror” after 9/11 and its assumption of a right to wage *preventive* wars (see Chomsky, 2002, for a definition of preventive war) reflect the unrivalled military power of the United States (Panitch & Leys, 2004). Given that, in the uni-polar post-Cold War world, the US is setting the security agenda of other states—including and especially Canada—it is useful to focus on the most recent manifestation of the US national security agenda in the following section.
Despite claims about the protection of national security, safeguarding ordinary citizens is not the real objective of the US’ war on terror and anti-terrorist measures; rather it appears that imperial power takes precedence over domestic security of the citizenry (Chomsky, 2005; Street, 2004). In order to understand this, one needs to understand that the US-led “war on terrorism” is indeed a component of and/or the latest manifestation of US-led capitalist imperialism. In the following section I examine the “war on terrorism” as a critical variable of US-led capitalist imperialism.

“War on Terrorism” as Primary Variable of US-led Capitalist Imperialism

It is important to note that since I am writing a critical or oppositional history of the war on terrorism, I rely mainly on subaltern texts and documents throughout this section, and the chapter generally. This is also true throughout the dissertation. Ultimately, my writing is intended to counter dominant interpretations of terror and anti-terrorism, and, therefore, the literature associated with it.

In this section I critically examine the war on terrorism as a component of US imperialism, relying heavily on subaltern and/or oppositional texts. As I explain earlier, given that the US has historically influenced and guided the Canadian national security agenda, and given that the US is currently setting the anti-terrorism agenda of Canada (and other NATO countries), I focus more on the US in my discussion of imperialism and the national security agenda.

While the notion of imperialism and empire has traditionally been limited to radical and Marxist accounts of US global power, today, and especially since 9/11, it is taken up as an explanation—and in some cases a promotion—of US power by scholars and thinkers from across the ideological spectrum (Colas & Saull, 2006). This is somewhat peculiar since, “the USA did not suddenly become an empire … on 12 September 2001” (Colas & Saull, 2006, p. 1). US imperialism and militarism are deeply rooted in US history and the politico-economic logic of capitalism (Foster, 2006). “As even supporters of US imperialism are now willing to admit, the United States has been an empire from its inception” (Foster, 2006, p. 13). Empires entail continued structures of domination bolstered by historically specific modes of social reproduction. Thus, if we are to speak of an American empire today, we must first uncover the historical origins and genealogy of such imperialism (Colas & Saull, 2006; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2005).
The US has been an empire since at least 1803, when Thomas Jefferson purchased the Louisiana Territory. And throughout the 19th century, what Jefferson referred to as the “empire of liberty” spread out across the continent (Boot, cited in Foster, 2006, p. 13). From here (i.e., the US’ genocide against first nations people), the US went on to conquer and colonize overseas land in the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the Philippine-American War that followed immediately after (Foster, 2006, p. 13). While the US has been an empire for centuries, there are three historical sea changes that are especially central to the progression and growth of US imperialism: WWII; the Cold War and its end; and the current so-called war on terrorism. Whereas the First World War and the Depression derailed the US imperialist project, after and in large part because of, the Second World War, the imperialist project—now refashioned as informal economic empire—was even more robust (see Brosio, 1994; Foster, 2006; Magdoff, 2003; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2005). Not long after, however, this renewed imperial project was met with the new challenges of the Soviet bloc/Cold War, the Vietnam syndrome, and the oil crises of the 1970s (Foster, 2006). But as before, the US emerged militarily and politically stronger after these setbacks, especially with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc (see Brosio, 1994; Colas & Saull, 2006; Foster, 2006; Street, 2004).

The third sea change in US imperialism, the war on terrorism, demands in-depth inquiry. In the US and other Western countries there is a tendency to treat 11 September 2001 and the concomitant “war on terror” as isolated events unconnected to a particular history, process and/or system. Considering these events uncritically makes the US population susceptible to fear and hysteria, and to those who would exploit and even encourage and exacerbate these sentiments to further their own interests. It is important to make connections between seemingly isolated realities, and to step far enough back in order to see the larger reality and processes of which they are a part. While critical thinkers undoubtedly condemn the events of 9/11, there is a stark contrast between an insincere “explanation”, as presented by George W. Bush, that “they [the terrorists] hate us for our freedom,” and one that critically and dialectically explores the ways in which US foreign policy and/or military operations in the Middle East contributed to the events (see Kellner, 2004).
For Foster (2006), “Global warfare, putatively against terrorism but more realistically in the service of imperialism, is the dominant political reality of the opening decade of the twenty-first century” (p. 7). Cole (2004) asserted that the US-led war on terror is being used to mask long-standing, but now highly exaggerated, global imperial aims. Numerous scholars have identified recent US military endeavours as an intensification of US led neo-liberalism, and stress that the focus of any left criticism must thus be the capitalist system itself (see Scatambulo-D’Annibale, 2006). For instance, McLaren (2006) calls attention to Bush’s efforts to use the events of 9/11 to pave the way for permanent military intervention overseas—something US rulers and transnational capital had long been anticipating. It must be stressed that Canada is very much involved in this process. It has heavily deployed troops in Afghanistan over the years and was recently the mission’s overlord there (Chehade, 2007). Moreover, Canada has been manufacturing Bell helicopters, which are highly sophisticated “targeting” and killing machines, for use in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Behrens, 2005).

We can use Marxist political economy to understand how the war on terror (particularly the war on Iraq) is directly linked to and reinforces what Brosio (1994) labels the “international regime of capital,” and the US capitalist imperialist state in three interconnected ways: 1) the military destruction of Iraq feeds the “military-industrial complex,” perpetuating the US policy of military Keynesianism and private profit; 2) transnational capital makes money “rebuilding” Iraq and; 3) the war on terror helps to secure oil and/or access to oil. In the following sections I explore these three points against the backdrop of a general discussion of how the war on terror serves as subterfuge for exacerbating militarized capitalist imperialism.

i) The “Military-Industrial Complex” Bolstered and Broadened by the War in Iraq

At present the term “military-industrial complex” may not be “the best descriptor to encompass the many tentacles and facets of the war and security industry and the links and connections between capital and its political allies” (Choudry, 2008). Thus it is only for the lack of a better term that I employ it here. As Johnson (2007) explained, the US economy has come to rely on war just to survive. He stated:

The [US] imperial project is expensive. The flow of the nation’s wealth—from taxpayers and (increasingly) foreign lenders through government to military
contracts and (decreasingly) back to the taxpayers—has created a form of ‘military Keynesianism,’ in which the domestic economy requires sustained military ambition in order to avoid recession or collapse. (Johnson, 2007, para. 6)

The US economy is in crisis. While the US is often seen as the global power, economically, it actually lags behind many nations, especially in manufacturing, telecommunications, electronics and insurance (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2005). What’s more, without its heavily subsidized military-industrial multinational corporations, the US would have a far smaller presence in industry (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2005). The Bush administration’s solution to impending economic crisis was to mix crude neoliberal avarice with military Keynesianism, which can be described as “tax cuts for the rich, especially on dividends and capital gains, generous subsidies for military research and production, and lucrative purchase contracts in the sphere of military production” (Sison, cited in McLaren & Martin, 2005, p. 200).

Wars of imperial aggression and acquisition historically serve to create profit for capital by propelling and fuelling the ever-expanding military industrial complex, mainly through the manufacture and sales of weaponry. The war on terrorism is the costliest military operation in US history (see Foster, Hollemean & McChesney, 2008; Parenti, 2005). Since the beginning of the war on terror in 2001, acknowledged American national defence spending has increased by almost 60 percent to a level of $553 billion in 2007. “This is higher than at any point since the Second World War” (Foster, Hollemean & McChesney, 2008, p. 1). What is also unique about the war on terrorism, especially the war on and occupation of Iraq, is that beyond weapons manufacturing, there is the added expenditure for and/or profit to private security men and firms, as well as and various private development and service firms. This serves to broaden and increase the dimension and scope (and profit) of the military-industrial complex. I elaborate on this below.

Over the past two decades, the United States has become more and more reliant on military contractors in order to carry out military operations abroad (Whitehead, 2012). This is especially true of the war in Iraq. The post-9/11 war on Iraq is historically unprecedented in its degree of use of mercenary or private soldiers (see Fiske & Carrell, 2004). In Iraq, “there is an army of thousands of mercenaries … in … major cities, many
of them former British and American soldiers hired by the occupying Anglo-American authorities and by dozens of companies” (Fiske & Carrell, 2004, para. 1). The main private military contractor in Iraq is the US firm Blackwater, which is presently the largest of the US State Department’s three private security contractors (Scahill, 2007; Singer, 2003). Overall, the occupiers have spent millions on private security men, enriching private security firms, which are largely (but not solely) UK and US owned (see Fiske & Carrell, 2004).

This practice has increased under the Obama administration. While Obama began reducing the number of troops in Iraq in 2012, he replaced them with military contractors at a much higher cost to US taxpayers (Whitehead, 2012). Whitehead argued that, “in this way…the war on terror is privatized, the American economy is bled dry, and the military-security-industrial complex makes a killing — literally and figuratively speaking” (para. 1). It costs far more to hire a private soldier or contractor. While base pay for an American soldier hovers around approximately $19,000 per year, private contractors can earn between $150,000–$250,000 per year (para. 3). This translates into massive profits for the military-industrial industry through a trend, the use of mercenary soldiers, which has greatly expanded under the US-led war on terror.

In addition to the vast use of mercenaries or private “security men,” another way the war in Iraq has expanded the scope of the military industrial complex is through the massive presence of private development firms tasked with the lucrative business of rebuilding the nation and its services. This leads me to the second argument of this section, which I discuss below.

**ii) “Rebuilding” Iraq is Good Business**

I argue above that the war in Iraq perpetuates the US policy of military Keynesianism, thus generating profit for, and through, the “military-industrial complex.” In addition, there is a second level of profit via Iraq’s so-called reconstruction. Ironically, US militarized capital stands to profit immensely by “rebuilding” a country it has destroyed. Immediately after the 2003 invasion, the White House made plans to transform and rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq. The US government sidelined aid agencies and assigned almost all of the available funds and contracts to private US firms (Burkeman, 2003). While 1.5 billion dollars was offered to private companies, “non-
governmental organizations and the UN would get just 50 million” dollars (Burkeman, 2003, para.1). In essence, the White House privatized post-war reconstruction efforts in a manner that is unprecedented—using public money to enrich private firms.

Approximately 150 US firms received lucrative government contracts for work in Iraq following the invasion (Juhasz, 2006b). By 2006 there were approximately 100,000 contractors operating in Iraq under US government contracts, a total that is approaching the size of the US military force there (Merle, 2006). While not all firms there are American, the US firms are the majority (Merle, 2006). For instance Kellogg, Brown and Root, which is the engineering and construction arm of Halliburton, is one of the largest contractors in Iraq (Juhasz, 2006b). Juhasz explained that,

The big reconstruction winners (after Halliburton) were Parsons Corporation of Pasadena, Calif. ($5.3 billion); Fluor Corporation of Aliso Viejo, Calif. ($3.75 billion); Washington Group International of Boise, Idaho ($3.1 billion); Shaw Group of Baton Rouge, Louisiana ($3 billion); Bechtel Corporation of San Francisco, Calif. ($2.8 billion); Perini Corporation of Framingham, Mass. ($2.5 billion); and Contrack International, Inc. of Arlington, Va. ($2.3 billion). (para.12)

These seven firms are responsible for virtually all reconstruction in Iraq, including roads, bridges, water, electricity, hospitals and sewers. However, they have failed to actually rebuild Iraq—especially in a manner that would benefit poor Iraqis. A major reason for this failure is that these companies actually “came to Iraq with the hopes of ultimately winning contracts to privatize the services they were hired to rebuild” (Juhasz, 2006b, para.12).

Coupled with what Klein (2007) described as a “sort of old-school colonial pillage” of Iraq’s oil (para. 6)—a point I elaborate on shortly—there is a type of “new school colonial pillage” or “colonialism 2.1” (para. 7) at work in Iraq. This new school colonial pillage, according to Klein, is the looting of the Iraqi state, the selling off of the industries and factories. Klein argued that the plan for Iraq was, “The kind of rapid-fire, shock therapy-style strip-mining privatization that we saw in the former Soviet Union in the ’90s” (para.7). As Juhasz’s (2006a, 2006b) work documents, private US companies were given massive contracts with the intention to privatize the country’s services. Under Saddam Hussein, services like health care were either free or very affordable for the
average Iraqi household (though public health spending did decline in the last decade of his rule) (see Karim, 2003).

For Klein (2007), the chief plan for Iraq was that the US would simply go in and, guarded by private military giant Blackwater, sell off Iraq’s industries. US officials openly admit to this plan, no least through their lamentation of the Iraqi people’s resistance to the privatization of the country. As one Reuters article reported (Abbas, 2009), Iraq’s US-backed minister of industry and his associates in Washington have met with great resistance from the Iraqi people to Western capitalism “as he presses ahead with privatization to wrench the country free from past Soviet-style policies” (para.1). This pitting of capitalism against Soviet-style policies, and the author’s description of the industry minister as “pressing ahead” with privatization, is an example of the messianic meta-narrative of global capitalism that I describe earlier in the chapter. The plan to privatize Iraq has not yet been fully successful. Abbas (2009) laments that plans to privatize or partially privatize Iraqi industries have “hit a wall of suspicion among Iraqi lawmakers and the public” (para. 3). Privatization legislation had not been fully passed as of 2010. And, Abbas explained, industries such as cigarette manufacturing and utilities such as electricity and water are unlikely to be privatized at all.

One industry that the Bush administration was desperate to privatize is the oil industry. This leads to the final argument of this section: the importance and pursuit of oil in the war on terrorism.

iii) The Importance of Crude Oil

The third and most obvious source of profit secured through the “war on terrorism” is oil and/or access to it. Foster (2008) held that, “The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the twenty-first century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies” (para.1). While dominant interests may change over time (and political circumstances), they almost always represent the ruling class and/or industrial and business elites or, in pre-industrial times, the wealthy (Parenti, 2005). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the dominant interests of the world economy have been capital, banking and industrial and business elites (Parenti, 2005; Foster; 2006), with US multinational corporations and the world’s central banks exerting great influence
and power at present (Parenti, 2005). And one of the primary things the US firms want access to, via the war on terror, is oil.

To be sure, in Afghanistan the sought-after prize was the possibility of a more politically stable environment for the construction of a pipeline linking the huge oilfields in Central Asia “to the US-friendly Pakistan” (Whyte, 2002, p. 155). Similarly, as I state above, one of the main objectives in Iraq is the pillaging of the country’s oil by the US oil industry. In 2007 a new oil law was proposed for Iraq, which has yet to be passed (see Muttitt, 2012). If passed, Klein (2007) has argued, “it will legalize pillage: legalizing the extraction of 100% of the profits from Iraq’s oil industry” to private US firms (para. 6). While the law was not passed, in 2009 the US-backed Maliki government began awarding contracts to Big Oil illegally. By 2010, Big Oil arrived in full force, confirming for some that Western control (by private firms) of Iraqi oil was a primary motivation for the invasion of Iraq and the larger war on terrorism (see Muttitt, 2012). For Klein (2007) and other critical authors, it is strange and convenient that the global terrorist threat just happens to emanate from the region of the world with the most oil (see Chehade, 2007; Chomsky, 2005; Chossudovsky, 2007; Foster, 2006; Parenti, 2002; 2005; 2011; Roberts, 2011a).

The bulk of the world's oil reserves are in the Middle East and Central Asia (Chossudovsky, 2007). Specifically, Muslim countries possess at least 16 times more oil than Western countries, and Western countries—especially the US—use military interventions and action to gain access to it (Foster, 2006). Yet because countries like Canada and the US purport to be democratic and accountable to their citizens, they cannot simply tell the public that one of the reasons for waging wars and invading sovereign states is for oil (although increasingly, US administrations are not shy about admitting this). Instead they demonize the governments and peoples of this oil-rich region as evil enemies or terrorists to be eliminated, or “liberated” through military interventions (see Chehade, 2007; Chossudovsky, 2007), which are often justified as humanitarian interventions (Bricmont, 2006)

**The Government-Private/Corporate Alliance**

It is not surprising that both the quest for oil and the “military-industrial complex” increased and/or were bolstered, in ways that I discuss above, under the former Bush
administration, given that both the defence industry and the oil industry were well represented in the Bush administration (Juhasz, 2006a). For the first time in US history, the president, vice president, and secretary of state were all previous energy corporation officials. In fact, with respect to that particular administration, “both the president and secretary of state” had less experience as public servants than they did as oil executives (Juhasz, 2006a, p. 100). The defence industry was also well represented in the Bush administration, especially Lockheed Martin, which had approximately sixteen past and current directors and executives in the Bush administration (pp. 101-102). Among them was Dick Cheney’s wife.

Overall, Halliburton, Chevron, Lockheed Martin, and Bechtel represent three fundamental mainstays of the Bush Agenda: “oil, war, and building the infrastructure of corporate globalization” (Juhasz, 2006a, p. 102). Not surprisingly, there is an interdependent dynamic among these three pillars, inasmuch as “corporate muscle always stands shoulder to shoulder with military coercion” (Whyte, 2002, p. 154). Past and present executives of the aforementioned firms directly shaped the Bush Agenda, profited greatly from its implementation (Juhasz, 2006a). What’s more, all of these firms have a strategic interest in Iraq, and have influenced US policy on it. Over the course of several administrations, “each company has used its influence in the U.S. government to increase economic engagement with Iraq and then, when Saddam Hussein no longer played ball, to advocate for war against Iraq” (Juhasz, 2006a p. 146). Along the way, the corporations’ most active allies were the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George W. Bush.

Western lawmakers and heads of state have also benefited directly from the “global war on terrorism.” According to a review conducted by nonpartisan watchdog group, the Centre for Responsive Politics (CRP), “US lawmakers have a financial interest in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan” (as cited in Aslam, 2008). An analysis of the accounts of US lawmakers has revealed that Congress members invested “nearly 196 million dollars of their own money” in firms that receive “hundreds of millions of dollars a day from Pentagon contracts to provide goods and services to U.S. armed forces” (Aslam, 2008, paras. 1-2). Moreover, Britain’s (a major partner in the US-led war on terror) Queen Elizabeth, one of the 10 richest individuals in the world, is a major
shareholder in Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum. Along with Exxon and Chevron, these companies make up the four major firms of global Big Oil (Cunningham, 2011), and benefit greatly from the acquisition of oil in the Middle East-Central Asia.

Overall, it appears that the 2003 invasion of Iraq was in large part an economic one, meaning that military invasion and occupation were employed for economic ends. This is the reality of US imperialism, its trajectory is replete with instances of economic and military collaboration: “There is little doubt that the US global economic empire has had a long and significant connection to the US military. They are two parts of the same project” (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2005, p. 74).

**Whose Interests and Security Does National Security Protect?**

All of the above raise questions about whose interests and whose security is being protected (and whose interests are excluded) by the national security agenda, and the related global war on terrorism. While this will become more apparent after the textual analysis of North American anti-terrorism legislation, it is important to make some initial observations by means of establishing the context in which anti-terrorism laws function.

Parenti (2002) maintained that the true intentions of US national security can be discovered in part by noting whom the national security state assists and whom it attacks. United States’ leaders have constantly supported rightist regimes and organizations and opposed leftist ones. Since the Second World War, the US government has given approximately “$240 billion in military aid to build up the military and internal security forces of more than eighty other nations.” The intention of this massive endeavour, he maintained, “has been not to defend these nations from invasion by foreign aggressors but to protect their various ruling oligarchs and multinational corporate investors from the dangers of domestic anticapitalist insurgency” (p. 73). He argued that this can be determined by observing that:

(a) with few exceptions there is no evidence suggesting that these various regimes have ever been threatened by attack from neighbouring countries; (b) just about all these friendly regimes have supported economic systems that are integrated into a global system of corporate domination, open to foreign penetration on terms that are singularly favourable to transnational investors; (c) there is a great deal of evidence that US-supported military and security forces and death squads
in these various countries have been repeatedly used to destroy reformist movements, labour unions, peasant organizations, and popular insurgencies that advocate some kind of egalitarian redistributive politics for themselves. (Parenti, 2002, p. 73)

The above sections focus on the national security state and agenda in general, as well as the broader context of US imperialism and the imperial war on terror. Having examined the general historical context in which current anti-terrorism discourse functions, I now narrow my focus to a discussion of the Canadian context in particular. In the following sections I critically examine the Canadian national security agenda, followed by a discussion of the history of the criminalization of dissent in Canada.

**The Canadian National Security Agenda**

Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation is “an embodiment of the increasing ‘globalization’ of law and policy” (Mazer, 2002, p. 1). The move to implement a global anti-terrorism legal regime has been quick and was guided in part by a United Nations committee (Rogge, 2001). Immediately following 11 September there was international pressure for countries to implement anti-terrorism measures. Canada’s anti-legislation arises out of, among other things, a motion passed at the United Nations following 9/11 that called on all nations of the world to implement anti-terrorist legislation and to implement UN conventions with respect to the prevention of terrorism within 90 days (Blaikie, 2001; see also Morden, 2002, 2010). Rogge (2001) maintained that, “With a global war against terrorism in place, many governments will regard the mass protests against the institutions of global capitalism as intolerable” (para. 15). The events of 9/11 have had a deep impact on a global economy that was already in recession. In the neo-liberal outlook, “any further delay to the entrenchment of the neo-liberal model will only worsen the already weakened global economy” (para.5). Thus, the containment of anti-neo-liberal dissidents across the globe is “likely seen as a necessary part of limiting the inevitable adverse economic impact of the war against terrorism.” Ultimately, for the authors of neo-liberal policy, the implementation of far-reaching anti-terrorism legislation that can potentially be used to suppress mass protest is rational and convenient (Rogge, 2001).
In Canada, “national” security is currently formulated in a way that serves the interests of global capital. Kinsman (2006) explained that, “International and regional forms of capitalist organizing rest on the organization of state, corporate, professional and other ruling relations and the identification of a ‘national security’ with defence of these institutions of global capitalism, especially in the context of the new ‘war on terrorism’” (p. 147). The “security” being protected or defended by the state today is not public or collective security but the “security” of powerful private groups (see della Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006). The myths that have arisen around the war on terrorism are used to benefit a small corporate and political elite (Mahajan, 2002). Anti-terrorism measures around the globe ultimately protect the interests of neo-liberalism and neo-liberal policy makers by criminalizing protests against the institutions of global capitalism:

When lawmakers state that the new anti-terrorism laws strike a balance between liberty and ‘security,’ we must consider that, in their view, neo-liberal economic integration is considered a precondition for security. Presently, ensuring ‘our’ security, in the view of many world leaders, means ensuring the prevalence of the neo-liberal model and its bulwark institutions. (Mahajan, 2002, para .15)

Overall, national security in Canada has historically been formulated in a manner that, to a large extent, serves the interests of global capitalism. This is not surprising given the capitalist nature of the modern Western state. Having examined the history of the national security agenda, both in general and in the particular case of Canada, in the following section I turn my attention to the history of state repression of dissent in Canada.

**History of Canadian National Security Campaigns**

While exception theory (which I discuss in chapter three) holds that the state became more authoritarian and repressive after 9/11, in reality, state repression against political dissent and activism is not something new or recent in North America. The current war on dissent and protest is but the latest manifestation of a centuries-long process and practice of criminalizing and monitoring dissent and “subversion” in North America (see Clarke, 2002; Warren, 2004). In the US, post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies reflect the latest, and arguably the most draconian, efforts along a centuries-long trajectory of legislation and other so-called security initiatives aimed at further undermining the US
Constitution and criminalizing dissent (see Chang, 2002, pp. 19-42). Similarly, in Canada, governments have long employed extraordinary powers to limit free expression in the name of combating so-called security threats (CJFE, 2001). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Canadian police had an array of legal instruments that they employed to criminalize union, socialist, and communist activists (see De Lint & Hall, 2009, pp. 249-257).

In the following section(s) I wish to examine this Canadian history more closely. An exhaustive examination is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I touch upon three important components of this history, namely the Winnipeg General Strike of the early twentieth century; the “red scare” on Canadian campuses; and, in less detail, the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Before presenting these three examples in Canadian national security history, I briefly discuss the history of the secret police in Canada, which underlies and overlaps with the three aforementioned examples. It should be noted that while I do not deal specifically with contemporary (non-discursive) actions of these police agencies in the analysis chapters, the agencies are still relevant for two reasons. First, the anti-terrorism laws grant greater powers and provisions for the RCMP and Canadian police in general. Second, many of the key anti-terrorism and security texts I examine in the critical discourse analysis in chapter four, five and six are produced by CSIS and the RCMP. These agencies have been very instrumental in discursively constructing dissent in certain negative ways, which I explore in the analysis chapters. For this reason it is useful and important to chronicle their history and their past dealings with dissent and opposition.

**The History of Security Policing in Canada**

For Parnaby and Kealey (2003), “Few institutions mirror a nation’s political culture, the working logic of its government, and the preoccupations of its leaders more than its secret police—its status, its modus operandi, and its declared enemies” (p. 215). From its inception, secret and/or security policing in Canada was aimed at protecting the imperial interests of Canada; first as an outpost of the British Empire, then as an ally of US imperialism. Kealey (2000) explained that the Canada Secret Service—predecessor to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)—was originally imperialist and strongly
identified with the interests of the British Empire, then later switch allegiance from Britain to the United States.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police security service has 19th century predecessors in the 1837 Rebellions in Lower and Upper Canada, and the anti-colonial agitations against Britain by Irish republicans and Indian radicals, which had counterparts/movements in North America (see Kealey, 1999). Overall, “Canada’s initial experience in the realm of intelligence and security matters, as in other areas of political life, was shaped decisively by its status as an outpost of the British Empire” (p. 211). However, the Canadian experience in political policing, while related to its colonial heritage, was also unique. For instance, while Britain was slow to develop a political police, the same cannot be said of the emerging Canadian nation-state. Unlike the English, whose Victorian liberalism was distrustful of political and secret police, Canadians appear to have been much more accepting of such organizations (p. 211).

Even at its inception, Canada’s secret police went uncontested. No one criticized its creation; no political debate surrounded it. Parnaby and Kealey (2003) explain that “the suspension of habeas corpus, political arrests without charges, mail seizure, secret agents, perhaps even agents provocateurs—all were present in these formative years of the new nation-state and all went unopposed but for the victims” (p. 212). Throughout 1860 to the First World War, the Canadian federal government “was preoccupied with ‘suspected seditionists’ whose real enemy,” the authors argued, “was the mother country itself.” Thus it relied heavily on the imperial infrastructure, including Britain’s extensive diplomatic presence in the United States, and the imperial civil service to assist its emerging secret police in political policing (Parnaby and Kealey, 2003, p. 212).

In the immediate post-war period, Canada’s internal security problems shifted decisively, and its own capacity to monitor dissidents expanded, thus diminishing the role of this imperial infrastructure (Kealy, 1999). With the onset of World War I, the issue of who posed a threat to Canada’s internal security, and the best way to limit that potential threat, underwent a shift at the highest levels of the federal government (Parnaby & Kealey, 2003). In the “crucible of the war years, Ottawa would suspend civil liberties outright, create a new battery of repressive measures, and, under the pretext of mobilizing the nation for war, move to crush its new, more formidable opponent: labour and the left”
For much of the twentieth century, the Canadian state was preoccupied by the early labour revolts, the “red scare,” and student movements of the new left – points I examine in greater detail subsequently.

i) Winnipeg General Strike

In May of 1919, 35,000 unionized and non-unionized workers in Winnipeg walked off the job in support of demands by workers in the city’s building and metal trades for collective bargaining rights, effectively shutting down the commercial and industrial life of the city from 14 May to 25 June 1919. At the same time, supportive strikes spread to communities across the country (Mitchell, n.d.). These events were “rooted in the opposition of the country's workers to a return to pre-war relations of power and authority in a reconstructed Canada” (Mitchell, n.d., p. 134). Political and business elites saw the strikes as a threat to their power and the existing order. Opponents of the strike in Winnipeg and across the country feared that the strike, successfully deployed, would undermine the property rights of capital and weaken the authority of the state. To undercut the strike, the city’s business elite, organized as the Citizen’s Committee of 1000, “sought to mobilize elements of civil society and the state against the strike” (p. 134). The Citizen’s Committee also included many prominent members of the city’s legal community.

From the very beginning of the strike, the Committee had loudly demanded the arrest of the strike leadership. This was accomplished on the night of 17 June 1919, when “the strike leadership was taken into custody and held on provisions of both the Criminal Code and the only recently amended Immigration Act.” These developments culminated in the sedition proceedings in Winnipeg in the fall and winter of 1919 and 1920 (Mitchell, n.d.; Wright, 1992). Overall, the Winnipeg General Strike triggered the following draconian actions/reactions by the state: the permanent imposition of the War Measures Act; the expanded definitions of seditious activity and unlawful assembly; and the broader definition of “aliens” and the summary deportation of aliens (amendments passed during the Winnipeg General Strike followed by sections 41 and 42 of the Immigration Act and section 98 of the Criminal Code) (Wright, 1992).

What’s more, the Citizen’s Committee succeeded in enlisting the “authority and resources of the federal Department of Justice in legal and ideological assaults on labour...
radicalism after the strike” (Mitchell, n.d., p. 136). Mitchell concludes that, “In this struggle, the Winnipeg business and legal elites, not the workers, were the real historical protagonists” (p. 137). They “set the agenda of conflict, determined the terrain and rules of engagement, and massed the resources of the state in a relentless war of position against labour radicalism” (p. 137). However, contrary to the common portrayal of the strike’s aftermath as a time of utter defeat for labour, the response of workers to the Citizens’ campaign was one of struggle and resistance.

ii) The “Red Scare” (and RCMP Campus Monitoring)

Like the United States, Canada had only very minor domestic and foreign intelligence systems prior to the twentieth century (Buse, 2000). The intermixing of the Winnipeg General Strike of 1919 and the wider domestic labour revolt of 1917-1920 and a fear of radicalism, triggered largely by the success of the Bolshevik revolution abroad (Kealey, 2002), engendered the birth of the new Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in February 1920, “providing Canada for the first time with a police force that operated from coast to coast to coast” (Hewitt, 2002, p. 41). The RCMP began as the North-West Mounted Police (in 1873), and later (in 1904) as the Royal North-West Mounted Police. The new force was a lot like the old in its function except, “in the area of security intelligence, where an expanded and permanent role would develop in the inter-war period” (Hewitt, 2002, p. 41). The major structures and basic ideological logic of the Canadian Secret Service, as it functioned until the creation of CSIS in 1984, were fashioned in the years from the outbreak of World War I until the start of World War II (Kealey, 2000).

From the outset, the ideology of the Canadian Secret Service was above all else, anti-communist (Kealey, 2000). With the arrival of the Communist Party of Canada (CPC), the RCMP took up the task of “spying [on] and infiltrating the radical organization” (Hewitt, 2002, p. 41). Kealey (1999) held that the intelligence functions of the RCMP grew immensely during the post-World War II Cold War, though he is keen to point out that this growth was not purely a phenomenon of the post-World War II Cold War, meaning the Cold War had “commenced with the success of the Bolsheviks in 1917” (p. 21). During the Cold War, especially after WWII, the RCMP was obsessed with communism. Despite proclamations by the Canadian state about defending
democracy, during the Second World War, the RCMP showed more concern about the threat to *capitalism* than the threat to so-called democracy (p. 21). In other words, in the Cold War years “Canadian” national security, though purportedly about defending and protecting Canada, was actually concerned with protecting the relations of capitalism.

As part of its obsession with and campaigns against communism and radicalism, the RCMP monitored university campuses and student activists; intelligence gathering on Canadian campuses has been occurring for almost a century (Hewitt, 2002). Indeed Mountie attention to Canadian universities stretches back well before World War II, in connection with radicalism and the Winnipeg General Strike (Hewitt, 2002).

RCMP activities on campuses intensified in the late1930s and early 1940s (see Axelrod, 1995). At this time the RCMP believed that, “universities were potential breeding grounds of critical thought and political ‘subversion’, and ... merited close scrutiny” (cited in Moses, n.d., p. 375). RCMP suspicion continued after the Second World. After the Gouzenko affair in 1945, the RCMP became even more fixated on communism and concerned about the possible extent of covert Soviet activity in Canada (Moses, n.d.). The Gouzenko affair, along with WWII, led to an increase in the Intelligence function of the Force (see Kealey, 2000). This helped to reignite the “red scare” of the 1930s. The RCMP was so disturbed by Gouzenko’s revelations about a spy ring operating in the Western world that it ended up gathering every possible piece of information about communism (Hewitt, 2002).

The RCMP proceeded to become more aware of what was happening on university campuses across Canada. The Mounted Police spied on student groups such as the Canadian Student Assembly (CSA) and the Canadian Youth Congress (CYC), and there was a stated “desire for university officials to control professors more tightly” (p. 94). In a weekly RCMP Security Bulletin (1952) a grave warning was issued:

> When a disease spreads until it affects a vital organ it is time for strong remedial action. The virus of Communism, long coursing, almost unopposed in our social blood-stream has now reached the heart of our educational system as represented by undergraduates and even college professors in several of our leading universities…. Evidence of a Communist ‘drive’ among our College youth is steadily accumulating. As yet the majority in every student body is loyal to
Democracy but it appears to be waging an unequal fight against well-organized foreign-controlled disruption and disaffection. (as cited in Hewitt, 2002, p. 94)

Hewitt explained that though the communist participation in student groups was nominal, the RCMP proceeded to “cast a wary eye upon any student activism.” In reality university campuses did not generally serve as the major site for the battles between Mounties and Communists. He maintained that the notion of a “communist threat” on Canadian campuses is a “socially constructed image” (p. 41). In his examination of the RCMP’s “espionage activities at Canadian universities,” which included the study of 2,000 pages of material on the matter released through an Access to Information request, Hewitt (2000; 2002) found a repeated theme: “the fear of youth being indoctrinated” (2000, p. 92). Youth were seen as a naïve blank slate on which any individual could leave his or her intellectual mark. Their naiveté, Commissioner S.T Wood argued, made them, by nature “radical and therefore receptive to subversive propaganda promoting social and economic reforms” (as cited in Hewitt, 2000, p. 92). Apparently, due in part to the RCMP’s perception of youth as naïve and easily radicalized, the idea of a “communist threat” on campus was greatly exaggerated. It should be noted that this theme of youth being vulnerable to indoctrination, and in the case of post-9/11 anti-terrorism efforts, to “radicalization,” is one that exists in contemporary RCMP texts on terrorism. This is discussed in the analysis chapters.

iii) Into the 1960s and 1970s

The RCMP’s early activities pale in comparison to its work in the 1960s and 1970s (see Hewitt, 2002, 2000; Kinsman, Buse & Steedman, 2000). In the 1960s there was a spill over effect in Canada from the student protests that had erupted in France and the United States. During that decade of radicalism, university students “were at the forefront of protest movements throughout the Western world” (Hewitt, 2000, p. 96; see also, Parent, 2000). In 1969, William Kelly, retired RCMP deputy commissioner, wrote that, “because some sympathetic students might be recruited by the Soviet Union, the Force needed to keep a close watch on them” (as cited in Hewitt, 2000, p. 91). However, while most of the various forms of social protest during this time were leftist in origin, Hewitt (2000) maintained that they were “not necessarily Communist-inspired” (p. 92). As such the RCMP had trouble coping with and understanding the different types of social protest
of this time. Hewitt argued that, “The ‘new left’ offered a strong critique of American society and values, but unlike the ‘old left’ its proponents were not beholden to Marxist orthodoxy or the Communist Party line” (p. 96). In this way the various forms of protest of the 1960s are a precursor of the contemporary global justice/anti-globalization movement(s).

The RCMP accelerated its activities on campus in order to deal with the 1960s upsurge in radicalism, all the while denying this course of action (see De Lint & Hall, 2009). Its activities included the recruitment and use of informants on campuses, although some restrictions were placed on this. The RCMP “followed events on campus with an intensity that would have put all but the most dedicated student to shame” (Hewitt, 2000, p. 97). The end of the 1960s increasingly aimed the RCMP’s university focus at Native and Métis organizations and their ties to radical black organizations in the US.

With the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) crisis of October 1970, the social tensions that had been building in Canadian society throughout the 1960s finally exploded (see Hewitt, 2000, 2002; Parent, 2000). The FLQ emerged onto the Quebec and Canadian political scene in the 1960s, when the revolutionary youth and student movement was in flow. Thousands of young Canadians and Quebecois were joining the revolutionary movement. The FLQ’s existence “provided all the justification the Canadian state needed to launch an all-out offensive against the revolutionary movement” (“Terrorism and Imperialism: The FLQ,” 2004, para. 4). This offensive had begun even before the invocation by the Trudeau government of the War Measures Act during the October Crisis of 1970. However, “similar to the provisions of anti-terrorism legislation passed by the Chretien government in November 2001,” under the draconian provisions of the War Measures Act, “Trudeau authorized the RCMP to take extraordinary actions against revolutionary activists” (“Terrorism and Imperialism: The FLQ,” 2004, para. 4). These included the deployment of the armed forces and the arrest of “thousands of youth and student activists, not just in Quebec, but across Canada,” who were “arrested and held without charges for weeks and months.” Hundreds of members of the Communist Party of Canada were arrested throughout this time (see Rupert, 2000).
It was an unprecedented peace-time suspension of civil liberties (see De Lint & Hall, 2009).

At the University of Saskatchewan, numerous rallies connected to the imposition of the War Measures Act occurred on both campuses. The RCMP covered all of them, “reporting on participants and the speeches made and collecting pertinent articles and letters” from the two university papers (Hewitt, 2000, p. 99). Echoing the current war on dissent—which is occurring under the guise of, and as a part of, the “war on terrorism”—the state’s mantra during this period was: “trampling the civil liberties of all Canadians was necessary to protect the country from the scourge of terrorism. The FLQ, Trudeau argued, posed a direct threat to Canada’s national security and territorial integrity” (“Terrorism and Imperialism: The FLQ,” 2004, para. 4). Ultimately, the FLQ October crisis led police in Quebec, and across Canada, to “regard most demonstrators as ‘professional agitators’ and to view dissent more generally as a serious public order problem” (De Lint & Hall, 2009, p. 95).

With the end of the Cold War, and the events of 11 September 2001, the focus of the Canadian national security state has shifted to new security threats: “anti-globalization” activists and suspected or alleged terrorists who, Parnaby and Kealey (2003) argue, “for extraordinarily different reasons and in extraordinarily different ways, have mounted a challenge to the global reach” of the US hegemony (p. 219). In its response to these perceived new security threats—i.e., “anti-globalization” activists and suspected or alleged terrorists (which, as I demonstrate in the analysis chapters, the state discursively conflates with one another)—Ottawa has “enhanced state power, eroded the balance between different branches of government, blurred the line between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ political action, and circumscribed individual and collective rights” (p. 219). This process is clear, but what is less appreciated, the authors maintain, is that this political strategy and approach possesses a long history in Canada, “one that stretches back well over a century” (p. 221). This is why it was necessary for me to chronicle that history above; in order to connect the past to the historical present, and to demonstrate that the criminalization of dissent in Canada is not something new (that was only ushered in by 9/11 and post-9/11 security measures), but has very long historical roots.
A Note on the Cold War and the War on Terror

To close this chapter, I would like to raise some important points about the Cold War /communist threat and the present historical juncture. In order to appreciate that the current war on terror and repressive anti-terrorism legislation do not represent some “state of exception” or mark the beginning of state authoritarianism, it is important to link what is happening presently to what has happened before. This means that we cannot let the spectacle of 9/11 usher in a historical amnesia that removes the current reality from the historical continuum of which it is a part. Current state repression is but the latest manifestation of a national security strategy that promotes and exploits fear and creates local and global enemies, in order to serve the interests of the capitalist national security state at home, and US-led capitalist imperialism abroad. To demonstrate this point, I present a brief comparison between the “anti-communism” and anti-terrorism rhetoric of US administrations, past and present. I focus mainly on the US here given that the United States was the Western leader of the Cold War and is currently driving the so-called global war on terrorism.

Comparison of administration speeches from the 1950s to 1980s and the post- 9/11 “war on terror” suggests that the ideology of anti-communism and the ideology of anti-terrorism are both used as mechanisms of social control by the US, in order to foster citizen complicity for imperial wars abroad and domestic suppression and repression at home. A “fear-struck population is easily led” (Thorne, 2007, para. 6). In both periods, citizens’ fear of “communism” and “terrorism”, respectively, is promoted and exploited on two levels. First, there is the fear of communism and terrorism by which government and mainstream media bombard the American people with messages about threats to national security and public safety. And second, there is the fear of being associated with (i.e., accused of) communism or terrorism.

During the anti-communist era, fear was a popular rhetorical tactic. In his 1951 Farewell Address to Congress, General Douglas MacArthur warned that the “Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens the destruction of every other sector” (MacArthur, 1951, para. 2). And in his Cuban Missile Crisis Address to the Nation in 1962, John F. Kennedy declared that, “we no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's
security” (Kennedy, 1962, para.1). Here the underlying message is that even if the enemies do not fire their missiles, the people are still in danger. In short, the people are never safe in this new type of world where danger is everywhere and in every way defined.

