DISCIPLINE AND TORTURE,
OR HOW IRANIANS BECAME MODERNS

a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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March 1987

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ABSTRACT

In this dissertation, I undertake an empirical analysis of Iranian punitive practices over the last century. In this context, I set out to investigate three issues. First, I critically examine the claim that modernity is characterized by a diminution of corporal punishments, considering both the older humanist-progressivist version of this claim and the revisionist-Nietzschean versions that have been advanced by several scholars including Michel Foucault, David Rothman, Michael Ignatieff, John Langbein, Gerhard Oestreicher, and Marc Raeff. In particular, I examine the relationship between modern torture and what might be called the "disciplinary process" that is said to characterize modernization. Second, I evaluate Chomsky and Herman's hypothesis that developing societies are characterized by a specific economy of violence that might be described as "state terrorism." Third, I test the utility of Foucault's theoretical approach to the study of power.
RESUME

Dans cette thèse, j'entreprends une analyse empirique des coutumes punitives iraniennes depuis un siècle. À cette fin, j'examine trois aspects. Premièrement, j'examine d'une manière critique le point de vue suivant lequel, la modernité se caractérise par une diminution des punitions physiques, tout en considérant l'interprétation traditionnelle humanistico-progressive de ce point de vue et les interprétations Nietzscheo-révisionnistes qui ont été suggérées par plusieurs penseurs, tels que Michel Foucault, David Rothman, Michael Ignatieff, John Langbein, Gerhard Oestreich, et Marc Raeff. Plus précisément, j'examine la relation entre la torture au XXème siècle et ce que l'on pourrait appeler le "processus disciplinaire" qui, d'une manière bien précise, caractérise la modernisation.

Deuxièmement, j'évalue les hypothèses de Noam Chomsky et d'Edward Herman suivant lesquelles les sociétés en voie de développement sont caractérisées par une économie de la violence d'une manière bien précise, et qui pourrait être décrite comme "une économie de terrorisme d'État.

Troisièmement, j'examine l'utilité de l'approche théorique de Michel Foucault pour l'étude du pouvoir.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The study was conducted under the scholarly supervision of Prof. James Tully, Prof. Samuel Noumoff, and Prof. Uner Turgay with the generous assistance of the Department of Political Science, the Institute of Islamic Studies, and the Center for Developing Areas Studies at McGill University. It also received the benefit of a critical reading by Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, a reading for which I am deeply appreciative.

I should like to thank my friends and colleagues who commented on this study and enriched it with their thoughts: Greg Ostrander, Guy Laforest, Remi Roy, Ron Afzal, Levent Hekimoglu, Chris Udry, Susan Weston, and Eric Worby. I should also like to thank Stewart Thomas, Maya Berberi, Richard Cooper, Mohamad Rahimian, Brian Walker, and Eric Darrier for their support and encouragement. Finally, I am indebted to Jim Tully, my friend and adviser, who has given me, among other things, a deep understanding of intellectual endeavour, scholarly acuteness, and wise supervision.

It may be that dissertations on the subject of torture ought not to be dedicated. There are so many beautiful aspects to this world that it is unnecessary to immortalize beauty where it dwells in association with cruelty. Let me speak then not of those to whom this thesis is dedicated but
of those who have been closest to me in my endeavour to understand the cruelties of this age, my family: Susan, Cameron, Davood, and Sallie.
In all works that use source material in a non-Latin alphabet, one encounters certain technical problems in the course of transliteration. As there is, currently, no standard and, possibly, adequate system for transliteration from Farsi to English, I have chosen to follow what is occasionally known as the "Princeton System," or the transliteration system for the Arabic alphabet provided by F. Ziaieh and B. Winder in their book, *An Introduction to Modern Arabic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). In some cases, however, partly as a reflection of Persian pronunciation and partly to simplify reading and avoid cluttered transliterations, I have introduced certain changes. These changes are as follows:

1. To represent the consonant *yay*, the letter *y* instead of *w* is used.

2. For the letters *thal* and *sad*, the letter *z* is used. Similarly, *dhal* and *dad* are represented by the letter *z*.

3. The letters *i* and *a* are used interchangeably to represent the *kafrass* short vowel sound.

4. The *yayn* and the *hasszah* are represented by the
signs preceding the appropriate vowel.

5. The letters ę, ş, ž, and ş are used to represent the four letters added by Persians to the Arabic alphabet.

6. A hyphen is used to separate prepositional suffixes such as yi.

7. Occasionally, a vowel is doubled for the sake of proper emphasis. For example, Tšaminat is written Tšaminat.

All quotations referring to Farsi sources are my own translations except (a) in the case of the transcripts of Mirza Kirmani's torture interrogation where I have followed, for the most part, E.G. Browne's English translation and (b) in the case of Al-e Ahmad's Garbzadeqi where I have utilized Paul Sprachman's excellent translation. All dates are given in the Gregorian calendar. The only exception to this rule occurs in the bibliography and footnotes where the date of publication of Farsi books is listed first according to the Iranian Solar calendar and then followed by the date according to the Gregorian calendar in brackets. Paraphrases from the Qur'an, unless otherwise specified, are from Mohammad Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran; An Explanatory Translation* (New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, n.d.).
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The stimulus for investigation must start not with philosophies but with issues and problems.

Edmund Husserl

In contemporary Iran, punishment is exercised through three distinct sets of practices. It is exercised through disciplinary practices: practices that train subjects through a system of routines and drills. It is exercised through tutelary practices: practices that supervise subjects through a regime of instruction and guidance. Finally, it is exercised through modern torture: practices that seize subjects through the medical manipulation of life processes.

I propose to write an account of these modalities of punishment, not a history of Iranian law, prison reform, or state repression. My objective is to use an analysis of these modalities to explain changes in the general exercise of power in Iranian society. I test the hypothesis that these modalities refer not only to the specific exercise of punishment, but may also characterize significant features of modern power relations.

Of these modalities of punishment, modern torture is the central concern of this study. The contemporary
significance of modern torture is well known. In the twentieth century, torture has reappeared. It emerges not only in developing societies like Iran but also in developed societies like France, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union. Beyond this consideration, however, modern torture, more so than discipline and tutelage, brings into question conventional understandings of the character of modernity. Its existence poses difficult theoretical and empirical questions in the study of modern politics.

**Political Theory and the Study of Punishment**

Since the publication of G.W.F. Hegel's *The Philosophy of Right*, political theorists have often examined the practice of punishment in European societies. They have used this analysis to explain features of modernity. I shall examine one particular account advanced by Friedrich Nietzsche. This account has its importance in that it defines a general hypothesis concerning modern politics.

In *On The Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche poses the following problem. What accounts for the disappearance of corporal severity in European penal history? Why does it become unnecessary for European societies to inflict severe corporal punishments in the administration of their subjects?

Nietzsche argues that, in European history, punitive retribution has functioned as a mnemonic device, that is, as an aid in strengthening the human memory. It incited Europeans to regulate their actions through their recollection
of punishment rather than suffer actual punishment. This capacity for self-regulation through memory is what Europeans came to designate as a moral conscience. To become conscientious meant to learn how to 'punish' one's self through one's memory rather than be punished by others. Nietzsche maintains that this development had significant consequences for the organization of European societies. He observes that becoming a conscientious individual did not simply mean that one became responsible and moral in one's own self-image. It meant, and this amounts to the same thing for Nietzsche, that individuals became predictable and governable for the actions of others. One could count on conscientious individuals because they would fulfill their duties without the threat of external punishments; their own consciences would drive them to satisfy their social obligations. Consequently, as individuals became or were made conscientious in their socio-economic affairs, governments abandoned corporal punishments for methods that incited penitence in individuals, e.g. incarceration in a penitentiary. Societies could now be governed without the threat of extreme violence.

In this manner, Nietzsche puts into question the way in which analysts conventionally explain the abolition of torture in the eighteenth century. On this conventional view, the abolition of torture was explained with reference to the general goals of the Enlightenment; torture was abolished because it violated the moral precepts of humanism and the historical demands of civilized progress. Nietzsche, however,
suggests that torture was abolished because there were other processes at work that made it possible to govern Europeans in new ways. These processes made it possible to dispense with torture because they transformed individuals into self-regulating beings. If enlightened humanists succeeded in abolishing torture, it was because torture no longer occupied a central place in the administration of European societies.

Of course, Nietzsche only succeeds in raising doubts concerning "the humanist-progressivist model"; he does not specify the processes that made it possible to dispense with corporal punishments. In the twentieth century, several analysts have critically examined and advanced empirical evidence that supports Nietzsche's hypothesis. Although these analysts do not agree on every point, they are united on one, namely, that the humanist-progressivist model does not provide a persuasive explanation for the abolition of torture. I shall call their arguments revisionist-Nietzschean explanations.

The earliest revisionist argument is almost certainly Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber explains how Europeans were made into self-regulating beings with reference to Protestant ascetic practices. Weber argues that Protestants were uncertain as to whether they would be rewarded or punished in the next world and, consequently, sought to allay their anxiety by turning to specific ascetic practices. These ascetic practices involved an extremely intense set of disciplinary procedures, the fulfillment of which satisfied religious precepts and thereby
incited good conscience. Weber adds that "the undoubted superiority of Calvinism in social organization" derived from the fact that "psychological sanctions" had replaced external sanctions. Calvinist communities could elaborate a meticulous form of self-government that not only held together despite "the King's threat of severe punishment" but also lay the basis for rational conduct in modern culture. Similarly, Calvinist communities elaborated an individualist social organization that withstood competition from "organic social organizations in fiscal-monopolistic forms" and that furnished the basis for capital accumulation and work discipline in modern societies.