The same messages of ubiquitous danger are disseminated in the war on terror. However, in the war on terror, scare tactics have reached new and extreme heights. In the George W. Bush administration’s rhetoric, the “evil enemy” lurks in all corners of the globe and can strike anywhere and at any instant. In a speech to promote and justify state surveillance, Bush (2004) explained in a fantastical manner that, “we’re now facing a different kind of war. Now the enemy hides in caves, they lurk in the shadows of the world. They will strike and kill innocent citizens without any conscience because they have no conscience” (para. 3). In a similar fashion Condoleezza Rice remarked in her 2004 Opening Statement to the 9/11 Commission that, “we must stay on the offensive to find and defeat the terrorists wherever they live, hide and plot around the world” (Rice, 2004, para. 4). While the post- 9/11-fear imagery is more vivid, ultimately, the language of the two periods is similar in tone. For example, Bush’s comment in the 2005 State of the Union Address that “our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many and intimidate us all,” sounds similar to Lyndon Johnson’s warning in 1963 about “those who reject the path of peace and those who seek to impose upon us or our allies the yoke of tyranny” (Bush, 2005, para. 1).

Indeed, in order to justify current national security campaigns against critics of the state and/or capitalism and increased social regulation, Western politicians and officials often conflate the “global war on terrorism” with the Cold War and the fight against communism. This is true even though in reality the Cold War and the “war on terrorism” are very different—a point to which I return shortly. Echoing the Cold War, the polarization of political choices, i.e., “support us or support terrorism”, helps build fear and social paralysis (Skrimshire, 2004). In this environment of fear and paralysis long-term analysis of fundamental problems, such as questioning the global circumstances that foster terrorism, “is drowned out in the cry for retribution and sidelined in the rush to show ‘resolve’ in the face of terrorists” (para. 5).
During parliamentary debates over Canada’s proposed anti-terrorism legislation, the Liberal government of the time spoke about terrorism in a manner that reified it, as if it exists as a cohesive thing or coherent subject: “Terrorism”, the Liberals maintained, “seeks to undermine the rule of law and human rights. Terrorism seeks to undermine our values and way of life. Terrorism tries to turn one community against another, religion against religion, and race against race” (Sponsor Speech, 2nd Reading of Bill C-36, 2001). However, unlike Communism (the global enemy of the past), for example, terrorism is not a way of thinking, or a paradigm, or a political position. At best, terrorism is a (political) act and/or tactic (see Tirman, 2006; Gordon, 2004); one that has been historically defined in such a way as to preclude the actions of Western states from being considered or condemned as terrorist (see Blain, 2007; Eagleton, 2005; Kinsman & Gentile, 2010).

In the anti-terrorist rhetoric of US politicians, there are overt comparisons to the Cold War and the fight against Communism. One might think that given the failure of the Vietnam War and the dangerous potential of the arms race, the Bush Administration would avoid comparisons between the war on terror and the (failed) anti-Communist struggles. However, the opposite is true. These dark moments in history have been branded in the public imagination, through official discourse, as great moments of American triumph (see Tirman, 2006). The resultant historical disconnect allowed the Bush Administration to gain legitimacy for its “global war on terror” by comparing it to the anti-Communist fight. However, while the Cold War was used as a pretext for the state’s national security agenda and national security campaigns of the time, it was nonetheless a “real” conflict in the sense that there were real state enemies and thus some “legitimacy.” Moreover, Communism is an actual political movement and/or paradigm while terrorism is but a methodology or tactic (see Tirman, 2006). In this respect comparing the Cold War to the so-called war on terror lends superficial legitimacy to the latter.

In a televised address to the nation on the fifth year anniversary of 9/11, George W. Bush (2006) proclaimed that, like the Cold War, this present war (on terror) is very much an ideological struggle – this time between the US and radical/extremist Islam. He stated, “the war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive
ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation…. Our nation is
being tested in a way that we have not been since the start of the Cold War.” Similarly,
Dick Cheney (2004) declared that, “just as surely as…the Soviet communists during the
Cold War, the enemy we face today is bent on our destruction. As in other times, we are
in a war we did not start, and have no choice but to win” (para. 1).

In its rhetoric, the Bush administration ultimately recycled the thinking and
frames of the Cold War; freedom versus oppression, the world divided, the necessity of
readiness to use overwhelming military force. The reality is, however, that while the
rhetoric, pretexts and rationalizations are the same; the actual situations (the Cold War
and the war on terror) are absolutely not the same. The Bush administration’s comparison
of the war on terror to America's long struggle with Soviet communism in the Cold War
falls wide of the mark (Tirman, 2006). Tirman (2006) explained that unlike the “war on
terror,” the Cold War was a great power contest that had many dimensions. While there
was a “war of ideas,” there were also vast alliances, proxy wars and mechanisms for
managing the conflict (para. 12). In short, it was an inter-state conflict that was highly
formalized. However, the “war on terror” is a “different kind of war.” Al Qaeda is
nothing like a state, and with the exception of 9/11, and a couple of other possible
bombings, “al Qaeda has provoked little actual violence in the West” (para.14.).

We must also remember that Communism is a real and tangible ideological political
system and there are indeed states that define themselves as Communist states. Thus it is
not theoretically illogical to go after a communist state as a target; the US had actual state
“enemies” during the Cold War. The same cannot be said of terrorism. Terrorism does
not exist as an enemy the way communism existed as an enemy. There is no state that
defines itself as terrorist. And “terrorism” itself is a highly contextual, socially
constructed concept (see chapter four), the meaning of which is reliant on the control of
the meaning making apparatuses (see Fiske, 1987; Gordon, 2004). Thus the application
of the term “anti-terrorism” can be highly misleading in that it implies that there is a real
and distinct entity known as terrorism that can be militarily targeted and opposed. It also
mistakenly presents terrorism as an ideology when in reality it is a method of action, one
that is used by the US government as well as “Islamic extremists” (see Chomsky, 1989).
Ultimately, by purposely conflating the bogus ideology of anti-terrorism to the ideology
of anti-communism, Western officials lend ideological legitimacy to imperialist missions abroad and the current stifling and criminalization of dissent and opposition internally (see Chehade, 2007; Lapham, 2004; Skrimshire, 2004).

In this chapter, I have presented the socio-historical context in which the rest of dissertation should be read. While most of the material and discussions presented here do not resurface in the analysis chapters, they do serve to historically ground and situate those chapters. Thus, the rest of the dissertation should be read with this context chapter in mind. This is especially true given that dominant discourse functions within and is guided by larger socio-historical forces (see Fairclough, 2001; Huckin, 1997, 2002). Overall, Canadian anti-terrorism discourse is part of the wider war on terrorism and national security agenda, which in turn are connected to certain socio-historical conditions, such as the US’ capitalist imperialist project, which I chronicle above. Moreover, in order to demonstrate (as I do in chapter three) that post-9/11 authoritarianism and criminalization of dissent are not a state of exception, it was necessary to explore the long history of the criminalization of dissent in Canada. To further demonstrate a connection and similarity between past and present North American security agendas, is was also useful to compare US war on terrorism discourse and rhetoric to anti-communism era discourse and rhetoric.

In the next chapter, I present the theoretical framework for the dissertation, historical materialism, thereby theoretically grounding many of the discussions and arguments presented in this chapter (and other chapters). I then discuss my methodology, critical discourse analysis (CDA), which, it should be noted, is at once both a theory and a methodology. I provide a discussion of the assumptions and points of departure of CDA, followed by a detailed description of how to conduct CDA and how I employ it specifically, including the analytic model and concepts that I bring to the analysis of the documents produced by Canada’s security agencies on anti-terrorism.
Chapter Three: Theory & Methodology

In this chapter I present the theoretical framework and methodology of the dissertation. For the theory section I briefly explore the current popular theoretical explanation of post-9/11 state authoritarianism, which is the state of exception theory. I note the limitations with this stance and present Marxist theory, and Marxist historical materialism in particular, as a better-suited critical vantage point from which to view and interrogate the national security agenda, the rule of law, and the war on terrorism. In this way, much of the discussions of Marxism and Marxist analysis serve to theoretically situate arguments made in the previous chapter. As critical discourse analysis (CDA) is both a theory and a methodology, at the end of the theory section I discuss CDA as a theory of discourse. I then move on, in the methodology section, to a discussion of CDA as a method for discourse analysis. In this section, I discuss how to do CDA, how others have applied CDA, and how I employ CDA—including the analytic strategy and technical terms I employ in my analysis of anti-terrorism discourse and texts. Given that, in the theory section, I present many Marxist thinkers and arguments, as well as numerous CDA assumptions and arguments on discourse, the theory section can also be understood and treated as a type of literature review.

I. Theory

State of Exception Theory and its Limitations

There is a widely accepted notion that 9/11 and the suspension of civil liberties that ensued constitute something new or different, a belief that everything changed on 9/11 (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010; Street, 2004). A popular explanation is that in times of emergency American leaders use the severity of the emergency to seize powers far in excess of what the emergency necessitates (see Leone & Anrig, 2003). Agamben (2005) theorized the excessive executive power taken up during times of emergency as the “state of exception,” an expression he adopts from jurist and legal philosopher Carl Schmitt. Agamben investigated how the suspension of laws within a state of emergency or crisis can become a prolonged or almost permanent state of being (see also Odysseos & Petito, 2007, who draw on Agamben to do something similar). Agamben (2005) addressed the ways in which this prolonged state of exception operates to remove individuals of their
citizenship and civil liberties, and pointed out that the state of exception is indeed a paradigm of contemporary government including the Third Reich as well as George W. Bush’s administration. From this perspective, the war on terror is explicated as a state of exception in which the normal rule of law has been suspended.

While the state of exception theory does capture “something crucial about the mobilization of national security in the war on terror,” (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010, pp. 440), fetishizing 9/11 and the attendant war on terror as “new” or “different” removes the latter from history, and may prevent us from seeing the continuities with past national security campaigns (Kinsman & Gentile, 2010, pp. 440-450). It is incorrect to characterize repression as the state’s response to crisis, “rather than seeing it also as a means to preserving normalcy” (Williams, 2011, p. 81). It makes it difficult to recognize repression in calm times; “and when it does appear it seems like an exception, an excess, a panicked over-reaction” (Williams, 2011, p. 81). For example, even prior to 9/11 and Canada’s anti-terrorism laws, “legislation had been introduced representing an unprecedented expansion of state power under the auspices of fighting organized crime, though never limited in its application only to organized crime” (ICLMG, 2003, p. 2).

Simply put, draconian state measures existed in North America long before the events of 9/11.

As Marxist theorist Mandel pointed out, part of the state’s three main functions is to repress opposition and/or threats to the existing mode of production by means of armed forces, judiciary, prison systems, etc., (cited in Brosio, 1994, p. 50). Williams (2011) has explained that:

- Repression is, first and foremost, a matter of politics: it is the means the state uses to protect itself from political challenges, the methods it employs to preserve its authority and continue its rule. This process does not solely rely on force, but also mobilizes ideology, material incentives, and, in short, all of the tools and techniques of statecraft … That is the basis of the counterinsurgency approach. (p. 81)

For instance, as Kinsman, Buse and Steedman (2000) maintained, “Cold war paranoia is not sufficient — except as an excuse — to account for the extent of the secret monitoring of Canadians in the twentieth century by their own government” (p. 1). For
them, “Canadian national security surveillance was no accident. It existed not simply because [of]…a few overzealous RCMP officer” (p. 1). Rather, “it was organized at the highest levels of the Canadian state through cabinet directives, the Prime Minister’s Office, and…coordinated national security efforts across Canada” (p. 1). Similarly, I argue that supposed over reaction to the threat of terrorism is not sufficient — except as an excuse — to explain draconian security measures and the increased criminalization of dissent and increasingly repressive policing of protest in Canada.

Current anti-terrorist measures are proactive measures that coincide with and perpetuate the historical trend toward an increasingly repressive state (Chang, 2002; Lindorff, 2004; McCullough, 2002;). Marxist historical analyses of the war on terror and anti-terrorist measures treat them as political choices that were in the works before the events of 9/11\textsuperscript{vii} (see Callinicos, 2003); choices that are grounded in and bolstered by the rule of law. The theory of the state of exception incorrectly explicates national security campaigns like the “war on terror” as exceptions to the rule of law, rather than properly grasping its locatedness in the standard relations and operations of the rule of law and power. Explanations that problematize the rule of law and allow researchers to historically locate current anti-terrorist measures and national security campaigns within it offer a better framework with which to understand the war on terror and dissent. These are found largely within the Marxist tradition.

\textbf{Marxism and Law}

It is beyond the scope and focus of this dissertation to examine the many different philosophies and theories of law. Here I wish only to point out that on the whole, and despite the variations within Marxist interpretations and analyses of law, Marxists present distinct interpretations (from traditional and/or liberal interpretations) of legal phenomena that are examined by other philosophies of law (Collins, 1982). Although Marx did not specifically address the criminal justice system in detail, and while there is no cut and dried Marxist theory of law (Corrigan & Sayer, 1981; Melossi, 1979; Collins, 1982; Fine, 1982; Brosio, 1994, 2004), a radical tradition has emerged from Marx’s understanding of capitalist societies (Greek, n.d.).

For instance, radical criminology or critical criminology (Taylor, Walton & Young, 1973; 1975), a Marxist theory of deviance, posits that in order to comprehend why certain
people are criminalized “we have to understand the origin and purpose of the creation of laws” (Greek, n.d., para. 10). This analysis of law creation entailed an understanding of the way in which a ruling class was seen to craft laws that served their basic interests, and exercise a dominating (or hegemonic) influence over all classes in society, “such that laws which Radical Criminologists considered to be ‘ruling class laws’ came to be seen as existing for the benefit of all” (Greek, n.d., para. 11). Simply put, within this Marxist informed theory of law (radical criminology), laws are understood as benefiting the ruling class while appearing to benefit the entire society.

Having briefly critiqued exception theory and presented Marxism’s understanding of Law as a better theoretical alternative, I will narrow my focus to an exploration of Marxist historical materialism. In the following section(s) I discuss historical materialism and its usefulness for critically understanding the rule of law, the modern western state, the national security agenda, and the war on terrorism.

**Historical Materialism**

Marx’s historical materialism allows us to understand and critique the post-9/11 “war on terror” and anti-terrorist measures as processes that are part of the organization of capitalist globalization, made possible by the state and the rule of law. Within this framework the so-called war on terror can be understood as part of the process of imperialism and/or economic globalization – which I mapped in the previous chapter. Moreover, “globalization” can be correctly treated as a continuation of earlier colonialist/imperialist projects (see Choudry, 2008). For instance, Rupert (2000) adopted Marx’s theory of historical materialism in order to understand globalization as well as the system that spawned it, capitalism, as historical social products. One must stress that, “historical materialism is not univocal and is itself continuously contested and redefined” (Rupert, 2000, p. 2; see also Corrigan & Sayer, 1981). However, for Rupert (2000) the rich and varied tradition of historical materialism serves an explanatory function insofar as it places seemingly natural systems and/or processes such as capitalism and economic globalization in their historical context. Rupert (2000) stated that:

To treat historically specific social relations and social self-understandings as if they were natural or necessary is to abstract them from the social and historical processes, which produced them, and then to reify this
abstraction, to treat it as if it were itself an objective reality, a given constraint upon all of social life. (p. 2)

Rather than a natural phenomenon, corporate or economic globalization is the result of intentional policies (Holst, 2003; Mander, 1996) – “a clearly political process [with] governments deliberately restructuring their economies in ways which benefit capital and disadvantage most of their citizens” (Holst, 2003, p. 6.). In this respect, capitalist globalization (and attendant anti-terrorism measures) is made possible and bolstered by the state and the rule of law. Thus it is necessary to historically locate and critique both the state, a process I began in chapter two, and the rule of law as historical social products borne of material conditions and interests, which also serve and protect particular interests. I attend to this in the following sections.

**Historical Materialism and the Rule of Law**

The essential concern for Marxist approaches to law “is to trace the nature of the relationship between law and the ‘material conditions of life’” (Collins, 1982, p. 135). In order to understand the particular characteristics of domination and order “embodied in the form of legal relations in any particular society and epoch, it must be related to the nature and historical development of the relations of production” (Piccioto, 1979, p. 167). This is especially true of the seemingly natural rule of law. “Historical materialism can help us understand the natural-seeming rule of law and transform it into conscious and collective rule by the people” (Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 21). Prevailing (liberal) theories and philosophies on law tend to take the rule of law for granted, treating it as a natural, neutral and/or inevitable phenomenon (see Allan, 1995, 2003; Hayek, 1978, 1981; Kelsen, 2007). Marxists, on the other hand, “examine the real nature of law in order to reveal its functions in the organizations of power and to undermine the pervasive legitimating ideology in modern industrial societies known as the Rule of Law” (Collins, 1982, p. 1).

Given that the system of political power is heavily reliant on public and positive laws, it is often referred to by the phrase the rule of law, “which is at once a description of the structure of the state and an ideal” (Collins, 1982, p.135). While there are a variety of meanings on hand, at the heart of the ideal of the rule of law is a rejection of arbitrariness: “the state is to act in accordance with predetermined ascertainable law;
there is to be equality before the law; and an independent judiciary is to adjudicate on claimed infractions” (Campbell & Connolly, 2007, p. 270). In the end, both the citizen and the official must be able to determine their respective rights and then act upon them confident that, if needed, the courts would uphold them (Collins, 1982).

The notion of the rule of law encourages individuals to see the form of law in a specific way; “for the law is characterized as a set of rules above petty political conflict” and faraway from “the control of particular groups or classes” (Collins, 1982, p. 135). The notion does not explain or describe how states actually behave: “degrees of arbitrariness and illegality characterize the behaviour of all states; judicial decisions can be contradictory,” and regularly accommodate themselves to the interests of dominant groups; “and rulings challenging such interests may be reversed by fresh legislation” (Campbell & Connolly, 2007, p. 270). In modern society, two characteristics of the form of law are stressed. In the first instance, legal practices are oriented towards an effort to provide “justice” according to rules applicable to everyone rather than an appraisal of the merits of each case. Thus the main virtue of justice is “to treat like cases alike, and not to venture afield into questions of social justice involving the distribution of wealth and power” (Collins, 1982, p. 135). The second characteristic of the form of law in contemporary society is the confidence in the autonomy of legal thought As Collins argued:

> Unless it is possible to believe that officials of the legal system can apply legal rules impartially though juridical logic without resort to considerations of social justice or personal gain, then the Rule of Law ideal will wear thin. Consequently western legal theory has become obsessed with the task of demonstrating the apolitical qualities of judicial reasoning and proving how issues of preference and interest play no part in the legal process. (Collins, 1982, p. 136)

However, claims that law is apolitical are ultimately unpersuasive: “Hence critical legal scholars’ portrayal of law as little more than a superstructural device, buttressing the interests of dominant (hegemonic) groups” (Campbell & Connolly, 2007, p. 270).

Kappeler (2004) held that politics, economics and law share a cohesive purpose when they intersect with crime and so-called justice. While individuals may seek comfort in familiar assertions that “the police are free from politics” or “the administration of justice
is not based on economic considerations, these are largely mystifications” (p. 189). In actuality, politics, *justice* and economics are intertwined (see Collins, 1980; Foster, 2006).

Marx’s historical materialism allows critical researchers to problematize the rule of law as a form of social control that is best suited to the modern capitalist state (see Corrigan & Sayer, 1981). In actuality, law and a legal system, which are economically “neutral” and appear to function with an independent rationality, nonetheless have a class character (Picciotto, 1979). However, this class character is not apparent. The owners of the means of production, or the ruling class as generally conceived, do not seem to be connected to the legal process at all. On the contrary, an independent body, ”apparently unconnected with either class,” takes it upon itself to enforce the laws against certain individuals in society, such as dissidents or working class people (Collins, 1982, p. 129).

Marxism asks how a structure of class domination, by the moneyed class over the non-moneyed or working class, “can reveal itself in politics as a neutral arbiter between individuals?” (Collins, 1982, p. 129). A component of the Marxist explanation of the neutral form of law “is to connect the apparent impartiality of the legal system to the ‘relatively autonomous’ state in capitalist societies” (Collins, 1982, p. 129). For Marx the bourgeois state is another form of class domination, but is much more subtle than earlier structures of power in that it maintained the appearance of independence from economic interests; thus judges and politicians were not evidently the lackeys of the ruling class (p. 130). Collins explained that,

In pre-capitalist systems the State was required to support the economic structures of domination though the enforcement of laws of status….But the capitalist mode of production has no need for such a function…by the state. All the powerful must do in order to protect the relations of production is to guarantee the inviolability of private property and to provide a reliable system for the enforcement of contracts which transfer ownership in commodities. (Collins, 1982, p. 131)

Still, because the relations of production and exchange are unequal, state forms (and systems of power) borne of such relations will reproduce inequality and unequal relations while appearing to guarantee the equality of sovereign individuals: “Liberal state forms,
which develop to facilitate the free play of ‘market’ forces on the basis of the equal treatment of free citizens,” hold at their core “the relation of production that constantly creates inequality and ultimately crisis, in the state forms as well as in economic relations” (Picciotto, 1979, p. 174). But, to reiterate, this equality is not readily apparent due the seeming neutrality of the state and the Law.

For dissidents and/or those who oppose capitalism, their predicament lies in this apparent neutrality of the legal system, which serves the interests of the capitalist mode of production while appearing to be unbiased and far removed from it (Collins, 1982). They must confront the liberal myth about the modern state, which interprets the liberal state “as impartial arbiter between conflicting interests rather than as a subtle instrument of control” (p. 138). Similarly, due to the prevailing interpretation of the liberal system of power (i.e., the rule of law) as natural and neutral, the acts of a radical against the law (i.e., dissent and activism that challenges or is aimed at the law) is effortlessly twisted into “an individual act of deviance against commonly accepted norms of conduct” (Collins, 1982; Corrigan & Syaer, 1981). Ultimately, the state is the type of organization that the bourgeoisie are obliged to adopt, “for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and their interests.” Among ruling classes, the bourgeoisie is unique in the degree to which it is divided against itself. Nonetheless, the rule of law, what Marx (1867) described as “equality in the conditions of competition” (Marx, 1867)—writ large” (as cited in Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 29), is the structure in which, at the expense of individual self-limitation, the bourgeoisie can nonetheless formulate and impose something approaching a class will (Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 29). In other words, “it is precisely because the bourgeoisie rules as a class that in the law it must give itself a general expression” (Marx, 1846, as cited in Corrigan & Syaer, 1981, p. 29.). Greater division of labour (specialized civil servants, politicians, lawyers, etc.) is in turn, implicit in these greater forms themselves.

The impartiality of the structure of political institutions grows out of the necessity of the owners of the means of production to distribute power equally among themselves (Collins, 1982,). Marx (1867) observes that, “the most fundamental right under the law of capital is the equal exploitation of labour-power by all capitalists” (as cited in Corrigan & Sayer, 1981, p. 32). Capitalists share power over labourers, with no single group retaining
a privileged position (Corrigan & Sayer, 1981). Power over them must be exercised neutrally through independent bodies. This is the source of the impartiality of the modern state. But many Marxists insist that the state is merely relatively autonomous, and “only impartial between members of fractions of the ruling class” (Collins, 1982, p. 133). For Collins, the state is not an organization of power that is intended to be shared entirely democratically. It is essentially an outfit of the ruling class.

Overall, there is a certain form of law connected with the seemingly structurally neutral quality of political institutions. A characteristic of modern legal systems that seems completely neutral in modern society is “the superiority of law over all other normative systems” (Collins, 1982, p. 134). This is almost never called into question in modern society, and it seems natural or obvious that The Law should rule. There are obviously disputes over the advisability of the introduction of this or that law, “but the authority of the state to override all other normative systems is not doubted” (Collins, 1982, p. 134). There is little sober challenge “to the legitimacy of the State’s claim to be empowered to legislate on any matter” (Collins, 1982, p. 134). In other words, the rule of law, as a system of power in and of itself, is very seldom problematized. Marxist historical materialism offers a much-needed alternative to the taken-for-granted approach to The Law, one that allows us to problematize it and historically understand and locate the rule of law as a form of social control within capitalism.

**Historical Materialism, the Security Agenda and the Rule of Law**

Uncritical and ahistorical interpretations and/or understandings of the modern state and the rule of law manifest in modern times in much of the critical analysis of the so-called global war on terrorism. Much analysis and criticism of the war on terror and draconian anti-terrorism measures, while perhaps valid in other regards, uncritically defends and seeks to “protect” or uphold the rule of law (see Fiss, 2006; Fitzpatrick, 2002; Hoffman, 2004; Pious, 2006; Sadat, 2004; Saito, 2003). Those who wish to protect the rule of law from draconian anti-terrorism legislation insist on maintaining a balance between security and freedom or rights (see Fiss, 2006; Pious, 2006). Neocleous (2007) maintained that the idea of “balance” between security and freedom is a liberal myth that hides the fact that liberalism’s chief concern is not liberty but security: “liberty is the original myth of liberal ideology” (p. 145). And it is this myth, Neocleous continued,
that is used to legitimate the massive and thoroughly reactionary concessions made by modern liberals to the security practices of contemporary states.

For liberals, liberty must always be sacrificed for the sake of so-called security. But speaking of “security” is never innocuous, because the logic of security is “the logic of anti-politics… in which the state uses ‘security’ to marginalize all else, most notably constructive conflicts,” dissent and political dialogue and discussions, “suppressing all before it and dominating political discourse in an entirely reactionary way” (Neocleous, 2007, p. 146). Neocleous argued that this is exactly the point hinted at by Marx in 1843 when he suggests that security was the supreme concept of bourgeois society: “it’s a concept that legitimizes any action by the state whatsoever, so long as the action is conducted in the name of ‘security’” (as cited on p. 146). And this explains why nearly all authoritarian measures since have been carried out in the name of so-called security, from the reorganization of global capital under the guise of national security to the reassertion of loyalty and consensus as the basis of domestic order (see Fernandez, 2008; Foster, 2006).

Given that security is the ultimate concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, to go on about insecurity and to keep insisting on more security, while humbly hoping that this increased security does not damage our liberty, “is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics” (Neocleous, 2007, pp. 146-147). For Neocleous, the genuinely radical position now requires us to be against security. Moreover, to position ourselves against security and to conduct a comprehensive critique of it demands before all else that we recognize “that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination” and justifies the bypassing of even the most nominal liberal democratic measures (p. 147).

The same can be said about the notion of the rule of law. The radical position requires that we stand against this notion, not least of all because it has been exported from the West and imposed/forced on so-called less developed countries as part of the processes and policies of neo-liberal globalization. According to Tamanaha (2004), “No other political ideal has ever achieved global endorsement” (p. 2). This ideal has become connected to the capitalist notion of economic growth and development, and is a
precondition of so-called financial assistance from the institutions of global capitalism (i.e., *globacracies*):

In the early 1990s, the Western-funded World Bank and International Monetary Fund began conditioning the provision of financial assistance on the imposition of the rule of law in recipient countries. This imposition was justified on economic grounds as a means to provide a secure environment for investments, property, contracts, and market transactions. At a training session of World Bank staff members and consultants, ‘Rule of Law’ was…the most repeated phrase of the week. Development specialists uniformly agree that absent the rule of law there can be no sustainable economic development. (Tamanaha, 2004, p. 2)

Treated critically, and from a historical materialist analysis of global capitalism, this means that local governments in other parts of the world had to ensure that their populations would be legally restrained and unable to resist or subvert the structural adjustment and privatization policies of economic, corporate globalization, which typically result in greater exploitation and impoverishment of already poor people. Just as the rule of law functions as a form of social regulation domestically in the West, to regulate and control everyday working people in increasingly authoritarian capitalist societies, the so-called ideal is exported abroad to ensure easy access for and diminished resistance against the policies of global capitalism and/or corporate globalization. It is similar to the manner in which “democracy” is spread through the global war on terrorism. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, western liberal ideals have been hypocritically and often forcefully exported while they fail to exist in a meaningful way for people in the West.

For Campbell and Connolly (2007), “the increasing quagmire of the ‘war on terror’” (especially in Iraq) casts major doubt on “the legal devises that were used to rationalise it … both in relation to the international use of force and anti-terrorist legal discourse” (p. 265). Marxists and other critical thinkers believe that the real motive behind the “global war on terrorism” is profit without obstacles. For instance, the Bush administration’s biggest “benchmark of progress” for the client Maliki government in Iraq was about profit, not so-called democracy: “namely the oil law that opens up the second-largest oil reserve in the world to Exxon Mobil, Chevron, Shell and British Petroleum” (Goldstein,
2007, para. 2). As I point out in chapter two, right after the events of 9/11 the Bush Administration silently outsourced the overseeing of the “war on terrorism” to Halliburton and Blackwater (See Klein, 2007). In 2007 Dick Cheney’s Halliburton established its headquarters for all of Asia in Dubai (Goldstein, 2007).

According to Klein (2007), this is an example of disaster capitalism wherein savvy politicians and industry leaders exploit natural and political disasters to wickedly implement policies that would never have passed during less muddled times. In the case of Iraq, the Bush administration exploited civil war—which they created through their military invasion and occupation, and the pitting of religious sects against one another—to enact a new law that allows Shell and BP to claim the country's vast oil reserves (Klein, 2007; see also Juhasz, 2006a, 2006b). For Klein, neoliberal transformations, such as the occupation in Iraq, are ultimately examples of “disaster capitalism” facilitated by socio-economic and environmental distress. It is important to stress that Klein does not present this as a new phenomenon that began with September 11 and the war on terror, but rather as a trend with a long history. Thus 9/11 and the concomitant war on terror is but the latest and most extreme example, along a historical continuum, of the use of disasters by political and business elites in order to pass laws that further strengthen their global power and the capitalist relations of production, exploitation and domination. In a sense, treated from a critical and historical materialist perspective, one can argue that the war on terror has become the new benchmark for political and corporate opportunism.

In the remainder of the chapter I will summarize the most salient points about Marxist historical materialism and move on to a discussion of critical discourse analysis. As critical discourse analysis is both a theory and a methodology, I will address CDA first as a theory, and then as it applies to my analytic method.

(Marxist) Historical Materialism Summary

In the following three paragraphs, I summarize parts of the above theory discussions in order to reiterate the most salient points raised in the theory section and to set the stage for my subsequent discussion of methodology. In the theory section, I set myself apart from the flawed theory of the state of exception, which posits post-9/11 state authoritarianism as something new; a sort of permanent state of exception ushered in by the “world-changing” or watershed events of 9/11. I presented Marxist analysis, namely
Marx’s theory of the capitalist state and historical materialism, as an alternative and better framework for understanding the nature of the current draconian anti-terrorism discourse and measures. Overall, Marxist analysis is a better framework for explaining current policy and the policy environment because it:

- Identifies the state as a relation of the particular mode of production (i.e., capitalism engenders and requires a capitalist state-form)

- Problematizes the state and the rule of law as a form of social control that historically serves the interests of the powerful (i.e., the capitalist class)

- Understands the state and the rule of law as historically creating and bolstering the current authoritarianism, meaning it views current draconian measures as rooted in history.

Overall, Marx’s historical materialism allows critical researchers to problematize the rule of law as a type of social control that is best suited to the modern capitalist national security state. Marxist theorizing, especially the theory of the capitalist state, lays bare the hidden class character of law and a legal system, which is economically “neutral” and seemingly operates with an independent rationality. This is achieved through an important component of the Marxist explanation of “the neutral form of law, which links the apparent impartiality of the legal system to the ‘relatively autonomous’ state in capitalist societies” (Collins, 1982, p. 129). Moreover, the Marxist theory of the capitalist state locates particular state-forms within the relations of production, arguing that state-forms are indeed a relation of production, thereby identifying modern Western state forms borne of the capitalist relations of production as, necessarily, capitalist states. Ultimately, for Marxists, the capitalist state is another mode of class domination, but is much more subtle than previous structures of power in that it preserves the appearance of independence from economic/capitalist interests.

What this means is that in capitalist societies, capitalist power (i.e., the dominance of the capitalist and moneyed class over ordinary people) is able to shield and hide itself vis-à-vis the seemingly neutral State, which serves the interests of capital while appearing removed and objective. One way in which this process occurs is through discursive practices, especially through official discourse such as political speeches, laws and official texts and documents. In order to lay bare this hidden power, and the discursive
processes through which it functions, one requires a methodology that is concerned with discourse and how it is used to bolster and/or camouflage power; this methodology is critical discourse analysis (McGregor, 2004). I discuss critical discourse analysis in the following sections.

**Critical Discourse Analysis**

It is important to the stress from the outset that critical discourse analysis (CDA hereafter) is *both* a theory of discourse and a method of analyzing it (see Fairclough, 2001; Jorgensen 2002) As a theory of discourse, CDA offers an explanation of what discourse is, how it works, and what its relationship to language, reality, human interaction, social relations, and power is. As a method, CDA is one way to apply that theory to actual instances of discourse. For my purposes, CDA as theory focuses on *what* I am looking at, which is discourse, and CDA as methodology focuses on *how* I look at it (i.e., how I collect and analyze data, etc.). In the remainder of the chapter, I discuss and apply CDA theoretically, using it, and its particular assumptions and points of departure, to critically explain discourse and how it functions in society. This is followed by a discussion of CDA as a method of discourse analysis, and the particular ways in which I employ it for my analysis of anti-terrorism discourse. While I try to present these two discussions, CDA as theory and CDA as methodology separately, at times they are unavoidably intertwined.

**Critical Discourse Analysis as Theory**

*Critical Discourse Analysis as an Oppositional Stance*

Critical discourse analysis is more than a mere method of research; it is also an explicitly formulated stance or oppositional position (see Van Dijk, 1995). This stance is an assumption that power is at work in discourse and texts, and that power seeks to hide itself. One way in which power is able to hide or camouflage itself is through discursive manipulation. CDA is largely concerned with critically understanding and laying bare the processes and practices of such manipulation. Huckin (2002) explained that the chief aim of CDA is to understand how people are manipulated by public discourse and thereby subjected to abuses of power, and to illustrate how public discourse habitually serves the interests of powerful forces over those of the less privileged. In other words, “CDA specifically focuses on the strategies of manipulation, legitimation, the manufacture of
and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of people in the interests of the powerful” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 18, emphasis in original).

CDA’s attempt to reveal the discursive methods of mental control and social influence imply a critical and oppositional stance against the powerful and the elites (Van Dijk, 1995), whom I define as global capital (or the moneyed classes) and the capitalist imperialist national security state, particularly in the west. The power of the US imperialist state and American multinational corporations, supported by other Western states like Canada and Britain, has placed neo-liberalism or American-style capitalism at the top of the global agenda (Fairclough, 2001). As such, neo-liberal capitalism has emerged as the global hegemonic power structure. However, like all power structures, it is a social phenomenon that needs to be legitimated, and language is the main method of legitimation (Jackson, 2005b). Thus the critique of language is a necessary component of any critical analysis of neo-liberal capitalism (Fairclough & Graham, 2002), and its global manifestation—militarized capitalist imperialism.

Given CDA’s oppositional stance against power, the identification of American-style capitalism as the global power structure by CDA scholars (see Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough & Graham, 2002), and CDA’s emphasis on the role of language and discourse in the deployment and maintenance of this global power structure (see Fairclough, 2001, 2002; Jackson, 2005a, 2005b), CDA is the optimal methodology for my research topic. As I have explained in previous chapters, mine is an oppositional research project that presents a counter-history and/or interpretation of the war on terrorism and anti-terrorism discourse and measures, which, therefore, relies heavily on subaltern sources and texts. It is in this respect that I argue that CDA is in line with a subaltern and/or counter research project and approach, not least because it generally emerges from a “socio-politically conscious and oppositional way of investigating language, discourse and communication” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17).

My Understanding of Critical Discourse Analysis (Defining the Terms)

Given that there may be several ways to understand and employ critical discourse analysis, it is useful to explain what critical discourse analysis means in the context of my work, and how I understand and employ these three terms throughout the dissertation. First, as alluded to above, CDA workers understand the notion of criticality to be more
than mere criticism. Rather, within CDA a critical approach is an oppositional one; as such, CDA’s understanding and use of criticality is in keeping with the subaltern theories and literature I tend to rely on throughout the dissertation. As De Beaugrande (2004) explained in his CDA work on the USA PATROT Acts, research in CDA situates the critical discourse analyst as a deconstructor of the discourses of power and manipulation, whose impact has been steadily growing worse whilst corporate globalization “accelerates us all to the brink of economic and ecological disaster” (para. 4). As a CDA analyst I assume a critical, meaning oppositional, stance to the meta-narrative of capitalist imperialism (which I define below) and its attendant war on terrorism and anti-terrorism discourse and discursive practices.

Second, situating myself within Marxist historical materialism (see De Vault & McCoy, 2002; Campbell & McGregor, 2008; Gramsci, 1973; Smith, 1990) and Marxist elements within CDA (see Fairclough, 2000, 2001, 2002; Huckin, 1997, 2002; McGregor, 2004), I understand discourse as socially constructed and, thus, as a social process and practice that individuals participate in consciously and, more often than not, unconsciously or, rather, uncritically. The active productive components of hegemonic discourse that individuals unconsciously participate in, what I identify as the meta-narrative of global capitalism and its support structure, fall within the scope of Marxist and neo-Marxist critique.

For Marxist-informed sociologist Smith (1990), “discourse refers to a field of relations that includes not only texts and their intertextual conversation, but the activities of peoples in actual sites who produce them and use them to take up the conceptual frames they circulate” (p. 40). I would add that by uncritically participating in (the production and active components of discourse, individuals (such as legislators, lawyers, judges, etc.) ultimately reproduce the discourse and its conceptual frames (i.e., meta-narratives). Returning to Smith’s definition of discourse as a field of relations that actual individuals participate in, this implies that in modern society power is exercised not only by capitalists and/or the powerful, but also by a union of capitalists and other individuals who view their interests as tied to capital, such as many professional workers and bureaucrats (see Fairclough, 2002). Fairclough (2002) pointed out that in the “normal” (i.e., non-crisis), everyday conditions of capitalist life, State power functions indirectly,
with a whole range of social institutions such as education, the law, and the media jointly and cumulatively ensuring the continued dominance of the capitalist class.

Another important point on discourse is that the dominant or broader discourse narrows and limits the response to the discourse and furthers the uncritical participation by individuals within it. While a dominant discourse may be broad in scope, it narrows and/or reduces the public’s options for dealing and/or interacting with it. For instance, in his CDA work on the discourse of counter-terrorism, Hodges (2011) explained that a discourse is a means for depicting knowledge about a particular historical juncture. A discourse refers to the types of knowledge or powerful sets of explanations, assumptions and expectations governing mainstream social practices. Simply put, “a discourse regulates the way a topic can be talked about meaningfully in a particular culture” or society “at a particular point in history” (Hodges, 2011, p. 6). It is in this respect that I argue that uncritical participation in a discourse, within the defined limits it creates, helps to reproduce it and its discursive parameters.

Similar to discourse, language can also be understood as a social process. To see it as such, according Fairclough (2001), one must know the difference between a text and discourse. A text is a product rather than a process; it is a product of the process of text production. Discourse, on the other hand, refers to the whole process of social interaction of which the text is just a part. “This process includes, in addition to the text, the *process of production*, of which the text is a product, and the *process of interpretation*, for which the text is a resource” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). Correspondingly, “text analysis is only a part of discourse analysis, which also includes analysis of productive and interpretive processes” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). In my analysis of the official Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, I examine the actual texts and also, albeit more indirectly and in a broader sense, their productive processes and contexts. For the sake of my research, the productive processes include the context of the “war on terrorism” and the capitalist imperialist project as well as the long history of criminalizing dissent in Canada. At the broader level of analysis, I am concerned with the power relations that guide and inform the texts’ production and interpretive processes.

Overall, language is a socially conditioned process; other (non-linguistic) parts of society such as historical power relations, domination, institutions of the state, etc., all
play a part in its conditioning (Fairclough, 2001, 2002; Van Dijk, 1995). At the same time, language helps to condition social reality. As Jackson (2005b) explained, language does not simply mirror reality, “it actually co-constitutes it” (para. 2). As a result, he continues, a fully informed and critical understanding of the present global “war on terrorism” is unachievable “in the absence of a critical deconstruction of the official language of counter-terrorism” (Jackson, 2005b, para. 2) or anti-terrorism. Drawing on all of the above, through the application of specific analytic strategies and concepts (which I define below), my CDA study of the language and discursive practices of Canadian anti-terrorism discourse lays bare the historical power relations at play in the language of this discourse.

Third, returning to my understanding and use of the notion of critical discourse analysis, I define and employ analysis not as formal, “objective,” scientific observation, but as situated analysis — meaning analysis from a particular position and/or standpoint. CDA is concerned with discourse and how it is used to bolster and/or camouflage power. As such it is inherently and explicitly political. Rather than attempt to be objective, CDA “explicitly emphasizes the fact that scholarly enterprise is part and parcel of social and political life, and that therefore also the theories, methods, issues, and data selection in discourse studies are always political” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 19). Leading CDA scholar Fairclough (2001) stressed the need for the researcher to identify and state their influences or the political position from which they write, and to be open with their readers about where they stand. Fairclough himself explained that he writes “as a socialist with a generally low opinion of the social relationships in my society and a commitment to the emancipation of the people who are oppressed by them” (p. 4). I research and write from a similar (i.e., socialist and/or Marxist) position as that described by Fairclough. Moreover, as I explained in the introduction chapter, my specific standpoint or position is that of the socio-political activist and socialist/radical researcher interested in social justice and social change.

CDA is an appropriate methodology for me as both an activist and a radical researcher/scholar given that, among the main criteria of CDA work, is that it is problem-or-issue oriented, instead of paradigm oriented (Van Dijk, 1995). The problem or issue I am concerned with is the stifling of civil liberties – mainly dissent. This is affected by the
discursive construction of particular types of dissent as terrorism or a terrorist threat within the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and the larger discourse of the war on terror.