There are, in addition, several more recent explanations that link the abolition of torture with the transformation of Europeans into self-punishing and, consequently, self-regulating beings. Rusche and Kirchheimer argue that a new organization of labor discipline in industrial economies led to the diminution of corporal punishments. Ignatiouff links the abolition of torture to changes in the way elites exercised power over the poor in the transition to industrial society: paternal relations gave way to carceral power. As he observes, "the intensification of labor discipline went hand in hand with the elaboration of the freedom of a market in labor, just as the extension of popular suffrage proceeded together with the extension of a structure of carceral power." Rothman argues that sanguinary punishments gave way to disciplinary institutions because there was a perceived need for a specifically anti-nomadic technique to control the
Langbein situates the processes leading to the abolition of torture much earlier than the eighteenth century. He argues that, by the seventeenth century, judges had numerous alternatives to torture, including deportation, workhouses, galleys, and prisons, and that these alternatives to torture gained increasing importance due to a major change in doctrines of judicial proof in early modern Europe.

Similarly, Oestreich draws attention to the role of Neostoicism in early modern Europe, a mode of thought that played the dual role of increasing the social discipline exercised by states and encouraging forms of individual self-discipline. Raeff adds to this the pivotal place of systems of surveillance, both in the form of self-inspection and in the order of social policing, in transforming Europeans into self-regulating beings.

However, perhaps the most influential contemporary reformulation of Nietzsche's argument is one advanced by the French political theorist, Michel Foucault. Although Foucault points to similar trends in European societies, his argument is much more ambitious. Indeed, Foucault claims not only to explain the abolition of torture but to provide a new characterization of how power is exercised in modern societies.

In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Foucault deals with a specific event in European penal history, the use of incarceration as the principal means of punishment. Foucault observes that in early modern Europe, there were three alternative ways of exercising punishment:
the practice of torture based on old monarchical law; the practice of convict labor proposed by Enlightenment jurists; and the practice of incarceration. "How is it," Foucault asks, "that, in the end, it was the third that was adopted?"

Foucault observes that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Europeans became pre-occupied with discipline, that is, with various techniques for correcting individuals, allocating time, and surveilling populations. These disciplinary techniques were employed in educational, medical, economic, religious, penal, and military institutions. Although the manner in which the use of these techniques was justified varied from place to place, these techniques had three consequences for European societies. First, they made it possible to exercise power over subjects at the lowest possible financial cost while at the same time maximizing the productivity of each individual. Second, they made it possible for the state to enforce the general behaviours demanded by law at ever more minute levels of social life. Finally, as observational techniques, they provided the means for collecting statistical data on social trends. This data, in turn, formed the basis of new disciplines (e.g., criminology, educational psychology, business administration, and social hygiene) and led to new disciplinary programs.

For these reasons, European societies became disciplinary societies. Through the analysis of the modern prison, Foucault explains the processes that characterize the exercise of power in such societies. He observes that, in
modern societies, the prison is the fulcrum of punishment because it is a point of rehabilitation. It is an apparatus that, like the factory, the workhouse, and the military academy, inculcates disciplinary habits. He adds that this reformatory process is closely related to another process, normalization. Since individual conduct is compared and reformed according to a knowledge of the regular functioning of individuals in general (e.g. statistical averages, behavioural standards, or norms of performance), discipline incites a new kind of subjectivity in the incarcerated, normality. To be a normal subject is to become a subject who is law-abiding in one’s own self-image and, simultaneously, law-governed, for the actions of social institutions. Normality, in other words, is a kind of subjectivity that accompanies and entrenches a disciplinary habit in an individual. Foucault maintains that the birth of the modern prison refers to these twin processes of disciplinization and normalization. However, he is quick to observe that the prison presents an extreme example of these general trends in modern societies. Modern societies may be disciplinary societies but they are not disciplined societies.

In short, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault makes two claims. First, he argues that insofar as European societies became disciplinary societies, torture became unnecessary as a means of government. Second, he argues that if a feature of modernity is a society’s maximization of all resources at its disposal for the improvement of its way of life, then one process through which this goal was achieved in Europe was
through discipline. Foucault makes it clear that he thinks these two claims are interrelated:

If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact the two processes—the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital—cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital... Each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other. 17

In fact, Foucault’s argument has its importance not so much because it presents new empirical evidence but rather because of its level of theoretical articulation. Foucault’s argument makes it possible to assemble the more detailed revisionist-Nietzschean studies under the general study of discipline, i.e., a particular relation of power and a specific method for understanding. One could say that, in this respect, Foucault’s explanation is the richest revision of Nietzsche’s hypothesis to date and, consequently, the most important alternative to the humanist-progressivist explanation of European penal history.

Nevertheless, Foucault’s explanation has one feature in common with humanist explanations. Like the humanists but for different reasons, Foucault believes that, over the last few centuries, there has been a process at work which renders torture superfluous to the general exercise of power.

Yet there is little grounds to justify this optimism. It
is well known that, after a period of world-wide decline in the
nineteenth century, torture has returned in the twentieth
century. Three features of this return require more careful
elaboration. First, the return to torture is not a return to
the ceremonial forms of torture which were practised in Europe
and elsewhere in the course of the eighteenth century. Modern
tortures are clinical, not ritual, tortures. Second, modern
tortures are associated with disciplinary practices and, especialy, with the practice of incarceration. Today, torture
takes place in the context of policing operations and prison
discipline. Third, modern tortures are apparently integral to
the government of many societies. However, there is no
distinct institution that fulfills the multiple tasks assigned
to torture as the public spectacle once fulfilled for
governments in the eighteenth century. The manner in which
modern torture assists in the government of societies remains
obscure. In short, modern tortures apparently differ from
classical tortures in the way in which they act upon bodies, in
the relation they bear to discipline, and in the mechanisms
through which they entrench power relations.

It is important to note that neither Foucault nor the
humanists can advance a satisfactory explanation for the return
to torture, much less the features that characterize it. On
the one hand, the humanist model leads one to conclude that, in
recent years, the world has become noticeably less humanist and
progressive, less rational and more superstitious, although it
is hard pressed to explain why this has happened and why the
excesses of force today are so often justified with reference
to humanity and progress. This raises considerable skepticism concerning the explanatory power of the humanist-progressivist model. Peters sums up the current objections:

Reason and humanitarianism are, however, difficult to quantify and a model of history which sees them increasing and decreasing in intensity is a difficult model to grasp and use and, even more difficult, one it is impossible to agree upon.

On the other hand, Foucault's argument leads one to conclude that the world has become distinctly less disciplinary and normalized, although Foucault would find it difficult to explain why this transformation is so often justified with reference to discipline and order.

Nor can it be objected that modern tortures are characteristic of non-Western, i.e. non-disciplinary societies, and this for two reasons. First, torture, in its contemporary form, initially appeared in Europe. In a seminal work on the history of torture, Edward Peters has traced the assembly of modern torture as a distinct practice "during the watershed of 1917-1945." It was during this period, Peters argues, that certain procedures characteristic of European and American police forces were systematized into the recognizable form of modern torture. Peters details the modifications torture underwent, moving from revolutionary Russia to fascist regimes in the twenties and thirties (Italy, Spain and Germany) and, finally, to French practices in Algeria. One can no doubt debate this precise chronology. However, Peters' account does indicate that the practice of modern torture is associated with European, i.e. disciplinary societies, although specific innovations occur elsewhere. Second, if the process of capital
accumulation is linked with a fundamental change in the exercise of power, then it is hard to see why there has been a return to torture in the twentieth century. Indeed, on Foucault's account of the disciplinary process, torture should not be needed at all. Thus, insofar as modern torture does exist, it raises unsettling questions. Why is it that Foucault's argument and, more generally, revisionist-Nietzschean explanations fail to account for the return to torture? Are there aspects of contemporary politics that Nietzsche's original hypothesis does not take into account? If so, how might these be defined? What alternative explanation can be offered that takes into account the existence of modern torture?

I propose to examine these questions using an analysis of penal practices in a developing society, Iran. Iranian penal history is particularly suited for an investigation of these questions. In the first place, Iranian penal history poses the same questions as does European penal history. In the late nineteenth century, Iranian penal history is characterized by a decrease in corporal severity. Between 1880 and 1900, classical tortures entirely disappear. New disciplinary practices are used and new institutions, such as workhouses, asylums, reformatories, and prisons, are established. These events seem to support Foucault's account. However, fifty years later, corporal punishments can be found in several types of carceral detention, especially in prisons, and in an entirely new form, modern torture. These punishments have persisted despite a revolution in which the abolition of
torture was a, if not the, principal goal. Indeed, while the practice of torture is outlawed in the new Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, modern torture still persists in Iranian society. These events raise doubts concerning Foucault's account.

In this context, it is not entirely insignificant that Foucault himself makes similar observations concerning Iranian penal practices. There is no question that Foucault is uncertain to what extent his analysis may be extended beyond the European context. Foucault frequently cautions against simple generalizations:

They don't have the same regime of truth as ours, which is, by the way, quite specific even though it has become quasi-universal. The Greeks had theirs. The Arabs of the Maghreb have another. And in Iran, it is for the better part modelled on a religion of esoteric form and esoteric content.

At the very least, however, Foucault's statements on Iranian discipline, police, and torture under the Pahlavis make it possible to raise questions concerning his explanation as it applies to Iranian politics in particular. These questions might include the following. How can torture be situated in the context of Iranian disciplinary and judicial practices? What relationship does torture bear to the forms subjection takes in a disciplinary society, especially normalcy? How might one explain a society like Iran in which there is discipline and torture?

Aside from these considerations, an examination of Iranian society permits one to take advantage of a rich literature on civil violence, punishment and modernization in
developing countries. This literature is significant because it is in this context that an alternative to Foucault's explanation has been advanced. But it is also instructive because it clarifies certain methodological problems one confronts when examining modern torture.