As Van Dijk found, “any theoretical or methodological approach is appropriate as long as it is effectively able to study relevant social problems” (p. 17). In this respect, Marxist historical materialism, and Marxist capitalist critique generally, is an appropriate theoretical approach for CDA work given the former’s emphasis on social critique and social transformation. This leads me to the topic of the following section.

**CDA is Compatible with a Marxist Theoretical Framework**

As a theory of discourse, CDA draws on and is informed by parts of Marxist class analysis and capitalist critique (see Fairclough, 2001; 2002). Stemming from Marxist-informed critical theory, CDA seeks to “uncover the ideological assumptions that are hidden in the words of our written texts ... in order to resist and overcome various forms of power” (McGregor, 2004, para. 6). Drawing on Marx, Fairclough (2002) argued that in capitalist societies power is held by a dominant class — i.e., owners of the means of production — over a subservient class, and that capitalist relations structure and permeate discourse. Similar to arguments that were made in the theory section, Fairclough’s argument held that the power of one class or group over another hides itself through the seemingly neutral state. But in reality, he continued, the state and its institutions serve the dominant class, either directly or indirectly: “contrary to the view of the state as standing neutrally ‘above’ classes, the state is the key element in maintaining the dominance of the capitalist class and controlling the working class” (Fairclough, 2002, p. 27). This is a fundamental position within Marxism; one that I take up to problematize the rule of law as engendering and bolstering the repression of dissent vis-à-vis anti-terrorism measures and the larger war on terror.

*(Hidden) Power and Discourse*

As Van Dijk (1995) pointed out, a common aim and approach of CDA is to accentuate the relevance of power and dominance in analyzing text and speech. For Fairclough (2002), discourse and power are linked in two synergistic ways. Firstly, power is exercised and enacted in discourse. Here, discourse is the site of power struggles. Secondly, there are relations of power behind discourse. Here, discourse is the stake in power struggles, given that control over discourse is a powerful mechanism for sustaining
power in general. In both cases, power is won, held and lost in social struggle. Currently, it is the capitalist class, which controls the State and is able to indirectly dominate subordinate classes through the state, which has both power over discourse and power through discourse. The elites have control over and preferential access to the most important and influential genres of discourse in society (Van Dijk, 1995), such as those that circulate in all principal institutions, including the Law and mainstream media.

What’s more, with respect to discourse and power, Fairclough (2001) argued that the entire social order of discourse is constructed and held together as “a hidden effect of power” (p. 46). In modern capitalist societies this hidden power functions largely, though not exclusively, through the media: what Fairclough describes as the “hidden power” of the discourse of the mass media (p. 43). He describes media power relations as “relations of a mediated … sort between power-holders and the mass of the population” (p. 43). Here, the balance of views and ideology is overwhelmingly in favour of existing power-holders: “the media operate as a means for the expression and reproduction of the power of the dominant class and bloc” (p. 42). Moreover, the mediated power of existing power-holders is also a hidden power, since this mediated power is “implicit in the practices of the media rather than being explicit” (p. 43). In addition, I point out that the media is directly linked to capital, in that a primary function of the media is to connect corporations and manufacturers to consumers vis-à-vis advertisers/advertisements, while all aspects of broadcast media are regulated by the State. Thus, the State and capitalism converge within the media, both in terms of discourse and day-to-day operations of the media.

While the role of media in discourse and the hidden power of media discourse are extremely important, this topic is beyond the scope of the dissertation and is not examined further. I wish only to mention here that in the war on terror and the attendant war on dissent, the mainstream media are complicit and play an important role in the de-legitimization of dissent and the conflation and construction of activists and dissidents with and as “terrorists” (see Cziesche, 2007; Warren, 2004).

**Ideological Analysis**

Before I proceed I want to quickly touch upon ideology. Textual analysis always encompasses within it some degree of (implicit and explicit) ideological analysis or
critique (Dellinger, 2005). Ideology is not understood here as abstract concepts and beliefs. Rather, in my work, ideologies are understood as material practices and processes that are constructed and produced through human activities (see Bannerji, 1995; Ng, 1995; Smith, 1990). For Paré (2002), ideology is understood as a complex, conflictual and contradictory social practice: “as activities in the world that construct and maintain privilege, knowledge, prevailing values, relations of power, etc.” (pp. 57-58).

Fairclough (1995b) maintained that ideology is tied to power, though this is not always readily apparent because ideology seeks to shield itself, so to speak. Within the Marxist tradition, ideology has more closely been tied to class power and class domination, “including power exercised by the state on behalf of a dominant social class” (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 17). In tying ideology to social relations of power, Fairclough (1995b) argued, one is ultimately alluding to uneven relations of power – to domination. Moreover, “in claiming that a discursive event works ideologically …. one is claiming that it contributes to the reproduction of relations of power” (p. 18).

CDA & War on Terror/Anti-Terrorism Discourse: A Literature Review

While there have been thousands of scholarly publications on the events of 9/11, the war on terrorism, and the anti-terrorism or counter-terrorism campaigns of western countries, scholarly work concerned with the discourse and language of terrorism and anti-terrorism — though growing — remains relatively limited. Silberstein’s (2004) work examines the discursive formation of terrorism and counter-terrorism and the ways in which words are deployed in the war on terror. Hodges (2011) examines the political narrative of the war on terror, emphasizing the important role of language in the interpretation of the events of 9/11 in particular ways (i.e., as “acts of war” demanding a military response). His work employs CDA to examine the discourse of the Bush administration in the years after 9/11, and how this discourse served to construct a particular interpretation and public narrative on the nature of those events and appropriate responses to them (see Hodges, 2011), as well as the ways in which enemies are created and conflated within this particular discourse (see Hodges, 2009; 2011).

Somewhat similar to Hodges, Jackson (2005a; 2005b; 2006) uses CDA to explore the nature of the narrative of the “war on terrorism” in order to identify its themes, its forms and expressions, and types of political and cultural myths that it encompasses.
Jackson (2005a; 2005b) is mainly concerned with the ways in which the counter-terrorism discourse of the Bush administration identifies and constructs “enemies” and how the language of the war on terrorism has become the dominant political paradigm in the US since 9/11. Bartolucci (2010) has employed CDA to examine the Moroccan government’s representations of terrorism. Treating “terrorism” as a discursive construction, her work is dedicated to the ways in which the government appropriates the western discourse on terrorism to advance domestic agendas and to target particular groups and political opponents. Finally, Raicu (2011) has taken up CDA to conduct a critical analysis of what she describes as the change-triggering and controversial war on terror discourse of Tony Blair, and the social, political and cultural changes it engenders.

While most of the aforementioned authors focus on official anti-terrorism discourse, there is very little CDA scholarship to date that specifically examines anti-terrorism legislation. One example is McDonald’s (2005) use of CDA to examine how the Australian government creates insecurity, exclusion, and fear in its post-9/11 security policy and discourse. Smith (2005) has applied CDA to analyze a US Senate committee hearing on anti-terrorism legislation, in order to unveil the construction of a psychology of fear in governmental public deliberation. De Beaugrande (2004) employed CDA to critically examine the USA PATRIOT Acts and argued that, through these legal documents, the US government effectively polarizes the citizenry into “patriots” versus “terrorists.” In examining two pieces of Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation, along with parliamentary speeches and public police documents, I contribute to this under-researched area within CDA. Moreover, my CDA analysis of Canadian anti-terrorism texts and how they criminalize particular forms of dissent, may be the first its kind.

As a research method aimed both at providing an analysis of discourses and at detecting links between language and other, often hidden or unapparent elements in society, such as power and domination (Fairclough, 2003), CDA appears to be an ideal framework for critically analyzing official anti-terrorism discourse in Canada, and its implications. As Raicu (2011) contended, with respect to the discourse of terrorism and/or anti-terrorism, “it is not only helpful, but necessary to resort to CDA in an attempt to decipher the multiple aspects the respective type of discourse involves and to better understand the social, political and cultural implications of a change-triggering and
controversial type of discourse” (p. 178). In the following section I discuss Fairclough’s understanding of and approach to CDA, which offers at once both a theory of discourse and a particular method of discourse analysis. I then explore how others have applied his CDA model, and how I use CDA for my specific research purposes. It should be noted that some of the authors’ work that I discuss above resurfaces in the following section.

**Fairclough’s Multi-Dimensional Theory/Model of Discourse**

Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2001) three-dimensional conception of discourse and corresponding discourse analysis is very compelling for my research topic, and has been widely applied (see, for example, Bartolucci, 2010; Hodges, 2011; Huckin, 1997, 2002; Jackson, 2005a; Locke, 2004; McGregor, 2004; Raicu, 2011). For my work, I am interested in multiple texts within official Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, the interconnections and relationships between these texts, and, especially, how certain broader discourses, contexts, and/or social conditions shape and inform these texts. For these reasons Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2001) CDA model is the optimal methodological approach for my research.

Drawing on Fairclough’s CDA model, I conceptualize the discourse under analysis in my research as having a multi-dimensional and nested quality. Fairclough’s CDA model consists of three inter-related processes of analysis tied to three inter-related dimensions of discourse (see Janks, 1997). Fairclough (2001) identified the three inter-related dimensions of discourse as texts, processes and/or discursive practices (of production, distribution and interpretation of texts), and their social conditions and context (p. 21). To say that discernible moments of language or utterances are produced, disseminated, and interpreted within spheres of action that are influenced by broader social and cultural conditions, as Fairclough does with his nested model (see Janks, 1997; Locke, 2004), is to offer a theory of discourse.

Fairclough (1992; 1995; 2001) then suggests strategies for unpacking the meaning and influence of those utterances, thus offering a method of analysis. Corresponding to the three dimensions of discourse, Fairclough distinguishes between three stages of critical discourse analysis. These are: description (of the formal properties of the text); interpretation (of the processes of text or speech production and reception); and explanation (social analysis of the context and social practices in which these processes
occur). It should be noted that, for my work, I am mainly interested in the processes of text production. A diagram of Fairclough’s nested dimensions of discourse, which I take from Huckin (1997), but have amended, and the corresponding stages of analysis, appears below. In each box, the word at the bottom indicates the dimension of discourse, and the word at the top of indicates the corresponding dimension or stage of analysis.

Gee (1990) distinguished between applied language or language-in-use (“little d” discourse) and the notion of Discourse (with a “big D”), which is the combination of language with other social practices and contexts. In this way, Gee’s big D/small d distinction is compatible with Fairclough’s nested dimensions (and contexts) of discourse. Both point to a theory of discourse that understands it as layered and/or enveloped and connected to other social conditions and contexts. Demonstrating the connection between these levels of discourse (and between discourse and larger contexts) is a task of much of the leading thinkers in CDA (Hodges, 2011). This is one reason why Fairclough’s multi-dimensional conception of discourse and discourse analysis is so useful and widely applied in CDA.

As Janks (2004) aptly pointed out, Fairclough’s approach to CDA, which she employs in her analysis of the discourse of apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, is useful because it provides numerous points of analytic entry. She notes that, “It does not matter which kind of analysis one begins with, as long as in the end they are all included
and are shown to be mutually explanatory” (p. 330). For her, “It is in the interconnections that the analyst finds the interesting patterns and disjunctions that need to be described, interpreted and explained” (p. 330). For instance, in my work, at the interpretation stage of analysis, I begin to uncover disjunctions and contradictions between the texts, as well as disjunctions and relationships between some of those things that the texts construct as threats and as threatened—a dynamic I describe below. These disjunctions and relationships are then more fully fleshed out and explained in the third level of analysis, as I consider them against the backdrop of the larger socio-historical contexts and social practices that bear upon them.

II. Methodology

Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method of Analysis

In a sense, one can ultimately say that Fairclough and others, like Gee (1990), Huckin (1997, 2002), Janks (1997), and Van Dijk (1995) offer a critical theory of discourse, and then a variety of critical methods of analyzing discourse. In the following section I explore some of these methods and some relevant applications of Fairclough’s CDA model.

How Others Use Fairclough’s Model

Fairclough’s CDA model has been applied in various ways and to various degrees. Some practitioners have employed Fairclough’s multi-dimensional CDA model to conduct lengthy and extensive analyses of small or simple pieces of text or textual artefacts. These include, for example, a single sentence of graffiti on a billboard (see Locke, 2004), an excerpt from a political speech by Tony Blair (see Raicu, 2011), a magazine advertisement by a life insurance company in post-apartheid South Africa (see Janks, 1997), and a single news report about protestors arrests during a demonstration against nuclear testing in Utah (see Huckin, 1997). Others have applied Fairclough’s CDA model in a more complex way to deconstruct or examine, for example, the USA PATRIOT Acts I and II (DeBeaugrande, 2004), hundreds of political speeches on counter-terrorism (see Jackson, 2005a), and the intertextual connections between public discourse on counter-terrorism (in the form of numerous administration speeches), media reportage, and the views of politically active university students (see Hodges, 2011).
explore a few of these — those related to my work in analytic strategy or topic, or both — in greater detail below.

While her research topic, data, and content are not at all related to my own, Janks’ (1997) approach to and application of Fairclough’s CDA model informed my own to a considerable extent. It should be noted that my discussion of Janks in the above sections serves to demonstrate how her theory of discourse, i.e., discourse as nested and enveloped within other dimensions of discourse that are produced and informed by social conditions, relations and contexts, matches my own. In the following section, my aim is to explain how I employ analysis methods similar to Janks’.

In the initial stages of working with a text, Janks (1997) draws three large, empty embedded boxes, reflecting Fairclough’s nested structure of analysis and discourse. She records analytic comments in the appropriate box as they occur. As Janks maintained, this allows her to “work with the different types of analysis simultaneously rather than sequentially and facilitates the drawing of linking lines across the boxes to stress interconnections” (p. 330). For Janks, the embedding of the boxes stresses the interdependence of the different dimensions of analysis and discourse “and the intricate moving backwards and forwards between the different types of analysis “ (p. 330). Like Janks, I began my analysis by drawing three empty embedded boxes, which reflect Fairclough’s dimensions of discourse and analysis, as they relate to my particular research topic. Here, I made general observations and notes in each of the boxes, moving back and forth between them. For me, this was more of a pre-analysis or analytic brainstorming stage, wherein I noted of my general impressions with respect to the texts and the interconnections across the dimensions of discourse and analysis. Thus, as a pre-analysis stage, this brainstorming process is not documented in the analysis chapters.

For a thorough critical discourse analysis, Janks (1997) typically begins with a text (among many), sees how far she can get with a single text, and then attempts to “fill in the gaps and unanswered questions and hypotheses raised by this limited and arbitrary entry point” (p. 331). In doing this, Janks is ultimately looking for patterns that she can use to create hypotheses about discourses at work in society. She then attempts to confirm or disconfirm these hypotheses by looking for other related texts. This allows her to discover questions that need answering concerning the “social relations and discourses
instantiated in this text and others connected to it” (p. 331). For my own (pre) analysis, I began with a single parliamentary speech in favour of Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act. As I examined the speech on the surface, patterns began to emerge. These patterns were also observable in several other texts I examined as well.

Specifically, and as I explain in greater detail over the next three chapters, during the first stage of analysis (descriptive analysis) I observed some patterns in the anti-terrorism texts with respect to what the texts identify and construct as threats, within the context of terrorism and anti-terrorism, and as threatened by these threats. These patterns, and the disjunctions therein, led me to formulate particular questions and hypotheses, which I explored, examined, and further developed at other levels of analysis. This process will become apparent in the analysis chapters. For now, I simply wish to point out that, much of the analytic strategy and structure that I pursue and employ in the next three chapters is drawn from Janks’ (1997) particular application of Fairclough’s integrated, multi-dimensional CDA model.

Before I continue it is important to briefly explain why I chose to approach and/or categorize the discursive formations in the texts as threats and threatened. Within the context of counter or anti-terrorism, threat and threatened are two sides of the same coin; there cannot be one without the other. Either category can be used, analytically, to explore the relationship between the threat and the threatened, which I do at the last stage of analysis (in chapter six). Identifying the threat and threatened components in the texts is useful, not least because the disjunctions and/or congruencies that one may find between them are an interesting point of departure for analysis. The threat and threatened dynamic is described in greater detail in the analysis chapters.

I now return to the discussion of how others have applied Fairclough’s CDA model, and the relationship of these researchers’ work to my own. While Janks’ work is related to mine in terms of her application of Fairclough’s CDA model, the following two authors — Hodges (2011) and Jackson (2005a) — are related to my work more in terms of their research topic. Unlike Janks (1997), who applies Fairclough’s model completely, Hodges (2011) and Jackson (2005a) employ his CDA model selectively in their respective analyses of the war on terrorism and counter-terrorism discourses. I briefly explore these below. Janks’ application of Fairclough’s CDA model resembles my use of
CDA as a method, while Hodges’ and Jackson’s CDA discussions resemble my understanding of CDA as a theory of discourse. While I have tried to keep the discussion of CDA as theory and CDA as methodology separate, the following sections mixes the two somewhat, and it is important to make note of this.

Hodges (2011) draws on Fairclough’s multi-dimensional conception of discourse and discourse analysis to, first, examine the war on terror narrative as officially constructed and presented by the Bush administration, and then, how it is recontextualized and interpreted by certain segments of the American public. As is the case in my own work, and like many who use Fairclough’s approach, Hodges is interested in uncovering the relationship and connections between micro-level discursive practices and larger discourses and contexts. Hodges examined presidential speeches, media discourse, and focus group interviews with politically active college students in order to determine the relationship and illuminate the connection between “microlevel discursive action and the shared cultural understandings bound up in the macrolevel Bush ‘War on Terror’ narrative” (pp. 7-8).

In order to determine the war on terror narrative, Hodges (2011) relied solely on presidential speeches. He maintained that, due to the rehearsed and prepared nature of presidential speeches, they articulate a well thought-out perspective and are “representative of a larger set of ideas that underlies much of the administration’s discourse and policies” (p. 11). It is (largely) for similar reasons that I examine government speeches as part of my analysis of the Canadian discourse of anti-terrorism. As speeches in favour of Canadian anti-terrorism legislation, the parliamentary speeches I examine are representative of the ideas and rationales that underlie the state’s anti-terrorism laws and much of the discursive formulations in the public police documents (the other two types of texts that I examine).

Hodges’ (2011) CDA work influences my critical discourse analysis of anti-terrorism discourse in Canada in particular ways, though there are also important points of divergence that are not addressed in the dissertation. For instance, I draw loosely on Hodges’ (2011) terminology while diverging somewhat on its meaning. Like Hodges (2011), I am interested in a war on terror macro-narrative or discourse—in Canada this is that “9/11 changed the world” in ways that threatened “our collective sense of safety,”
and that terrorism seeks to undermine “our entire way of life” (Bill C-36 Sponsor Speech, 2001)—and how it informs discourse at all levels, or what he calls “micro level discursive actions” (see Hodges, 201, p. 7), which for my research constitute parliamentary speeches, anti-terrorism laws, and police documents.

In my work, I add another, and very important, variable to the analysis. This is the broader, underlying meta-narrative or meta-discourse that guides these discursive actions or practices and is furthered by them. I identify and uncover this particular meta-narrative through my analysis, mainly at the final stage of the analysis. My critical discourse analysis of the micro level discursive practices of anti-terrorism illustrates how this meta-discourse, and the interests and relations represented and furthered therein, are embedded in (i.e., are written into, guide, and inform) and reinforced by the anti-terrorism discourse. Ultimately, like Hodges (2011), who uses Fairclough’s model much more selectively and loosely than I do, I draw on Fairclough in part to “provide analysis of micro-level discursive action to illustrate how that situated use of language relates to larger discourses” (p. 7) and contexts.

My focus is ultimately on the micro-level discursive practices/texts of the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse. However, I analyze micro-level discursive practices cognizant of, and with an interest in illustrating, the ways in which larger levels of discourse and larger social contexts and social conditions are linked to or shape micro level discursive texts. This is similar to Phillips’ (1996) approach, which, leading from the work of Gee (1990, 1999), which I discuss above, employs CDA to investigate the link between the “little d” discursive action (in the shape of political speeches, interviews and media reportage) and the “bid D” discourse of Thatcherism that emerged during the time of her leadership in the UK.

Another example of Fairclough’s model in practice—albeit very loosely—is in the work of Jackson (2005a). Drawing on Fairclough (1992), Jackson’s analysis of US counter-terrorism discourse employs a nested or multi-dimensional CDA approach, which combines textual and social analysis, in order to shed light on the relationship between discourse and social processes. For his work, Jackson focused on texts that deal with the subject of the US’ war on terrorism. He examined more than 100 speeches, radio broadcasts, and reports to Congress between September 11, 2001 and January 31, 2004.
Like Hodges (2011), he places much weight on political speeches and began his analysis by examining Bush administration speeches that garnered the most attention following 9/11. In examining these speeches, Jackson (2005a) “sought to examine whether the language remained consistent over both different speakers and different times” (p. 26). In this sense, like Hodges (2011), Jackson is interested in iteration—i.e., the degree of repetition of the war on terrorism discourse across contexts—and whether or not, and the manner in which, the discourse is recontextualized. While I also examine certain instances and/or occurrences of recontextualization, unlike Hodges and Jackson, my analysis of anti-terrorism discourse is not heavily focused on or concerned with iteration and recontextualization.

Like Hodges (and myself), Jackson (2005a) chose to examine government speeches partly because they represent the source of underlying ideas of the war on terrorism discourse. He stated that, “The ‘war on terrorism’ is an elite-led project and these elites have provided the primary justifications and overall vision. Thus it seems logical to focus primarily on their words” (Jackson, 2005a, p. 26). Part of Jackson’s analytical technique is to uncover the types of rhetorical and grammatical strategies that are employed in the discursive construction of the war on terrorism. In my work, I do something similar inasmuch as I attempt to describe, reveal, and problematize the discursive construction of terrorist threats and victims within the anti-terrorism discourse by uncovering the rhetorical and discursive strategies that are employed. Unlike Jackson, however, I am not interested in grammar or grammatical strategies, given that this type of analysis is not relevant for and does not contribute to my overall research focus and analysis.

To conduct his analysis of the war on terrorism discourse, Jackson (2005a) mixed specific text analysis (focusing on the formal features of the text), and broader interdisciplinary analysis (focusing more generally on society, politics and culture) (p. 25). In this process, he carefully read his chosen texts and applied numerous analytical questions, which relate to both the formal features of the texts as well as to broader society, culture, and politics. Like Jackson, I also apply some analytical questions that are directed at both the specific texts and the broader social context in which they are produced. However, unlike Jackson, who formulates his analytical question before conducting the analysis as a way to guide and inform his analysis, my questions come out
of the first and second levels of analysis; they emerged as I analyzed the texts. In this way, as I explain above, I do something similar to Janks (1997), who formulates questions and hypotheses largely from the initial, descriptive stage of analysis, drawing on the patterns and disjunctions she observes therein. The questions that emerge from the initial stages of my analysis in chapter four are explored and developed in chapters five and six.

**How I Use Fairclough’s CDA Model**

Overall, I employ Fairclough’s multi-dimensional CDA model because it allows me to look at the totality of the anti-terrorism discourse, and examine the texts both on their own, and intertextually, looking at the links and relationships between them. Fairclough’s model allows me to examine the texts at face value at first (non-critically), and then begin to interpret the discursive processes and practices at work in the texts as well as the larger social contexts and social conditions that bare upon and inform these processes. With this model, I am able to use analytical tools and frameworks, such as the threat and threatened dynamic, which I explain above, to inform other analytical questions and other levels of analysis. By moving between the texts I am able to link the texts in a manner that builds a case or argument about the criminalization of dissent, a process that is only fully apparent across the texts or intertextually.

For Hodges (2011), “intertextuality is useful for the analysis of political discourse because it emphasizes the connections across multiple discursive encounters where issues are formulated and contested” (p. 8). While I concur with Hodges’ observations, for the purposes of my research I employ the term intertextuality somewhat differently than he does. In his CDA work on the war on terror narrative of the Bush administration, Hodges uses intertextuality to describe and explore the iterative process at work across the narrative, wherein the narrative is “reinscribed across different interactional contexts” (p. 8). Hodges is largely concerned with the process whereby a given piece of discourse is lifted from one setting and then inserted into another setting where it is recontextualized.

For my work, the term intertextual is used in a broader, analytical sense, with respect to elements of the discourse that are repeated across several texts. This means that while the criminalization of dissent may not be readily apparent by examining a single text or
two texts on their own, when we examine several texts, and when these are treated together, discursive patterns, processes, and relationships begin to emerge that point to the criminalization of dissent. This is especially true when one examines the context and social practices in which these processes are embedded – Fairclough’s third dimension of discourse analysis.

While I do not apply Hodges’ (2011) conception of intertextuality as part of a methodology, I do something similar to Hodges’ approach in that I use a layered analytic model that ultimately lays bare, for the purposes of my research, how notions and contexts of dissent are transposed and recontextualized into contexts and notions of terrorism and vice versa. The dynamic of threat and threatened, discussed above, as I employ it as a source for all three stages of analysis, is similar to Hodges’ approach in the sense that certain aspects of the discourse I examine are reintroduced at different levels of analysis and different contexts. As a tool, the framework of threat and threatened allows me to look at the relationship of the texts, trans-textually, and the relationship between the stages of analysis.

While it bears some resemblance to Hodges, mine is also a slightly unique approach to CDA insofar as I use Fairclough’s method to build a descriptive analytic base, which is then used to build and inform the other two levels of analysis. The descriptive dynamic and framework of threat and threatened unifies the different texts as well as the different stages of analysis. Analytically, the duality of threat and threatened can be used descriptively, interpretively, and for larger explanation and social analysis. Ultimately, I develop the analysis around a small, powerful motif, that of threat and threatened, and how this is discursively constructed in the anti-terrorism texts.

**Final Note (on my CDA approach)**

When CDA has been applied to examine the discourse of terrorism and/or counter-terrorism, I observed that researchers tend to look at numerous texts, such as in the work of Hodges (2011), Jackson (2005a) and Bartoclucci (2010), who each examine copious texts in their analyses. This suggests that in order to be able to analyze anti-terrorism discourse, one ought to examine several texts and to, at some point in the analysis, examine them intertextually. This is something I do in my analysis, and helps to support the broad nature of my analysis, and the number of texts I chose to examine. I could have
looked at just two or three documents in great detail. Instead, I chose to look at a broad collection of texts—which together form a package or set of official documents—thematicaly, looking at some less deeply or in less detail than others. Drawing on Fairclough’s (2001) concept of nested discourse and analysis, I chose to look at several anti-terrorism texts thematically, and bring them together, mainly at the last stage of analysis, for an intertextual analysis.

**General Reading Strategy and Specific Analytic Tools**

Having described the analytic structure of CDA (as others and I employ it), I now turn my attention to my general strategy reading of the texts; followed by a description of the specific analytic concepts or tools I employ throughout the analysis, an explanation of the document selection process, and, finally, a description of the next three chapters (i.e., the analysis chapters).

CDA practitioners recommend that the analyst initially approach a text uncritically, like an ordinary, undiscerning reader, and then re-approach it in a critical manner (Fairclough, 1992; 2001; Huckin, 1997; Janks, 1997, Locke, 2004). Janks (1997) distinguishes between engaged and estranged readings of texts, the former being when we read (or agree) with the text and the latter being when we read against (or disagree with) the texts. She argued that:

> Each on its own is a form of entrapment. Engagement without estrangement is a form of submission to the power of the text regardless of the reader's own positions. Estrangement without engagement is a refusal to leave the confines of one's own subjectivity, a refusal to allow otherness to enter. (Janks, 1997, p. 330)

Ultimately, engaged reading of the text is a non-critical reading while an estranged reading is a more critical and analytical reading of the text. Before I proceed, it is important to define the words critical and uncritical as I use them in the analysis. CDA is concerned with discursive manipulation and abuses of power in public discourse. In this respect, when I refer to “uncritical” readers I am describing any reader who may be unwary or unsuspecting of the deeper levels of discursive manipulation at play in public discourse. A critical reading of texts, as I use and understand it, implies some deeper, analytical process involving analytic tools and concepts for text deconstruction. This is not something individuals (including researchers and academics) readily undertake in our
daily, general and surface reading of texts. It is in this manner that I employ the terms critical and uncritical or non-critical reader(s). This should be kept in mind while reading the analysis chapters.

**CDA Technical/Analytic Terms**

As I state earlier, in CDA, one initially reads with the text—non-critically—and then moves deliberately to a critical reading, against the text. To facilitate the critical reading of the texts, CDA offers a powerful cache of analytic apparatuses that can be installed in the close reading of public texts (Huckin, 1997, 2002; see also McGregor, 2004). Huckin (1997) has identified several useful analytical concepts to remember when conducting CDA. Some of these concepts are more applicable to the sentences within a text, while others are more suitable for examining the text as a whole. At the same time, some may be applicable to both individual sentences and the text as a whole (see Huckin, 1997). Huckin (1997) suggests beginning with the text as a whole and proceeding to its minute parts. In my textual analysis, I apply Huckin’s concepts based on their applicability to and explanatory power for the text(s) at hand. Some of these concepts are described below.

While Huckin (1997) identifies numerous analytic tools, in the following section, I describe only those concepts that I employed for my analysis. In describing these analytic tools and concepts, I provide examples from Huckin’s (1997) work as well as from my own. The examples I provide from my analysis are meant to quickly illustrate the function or meaning of the concept only. I explore and expand upon examples in greater detail in the analysis chapters.

1. **Text Level Analysis (reading the text as a whole)**

   **Framing**

   A major part of text production and text interpretation is *framing*. For Huckin (1997) framing refers to “how the content of a text is presented, what sort of perspective (angle, slant) the writer is taking” (para. 15). For instance, as Huckin held, news reports often construct and present a narrative that is framed along the lines of good guys vs. bad guys. He gives a specific example from his own analysis of a news report about protestor arrests during an anti-nuclear testing demonstration, in which the protestors are framed as the bad guys. In my own analysis, I found that public police documents on terrorism tend
to frame or present protestors and activists as bad guys, not least by linking them and conflating them with white supremacists, “violent militants,” and/or “Islamic extremists.”

**Foregrounding and Omission (or backgrounding)**

Very closely related to framing is foregrounding and backgrounding (omission). These terms “refer to the writer's emphasizing certain concepts (by giving them textual prominence) and de-emphasizing others” (para. 16). The ultimate form of backgrounding is omission (Huckin, 1997). Omission involves leaving certain things entirely out of a text. Huckin maintained that omission can be the most potent aspect of textualization, given that “if the writer does not mention something, it often does not even enter the reader's mind and thus is not subjected to his or her scrutiny” (para. 17) Simply put, it is hard to raise questions about something that is not even present in the text. In his analysis, Huckin found that the article “foregrounds the protestors-versus-police frame. And in so doing, it backgrounds more important societal issues” raised by the protestors (para. 34). In my analysis of anti-terrorism laws and police texts, I found that the official texts seem to foreground economic security and the protection of global financial institutions and summits. In doing so, the texts background public safety.

**Presupposition**

As Huckin explained, writers can also manipulate readers through presupposition. “Presupposition is the use of language in a way that appears to take certain ideas for granted, as if there were no alternative” (para.18). In Huckin’s (1997) analysis of the news article on protestor arrests, he point our that, “The way this news story is framed presupposes that the most interesting feature of public protests is the number of protestors arrested, not the issues behind the protest” (para. 36). In my analysis of Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, I observed that much of the anti-terrorism texts (parliamentary speeches especially) are framed in a way that presupposes that that there is a serious post-9/11 terrorist threat facing Canada and Canadians, without ever substantiating this presupposition. There is no effort to prove or substantiate this presupposition. Instead, it is taken for granted that the world changed on 9/11 in a way that gravely threatens Canadians and, therefore, necessitates greater security measures and the creation of anti-terrorism laws.
Once the analyst has read and analyzed the text as a whole, some of the same analytic concepts can be applied to an analysis of the text at the sentence level. When applying some of the above concepts to a sentence level reading, Huckin (1997) sometimes gives them a different name. I describe these below.

**ii) Tools for Sentence Analysis**

**Topicalization**

At the sentence level, a reader “might notice that certain pieces of information appear as grammatical subjects of the sentence and are thereby *topicalized* (which is a type of foregrounding at the sentence level). A sentence topic or topic position is what the sentence is about (para. 20). As McGregor (2004) pointed out (in his discussion of Huckin’s concepts), in choosing what to place in the topic position, the writer creates a slant or perspective that influences the reader’s perception. This is similar to foregrounding at the text level. In the analysis chapters, I explore the ways in which the anti-terrorism texts foreground (at the text level) and/or topicalize and emphasize (at the sentence level) the protection of the economy and global financial institutions, and how this creates a disjunction and contradiction between certain texts.

**Presupposition**

As Huckin (1997) explained, presupposition can also occur at the sentence level. For instance, “If a politician says, ‘we cannot continue imposing high taxes on the American people’, he or she is presupposing that the taxes Americans pay are high (which makes good political rhetoric but is not true, at least not compared to other industrialized nations)” (para. 23). Such presuppositions, Huckin maintained, are rather common in public discourse, “especially in political speeches” (para.23). In the analysis chapters I uncover and critically examine instances of presupposition present and employed in the anti-terrorism texts at both the text and sentence level.

**Insinuations**

Another discursive strategy that the analyst might observe at work at the sentence level is insinuation. Huckin (1997) held that insinuations “are comments that are slyly suggestive” (para. 24). Like presuppositions, Huckin maintained, they are difficult for readers to challenge--but for a different reason. Insinuations usually have double meanings, “and if challenged, the writer can claim innocence, pretending to have only
one of these two meanings in mind” (para. 24). One example from my analysis of official anti-terrorism texts is the use of words like “militant” to describe activists or activist factions, and the use of the phrases “moderate, mainstream” views. The former suggests or insinuates a level of deviance while the latter suggests normal or appropriate thought and behaviour.

iii) Words and Phrases

Connotations

Beyond the text and sentence level, at a more detailed level of reading, the analyst can take note of “the additional, special meanings or connotations that certain words and phrases carry” (Huckin, 1997, para. 25). For Huckin, connotations originate from the use of a word or phrase (lexis) in a particular type of context. “The word grammar, for example, has negative connotations for most Americans, who have unpleasant memories of being drilled in school by a stern grammar teacher” (para. 25). In my analysis, for instance, I note that as an adjective the word militant carries certain negative connotations, especially when used in the context of dissent or protest (i.e., to describe or modify these things). For instance, the phrases “militant activists” or “militant protestors” carry negative connotations related to violence or menacing, aggressive behaviour.

Tone

Another characteristic of discourse worth attending to for critical purposes is modality, which, as Huckin (1997) explained, “refers to the tone of statements as regards their degree of certitude and authority” (para. 27). He argued this tone is carried largely by words and phrases like may, might, could, will, must, without a doubt, it's possible that, etc. Through their use of such modal verbs and phrases, some texts convey a tone of heavy-handed authority while others, at the opposite extreme, express a tone of deference (para. 27). I use the concept tone very minimally. And when I do employ it, I do so in a slightly different way and with a different understanding and intention than Huckin in that I am mainly interested in tones of certitude. In my analysis I found that some texts had a tone of authority and certitude, even when making unsubstantiated claims. Given the official nature of the texts, and the fact that the authors and producers of Canadian anti-terrorism texts are officials, it is not surprising to find a tone of authority within the discourse. I hold that undiscerning readers may be less likely to question what is
presented in the anti-terrorism texts given both their official authorship and tone.

Huckin (2002) emphasized that these different concepts ought to be used selectively, not exhaustively. He explained that,

Critical discourse analysis is an *approach*, a way of looking at texts, not a rigorously systematic method of analysis... a critical discourse analyst should use his or her best judgment as to which concepts are most appropriate to an insightful understanding of the text at hand. In most cases, the basic insight is gained during an initial reading of the text, before the CDA concepts are fully applied. In other words, CDA is not a ‘discovery’ mechanism per se; rather, it serves to confirm, explain, and enrich the initial insight and to communicate that insight, in detailed fashion, to others. (p. 12)

Along with Huckin’s analytic concepts, I also employ several concepts that do not come from Huckin’s work. What follows are largely my own definitions and understanding (and use) of these terms.

**Linkages**

*Linkages* are techniques of making associations and/or connections between words. For me, linkages are achieved through affinity and conflation, which while slightly different, are involved in and/or achieve the same discursive formulations. If one was to relate the two terms, one could say that affinities construct linkages, which result in conflation. I define the two techniques involved in the process of linkages below:

**i) Affinity**

First, as a discursive strategy, *affinity* serves to create or construct a relationship or a potential or actual closeness between two entities (see Horrocks, 1997) that are not necessarily related. In my understanding (and use of the term), affinity occurs when two words are used in a similar context and tone, so as to affect a type of similarity or likeness between them. Discursively, affinity can be achieved through the use of other discursive techniques or strategies such as recontextualization, etc. One example from my work is the use of the words protests or activists/activism in the same sentence and context as the words terrorism or terrorist acts (see Bill C-35 House Sponsor Speech; RCMP, 2009). Here, terrorism or terrorist acts are deontextualized and then
recontextualized (see Hodges, 2011) as related to or similar to protest and activism. For this reason, I view affinity as a type of meta-explanatory or analytic term that may contain or employ other discursive techniques/strategies as part of its construction.

Second, for my purposes affinity can also be understood as or further broken down into affinity/modifier. Two examples are the words “Palestinian” and “terrorist,” and “violent” and “protests/protestors.” While this is similar to the discursive act of conflation, my understanding and critique of this discursive strategy is to treat the first word as a modifier or adjective, which modifies and describes the second world while simultaneously creating a bridge or likeness between the two often dissimilar words, in such a way that the implication is that one word can be substituted or exchanged for the other. For instance in the phrase “violent protests,” violent describes and modifies protest/protestors in such a way as to content violence to the act of protest even though not all protests or protestors are violent, and even though the text producer may not define what is meant or implied by violence (i.e., is property damage “violence” in the same sense that violence or physical harm against people is “violence”?).

In a Google search for articles on the 2010 G20 protests in Toronto, I found that out of 50 sample articles, 37 used the phrase “violent protestor/protests/demonstrations” more than once in the article. While the words did not always appear as a phrase they were always used in the same sentence and/or context. Similarly, in 20 sample articles on the siege of Gaza, the word Palestinian was used in connection with the word terrorist(s) 16 times. The effect is to discursively connect and construct protest to/as violence and Palestinians to/as terrorism and terrorists.

The difference between affinities and linkages is that affinities create a link between two entities, acts, events, or places that are not necessarily related. Affinities ultimately result in or contribute to linkages, so I treat affinities and linkages as part of an interrelated discursive strategy. In other words, affinities construct or achieve linkages in a particular way.

**ii) Conflation**

*Conflation* occurs when two or more things, individuals or concepts are discursively confused until they become the same or similar or interchangeable, despite their difference. My understanding and use of the term conflation is slightly different from the
common use in that, traditionally, conflation describes two or more concepts, persons or places, \textit{which have some similarities}, that become confused to the extent that they become treated as one thing (see Haught, 1995). Because terrorism and protest/activism/dissent do not, in my assessment, share some similarities, I use the term conflation a little differently, and it is important to note this difference.

An example conflation found in my analysis of an RCMP document on “radicalization” is the conflation between left-wing political groups and/or activists and Islamist extremists/terrorists. In this text, left-wing activists are discursively constructed as similar to or vulnerable to becoming like Islamist extremists and terrorists due to a similarity in political thought and similar critique on certain political issues. Here, left-wing activist are conflated and confused with Islamist terrorists due to supposed similar beliefs between the two.

Conflation can also occur simply by placing two things in the same sentence or paragraph, without the text producer providing any description of their similarity. For instance, placing “anti-globalization groups” in the same sentence as “white supremacist groups,” as two CSIS documents I examined do, serves to conflate these two dissimilar things simply by placing them in the same sentence. This effect can be very subtle or subconscious, a testament to the type of discursive manipulation at play in sentence production.

\textit{Recontextualization}

Another discursive strategy at work in some of the texts I examine in the analysis chapters is \textit{recontextualization}. Recontextualization is a process that extracts text or meaning from its original context (decontextualisation) in order to introduce it into another context. Recontextualization implies an alteration in meaning, given that text meanings depend on their context (see Huckin, 2002; Eagleton, 1991; Linell, 1998). In certain anti-terrorism texts, I observed that officials decontextualized acts of terrorism, such as the event of 9/11, and recontextualized them as being similar or related to acts of protest, and vice versa. I examine this process of recontextualization in greater detail in the second level of analysis, interpretation, in chapter five.

\textit{Repetition}

As a discursive technique, repetition can have symbolic effects and an emphasizing
effect (Bazzanella, 1996) making it a powerful technique. Repetition in political discourse, especially political speeches, is mainly intentional and pre-planned or rehearsed (see Forraiova, 2011). For instance, in the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, one of the texts I examine in the analysis chapters, the word(s) “terrorism” or “terrorist activity” (or some variation therefore) appears forty one times. Whether employed topically or otherwise, such extensive use constitutes repetition. Discursively, this serves to emphasize and symbolize the danger posed by the terrorism or terrorist activity. One effect of such repetition is the creation or promotion of fear for the reader or receiver of the text. It also normalizes the word and concept of “terrorism,” as defined and employed by the state, in the general discourse and imagination.