The State Terrorism Hypothesis

It is sometimes argued that, in developing countries, civil violence is a function of economic modernization. Lipset argues that the "peaceful 'play' of power" and "tolerance for opposition" can be correlated with growing industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education. "Those nations," he argues, "which have adapted most successfully to the requirements of an industrial system have the fewest internal political strains." Pye argues that modernization weakens all forms of authority and intensifies socio-economic confusion. As a result, he maintains, random violence and insurgent terrorism are made possible. Similarly, Huntington observes that "the relation between the rate of economic growth and political instability varies with the level of economic development." Huntington places special emphasis on developing societies where social mobilization and expectations exceed the rate of economic development although, he adds, civil violence can be offset by increased urbanization.

Pye and Huntington go on to suggest that states can act to substantially reduce civil violence in the course of development. In particular, they stress the importance of
counter-insurgency warfare as a means of containing random violence and calculated insurgency. Consequently, the violence of the state is characterized as a policy response to high levels of civil violence endemic to developing countries, one which promotes stability and development. As Huntington puts it, "the civil violence which development produces is not the violence that produces development." What accounts for this difference is that policy-oriented warfare entrenches crucial organizational skills:

The capacity for coordination and discipline are crucial to both war and politics and historically societies which have been skilled at organizing the one have always been adept at organizing the other. In other words, state warfare can play a role in the formation of disciplinary habits, habits which in turn facilitate economic development. It is from this consideration that Huntington draws the conclusion: "Discipline and development go hand in hand."33

More recently, however, Chomsky and Herman have argued that governmental violence is the dominant source of random and calculated violence in developing countries. Not only does "state terrorism" account for quantitatively much more violence that "retail terrorism," but it is also far more durable. State terrorism is "rooted in relatively permanent structures that allow terror to be institutionalized" whereas "retail terrorists are frequently transitory and they are often produced by the very abuses that state terrorism is designed to protect." According to Chomsky and Herman, this form of institutionalized terror is often necessary to perpetuate
depaendent capitalism on the periphery. State terrorism "is an instrument of class warfare, organized and designed to permit an elite, local and multinational, to operate without any constraint from the democratic processes." In this context, the U.S. is "setting the pace as a sponsor and supplier" of state terrorism while the military leaders of developing countries are "carefully nurtured by the U.S. security establishment to serve as 'enforcers' of this joint venture partnership [in capitalist development]."  

Although Chomsky and Herman generally agree with the analysis of dependency theorists, they have a rather different concern. Chomsky and Herman focus not on relations of economic exploitation but on relations of political repression. They are concerned not so much with 'political economy' as with the 'political economy of human rights' - to use the title of their two volume study. Indeed, the originality of their work derives from their attempt to articulate the "economy of violence" that characterizes societies in developing areas.

Chomsky and Herman argue that, contrary to conventional expectations, policy-oriented state warfare has produced not disciplinary societies, but rather state terrorist societies. These are societies in which there is institutionalized terror in the form of discipline and torture. In this context, they make three interrelated claims. First, they argue that there is a neglect of human rights and, especially, what have been called "anti-torture rights" on a massive scale in developing countries. Second, they argue that this neglect is systematic and relatively institutionalized in state structures. Third,
they argue that the U.S. systematically sponsors and supplies these institutionalized networks. These three claims constitute what I shall call the state terrorism hypothesis.

Over the last decade, researchers have gathered considerable evidence that gives qualified support for the state terrorism hypothesis. This evidence includes Amnesty International's documentation of the violation of 'anti-torture rights' on a world-wide scale, statistical studies correlating U.S. aid and increased state repression, and empirical documentation concerning the channels through which U.S. aid and training moves to developing countries. This kind of evidence has led political scientists to "consider it worthwhile to study the role of violence by the state and, in particular, the systematic use of violence" and has contributed to a growing literature on state repression. Within this literature, studies rely on some combination of historical and statistical approaches and each approach suffers, unfortunately, from serious deficiencies.

Historical approaches focus on repression within a particular society, providing a rich and detailed description of the character of social conflict. While it may be true that such approaches are important given the highly specific objects and causes of repression, this consideration does not mean that various societies do not share similar procedures, modes of operation, or general economies of violence. Chomsky and Herman specifically recognize this feature of state terrorism in their designation 'institutionalized violence' but, in historical approaches, there is, as one social scientist
observes, "no direct grappling" with the phenomenon of systematic violence.

Statistical approaches focus on various indices such as censorship of the media; number of arrests; cases of torture, exile and execution; limitations of constitutional rights; and restrictions on parties. While the significance of such data cannot be underestimated, considerable difficulties arise when one wishes to account for what changes in these indices mean. For instance, a decline in arbitrary arrests and cases of torture could mean a decrease in repression. However, in Argentina, during the late seventies, such figures indicated a change in the means of repression: less arrests and more "disappearances". Similarly, the decline in emigration of a repressed minority may mean a greater tolerance and more minority satisfaction with state performance. It could also mean, as in the case of the recent decline of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, that the state is deliberately preventing such emigration from taking place. Even if there was a decline in all these indices, the evidence is ambiguous. One analyst could maintain that this evidence indicates decreased repression whereas another might argue that the repression has become so effective that it has paralyzed the populace. Thus, despite its importance, little insight can be gained into the systematic character of violence through statistical evidence.

Even if these difficulties should be resolved, there is a more pressing problem. Studies of state terrorism are studies of power. Conventionally, the exercise of power is
characterized either in terms of oppression or repression. It is in these terms that most studies of state terrorism are couched and in this context that crucial considerations arise.

The critical force of these characterizations of power hinges on some counterfactual definition of freedom. To argue that some society is being repressed is to say, simultaneously, that given the removal of certain obstacles or provision of certain possibilities, the people would have acted differently. It follows that to make a convincing case for state terrorism, one would have to define the boundary conditions that distinguish freedom from power. One cannot avoid this difficulty by appealing to objective indices or historical descriptions. In providing a history of repression, one would have to make evident why a specific act counts as state repression whereas others do not. In compiling statistical evidence, one would have to explain why certain indices are essential to freedom whereas others are not. Without defining such boundary conditions for freedom, it would be difficult to understand what is meant by repression, much less the systematic character of repressive violence.

However, to attempt to define such conditions is to do political theory. In the study of power, at any rate, analysts cannot avoid invoking the vocabulary of political philosophy. Political philosophy enters directly into their studies, forging key conceptual links in social scientific arguments. This observation suggests that the relation between political theory and political science must be something other than ex post facto commentary on scientific method. Just as the
political scientist cannot avoid political philosophy, so too, the political theorist cannot be content with abstract analyses of power.

Thus, I suggest that the study of state terrorism might benefit from debates in political philosophy and that, conversely, theoretical debates concerning power might gain weight through empirical analysis. Such are the considerations that guide this study of punishments and, it is to these that I now turn.

The Power to Punish

Today, most accounts of torture and, more generally, punishment are written as a sub-branch of legal and institutional analyses. Among many criticisms that may be made of such accounts, I shall consider only two: the teleological bias deployed and the specific metaphor of power employed.

As legal and institutional analyses, current studies of punishment have an intrinsic teleological framework. Juridical penal studies always assume that the purpose of punishment is to maintain the power of the law. Punishment is held to be a consequence and logical extension of legislation. Similarly, institutional studies define the function of punishment as the maintenance of state power. Punishment and war become the exclusive instruments of the state which it wields on society to preserve itself. "In all societies, the state is the institution that monopolizes force and thereby enforces order in the interests of those holding power."
Each of these implicit frameworks guides subsequent research on torture. Juridical studies limit their scope to the study of civil, penal, and criminal law, emphasizing "enlightened" legal reforms. Institutional studies confine themselves to examining the role of torture in the operation of the state. Consequently, each kind of study reprojects its initial framework onto political events. Institutional studies conclude that the crucial function of a repressive apparatus is that of being the guarantor of the state. Even when the state no longer possesses a monopoly on violence in a particular society, a "consistent" indissoluble link is established "between the use of torture and crimes against the sovereign or the state." Similarly, juridical studies always conclude that legislative action plays a major role in curtailing or sustaining the operation of torture.

Thus, in each case, there is a process of mutual re-enforcement. The initial teleological bias narrows the field of legitimate social scientific inquiry while scholarly activity further entrenches the original projection. The immanent account of the function of punishment never comes into question.

There is a further dimension to this kind of analysis. Any teleological study of punishment implicitly contains an account of perversions. In current studies, torture or some of its constituent elements are always made to appear as defects: the malfunctions of a penal system, deviations from humanity, violations of the law, distortions of clinical procedures, or the activity of abnormal or repressed individuals. In this
manner; the analyst loses sight of the practical foundations of modern torture: what may be an integral support appears contingent, while assumed social ends appear essential. The analyst sees in modern torture only a technical failure (of penal systems, humanity, society, psychiatry, or laws), not the socio-political issue of its emergence.

The preceding argument does not mean to deny that torture has specific social ends; only that it is not wholly intelligible from the standpoint of those ends. Torture may have multiple ends, each acting as a circuit for numerous practices and institutions.