**The Document Selection Process**

For my analysis I was interested mainly in the official and legal discourse of anti-terrorism in Canada. I chose to focus on the controversial anti-terrorism legislation, as well as the parliamentary speeches that surround it. I also examined specific public police documents, by CSIS and the RCMP, on the issue of terrorism and security. As official documents, parliamentary speeches and especially laws, and police documents make up the bulk of official anti-terrorism discourse in Canada. Critical analysis of the official discourse and language of anti-terrorism is worthwhile and necessary not least because the deployment of language by politicians and other officials (such as police agencies) is an exercise of power, and without critical examination and careful interrogation, unchecked power becomes more and more abusive (Jackson, 2005a). In my approach to the texts, I began by reading the parliamentary speeches in support of the Bills, since these speeches serve as a justification for the enactment of the laws and also set the rhetorical environment and backdrop for the laws. I then read two of the most important and most controversial policies within Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation – namely, the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (Bill C-36) and *An Act to amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act* (Bill C-35). Last, I read several public police documents produced by CSIS and the RCMP, which deal directly or indirectly with terrorism and/or national security.

These police documents are an important and instrumental part of the official discourse on anti-terrorism inasmuch as the current and emerging “security threats”
identified therein may contribute to the justification of the existence, and the need for the
continued existence, of the draconian anti-terrorism legislation. Moreover, as I
demonstrate in the next three chapters, these documents are especially useful for my
research focus not least because they explicitly name very specific types of activism as
“potential terrorist threats,” “domestic terrorism,” or “new challenges” in the war on
terror. Collectively, the documents I examined span a period of ten years, from 1999-
2009. I examined two pre-9/11 documents in order to observe and analyze the pre-“war
on terrorism” security discourse. Overall, these texts are but a small sample of the
official anti-terrorism discourse in Canada. Still, they represent the depth of the discourse
and, collectively, they serve to paint a telling picture of the nature and function of “anti-
terrorism” discourse in Canada and the particular interests it represents and/or protects.

The full text of the speeches can be found in the appendix. I have also included the
full text of Bill C-35 in the appendix. Given that the text of Bill C-36 and the police
documents are very long, I have included in the appendix only the excerpts that I
analyzed from each. It should be noted that when quoting sections of the anti-terrorism
texts, I often use bold font for important words or sentences in the quotes, in order to
highlight their importance and to easily draw the eye to them. This is a practice I
observed in Jackson’s (2005a) CDA work on the US discourse of counter-terrorism, and
felt would be useful for my own analytical presentation. Moreover, when quoting
parliamentary speeches, I do not provide page or paragraph numbers because the online
transcriptions of these speeches are not structured in this way. They appear as one long
paragraph. For this reason, it is not possible to provide this type of information.

Outline of Analysis Chapters

While one can use any of Fairclough’s three stages of analysis as an analytic entry
point, like Janks (1997), I “work from text to discourse” (p. 331), meaning I begin with
textual analysis and move on to interpretation and explanation. It is important to note that
while I present the analysis in a linear manner in the following chapters, the overall
analysis actually flows back and forth between the various dimensions. Thus, analytic
integration and overlap between the different stages is apparent, at times, when reading
the analysis chapters. Such is the nature of Fairclough’s integrated and multi-dimensional
CDA approach.
Overall, my analysis in the next three chapters stems from the following strategies: First, I begin with a non-critical description of the texts in chapter four, focusing on the genre or text type (see Huckin, 1997) and the structure of the texts. Here, I also provide a face value listing of all those things in the texts that one can describe as threats and all those things one can describe as threatened. To make the lists, I look at what is topicalized (i.e., emphasized) at the sentence level (see Huckin, 1997) of each text, and list them in the order that they appear in the text.

Second, in chapter five, I draw on some of the lists developed in the first analytical stage in chapter four, in order to undertake an interpretive analysis (the second stage of analysis in Fairclough’s CDA model) of the discursive construction of threats and threatened. I focus only on those things that are arguably categorically odd or incongruous within the context of terrorism and anti-terrorism, given that they do not generally fit with the common or public conception of things associated with the threat of terrorism or terrorist violence. I illustrate the ways in which certain things that are arguably unrelated to terrorism, and things that are arguably not directly threatened by terrorism, are nonetheless constructed as such in the Canadian anti-terrorism text. Here, I critically examine and expose the discursive strategies at work within the texts in these particular processes of construction of the threats and the threatened, beginning with the latter. It should be noted that, at the beginning of this chapter, I define and explain the discursive concept of threat and threatened, and its usefulness as a dynamic analytic device, for the purposes of my research.

Finally, at the explanation or social analysis stage, in chapter six, I examine the texts in relationship to one another as well as the relationship between text and the larger context in which they are created and function. In addition, at this stage, I formulate a hypothesis, drawing on all of previous levels of analysis, about the relationship between the threats and the threatened, which takes into account the larger social context including socio-historical practices. Though I introduce them separately, these stages of analysis are at times interconnected and inter-related – reflecting Fairclough’s (2001) model of nested dimensions of analysis. As such, there may be overlap between them. As stated in the methodology chapter, a major strength of Fairclough’s model is that it provides multiple points of analytic entry (Janks, 1997). It does not matter where one begins, as
long as all of the stages are included and shown to be mutually explanatory (Janks, 1997). While I begin with description, then go on to interpretation, and explanation, this is done in a way that, at times, goes back and forth between the three, often building and developing upon previous or other stages. The analysis conclusions, which come out of the entire analysis but mostly from the last stage (explanation/social analysis), are discussed as the end of chapter six.
Chapter Four: Description

In this section of the dissertation I conduct a critical discourse analysis of Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, focusing on specific official texts. I carry out the analysis drawing on Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2001) multi-dimensional CDA model, which I describe in chapter three. As I state in that chapter, and as Huckin (1997) has explained, Fairclough’s CDA model is a highly integrated form of discourse analysis in that it tries to unite at least three different levels of analysis: the text; the discursive practices (that is, the processes of writing/speaking and reading/hearing) that create and interpret that text; and the larger social context (and social conditions) that bear upon it. In so doing, “CDA aims to show how these levels are all interrelated” (Huckin, 1997, para. 2). While I use Fairclough’s analytic structure, in order to deconstruct the texts I rely largely on Huckin’s (1997) analytic concepts, which I define in chapter three. I also employ several analytic concepts that do not originate with Huckin, which I also define in chapter three. As I explain in chapter three, due to its length, the critical discourse analysis is spread across three chapters, with each chapter attending to one stage of analysis. In this chapter, I focus on descriptive analysis only.

Analysis Strategy Recap

I focus on three types of documents: parliamentary speeches in support of Canadian anti-terrorism legislation, two pieces of the anti-terrorism legislation (Bill C-36 and C-35), and public police documents (several Annual Public Reports by CSIS, a CSIS report on the anti-globalization movement, and two RCMP documents on the war on terror) related to security or terrorism.

As I explain in the methodology chapter, taking my lead from other CDA practitioners (Fairclough, 1992; Huckin, 1997; 2001; Janks, 1997, Locke, 2004), I read the texts in two stages, uncritically and then critically. I first approached the text as a typical reader merely trying to comprehend the text in an uncritical way (see Huckin, 1997). Janks (1997) describes this as reading with the text or as an engaged reading of the text (p. 330), and stresses the importance of beginning in this way. I then read the texts more critically in order to discern and deconstruct the discursive strategies and manipulation at work in the texts. Relating the uncritical and critical reading of the texts to Fairclough’s (2001) three-dimensional model, for my reading of the texts, most of the
descriptive analysis falls within the uncritical reading and is not worth delineating here. Thus, what follow are the important parts of the description only, and then, in chapters five and six, the critical reading of the texts, which falls under the interpretation and explanation stages of Fairclough’s model. Before I begin the descriptive analysis of the texts, it is useful to give a brief history and description of the two anti-terrorism laws I examined, given that these are the most official texts within the discourse and they serve to ground the other texts. It is also important to briefly explore the history and meaning of the most important word in the discourse—“terrorism.” I attend to these below.

**General Background of Anti-terrorism laws and the History “Terrorism”**

**Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36)**

Canada's Anti-Terrorism Plan began with the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (introduced as Bill C-36)—the most significant portion of the legislation—and was supported by a $7.7 billion investment in the December 2001 federal budget (Transport Canada, 2002, # GC004/02). Unlike the US and the UK, Canada did not have anti-terrorism laws before 11 September 2001 and some feel that it went too far (Morden, 2010). A little more than a month after September 11, the Canadian government introduced a massive and hastily drafted *Anti-terrorism Act* (Bill C-36), with virtually no public debate or inquiry (Roach, 2003; Rogge, 2001). Notwithstanding grave reservations from many segments of Canadian society as to the extensiveness of the Bill, it was pushed through Parliament just before Christmas (Morden, 2010).

Bill C-36 officially became law on Dec 18, 2001; only three months after the September 11 attacks and two months after the US passed the USA PATRIOT Act (Caron, 2005). As mentioned in the context chapter, Canada’s legislation arises out of the motion passed at the United Nations following 9/11 that called on “all nations of the world to implement anti-terrorist legislation and to implement UN conventions with respect to the prevention of terrorism within 90 days” (Blaikie, 2001; Morden, 2010; 2002; Rogge, 2001). Despite the amendments, concerns remain about the stipulations and scope of the *ATA* (Roach, 2003).

The *ATA* (Bill C-36) amended the *Criminal Code* and nineteen other statutes (Holthuis, 2007; “In the Shadow,” 2003), and enacted the *Charities Registration (Security Information) Act* (“In the Shadow”, 2003). Among the federal laws modified
by the *ATA* are the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, and the Proceeds of Crime (money laundering) Act (Caron, 2005). The *ATA* also criminalized many forms of facilitating or financing terrorism, including participation in and support for terrorist organizations (Holthuis, 2007). The *ATA* has four declared objectives: stop terrorists from getting into Canada and protect Canadians from terrorist acts; bring forward tools to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists; prevent the Canada-US border from being held hostage by terrorists and impacting on the Canadian economy; and work with the international community to bring terrorists to justice (Morden, 2010).

Bill C-36 is an omnibus bill that had several layers of effect. It is “cross-jurisdictional in both a horizontal – affecting different branches of government – and vertical – affecting different levels of government – sense of the word” (Mazer, 2002, p. 2). The Bill’s horizontality is reflected in the range of fields that it affected:

In defining terrorist activity, creating stricter penalties for those who commit terrorist offences, and granting police new powers of preventive arrest, it touched criminal law. In allowing for the issuance of ministerial certificates prohibiting…the release of certain pieces of information, it touched on the areas of access to information and privacy rights. In enhancing the use of electronic surveillance equipment and in providing for statutory recognition of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), it touched on the areas of intelligence services. In making it a crime to collect or donate funds to carry out a terrorist activity, it touched charities and national revenue collection as well as domestic and international financial institutions. In introducing new restrictions on hate speech spread via the Internet and creating a special category of offences for mischief relating to religious property, it touched the arenas of tolerance and anti-racism. (Mazer, 2002, p. 3)

The verticality of the Bill’s cross-jurisdictional character, Mazer (2002) continues, is best observed in the “co-habitation, in the Bill, of domestic and international legal norms.” Simply put, “the Bill is a domestic response to an international threat: the domestic expression – and implementation – of an international legal architecture.” (p. 3).

This is an example of the ways in which the local is linked to the trans-local or, how the micro-level is linked to the macro-level, with Canada’s domestic anti-terrorism
Bill C-35

Another instrumental portion of Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation is Bill C-35, An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act. The Bill was introduced on October 1, 2001. Following several readings in the House of Commons and the Senate, it received royal assent, and become law, on April 30, 2002 (Parliament of Canada, 2002). Though the government tried to nonchalantly pass this off as simply a “housekeeping bill” (see Robinson, 2001), this policy is primarily aimed at granting immunities and privileges to previously unprotected “international organizations,” and their agents and representatives—a point to which I return to and elaborate on in the analysis. Bill C-35 also significantly enhances existing police powers. Clause 5 of the Bill amends the Act by adding a section, 10.1, on the security of intergovernmental conferences, wherein the RCMP is granted greater powers in order to ensure the security of such conferences. These include “controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances” (10.1 (2)). Moreover, clause 5 provides provisions for “consultation and cooperation between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and provincial and municipal police forces” (10.1 (4)) in order to ensure the security of intergovernmental conferences and those in attendance.

Bill C-35 is controversial and has met with much criticism. In its response speech during the second reading of Bill C-35 in the House of Commons, the NDP argued that the Bill is part of the “alarming trend toward giving more powers to the police” in a way that facilitates the “growing criminalization of dissent in Canada” (Robinson, 2001). For example, under this Bill, the RCMP has the power to limit the rights of protesters “as they deem necessary” (see CFSC, 2003). Another concern is the Bill’s emphasis on the protection of “international organizations” and “internationally protected persons” (IPPs), and the ways in which the legislation extends the definition of these terms to include non-treaty organizations (see Carter & Carter, 2002). I revisit this in other parts of the chapter.
Histories and Meaning of the Word Terrorism

Given that I am dealing with anti-terrorism discourse, before moving onto the critical discourse analysis, it is important to critically examine the history, meaning and historical function(s) of the most important word in this discourse – “terrorism.”

At the current juncture, the word “terrorism” is applied and misapplied so extensively that it is becoming meaningless (Bartolucci, 2010). Critical researchers want to know who has the authority to define both the terrorist and the terrorist act? Who has the power to deem some acts of violence as legitimate, and others as not? (Witworth, 2002). Cultural studies theorists, taking the lead from Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci, have long stressed that the meaning making apparatuses historically are in the hands of the power elite (Fiske, 1987). Critical Terrorism Studies (see Franks, 2006), which emerged in opposition to traditional state-centric Terrorism Studies, is built on an understanding of the socially and politically constructed nature of terrorism knowledge and an appreciation of the inherent ontological shakiness of the “terrorism” category and label (see Bartolucci, 2010; Jackson, 2007).

Given that meaning is contextual and changes over time (Hodder, 2000), the meaning of terrorism has changed considerably since its first use. Terrorism, which is derived from the word terror (Bartolucci, 2010), is a political concept, a modern invention that first entered the English lexicon during the era of the French Revolution (Blain, 2007; Eagleton, 2005), “providing government and imperial administrators with a practical solution to the problem of how to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate forms of political violence” (Blain, 2007, p. 49). This differentiation gives contemporary imperial states (like Canada and the US.) and colonialist/imperialist administrators the power to define their own violence as rightful or legitimate and others’ violence, including retaliatory violence, as illegal and “terrorist.”

As Kinsman and Gentile (2010) explain, the social construction of knowledge regarding terrorism in the West, for instance, excludes Western states from being deemed terrorist: “within official Western discourse, the terror and terrorism perpetrated by Western states…is not seen as such.” The Western construction of terrorism, they continue, “precludes the naming of American and Canadian military actions as terrorist” (p. 442). And the same can be said of all powerful imperial/colonial states.
Before it was fully appropriated by power elites during the French Revolution, the word “terror,” from which terrorism originates, signified violence carried out by the dominant forces of a society, “and it did not have the negative connotation that modern ‘terrorism’ has” (Bortolucci, 2010, p. 122). This definition was deserted in favour of the opposite; and present definitions of terrorism hold negative connotations (p. 122). Gordon (2004) stresses that we must always be cognizant that the word “terrorism”/”terrorist” is presently defined in such a way as to serve the interests of those who hold power. The common use of the word terrorist refers to “a member of a clandestine or expatriate organization aiming to coerce an established government by acts of violence against it or its subjects” (p. 106). Under this one-sided definition of terrorism, governments and states cannot be considered terrorist because terrorism is used to signify the violent actions of groups/individuals against those in power. This is the description accepted and reproduced by the dominant classes in the western states as well as the corporately owned mainstream media (see Witworth, 2002).

However, it negates and disregards a much more significant form of terrorism-state terrorism—which can be defined as “terrorizing the whole population through systematic actions carried out by force of the state” (Gordon, 2004, p. 106). Critical Terrorism Studies highlights the use of terrorism by states against their own citizens or against the citizens of foreign countries. While state terrorism has been massive throughout history, and the West and its clients have been the major perpetrators of state terrorism (Hermann & O’Sullivan, 1991), “when discussing terrorism the dominant official discourse normally refers to the use of terrorism by ‘extremist’ non-state actors targeting the state, neglecting the issue of state terrorism” (Bartolucci, 2010, p. 122).

Throughout history, especially the history of western imperialism, the “terrorists” are constantly being redefined based on American interests and foreign policy (see Chehade, 2007). Let us not forget that in the Middle East and elsewhere contemporary villains and terrorists were once the allies of the US and the west (see Parenti, 2004). These include Manuel Noriega of Panama, Saddam Hussein, and the ultimate enemy – Osama Bin Laden. All were at one time strategic allies of the US (Chehade, 2007).

And the opposite is also true: yesterday’s “terrorists” are today’s beacons of justice and resistance. At one time Canada considered Nelson Mandela and the African National
Congress terrorists for their armed resistance against Apartheid in South Africa. But in 2001 Mandela became the second person ever to be awarded honorary Canadian citizenship (CBC, “Mandela to be Honoured,” 2001). These are perfect examples of how meaning changes across space and time and context: yesterday’s terrorists are today’s heroes.

Overall, terrorism and/or knowledge of terrorism are socio-historical constructions, whose meanings are contextual, and shifting, and often serve the powerful (see Lapham, 2004; Skrimshire, 2004). This has important implications for the strategies and ethics of counter-terrorism or anti-terrorism, “not least because it implies that the terrorist label is never a fixed or essential identity” (Jackson, 2007, para. 12) and that it may change and expand depending on the needs and interests of the state and the wider context in which it is employed. The shifting and vague nature of the terrorist label is apparent in the official Canadian discourse on anti-terrorism, as I demonstrate at the second and third stages of analysis below. I now turn my attention to the critical discourse analysis of Canadian anti-terrorism texts, beginning, in this chapter, with the descriptive analysis of the texts.

**Description (text analysis)**

In this section I describe the structure and formal features (such as producers, genre, etc.) of the three types of texts, as well as what the texts identify as threats and as threatened. As I explain in chapter three, when quoting the anti-terrorism documents, I often use bold font for what my analysis indicates are important words or sentences in the quotes, a practice I borrow from Jackson (2005a). Moreover, when quoting from parliamentary speeches, I do not provide page or paragraph numbers because these are not available in the online transcriptions I obtained of the speeches.

**General Description of texts and their producers/receivers**

Each of the three types of texts I examined is part of the same discourse, but addresses *functionally differentiated text readers*vi. Parliamentary speeches are produced by politicians or professional/party speech writers and are arguably primarily intended for political peers (i.e., legislators and members of parliament) and the political media, which reports it to the wider public, and to any of the public that care to tune in. Legislation contributes to a vast existing official body of work that falls within the expressed professional purview of lawmakers, judges, lawyers and police. In the case of the police
documents, while they are “public reports” intended for general consumption, more specifically, they are aimed at members of the police and intelligence communities and political leaders and/or parliamentarians.

Thematically all three types of text I examined, political speeches, laws and police documents, deal with the same official discourse, which is the discourse of/on anti-terrorism. The political Sponsor Speeches in parliament lay the context, official rationale and the background for anti-terrorism measures and discourse, and precede the enactment of the actual law, while most of the police documents are post-hoc, and serve to reinforce the anti-terrorism discourse, and the need for the anti-terrorism laws.

**Genre and Formal Features of the Texts Under Analysis**

i) Parliamentary Speeches

Parliamentary speeches fall within the genre or text type (Huckin, 1997) of political speeches, delivered in the House of Common or the Senate. Political speeches given in Parliament are different from political speeches given to public audiences. While parliamentary speeches are accessible to the public, either in person, through television, or online transcripts, the immediate audience of parliamentary speeches is other politicians and officials within parliament. Given this setting, the language of parliamentary speeches is formal and adheres to a particular official or formal protocol, such as referring to the Speaker of the House by title and to other members of parliament as “the Honourable Member.” Political speeches often aim to be persuasive/convincing in tone, while making large and emphatic claims and/or arguments.

For instance, in the Sponsor Speech for Bill-C36 (2001), the government maintained that the events of 9/11 changed the world and challenged Canadians’ sense of safety and security. To emphasize the challenge to Canadians’ sense of safety and security, this point is repeated several times in the speech. For my analysis, I focus mainly on three parliamentary speeches, the House of Commons Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 and the House and Senate Sponsor Speeches for Bill C-35. I also make brief reference to one other parliamentary speech (by a former RCMP Commissioner) in my discussion of the relationship between texts, and the disjunctions therein.
ii) Anti-terrorism Laws

Anti-terrorism laws belong to the genre or text type (see Huckin, 1997) of legislative or legal writing. The creators of the Canadian anti-terrorism laws are legislators who, at the time of the creation of these laws, were from the Federal Liberal party. Legal texts are far more formal and structured than parliamentary speeches, not least because they are codified and employ legal writing, which may not be easily accessible to or understandable by the average reader. Legal writing is a form of technical writing used by legislators, lawyers and judges. Legal writing uses technical terminology considerably, making it very formal and inaccessible to lay readers (see Haigh, 2004). Punctuation and conjunctions are very instrumental in legal Acts. Due to the very particular protocol for reading legal texts, most (non-professional) readers may misinterpret the text upon first reading. Legal professionals will likely be able to make more sense of a law from the first reading.

The standard organizational structure of a statute or Act is: part; section; subsection; paragraph; subparagraph sentence; clause; and subclause (Justice Canada, 2011). Most Acts will include some, but not always all, of these divisions. For instance, in the ATA, the definition of “terrorist activity” constitutes a sentence within a subsection, which is then broken down into several clauses. In addition, some Acts, such as the ATA, begin with a preamble. “The preamble is part of the Act and may be used to interpret the Act” (Alberta Justice and Solicitor General, 2012, para.16). The preamble is written in a more informal, non-technical manner and lays out the reason behind or justification for the Act. In the ATA, many sections, or definitions within sections, refer the reader to other sections of the Criminal Code that are not at hand. This makes reading and analysis of this and similar texts more time consuming and difficult.

Given that the ATA (Bill C-36) is a very long Act, which amended the Criminal Code and nineteen other statutes (see Holthuis, 2007), I have analyzed only those parts of the ATA that are relevant to my research, namely the preamble to the law, the definition of “terrorist activity” in section 83.01 of the Act as well as the ATA’s discussion of the threat to the economy and financial security in section 27.3. Bill C-35, An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, is a very short law (only one and a half pages in length). For this reason, I analyzed it in its entirety. While Bill C-36
and C-35 were introduced separately and passed one year apart, it has been argued that they compliment and bolster one another with respect to the legal protections and immunities they provide to international summits, attendant organizations (i.e., “international organizations”), and their representatives (i.e., “internationally protected persons”) (see Roach, 2003; Klein, 2001).

**ii) Police Documents**

The Police documents fall within the genre of what I describe as departmental reports (by a branch of the state) that are also meant for public distribution and consumption. The majority of the public police documents I examined, all except for two, were Annual Public Reports by CSIS. The CSIS website states that:

The CSIS Public Report is an annual report that is submitted to Parliament, and discusses Canada’s security environment and CSIS’s national security role. The aim of these reports is to inform Parliament and the Canadian public about CSIS’s mandate and how CSIS safeguards the national security of Canada, with due respect for individual rights and freedoms. The reports also help to dispel many of the popular myths surrounding security intelligence work (CSIS, Annual Reports website).

As suggested in the Service’s explanation above, the author of these texts is the police agency, which is an apparatus of the state, and the intended audience is parliamentarians and the general public. As one might expect, the language of the police documents is much less formal, and thus more accessible than the legal texts. Still, the CSIS Public Reports are somewhat formal in that they at times address CSIS and political leadership. The structure of the CSIS Reports begins with a general discussion of the global security environment and moves on to discuss specific threats to or concerns for Canada. These documents discuss the Service’s current security strategies and what it intends and needs to do for the future. The CSIS Public Reports documents deal with numerous issues, but I focus on those parts that are relevant to my research only. The other CSIS document (a document on the anti-globalization movement) and the RCMP document (a report on radicalization) focus on a single issue and are written in a non-formal manner, which is very accessible to the public. Unlike the CSIS Public Reports, these other two police documents directly address the public at certain points in the text.
What the texts identify as threats and as threatened

Given that my research focus is anti-terrorism texts, it is useful and necessary to begin the analysis by making note of those things in the texts that constitute or can be identified as threats and/or problems and those that constitute or can be identified as threatened and/or in need of protection. While the texts do not always use the words threats and threatened, though in many instances they do, the very nature of official documents that are part of a counter or anti-terrorism strategy is to officially and legally address the threat of terrorism and to protect that which it threatens. This is ultimately what the texts are dealing with/and or constructing, and it is how I chose to categorize those things that the official anti-terrorism discourse identifies with the problem and as being threatened by the problem. For this description, I simply read the texts at face value, and made note of all the things the text named as a problem or threat and all those things the text named as threatened and/or in need of protection. Here, I was interested in topicalization at the sentence level; what the texts emphasized in each sentence (see Huckin, 1997). I list items from each category in the order that they appear in the texts. In addition, for words and phrases that appear more than once, I list it once with the number of times it is employed in the text, in brackets.

It should be noted that for the police documents, I do not draw on the entire documents to construct the lists, but those parts that are relevant to my research only. The police documents also deal with topics beyond security and terrorism. However, for the purposes of my research, I am only interested in the sections that deal specifically with security, terrorism, terrorist threats, and/or real or potential targets of terrorism. It should also be noted that, for all of the texts, I have quoted the texts verbatim for short items or sentences and paraphrased the longer sentences. For this reason, and following the lead of other CDA practitioners (see Hodges, 2011; Janks, 1997; Locke, 2004), I have chosen not to include quotation marks for the words or phrases in the lists. Moreover, it is important to note that for the descriptive analysis, I simply present the lists and comment only on those lists that warrant specific notice relative to future stages of analysis in chapters five and six. I revisit parts of various lists during the interpretive and explanatory analyses in chapters five and six respectively. The list of threat and threatened for each of the anti-terrorism texts appear below.
i) Parliamentary Sponsor Speeches

(House) Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36

Threats:

1. Terrorism (x 15)
2. Persons and activities that undermine the security and welfare of Canadians.
3. Terrorist acts (x 2)
4. Forces of terrorism (x 2)
5. Terrorists (x 4)
6. Hate propaganda
7. Mischief, motivated by bias or prejudice
8. Hate based on religion, race, colour, national or ethnic origin
9. Communication of hate messages (using Internet)
10. Terrorist activity (x 8) and those who would carry out or support such activity
11. Terrorist groups (x 2)
12. Terrorist financing (x2)
13. Terrorist bombings, using explosives or lethal devices and/or chemical or biological agents (the term explosive includes toxic chemicals, biological agents and radioactive substances).
15. Participating in facilitating or instructing terrorist activity and harbouring others who carry out terrorist activity
16. Leaders of terrorist organizations
17. Terrorist organizations
18. Threats to Canada, including those arising from religious or ideological objectives or political causes
19. Espionage by foreign powers and by terrorist groups
20. Espionage against Canada's national security, defence, international relations and economic interests.
21. The terrorists who planned and carried out the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001, in the US

Threatened:

1. National security
2. Canadians’ sense of safety and security (x2)
3. Rule of law
4. Human rights
5. Our values and way of life
6. Community
7. Religion
8. Race
9. The security and welfare of Canadians
10. Free and civilized nations everywhere
11. The balance between an open and just society and a safe and secure one.
12. Canadian citizens
13. Borders
14. Places of religious worship or associated religious property
15. Public places,
16. Government or infrastructure facilities
17. Transportation systems
18. The globe
19. The innocent
20. Our lives
21. “The most basic democratic values of freedom and liberty”
22. Public security

For the purpose of the descriptive analysis, it is important to note that in the above lists, the threat is primarily singular and repetitious, centered on the word terrorism or some variation thereof. Indeed, the word terrorism/terrorist (in various forms) appears or is repeated forty one times. As a discursive strategy, repetition can have an emphasizing effect (Bazzanella, 1996). Emphatic repetitions “have emotive connotations and draw extra attention to a notion” (Forraiova, 2011, p. 22). Here, the notion is that terrorism is a (serious and existential or far-reaching) threat, and the emotive connotations are fear and insecurity. In addition, repeating the word terrorism/terrorist over and over serves to normalize the notion of the existence of a terrorist threat in the first instance. Indeed some have argued that the global terrorist threat does not exist beyond political discourse and rhetoric (see Beckett, 2004; Flitton, 2011; Mueller, 2006) and that terrorism is largely a virtual threat (see Beckett, 2004; Wise, 2010).

(House) Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35

Threats:

1. Violent protests
2. Terrorist attacks

Threatened:

1. International events including summits in Canada
2. Foreign officials who attend intergovernmental conferences or summits in Canada
3. “International organizations” including “international organizations and meetings that are presently excluded [from legal protection in Canada] such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the G-8 and the summit of the Americas
4. Non-treaty “international organizations”
5. Intergovernmental conferences held in Canada.
6. International inspectors (who come to Canada on temporary duty in order to carry out inspections under the chemical weapons convention).
7. Permanent missions accredited to international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO

ii) Anti-terrorism Laws

Preamble to the Anti-Terrorism Act

Threats:

1. Acts of terrorism (x2)…
2. Terrorism (x6)…
3. The trans-border nature of terrorism…
4. Terrorist activity (x2)…
5. The financing, preparation, facilitation and commission of acts of terrorism…

Threatened:

1. Canadians (x2)…
2. People everywhere…
3. Domestic and international peace and security…
4. Canada's political institutions…
5. The stability of the economy…
6. The general welfare of the nation…
7. The security of the nation…
8. The political, social and economic security of Canada…
9. Canada's relations with its allies…

Definition of “Terrorist Activity” from Bill C-36 (the ATA)

Threats:

An act or omission inside or outside of Canada that is:

1. Committed wholly or partly for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause…
2. [And] is intended to intimidate or compel [those listed as threatened below] to do or refrain from doing something….
3. [And] that intentionally uses violence…

Threatened:

1. Public (or segment of the public’s) security, including: economic security;
2. A person, a government’s, or a domestic or an international organization’s ability to do or not do something due to intimidation or coercion by the threat
3. Human Life
4. Health and physical safety of public or segment of it
5. Public or private property (if damaging it threatens public safety and human life and health)
6. Public or private essential service, facility or system (if disrupting these threatens public safety and human life and health)

Preamble to Bill C-35 (An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act)

Threats/problems:

1. The deficiency in the existing statutory definition of “international organization.”
2. Insufficient security at intergovernmental conferences in Canada (for persons who have privileges and immunities under the Act).
3. Insufficient formal authority for the RCMP to provide security at intergovernmental conferences in Canada

Threatened/in need of protection:

1. “International organization” (meaning an intergovernmental organization, whether or not established by treaty, of which two or more states are members, and includes an intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate)
2. “Accredited mission” (meaning a permanent mission of a foreign state that is accredited to an international organization headquartered in Canada)
3. The office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, and to any person connected with that office
4. Any intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by persons granted privileges and immunities under this Act

iii) Police Documents

It should be noted that, due to their large number, for the police documents, I situated the lists of threats together and the lists of threatened together, rather than organizing them document-by-document, as I did above. That said, the lists for the RCMP document are presented in their own section at the end, given that I examined two different quotes from this document, which should be considered on their own.

i) Threats/Problems:

CSIS 2000 Public Report

1. International Terrorist Networks
2. (Effects of) Terrorism
3. Islamic religious extremism
4. Sunni extremist threat
5. Politically motivated violence in Canada
6. Transnational criminal activity
7. Conflicts in other parts of the world such as Palestine-Israel; the former Yugoslavia; Pakistan and Kashmir region; Northern Ireland; Africa
8. China’s hegemonic ambitions
9. The emerging phenomenon of anti-globalization
10. Left-of-centre activists and militant anarchists
11. Black Bloc anarchists
12. Factions of militant animal rights and environmental activists

CSIS Public Report 2001
1. The events of September 11, 2001
2. Possibility of a terrorist attack
3. Sunni Islamic extremism
4. Terrorism
5. Terrorist Acts
6. Terrorist Networks
7. Groups, individuals and states that use violence is support of political, ideological or religious agendas
8. Illegal immigrants
9. Emerging or potential threats to the security of Canada
10. (The growth and complexity of) the anti-globalization movement
11. Individuals (at demonstrations) who support the use of serious violence to achieve their aims
12. Al Qaeda
13. Potential use of weapons of mass destruction
14. The technological capabilities of terrorist organizations

CSIS Public Report 2002
1. Sunni Islamic extremism
2. Sunni Islamic terrorist networks
3. Sunni Islamic extremist groups
4. Al Qaeda (x5)
5. Osama Bin Laden (x2)
6. Terrorism in Canada [which is divided into four categories]:
   i) religious extremism (“with Islamic extremism being the most serious threat at present”);
   ii) state-sponsored terrorism (“exemplified by the current regime in Iran”);
   iii) secessionist violence (“for example, Sikh extremism and separatist movements in Sri Lanka, Turkey and other countries); and
   iv) domestic extremism ( “including, but not limited to, certain elements of animal rights, anti-globalization and white supremacist groups”)

CSIS Public Report 2003
1. Terrorism (religious extremism; secessionist violence; domestic extremism; and state-sponsored terrorism, as defined in the 2002 CSIS Report)
2. Domestically grown threats (including groups labelled as domestic extremism)
3. Transnational terrorist organization
4. Terrorist capabilities
5. Sunni Islamic extremists
6. Al Qaeda
7. Osama Bin Laden
8. Increasingly lethal terrorist tactics
9. Possibility of weapons of mass destruction [WMDs] (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) being used in/against Canada
10. Proliferation of WMDs by foreign countries
11. International criminal organizations

1. Very similar to previous document, thus, not listed

CSIS Public Report 2007-2008
1. Terrorism

ii) Threatened/ in need of protection

CSIS Public Report 2000
1. Public Safety
2. National security
3. Canada’s social, political, and economic infrastructures

CSIS Public Report 2001
1. The globe
2. Public Safety
3. The security of Canada
4. Canada’s national and economic security
5. Key sectors of the Canadian economy and other public institutions

CSIS Public Report 2002
1. Citizens and symbols of the western world
2. US civilian and military interests and their allies, including Canada
3. Information infrastructures

CSIS Public Report 2003
1. Food sources and water supplies
2. Heavily populated urban centres
3. Infrastructure critical to government and economic activity
4. Economic Security

CSIS Public Report 2005-2006:
1. National Security

CSIS Public Report 2007-2008:
1. Public Safety
2. National security
3. Economic Security

2009 RCMP Document on Radicalization: two excerpts

Quote/Excerpt one

Threats/Problems:
1. Radicalization
2. An overtly ideological message and belief system
3. Extreme views
4. Radial thinking
5. Espousing or engaging in violence or direct action to promote “political, ideological or religious extremism”
6. Home grown terrorism
7. Process of radicalization
8. Domestic radicalization leading to terrorist violence

**Threatened/Targeted/Protected:**
1. Moderate, mainstream beliefs
2. National security

**Quote/Excerpt Two**

**Threats/Problems:**
1. Radicalization
2. “Global development of linkages between the political left wing ("reds") and Islamist extremists ("greens")”
3. Opposition to globalization, capitalism and US foreign and security policy…
4. **Coupled with** anti-Israel sentiment and admiration for terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah

**Threatened/ in need of protection:**
1. Broader spectrum of western politics
2. Mainstream, moderate views

For the descriptive analysis, it is interesting to note that in the above lists from the public police documents, the majority of the threats are related to things like Islamic and Sunni extremism, international terrorism, terrorist networks, Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, lethal terrorist violence and capabilities, etc. All of these can be said to be of a similar type or category in that they relate to the foreign threat of Islamic terrorism and/or serious terrorist violence. This is what one is accustomed to seeing, or would expect to see, in the post-9/11 discourse of the war on terrorism and counter-terrorism (see Bartolucci, 2010; Jackson, 2005). However, within the lists there are also certain threats that seem out of place or incongruent with terrorism and terrorist violence. These have to do with the phenomenon of anti-globalization and other types of activism, as well as radical thought. The incongruence among the threats is analytically explored in the explanation stage of analysis, in chapter six. At the descriptive analytic stage it is important to simply make note of it. It is also interesting to note that these things also appear in the 2000 CSIS Public Report, which was created before the events of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror and anti-terrorism measures. This point is also addressed analytically in the remaining two analysis chapters. Having described the texts on the
surface, in the next chapter I conduct the interpretive analysis – Fairclough’s (2001) second stage of analysis.
Chapter Five: Interpretation

Having described the texts on the surface and in an uncritical way, noting what each text identifies as threats and as threatened, in this chapter I begin to narrow my focus and read the texts more closely in order to critically analyze the discursive strategies and constructions at work therein. Out of the descriptive stage of analysis, questions and patterns begin to emerge that one must attend to critically and analytically (see Janks, 1997; Locke, 2004). Before I explain these, I wish to make some observations about the threat and threatened dynamic, as I observe and employ it analytically. By identifying the threats and threatened in the lists in chapter four, within a descriptive context, I establish the building blocks for further levels of analysis and the relationships between them.

The link, figuratively, between threat and threatened as I understand and employ it analytically can be understood as an active-passive dynamic, wherein the active component threatens the passive component. In other words, in this dynamic, that which is threatened by virtue of being acted upon is automatically constructed as being victimized. Conversely, that which threatens it is *de facto* vilified and/or constructed as a villain or menace. Unsuspecting readers may have a strong identification with this type of causal threat and threatened, i.e., villain and victim, dynamic (between active and passive agents). Text producers can take advantage of this mental bias, in such a way as to construct a discursive picture of the victim that may create or influence, among readers, an underlying sense of fear, sympathy for the victim, and enmity against an often ambiguous, ill defined, unspecified and/or shadowy threat. I will apply this threat and threatened dynamic as an analytic and explanatory framework at various parts in the next two chapters.

One example of the threat and threatened (i.e., villain and victim) dynamic is the constant portrayal in politics and the media of the West as the innocent victim of “terrorism,” without any reference to its participation in creating situations in which violence has flourished. For instance, right after the attacks of 9/11, George W. Bush declared in a televised speech before Congress that they (i.e., “the terrorists”) hate us for our freedoms (Bush, 2001; see also McConnell, 2012). No mention was made of US foreign policy or aggressions abroad. Many point to the notion of “blowback” as a convincing account of how US policy and institutions contributed to producing the events
Taking a look at how the threat and threatened dynamic is constructed and/or exploited in Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, in the House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 (2001), the government states that, “The horrific terrorist acts of September 11 created suffering, fear and uncertainty. These events challenged Canadians’ sense of safety and security.” The text is discursively initiated by referencing the events of 9/11. This immediately draws to one’s mind the now-iconic, violent images of airplanes crashing into buildings and ensuing fireballs and subsequent collapse of the twin towers that comprised the World Trade Centre. These iconic images offer a surreal visual actualization of the active-passive causal dynamic within the contexts of the events of 9/11 and the associated terrorist threat. The quote tells the reader that these events (9/11) created great fear and suffering, setting the stage for a greater and deeper discussion of the threatened or victim(s) in other parts of the chapter.

After the initial literal and symbolic introduction to the threat and threatened, in the context of the war on terror and 9/11, the text precedes to elaborate upon that which is threatened, which encompass a very broad and even existential scope. While the events of 9/11 did not occur on Canadian soil and were not aimed at Canadians, with the exception of the 24 Canadians who were unfortunately present at the WTC on that day (see O’Malley, 2003), the text conflates the horrific acts of September with “Canadians’ sense of safety and security.” One way the text supports this claimed link, between the events of 9/11 and Canadian safety and security, is to construct the threatened as a broad collective and to construct the threat, simultaneously, as equally far-reaching yet somehow descriptively ambiguous.

For instance, as I made note of those things that the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 (the *ATA*), the preamble to the *ATA*, and the text of Bill C-35 identify as threatened, I observed that these things were very broad in scope, and seemed to be associated with things beyond *Canada* or the Canadian context. This is odd given that the government maintained, during its introduction of anti-terrorism laws, that the purpose of the laws is to strengthen Canadian national security and to restore the Canadian public’s sense of safety and security (see House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, 2001). However, in some
texts Canadian national security seems to include or to be connected with concerns that are also trans-national. In the following section I examine the discursive construction of the collective, and often global, identity of the threatened.

The construction of the collective identity of the threatened

i) Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 and preamble to the ATA

I observed that, at the text level, the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 (the ATA) and the preamble to the ATA seem to emphasize or foreground (see Huckin, 1997) the collective identity of those things that are threatened, by giving it what Huckin describes as “textual prominence” (para. 21). For instance, in the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, I observed wording or references to a collective identity employed fifteen times, and five times in the preamble to the ATA. I have listed these below; in the order they appear in each text.

Bill C-36 Sponsor Speech

1. Our values and way of life
2. Other democratic countries…
3. Other democratic nations…
4. Our collective sense of safety and security
5. All democratic nations…
6. Canada’s commitment to work together with the international community…
7. Whether we are in North America or somewhere else in the world…
8. We must…work with our neighbours and with our allies…
9. International conventions…
10. Our world…
11. Our lives…
12. Our most basic…
13. Our commitment…
14. All Canadians…
15. Public security…

Preamble to the ATA

1. Canadians and people everywhere…
2. Domestic and international peace and security…
3. Canada must act in concert with other nations…
4. International instruments…
5. Canada’s…allies…

Within the collective identify, there are both themes and scales of collectivity. For instance, in the above lists, some of the terms arguably refer to a national collective identity while others refer to a global scale of collective identity, and some may be
interpreted in either sense. Examples of words or phrases indicative of a national collective identity, in the speech and the preamble to the law are: “our collective,” “Canada’s commitment,” “we must,” “all Canadians,” “public security,” “Canadians,” “domestic,” and “Canada.” In the speech and the preamble, the aforementioned words appear in direct reference to Canada. The words or phrases that seem to describe or imply a global collective identity are: “counties,” “nations,” “international community,” “the world,” “global threat,” “our allies,” “international conventions,” “people everywhere,” international peace and security, and “Canada’s allies.” These words seem to suggest a global collective identity.