Aside from the teleologies implicit in current analyses, there is the issue of the metaphor of power they employ. It is not surprising that the primary accounts of punishment in our societies should be accounts of the law or the state. Historically, since the European middle ages, the power to punish has been counted among the powers of the King, to make war. The primary instruments he employed to enforce this power were the law and the state. As Machiavelli put it to his sovereign: "You should consider then that there are two ways of fighting: one with laws and the other with force." 52

The metaphor of power to which I refer is the political-juridical model of sovereignty. For the purpose at hand, it is sufficient to identify five features of the received tradition on sovereignty. 53 First, sovereignty is determinate. It has a locus in a sovereign who may be defined as either an individual (Hobbes) or a collective (Rousseau) entity.
Second, sovereignty is a state of autonomy. To count as a sovereign, an entity must stand exterior to and act upon the events about it. It must be autonomous in a sphere of action. This sphere of action may be defined by fact or by law and sovereignty, consequently, may be either absolute (Filmer) or relative to a rule (Grotius, Hobbes).

Third, sovereignty is relational. One is sovereign not only in a context, but over some entity. The subordinate entity may be either an individual (Buchanan, Grotius, Selden, Pufendorf) or a collective (Aquinas, Ockham, Suarez, Gerson, Bartolus). The relation of domination may be established on the basis of an alienation (Aquinas, Selden, Suarez) or delegation (Ockham, Gerson, Bartolus) of one’s sovereignty to another.

Fourth, sovereignty is coercive, this repressive force being exercised on a de facto or de jure basis. Coercion is certainly necessary, by definition, to sovereignty in theories that equate sovereignty with supreme coercive power (Bodin, Hobbes). However, it is equally necessary to theories that define sovereignty in some other way, e.g. locating sovereignty on a moral foundation of natural laws. In such cases, coercion is causally necessary to sovereignty if it is to be capable of surviving violent opposition and fulfilling the tasks ascribed to it.

Fifth, sovereignty is interested. A sovereign acts and may be explained with reference to the goods that it seeks. These goods are either personal goods like self-preservation or common goods and their importance may be calculated on the
basis of one's nominal (Hobbes) or real (Richelieu) interest. Coercion, in this respect, without prudence is blind and improvident while coercion tempered and directed by prudence is ideal and results in the most entrenched sovereignty (Lipsius). As a corollary to this feature of sovereignty, there is the often discussed 'problem of counsel': a sovereign seeks as much as possible to suspend coercion so as to receive the best counsel on its interests; true knowledge of interests flourishes only where there is freedom. In other words, in theories of sovereignty, knowledge and coercion are exterior to one another.

There is no question of presenting an exhaustive account of the historical role that 'sovereignty' has played in European politics. Briefly, the political-juridical model of sovereignty was forged to describe and justify the powers wielded by the Catholic Church in the twelfth century and this on the basis of the notion of Imperium as it was rendered in Roman law. Subsequently, it was employed by several groups contending against one another in late medieval Europe. Papal absolutists used it to justify the dominion of the Pope while conciliarists used it to entrench the authority of councils and undermine the sovereignty of the Pope in Church government. Imperial theologians used it to strengthen the claims of the Holy Roman Emperor against the Pope and the northern Italian city states. Italian humanists, in turn, developed it into a theory of popular sovereignty and used it to justify the autonomy of the city-states. Later, the theory of sovereignty came to serve as a justification for subjugating feudal lords.
and creating the large, centralized monarchies of Western Europe. During the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, its history became more complex. It was used by some to legitimate the enforcement of right religion by the monarch through war or punishment and by others to persuade monarchs to use their power to make war as a means of enforcing the peace among groups within their kingdoms. It was used by some to limit the power of monarchs and by others to re-inforce it:

...we find it among Catholic monarchists and Protestant anti-monarchists, among Protestant and more-or-less liberal monarchists, but also among Catholic partisans of regicide or dynastic transformation. It functions both, in the hands of aristocrats and in the hands of parliamentarians. It is found among representatives of royal power and among the last feudatories. In short, it was a major instrument of political and theoretical struggle around systems of power of the sixteenth and seventeenth century."

Finally, in the eighteenth century, it functioned in yet another role. Tempered by a republican tradition, it was used to construct an alternative vision of the state in opposition to the absolutist, administrative monarchies. It was used to justify the sovereign power of the people against the monarch. It provided the juridical explanation and justification of the people's right to make war, either through law or by force, against their enemies. In its most extreme form, it justified the right of the people to control the state and to appeal to this right in the course of revolution - a role it still plays today.

Precisely because so much of our political history has turned on this model of sovereignty, it remains, by and large, the principal way in which we characterize power today."
Lukes observes, while there are other accounts of power, these are "out of line with the central meanings of 'power' as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have centrally preoccupied students of power."5

Although Lukes' assertion is, in itself, no argument, it does explain why there is still such a strong tendency to characterize power as determinate, autonomous, relational, coercive, and interested. Moreover, even if it were granted that other accounts of power are marginal to 'power' as traditionally understood, it still does not follow that the political-juridical model of sovereignty serves as an adequate analytical tool for the study of power today. Indeed, for some time now, it has been observed that this reigning metaphor for power has serious deficiencies when applied to the study of politics and, in particular, pluralist politics. For example, Benn and Peters argue:

In brief, "sovereignty" may be an important and useful concept for juristic analysis, and though there may not be a determinate sovereign in a juristic sense in every state, it is neither meaningless nor misleading to say that there might be. It is misleading as a political concept, at least if sovereignty is understood to reside in a determinate person or institution because it suggests the wrong questions. To ask where sovereign power lies would seem to imply that someone or some group can regularly get their own way if they insist on it, no matter what any one else may want or do. This is unrealistic. What a government can do depends very largely on what people believe it ought to do, and what powerful sectional interests want it or permit it to do. Political action is always the result of a conflict of wills, never an expression of a single 'independent will.'6

Elsewhere, Benn argues that sovereignty is also misleading when it is used to define the supreme political influence of a sectional interest for here too "the policy is not the
intention of a group identifiable by a common interest but the result of an interplay of influences within the organization." Consequently, Benn concludes that while "these two senses may be relevant to historical or sociological studies, and are not relevant to normative studies; their usefulness where they are relevant is limited, for they can be seriously misleading." He adds that "there would be a strong case for giving up so Protean a word." Benn's argument is not decisive, but it does raise disconcerting questions. Are we currently missing crucial aspects of modern forms of power by frequently using the political-juridical model of sovereignty as a basis for analysis? If so, what kind of theoretical approach might avoid these difficulties? These questions have been the concern of several political theorists over the last two decades. Most recently, these issues have been raised by Michel Foucault. Indeed, Foucault has advanced an alternative theoretical framework, one which he thinks can be used to explain modern power relations more adequately.

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault draws attention to how specific systems of punishment might contribute to changing social structures. He suggests that penal practices should be examined not so much because they exclude illegal behaviour or repress unwanted opposition but rather because they may incite new forms of human conduct and thereby make possible new ways of organizing social relations. In this respect, penal practices may constitute models of specific power relations. They may be more usefully analyzed as modalities of power
rather than as expressions of ethical or political ideals.

In his later works, Foucault elaborates these observations into a general approach. He argues that one may explain significant features of modern politics by analyzing practices that shape the conduct and subjectivity of individuals. He sets out a method for analyzing how subjects come to be themselves through historically specifiable practices.

Foucault is particularly interested in what he later comes to call practical systems. These systems are ensembles of a wide variety of elements in which forms of subjection are constituted. These elements include the discourses utilized; the actions which work on the conduct of oneself and others; and the mental and behavioural dispositions that are constituted. These different elements may interact in complex ways. For example, in a disciplinary system, the procedures for observing and correcting subjects (e.g. reforming criminals) may also be the procedures through which a knowledge of subjects is gathered (e.g. criminology) and the means by which a form of subjectivity is entrenched (e.g. reformed or normal subjects). These elements may modify one another as practitioners elaborate new techniques, researchers propose new programs, or subjects resist in different ways. When one explains these interactions and modifications, one is also explaining what people do and the ways in which they do it or, in short, the *techné* of a system. To explain a practical system like a disciplinary matrix is also to explain a practice e.g. discipline.
The *techné* of a system defines the exercise of power in that system. It defines the multiplicity of actions subjects exercise on themselves or on others. These actions do not always repress other actions or limit choices. They also work on individuals by providing new knowledge concerning themselves; making available new possibilities for self-transformation; or increasing a subject's potential to undertake different tasks.

In the most general sense, one could characterize the exercise of power in a practical system as governing conduct. Individuals are led to learn a type of activity and, as such, are disposed towards certain ways of behaving and thinking. But to characterize the exercise of power in this way does not limit the possible ways in which actions can modify one another. On the contrary, it implies a wide field of possibilities, that is, numerous ways in which subjects are governed in various societies during specific epochs and, consequently, different qualities of power e.g. disciplinary power or tutelary power.

Government, then, can be achieved in various ways. Violence or consensus may serve as means to this end, but they are not essential to the exercise of power. What does appear essential, Foucault argues, is freedom. Foucault observes that while a form of conduct may be imposed on subjects at a preliminary stage, it is not fully entrenched as a means of government until subjects pursue it without the supervision of others. Disciplinary punishment, for example, is not fully effected until the prisoner struggles to rehabilitate,
discipline, and normalize himself; merely adopting the external habit is not sufficient. This observation suggests that, in observing a power relation, subjects possess a wide range of options from submissive acceptance to outright rebellion.

If the exercise of power is the art of government, then freedom is this agonic activity in which types of conduct or forms of subjectivity are, however minutely, contested. Foucault maintains that, in any analysis of power, these struggles constitute important foci of study because they reveal the forms which government assumes in a given society.

In advocating this theoretical approach to politics, Foucault has abandoned conventional assumptions concerning power. For Foucault, the exercise of power does not seem to be a relationship between a determinate sovereign and its subjects but the ways in which actions modify other actions. It would be difficult on this account to speak of power as if it were an ontological, homogenous capacity that can be concentrated or diffused in a society. The exercise of power seems to exist only in actions and the ways in which they modify one another.