The following words could apply to either a national or global collective identity: “our world,” “frighten us,” “our lives,” “force us,” “our most basic,” and “our commitment.” These words appear in a sentence in the Sponsor Speech that begins with the statement, “Our world changed dramatically on September 11.” Here, the speaker/speech writer could be interpreted as referring to the world of Canadians or to the global world, or both. Overall, some of the wording is applicable to a national collectivity, while other parts can refer to both national and global collectivity, and the majority of the words refer to a global (or western) collectivity.

From the above lists we can see that the majority of the collective terminology refers to, or implies, a global collectivity or at the very least a commonality among “democratic nations.” In this respect, Canadian safety and national security is discursively constructed as linked to a wider or global security. The Sponsor Speech maintained that the “world changed dramatically on September 11” in a way that challenged “our collective sense of safety and security.” There are some notable disjunctions and omissions in this claim. The most apparent omission or deletion (see Huckin, 1997) is the fact that the events of 9/11 occurred in the US, and not on Canadian soil. The speech makes no mention of this and, with the exception of the statement about “our neighbours,” does not name the US directly. The word neighbours carries a very personal and endearing connotation and implies a direct proximity between what happened to our neighbours and Canadian interests.

The speech does not explain how something that happened in and to the US ends up threatening Canadians in such an existential way as to, as the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-
36 claims in other sections, threaten “our way of life.” Here, the events of 9/11 and the wider war on terror discourse of the Bush administration (see Hodges, 2011) are decontextualized from the US-specific context and then recontextualized as related to and effecting Canadians. What’s more, the events of 9/11 are also constructed as forcing the Canadian government’s hand, so to speak, in their necessary response to 9/11, which the government explained is to “re-evaluate our legal framework” in order to “strengthen national security” (House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, 2001). Ultimately, while the events of 9/11 did not happen in Canada, the Bill C-36 Sponsor Speech frames them as effecting Canadians and constructs terrorism as a global threat: “Whether we are in North America or somewhere else in the world, terrorism represents a global threat” (2001). For this reason, the government argued, “we must…work with our neighbours and with our allies” in the fight against terrorism. Overall, the words and phrases in the two lists above, relative to Canadians’ national security, disproportionately allude to and construct a global collective identity, thus linking Canadian national security to global security.

ii) Police Documents and Bill C-35: Constructing the Economy and International Organizations as Threatened

In the 2001 CSIS Public Report, the content of the document is framed (i.e., presented) (Huckin, 1997) in such as way as to cast Canada’s national security as part of or connected to global security. For instance, the document contains a section on the “global security environment” and ensuring Canada’s security. Here, much focus is given to the “protection of the Canadian economy” and the need to ensure security at “meetings held by multinational organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank” (p. 2). In this section’s topic foci (i.e., “the global security environment” and “ensuring Canada’s security”) and its content (i.e., the “protection of the Canadian environment” and “meetings held by multinational organizations”), Canadian economic security issues are discussed and presented alongside, and in the same context as, global and/or multinational security issues. Overall, throughout this section of the document, the two are mutually foregrounded, at the text level, and topicalized, at the sentence level,
(Huckin, 1997) in such a way that they become more and more interchangeable or conflated.

It is in this respect, I argue, that there seems to be a disjunction (Janks, 1997) between what the 2001 CSIS document focuses on and the stated purpose of the CSIS Annual Public Report. CSIS states on its website that, “The CSIS Public Report is an annual report that…discusses Canada’s security environment and CSIS’s national security role” (emphasis added). However, as the above analysis of the 2001 CSIS Report indicates, it would appear that Canada’s national security environment is connected to the global security environment in a manner that presupposes and arguably constructs a de facto link between Canadian national security and the protection of multinational organizations, without qualifying or explaining this link.

It is interesting and curious to note that the issues or topics foregrounded in the aforementioned section from the 2001 CSIS Report, i.e., the Canadian economy and meetings held by multinational organizations, appear repeatedly in the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse. I first observed this in my general, descriptive reading of the texts, and it struck me as odd that both the Canadian economy and, especially, multinational organizations and their meetings were included among things that are threatened by terrorism and/or in need of protection under anti-terrorism measures. In the following section I examine in greater detail how the economy, multinational organizations, and the meetings of multinational organizations are discursively constructed as threatened and in need of protection in the official anti-terrorism texts.

Like the 2001 CSIS Public Report, in its 2003 Public Report, in a section entitled “Threat Priorities,” CSIS lists “economic security” as a security priority (p. 7), and mentions economic security three times in a single section. Drawing on Huckin (1997), one can argue that, by giving textual preference to economic security in the Annual Report, CSIS demonstrates its commitment to, and the importance of, the protection of the economy and economic interests as part of the national security objective. Similarly, in the preamble to the ATA, the state stresses the need for the legislation to, “protect the political, social and economic security of Canada and Canada’s relations with its allies” (Anti-Terrorism Act, preamble). Moreover, part of the definition of “terrorist activity” in the ATA, which I examine in greater detail elsewhere, includes threats to economic
security. Within the Act, “terrorist activity” is defined in part as an “act or omissions committed ... with the intention of intimidating the public ... with regard to its security, including its economic security ... that intentionally causes ... substantial property damage, whether public or private” (s.83.01). By situating economic security among the important words in the discursive topic position (i.e., topicalization), the topic being the public’s security, the Canadian government creates a slant that places “economic security” and the protection of the economy as a priority in the fight against terrorism and ensuring public security. Simply put, it discursively frames the Anti-terrorism Act in a way that emphasizes the protection of the economy.

If one digs even deeper into the language of Canada’s ATA, one finds further emphasis on the protection of the economy. The ATA re-defined the Official Secrets Act, renaming it the Security of Information Act, which is S.27 of Bill C-36 (the ATA). Under subsection 3 of the Security of Information Act, entitled “Prejudice to the safety or interest of the State,” it states, “for the purpose of this Act a purpose is prejudicial to the safety or interest of the state if a person,” among other things: “adversely affects the stability of the Canadian economy, a financial system, or any financial market in Canada without reasonable economic or financial justification”; and, “impairs or threatens the capability of the government or the Bank of Canada to protect against or respond to economic or financial threats or instability” (S.27.3). Here, actions that threaten the economy, a financial system, or any financial market in Canada are constructed as threats to the safety or interest of the state.

In placing the word “or” between safety and interest, the government makes these two things interchangeable and thus bundles the “safety” of the state with the “interests” of the state or vice versa, within the categorization of that which is threatened by terrorism. However, it can be argued that safety and interests are not the same thing. For many, the word safety implies or connotes some type of physical safety or safety from physical harm, whereas interest could refer to any number of things, and is not necessarily as urgent or as dire as safety. While they are not the same, the discursive bundling of these concepts potentially allows two disparate things to be indirectly conflated and even bolster one another. There is a level of discursive manipulation at
work in this type of formulation, in that things that threaten the *interests* of the state can be indirectly conflated with and constructed as threats to the *safety* of the state.

For instance, the definition of “terrorist activity” includes acts or omissions intended to intimidate “the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, **including** its economic security” (s.83.01). By using the word “including,” the law links economic interests to threats to public security (and safety), thereby constructing the latter as a subset of the former. In other words, reference to public security *legally* includes economic security within the context of anti-terrorism discourse. Moreover, given that threats to the public’s *economic security*—which is now a component of public security—are among the first items listed as threatened in the *ATA*’s definition of “terrorist activity,” any subsequent mention within the anti-terrorism legislation, or as a consequence of the enactment of this legislation, of public security would, *de facto*, include economic security and interests.

While the *ATA* makes reference to economic security numerous times in the sections that I examined, there are no explanations or qualifications offered as to how terrorism or the threat of terrorist activity effects or threatens the economy. Nor does the text explain how or why economic security is part of public security; it simply links the two discursively in a way that presupposes an actual connection without qualifying the connection. Discursively, this an example of what Huckin (1997) describes as omission, leaving certain things completely out of a text. This technique “can be the most potent characteristic of textualization,” because what is not included in a text often does not enter the reader’s mind “and thus is not subjected to his or her scrutiny” (para. 17). With respect to the above sections of the *ATA*, it is difficult for the reader to raise questions about the validity of the claims that terrorism threatens the economy and economic security, and also that economic security is part of public security, if no causal explanations are offered in the text.

As an aside, a non-critical reader may be inclined to interpret this unexplained link as perfectly reasonable, given that the Canadian economy is part of a larger global economy (i.e., through globalization). And a threat to the global system or economic and/or trade infrastructure could consequently have a negative effect on Canadian economic security. Moreover, one can surmise that within the context of the alleged
global threat of terrorism, the would-be threat to Canada’s economy, if there really is one, could manifest as the threat to the integration between Canadian and foreign markets and to the economic and trade relations of Canada. Indeed the preamble to the *ATA* emphasizes the need to protect the security of “Canada’s relations with its allies” (*Preamble to ATA*, 2001). These relations include international economic relations.

That is to say that the economic threat is not purely a national one but results from the integrated and trans-local nature of the economy and economic interests and from Canada’s relations to other nations such as the US. Overall, it is almost inconceivable that terrorism could seriously threaten the Canadian economy (domestically) unless the threat, and the Canadian economy, can be linked to a larger trans-national context.

Indeed, in looking at the *ATA* in relation to or in connection with the larger dimension of the (US-led) global war on terror discourse, in which the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and discursive practices are nested, I make the following lengthy observation. By harkening to the events of 9/11 (as the government Sponsor Speeches do in their justifications for the anti-terrorism legislation), which occurred against the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York, one can argue for the not too subtle inference that terrorism violently targeted and threatened the financial heart of the US and western economic interests, while simultaneously assaulting public safety (i.e., through loss of life) and causing catastrophic property damage (i.e., the complete destruction of the WTC buildings) and disruption to municipal services. One can see all of these elements, i.e., economic security as linked to public security/safety and property damage, concretized within the Canadian law, and as discursively underpinning the unqualified claim that terrorism now poses a threat to the Canadian economy.

I argue above that by legally connecting public security with economic security, Bill C-36 conflates the two in a manner that makes the latter a de facto sub-set of the former in both the *ATA* and in any subsequent legal texts or discourse on anti-terrorism. This is evidenced in Bill C-35, which followed Bill C-36, and deals primarily with the protection of multinational organizations such as the G8 and the summit of the Americas (*Senate Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35*, 2001) and their meetings on Canadian soil. These multinational organizations categorically represent state and/or economic interests and not *public* (i.e., ordinary citizens’) security. In the following section I examine how the
anti-terrorism laws amend the legal definition of “international organizations” and construct them as threatened and in need of protection, within the context of terrorism and anti-terrorism.

In the Sponsor Speeches for Bill C-35, An Act to Amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, and in the legal text of the actual Bill, one finds the protection of “international organizations,” international summits and conferences, and “internationally protected persons” (IPPs) topicalized or emphasized, at both the text level and sentence level. During the second reading of Bill-35 in the House of Commons, the Liberals maintained that, “The main amendments [to the existing Act] are designed to facilitate international events including summits in Canada” of organizations such as the G8 (Bill C-35 House Sponsor Speech, 2001). A chief motivation for the Bill, the government maintained, was to correct “the deficiency in the existing statutory definition of ‘international organization’” (s. 1. (1)). For the government, this “deficiency” was the previously restrictive definition of “international organization,” which applied to intergovernmental organizations established by a treaty. Bill C-35 amends the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act and broadens the definition of “international organization” to include “… an intergovernmental organization, whether or not established by treaty, of which two or more states are members, and includes an intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate” (s. 1. (1)).

The government argued in this Sponsor Speech that it was necessary to include previously excluded organizations such as the G8 and the Summit of the Americas in the legal definition of “international organization” so that the meetings of these organizations and the “foreign officials” involved “obtain protection and treatment under Canadian [anti-terrorism] law” (Bill C-35 House Sponsor Speech, 2001). Bill C-35 also broadens the “internationally protected persons” (IPPs) status—as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code— to foreign representatives including diplomats and other “officials,” which now could include representatives of non-treaty organizations such as those identified above, and, CEO’s of major corporations attending summits in Canada (see Galati, 2001). This amendment provides the statutory basis for the privileges and immunities for officials in Canada (House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35, 2001). It is
interesting to note that while Bill C-35 is part of the anti-terrorism legislation, the Bill makes no direct reference to terrorism.

Essentially, Bill C-35 broadened the legal description of what constitutes an “internationally protected person” from “diplomats to mere delegates of a trade conference” (Schick, 2011, 2002, para. 6) and expanded the definition of “international organization” to include non-treaty organizations. The expanded definition of “international organizations,” and the legal privileges and immunities it guaranties, can be applied to the multinational organizations referred to in the 2001 CSIS Public Report, such as the “Organization of American States (OAS), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank” (CSIS, 2001, p. 2). In addition to the protection of international organizations and their trans-local meetings, the Senate Sponsor Speech for Bill-35 (2001) maintained that the Bill “would improve the ability of…Canadian cities to service the headquarters of international organizations operating their headquarters in Canada.” In addition, and more importantly for my research, it argued that, “The amended legislation would also help Canada compete with other countries to attract these headquarters or other international organizations” (37th Parliament, Issue #79).

When read in the (supposed) context in which this Bill was introduced, one has to wonder what servicing the headquarters of international organizations has to do with protecting the public from terrorism. There appears to be a disjunction between what the parliamentary speeches claim the legislation will do and what the legislation discursively achieves and/or emphasizes. Indeed, given the aforementioned entities and relations topicalized in the anti-terrorism legislation, one could argue that the legislation (or parts of it) appears partly aimed at making Canada safe for investors, Big Business and/or the military industrial complex.

Returning to the text of Bill C-35, to facilitate greater-protection of the agents and representatives of “international organizations,” Bill C-35 “provides that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police has the primary responsibility to ensure the security for the proper functioning of intergovernmental conferences” (Summary, Bill C-35). While the RCMP already had this authority informally, the Act clarifies “in statute the present common law authority for police to provide security and protection for high profile
international events” (Sponsor Speech, Bill C-35 2nd Reading). For instance, Bill C-35 explicitly protects the methods of transportation to the areas in which the “internationally protected persons” are to meet (Sponsor Speech, Bill C-35 2nd Reading). Given these discursive formulations within Canada’s “anti-terrorism” laws, attempting to block the movement or passage of buses carrying delegates, for instance, could be treated as a “terrorist activity.” In addition, in order to facilitate the protection of IPPs at international summits, Bill C-35 grants the RCMP the power to limit the rights of protesters “as they deem necessary” (see CFSC, 2003). It is interesting to note that the legal text foregrounds things such as the protection of international summits, attendant representatives from “international organizations,” protecting the means of transportation of these individuals, and the ad hoc limitation of protestors’ rights while making very little reference to public safety.

**A Note on Context**

At this point it is helpful to examine and comment on the larger social context in which Bill C-35 was introduced and the socio-historical conditions and social practices that informed its creation, thus moving briefly to Fairclough’s (1992; 1995; 2001) third level of discourse analysis, before continuing with the interpretation of discursive practices of the anti-terrorism texts. In the Senate Sponsor Speech (2001) for Bill C-35, the Liberal government explained, in very clear terms, its reasons for, and the intensions behind, changing the legal definition of “international organization.” The government explained that:

> The change to the definition of ‘international organization’ makes it clear that Canada can grant privileges and immunities…to the…**G8, and other international organizations that** are not established by treaty but are **integral to the conduct of Canada's international relations**…. The amendments…represent a **timely clarification, since Canada is scheduled to host the G8 summit in Canada** in Kananaskis, Alberta in June of next year….

**I would like to provide one of the reasons** for proposing such a provision in this bill. Shortly after the **Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City** last spring, a court challenge was launched in the Tremblay case [a case against a protestor],
alleging that the perimeter fence was an inappropriate security measure. The Quebec Superior Court held that the fence was authorized by law, and that it did not breach the Charter. **Given that Canada will be hosting international summits in the future, the government considers it useful that this law be given a statutory basis.** The amendment has been carefully drafted in light of the common law and statutory duties conferred on the police to keep the peace, to protect persons — including internationally protected persons — from harm and to protect **persons engaged in lawful demonstration** from unlawful interference (37th Parliament, Speech #79).

In the above excerpt, the government tells the reader/audience that the context and reason for the amendments ushered in through Bill C-35 are not due to terrorist threats *per se*, but are concerned with being able to better police and/or manage protests at summits held by non-treaty international organizations like the G8 and G20. In the above excerpt, the Summit of the Americas meeting held in 2001 in Quebec City is topicalized at the text level and at the sentence level. Maude Barlow (2001), of the Council of Canadians, describes the Quebec City summit of the Americas as, “The gathering of 34 heads of states of North and South America to further the economic and social integration of the Americas based on the US-style free market model known as the ‘Washington Consensus’” and to “consolidate North American corporate dominance in the countries of the South.” This integration would have been “accomplished by signing a ‘Free Trade Area of the Americas’ [FTAA] based on the model of NAFTA” (para. 2).

The FTAA was not signed during the Quebec City summit, and remains unsigned to this day. The last meeting over the FTAA was in 2005, and the Canadian government remains committed to resuming negotiations and signing the FTAA (Foreign Affairs & International Trade Canada, 2009). The Quebec City summit of the America’s attracted massive protests (called A20), which represent one of the largest anti-globalization demonstrations to that point in time (the OAS protests in Windsor in 2000 and the G8 protests in Kananaskis in 2002 also represent large and disruptive protests against corporate globalization around the time of the creation of anti-terrorism laws) (see De Lint & Hall, 2009; Peterson, 2006; Warren, 2004). Protestors and segments of the public condemned police for what they described as excessive use of tear gas, rubber bullets,
water cannons and mass arrests (see Legras, 2001). One of the biggest criticisms was the use of these tactics and the arrest of key activists during “green zone” protests, meaning sanctioned/legal protests, pre-approved by police officials (see Porter, 2010; Warren, 2004). A contested security practice was the erection of a security fence around the summit area, which was breached by protestors during the demonstrations. As the government speech above explained, during one protestor’s trial, a court challenge was launched claiming that the fence was an improper security measure. The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the challenge and held that the fence did not breach the Charter of Rights.

Overall, the Quebec City protests were the largest, and arguably the most disruptive, anti-globalization protests up to that historical juncture, especially for Canada. They presented new challenges for police (Warren, 2004) and the state with respect to protest policing and containment. From the government speech excerpt above, it is apparent that the legal amendments contained within Bill C-35 were aimed largely at addressing these challenges, at better “facilitating” international trade summits, and managing and/or limiting protest against these summits. In the Bill, this is achieved by extending the definition of “international organizations”—which are protected under Canadian law—to non-treaty bodies like the Summit of the Americas and the G8, which were previously unprotected by law. To be sure, the Summit of the Americas is explicitly named in the House of Commons Sponsor Speech for Bill-35. And in the above Senate speech, the government held that extending the definition to include such organizations, and legislating the powers of police during their international summits, is crucial “given that Canada will be hosting international summits [like the Summit of the Americas and the G8] in the future.”

It seems curious that only one-year after Canada hosted the summit of the Americas, a meeting that was wholly economic in focus and that attracted much public protest and opposition (as well as police brutality and mass arrests), the legal definition of “international organizations” was extended to include non-treaty organizations like the summit of the Americas, thereby protecting it and similar institutions under anti-terrorism law. Overall, given that the key amendments ushered in through Bill C-35 were created following the Summit of the Americans hosted in Quebec City in 2001, and given that the
government speeches specifically reference these events, it can be argued that this particular “anti-terrorism” policy may be aimed at things unrelated to terrorism.

The Discursive Construction of Threats

At the descriptive level of analysis, in chapter four, I made note of all those things in the anti-terrorism texts that one can identify as a threat and as threatened. Referring to the lists in that chapter, I note that in the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 (2001), the threat is mainly identified as terrorism or some variation of this word. In the speech, one finds the words and/or phrases “terrorism,” “terrorist activities,” “terrorists acts,” “terrorists,” “terrorist organizations,” “forces of terrorism,” “leaders of terrorists organizations,” “terrorist bombings,” and “the terrorists who carried out the…attacks of 11 September,” appearing forty-one times, aggregately. Similarly, in the very short (approximately one paragraph) preamble to the Anti-Terrorism Act, the words/phrases “acts of terrorism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist activity” appear ten times, aggregately.

Treated together, the CSIS Public Reports (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; 2005-2006; 2006-2007) focus primary on the following threats: “terrorism,” “terrorist acts,” “terrorist networks,” “international terrorist networks,” “Islamic religious extremism,” “the Sunni extremist threat, “Sunni Islamic extremism,” “the possibility of a terrorist attack,” “Al Qaeda,” “Osama Bin Laden,” “increasingly lethal terrorist tactics,” and the “possibility of weapons of mass destruction” (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) being used in or against Canada. The police documents emphasize the violent and lethal scale and scope of the terrorist threat. For instance, the 2003 CSIS Public Report maintained that:

The most significant threat to Canada is that posed by terrorism …. Terrorist capabilities, modus operandi, and technology continue to evolve, creating increasing demands upon governments and security forces to ensure unrelenting vigilance …. Safeguarding against the possibility of a terrorist attack occurring in, or originating from, Canada is the highest national security priority. (CSIS, 2003, p. 1)

In another part of the Report, CSIS continues that:

Emerging terrorist threats and tactics have become more lethal and intelligence failures could have catastrophic results …. the possibility that a
A weapon of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear) could be acquired and used by terrorist groups is now conceivable. Potential targets might include food sources and water supplies, heavily populated urban centres, and infrastructure critical to government and economic activity. (CSIS, 2003, p. 2)

In the above quotes, CSIS officials present terrorism as a very serious problem and threat (i.e., the most significant threat to Canada) that can have lethal and catastrophic results, without substantiating this claim. As a methodology, CDA attends to what is not said or written as much as what is (see Huckin, 1997; 2002; McGregor, 2004). Neglecting to prove this claim is problematic, not least because such unsubstantiated claims are used to justify greater security measures and the creation of draconian laws. For instance, due to the critical nature of the supposed threat of terrorism, the government and security forces are discursively constructed and presented as being forced to act. The first passage maintained that the scope and capabilities of terrorism “demands upon governments and security forces … vigilance” and “creative, cooperative responses.” Here, the state’s response to terrorism is constructed as a necessary or forced solution.

Similarly, in the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 (House of Commons, 2001), the government maintained that “reviewing our legal framework” in order to “strengthen our national security” was necessary following the events of 9/11 and the ensuing terrorist threat. Again, it is important to draw attention to what is not said in the texts. There are no alternative solutions suggested or even implied in either the parliamentary speech or the 2003 CSIS Report. Such omissions (Huckin, 1997) suggest or imply that the government’s hands are tied, so to speak, and that it has no other recourse but to introduce new legislation and enhance its security measures in the face of the potentially lethal and catastrophic terrorist threat. This is a very salient point. Essentially, the state presents the draconian legislation as necessary and as the only possible option in the face of terrorism. Here, the government constructs itself as forced to act due to external forces, thereby transferring moral and political responsibility to an external other (i.e., terrorists and the post-9/11 terrorist threat). In this way, state repression can be blamed on terrorism rather than the state. This is reminiscent of the flawed theory of the state of exception, examined in chapter three, which posits current state authoritarianism as a
response to crisis rather than a state of normalcy and/or standard operating for the modern state.

Given that the aforementioned texts constitute a significant component of the official anti-terrorism discourse, it is not surprising that they emphasize terrorism and the violent, lethal and/or catastrophic potential or outcome of terrorist attacks. At the same time, however, in many of the anti-terrorism texts (especially the House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35, the legal text of Bill C-36, and the RCMP document on radicalization), one also finds things that are arguably not associated or incongruent with terrorism and lethal terrorist violence, discursively constructed as a terrorist or security threat and/or as a subset of this threat. I investigate the discursive strategies involved in the process of construction of atypical or incongruent threats below.

The Construction of Incongruent Terrorist Threats

During the second reading of Bill C-35 in the House of Commons on October 5, 2001, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the Liberal Sponsor Speech for the Bill. Among the important passages from the speech is the government’s argument that:

Following the violent protests at international events, for example, Genoa and more recently the terrorist attacks in the United States, it would be timely for the government to clarify in statute the present common law authority for police to provide security and protection for high profile international events...

(House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35, 2001)

Leading from the work of Hodges (2011), who used critical discourse analysis of presidential speeches to demonstrate how two disparate “enemies” of the US—Iraq and Al Qaeda—“are discursively positioned as interchangeable adversaries” in the war on terror (p. 16; pp. 64-83), I argue that in the above quote, two dissimilar acts—terrorist attacks and violent protests—are discursively positioned as interchangeable and equal security threats. While the “terrorist attacks” of 9/11 are unrelated to the “violent protests” at Genoa, the two are presented in the same sentence and a similar context.

Before critically analyzing this discursive construction, it is useful to provide some context and background information on the Genoa protests. The “violent protests” cited in this speech are in reference to demonstrations at the July 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa,
Italy (see Warren, 2004). Genoa marked the culmination of the escalation of coercive tactics by the state used against the anti-globalization/global justice movement (della Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006) prior to 9/11 and the concomitant war on terror. During the two days of demonstrations, police made repeated violent charges that involved the great bulk of the peaceful protestors. On the proposal of some of the most senior officers present, “armoured vehicles were launched at high speed against the crowd” (p. 19). Members of the police forces fired at least 20 pistol rounds, one of which killed the young Italian demonstrator Carlo Giuliani (p. 19). It appears that the violence exhibited during the Genoa G8 protests was disproportionally that of police violence against citizens.

Returning to the aforementioned quote from the Sponsor Speech, one finds a constructed affinity between violent protests and terrorist attacks. Even though the two are not at all related, and demand an altogether different response, they are discursively presented as being similar on some level. In the speech passage, the two terms appear in the same sentence, and are presented as justifications for formally legislating police power to “provide security and protection for high profile international events” in Canada (House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35, 2001). This is an example of what Hodges (2011) describes as “recontextualization,” where something (in this case protests at an international summit) is decontextualized, and then recontextualized (see p. 8) into something else; in this case, as having to do with or being similar to “terrorist attacks”.

While Hodges uses the term to describe intertextual recontextualization, I use it here to describe the intratextual recontextualization (see Blommaert, 2005) at work in the Sponsor Speech. Through the language of the speech, the liberal government appears to make discursive connections between protests at international events and terrorist attacks. In addition, mentioning the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the same sentence as, and in reference to, protests at high profile international events not only decontextualizes the 9/11 attacks, it also trivializes them. The Canadian state exploits the very real violence and suffering that occurred on that day to discursively justify the push for greater security and policing for international summits. While protest and terrorist attacks are fundamentally unrelated, the psychologically manipulative effects are such that that reader or listener will likely make a connection between terrorist attacks and protests or
demonstrations against high profile international meetings. In this way, the government lends ideological credibility to its plans for, and legal codification of, greater police security at these meetings. As employed in this speech, the words “terrorist attacks” are part of what Raicu (2011) describes as the “legitimizing vocabulary of the ‘war on terror’” (p. 179), which is often employed out of context by officials. In addition, the discursive construction of connections or affinities between terrorist attacks and violent protests serves to stigmatize and delegitimize anti-G8 and similar types of protest (no matter how peaceful) by conflating it with terrorist attacks.

All of the above are examples of affinity used to create linkages that relate protest acts to terrorist acts. This process can be seen to resonate on a more detailed level when one looks at the phrase “violent protests,” on its own. While seemingly qualifying the discursive link between protests and terrorist violence, this phrase also functions as an affinity/modifier, wherein the first word modifies the second in such a way that at a certain point, violence and protest become discursively interchangeable and thus conflated. The effect is that protest, violent or not, is painted with the brush of violence.

Similarly, in a 2001 CSIS Public Report, affinities are constructed between the words “demonstrations” and “serious violence.” While the report states that, “the majority of protestors stage non-violent demonstrations,” the document goes on to state, in the same sentence and the same context, that, “these demonstrations also attract individuals who support the use of ‘serious violence’ to achieve their aims” (CSIS, 2001, p. 2). Here one sees presupposition and conflation at work in the discursive practices of the text. First, the text directly maintains that demonstrations attract individuals who support serious violence, without providing any statistical proof or qualification for this claim, making it a presupposition or unsubstantiated assertion. While it is an unsubstantiated claim, the text presents it with a tone of certainty and authority (Huckin, 1997) that the typical reader is unlikely to questions, especially given the official nature of the documents.

Other police documents are more direct in their discursive constructions of dissent as a threat, and even go as far as to categorize forms of activism as terrorism, broadly conceived. For instance, both the 2002 and 2003 CSIS Public Reports identify certain elements of activism as “domestic extremism,” which, according to CSIS, is one of the
four categories of “terrorism” in Canada. With regards to “domestic extremism,” CSIS’ 2003 Public Report states:

The potential for terrorist violence is not exclusively foreign-based. Domestically grown threats do exist. Violence can originate from any number of domestic radical groups ranging from the neo-Nazi movement to the violent\textsuperscript{xv} fringe of any number of single-issue groups such as the ecological, animal rights or anti-globalization movements. (CSIS, 2003, p. 4)

Here, one can see affinity at work in the construction of a relationship or a potential or actual proximity (see Horrocks, 1997) between anti-globalization groups, animal rights groups, ecological groups and white supremacists. This is highly problematic for anti-globalization, animal rights and environmental activists who do not necessarily have anything in common with the often hate-driven beliefs and agendas of white supremacists.

For instance, Rob Sinclair, campaigner with the International Fund for Animal Welfare, feels that equating animal rights groups with white supremacists is especially offensive. He states, “this is a sort of smear on the entire community …. To have this group thrown in with Neo Nazis is truly insulting. It sounds like CSIS is once again completely out to lunch” (Cheadle, 2003, para. 10). Commenting on the same report, former NDP leader Jack Layton said that all Canadians should be concerned by this report, as it infringes on individuals’ freedom of expression and the right to have a differing political opinion: “It looks as though CSIS is lumping together anyone who disagrees with the government …. It’s important to preserve the right of people to disagree. That’s one of the fundamentals of democracy” (Cheadle, 2003, paras. 8-9). Overall, lumping the ecological, animal rights or anti-globalization movement in with hate-based movements like the neo-Nazi movement serves to conflate these types of activism with something that carries very negative connotations in society, thus, smearing or delegitimizing these forms of activism.

Moreover, in describing these types of activist groups as “domestically grown threats” or “homegrown threats” (RCMP, 2009) and categorizing them as a type of terrorism and/or potential terrorism (i.e., “domestic extremism”), the RCMP and CSIS construct the notion that, in the global war on terrorism, the threat can emerge from
within Canada as well as from without. This means that the anti-terrorism discourse constructs local or domestic threats, villains and enemies in the context of the fight against terrorism. Moreover, using the word “grown” or growth in association with any kind of threat immediately conjures up negative connotations of a malignant or unwelcome ‘culture’ that must be excised. Here, I refer to culture both figuratively in the biological sense, and literally, in terms of the culture of popular opposition and activism.

In the following section I further examine the ways in which domestic threats are constructed, and the discursive processes at work in connecting and conflating particular types of political and ideological thought and/or politically and ideologically motivated action, with terrorism.

**Broad Definition of “Terrorist Activity”**

Terrorism conjures up images of extreme violence and physical harm against people, such as what happened in the case of 9/11. Indeed, as mentioned above, in describing the post-9/11 terrorist threat, many of the anti-terrorism texts I examined emphasize the physical suffering and misery caused by the 9/11 attack, lethal violence, potential terrorist bombings, the possibly of an attack against Canada that involves WMDs (see CSIS Public Reports, 2001, 2002, 2003; House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, 2001), etc. It is these types of extremely violent acts, or potential acts, that one would expect to find emphasized and foregrounded (Huckin, 1997) in the anti-terrorism legislation. To be sure, in his address to the Committee on Justice and Human Rights during parliamentary debates over the *ATA*, the former RCMP commissioner (2001) argued that the *ATA* was aimed at “serious acts of violence only.” Thus, one might expect that the law would define and formulate terrorism in a way that focuses on very specific acts of serious violence, such as bombings, etc.

However, the Anti-Terrorism Act’s definition of “terrorist activity” is far-reaching and vague. The *ATA* marks the first time that terrorism has been defined in the Canadian *Criminal Code* (Roach, 2003). Rather than focusing merely on specific acts of terrorism and/or specific acts of terrorist violence, the government of Canada adopted a generalized approach that is far-reaching and cumbersome. Canada’s definition of “terrorism” in the *ATA* was modeled after the already-wide definition of terrorism in the United Kingdom’s
Terrorism Act of 2000 and is actually even broader than that of the U.K. (Blaikie, 2001; Morden, 2010). I critically examine the Canadian definition below, using CDA.

Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act defines terrorist activity as an act or omission “that is committed … in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause,” and “with the intention of intimidating the public … with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act …” that “intentionally … endangers life” or “causes a serious risk to the … safety of…any segment of the public,” or “substantial property damage, whether to public or private property,” or causes “serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system , whether public or private …” “other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of the above” (s. 83.01).

Ideological Profiling

Approaching this definition as a totality, as a text unto itself, it is useful to begin by looking at the framing (Huckin, 1997) of the definition of “terrorist activity.” For Huckin, framing addresses how the content of the text is presented, what sort of angle or perspective the text producer is taking (para.15). Foregrounding, the text producer’s emphasis on certain concepts (by giving them textual prominence), is closely related to framing (para. 16). In the above definition of “terrorist activity,” the very first clause is an act or omission “that is committed … in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause.” By positioning this statement or condition at the very beginning of the definition—i.e., by foregrounding it—the state emphasizes the importance of what has come to be described as the motive clause (see Roach, 2003). In this way, the state legally frames “terrorist activity” as being politically, ideologically or religiously motivated.

This casts the net of what can possibly be considered “terrorist activity,” based on motive, rather broadly. In addition, one can argue that, given the wording in the above definition, if the motive for an act that fulfills the other qualifications in the definition of “terrorist activity” is of a different nature, such as for financial gain, notoriety, etc., the act although potentially criminal would not necessary be considered a terrorist act. Roach
(2003) argued that the inclusion of motive in the ATA was neither wise nor necessary “to distinguish terrorism from other crime” (p. 26). Unlike in the US, where proof of motive is not required, Canada’s motive clause makes “the politics of suspects a fundamental issue.” In this way, terrorism trials in Canada could become political and ideological trials reflecting what some call the “criminalization of politics” (Barabazon, 2006, p. 14).

The inclusion of political and ideological purpose in the language of the law instructs police to interpret the law in such a way that they can consider a citizen’s active involvement in the political life of the state as “evidence of one of the elements of the criminal offence of terrorism” (Rogge, 2001, para. 6). The inclusion of motive is unorthodox in Canadian law, and many feared at the time of the introduction of Bill C-36 that the motive clause could be used to target those with political, ideological or religious views deemed unusual or unpopular (i.e., non-mainstream and non-status quo) (see Holthuis, 2007; Klein, 2001).xviii

For instance, in a report published by the RCMP in 2001 entitled “The Hands of Terror,” it is stated that “potential terrorists” are often “operating under ideology as opposed to affiliation” (RCMP, 2001, para 3). Particular examples of what these ideological intentions are and the issues that are highlighted as being actively monitored by the RCMP include individuals and groups involved with activism concerning “genetically modified food and ongoing environmental concerns about water, forest preservations and animal rights” (para. 3). Ultimately, the discursive inclusion and foregrounding of emphasis on political, ideological and religious motive in Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation allows and instructs police agencies to interpret and construct deep and/or unpopular ideological and political beliefs as indications of the crime of terrorism. The issue of political and ideological motive resurfaces in my discussion of other police documents in other parts of the analysis.

_Terrorist Activity_ and Dissent/Protest

Returning to the aforementioned definition of terrorist activity, which lists a number of conditions for actions to be considered terrorist, one finds the following exception: “other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of the above” (ATA, s. 83.01). While this sentence seems to safeguard protest and dissent, it only excludes advocacy,
protest, dissent or stoppage of work “that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm” listed in the definition. I argue that the sentence can be seen as a type of discursive trap. If we break the sentence into parts, at the word “that,” we see that everything after the word “that” modifies what comes before it. The first part of the sentence—“other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work”—seems to exempt and protect advocacy and protest from being caught up in the broad and vague definition of “terrorist activity.” However the second part of the sentence—“that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of the above”—can be seen to potentially obfuscate the first section, not least because much of what activism and protest do, or aim to do, such as direct action and civil disobedience, could easily result in some of the things listed in the definition of terrorist activity – a point I develop below.

Indeed, if we deconstruct the entire above definition and focus only on those parts that could be applied to dissent and protest, then a selective interpretation of the definition of “terrorist activity,” as it may relate specifically to dissent, would be: an act or omission “that is committed … in whole or in part for a political … purpose, objective or cause,” and “with the intention of … intimidating the public … or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act” that “intentionally … causes … property damage …or… interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system” (ATA, s. 83.01).

One could argue that this describes or could describe any number of political demonstrations and/or acts of civil disobedience such as blocking a road, occupying an official’s office for a political purpose, starting a boycott campaign, etc. Essentially, just about anyone who attends a protest and engages in certain acts of civil disobedience could possibly be considered a “terrorist” under this omnibus Act. For instance, as Galati (2001) pointed out, “any protest that is going to cut off part of the city from essential services like ambulances by definition endangers life” and “is a terrorist act under this Bill” (para. 13). Moreover, just about any politically motivated awareness raising or educational campaign, such as alerting the public about dangerous chemical companies, dangerous weapons manufacturers or the dangers of genetically modified organisms (GMO), for instance, can be considered to be “intimidating the public.” And if the
campaign also involves blocking or disrupting an essential service, while handing out information leaflets or staging a large sit-in or a protest, for instance, it would constitute a “terrorist activity.”

It should be noted that an earlier, un-passed version of Bill C-36 included the word “lawful” in the exclusionary/exempting sentence. It stated, “other than as a result of advocacy, lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work” (Bill C-36, First Draft, First Reading in House of Commons, 2001). The problem here is who determines what constitutes “lawful” protest and dissent? Under the earlier definition, an illegal strike, for example, could still be a terrorist activity. These concerns were raised in the House of Commons debates, and the definition was amended to exclude the word “lawful” before the Bill became law (Mazer, 2002, p. 9). This notwithstanding, the current definition of “terrorist activity” is still overly broad and vague and threatens to capture protest and dissent whether it is “lawful” or not, not least because protests may and often do result in any number of the things listed in the current definition.

The following are some examples of activities that would be caught under the legal definition of terrorism or terrorist activity which may not remotely resemble terrorism: protest activities by Aboriginal people which disrupt an essential service or block a road as a protest against development activities on Aboriginal lands; workers involved in any number of strikes or the protestors of the Quebec City Summit or the APEC Conference in Vancouver; political activists who may have appeared as “terrorists” to those in power at a given time but who are ultimately remembered as champions of freedom such as Louis Riel or Nelson Mandela (Morden, 2001, p. 8). To this one can add student activists currently protesting the proposed Quebec university tuition hikes or anti-corporate globalization protestors at the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto.

The broad definition of terrorist activity is especially problematic when considered alongside new police powers ushered in through the ATA. These include the preventive arrest provision, which allows police officers to arrest and detain individuals without a warrant based on mere suspicion that a terrorist act may occur. Under this provision, police can detain individuals for up to 72 hours without providing or allowing access to a lawyer (see Blaikie, 2001; Galati, 2001; Mazer, 2002; Morden, 2010). These new powers, when combined with the broad definition of “terrorist activity,” have
implications for domestic dissent. As Sinson (2002) explained:

The legislation provides drastic new powers to police to arrest and detain suspected terrorists for long periods of time without recourse to a lawyer, suspending normal rights of due process. Despite police claims that the legislation was not meant to be used against domestic protestors, it contains such a broad and sweeping definition of a terrorist that it can be used against the Left. (p. 5)

**Radicalization: Constructing Non-Mainstream Thought (& action) as a Threat**

In the following section I examine a text produced by the RCMP that is one of the most important and instrumental texts for the purpose of my research focus. As such, it is given special attention. This text has some similar discursive effects as some of those achieved through the *ATA*’s definition of “terrorist activity” and also serves to indirectly modify key parts of the definition. Overall, this document presents opportunities for multi-dimensional analysis. It is discursively instrumental on its own and also in relation to the *ATA*, and I informally go back and forth between interpretation and explanation—two of Fairclough’s (1992; 2001) stages of analysis—in examining it. While I am interested in the discursive practices of this text, the document also allows me to begin to look (more deeply) at the relationship between texts as well as the relationship between text and larger social context and/or social practices.

In a 2009 report by the of the National Security Criminal Investigations division of the RCMP entitled “Radicalization- A Guide for the Perplexed,” the text describes radicalization as “a critical **subset of the terrorist threat.**” The text states that:

The RCMP defines radicalization as the process by which individuals — usually young people — are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages **movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs** towards extreme views …. **Radical thinking** … [only] **becomes a threat to national security** when Canadian citizens or residents **espouse** or **engage in** violence or **direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism.** Sometimes referred to as ‘homegrown terrorism,’ this process of radicalization is more correctly referred to as **domestic radicalization leading to terrorist violence.** (RCMP, 2009, para.1)
Taking this excerpt apart we can see that, in the sentence before the block quote, radicalization is topicalized both at the text level and the sentence level and identified as a “critical subset of the terrorist threat.” Referring to my descriptive categorization of the binary form of threat and threatened, which I discuss in chapter four, this text clearly identifies radicalization as a component of the terrorist threat. The word “critical” descriptively modifies the word radicalization in a manner that makes the scale of the threat posed by radicalization extreme and urgent. The threat discussed in this quote is the threat of the process of radicalization, a process that (through exposure to an ideological belief system) encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views.

Moreover, in the above quote, one finds the presupposition that the promotion of political, ideological or religious “extremism” is a motive for terrorism or terrorist violence. For this reason one can argue that this document is related to the *Anti-Terrorism Act* (Bill C-36), which defines “terrorist activity” in a way that includes “political, religious or ideological” motive (s.83.01). The RCMP document takes from the *ATA* the concept of ideological, political and religious motives being linked to terrorist activity or, in this case, to terrorist violence. Both texts topicalize political, ideological and religious motive. In this way, the motive clause is topicalized intratextually and intertextually. The Act treats the motive as qualifiers for terrorist activity (for instance, if a person arguably does the same activity for money, it would not qualify as terrorist activity). And the RCMP text describes the process by which such motives are constructed (i.e., radicalization). In other words, the police document describes the process by which one becomes ideologically, politically or religiously motivated to engage in “terrorist activity” (i.e., they get radicalized). In this respect, the discursive relationship between the two texts is that the RCMP documents serves to modify or explain the *ATA*’s motive clause.

Overall, in the RCMP document it is the process of radicalization that is identified and constructed as a type of threat. As stated above, this is a process whereby individuals, especially youth, “are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views” (RCMP, 2009). In this formulation, the things that are threatened are moderate,
mainstream beliefs, and those individuals who may be at risk of abandoning mainstream thinking for more radical views.

The document stresses that radical thinking, the outcome of radicalization, is only a threat to national security and/or a part of the terrorist threat, when individuals “espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism.” So what the RCMP is effectively attempting to stop or prevent are the individual associations necessary for the promotion of information pertaining to religious, ideological or political “extremism,” and the ability to disseminate such information. Thus, radicalization or radical thinking/extremism is only a threat when it attempts to go beyond the scope of the individual and attempts to promote and further (by espousing or engaging in violence of direct action) its message to a broader public. This is ironically what much advocacy, protest and/or activism seeks to accomplish (though arguably via direct action rather than violence, see Fernandez, [2008]; Warren, [2004]).

The document fails to define “extremism” or extreme views outright. This is an important and problematic omission (see Huckin, 1997), not least because the unsuspecting reader is unlikely to question what does not appear in the text (Huckin, 1997). In addition, given the official authorship of the text, the use of the word “extremism,” which carries negative and even violent connotations, to qualify or modify the words religious, political and ideological may serve to manipulate uncritical text interpreters/readers into making negative assumptions or conclusions about individuals with deep religious, ideological or political convictions. Moreover, while the RCMP does not explicitly define extremism, given that the text constructs moderate, mainstream views as threatened by radicalization, one can surmise that for the RCMP, extreme views are those that somehow challenge or do not agree with the mainstream or status quo.

It should be noted that the document does not define moderate or mainstream, either. The assumption is that readers know what those words and positions mean. Discursively, these words carry connotations that link them to normal or correct ways of thinking. The insinuation (see Huckin, 1997) here is that individuals who do not hold moderate, mainstream views may think in ways that are abnormal or deviant.

All of the above have implications for dissent. Given that espousing or engaging in direct action becomes a national security threat when it is done to promote political,
ideological or religious “extremism,” and given that dissidents often espouse or engage in direct action to promote political and ideological “extremism,” i.e., non-mainstream or non-status quo views and agendas, dissent or civil disobedience can be constructed as a national security/terrorist threat. This is especially true because it is often done for political and ideological reasons. Any direct action, or simply the espousal of direct action, that promotes views or agendas that are against the mainstream or dominant order and ideology can be formulated as a subset of the terrorist threat. This could include the promotion of anti-war or environmental sentiments or direct action related to these issues, since both of these views are counter to the mainstream.

The RCMP document essentially calls for the policing and undermining of the potential for non-mainstream political or ideological views to be promoted or grow in Canada. In this respect, even a leaflet campaign that spreads and promotes non-mainstream political views and issues can be seen as a potential threat. So too could “extreme” political or ideological views. Under the discursive formulations in this document, all of the above could be seen as promoting or facilitating radicalization and, therefore, as a sub-set of terrorism or a “new challenge” in the war on terror.

As a final note on this quote from the RCMP text, one can point out that the relationship between that identified as a threat—i.e., the process of radicalization—and that identified as threatened—i.e., (individuals with) moderate, mainstream views—is that radicalization threatens to transform certain individuals from moderate, mainstream thinkers to radical thinkers. Radicalization, in turn (especially when coupled with politically, religiously or ideologically motivated direct action or the promotion of it), can, by definition, transform individuals into a subset of the terrorist threat and/or lead to terrorist violence. This is similar to an observation and argument made by Bartolucci (2010) in her CDA work on the terrorism discourse of the Moroccan government. She found that in the official terrorism discourse, radicalism and/or radicalization are considered the main factors leading to “terrorism.” In the discourse, she argued, “a simple logic of causation is implicitly assumed in such a way that the link between radicalism and terrorism becomes indissoluble” (pp. 127-128). A similar discursive logic of causation is at play in the RCMP document on radicalization, wherein radicalization is presented as a transformative process, from a moderate to extreme/radical individual, that
inevitably can lead to terrorist tendencies in individuals with newly formed extreme or radical political and ideological views.

In another noteworthy section of this RCMP text, the document goes on to discuss other segments of the population that are vulnerable to becoming radicalized, and thus a subset of the terrorist threat. The text states that:

Other vulnerabilities and vectors for radicalization include the **global development of linkages** between the political left wing (“reds”) and Islamist extremists (“greens”). **The unifying factor is, to a large extent, opposition to globalization, capitalism, and US foreign and security policy, coupled with anti-Israel sentiment and admiration for the purported social activist component of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezballah. This seemingly counterintuitive discovery of common cause is allowing Islamist groups to cloak themselves in the rhetoric of liberation for oppressed peoples** and, more importantly, to participate actively in the broader spectrum of western politics. (RCMP, 2009, para. 47)

This excerpt is complex and contains numerous entry points for analysis. I begin with a sentence near the end of the excerpt: “This seemingly counterintuitive discovery of common cause is allowing Islamist groups to cloak themselves in the rhetoric of liberation for oppressed peoples.” Because of the common misuse of the word *rhetoric*, which functions as a pejorative, this sentence belittles individuals who speak as or on behalf of the oppressed. In everyday parlance, *rhetoric* means empty or inflated language. Thus, the *insinuation* (Huckin, 1997) is that “reds” and “greens” are both ridiculous and disingenuous in their talk (i.e., *rhetoric*) of liberation for oppressed peoples. Indeed the quote constructs or identifies such speakers as “cloaked,” signifying something hidden, disguised and/or sinister. Lastly, what this claim does is throw suspicion on anyone defending oppressed people, since they may be using that rhetoric to cloak their real intentions.

Another sentence that warrants analysis is: “This seemingly counterintuitive discovery of common cause.” Here one finds both *omission* and *presupposition* at work in the text (see Huckin, 1997). The text producers neglect to substantiate this claim of common cause or to explain who made this counterintuitive discovery. Instead, it is
simply presupposed that there is indeed this particular common cause, listed in the quote, between the political left wing (“reds”) and Islamist extremists (“greens”). Moreover, the text does not define what is meant by “seemingly counterintuitive.” This is not a phrase that is easily discernable. At best, it is confusing, and at worst, is seems like an oxymoron. If anything, the fact that the RCMP admits that this so-called discovery is counter-intuitive raises questions about the validity of its claim about a common cause between the “reds” and “greens” in the first place.

Having examined some specific sentences from the above quote, in the following sections I look at the quote more broadly and analyze the numerous negative and/or problematic formulations of the political left wing (“reds”). In the quote, there are several discursive strategies at work in constructing the political left wing as a (potential terrorist) threat. First, this quote presupposes that radicalization is a threat. Second, radicalization is intratextually decontextualized from its Canadian or national context, in the earlier section of the text, and then recontextualized as related to (or resulting from) “the global development of linkages between the political left wing (‘reds’) and Islamist extremists (‘greens’).” In other words, radicalization is recontextualized within the sphere of global influences and linkages between “reds” and “greens.” Specifically, individuals who are politically motivated and non-conservative/mainstream (e.g., the political left wing or “reds”) and individuals who are religiously motivated (e.g., Islamist extremists or “greens”) are constructed as sharing in, or linked through, common political/ideological unifying factors. These unifying factors include: “opposition to globalization, capitalism, and US foreign and security policy, coupled with, anti-Israel sentiment and admiration for the purported social activist component of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah” (RCMP, 2009, para. 47).

It should be noted that while the text uses the word factor, singular, it actually lists five different things (see above), and does not specify which among them is the unifying factor. Rather it discursively presents all of these five things as representing a single unifying factor. Beyond this, whether the unifying factor is one thing or many things, the text does not demonstrate that “reds” and “greens” are united in any of these ways and/or over any of these issues. Rather, this task is left up to the analyst to attempt to discern. Using CDA, I address all of these problems and tasks below.
One problem is that the text assumes or presupposes that “reds” and “greens” share these sentiments in common. This is never proven but rather stated in a way that takes it for granted, and as such, is not likely to be scrutinized by the uncritical reader. More importantly, the phrase “coupled with” served to connect two sets of beliefs or sentiments—i.e., opposition to globalization, capitalism, and US foreign and security policy and anti-Israel sentiment and admiration for the purported social activist component of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezballah—that are not necessarily linked. Opposition to globalization or capitalism do not equate with support for Hamas and Hezballah.

Though the text fails to prove or qualify this link, it nonetheless discursively constructs it. Specifically, it grammatically and syntactically creates the link by defining the two blocs or types of opposition and then using the phrase coupled with to bridge or connect the two. In essence, the RCMP is linking two things that are not necessarily related, twice.

If one deconstructs the structure of the above quotes, against the backdrop of an examination of some of the actual social practices of “reds” and “greens,” we can begin to unveil what, if any, unifying factors the two may in fact share. Looking at the first type of opposition, i.e., to globalization, capitalism, and US foreign and security policy, what might both the political left wing and Islamist extremists share or be equally opposed to? It is well documented that large segments of the “political left wing,” which I define as individuals working for global justice or who have global justice sentiments, are critical of and/or opposed to globalization and capitalism (see Chehade, 2004; McNally, 2006; Starr, 2000). It is also well documented that the “political left” (which I define as elements and actors critical of the neoliberal and/or mainstream policies and/or the status quo) is often critical of and opposed to US foreign and security policy (see Fernandez, 2008; McNally, 2006; Rupert, 2000; Starr, 2000).

Islamists or “Islamist extremists”, on the other hand, are not necessarily focused on opposition to globalization and capitalism. While Islamist groups are often presented as being opposed to globalization (see Karim, 2004; Maisami, 2003), as Maisami (2003) explained, what many Islamist groups actually oppose is westernization, which I argue is more of a cultural process than an economic one. Moreover, some Islamist groups or
parties fully support capitalism and global capitalism, especially at the current historical juncture. The revolutions of the “Arab Spring,” for instance, have produced some Islamist regimes that are sympathetic to capitalism. For example, “the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has assured the western powers of its commitment to free-market capitalism” (Gerges, 2012, para.8). Considered to be “Islamist extremists” by many in the west (see Chomsky, 1989; Parenti, 2002; 2005), groups like Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (which came to power in the June 2012 elections) and similar new religious regimes in Tunisia and Morocco have “interests to deal with global financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank” (Gerges, 2012, para.14).

Thus it cannot be presupposed, as it is in the 2009 RCMP document, that Islamists necessarily share an opposition to globalization and capitalism with the political left wing and vice versa. There is, however, much opposition to US foreign and security policy traditionally found among Islamist groups and parties. So, in the first bloc or type of opposition listed in the RCMP document (i.e., against globalization, capitalism, and US foreign and security policy), one can argue that “reds” and “green” are both critical of US foreign and security policy. This is the one thing they can arguably be said to have “in common” in this category.

Looking at the second type of opposition listed in this document—i.e., anti-Israel sentiment and admiration for the purported social activist component of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah—it can be argued that many individuals and groups described as “Islamist extremists” admire the purported social activist or social services component of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah (see CeSPI, IDEA & IAI, 2010). Similarly, those defined or described as religious/Islamist extremists in the region are often critical of Israel’s occupation of Palestine and its policies toward the Palestinians (see Chomsky, 1999; Gordon, 2004; Karim, 2003). The “political left wing,” on the other hand, which is not a monolith, is not generally sympathetic or supportive of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Indeed many on the left, especially self-described anarchist groups (see Sunshine, 2008), are critical of and denounce these groups, including their social roles or services. While many on the left support the Palestinian plight and cause, they do not necessarily support groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. As Rosa-Rossa (2009) pointed out, “the vast majority of the Left, including communists, agrees in supporting the people
of Gaza against Israeli aggression, but refuses to support its political expressions such as Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon” (para.2).

This means that opposition to Israeli policies and support for the Palestinians does not necessarily translate into support for these “terrorist groups.” It is fallacious, therefore, to conflate the two, as the RCMP document does. While they do not commonly support Hamas and Hezballah, many left-wing groups are known and documented for being critical of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and the occupation (see Chomsky, 1999; Cook, 2010; Petras, 2006). Indeed on numerous university campuses across Canada, there are Palestinian solidarity groups, participation in the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) campaign (a campaign to boycott Israeli products and goods on all levels; see Waxman & Zonszein, 2011) and participation in Israeli Apartheid Week, which is a week-long series of awareness-raising talks and cultural events, etc., for the plight of the Palestinians. Thus, for the second bloc or type of opposition, and overall, what “reds” (the political left wing) and “greens” (Islamic extremists) can arguably be said to have in common is a criticism of Israel’s policies toward and treatment of the Palestinians.

While the document does not specify this singular link, and indeed attempts to construct the so-called unifying factor between “reds” and “greens” as a seemingly counterintuitive multiplicity, social analysis of the wider socio-historical context and the social practices of “reds” and “greens” has revealed opposition toward US and Israeli policy to be the sole “unifying factor.” In this respect, one has to wonder if the purpose of this text is not, in part, the protection of the US and Israel and their policies. In addition, one has to ask what the protection of US and Israeli policies and action has to do with the protection of Canadian national security in the context of Canadian anti-terrorism measures and discourse.

While “Islamist extremists” are not necessarily concerned with active opposition to globalization and capitalism, I contend that these two things (opposition to globalization and capitalism) are likely discursively thrown in with words like “Islamic extremists,” Hamas, and Hezballah in order to conflate the political left wing, and opposition to globalization and capitalism, with Islamic extremists, and thus delegitimize the former in the Canadian public imagination. Moreover, conflating the political left and its opposition
to globalization or capitalism with Islamic terrorism may serve to justify the suppression or criminalization of this form of dissent within the context and agenda of the war on terror and anti-terrorism. These are points that are further explored, among other points, in the next chapter.
Chapter Six: Explanation (Social Analysis)

In this final analysis chapter, I undertake the third stage of Fairclough’s (2001) three-part analytic strategy – explanation. Here I look more closely at the relationship between texts, the relationship between text and larger social contexts/social practices, and the relationship between the various things constructed as threats and threatened within the anti-terrorism discourse, along the backdrop of the wider context and social practices. These are interrelated and interconnected, and as such, are not treated separately but simultaneously. It is largely from this level of analysis that I formulate my conclusions.

Relationship between Text and Context and Relationship between Texts

Having critically examined the discursive constructions and strategies at work in the texts, it is important to look at the texts in relation to the larger social contexts and conditions in which they are produced – Fairclough’s (2001) third dimension of discourse. As this overlaps with the relationship between texts, I move back and forth between the two (relationship between text and context and the relationship between texts) in the following section.

In parts of the interpretation chapter, I illustrate how certain types of dissent are constructed as a threat within official anti-terrorism discourse in Canada. As I observed these formulations within the discourse, I asked myself if dissent really does constitute a terrorist threat and what other contexts, beyond the threat of terrorism, may have contributed to such formulations. The government claimed during its introduction of anti-terrorism laws that the context and reason for this legislation, and by extension, for the types of discursive constructions contained therein and analyzed in chapter five, was the watershed event of 9/11 and the global threat of terrorism. For instance, as mentioned in other parts of the analysis, the Liberal Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 (House of Commons, 2001) states that:

The horrific terrorist acts of September 11 created suffering, fear and uncertainty. These events challenged Canadians’ sense of safety and security …. The world changed on September 11 in a way that changed our collective sense of safety and security. Reviewing our legal framework was one component of a more thorough review undertaken by the federal government to strengthen our national security.
In this quote, the government identifies a critical problem, i.e., 9/11 and the grave threat posed by terrorism, and points to the need to review its legal framework as part of the solution to the problem, which is strengthening our national security. Given that the speech is in support of new legislation, we know that the solution entails a transformation of the Law, and by extension, societal changes that may result from the enactment and enforcement of the new laws. The above government quote signifies that the events of 9/11 constitute a global paradigm shift. And as a result of this paradigm shift, the government presents itself as being forced to reexamine and transform its actions and policies.

As a forced reaction to the external transformation ushered in by 9/11, anti-terrorism measures are *de facto*, though not explicitly, presented as unique and different from the government’s pre-9/11 security agenda. If this were true, then one would expect to find stark differences between the discursive practices of pre-9/11 security texts and post-9/11 security texts. However, as the following section illustrates, an examination of pre-9/11 texts suggests that the state and police agencies were already targeting particular types of dissent and constructing them as security threats, even before the watershed events of 9/11 and the global threat of “terrorism.” For instance, in the years immediately preceding 9/11, Canadian police agencies were *already* naming the “anti-globalization” movement as a growing concern and possible security threat.

For instance, in a 2000 CSIS document (see appendices) on the “anti-globalization” movement, the movement and its security implications are *foregrounded* (Huckin, 1997) at the text level and *topicalized* (Huckin, 1997) at the sentence level. In addition, at the sentence level, the movement’s criticism of capitalism is placed in the topic position, thus emphasizing it. The document identifies the “anti-globalization” movement as a “growing security concern” and states that, “Underlying the anti-globalization theme is criticism of the capitalist philosophy, a stance promoted…by left-of-centre activists and militant anarchists” (CSIS, 2000, para. 7). By naming the movement as a growing security concern, and then discursively situating the movement’s underlying criticism of capitalist philosophy in the same sentence, the text creates a linkage between a critique of capitalism and security concerns. This discursive linkage constructs an *insinuation* that
the anti-globalization movement is a growing concern or threat, at least in part, because of its critical stance towards capitalism.

Similar discursive formulations are at work in CSIS’ 2000 Annual Public Report, which reproduces and expounds upon some of the points made in the above CSIS document. Like the text above, this Report came out one year before the events of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror. Similar to the above text, the anti-globalization movement is topicalized in this Report as among the Service’s security concerns. In a section entitled the “Global Security Environment,” CSIS argued that its security concerns are growing and names activism and protest against corporate power as an emerging security issue. The text states:

An example of the wide range of security issues of concern to the Service, the emerging phenomenon of anti-globalization is demanding increasing attention. Meetings of international monetary, trade and environmental organizations, which in the past elicited no protest interest, are now the focus of thousands of activists [who] share a mutual antipathy for multinational corporate power …. Underlying the anti-globalization theme is criticism of capitalist philosophy.

(CSIS, 2000b, p. 3)

Social analysis

It is interesting that the 2000 CSIS Public Report topicalizes meetings of international monetary, trade, and environmental organizations. By placing these in the topic position (i.e., security issues of concern to CSIS) the text producer creates a perspective (see Huckin, 1997) that highlights these things as important to, or a part of, CSIS’ national security agenda. By emphasizing these types of international organizations within a national security context, the text producer can influence the reader’s perception (Huckin, 1997), and acceptance, of these organizations, and their meetings, as connected to Canadian national security. Again, this is a process that began before the events of 9/11.

For my research purposes, it is even more interesting to note that the text points out that international monetary, trade, and environmental organizations had not elicited protest interest in the past. It is important to look at the larger socio-historical context at the time this document was produced. This observation by CSIS comes very shortly after,
and in the context of, the massive and successfully disruptive 1999 WTO protests in Seattle, which many consider to be the official emergence or crystallization of the anti-corporate globalization movement in the west, and especially Anglo-America (see Starr, 2000; McNally, 2006). For many, the anti-corporate globalization movement marked a time of political resurgence and awakening that was gaining momentum and becoming progressively more popular (see Starr, 2000; McNally, 2006; Fernandez, 2008). Moreover, this movement was decidedly more emboldened and confrontational and less willing to acquiesce to a sanctioned protest model (popular in the 1980s) of cooperation with the state (see Fernandez, 2008; Flesher Fominaya & Wood, 2011)

What’s more, as the above CSIS Public Report suggests, the anti-corporate globalization movement was among the first mass protest movements in the west to explicitly name and challenge global capitalism, and its institutions, as a socially, economically, and ecologically destructive politico-economic system (see Starr, 2000; Rupert, 2000). Thus, the continued success of this mass, trans-national movement could conceivably undermine the relations of global capital, global power and the capitalist state (which I discuss in chapters two and three of this dissertation).

From the position of CDA, a context-sensitive analysis (see Janks, 1997; Huckin 2002) of the above (pre-9/11) CSIS documents demands that we consider and examine them against the backdrop of the context I just described; the 1999 Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization and the growth and momentum of the anti-corporate globalization movement.

When examined in this context, the statements made, and the issues prioritized and emphasized, in the pre-9/11 CSIS texts, lead me to speculate that when wide dissent and activism began to be explicitly directed against the institutions of multinational corporate power and/or global capital, and their actions or policies, such dissent began to be perceived and constructed as a “national” security threat by the capitalist state. Indeed in a cursory look at several CSIS Public Reports before 1999 and the success of the Seattle anti-globalization protests, which I do not cite here, I observed that anti-globalization and/or anti-capitalist activism and protest were not at all discussed or mentioned in CSIS’ discussion of the global security environment or of threats to national security.
It appears that, with respect to CSIS, what discursively qualifies an actor or phenomenon as a security threat or concern is driven (or informed), in part, by what the discourse further defines as the “target” of this constructed threat. The fact that this process began before the events of 9/11, and the fact that the post-9/11 texts I examined continue to construct anti-globalization activism as a security threat, and indeed as part of the terrorist threat, may support the view that the motivation behind Canada’s anti-terrorism measures may extend beyond the fight against terrorism and may be the result of events other than or in addition to the supposed watershed events of 9/11.

Indeed, while Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation was introduced in the context of the attacks of 11 September 2001, as the NDP argued in its speech at the second reading of Bill C-36 in the House of Commons, it more importantly also arose in the context of increasing domestic control and the stifling of dissent and/or any unwelcome opposition to government policies, a process that predates 9/11 (Blaikie, 2001). NDP representative Bill Blaikie stressed in his speech to the House that the legislation is not to be considered in isolation:

> We are unfortunately not just dealing with the context of September 11… the backdrop for this in the minds of a lot of Canadians is APEC and Quebec City… The government might say that is an entirely different thing. The question is whether or not the bill is designed in such a way as to make sure that the kind of protest activities that took place in Vancouver at the APEC meeting, in Windsor at the OAS meeting and in Quebec City at the FTAA meeting will be treated differently from the kind of activity which is addressed in this particular legislation. (37th Parliament, Speech #095)

Overall, in looking critically at Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and the creation of anti-terrorism measures, one must look beyond the state’s reasoning for their creation, and examine the entire social and political context in which they were created. While Canadian anti-terrorism laws may have been introduced in the context of 9/11 and the “war on terror,” they also, and more importantly, were created in the context of the criminalization of dissent in Canada, a process with a long and shameful history (which I examined in chapter two). As argued in chapter two of the dissertation, and as McCullough (2002), Chang, (2002), Lindorff (2004), Mazer (2002) and Callinicos (2003)
have all demonstrated, 9/11 did not create a new or uniquely draconian policy environment. Rather post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures are proactive measures that overlap with and further the historical movement toward an increasingly repressive state (Chang, 2002; Lindorff, 2004; McCullough, 2002). From a historical materialist perspective, given the history of state repression in Canada, and given the formulation of particular types of opposition and dissent as security threats in the pre-9/11 CSIS texts, post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures can be seen as a continuation and intensification of the state’s repression of opposition (see Callinicos, 2003; De Lindt & Hall, 2009; Warren, 2004).

This suggests that the context and reason for the creation of anti-terrorism measures may be something other than, or in addition to, the threat of terrorism and the events of 9/11. In the following section I examine the relationship between the anti-terrorism texts, and the relationship between text and larger social context, more closely.

**Relationship Between Texts**

*Contradictions and Disjunctions*

The first thing worth noting about the relationship between the Canadian anti-terrorism texts I examined, is that the discursive practices of certain texts seem to contradict claims and assurances made in other texts. This is observable on two levels. First, in the parliamentary Sponsor Speech for the *Anti-terrorism Act*, the Liberal government maintained that we must address “Canadians’ sense of safety and security … as our first priority” (Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, 2001). However, as analyses of other texts illustrated, the language of and discursive constructions within the actual law and public police documents appear to focus disproportionally on the safety and security of the economy, financial systems, non-treaty international organizations such as the G8 and G20, the international conferences of these organizations, and their representatives. These are not the types of entities that readily come to mind when one thinks of “public safety.”

For instance, and most notably, Bill C-35 extends Canadian legal protections to previously unprotected global financial institutions and economically based international organizations, such as the IMF, WTO, World Bank, G8, and G20, and their representatives during international monetary and trade meetings in Canada. Fernandez (2008) describes these institutions as *globacracies*, institutions that serve and facilitate…
economic interests and global free market capitalism (see also Gerges, 2012). Part of the official protection of these intuitions entails limiting dissent and protest during the meetings of such organizations, given that Bill C-35 allows the RCMP to infringe on the rights of protestors as they see fit (see Clarke & Clarke, 2002) – an example of how the laws protect global power by targeting those who oppose or target it.

The second way in which the texts contradict one another concerns the issue of dissent. During parliamentary debates about the proposed anti-terrorism legislation, officials proclaimed emphatically that these laws were not aimed at dissent. For instance, during his speech before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, former Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Giuliano Zaccardelli, maintained that:

This legislation is in no way meant to address public dissent in this country or any such thing. This legislation is meant to deal with very limited…serious acts of violence based on certain things. This is in no way whatsoever aimed at reducing dissent or discussion in this country. (37\textsuperscript{th} Parliament, October 2001)

However, the Commissioner’s assurances are contradicted in the texts I examine in chapter five. For instance, to reiterate points made in chapter five, my interpretive analysis of the definition of terrorist activity in the ATA demonstrates that the definition is so broad as to capture political dissent. What’s more, the definition’s inclusion of a political, ideological and religious motive clause, which is later modified in the 2009 RCMP document on radicalization, may be interpreted as instructing police and other legal officials to target individuals with extreme or unusual political and ideological views and/or politically and ideologically motivated activism/direct action. In addition, and more problematically, numerous police documents examined thus far explicitly construct and name particular types of dissent as part of the terrorist threat.

More than just contradiction, when treated inter-textually, one may observe a discursive trick or sleight of hand or ‘bait and switch,’ so to speak, at play across the texts. The Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, which precedes the passing of the laws, emphasizes the broad and existential threat of terrorism, while neglecting to define what terrorism is, and maintaining that public safety is the first priority of anti-terrorism legislation. However, by the time one arrives at the laws and the police documents, public
safety and terrorism are formulated in such a way as to include and conflate things such as the economy, financial markets, and international organizations like the G8 and WTO (and their meetings), with public safety, and, dissent with terrorism.

Given that the *ATA* already constructs public safety and public security in such a broad way as to include interests such as economic security, Canada’s relations with its allies, and the operations of financial systems and markets, the types of entities officially protected in its sister Bill, Bill C-35, such as non-treaty organizations like the G8, are made to appear justifiable and sellable to the public as a part of, or an extension of, public safety and security. Ultimately, in the anti-terrorism texts, both *public safety* and *terrorism* are formulated in such as way as to include things, and conflate them with things, that one would not typically associate with either of them.

**Larger Context of the War on Terror Discourse**

It is important to note that Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and discursive practices are nested within, and grounded and informed by, the larger US-driven war on terror discourse and project. As stated above, while the events of 9/11 did not occur in Canada, Canadian anti-terrorism discourse points to the attacks against the US as ushering in a global terrorist threat – a discursive construction that pits so-called democratic nations against all those would-be terrorist entities (see Bill C-36 Sponsor Speech *threat and threatened* list in chapter four).

This reflects the US war on terror discourse, which framed the events of 9/11 and America’s reaction to it, in the polarizing logic and language of either you’re with us, or you’re against us. In a speech before Congress on September 21, President G. W. Bush presented the following ultimatum: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (“You are either,” 2001, para. 9). One of the most important aspects of the Bush administration’s war on terror discourse is its interpretation and framing of the events of 9/11 as an “act of war,” rather than specifically criminal or even terrorist acts (see Hodges, 2011), for instance. On the *same day* as George Bush’s September 12, 2001 declaration of the events of 9/11 as an “act of war,” NATO declared the attacks on the US as “an attack on all 19 member states” (see O’Malley, 2003, para. 3). Interpreting the 9/11 attacks as an act of war allows
and necessitates a military response (see Chosmky, 2002; Hodges, 2011; Parenti, 2005; Street, 2004).

What’s more, interpreting 9/11 as an act of war against the US and its NATO allies (including Canada) and interpreting the terrorist threat as global, as both the US (see Bush, 2004; Rice, 2004) and Canadian war on terror discourse does, paves the way for a global (i.e., imperial) war on terror. As I argue in chapter two of the dissertation, and as Thobani (2007) has demonstrated in her work, since the events of 9/11, the US has been attempting to assert its national security and sovereignty as a globalized security and sovereignty. Conflating threats to the US with threats to Canadian safety and constructing the threatened in collective and global terms, as the Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36 does, as well as legally protecting US-led non-treaty international organizations such as the IMF, WTO, G8 and G20, as Bill C-35 does, is one way in which Canadian anti-terrorism measures assist this US endeavour.

The US’ above ultimatum or veiled threat to the world—that, either you are with us or you are with the terrorists—was not only aimed at foreign audiences, but also at, as the USA PATRIOT Act(s) would later make apparent, any unpatriotic Americans who dared to question, criticize, or oppose the government and its policies in this time of crisis and emergency (see DeBeaugrande, 2004). In the months and years since 9/11, the US government has enacted laws and executive orders that directly conflate certain types of activism, such as anti-war activism, with undermining US war efforts and/or as being sympathetic to or providing material support for terrorism (see Parenti, 2005; Roberts, 2011a). The gag order on opposition to US polices is reflected also in Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, as the 2009 RCMP document on radicalization demonstrates. For instance, to reiterate some points made in chapter five, the RCMP text constructs the individuals in the political left wing as potential terrorists and as new challenges in the war on terror, in part, due to opposition to US foreign and security policy (RCMP, 2009).

I contend that these types of discursive strategies (in the RCMP text), coupled with the emphatic exaggeration of the supposed threat that terrorism presents to Canada and Canadians serve to create and promote fear, on two levels: First, there is the fear of terrorism or of being targeted and/or attacked by terrorism. Second, and more importantly, there is the fear of being associated with and/or accused of terrorism. In his
CDA work on the USA PATRIOT Acts I and II, De Beaugrande (2004) examined specific sections of the Acts to uncover the ways in which the language of the Acts discursively construct opposition to government policy as unpatriotic and related to or aiding terrorism. In particular, the new crime of “domestic terrorism,” created in section 802 of the PATRIOT Act I, means activities “that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion” (s.802). De Beaugrande argued that this broad new definition “could sweep in people who engage in acts of political protest and subject them to wiretapping and enhanced penalties” (para. 32). The result of the USA PATRIOT Acts, he contended, is to effectively polarize the citizenry into patriots versus terrorists.

Similarly, as stated in chapter five, the definition of “terrorist activity” in the Canadian ATA is so broad as to potentially capture dissent, with its various vague clauses including actions that may be—and often are—employed during civil disobedience or protest. What’s more, like the USA PATRIOT Act I, the 2002 and 2003 CSIS Public Reports create a domestic category of terrorism called “domestic extremism” (CSIS Public Report, 2002; 2003), which actually includes very specific forms of dissent. As such, it goes beyond the American discourse in its direct inclusion of protest and dissent within the formulation of terrorism. Finally, in defining terrorism on religious, political and ideological grounds, something the American laws and discourse does not do, as both the ATA and the RCMP police documents do, the Canadian discourse may make members of the public afraid to be too extreme (i.e., oppositional or non-mainstream) in their views.

In this way, the Canadian texts attempt to neutralize opposition before it even emerges or grows. Thus, while the Canadian anti-terrorism texts are nested in the larger, US-driven war on terror discourse, one can argue that Canadian discursive practice are more draconian and more problematic in that they threaten to criminalize oppositional political and ideological thought, as well as actions.
Relationship Between Threat and Threatened

Given that dominant power is able to conceal itself in public discourse (see Fairclough, 2001; Huckin, 1997; Van Dijk, 1995), on the surface, the question of who or what the discourse serves may not be readily apparent or easy to identify. As a methodology, CDA is resourceful for and committed to uncovering the discursive processes of power concealment and reinforcement. For my research, one way to uncover the hidden power behind/within the public discourse of anti-terrorism is to look at the relationship between some of those things identified and constructed as a threat and some of those things identified and constructed and threatened, within the Canadian discourse.

When we look at this relationship, we can begin to formulate hypotheses about whose interests official anti-terrorism discourse serves, protects, and/or reinforces. For the relationship between threats and threatened, I am ultimately interested only in those things that are peculiar or incongruent within each category – i.e., things that do not typically fit the category of terrorist threats and the category of targets of terrorism. This relationship is intertextually layered and contains many components. I describe the relationship between threats and threatened and the analytic process by which I arrived at this relationship, in the subsequent section.

As Janks (1997) explained, during the descriptive stage of analysis, one begins to formulate questions and hypotheses that guide other levels of analysis. From the lists of those things that the texts identify as a threat and as threatened and/or in need of protection, I noticed some patterns and peculiarities. Most of those things identified, across the spectrum of the texts, as threats, were about or related to terrorism, terrorist activity, terrorist acts, terrorists networks, Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, terrorist organizations, the threat of WMDs being used in Canada or against Canadians, etc. These types of threats are arguably similar and/or related. Similarly, among those things identified as threatened within the various texts, most seemed to be related in some way. These include: public safety and security, the safety of Canadians and their families and communities, Canadian citizens, human life, etc.

At the same time, in each category there were things that stood out as odd or dissimilar to the patterns above. For the threats category, they include: violent protests, the emerging phenomenon of anti-globalization, militant animal rights and environmental
activists, the political left wing, and “domestic extremism”—which is defined to include “certain elements of animal rights and anti-globalization…groups” (CSIS Public Report, 2002, pg. 3). For the threatened category, they include: international conferences in Canada, non-treaty “international organizations” (as newly defined in the anti-terrorism legislation) such as the G8, internationally protected persons (IPPs) (as newly defined in the anti-terrorism legislation), the headquarters of international organizations headquartered in Canada and their missions in Canada, the economy, financial systems, and financial markets.

As I observed these peculiarities, I asked myself how, if at all, things like animal rights and anti-globalization groups are related to other threats such as terrorism, terrorist groups, Al Qaeda, etc. Do the former pose an equal threat to public safety, for instance, as the latter? Similarly, I asked myself if things such as international economic organizations like the G8 and IMF, financial systems, and markets are threatened, within the context of the war on terrorism, in an equal or related manner to public safety or Canadian citizens. For me, the answer is no and thus there appears to be a disjunction both within the respective categories of threat and threatened and, especially, between the categories. In other words, the threats and threatened seem disproportionate to one another and also across categories (e.g., do anti-globalization groups threaten public safety to the same extent, and in the same way, as Al Qaeda or terrorist acts, etc?).

From the above observations, I then asked myself how, if at all, the peculiar or odd things in each category are related to one another. In other words, is there a relationship between threats such as anti-globalization groups, militant environmental and animal rights groups, and/or the political left wing and threatened entities such as the economy, non-treaty organizations like the G8 and IMF, and/or the trans-national summits of non-treaty organizations? This, as it turns out, is a key question. When one posits this question, a direct relationship begins to emerge in that animal rights groups, anti-globalization groups, and/or the political left wing often oppose, resist or protest against economic policies (e.g., neoliberalism), international organizations like the G8 and IMF, and/or the international conferences and summits of these types of organizations (see Starr, 2000; Rupert, 2000; McNally, 2006). In essence, one can say that those things oddly identified and constructed as threats, just happen to target those things oddly
identified and constructed as threatened and/or in need of protection under the law. This raises questions about whose interests Canadian anti-terrorism discourse protects and reinforces. I explore this below.

**Whose Interests Does Anti-terrorism Discourse Protect?**

Given that the anti-terrorism texts construct particular types of dissent as similar to and/or a subset of the *terrorist threat*, one has to ask whether such dissent actually threatens those things protected in the discourse and the anti-terrorism laws. It is difficult to argue, for instance, that political dissent and protest, the anti-globalization movement, radical/non-mainstream thinking and/or the political left wing threaten Canadians’ physical safety, our way of life, human rights, democracy and/or liberty, all of which are listed as threatened by “terrorism” in some of the texts. Indeed, for many, dissent and protest are beneficial to and essential for democracy, liberty and human rights (see Goodman, 2008; McNally, 2006; Starr, 2000). Ultimately, there is little to no connection between dissent and threats to public safety (understood here as physical harm), democracy or liberty.

One can argue, however, that there is a direct relationship between dissent and protest, the anti-globalization movement, and/or the political left wing, and things like the economy, multinational corporate power, non-treaty international organizations, financial systems, and markets. The relationship is that, on some level and to varying degrees, the former directly challenge, oppose and/or target the latter and their policies.

Moreover, one can argue that the latter are part of the current dominant politico-economic power structure or its operations. For instance, the non-treaty international organizations named in the various anti-terrorism texts I examine, such as the G8, the G20, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank are all institutions of global capitalism (see Fernandez, 2008; Rupert, 2000). And these intuitions are disproportionately controlled or represented by the US (see Foster, 2006; Harvey, 2005), which is currently the world’s hegemonic super power (Foster, 2006; Parenti, 2002, 2005; Thobani, 2007).

As I explain in chapters two and three, unlike other empires, the United States is an economic empire, which has been able to absorb its western allies and dominate the world through the global spread of US-style capitalism (Colas & Saull, 2006; Foster, 2006; Harvey, 2005). It is through neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programs
that the US is able to spread its type of capitalism around the globe. Institutions such as the IMF and WTO, which are currently protected through Canadian anti-terrorism laws, create these policies (see Rupert, 2000). In addition, the international summits of these and similar organizations, which are also currently protected under anti-terrorism laws, help to facilitate the planning, implementation, and management of these and other policies and multinational neoliberal practices (see Fernandez, 2008; Foster, 2006). Simply put, these institutions, and their international summits, are an integral component of the relations of (US-led) global capitalism. Thus, by granting these institutions and their meetings protection under Canadian anti-terrorism laws, the Canadian state also protects the relations of US-led, neoliberal global capitalism.

Moreover, the fact that actions or entities that oppose the institutions and relations of global capitalism are conflated with terrorism is very telling. That the anti-terrorism texts target dissent against and/or opposition to globalization, capitalism, corporate power, and US foreign and security policy, in particular, betrays whose interests the discourse ultimately protects and reinforces. In other words, the discursive construction of these forms of dissent as (and conflation with) terrorist threats or potential terrorist threats betray a commitment to protecting and reinforcing the hegemonic power structure of global capital.

By using CDA to examine and deconstruct how the discourse works to benefit some interests while disadvantaging others, I was able to unravel and unlock who or what the discourse ultimately serves.

**A Note on Canadian Safety**

The textual analysis suggests that the primary goal of anti-terrorism legislation may not be, despite assurances by the government to the contrary (see House Sponsor Speech for Bill C-36, 2001; RCMP Commissioner, 2001), the safety of Canadians. Indeed, Canadians are no safer today, if they ever were in danger at all, from so-called terrorism than they were before 9/11 (see Caron, 2005; CCPA, 2001; Council of Canadians, 2005). What’s more, from my analysis of the entirety of the anti-terrorism discourse (the speeches, laws, and police reports), the state fails to demonstrate a real and tangible terrorist threat to ordinary Canadians. In fact, in the 2007-2008 Annual Public Report by CSIS the opposite is maintained. CSIS states that, “Unlike many nations, Canada has
been fortunate that no major [terrorist] incidents have occurred within it's borders, or originated from Canada ... in over two decades” (CSIS, 2008, p. 6). This seems to suggest that there is no real terrorist threat to Canada and Canadians. This is an example of how the texts contradict one another (i.e., other texts, including other CSIS Reports, emphatically stress that there is a grave terrorist threat) and of the disjunctions that exist in the relationship between the texts and between text(s) and social context.

Ironically, the only thing that may put Canadians at risk of so-called terrorism is our very involvement in the global war on terror and counter-terrorism efforts. As CSIS admits in its 2003 Public Report, “As Canada continues to be an active player in the international struggle against terrorism, it will face increasing threats from transnational terrorist organizations” (CSIS, 2003, p. 1). Thus, the war on terrorism is arguably more of a threat and problem to Canada and Canadians than so-called terrorism. This is another example of the disjunctions and contradictions between the texts. It appears that terrorism exists, and is a threat, only when its suits the state’s interests and agenda.