Although Foucault's theory has been the subject of theoretical debate, Foucault has insisted that the significance of this theory be evaluated primarily in terms of whether it can be used in empirical analysis. I propose to test Foucault's theory of power by using it to study punitive practices in Iran. Although it has been observed that Foucault's approach might be useful in the analysis of developing countries, there is currently no study that applies Foucault's theory in a rigorous fashion to a
contemporary issue in developing areas studies.

I shall evaluate the utility of Foucault's theoretical approach by posing the following questions. First, can Foucault's approach account for modern torture which, according to his empirical argument, should not exist? Second, can it explain the emergence of modern torture in Iranian politics more adequately than the state terrorism hypothesis and if so, in what ways? Third, can it be used to highlight features of contemporary politics that revisionist-Nietzschean explanations overlook?

Punishment and the Study of Iranian Politics

To the extent that punitive practices characterize some of the ways power is exercised in Iran, a study of Iranian punishments may clarify more general features of contemporary Iranian politics. It might be useful, consequently, to situate this inquiry in relation to Iranian studies and, more specifically, indicate briefly what role it might play in contemporary discussions of the nature of power in Iranian society.

Traditionally, scholars focused on three aspects of Iranian politics. First, they emphasized the particularity of Iranians, noting their long history and relative cultural autonomy. They argued that this Iranian particularity had become even more pronounced in modern times due to a growing detachment from the Islamic past and a tendency towards secularism in national politics. Second, scholars drew
attention to the elitist nature of Iranian politics, stressing the continuities between pre-Islamic civilizations, traditional Islamic society, and modern Iranian society. They argued that the modern Iranian state, like previous states, was supported by a network of highly personal power relationships. Finally, scholars noted the consequences of traditional relationships for Iranian political culture. They argued that the emphasis placed on personal power induced certain psychological effects in Iranians including insecurity, uncertainty, xenophobia, and distrust.

More recently, many analysts have taken issue with these characterizations of Iranian politics. In the first place, contemporary analysts argue that there is an ambiguous relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Iran. They observe that religious movements have been as important as secular-nationalist movements in shaping Iranian politics, pointing to the continued role of the ulema: contemporary developments in Shi'i laws and institutions; and the role of popular religious rituals in shaping political protest throughout the twentieth century. Furthermore, analysts argue that socio-economic factors have had important effects on the balance of power between social groups, classes, and the Iranian state. They draw attention to important socio-economic crises in recent history, pointing out just how tenuous the despotic or elitist character of Iranian politics was at specific junctures. Moreover, analysts question conventional stereotypes of Iranian national character, observing that the psychological traits in question are in fact
inferred from complex social contexts. They note that once such traits are placed in their context, "ster-typical behaviour" can be readily understood as styles of discursive interaction, expressions of socio-economic conflicts, or rational responses to dangerous political situations. 67

Finally, various scholars are critically examining the frameworks that are usually employed to analyze Iranian politics. Some analysts, most notably Edward Said, are concerned with the ways an understanding of Iranian politics is shaped by a social construction of reality that might be called Orientalist. 68 Others point out that there is little consensus among social scientists as to what is meant by "modernization" and "development" and argue that Iranian politics might be analyzed more precisely by focusing on modes of economic production and state repression. 69 Indeed, as there is currently no standard and, possibly, adequate definition of modernization, 70 I shall follow Weber's suggestion that "modernity," to the extent that it describes a coherent process, refers to rationalization in the means of political coercion and economic production. 71

In short, contemporary analysts agree with their predecessors that "the change in power relationships has had rather little to do with the formal constitutionalist structure of Iranian politics since 1906." 72 They differ, nevertheless, on the issue of how one might go about explaining such changes. Contemporary analysts are suspicious of arguments that emphasize inevitable historical trends; inherent societal characteristics; or psychological traits of individuals.
Instead, they are concerned with aspects of civil society (especially religious institutions, communal conflicts, social rituals, and modes of economic production) and emphasize how socio-economic conflicts in civil society shape contemporary Iranian politics.

What has emerged as a consequence of such inquiries is not only a different explanation of why there are conflicts in Iranian politics but also a growing interest in how power is exercised. It is well known, for example, that the modern Iranian state governs its populations in a distinctly different way than the older Qajar state. Halliday summarizes these differences succinctly:

This state is, therefore, quite different from that which existed one hundred years ago. It is capitalist, whereas the other was pre-capitalist. It controls the whole of its national territory, whereas the other's writ did not run outside the main cities. It promotes economic development, whereas the other neglected it. It has a large standing army, whereas the other had virtually no armed force at all. It has to a considerable extent transformed socio-economic relations in the Iranian countryside, whereas the other left the countryside alone."

However, the question remains: how did such remarkable changes in the nature of state power come about? Said has argued that such changes might be analyzed in an illuminating way by the detailed study of the "cultural discipline" that shaped Middle Eastern politics. Noting Foucault's work on the study of power, Said remarks, "much of what he [Foucault] has studies in his work makes greatest sense not as an ethnocentric model of how power is exercised in modern society, but as part of a much larger picture that involves, for example, the relationship between Europe and the rest of the world."
Similarly, Keddie argues that one way of explaining changes in power relationships is by engaging in detailed studies of material culture. Noting the important work done in this area by Braudel and the Annales school, Keddie calls for more detailed studies of issues such as technology and the production of goods; the lives of women and nomads; military technology and organization; and urban architecture. She argues that what can be learned in this fashion is not only how power is exercised but also the conflicts that shape the exercise of power. "As to the current interest in 'making the silent masses speak,'" she remarks, "the study of material culture is one of the best means of arriving at this goal."

In the context of these considerations, this study of punitive practices may clarify how power is exercised in two ways. On the one hand, it may indicate some of the ways in which dominant political alliances maintained their hegemony. On the other hand, it would register the ways in which various groups and classes contested the exercise of power. In short, a study of punishment may clarify some of the conflicts that shaped Iranian politics and, in particular, the state. Consequently, in the course of this study, I shall also be concerned with the question: what implications, if any, does this study have for current debates on the nature of power in Iranian society?
Supposition: Objectives, Dimensions, and Originality of Research

In this dissertation, I undertake an empirical analysis of Iranian punitive practices over the last century. In this context, I set out to investigate three issues. First, I critically examine the claim that modernity is characterized by a diminution of corporal punishments, considering both the older humanist-progressivist version of this claim and the revisionist-Nietzschean versions that have been advanced by several scholars including Michel Foucault, David Rothman, Michael Ignatieff, John Langbein, Gerhard Oestreich, and Marc Raeff. In particular, I examine the relationship between modern torture and what might be called the "disciplinary process" that is said to characterize modernization. Second, I evaluate Chomsky and Herman's hypothesis that developing societies are characterized by a specific economy of violence that might be characterized as "state terrorist." Third, I test the utility of Foucault's theoretical approach to the study of power.

In investigating these issues, I plan to observe the following methodological rules, rules that adapt certain features of Foucault's analytics of power to the study of punishment.

(1) Regard 'punishment' as a heterogeneous ensemble of practices possessing their own field of operation. Treat these instruments and the targets to which they are applied as specific. Subsequently, situate 'punishment' in the broader field of power relations.
(2) Do not confine analysis to the study of punishment within legal and political institutions. Consider punishment as a complex social practice with multiple functions and objectives. Consequently, investigate the various ways punishment is utilized within a society.

(3) Examine the cluster of relations between punitive practices and emerging patterns of social behaviour. Consider whether or not developments in either domain are grounded in a common institutional or ideological matrix.

The dissertation is divided into three parts. In Part I (Chapters II-VI), I examine the disappearance of classical tortures and the appearance of modern tortures in Iran. Chapter II introduces this theme.

Chapter III deals with the following questions. What was the place of punishment in nineteenth century Iran? Were classical punishments simply expressions of arbitrary despotic powers wielded by Qajar shahs or is there an economy of violence that characterizes classical punishments?

Chapter IV deals with the following questions. What accounts for the decline of classical punishments? Was their disappearance inevitable given certain broad social trends like secularism, industrialization and political humanism? If not, what alternative explanations can be offered to explain their disappearance?

Chapter V deals with the following questions. What accounts for the re-emergence of torture in the mid-twentieth century? Is torture to be understood simply as a repressive feature of the Pahlavi state or did it have a more complex role
in the governing of Iranian society?

Chapter VI is a transitional chapter, preparing the way for a more detailed discussion of torture since the Islamic Revolution. It points to, on the one hand, the efforts to abolish torture since 1979 (by popular protests, by religious leaders, and by the ruling Islamic Republican Party) and, on the other hand, the persistence of torture.

In Part II (Chapters VII-IX), I am concerned with explaining continuities and discontinuities in contemporary Iranian punishments. Chapter VII introduces this theme.

Chapter VIII deals with the following questions. What types of punishment were employed in social, religious or family contexts in the pre-revolutionary period? What relationships, if any, exist between these punishments and the punishments employed by public institutions?

Chapter IX deals with the following questions. What effect did the Islamic Revolution have on the general practice of punishment in Iranian society? Do pre-revolutionary punishments, in particular those that occurred in family, social or religious contexts, clarify the types of punishment practised in the post-revolutionary period? Are post-revolutionary punishments Islamic and, if so, in what ways?

In Part III (Chapters X-XII), I am concerned with the broader questions that form the background against which the case study is conducted.

Chapter X deals with the following questions. Does the case study clarify the kinds of conflicts that have shaped
Iranian politics and, in particular, the state over the last century? What implications, if any, does the study have for current debates on how power is exercised in Iranian society?

In Chapter XI, I relate the conclusions of the case study to possible explanations of contemporary punishments including the humanist-progressivist hypothesis, the revisionist-Nietzschean hypothesis, and the state terrorist hypothesis. Through this critical assessment, I evaluate the utility of Foucault's theoretical approach to modern politics.

The study is followed by three appendices providing (a) a chronology of major events in Iranian politics over the last century; (b) a glossary of common Persian terms utilized; and (c) an analysis of the changing relationship between architectural spaces and the way in which the Iranian government exercised power over the last century.

Finally, I have indicated that the dissertation may clarify specific theoretical and empirical debates in the social sciences. In addition to these potential contributions, one might note that the dissertation draws attention to current gaps in social scientific literature. One can best indicate these gaps by contrasting the dissertation with the available literature.

**Studies of Michel Foucault’s Works.** (1) Whereas most recent studies evaluate Foucault’s arguments concerning power on the basis of strictly theoretical considerations, the dissertation critically examines Foucault’s arguments with reference to a specific empirical issue, modern torture. (2) Some analysts, most notably Jacques Donzelot,” have used
Foucault's approach to study empirical issues. However, whereas current 'Foucauldian' analyses, like Foucault's own studies, are concerned exclusively with European politics, the dissertation examines the utility of Foucault's approach in explaining issues in the politics of developing areas. (3) Whereas most studies of Foucault's work (theoretical and empirical) focus on the place of discipline in modern politics, the dissertation shifts the focus by examining a more problematic feature of contemporary politics, the emergence of modern torture.

Studies of Punishment. (4) Whereas most studies emphasize the trend towards decreased corporal severity in punishments, the dissertation draws attention to the re-appearance and increasing predominance of severe corporal punishments in the late twentieth century. (5) Whereas current studies take Western European penal history as definitive of general trends in punitive practice, the dissertation draws attention to the rather different trends in punishment elsewhere in the world (most notably, but not exclusively, in the Middle East).

Studies of Torture. (6) Whereas most studies of torture are concerned with identifying human rights violations, the dissertation draws attention to the complex character of torture as a mode of government in the twentieth century. (7) There are some empirical studies of torture. Whereas these studies are concerned with the place torture occupies within a historical or institutional context, the dissertation analyzes torture as a power relation.
Studies of Iranian Politics. There is no detailed historical description, much less social scientific analysis, of Iranian punishments.
FOOTNOTES


3. This view was based on a reading of the works of figures prominent in the abolitionist movement such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Beccaria. In the nineteenth century, it was advanced by several humanist historians including Charles Lea, W.E.H. Lecky, and Andrew Dickson White. Their views are summarized in Edward Peters, Torture (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 74-77. In the twentieth century, there have been efforts to maintain its centrality to an explanation of the abolition of sanguinary punishments. See, for example, Peter Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of Repression: From a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and Myra C. Glenn, Campaigns Against Corporal Punishment: Prisoners, Sailors, Women, and Children in Antebellum America (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1984). While acknowledging that other processes were at work (Spierenburg, pp. 203, 205; Glenn, pp. 127-147), these analysts still locate the reasons for the abolition of corporal punishments in a change in moral sensibilities in the eighteenth and nineteenth century respectively (Spierenburg, pp. 184, 204-205; Glenn, p. 146). While these analysts demonstrate that the indignation of abolitionists and reformers was not incompatible with strictly utilitarian and disciplinary considerations, (Spierenburg, p. 189; Glenn, p. 146), it is an open question as to whether torture might not have disappeared had there been no abolitionist or reformist movements. In other words, the issue is not whether there was a change in sensibilities or even whether this corresponds with a change in punitive practices; it is, rather, whether
this factor played a determinate and causal role in the abolition of sanguinary punishments. Perhaps a more cautious view is that advanced by Peters who urges analysts not to discount this possibility in explaining the abolition of torture (Peters, p. 89).

*Peters*, p. 77.


Ibid., pp. 220-221.


Peters, p. 77.

Ibid., p. 105.

Ibid., pp. 103-140. For an account of corporal punishments employed in prisons, see Rothman, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America*, pp. 17-40.


Foucault, "L'esprit d'un monde sans esprit," p. 239.


Ibid., p. 79.
26 Ibid., p. 91.


30 Ibid., p. 15; Pye, p. 127.


32 *Idem*, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 23.

33 Ibid., p. 24.


35 Herman, p. 83.

36 Ibid., pp. 83-84.

37 Ibid., p. 84.

38 Chomsky and Herman, p. 8.

39 Herman, p. 3.

40 I adapt this phrase from Sheldon Wolin's discussion of Machiavelli's political writings. Wolin uses this phrase to characterize Machiavelli's thoughts concerning the systematic use of violence in political life but it also furnishes a

"Anti-torture rights" refer to those human rights to life, liberty, and integrity of person which cannot be denied without due process of law.


Stohl and Lopez, p. 3.

Ibid., p. 183.


Of course, one can take a nominalist position on this issue and assert that the indices are based on how policy makers define a violation of human rights. However, one needs much more than this to build an index or rank order of greater or lesser severity; one also needs to interpret acts as
belonging to this index or not. Here again, one may seek to avoid this difficulty by turning to policy makers and human rights experts. Schoultz, for example, compiles an order of Latin American countries in terms of greater or lesser repressive severity based on the perceived reputation of countries among human rights experts.

However, several interpretive problems still remain. In the first place, a nation's perceived reputation among experts may differ from its actual performance. With the exception of extreme cases, it is often difficult to make an independent validation of alleged human rights violations. Consequently, data on human rights violations may not be readily available or, if it is, reliable. Second, the perceived reputation of a nation may be shaped by the varied cultural, political, and economic access experts have to countries. Varied access may make for partial or exaggerated comparisons between countries but there is as yet no method to determine whether and to what extent this factor does distort perceptions.

In the light of such considerations, Amnesty International maintains that the endeavour to find and build reliable data sets on repression "is impossible and meaningless" Political scientists, however, maintain that such considerations are strictly practical, and that they do not prove that a statistical analysis of repression is impossible (David Pion-Berlin, "Theories of Political Repression in Latin America: Conventional Wisdom and an Alternative," ES 19:1 (Winter 1986): 49). What is important here is to be quite clear as to what these practical difficulties are. For while Amnesty International's arguments fail to show that a statistical analysis is impossible, they do reveal the complex obstacles encountered by social scientists studying repression—practical difficulties that are, nevertheless, far more formidable that many might acknowledge.

Nor should one draw the wrong conclusion from the fact that statistical analyses of repression are not logically impossible. It may appear to be a small step to claim that, since none of the difficulties are insurmountable, it is possible to carry out a meaningful statistical study of repression if social scientists are innovative enough to develop new methods and techniques to deal with these difficulties. In other words, there is a temptation to believe that this is precisely what social scientists ought to be doing. Yet one need not warn political scientists about the dangers of moving from what is, or what is possible, to what ought to be done about them. This is a dangerous tendency of which political scientists are well aware.

The proper scientific attitude to the study of repression, consequently, is by no means clear and the particular approaches one can adopt require serious consideration. As Nagel remarks on the subject of social science more generally, "problems are not resolved merely by showing that they are not necessarily insoluble; and the present state of social inquiry clearly indicates that some of the difficulties we have been considering are indeed serious."


"The claim here is an epistemological, not a political, claim; I am concerned not with the use, but with the production, of knowledge. Within theories of sovereignty, it is generally acknowledged that knowledge of any sort (but especially that of history) has an instrumental value to those possessing coercive authority. There is, consequently, no question that knowledge, once constituted, may interact with coercion in a variety of ways.

It is quite another matter, however, when the 'origins'
of knowledge and coercion are considered. Coercion has its roots in a passion for domination, *libido dominandi* to use Augustine's phrase. To the extent that passion shapes the procedures through which knowledge is constituted, knowledge lacks reliability. True knowledge is constituted, in other words, in a state of autonomy where the subject stands at a relative distance from its passions. Thus, while knowledge and coercion may interact in a variety of ways, they originate in radically different fields and are, in this sense, exterior to one another.


Benn, pp. 77-81; Benn and Peters, pp. 21-22, 253, 301-302; Lukes, pp. 26-33.

Lukes, p. 31.

Benn and Peters, p. 308.

Benn, p. 81.

Ibid., p. 82.

Arturo Escobar, "Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His Work to the Third World," *Alternatives* 10 (Winter 1984/1985): 377-400. Escobar's argument is, strictly speaking, an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of two political theorists to the study of developing countries, Jurgen Habermas and Michel Foucault. While Escobar does suggest specific directions for research, it is difficult to assess what kind of theoretical approach he is suggesting one might take towards these empirical problems. Escobar vacillates between two theoretical approaches and consistently glosses over crucial disagreements between Habermas and Foucault, disagreements that both theorists have persistently emphasized in their writings. To the extent that Escobar does not treat these conceptual difficulties, it is hard to understand what one might make of his overall analysis.

*See, for example, Elgin Grasemc. *Introduction to Iran* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development*


For Said's account of Orientalism, see Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); idem, Covering Islam (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); idem, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). Halliday has raised similar questions regarding more specific Orientalist concepts such as "Islam" and "Asiatic" despotism (Halliday, pp. 28-31). Finally, Millward has drawn attention to the anti-Orientalist objections raised by Iranian scholars (Millward, pp. 48-69).

Halliday, pp. 39-40.


73 Halliday, pp. 29-30.


75 Ibid., p. 222.


PART I

TORTURES AND DISCIPLINES
CHAPTER II

TWO INCIDENTS IN A FORGOTTEN HISTORY

Most thought provoking is that we are still not thinking - not even yet although the state of the world is becoming constantly more thought provoking.  