Moreover, the Canadian State has yet to demonstrate that anti-terrorism legislation was necessary for keeping Canadians safe from so-called terrorism. The state already possessed draconian police and judicial powers before the creation of the post-9/11 Anti-terrorism Act (see Roach, 2003). For instance, Canadian law enforcement and security agencies already had extensive investigative powers, as well as extensive powers to conduct surveillance and restrict access to information before the events of 9/11 (CJFE, 2001). In a speech to parliament in 2004, Senator Andreychuck proclaims that since police already had extreme powers before the creation and enactment of the ATA, “then what was Bill-36 all about?” (Opposition Speech for Bill C-36, 2nd Reading, Senate, para. 4). For attorney Denis Barrette, the answer is that the ATA is mainly about intimidation and the chilling of dissent and not combating so-called terrorism (as cited in Caron, 2005). I elaborate on this below.

**Stifling Dissent**

In light of what I have uncovered through the critical discourse analysis of official anti-terrorism documents, and the ways in which dissent, especially that against US-led globalization and capitalism, are constructed as and conflated with terrorists threats, I am inclined to agree with the above assertion.
Many activists wonder whether a primary motive for passing such expansive anti-terrorism laws is to stymie the global success of anti-globalization protests, in order to protect global capital and its apparatus of power (see Clarke, 2002; Morden; 2010; Rogge, 2001). As one Canadian activist explained:

As the anti-corporate globalization movement grows our governments are acting more and more as collaborators protecting global corporate interests. The tools of repression…are being used against people and democratic dissent. (anonymous, cited in Blanchard, 2001, para. 60)

Tony Clarke (2002) of the Polaris Institute contended that a primary aim of Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation is indeed “the movement against corporate globalization itself” (p. 50). Similarly, Canadian activist groups widely believe that the new laws may be used by law enforcement officers to further suppress activist strategies for engaging in public debate and dissent on issues and/or policies of public and global concern (Comeau, 2002; Rogge, 2001).

While the Canadian anti-terrorism laws have not, to date, been used against activists, there is great potential for this (ICLMG, 2010). For instance, Canadian environmental activists, who oppose the effects of Big Business and of capitalist policies and practices on the planet, have been threatened under these measures. One example is anti-tar sands disobedience action by Greenpeace activists in 2009, which resulted in 37 arrests. An enraged Alberta conservative government complained that, “We’re coddling people who are breaking the law,” (as cited in Arsenault, 2009, para. 3) and “threatened to unleash its counterterrorism plan if activists continue using civil disobedience to protest the tar sands” (Arsenault, 2009, para.1).

This atmosphere of fear and harassment alone can have stifling effects on dissent. For instance, in the years immediately following 9/11 and the enactment of draconian anti-terrorism measures in the west, many North American activists retreated from the anti-corporate globalization movement for fear of government reprisal (see Chehade, 2005). Regrettably, the movement lost ground in its ability to mobilize large numbers in North America “in the wake of September 11 and the attendant ‘war on terrorism’ launched by US imperialism” (“Thoughts on the,” 2004, para.6). However, as the recent Occupy Wall Street protests in the US (and Canada) indicate, the tide may be turning.
This is not a topic I elaborate on here, but it potentially opens up an interesting avenue for future research.

**Final Note: Overview of Anti-terrorism Texts’ Key points and My Analysis of Them**

To wrap up the analysis chapters, in the following section I present the key points or arguments of the anti-terrorism texts (i.e., the claims that are discursively constructed therein), and my analysis of the main arguments. The order in which I present these is important insofar as the points build on one another in a manner that ultimately serves to relate dissent to terrorism, while formulating terrorism and the terrorist threat so broadly as to contradict the stated purposes and context of Canadian anti-terrorism legislation.

First, parts of the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse construct the events of 9/11 as watershed events that ushered the world into a *global terrorist threat*, even though the attacks occurred in the USA. Here, the texts present Canadians as gravely threatened, though there is no explanation or qualification as to exactly how events that occurred in and against the US directly threaten Canadians or the world.

Second, according to the formations within the texts, global terrorism threatens the economic, political and ideological system, or status quo, of the western/democratic/capitalist group of nations. Canada is an integral member of the western/capitalist/democratic group of nations. Thus, according to the logic of the texts, Canada is vulnerable to the threat of global terrorism.

Third, to ensure the safety and security of the Canadian public against the terrorist threat, the parliamentary speeches argue that our legal framework must be amended. Here, the creation of new laws is constructed as an integral part of ensuring Canadian national security. The creation of new laws is constructed as a necessary measure, meaning the Canadian State presents its draconian legal strategy as a *forced* response or solution to the terrorist threat. No alternatives are suggested or even considered.

Fourth, as the analysis of the texts indicates, Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation seeks to protect the safety and security of the public, *including its economic interests* and transnational partners. This construction contains several contradictory elements, when we consider the texts intertextually or as a collective. Through discursive strategies that I examine in chapter five, the anti-terrorism texts make the protection of public safety and economic interests interchangeable. As I argue in chapter five, public safety is formulated
so broadly as to include the protection of the economy, property, and the relations and meetings of global capital. Indeed greater focus is given to the protection of property, the economy and trans-national institutions—under the guise of public safety—than things such as the protection of the public from physical harm.

Correspondingly, through the particular discursive strategies discussed in other chapters, the texts formulate terrorism or terrorist activity in a manner that includes, and even emphasizes, things like property damage and the intimidation of or interference with the representatives and meetings of the aforementioned institutions. It is curious that terrorism is formulated in this way rather than, for instance, in a manner that focuses on acts of violence. This is especially true given claims made in certain parliamentary speeches that the target of anti-terrorism legislation is serious acts of violence only. In this respect, the particular formulations of terrorism in the laws and police documents appear to completely contradict claims and assurances made in the parliamentary speeches.

Fifth, and related to the above point, under the discursive formations and strategies within the texts, to qualify for “terrorist activity” one’s actions must be religiously, ideologically and/or politically motivated. This seems to contradict another claim and/or assurance made in the former RCMP Commissioner’s speech that the anti-terrorism laws are not aimed at dissent. Given that most dissent and opposition is politically or ideologically motivated, and given the inclusion of and emphasis on ideological and political motive in the ATA’s definition of “terrorist activity,” one can argue that, contrary to the Commissioners’ assurances, dissent does appear to be a target of the anti-terrorism legislation. This is especially true given the next point.

Sixth, according to certain police documents in my study, being politically left wing, a radical thinker, and/or opposed to capitalism, globalization and US foreign and security policy qualifies individuals as terrorists or as a subset of the terrorist threat. Actively opposing the policies and international meetings of global financial institutions like the G8 and IMF, etc.—newly defined as “international organizations” under Canadian anti-terrorism laws—may also qualify individuals as terrorists. It cannot be denied that all of the above constitute positions associated with dissent and opposition, especially at the present historical juncture. If, as the police agencies of the state claim, dissent is not a
target of anti-terrorism discourse and measures, then it is odd that terrorism is formulated and defined in such a way as to capture acts, and even *thoughts* or specific modes of thinking, associated with dissent.

The last two points suggest that there is an aim other than terrorists and combating terrorism behind anti-terrorism discourse and measures. This is especially true when we consider the full context in which Canadian anti-terrorism measures were introduced, and, when we consider the fact that the criminalization and stifling of dissent began before the events of 9/11 and the concomitant war on terrorism. I elaborate on these points in the conclusion chapter.
Chapter Seven: Conclusion

In this chapter I synthesize my argument into a summary of the dissertation in order to help the reader pull the separate sections into a unified, coherent argument. I begin the chapter with a brief discussion of the entire dissertation, which serves to unite the most salient points. I then move on to a more specific presentation of the critical discourse analysis findings and their implications. As these are inter-related, there may be some overlap between the general and specific discussions, as well as within the discussion of specific analysis findings. In the remainder of the chapter, I explore the limitations of the research, areas for future research, and my contributions to knowledge.

The phenomena of the authoritarian capitalist state and the hidden power behind public discourse, described in chapters two and three, were amplified under and through the conditions of Canadian anti-terrorism discourse; and together, these forces resulted in the current criminalization of dissent, described in chapters four, five and six. As a methodology specifically designed to reveal the hidden power behind discourse, I employed critical discourse analysis (CDA) to uncover how this criminalization of dissent is discursively achieved in the anti-terrorism texts. Fairclough’s (2003; 2001) approach to discourse analysis, described in chapter three, is concerned with the analysis of socially situated language. Thus my analysis went beyond texts and language to explore the social and material practices, and wider socio-historical contexts, involved in the production of the texts.

Due to the hidden and often self-normalizing nature of dominant power (see Van Dijk, 1995; Fairclough, 2001, 2002; Jackson, 2005a), a direct connection from the broadest-level of discourse to the most local is not obvious or readily apparent. By employing a multi-dimensional conception of and/or approach to discourse and discourse analysis, and by examining official anti-terrorism texts and discourses intertextually, I was able to lay bare how the macro-level discourse of the war on terror and the meta-narrative of hegemonic global capital, explored in chapter two, inform and are written into the micro-level discursive practices of Canadian anti-terrorism texts. This reflects Fairclough’s nested dimensions of discourse in that, as I demonstrate in chapters five and six, Canadian anti-terrorism discourse is ultimately nested within and informed by larger
discourses, such as the national security discourse and war on terrorism discourse, which are themselves shaped and informed by often trans-national socio-historical contexts and practices (i.e., global capitalism and/or the relations of US-led capitalist imperialism).

By beginning with and focusing on the micro-level discursive practices of anti-terrorism texts, I was able to demonstrate how these texts discursively construct opposition to and/or dissent against the hegemony, institutions, policies, and operations of US-led global capital as part of the terrorist threat. At the same time, the analysis reveals how official anti-terrorism texts formulate public safety and national security in a manner that includes economic interests, markets, financial systems, and the financial institutions of global capital. Simply put, Canadian national security is constructed in such a way as to incorporate trans-national capital and the neoliberal policies of Canada and other states, while terrorism is constructed in such a way as to capture anti-capitalist and/or anti-corporate dissent.

In addition to the above points, the fallacy of the theory of the state of exception/exception theory (described in chapter three)—which posits post-9/11 state authoritarianism as something new or unique, and positions the rule of law as a victim of draconian anti-terrorism measures—is also highlighted and illustrated through the textual analyses in chapters four, five, and six. Parts of the textual analyses reveal that the security apparatus of the Canadian State was already targeting particular types of dissent in the years immediately before the supposed watershed events of 9/11. This suggests that, rather than something new or exceptional, post-9/11 authoritarianism and repression of dissent represent a mere continuation and perhaps an intensification of this long historical practice by the Canadian State, which I explored in chapter two.

The second fallacy of exception theory, i.e., that the rule of law is the victim of draconian anti-terrorism measures, is illustrated through the reality that, as the analysis chapters demonstrate, the anti-terrorism laws themselves facilitate the draconian repression of dissent, not least of all through the discursive conflation of dissent with terrorism. My Marxist informed understanding of the law or rule of law, which I discuss in chapter three, as not the fair and neutral arbiter of the state, but rather the ultimate form of social control and a representative of the interests and power of the elite, is greatly heightened under the conditions of anti-terrorism measures (and discourse). My critical
discourse analysis, in chapters four, five and six, demonstrates that anti-terrorism laws and related police documents directly protect the capitalist class and/or global elites by extending legal status and protections to the institutions, agents and meetings of global capital. They also indirectly protect global capital by targeting and criminalizing opposition and resistance to it and its policies and trans-national operations.

Thus, in relation to the above two paragraphs, one can conclude that the trend of the capitalist national security state—chronicled in chapters two and three, and which serves the interests of capital while appearing neutral—was also amplified through official Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and related policies. Together, these forces (the Canadian national security state and anti-terrorism discourse and policies) protect and reinforce the power and interests of the current global power structure and/or US-led capitalist imperialism.

Drawing on both Marxism and CDA, I argued throughout the dissertation that dominant power is able to hide itself in the institutions (e.g., Law) and official discourse of the seemingly neutral state, while using them to delegitimize and criminalize any opposition, thereby strengthening and reinforcing its own power. My research ultimately helps the critically minded audience see and understand the process that CDA is particularly designed to expose, i.e., how power conceals itself in discourse and how public discourse serves and reinforces dominant power. My study deconstructed numerous sample texts using CDA, and demonstrated how they are working to obscure the truth about the so-called terrorist threat in a manner that constructs permission to crush and criminalize resistance and opposition to the dominant global power structure, thereby protecting it.

By examining a) how the anti-terrorism texts construct certain things as threats and as threatened, b) the relationship between these constructions and wider social contexts, and c) the relationship between particular types of threats and threatened, I was able to uncover who or what the discourse protects and who or what the discourse targets. Examined in this way, a relationship emerged between those things oddly or incongruently constructed as threats and as threatened, which betrays and lays bare the interests that benefit from and are protected by anti-terrorism discourse in Canada — a point I return to in other parts of the chapter.
Overview of Specific Analysis Findings and their Implications

I. 9/11 and terrorism are not the main reason behind anti-terror laws.

My multidimensional CDA work, which goes beyond textual analysis to also examine the social practices and larger contexts that inform text production and interpretation, suggests that the events of 9/11 and the supposed ensuing terrorist threat are not the only contexts, or reasons, behind anti-terrorism measures in Canada. While Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation was introduced in the context of the attacks of 11 September 2001, it more importantly also arose in the context of the stifling of dissent and/or opposition to government policies, a process that predates 9/11, and which I chronicle in chapter two. Indeed, in the CSIS texts in the years immediately preceding 9/11, anti-globalization activism was already being constructed as a security concern or threat. This occurred in the context of, and in conjunction with, the emergence and growing momentum of the anti-corporate globalization movement and the success of the Seattle WTO protests of 1999, as well as the 2000 OAS protests in Windsor and the 2001 Summit of the Americas protests in Quebec City. These protests happened before 9/11. It is within this context that Canadian intelligence and security officials began constructing particular kinds of dissent and protest as a growing security concern.

For instance, in the pre-9/11 CSIS Annual Public Reports (2000; 2001) and a CSIS report (2000b) on the anti-globalization movement, the movement is constructed and named as a growing security concern because of its opposition to and protest against the meetings and summits of multinational corporate power and trade and economic organizations like the IMF, WTO and World Bank (see chapter five). Interestingly, while the CSIS Public Reports are meant to address Canadian national security, there is no mention or explanation in these texts about how, if at all, the anti-globalization movement and/or protests against the meetings of the aforementioned global financial institutions threaten Canadians’ safety and security.

It is also interesting to note that it is only with the full emergence of the anti-corporate globalization movement (in late 1999) that CSIS began to formulate this movement and associated dissent or protest as a security concern. In the several CSIS
Reports I looked at that were produced prior to the year 2000, there is not a single mention of anti-corporate activism, or any type of activism or protest as a security concern. In this respect, one can conclude that, when wide dissent and activism began to be explicitly directed against the institutions of multinational corporate power and/or global capital, such dissent began to be perceived and constructed as a national security threat by the Canadian capitalist national security state.

While Canadian security agencies were formulating anti-corporate globalization protest and dissent as a security concern before the events of 9/11, these events conveniently gave the Canadian government a pretext for greatly intensifying the trend and further formulating this type of dissent as a security threat by conflating it with the very serious accusation of terrorism or terrorist violence. For instance, in its House of Commons Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35, which I examine in chapter five, the Liberal government recontextualizes the “terrorist attacks” of 9/11 and conflates them with what they describe as “violent protests” at international summits and conferences. Though the 9/11 attacks did not occur during an international summit or summit protests and, more importantly, while acts of civil disobedience are in no way comparable to terrorist attacks, the speech uses these violent terrorist attacks of 9/11 to justify its call for greater security at summits where protestors are present.

In fact, as I illustrate in chapter five, in the Senate Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35, the government openly admits that one of the reasons for the creation of the Bill, and the many amendments to the Criminal Code it ushered in, was to address policing and security issues and challenges that arose during particular protest events in Canada, and in order to prepare for an upcoming G8 summit in Canada. Thus, while Bill C-35 was created as part of Canada’s so-called anti-terrorism legislation, from the government’s own words, one can surmise that a major motivation for this law was to provide greater police powers to limit protest against the meetings of the trans-national institutions of global capitalism, such as the G8 and the Summit of the Americas.

II. Canada’s anti-terrorism measures delegitimize, stifle and criminalize particular types of dissent.

As alluded to above, through the war on terror and attendant anti-terrorism measures, the state is able to attempt to quash a movement that was gaining popularity and
momentum before and around the time of the events of 9/11. One way this is achieved is through the discursive conflation, in the anti-terrorism texts, of this type of activism and opposition with terrorism and terrorist violence.

For instance, by constructing individuals who happen to oppose capitalism, globalization, and US foreign and security policy (i.e., the main components of the current global power structure) as similar to “Islamist extremists,” and as a subset of the terrorist threat (see RCMP, 2009), the RCMP document stigmatizes, delegitimizes, and potentially criminalizes “left wing” individuals and groups in Canada. It is odd that criticizing the policies and actions of other states opens Canadians up to being constructed as extremists and as threats to Canadian national security (i.e., how does opposing the policies of other states threaten the public safety of Canadians?). In addition, by harking to mainstream, moderate views as the positive alternative to so-called extremism and radicalization, which the texts fail to adequately define or qualify, the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse protects the status quo by demonizing and criminalizing anything that may actively oppose it or disagree with it.

**III. The disjunctions and contradictions between the texts point to dissent as a target and to the protection of global capital.**

While the parliamentary speeches claim that Canadians’ sense of safety and security is the main priority of anti-terrorism legislation, in the actual laws and police documents, public safety is constructed in a way that largely translates and/or manifests as the protection and prioritization of other, arguably unrelated, things. These include: the economy, the Bank of Canada, non-treaty “international organizations,” the agents and representatives these “international organizations” (now considered “internally protected persons” under anti-terrorism laws), and trade and economic summits. Situating these within the rubric of Canadian public safety and security belies at the very least a discursive expansion of the notion of “public safety” to include economic and corporate interests, and at most the cloaking of global economic and corporate interests and power under the guise of public safety, in a manner that constructs any opposition to this power as a threat to public safety and, therefore, a terrorist threat or terrorist act.

In this respect, one can conclude that Canadian anti-terrorism texts and/or discursive practices protect and reinforce the power of economic interests and global capital in two
inter-related and overlapping ways. On the one hand, the texts construct “public safety” so broadly as to include economic interests, financial systems and markets, and the relations (i.e., neoliberal production and labour relations, etc.) and meetings of global capital. On the other hand, the texts construct the terrorist threat in a manner that directly and indirectly captures various forms of anti-corporate globalization and anti-capitalist dissent and/or opposition to the neoliberal policies of the capitalist national security state. In this respect, by targeting and criminalizing those individuals or actions that challenge and oppose capital and its many arms and ill effects, the Canadian state protects the latter. These, the protection of the interests of global capital and the criminalization of those who oppose global capital, are ultimately two sides of the same discursive practices.

IV. The relationship between what is constructed as a threat and as threatened points to who/what the anti-terrorism discourse & measures protect and reinforce.

The two discursive processes described above—i.e., the protection of the interests of global capital and the criminalization of those who oppose global capital—constitute and reflect a particular relationship or pattern that I was able to critically discern and analyze using my novel analytical framework of threat and threatened. Ultimately, as chapters five and six demonstrate, those things that the anti-terrorism texts strangely or incongruently identify and construct as terrorist threats just happen to target those things that the anti-terrorism texts strangely or incongruently identify and construct as threatened and in need of protection by anti-terrorism laws. Simply put, “anti-globalization” dissent and protest just happens to target and/or oppose corporate power, neoliberal policies, economic elites, global financial institutions, trade and economic summits, and their delegates. By criminalizing dissent against and opposition to the aforementioned interests, policies and institutions, Canadian anti-terrorism discourse ultimately protects them, under the guise of combating terrorism.

V. Anti-terrorism discourse and criminalization of dissent constitute an educational project.

Effectively, Canadian anti-terrorism laws and associated discourse criminalize particular forms of dissent through discursive practices that conflate dissent with terrorism and terrorist violence. From the perspective of Educational Studies, this can be seen as a type of pedagogical project. The anti-terror legislation and associated discourses
exemplify the ways in which the Canadian State is involved in a broader, non-formal educational project aimed at shaping people’s hearts and minds over how to interpret and understand what constitutes terrorism. As I argue in chapter one, the state educates its citizenry through its policies and public discourse. One purpose of anti-terrorism discourse and policy appears to be to “normalize” a particular way of thinking about both terrorism and dissent, in a manner that conflates the two, and thus promote public support for the war on terror abroad and war on dissent at home.

The conflation of dissent with terrorism instructs the public about what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. As an ideological project and form of ideological manipulation, the discursive construction of dissent as a terrorist threat attempts and/or serves to delegitimize dissent and turn the general public against it. In addition, it issues a warning or deterrent to any would-be opposition or dissenters that resistance to the war on terror and to the hegemony and policies of global capital and the capitalist national security state will not be tolerated.

As I argue in chapter one, this is not formal education but a type of informal, socio-political education wherein the state teaches “proper conduct” through its policies. Understood in this way, my work on the official discourse of anti-terrorism impacts Educational Studies inasmuch as it broadens the notion of “education” to incorporate the pedagogical and ideological functions of government policy. In other words, one of the things my thesis demonstrates is how “education” can be understood more generally than just schooling, but as an ideological practice focusing on the moral regulation of the State’s citizens (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985). This expansion of the notion of education to include the ideological functions of public policy is part of my contribution to knowledge.

**Limitations of the Research**

1. The anti-terrorism laws have not been applied to date.

My research demonstrates a high potential for anti-terrorism legislation to be applied against particular types of dissent and activism in Canada. This notwithstanding, one limitation of my research is that, to date, none of the laws that make up Canada’s anti-terrorism legislation have been applied to arrest and charge global justice activists (Roch
Tasse of the ICLMG, personal communication, May 3, 2010). Thus, there are no cases or examples of the discourse in action (against activists) with which to further support or buttress my arguments and conclusions. That is not to say that activists have not been threatened under anti-terrorism laws, as is the case with tar sands activists in Alberta, as I point out in other chapters. What’s more, while there have been no reported arrests and convictions under anti-terrorism laws, there is no way to know for sure. While the government claims no incidents or abuse of anti-terrorism laws, there is no comprehensive, and independent, oversight mechanism to ensure that the government is properly monitored (see Andreychuk, 2004).

II. No individuals were interviewed

Due to time and financial restrictions I was not able to interview politicians, policy makers, and/or global justice activists. The research arguably could benefit from insider government knowledge about the policy making process and the aims and intentions of anti-terrorism measures. Moreover, the study could have been strengthened through interviews with global justice activists about the ways in which anti-terrorism measures, and the general post-9/11 environment of state repression, have impacted, if at all, their organization and mobilization efforts and desires. Through these types of interviews one may be able to better gage if post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures had a chilling or stifling effect on dissent among such activists.

III. My study does not examine the entire body of Canadian anti-terrorism texts.

Locating and examining all of the official anti-terrorism and security texts that exist were beyond the capabilities and time allowances of my research project. One area I did not examine is anti-terrorism texts produced by Canadian think tanks. Think tanks have considerable power to influence government policy and opinion, especially in Canada where the bulk of our think tanks are affiliated with or engendered by government. It is the nature of doctoral research that one cannot look at everything. As an area of future research, it may be interesting to examine the security and terrorism reports of right wing think tanks such as the Mackenzie Institute and the Frasier Institute, who tend to be especially scathing in their criticism of dissent in the era of anti-terrorism.
IV. My research does not examine media discourse.

As I briefly mention in chapter three, mainstream media plays an instrumental role in disseminating, reinforcing and shielding dominant discourse. This has been especially true with the discourse of the war on terrorism and counter-terrorism. While it is a key issue, it was beyond the scope of this dissertation but opens up an exciting area of future research.

Areas of Future Research

I. Occupy Wall Street Movement.

Beyond the anti-terrorism discourse of right-wing think tanks and mainstream media, there are some emerging and/or ongoing protest movements that offer interesting areas for future research. The anti-globalization movement lost ground in its ability to mobilize large numbers in North America in the wake of September 11 and the attendant war on terrorism. However, as the recent Occupy Wall Street protests in the US (and Canada) indicate, the tide may be turning. This opens up an interesting avenue for future research. In relation to, and as an extension of, my current study, it may be useful to examine the Occupy Wall Street protests, which are critical of capitalism and corporate greed, in the context of the national security agenda. As this movement continues to evolve, one can explore whether or not the State responds to it in a similar manner to its repression of the anti-globalization movement. Moreover, it will be interesting to see if anti-terrorism rhetoric and laws will be, or already have been, invoked against Occupy Wall Street protestors in North America.

II. Quebec Student (Tuition) Protests and Bill 78.

An even more interesting and compelling topic—not least because it pertains to a uniquely Canadian context—for future research is the Quebec student protests of 2012, and the Quebec Liberal’s creation of Bill 78. As I was finishing up my study on the criminalization of dissent in Canada, the Quebec Student Protests against proposed post-secondary tuition hikes by the provincial Liberals began. I instantly saw connections to my dissertation research, as well as opportunities for future research. As my textual analysis suggests, youth activists and dissidents are especially targeted by the authoritarian Canadian State. This is also the case with the Quebec student protests of 2012.
In response to the increased momentum of the student protests, the Liberal government of Quebec drafted a Bill (Bill 78) that essentially made it illegal to organize and attend protests against the province’s proposed tuition increases. As an area of future research, I may critically examine Bill 78 as an unconstitutional attempt to criminalize legitimate protest and infringe on the Charter rights of Canadians, and to target youth. Given that the Quebec student strikes and protests have to do specifically with access to education, and a resistance to the increased profit focus of higher education, the topic is especially relevant to the field of Educational Studies.

Moreover, my analysis could be applied to other similar developments internationally; both in terms of shaping state responses to supposed terrorist threats (i.e., in the form of “violent protest”), but also and more importantly to how local social movements have responded to such state responses.

 Contributions to Knowledge

I. Needed Focus on Discourse.

While there is much scholarly work on the events of 9/11 and the attendant war on terrorism and counter-terrorism campaigns, there has been very little research on the discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism. My study on the *discourse* and *discursive practices* of anti-terrorism adds to this hitherto neglected area of research, in ways that I elaborate on below.

II. Unique Focus on the Canadian Context and Legal Texts.

Among the wider body of work on the war on terrorism, and, the limited body of work on the discourse of terrorism and counter-terrorism, much of the focus has been on the United States. There is very little scholarly work that focuses on the Canadian anti-terrorism context in general and, in particular, on the official Canadian *discourse* of anti-terrorism. My doctoral research fills this void and offers a distinctive analysis of Canadian anti-terrorism discourse. Moreover, my study offers a unique focus on the *legal* (and police) documents of the Canadian anti-terrorism discourse, something that is not currently widely studied, especially using CDA. In the literature I examined, very little CDA work exists on anti-terrorism laws generally, and there is no CDA research that I know of that examines Canadian anti-terrorism legislation in particular. By focusing on Canada and its anti-terrorism laws and associated texts, I add two interesting and
important dimensions—i.e., Canada and its legal anti-terrorism documents—to the critical discussions of the war on terrorism.

### III. Focus on (Particular Forms of) Dissent and Global Capital.

What’s more, through my focus on how the Canadian anti-terrorism documents criminalize particular forms of dissent, my study narrows the critical lens of the interrogation of the war on terrorism and anti-terrorism measures in unique ways. While there is some work that examines the negative effects of the war on terrorism/anti-terrorism measures on civil liberties in general (see De Beaugrande, 2004; Chang, 2002; Jackson, 2005a), very little research, if any at all, focuses on the ways in which the war on terrorism and anti-terrorism measures impact anti-globalization and/or anti-capitalist dissent in particular. This is especially true of research done within CDA. My study on the ways in which Canadian anti-terrorism texts criminalize these types of dissent in particular—through the various discursive strategies discussed in the analysis chapters—raises important questions about who or what the so-called anti-terrorism discourse and associated policies effectively protects.

By examining who or what the anti-terrorism texts target and construct as a threat, one is ultimately able to reveal who or what the anti-terrorism texts protect (i.e., classify as threatened by terrorism), and vice versa. This unique approach (i.e., the threat and threatened dynamic) allows me to work backwards, using CDA, in a manner that begins with the identification of the threat and threatened components within the texts, and move on to an analysis of the relationship between certain types of threat and threatened. When we do this, a relationship emerges between those things in the texts that one would not normally classify as a terrorist threat and those things that one would not normally classify as threatened by terrorism. For the former (i.e., the threats) we have things such as opposition to or dissent against globalization, corporate power, capitalism, and US foreign and security policy. For the latter (i.e., the threatened), I identify things such as economic security; financial systems; markets; and the operations, relations, transnational financial institutions, agents, representatives and meetings of global capital.

When one looks at the relationship between these two categories, it is very apparent the former happen to oppose or resist the latter. Moreover, the latter are part of the current global hegemonic power structure. Thus, those things that are constructed as
terrorist threats, such as dissent and particular types of activism and protest, just happen to resist the global power structure. Given that power it able to hide itself in discourse, my study very clearly reveals how this power informs the discourse of anti-terrorism in way that delegitimizes or criminalizes resistance to it. In this way, I introduce an interesting analytic framework—the threat and threatened dynamic and the relationship between (incongruent) threat and threatened components—with which to examine anti-terrorism texts that ultimately points to the interests behind and protected by so-called anti-terrorism measures in Canada.

**V. Extends the Notion of Education.**

As I argue above, one of the things my thesis shows is that through its anti-terrorism discourse and associated policies, the Canadian state is engaged in a type of informal Educational project, wherein it normalizes particular ways of thinking about terrorism and dissent. In this project the state instructs the hearts and minds of the citizenry in a way that teaches proper conduct, and behaviour, concerning dissent and opposition. Through this revelation, my study impacts the field of Education Studies in that it extends the notion of “education” from mere formal schooling to include the ideological and pedagogical functions of public policy and discourse. Given the interdisciplinary reach of my research topic and study, the dissertation has the potential to impact or inform other fields beyond Education. I list these below.

**VI. Multi-disciplinary Appeal or Scope**

**Public Policy Studies and/or Socio-Legal Studies**

Given the emphasis my study places on anti-terrorism laws, and how these laws potentially impact segments of the public (i.e., oppositional or dissident voices), it may have implications or insights for the field of public policy studies or socio-legal studies.

**(Critical) Terrorism and Security Studies**

While much of the research on terrorism and security tends to be supportive of the war on terror and/or is State-commissioned, as I explain in chapter four, Critical Terrorism Studies has recently emerged as a critical response to traditional terrorism studies. It is built on an understanding of the socially and politically constructed nature of terrorism knowledge and an appreciation of the inherent ontological shakiness of the “terrorism” category and label. My multi-dimensional study, which examines both the
anti-terrorism texts and laws of the Canadian state, as well as the larger context of the war on terrorism and the Western imperial project of which it is a part, may have some usefulness for this new and exciting critical field of study.

Social Movement Studies and/or Social Justice Studies

Given my concern with dissent and activism, and given that my study reveals how Canadian anti-terrorism discourse and policies impact upon them and potentially criminalize them through conflation with terrorism, it has potential implications for social movement or social justice studies and research.

Marxist capitalist critique

Mine is a unique interrogation of capital and capitalist social relations that begins with and/or emerges from a critical analysis of the discursive practices of Canadian anti-terrorism texts, and the ways in which terrorism and dissent are formulated therein. As such it adds new and timely dimensions to traditional Marxist critiques and analyses of capitalist social relations.

Critical Discourse Analysis

As I state above, there is very little CDA work on the discourse of terrorism and anti-terrorism. My study contributes to this emerging, but still slim, area of research. Moreover, by using CDA to study and deconstruct legislation and police documents, I broaden the scope of CDA’s applicability and/or usefulness to two types of documents that have not been widely studied using this methodology.

Final Note: Hidden Power & the Contemporary Relevance of My Work

The so-called war on terrorism has intensified state repression in alarming and monumental ways. In Canada, anti-terrorism legislation and associated discourse has implications beyond its stated purpose, which may not be readily apparent to unwary readers. As both a theory of discourse, which posits that power hides behind and is strengthened through public discourse, and a method designed for revealing this process, CDA helps critical readers connect the discursive dots and uncover the hidden power and agenda behind Canadian anti-terrorism discourse. Moreover, as a theoretical framework grounded in socio-historical critique of capitalist relations, Marxist historical materialism allows us to historically uncover and map the larger contexts and social practices and relations of power that bear upon and guide local discursive practices.
My study, conducted from the illuminating and compelling interface of Marxist historical materialism and critical discourse analysis, reveals how the power of global capital is able to reinforce and protect itself by criminalizing any resistance to it vis-à-vis so-called anti-terrorism measures and discourse. Given that global capital presently threatens to destroy the social and natural world, and given the mass opposition currently emerging across the globe against global capital and proposed austerity measures by capitalist regimes of all political stripes, my thesis could not be more timely and relevant. As capitalist economies continue to fail—against the backdrop of an ever-increasing (US-led) militarized imperial agenda abroad—and as governments deepen their repression of popular opposition and reaction to this process, scholarly research that connects imperialism, the war on terror and the war on dissent, such as mine, will become increasingly pertinent.
and received first reading on April 23, of Commons and has now passed through to the committee stage. Bill C-17

The Combating Terrorism Act.
instate these draconian powers of investigative hearings and preventive arrest through Bill C-17, the

xix clause still exists in the current definition of “terrorist activity,” which I quoted in the 2007; Barabazon, 2006). However,
xviii text in a different way.
xvii vandals, and other small actions, several of them launched from the United States.

xvi motivated enough to strike back in retaliatory self-plundered, their people mass-murdered, raped, arrested and tortured might be desperate and motivated enough to strike back in retaliatory self-defense (Lendman, 2006).

xv Interpretive processes means the ways Canadian officials interpret official anti-terrorism discourse and
texts, such as laws, in a manner that formulates anti-capitalist activists as potential terrorists or security threats.

xvi For the UK’s definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 refer to

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1

xviii By functionally differentiated text reader I mean one that is not passive but interacts with the textual
discourse in varying ways (see Hall, 1980; 1981). Depending on their functional role—i.e., legislator,
politician, lawyer, judge, police officer, a citizen subject to the law, etc.,—readers may interact with the
text in a different way.

xvii Lodine was a Soviet agent who defected while working in Canada. He exposed a number of
Canadians who had been secretly providing the Soviets with information (Hewitt, 2000).

For Abel (1995) law is “relatively autonomous” in that it is influenced by the economic infrastructure,
pressured by political forces, shaped by the social system, but not fully determined by any of them (cited in
Campbell & Connolly, 2007, pp.270-271). There is disagreement among Marxists over whether or not the
state is “relatively” autonomous, with some arguing that it is either more or less autonomous (see Piccioto,
1979).

Notes

i Words and ideas are spoken, written, heard, or read in definite local historical contexts, and emerge from
material bases and social relations that we all participate in (Smith, 1990; Campbell & Gregor, 2008).

ii As an aside, one can point out that the rationale that global capitalism is a necessary, positive, and
progressive force in the world may help the capitalist state to (discursively) construct those who oppose or
resist global capitalism as negative or extremist forces.

iii Following on the imperial history of creating Canada to protect its own interests at the expense of the
indigenous population of Canada, the French, and the newly emerging US empire (see Engler, 2009; Miles,
2011).

iv To read about these myths go to http://monthlyreview.org/2002/02/01/the-new-crusade-americas-war-on-terrorism

v The Lower Canada Rebellion, which began first, was a larger and more sustained conflict by French
Canadian and English Canadian rebels against British Colonial rule. The Upper Canada Rebellion was an
abortive uprising in Upper Canada against Upper Canada oligarchy, which included a series of raids,
skirmishes, and other small actions, several of them launched from the United States.

vi Igor Gouzenko was a Soviet agent who defected while working in Canada. He exposed a number of
Canadians who had been secretly providing the Soviets with information (Hewitt, 2000).

vii Let us recall that both the US and Canada had thousands of pages of anti-terrorism policy ready to be
introduced only a month after the events of 9/11 (see chapter five).

viii For instance, laws in the US are often indirectly written by and serve the interests of special interest
groups in that powerful moneyed interests that finance political campaigns influence US electoral outcomes
(Roberts, 2011a, para. 6).

ix For Abel (1995) law is “relatively autonomous” in that it is influenced by the economic infrastructure,
pressured by political forces, shaped by the social system, but not fully determined by any of them (cited in
Campbell & Connolly, 2007, pp.270-271). There is disagreement among Marxists over whether or not the
state is “relatively” autonomous, with some arguing that it is either more or less autonomous (see Piccioto,
1979).

vii Interpretive processes means the ways Canadian officials interpret official anti-terrorism discourse and
texts, such as laws, in a manner that formulates anti-capitalist activists as potential terrorists or security threats.

xviii By functionally differentiated text reader I mean one that is not passive but interacts with the textual
discourse in varying ways (see Hall, 1980; 1981). Depending on their functional role—i.e., legislator,
politician, lawyer, judge, police officer, a citizen subject to the law, etc.,—readers may interact with the
text in a different way.

xvii Blowback refers to the reality that people battered by military attacks, their land and resources
plundered, their people mass-murdered, raped, arrested and tortured might be desperate and
motivated enough to strike back in retaliatory self-defense (Lendman, 2006).

xi For the UK’s definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000 refer to

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1

xvii To see the ATA’s full definition of terrorism refer to the Appendices.

xviii The government responded to these criticisms with a slight amendment to the motive clause (Holthuis,
2007; Barabazon, 2006). However, though it was amended, the (political, religious ad ideological) motive
clause still exists in the current definition of “terrorist activity,” which I quoted in the dissertation.

xix These new powers were subject to a renewable review or “sunset clause” (Roach, 2003) and were
not renewed upon review in 2007 (“In Depth,” 2007). However, the government is trying to re-instate these draconian powers of investigative hearings and preventive arrest through Bill C-17, the
Combating Terrorism Act. On September 22, 2010 Bill C-17 received its second reading in the House
of Commons and has now passed through to the committee stage. Bill C-17 was originally introduced and
received first reading on April 23, 2010.
These policies force less developed countries to privatize social services, open up their markets to foreign firms and foreign direct investment, and allow foreign firms to exploit cheap labour and lax environmental regulations without re-investing in the local economy or population (see Rupert, 2000; Chehade, 2004).
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Appendices

Appendix A: Parliamentary Speeches (Excerpts)


Madam Speaker, I want to thank members for the opportunity to rise in the House this morning to speak in support of Bill C-36, the Government of Canada’s anti-terrorism act.

Before commenting on specific measures, I would like to highlight this government’s commitment to the fight against terrorism. This bill represents an important component of the federal government’s comprehensive strategy to strengthen national security.

The horrific terrorist acts of September 11 created suffering, fear and uncertainty. These events challenged Canadians’ sense of safety and security and it is this that we must address as our first priority.

Terrorism seeks to undermine the rule of law and human rights. Terrorism seeks to undermine our values and way of life. Terrorism tries to turn one community against another, religion against religion, and race against race. Terrorism seeks all these things but it will achieve none of them, not here in Canada. This government has been clear but it is worth repeating over and over again: this is not a war against any one group or ethnicity but a war against terrorism.

The measures contained in this bill target persons and activities that undermine the security and welfare of Canadians. Our efforts are directed against terrorist acts, not against the members of a specific community, ethnicity, or religion. Diversity is one of Canada’s greatest strengths and we are taking measures to protect it.

We are marshalling our resources against the forces of terror while still maintaining our commitment to the enduring values of democracy. Striking the proper balance has always been the challenge of democratic governments. This has never been more true than it is today. We are protecting our values and defining the threat that terrorism poses to free and civilized nations everywhere. These values receive an important part of their legal expression in the charter of rights and freedoms. We will protect the very thing that terrorism seeks to disrupt, namely, maintaining the balance between an open and just society and a safe and secure one.

Bill C-36 is one element of the Government of Canada’s comprehensive action plan on Canadian security, a plan whose objectives are to stop terrorists from getting into Canada and protect Canadian citizens from terrorist acts, to bring forward tools to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists, to keep our borders secure and to work with the
international community to bring terrorists to justice and address the root causes of hatred.

In developing this legislation we have paid close attention to what other democratic countries are doing in their fight against terrorism. It is important that we act in a way that is consistent with the approach of other democratic nations and in conformity with international law.

The world changed on September 11 in a way that changed our collective sense of safety and security. Reviewing our legal framework was one component of a more thorough review undertaken by the federal government to strengthen our national security. Be assured that all democratic nations have undertaken a similar re-examination.

Canadians have much to be proud of and much to protect. This bill strikes a balance between our desire to maintain the values of freedom and individual rights and our collective determination to protect our citizens….

I should like to describe the approach we have developed in Bill C-36. The proposed legislative package focuses on three elements. Bill C-36 targets terrorist activity and those who would carry out or support such activity. The three main objectives of the new measures are as follows: first, to suppress the very existence of terrorist groups; second, to provide new investigative tools; and, third, to provide a tougher sentencing regime to incapacitate terrorists and terrorist groups….

Let there be no doubt. Whether we are in North America or somewhere else in the world, terrorism represents a global threat, the force of which reverberated in the cities of New York and Washington on September 11. We shall take all legitimate means necessary to undermine the forces of terrorism. We must without hesitation work with our neighbours and with our allies to ensure that those who seek to terrorize the innocent and support terrorists understand that we will cut off their money. We will find them and we will punish them for their acts of violence.