Martin Heidegger

On August 15, 1852, thirty members of the outlawed Babi religion were found guilty of attempted regicide and apostasy. "By the orders of the most Exalted [The Shah] and the fetva of the distinguished julema (May Allah multiply their number!), death sentences were issued for Mullah Shaykh Ali and his followers."¹ Haji Sulayman Khan and Haji Qasim Nayrizi, the two leaders of the Babi plot, were immediately taken to the city and 'made into candlesticks'. Holes were dug in the flesh of their bodies into which lighted candles were inserted. "Accompanied by drums, musical instruments. and a large crowd, they were led through the alleys and the bazaars. They were stoned by the people of the city until they reached the gateway of the Shrine of Shah 'Abd ul-'Azim where the court executioners divided their bodies into four parts and hung the pieces over the four gates of the city."²

"During these horrible tortures," reports Lady Sheil, "he [Sulayman Khan] is said to have preserved his fortitude to
the last and to have danced to his place of execution in defiance of his tormentors and the agony of the burning candles." The *Itizad as-Saltanah* writes that "when they were leading Haji Mirza Sulayman Khan, after he had been made into a candlestick, he danced and sang this poem: Would that the curtain fall from that pleasant view/ So that people could see [the corruption of] Negaristan. When they desired to execute him, he said 'Let Haji Jasim Nayrizi be the first to be delivered to this pleasant state, for he is my greater'.

Shortly thereafter, Mullah Fathullah, the would-be assassin of the Shah, was brought before the throne. "In the midst of the royal camp, candles were placed into his body (by making incisions) and lighted," The steward of the royal household, as the Shah’s representative, shot the *mullah* "in the very place that he had injured the Shah." The *mullah* was then stoned to death by royal attendants and his body was "either cut to pieces or shot or blown from a mortar."

"Then each of the Babis was surrendered to a group of nobles, to different classes of servants and craftsmen of the bazaar, and they executed them." Mullah Shaykh 'Ali, the chief religious leader of the Babis, "was handed over to the scholars and students of the religious sciences and they put him to death." The Qajar princes, the Minister of the 'Home Office', and the relations of the Grand Vizier each slew a Babi leader. The Minister of 'Foreign Affairs' "with averted face made the first sword cut" on his victim and "the secretaries of his department finished him and cut him into pieces." The Master of the Horse and the servants of the
stables horse-shod their victim before slaying him. The artillermen "dug out the eye of Mahommed Ali...and then blew him away from a mortar." The remaining conspirators were distributed among the infantry, the cavalry, the students of the University of Sciences, "the chief servants of the court, the people of the town, merchants, tradesmen, artizans, who bestowed on them their deserts..."  

"When these executions were over," writes Lady Sheil, "it was said that the Shah's meerghazabs [executioners] had presented sheereegee [sweetmeats] to all the ministers of state, as a mark of their admission into the brotherhood."

"In Tehran, when any one is installed in office, it is usual for his friends and those under his authority to send him sheereegee...as a token of congratulations."  

A century later, Shokrollah Paknezhad was arrested and detained at the SAVAK station in Khorramshahr, a southwestern Iranian port. After being severely beaten, he was transferred to the regional police prison. He was placed in solitary confinement for one week. He was then transferred by a SAVAK vehicle to the notorious Evin prison in Tehran. Interrogations began as soon as he arrived. His two torturers, who addressed each other as 'Doctor' and 'Engineer', tortured him for one week. During the course of his interrogation, he was beaten, flogged, and had his nails pulled out. He was forced to wear weightcuffs, a pressure device that can break the shoulders in less than two hours of agonizing torture. On the fifteenth day after his detention, Paknezhad was taken from solitary confinement and placed
before a firing squad. He was reminded that "since I had been caught on the Iraqi border and nobody knew anything about my arrest, and since everybody thought I had gone to Iraq, hardly anyone would know that I had been executed." When Paknezhad still refused to write a recantation "according to their wishes," he was taken back to solitary confinement. Paknezhad was released after 18 days of detention but was re-arrested within the year. After nine more months of imprisonment and torture, the Third Military Tribunal found Paknezhad guilty of endangering state security and sentenced him to life imprisonment. He was released during the Islamic Revolution (1979-1979) but, subsequently, re-arrested in 1981. He was detained without formal charges or trial for several months and executed at Evin prison in December 1981.

Within a century, then, the practice of torture had changed. Classical Iranian torture, with its ceremonial processions, ritual discourses, and public executions, disappeared. Torture vanished from the execution square and re-appeared in prisons, detention centers, and torture chambers. The public confrontation between the executioner and the condemned body gave way to the private operation of the torture "physician" on his "patient." Torture became a specialized scientific technique. A whole body of scientific discourses became entangled in its application. Its methods and instruments were drawn from medicine, engineering, psychology, and physiology. Even its basic architectural units, the cell and the solitary confinement chamber, were
founded on scientific principles.

Lying slightly beneath all these changes was a new punitive principle: Do not seek to punish the criminal act of the body; punish instead the delinquent life of your victim. This was an important development in Iranian penal history. All the subsequent violations of the body, its savage degradation in the Iranian penal apparatus, may be traced to this elementary displacement. The body, the principal target, of classical Iranian torture, lost its favored status. Now punishments were directed at a point slightly beyond the body. Their target was a finer, more diffuse object, a human life.

From that moment onwards, life emerged as an object for penal research. Punitive tactics were devised to utilize the biological processes of human life. Instruments were constructed to penetrate the interior regions of the body: the blood stream, the orifices, the nervous system, the brain, and the structure of the skeleton. In short, the body became an instrument of torture, betraying the secret weaknesses of the prisoner.

In order to strike a target so diffuse as a delinquent life, a new quality of pain was necessary, a pain that gripped the 'consciousness' of the victim rather than his body. The victim was grasped from within, through electric shocks, injections, internal pressure, sensory deprivation, and hundreds of shadowy psychological tactics of fear and pain. The marks of punishment were seen not merely on the body, but in the "eyes [which] become frenzied out of fear, morbid dread and insomnia." This was not, as Muhammad Reza Shah put it,
"torture in the old sense of torturing people, twisting their arms and doing this and that." This was a more "intelligent" punishment, a punishment designed to persist long after the moment of its application. The objective was not to scar the flesh with marks of infamy, but to locate, isolate, and cripple the victim's 'soul'.

Modern torture then stands at a particular juncture in the operation of power in Iranian society. Torture is, on the one hand, a bio-technology of punishment. It forms part of the more general field of political practices that specialize in the administration of human life. On the other hand, modern torture involves a specific way of acting upon bodies. Torture is articulated onto the victim's body through a non-corporal reality referent, the 'consciousness'. Its application responds to the principles attributed to this concept: norms and pathologies. The history of the normal and the abnormal self, the specific modalities through which it is envisaged, characterized, and treated, is the correlative history of modern torture.

How might we understand this new power to punish? One can, no doubt, point to the illegality of torture, the immorality of the practice, and the savagery of men. From this stance, modern torture appears as an extension of older torture practices. It is a remnant of a distant age and, consequently, a persisting "malignant growth on the body politic." If I do not privilege these conventional themes here, it is because I think they treat the existence of modern
torture too lightly. Does the sudden emergence of modern torture today indicate a return to certain classical penal practices? Perhaps. But it would be a mistake to treat it as a mere atavism.

In what follows, I seek to establish proximity to, rather than distance from, modern torture; to displace the unbearable lightness of moralism by granting torture political weight. I struggle, in short, to think of torture in the present.

Modern torture belongs to the present moment. It arises out of the same notions of rationality, government, and conduct that characterize modernity as such.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 42.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 279.


16 Ibid.

CHAPTER III

CLASSICAL PUNISHMENTS

"This [is] not the time for trifling....The punishment, however severe, of criminals who [seek] to spread massacre and spoliation throughout the length and breadth of Persia, [is] not to be deprecated, or to be included under the designation of torture, which [has] been defined to be the infliction of pain to extort a confession of guilt." With these words, in 1852, the Grand Vizier dismissed the British consul's suggestion that death "ought to be done without torture." Surely the consul's suggestion was conflating two distinct activities. Torture referred to the juridical production of the truth. Public punishment applied the penalties of justice. Each possessed a different objective and responded to specific demands.

Somewhat earlier and in a different tone, Hakim [Doctor] Mohammad instructed surgeons in their practice. In the Zakhira-yi Kamila, The Treasury of Perfection, the hakim expounds on major surgery and its techniques. He notes the therapeutic and judicial uses of surgery, especially in the case of amputation of organs and limbs. Techniques specific to penal torture are elaborated. Different methods for applying the same punishment are weighed according to their painfulness. Exoculation, for instance, may be achieved through piercing or gouging out the eyes, but the pain caused
by the former is fierce. "What destruction will be wrought...death is preferable." The hakim proceeds to the discussion of treatment. He suggests remedies for the treatment of wounds and bruises caused by punishment. Two kinds of burns are distinguished: accidental burns and burns "inflicted by the orders of someone in authority." The treatment of both kinds appears to have been the same. However, in the case of castration, different treatments are prescribed depending on whether "it is desired that the patient live."

These discussions of punishment do not correspond precisely, but they are corrective and instructive: classical punishments were certainly cruel, but the application of torture was not arbitrary.

The Offence of Bodies

Like most Muslim societies, nineteenth century Qajar Iran had inherited a criminal procedure that was centered about the act of the accused. The physical act alone constituted the crime. No other evidence was pertinent to the case. For example, in cases of liquor consumption, Shi'a Isamiyya jurisprudence ruled that "the smell of the breath being patently drunk, or vomiting is not sufficient evidence in itself." Proof of this offense required either the confession of the accused or the testimony of two reliable male witnesses who could verify the act. Similarly, an unexpressed denunciation of Islam did not constitute apostasy.
Such an unexpressed belief had to "be accompanied by action or declaration."