The legislation before the House would provide a definition of terrorist activity for the first time. This definition is critical, as many of the legal implications under the bill are tied to the concept of terrorist activity. The first element of the definition outlines the offences that are established in the 12 international conventions related to terrorism, all of which we have signed.

Equally important, however, is a general definition that refers to acts or omissions undertaken for political, religious or ideological purposes and which are intended to intimidate the public, force governments to act and cause serious harm….

This is an important issue about which some of my colleagues have expressed concern. To respond to their concerns let me assure the House and all Canadians that this definition shall in no way include legitimate forms of political dissent. It would not impinge upon the lawful activities of legitimate political groups or lobby organizations.
In addition, the legislation would permit the designation of groups whose activities meet the definition of terrorist activity….

I should like to turn now to the element of the bill that would provide for preventive arrest as a way of assisting law enforcement officers to disrupt terrorism acts. The September 11 events heightened our awareness of the highly sophisticated nature of terrorist activity….

If an officer believes on reasonable grounds that a serious terrorist offence is about to take place and suspects that the arrest of a particular person would prevent it, then that person can be detained and brought before a judge. These measures would only be available under strictly defined conditions and would be subject to numerous procedural safeguards.

The consent of the attorney general would be required as a prerequisite, save for emergency circumstances. The person would be brought before a provincial court judge within 24 hours or as soon as possible, and a maximum further period in detention of 48 hours would be possible if a judge so orders….

Today I want to reassure Canadians that their government has listened to them and acknowledged their desire for action. It is responding with a legislative package that I believe meets their expectations not only in relation to combating terrorism but in its commitment to protecting individual rights and freedoms.

Our world changed dramatically on September 11 but not in the manner that the terrorists who planned and carried out the horrific attacks had hoped. They aimed to frighten us, disrupt our lives and force us to question our most basic democratic values of freedom and liberty. They did not succeed. Our commitment to democracy is stronger than ever. Together all Canadians are committed to increasing public security while maintaining our core values.

Bill C-36 represents an appropriate legislative balance to reflect Canadian values. Though our allies may have designed different legislative means to suit their legislative and constitutional frameworks, we nevertheless share a collective goal: to provide our citizens with security for themselves, their families and their communities…

Madam Speaker, I am happy to have the opportunity to address Bill C-36 and to put on the record the concerns of the New Democratic Party.

I want to begin by saying a few words about the context in which we are having this
debate. Obviously the context is set primarily by the events of September 11 and the need that follows from those events for Canada to consider whether or not its current legal regime is adequate to prevent terrorist activity here in Canada or prevent Canada from being used as a place where terrorist activity in other countries can be financed or in other ways supported.

This drive for new and better anti-terrorism legislation is driven by the legitimate concerns and the legitimate fear that have arisen out of September 11. It arises also out of the motion passed at the United Nations subsequent to September 11 which calls on all nations of the world to implement anti-terrorist legislation and to implement UN conventions with respect to the prevention of terrorism within 90 days. The government is moving to do that. That is a good thing and something which we welcome regardless of what particular concerns we might have about the legislation that is now before us. That is part of the context, i.e., September 11. However, we are not doing this in isolation. Unfortunately we also are considering this legislation in the context of the last few years here in Canada.

What I mean by that is the events that happened, for instance, at the APEC meeting and subsequently in Quebec City. They are on the minds of many people. The government might say that is an entirely different thing. The question is whether or not the bill is designed in such a way to make sure that the kind of protest activities that took place in Vancouver at the APEC meeting, in Windsor at the OAS meeting and in Quebec City at the FTAA meeting will be treated differently from the kind of activity which is addressed in this particular legislation. That is one of the concerns we bring to the table, because we know that it is a concern out there within a certain constituency in the Canadian public.

In the end, all of this is really a question of trust. It is really a question of not what the legislation says and not what the government says, but whether or not Canadians trust that the spirit and the letter of the law will be followed and not in some way or another abused. That is really what is at stake here. No amount of citing the relevant clauses of the bill and saying that something cannot happen will do. If people believe out of their own experience or from reading or learning about the experiences of others that either the government or the police have an inclination in some circumstances to abuse powers and to treat as unlawful that which is lawful, then they find themselves in a position of not being able to give the kind of approval they would otherwise probably like to give....

This comes back to trust and I think it is regrettable. I would prefer that we were dealing with anti-terrorism legislation in a context of trust where all Canadians could feel they did not have a government that was careless about their civil liberties and right to lawful protest. Instead we are unfortunately not just dealing with the context of September 11, which should be the overriding concern, but the backdrop for this in the minds of a lot of Canadians is APEC and Quebec City.

One thing the government has to do is persuade those Canadians who have kepticism arising out of those experiences that this is entirely different and that this would not be used to harass legitimate protestors or get in the way of legitimate protests....
I know the minister said the legislation is not intended for that sort of thing at all, and I hope it is not. I even believe that it is not in the minister’s mind. I am trying to convey the spirit of skepticism that exists among a great many people arising out of the experiences over the last few years. There would not be any more need to trump up charges against anybody because this provision in Bill C-36 could be used….

There has been much said about preserving the balance between liberty and security. We must not just respect Canadian values in this regard. We need to respect Canadian values as set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The government claims that it has done this. We will want to hear evidence about this in committee and perhaps debate among ourselves whether this bill meets that challenge…


Honourable senators, I rise today to begin second reading debate on Bill C-36, the anti-terrorism bill. This bill is a critical piece of Canada’s response to the threat of terrorism, a threat that while certainly not new to any one of us presented a new threat to the world on September 11, 2001. Since that terrible day, countries around the world have moved quickly to respond with enhanced security measures through increased investigative efforts, through diplomatic initiatives, through an ongoing military campaign and through humanitarian relief. Canada has played its part on all of these fronts.

We have made progress, but, honourable senators, it would be wrong and it would be dangerous to think that the significant threat of terrorism has been eliminated. While the government, in partnership with the international community, has taken and will continue to take measures to maintain the security of Canadians, we must be vigilant to guard against future terrorist action. Our response to this threat must be wide ranging and long term. The proposed legislation in Bill C-36 is a vital part of this response….

Honourable senators, our current law allows us to investigate terrorism and prosecute those who have engaged in various specific activities generally associated with terrorism, including hijacking, murder and sabotage. However, these and other laws are not sufficient. We can today convict terrorists who actually engage in various acts of violence if we are able to apprehend them after their acts. However, I would suggest that after what we saw on September 11, that is not good enough.

We need to be able to protect Canadians and prevent terrorist acts from being committed in the very first place. We need investigative tools that will help us gain information on terrorist groups before they engage in their attacks. We need preventive arrest powers to help us interfere with and destabilize terrorist groups who are in the planning stages of an attack. We need new Criminal Code offences that allow us to convict those who
facilitate, participate in and direct terrorist activity. These must include a preventive aspect that applies whether or not the ultimate terrorist acts are carried out. We also need to be able to stop the flow of money that terrorists need to carry out their terrible acts.

These are some of the gaps that Bill C-36 would fill….

Honourable senators, the government’s goal throughout has been to make the changes necessary to protect Canadians while remaining true to Canadian values. The Minister of Justice has stated on several occasions that the provisions of Bill C-36 comply with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

At the same time, we all recognize that certain aspects of this bill have given rise to concern. The bill authorizes the exercise of powers that, while perhaps not unprecedented in Canadian law, certainly are unusual. As the special Senate committee stated in its report:

The challenge is to find the right balance: ensuring that our law enforcement and security agencies have the tools necessary to protect us and to prevent terrorism before it strikes while not undermining the freedoms that our government ultimately is mandated to protect.

In my view, honourable senators, the bill before you today strikes that balance by providing our law enforcement and security agencies with the necessary tools while ensuring that there are avenues of review and appeal. The bill would allow for the establishment of a list of entities about which there are reasonable grounds to believe they knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity. A number of concerns were expressed, particularly before the special Senate committee, about the possibility that innocent people could find themselves named on the list. The bill always provided a right for the listed person or entity to apply for judicial review of their listing by a judge of the Federal Court right away and if there has been a material change of circumstances. However, now the person or entity would also be able to apply to the Federal Court for judicial review every two years after the list comes up for year review. That is the result of the work of our committee….

I believe this bill strikes a good balance. I look forward to the deliberations of the special Senate committee as it studies the bill on a clause-by-clause basis. I ask you to support speedy passage of this bill to committee. I wish the committee good luck in its study, which I know will be intensive and broadly based.

iv) Sponsor Speech for Bill C-35 (House of Commons). By Ms. Aileen Carroll (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lib.): 37th Parliament, 1st Session. Friday, October 5, 2001
Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to speak to the bill entitled an act to amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act.

The bill includes a variety of changes to the existing Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act most of which are technical in nature.

The main amendments are designed to facilitate international events including summits in Canada and to enable us to comply with our existing commitments under international treaties.

The bill would also correct several housekeeping inadequacies identified since the act was enacted by parliament in 1991.

As the House may know, the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act provides the statutory basis for the privileges and immunities of diplomats in Canada. It also provides the government with the ability to deal by order in council with the privileges, immunities and legal status of international organizations and their events or summits in Canada.

For example, existing orders in council under this act govern the legal status in Canada of organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the United Nations and the Agence de la Francophonie.

The bill’s core amendment is key to providing privileges and immunities to foreign officials who attend intergovernmental conferences or summits in Canada. The amendment broadens the definition of “international organization” to include international organizations and meetings that are presently excluded such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the G-8.

This amendment would ensure that these meetings and foreign officials involved obtain protection and treatment under Canadian law.

The second amendment in the bill that I wish to draw to the attention of the House concerns the police authority to provide security and protection for intergovernmental conferences held in Canada.

Following the violent protests at international events, for example, Genoa and more recently the terrorist attacks in the United States, it would be timely for the government to clarify in statute the present common law authority for police to provide security and protection for high profile international events.

The legislation would provide that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police would have the primary responsibility to ensure the security for the proper function or a meeting of an international organization attended by persons granted privileges and immunities under the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act and for which an order has been passed under that act.
The provisions would make clear for greater certainty the present authority of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to take appropriate measures to ensure that such international conferences or meetings are able to be carried out safely and effectively.

The bill would allow the government to extend privileges and immunities to international inspectors who come to Canada on temporary duty in order to carry out inspections under the chemical weapons convention and the agreement with the preparatory commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization…

v) Bill C-35 Liberal Sponsor Speech (Senate) By Hon. B. Alasdair Graham Debates of the Senate 1st Session, 37th Parliament, Monday, December 10, 2001

Honourable senators, I rise to speak to Bill C-35, respecting the privileges and immunities of foreign missions and international organizations. This bill is sponsored by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It received third reading in the other place on December 4, having been approved by the Standing Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs.

As the title indicates, Bill C-35 amends the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, which was enacted in Parliament in 1991. It will be helpful to keep in mind the function of the existing act when considering the amendments.

The existing legislation is the federal law that provides for the special legal status in Canada of representatives of foreign states and of international organizations. The act can be divided into two parts: The first one deals with the legal status of foreign missions to Canada, such as embassies, high commissions and consulates; the second deals with the legal status enjoyed by international organizations such as the United Nations or the International Civil Aviation Organization in Canada. It is this second aspect dealing with international organizations that is the main subject of the amendments contained in Bill C-35…

The main purpose of Bill C-35 is to modernize the part of the act governing the granting of privileges and immunities to international organizations and their international meetings. The bill will enable Canada to comply with our existing commitments under international treaties, as well as fix several technical inadequacies that have been detected since 1991….

The change to the definition of “international organization” makes it clear that Canada can grant privileges and immunities by order to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the G8, and other international organizations that are not established by treaty but are integral to the conduct of Canada’s international relations. This amendment reflects the development in the conduct of international relations over the last several years whereby international summits are held by non-treaty based international bodies such as the G8 or the G20. The amendments also represent a timely clarification, since Canada is scheduled to host the G8 summit in Canada in Kananaskis, Alberta in June of next year….
I would like to provide one of the reasons for proposing such a provision in this bill. Shortly after the Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City last spring, a court challenge was launched in the Tremblay case, alleging that the perimeter fence was an inappropriate security measure. The Quebec Superior Court held that the fence was authorized by law, and that it did not breach the Charter. Given that Canada will be hosting international summits in the future, the government considers it useful that this law be given a statutory basis. The amendment has been carefully drafted in light of the common law and statutory duties conferred on the police to keep the peace, to protect persons — including internationally protected persons — from harm and to protect persons engaged in lawful demonstration from unlawful interference.

Any security measures taken by the police will be subject to Charter scrutiny and must be justifiable as reasonable in the circumstances. In other words, any police measure that limits a Charter right, be it freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or whatever, must be justifiable in a free and democratic society….

In conclusion, the bill to amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act will allow Canada to live up to its international obligations to grant privileges and immunities to international organizations. The amendments will enable Canada to continue to safely host important international events and summits in Canada…
Appendix B: Laws (Excerpts)

i) *Anti-Terrorism Act* (Bill C-36)

Permeable to the *Anti-Terrorism Act* *(ATA)*

WHEREAS Canadians and people everywhere are entitled to live their lives in peace, freedom and security;

WHEREAS acts of terrorism constitute a substantial threat to both domestic and international peace and security;

WHEREAS acts of terrorism threaten Canada's political institutions, the stability of the economy and the general welfare of the nation;

WHEREAS the challenge of eradicating terrorism, with its sophisticated and trans-border nature, requires enhanced international cooperation and a strengthening of Canada's capacity to suppress, investigate and incapacitate terrorist activity;

WHEREAS Canada must act in concert with other nations in combating terrorism, including fully implementing United Nations and other international instruments relating to terrorism;

WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada, recognizing that terrorism is a matter of national concern that affects the security of the nation, is committed to taking comprehensive measures to protect Canadians against terrorist activity while continuing to respect and promote the values reflected in, and the rights and freedoms guaranteed by, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*;

AND WHEREAS these comprehensive measures must include legislation to prevent and suppress the financing, preparation, facilitation and commission of acts of terrorism, as well as to protect the political, social and economic security of Canada and Canada's relations with its allies;

NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: The Anti-Terrorism A
`terrorism offence'' means

(a) an offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 or 83.18 to 83.23:

"83.02 Every one who, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, provides or collects property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, in whole or in part, in order to carry out

(a) an act or omission that constitutes an offence referred to in subparagraphs (a)(i) to (ix) of the definition of "terrorist activity" in subsection 83.01(1), or

(b) any other act or omission intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, if the purpose of that act or omission, by its nature or context, is to intimidate the public, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or refrain from doing any act,

is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

"83.03 Every one who, directly or indirectly, collects property, provides or invites a person to provide, or makes available property or financial or other related services

(a) intending that they be used, or knowing that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out any terrorist activity, or for the purpose of benefiting any person who is facilitating or carrying out such an activity, or

(b) knowing that, in whole or part, they will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group,

is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

"83.04 Every one who

(a) uses property, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity, or

(b) possesses property intending that it be used or knowing that it will be used, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, for the purpose of facilitating or carrying out a terrorist activity,

is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years.

"83.18 (1) Every one who knowingly participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any
terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

2) An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not

(a) a terrorist group actually facilitates or carries out a terrorist activity;

(b) the participation or contribution of the accused actually enhances the ability of
a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity; or

(c) the accused knows the specific nature of any terrorist activity that may be
facilitated or carried out by a terrorist group.

(3) Participating in or contributing to an activity of a terrorist group includes

(a) providing, receiving or recruiting a person to receive training;

(b) providing or offering to provide a skill or an expertise for the benefit of, at the
direction of or in association with a terrorist group;

(c) recruiting a person in order to facilitate or commit

    (i) a terrorism offence, or

    (ii) an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would
be a terrorism offence;

(d) entering or remaining in any country for the benefit of, at the direction of or in
association with a terrorist group; and

(e) making oneself, in response to instructions from any of the persons who
constitute a terrorist group, available to facilitate or commit

    (i) a terrorism offence, or

    (ii) an act or omission outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would
be a terrorism offence.

(4) In determining whether an accused participates in or contributes to any activity of a
terrorist group, the court may consider, among other factors, whether the accused

(a) uses a name, word, symbol or other representation that identifies, or is
associated with, the terrorist group;

(b) frequently associates with any of the persons who constitute the terrorist
group;

(c) receives any benefit from the terrorist group; or

(d) repeatedly engages in activities at the instruction of any of the persons who
constitute the terrorist group.
(1) Every one who knowingly facilitates a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.

(2) For the purposes of this Part, a terrorist activity is facilitated whether or not

(a) the facilitator knows that a particular terrorist activity is facilitated;

(b) any particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated; or

(c) any terrorist activity was actually carried out.

83.20 Every one who commits an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

83.21 (1) Every person who knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to carry out any activity for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group, for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.

(2) An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not

(a) the activity that the accused instructs to be carried out is actually carried out;

(b) the accused instructs a particular person to carry out the activity referred to in paragraph (a);

(c) the accused knows the identity of the person whom the accused instructs to carry out the activity referred to in paragraph (a);

(d) the person whom the accused instructs to carry out the activity referred to in paragraph (a) knows that it is to be carried out for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group;

(e) a terrorist group actually facilitates or carries out a terrorist activity;

(f) the activity referred to in paragraph (a) actually enhances the ability of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity; or

(g) the accused knows the specific nature of any terrorist activity that may be facilitated or carried out by a terrorist group.

83.22 (1) Every person who knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to carry out a terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
(2) An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not

(a) the terrorist activity is actually carried out;

(b) the accused instructs a particular person to carry out the terrorist activity;

(c) the accused knows the identity of the person whom the accused instructs to carry out the terrorist activity; or

(d) the person whom the accused instructs to carry out the terrorist activity knows that it is a terrorist activity.

83.23 Every one who knowingly harbours or conceals any person whom he or she knows to be a person who has carried out or is likely to carry out a terrorist activity, for the purpose of enabling the person to facilitate or carry out any terrorist activity, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years.

(b) an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist group,

(c) an indictable offence under this or any other Act of Parliament where the act or omission constituting the offence also constitutes a terrorist activity, or

(d) a conspiracy or an attempt to commit, or being an accessory after the fact in relation to, or any counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c);

“terrorist activity” has the same meaning as in subsection 83.01(1):

“terrorist activity” means

(b) an act or omission, in or outside Canada,

(i) that is committed

(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and

(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside or outside Canada, and

(ii) that intentionally

(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence,
(B) endangers a person's life,

(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public,

(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or

(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C),
An Act to amend the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act (Bill C-35)

Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:

FOREIGN MISSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ACT

1. (1) The definition "international organization" in subsection 2(1) of the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act is replaced by the following:

"international organization" means an intergovernmental organization, whether or not established by treaty, of which two or more states are members, and includes an intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate;

(2) Subsection 2(1) of the Act is amended by adding the following in alphabetical order:

"accredited mission" means a permanent mission of a foreign state that is accredited to an international organization headquartered in Canada;

2. Section 4 of the Act is amended by adding the following after subsection (3):

(4) The Minister of Foreign Affairs may, by order, authorize the detention by officers under the Customs Act of goods imported by a diplomatic mission or consular post of a foreign state for any period during which, in the opinion of the Minister, the foreign state applies any of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations restrictively with the result that the privileges and immunities accorded to that state's diplomatic mission and consular posts in Canada exceed those accorded to a Canadian diplomatic mission and Canadian consular posts in that foreign state.

3. (1) The portion of subsection 5(1) of the English version of the Act before paragraph (a) is replaced by the following:

5. (1) The Governor in Council may, by order, provide that

(2) Paragraphs 5(1)(c) to (e) of the Act are replaced by the following:

(b.1) subject to subsection (1.2), accredited missions shall, to the extent specified in the order, have privileges and immunities comparable to the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic missions of foreign states in Canada under the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations;

(c) representatives of a foreign state that is a member of or participates in an international organization shall, to the extent specified in the order, have the privileges and immunities set out in Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations;

(d) representatives of a foreign state that is a member of an international organization headquartered in Canada, and members of their families forming part of their households, shall, to the extent specified in the order, have privileges and immunities comparable to the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic representatives, and members of their families forming part of their households, in Canada under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

(e) members of the administrative and technical staff, and members of their families forming part of their households, and the service staff of the mission of a foreign state that is a member of an international organization headquartered in Canada, other than persons who are Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada, shall, to the extent specified in the order, have privileges and immunities comparable to the privileges and immunities accorded to such persons under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;

(3) Paragraph 5(1)(f) of the Act is replaced by the following:

(f) que les hauts fonctionnaires d'une organisation internationale désignés par lui - ainsi que, dans le cas d'une organisation internationale ayant son siège au Canada, les membres de leur famille faisant partie de leur ménage - bénéficient, dans la mesure spécifiée, de privilèges et immunités comparables à ceux dont bénéficient respectivement les agents diplomatiques et, le cas échéant, les membres de leur famille faisant partie de leur ménage, en vertu de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations diplomatiques;

(4) Subsection 5(1) of the Act is amended by striking out the word `and' at the end of paragraph (h) and by adding the following after paragraph (h):

(h.1) such other classes of persons as may be designated by the Governor in Council who, in accordance with a treaty, convention or agreement set out in Schedule IV, are entitled to privileges and immunities, and members of their families forming part of their households, shall, to the extent specified in the order, have privileges and immunities comparable to the privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic agents, and members of their families forming part of their households, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
(5) Section 5 of the Act is amended by adding the following after subsection (1):

(1.1) An order made under paragraph (1)(b) or subsection 6(2) that has the effect of granting to an international organization or to an office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, as the case may be, any duty or tax relief privileges may, in relation to those privileges, if it so provides, be made retroactive.

(1.2) An order made under paragraph (1)(b.1) may restrict or withdraw any duty or tax relief privileges in relation to a particular accredited mission for the purpose of according to that accredited mission treatment that is comparable to the treatment accorded by the foreign state in question to a Canadian permanent mission that is accredited to an international organization in that foreign state.

(1.3) An order made under paragraph (1)(b.1) that has the effect of granting to an accredited mission of the International Civil Aviation Organization any tax relief privileges in relation to Part IX of the Excise Tax Act may, in relation to those privileges, if it so provides, be made retroactive and have effect with respect to any period beginning on January 1, 1991 at the earliest and ending on December 31, 2000 at the latest.

(6) Section 5 of the Act is amended by adding the following after subsection (3):

(4) In the event of an inconsistency or conflict between an order made under subsection (1) and section 19 of the Immigration Act, the order prevails to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict.

4. Section 6 of the Act is replaced by the following:

6. (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), the Minister of Foreign Affairs may, by order,

(a) grant to the office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, and to any person connected with that office, any of the privileges and immunities accorded under section 3 to consular posts, and to persons connected with those posts, other than duty and tax relief privileges;

(b) extend any of the privileges and immunities granted under paragraph (a) to that office, and to any person connected with it;

(c) grant to that office, and to any person connected with it, any of the benefits set out in the regulations;

(d) withdraw any of the privileges, immunities or benefits granted under this subsection or subsection (2); and

(e) restore any privilege, immunity or benefit withdrawn under paragraph (d).

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), on the joint recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance, the Governor in Council may, by order,
(a) grant to the office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, and to any person connected with that office, any of the duty and tax relief privileges accorded under section 3 to consular posts and to persons connected with those posts;

(b) extend any of the duty and tax relief privileges provided for in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations that have been granted to that office, and to any person connected with it; and

(c) grant to that office, and to any person connected with it, any duty or tax relief privilege not provided for in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

(3) Before the Minister makes an order under subsection (1) or the Governor in Council makes an order under subsection (2), the Minister or the Governor in Council, as the case may be, must be of the opinion that the office of the political subdivision of the foreign state performs, in Canada, duties that are substantially the same as the duties performed in Canada by a consular post as defined in Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

(4) An order made under subsection (1) or (2) must be for the purpose of according to the office of the political subdivision of the foreign state, and to any person connected with the office, treatment that is comparable

(a) to the treatment accorded to the office of a Canadian political subdivision in the foreign state, and to persons connected with that office; or

(b) if there is no office of a Canadian political subdivision in the foreign state, to the treatment that, in the opinion of the Minister or the Governor in Council, as the case may be, would, on the basis of assurances offered by that foreign state, be accorded to an office of a Canadian political subdivision in that foreign state, and to persons connected with that office.

(5) The Minister of Foreign Affairs may, by order, grant to the office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, and to the archives of that office, any of the immunities accorded to consular premises and consular archives by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations for the purpose of according to that office treatment that is comparable

(a) to the treatment accorded to the office of a Canadian political subdivision in the foreign state; or

(b) if there is no office of a Canadian political subdivision in the foreign state, to the treatment that, in the opinion of the Minister, would, on the basis of assurances offered by that foreign state, be accorded to an office of a Canadian political subdivision in that foreign state.
5. The Act is amended by adding the following after section 10:

**Security of Intergovernmental Conferences**

10.1 (1) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police has the primary responsibility to ensure the security for the proper functioning of any intergovernmental conference in which two or more states participate, that is attended by persons granted privileges and immunities under this Act and to which an order made or continued under this Act applies.

(2) For the purpose of carrying out its responsibility under subsection (1), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police may take appropriate measures, including controlling, limiting or prohibiting access to any area to the extent and in a manner that is reasonable in the circumstances.

(3) The powers referred to in subsection (2) are set out for greater certainty and shall not be read as affecting the powers that peace officers possess at common law or by virtue of any other federal or provincial Act or regulation.

(4) Subject to subsection (1), to facilitate consultation and cooperation between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and provincial and municipal police forces, the Solicitor General may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into arrangements with the government of a province concerning the responsibilities of members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and members of provincial and municipal police forces with respect to ensuring the security for the proper functioning of a conference referred to in that subsection.

6. Section 11 of the Act is replaced by the following:

11. A certificate purporting to be issued by or under the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and containing any statement of fact relevant to any of the following questions shall be received in evidence in any action or proceeding as proof of the fact stated in the certificate without proof of the signature or official character of the person appearing to have signed the certificate:

(a) whether a diplomatic mission, a consular post or an office of a political subdivision of a foreign state has been established with the consent of the Government of Canada;  

(b) whether an organization or conference is the subject of an order under section 5;  

(c) whether a mission is accredited to an international organization;  

(d) whether any premises or archives are the premises or archives of an office of a political subdivision of a foreign state; or  

(e) whether any person, diplomatic mission, consular post, office of a political subdivision of a foreign state, international organization or accredited mission has privileges, immunities or benefits under this Act.
Appendix C: Police Documents (Excerpts)


Introduction

1. Shock and surprise were widespread in the wake of the disruptive protests and associated violence that characterized the Seattle World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, 29 November-3 December, 1999. Yet the demonstrations were not something new, nor was the principal target-multinational corporate power-an unexpected focus. Opposition to corporate globalization has been growing for several years, a trend underscored by increasing media attention since 1995. Security agencies at Seattle, however, were caught off-guard by the large number of demonstrators and scope of representation, combined with the use of sophisticated methods and technology that effectively shut down the Conference….

2. Prior to Seattle, the most recent associated event occurred six months earlier, on 18 June, 1999, when protests known as “J18” were organized to coincide with the G8 Economic Summit in Cologne, Germany. The focal point was the City of London, where a march of 2000 people degenerated into a riot in which 42 people were injured and damage was estimated at one million pounds sterling. But the activities were not confined to London; cities in North America and Europe also were involved, and in most cases financial districts were targeted.

3. Bringing together a broad spectrum of interests and agendas, J18 incorporated both people and technology. While the former demonstrated on the streets, the latter featured in cyberattacks against business institutions. For five hours, at least 20 companies were subjected to more than 10,000 attacks by hackers. Adding a sense of insult to injury, the Internet was the means by which the concept of J18 originated, and by which the event was ultimately orchestrated….

Situation

5. Meetings of international monetary, trade and environmental organizations, which in the past incited little or no protest interest, are now drawing the attention of thousands of anti-globalization activists. Representing a broad spectrum of groups, lobbyists, and overlapping networks, including some violent extremists whose presence raises security concerns, they share a mutual antipathy-that of multinational corporate power. Often described as more influential and stronger than government, some corporations boast budgets larger than the gross domestic product (GDP) of many nations: “…of the top hundred economies, fifty-one are multinationals and only forty-nine are countries.”
6. Alleged abuse of corporate power by multinationals is the basic focus of protest activity. Large corporations with international undertakings stand accused of social injustice, unfair labour practices— including slave labour wages, living and working conditions—as well as a lack of concern for the environment, mismanagement of natural resources, and ecological damage. Anti-globalization demonstrations have achieved worldwide support partly because the target, *per se*, its representatives, and its effects are global in nature. Major brand names, among them Nike, Starbucks, McDonalds, and Shell Oil, are principal targets, ironically because their massive advertising campaigns designed to engender public prominence have been successful—and that status is being used to highlight the charges brought against them.

7. Protest objectives extend beyond the claimed corporate impropriety, however. Multinational economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are seen as establishing, monitoring, and rendering judgements on global trade practices, and are viewed as the spearheads of economic globalization. These institutions, considered to be the servants of corporate interests, exercising more power than elected governments and interested only in the profit motive, have increasingly become principal demonstration targets. Underlying the anti-globalization theme is criticism of the capitalist philosophy, a stance promoted once again by left-of-centre activists and militant anarchists.

8. The global parameters have encouraged disparate groups and individuals to participate in the demonstrations. In Seattle and Washington, for example, the wide variety of parading malcontents evoked the eclectic ambience of a “protest county fair.” Circumstances also have promoted the involvement of fringe extremists who espouse violence, largely represented by Black Bloc anarchists and factions of militant animal-rights and environmental activists. The melding of various elements and establishing of strange-bedfellow ties at individual demonstrations have contributed both to the impact and the unique character of the events.

**Discussion**

**The Issues**

9. The growing trend toward anti-globalization activism is directed, first, against “big business”— multinational corporate power—and, second, against “big money”—global agreements on economic growth. Allegations of exploitive labour and human-rights abuses reach back to the mid-1990s when a number of corporations producing major brand name products, such as Nike sneakers, Gap jeans, and Starbucks coffee, were accused of union-busting, sweatshop working conditions, and child labour practices on a global scale. Among other well-known multinationals, McDonalds, Monsanto, and Shell Oil were indicted for similar faults. The litany of castigation ranges across a broad spectrum, including paying low wages, offering minimal health benefits, depleting old-growth and rain forests, using unsafe pesticides, bio-engineering agriculture crops, violating animal rights, and colluding with violent and repressive regimes.
10. Accusations against the multinationals continue—students still gather in Eugene, Oregon, the home of Nike, to protest the corporate giant’s Third World labour practices—but increasingly they are being supplemented by demonstrations against such institutions as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB). Protagonists claim these establishments promote and facilitate corporate power and that elected governments are being overshadowed in the political arena by global economic institutions and their efforts to direct and expand economic growth. Activists, however, are divided in their anti-globalization position. The larger segment supports restructuring corporations to reflect accountability and transparency; the smaller segment, while also supporting these objectives, actively promotes the total demise of global structures including the WTO. Anarchist activists and some environmentalists fall in the latter category.

11. The philosophy of capitalism also is under attack, facing charges that it is ignoring the social welfare of individuals, and destroying cultures and the ecology in the quest for growth and profit. As prominent corporate names come under fire, making for good publicity and media attention, groups such as animal-rights activists and environmental protection advocates vie for an opportunity to share the spotlight, many making similar claims about exploitation. Some observers term the situation the “rise of the New New Left”(4) and draw comparisons to the 1968 Parisian “summer of the barricades.” The unifying elements on this occasion, however, are the powers of the corporations, name-brands, globalization, and the interests of capital, in opposition to the welfare of workers, exploitation of the ecology, and a range of collateral issues. Many factors are involved, with certain incidents cited as triggers, among them the death of Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa, and the campaigns against Kathy Lee sportswear, Wal-Mart, Mattel and Disney, and Shell and Chevron Oil Companies, which draw attention to the claims of the protesters and give substantive meaning to the demonstrations….

16. No matter the fundamental viewpoint, pro or con, involving globalization, concerns on the part of law enforcement and security agencies are very real. While individuals and groups have a right to legitimate protest, including non-violent demonstrations whatever their size, they do not have the right to close down political meetings. Writing in the The Ottawa Citizen, two professors from Carleton University have said: Democracies have the right and the responsibility to protect free expression and lawful assembly. This includes rights for activists and critics. It also includes the rights of elected officials to assemble and express their views. The tyranny of small groups, minorities or even majorities to prevent the exercise of such rights by trying to shut down meetings is unacceptable in a democracy.


What is Radicalization?

Radicalization is a critical subset of the terrorist threat. The RCMP defines radicalization
as the process by which individuals — usually young people — are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism. Sometimes referred to as “homegrown terrorism,” this process of radicalization is more correctly referred to as domestic radicalization leading to terrorist violence.

The nuances of this definition are critical. The English word “radical” comes from the Latin radis, or “root.” Its connotation (as in the word “radish”) is of being buried in the ground, rooted, fundamental. So a radical is a person who wishes to effect fundamental political, economic or social change, or change from the ground up….

“Reds and Greens”

Other vulnerabilities and vectors for radicalization include the global development of linkages between the political left wing (“reds”) and Islamist extremists (“greens”). The unifying factor is, to a large extent, opposition to globalization, capitalism and US foreign and security policy, coupled with anti-Israel sentiment and admiration for the purported social activist component of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizballah. This seemingly counterintuitive discovery of common cause is allowing Islamist groups to cloak themselves in the rhetoric of liberation for oppressed peoples and, more importantly, to participate actively in the broader spectrum of western politics.

While primarily a European issue, manifestations of this “red-green coalition” have surfaced in Canada, most notably at the level of student politics. Concordia University has been repeatedly forced to cancel debate on the Israel-Palestine issue after demonstrations and threats of violence by Muslim and left wing student groups who do not want their views challenged. While this is relatively removed from the mainstream, it is still a fundamental abrogation of constitutional guarantees regarding free speech and association…
now active in a number of regions including North America, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. International initiatives in the fight against terrorism could have wide-ranging implications for some of these regions as the focus moves from Afghanistan.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by countries seeking to acquire nuclear, biological or chemical weaponry and related delivery systems continues to be a leading international concern. The potential use of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological materials by a terrorist group poses an emerging threat and increasingly challenges the security and intelligence communities. Of concern is the desire by some groups to use lethal techniques which could cause large-scale damage to governments or systems they consider as opposed to or offending their beliefs.

Africa will continue to require great investment in international peacekeeping and global humanitarian assistance as African states intervene militarily to control insurgencies that threaten neighbouring countries or harbour dangerous elements, such as terrorist groups and radical fundamentalist movements. Developments in the Middle East continue to spiral downwards, with conflicts in the West Bank and Gaza reaching critical and unpredictable levels. Other concerns include the long-standing Indian-Pakistani feud over Kashmir, which remains contentious and fractious. Pakistan’s continued support to militants in Kashmir ensures the continuance of conflict along the line-of-control, and conflict between India and Pakistan in this region will keep military tensions heightened. The results of efforts to decommission weapons in Northern Ireland remain uncertain, with recurrent acts of terrorism occurring in the region.

Transnational criminal activity transcends national borders and threatens Canada’s national and economic security. Organizations involved in this activity can detrimentally affect the integrity of Canadian financial institutions, key sectors of the Canadian economy and other public institutions. Migrant smuggling is a lucrative activity for transnational criminal organizations. The covert avenues utilized to smuggle illegal migrants may also become a conduit to facilitate the entry of terrorists into countries, as scrutiny is placed on legitimate entry mechanisms.

The growth and complexity of the anti-globalization movement, combined with Canada’s role in the international community and as a host of world events, are an ongoing concern. Meetings held by multinational organizations such as the Organization of the American States (OAS), the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank are viewed by anti-globalization protesters as a means of promoting economic and social policies benefiting the rich and powerful at the expense of the world’s people and the environment. The protestors represent a wide variety of groups, whose goal is to raise awareness of global issues such as poverty, human-rights violations, free trade, and environmental practices. The majority of protestors stage non-violent demonstrations; however, these demonstrations also attract individuals who support the use of serious violence to achieve their aims, moving beyond legitimate dissent and lawful advocacy.

Technological changes touch upon many security issues and increase the complexity of effective investigations. Advances in computer-based communications and encryption continue to challenge the capacity of intelligence services to lawfully intercept communications and gather intelligence. Investigations of threats posed by terrorism and intelligence activity are further complicated by the use of cybertechnology by foreign intelligence agencies and terrorist groups. The reliance of modern countries on critical infrastructures has created vulnerabilities that impact upon national security concerns. The Service must remain abreast of leading-edge technology and it endeavours to meet this challenge through
iv) CSIS 2002 Public Report (Excerpt)

Part II
Counter Terrorism

Terrorism Today

The initially promising geopolitical developments of the 1990s saw the end of superpower rivalry and led to changing power and influence structures throughout much of the world. However, ethnic and religious conflicts accompanied these changes, producing instability and the creation of a climate favourable to terrorism. The nature of terrorism today has fundamentally changed from that of even a few years ago and continues to evolve. While the world has seen a reduction in the number of terrorist incidents during the last decade, the incidents now occurring are becoming more deadly and indiscriminate.

Terrorism in Canada can be divided into four categories: religious extremism (with Islamic extremism being the most serious threat at present); state-sponsored terrorism (exemplified by the current regime in Iran); secessionist violence (for example, Sikh extremism and separatist movements in Sri Lanka, Turkey and other countries); and domestic extremism (including, but not limited to, certain elements of animal-rights, anti-globalization and white supremacist groups).
iv) CSIS 2003 Public Report (Excerpt)

A number of groups or individuals associated with international terrorist organizations have a presence, or are active, in Canada. Most of their Canadian activities support actions elsewhere and are often linked to homeland conflicts. Those activities include using Canada as a base for fundraising and lobbying through front organizations; providing support for terrorist operations; procurement activities; planning and organizing terrorist activities abroad; and coercing and manipulating immigrant communities.

Religious Extremism

Sunni Islamic extremism remains the primary focus of the CSIS Counter Terrorism program. Since the September 2001 attacks, the Sunni Islamic terrorists' pattern of multiple coordinated bomb attacks against civilian targets has become tragically familiar. Attacks in Turkey and Morocco, during 2003, indicate that the threat has not diminished and is extending to hitherto untouched countries.

Secessionist Violence

Secessionist violence continues to tear apart various communities, and these conflicts often find their way into the multicultural fabric of Canadian society. In Sri Lanka, for example, a murderous civil war seems ready to flare up again into armed conflict, despite peace negotiations. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), one of the warring parties in Sri Lanka, is a sophisticated organization that pioneered the use of human suicide bombers for terrorist operations. Its presence in Canada, as well as that of other terrorist entities of the same ilk, affects the life of new Canadians seeking to flee political turmoil.

Domestic Extremism

The potential for terrorist violence is not exclusively foreign-based. Domestically grown threats do exist. Violence can originate from any number of domestic radical groups ranging from the neo-Nazi movement to the violent fringe of any number of single-issue groups such as the ecologist, animal-rights or anti-globalization movements. Canada is a diverse country, where democratic and open debates about political, linguistic, ethnic or religious issues are the norm. However, there remains a violence-prone margin of loosely attached persons who may resort to violence to achieve their goals. Throughout its existence, in accordance with the principles of the CSIS Act, the Service has been responsible for advising government regarding these attempts to resort to violence, without preventing the legitimate expression of political views, including ones dissenting from the majority of Canadian society.

State-sponsored Terrorism

There is an ongoing need for intelligence about the threats posed by states which, as a matter of national policy, support terrorism. Several states continue to provide various means of support for terrorist groups, including funding, training, or the provision of a safe haven.

State sponsorship of terrorism threatens security interests in Canada and abroad. A number of terrorist groups that are known to be supported by national governments, such as the Hezbollah, have
v) CSIS 2007-2008 Public Report (Excerpt)

CSIS Operational Activities
2007-08

CSIS, like other organizations, must establish priorities to ensure the best use of its resources in fulfilling its mandate. Over time, priorities change with circumstances. For this reason, the Service's operational priorities are reviewed on an ongoing basis to ensure they reflect the current threat environment.

In the early days of CSIS, most of its operational resources were directed to counter-intelligence investigations. However, over the years - both before and after 9/11 - terrorism has emerged as the primary preoccupation of the intelligence community in Canada and abroad, and 2007-08 was no exception. The Government of Canada has identified counter-terrorism as the top priority of CSIS.

Other operational priorities for the Service in 2007-08 included investigations which focussed on: espionage and foreign interference (such as clandestine work of foreign governments in Canada); security threats against Canada's information systems and critical infrastructure (posed by hackers, terrorists and foreign countries); the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear threats); and terrorist financing. Finally, security screening also continued to be a key priority in 2007-08, as CSIS continued its work relating to security assessments of individuals as part of the Government Screening program, as well as in providing advice to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) as part of the Immigration Screening program.

The Threat Environment 2007-08

Terrorism

Unlike many nations, Canada has been fortunate that no major terrorist incidents have occurred within its borders, or originated from Canada (such as the tragic Air India bombing in 1985), in over two decades. While some incidents did occur in 2007-08 (for example, in April 2007, an explosive device was detonated outside a Jewish community centre in Montreal, causing damage but no injuries), the number of incidents of this nature have been minimal within Canada's borders over the past several years.

Terrorism, however, remains a real threat to the safety and security of Canadians. Since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. (in which 24 Canadians were among those killed), there continue to be major terrorist acts committed across the globe.