Among classical jurists, therefore, the verification of the deed was the central element of the judicial inquiry. Judicial verification was ipso facto an admission of guilt. It carried the same force as a full confession by the accused. Proof of the deed, however, had to be unquestionable. To prevent an abuse of justice, Islamic legal theory made proof of an offense very difficult. This was especially true of crimes which carried mandatory punishments prescribed by the Shari'a or religious law. In these cases, the accused could withdraw his confession at any time during the course of the inquiry. It was even recommended that the "judge suggest this course of action to defendants who have already confessed." There were also stringent prerequisites for the production of witnesses. For example, fornication or adultery required the testimony of four reliable male witnesses, who, according to classical jurists, "must have been present at the sexual act itself." Finally, "Islamic legal theory maintained that if the physical act resembled a similar legal act, it may be presumed that the accused was behaving in accordance with the Shari'a.

This juridical importance of the act extended to penal procedures. Classical punishment was exclusively a punishment of the deed. It was, in the strictest sense, "the penalty for the offence of the body." Punishment annulled the criminal act by re-inscribing the offense on the body that committed it; its marks were always decipherable. Often there was the
use of symbolic torture where the type of punishment referred to the nature of the crime: thieves lost their right hands, highway robbers lost the opposite hand and foot, and apostates were purged through fires. In some cases, the actual crime was duplicated on the offender. For example, the would-be regicide Mullah Fathullah was wounded "in the very place that he had injured the Shah" with the very same weapon, a pistol.\(^2\) If marks were not inscribed onto the body, ineffaceable lines were traced around the victim: as late as 1884, one finds cases where brigands were walled up alive in pillars of brick and mortar.

It was not sufficient, however, to mark the body with a sign of its "degradation in this world" (Sura 5, Verse 33).\(^3\) Classical penal torture also had to meet two other requirements. First, it had to punish the offense openly. Punishment was a long and spectacular exhibition. The condemned man was ceremoniously paraded through the streets and bazaars. He was slowly flogged in the square, bastinadoed before an audience, or dismembered in the religious shrine.

Moreover, from the legal perspective, punishment had to confirm the judicial inquiry. By inscribing the offense on the body, penal torture reproduced the judicial verification of the deed. The offender's body now testified to his own offense. Thus, the execution of punishment re-inforced the judicial system.

The central element of classical Iranian torture then was the body of the condemned. The body proclaimed the offense, confirmed the judicial process, and annulled the
crime. It was invested with its own judicial life. No doubt this explains why the body of the dead criminal would be preserved, in some cases for ten days, so that it could be executed with his living accomplices. This also explains the tortures that continued after the death of the offender: the dismembering of the corpse, the blowing of the corpse from mortars, the dragging of the body through the streets, and its humiliating exhibition above the city gates.

This torture of the body did not conclude with the destruction of the corpse. Torture was also applied to the offender's divine soul. Evidently, the offender's soul was not an immaterial entity, but a subtle material body. The punishment of the corpse, therefore, simply initiated the eternal tortures of the material soul in Hell. "You and every organ of your body are responsible for your deeds. While you are in this 'house of correction', get ready for the 'house of justice'" (Sura 17, Verse 36).

The Conduct of Bodies

Nineteenth century punishments, however, are not to be understood simply as applications of justice or enforcements of morals. They are also to be numbered among the rituals of ethical life.

Among classical punishments, judicial torture occupied a strictly regulated place. Although it was not prescribed by the *shari'a*, classical judicial torture stemmed from the same epistemologico-juridical formation as Islamic jurisprudence.
Like the latter, judicial torture, was an investigation into "the truth of the deed." It proceeded only after partial proof of a criminal offense had been established. The rules of producing this proof were strict. The proof had to include documentary evidence written by the accused and witnesses to the criminal act. Once this proof had been ascertained, the preliminary investigation was initiated. The results were then submitted to the Shah with a petition to apply the instruments of torture. A written letter from the Shah in turn directed the investigation to proceed until the truth of the deed was fully known.

Judicial torture was more than a legal procedure. It was also a technique of administering pain. This pain had two purposes. First, it punished its victim for his partial offense. Simultaneously, it extracted further knowledge of this offense from the body. Through torture, the truth of the crime came to be known "more fully." Each revelation precipitated further punishment and interrogation. Consequently, the administration of pain was graduated to an incremental production of the truth. Judicial torture began with the display of "the instruments of branding and torture" during the preliminary investigation, and slowly intensified the torment.

This process culminated in the final declaration of the accused. The final declaration was the full crime reconstituted in writing; every minute intention, idea, or feeling relating to the deed was now fully exposed. As the reproduction of the crime, the declaration had to meet three
prerequisites. First, it had to be presented spontaneously and voluntarily. The offender, as speaking individual, was to embody the living truth of his crime. Second, his declaration had to be witnessed by an audience of magistrates. Finally, the declaration had to complement the preliminary investigation and corroborate the written testimony of the witnesses. This simultaneously confirmed the authenticity of the offense and the marks of infamy born by the offender. In this manner, the accused committed himself to the process of judicial torture.

Torture then was not a defect of the Qajar judicial system. On the contrary, judicial torture clearly conformed to the classical system of Islamic law. Operating from a well-defined corner of the penal apparatus, judicial torture supported the main aspects of traditional legal procedures.

Curiously enough, however, judicial torture was conducted within certain limits. In his submitted report, the magistrate attested that the examination had been "carried out with gentleness and politeness." It was expected that if this injunction to right conduct was violated, the aggrieved would claim hajst or sanctuary and petition the Shah "to send a third unprejudiced examiner to investigate the truth between [himself] and them." A magistrate exposed in such a fashion was shamed. Indeed, shame was so strongly feared that even the corrupt magistrate would not resort to torture unless he could obtain, by some pretext, partial proof of a criminal offence and thereby justify his actions. Judicial torture was a torture of the truth, but it required the truth to be
produced within the limits of right conduct, not demanded at all costs.

There emerges, consequently, a space in which the victim is invited to bear himself well. The trial of affliction was more than a mere discipline, an effort to withstand pain. Suffering was an opportunity for transforming oneself. It was harnessed to achieve a *safa-ri batin*, an inward piety and an external detachment. Following his torture, the regicide Mirza Reza Kirmani concluded his statement in this serene spirit: "Now that I have done this deed, I have no further hope of life, since it need a magnanimity like that of God or but one degree short of this to pardon me."

Judicial torture provided an opportunity for the accused to voluntarily embrace his suffering. Suffering was, at least in part, an active choice of the victim made independently of rewards or punishments. In this respect, judicial torture is linked with older rites of redemptive suffering. "For God (Exalted be His Majesty) made this world as neither a reward for the believer nor punishment for the unbeliever. Truly, affliction is nearer to the pious man of faith than is the fallen rain on the earth."

The observation may be put more generally: punishment was a semi-voluntary activity. Limits were placed on the conduct of magistrates and, consequently, proper behaviour was solicited from the victim.

In penal torture, the arrangement of these elements was considerably more complex. To be sure, one finds the same
The victim was invited to bear himself, insofar as he could, with "complete serenity and calmness." He honoured the necessary ritual obligations, as in the case of the Babi Sulayman Khan who deferred the honor of death upwards to his elder, Shaykh Nayrizi. He marked his death with a delicate poem:

The world is that which sometimes graces, sometimes pains,
The playful wheel has many childish games like these.

If we were burdensome, we are gone.
If we were unkind, we are gone.

For his part, the executioner honoured the victim and fulfilled his requests. For example, the Nujjat-ul-Islam Shafti would lead the condemned with insistence, gentle speech, and encouragement, saying, "Upon my ancestors, I, myself, will be an intercessor on your behalf on the Day of Judgement," with openness, sincerity, and hopefulness. After that, usually in a state of tears, he would sever their heads, pray over their corpses, and, occasionally in the course of prayer, [he] would faint.

Nevertheless, the opportunity for ethical conduct was not provided indiscriminately. The incitement to proper conduct was signalled by physical or verbal acts. For example, in 1828, the Asif id-Dowleh, a nobleman of high rank and a cousin of the Shah suffered his punishment in the public square of Tehran for having sustained a defeat by the Muscovites. As a homage to his rank, a silk carpet was spread on which he was placed and the first blow was struck by the Shah's son, Abbas Meerza, the heir to the throne. By contrast, in 1810, a slave who had poisoned the family he served was "hung by the heels in the common market-place, and cut up in the same manner as a butcher does the carcass of a sheep: but he was denied
the mercy shown that animal, of having his throat cut before he was quartered."\(^{30}\)

These forms of penal torture do not correspond precisely to a division between the hereditary aristocracy and the commoners. The Grand Vizier Amir Kabir was the son of a cook yet he was permitted to name the manner of his execution.\(^{31}\) However, penal tortures do mark distinctions between, those capable of right conduct (noblemen, religious leaders, merchants, and male commoners) and those who were deemed incapable (slaves and women). These groupings do admit of relative distinctions. A peasant, for example, was not expected to carry himself like a nobleman given his lack of cultivation, but even he was aware of the punishments appropriate to his dignity.\(^{32}\) Similarly, women had a higher status than slaves. No attempt was made to expose or touch their bodies in the course of punishment. The expectation of modesty, demanded or assumed, accounts for the tortures that characterize female executions: stoning, strangulation, and the casting of women off high towers and minarets. But the status of women, even of extremely cultivated women, was never secure. Women often shared in the misfortunes of their male family members. "When a nobleman or minister is put to death, it is not unusual to give away his wives and daughters as slaves; and sometimes (though rarely) they are bestowed on the lowest classes in the community."\(^{33}\) Moreover, women were rarely, if ever, invited to express virtues beyond the minimal demands of modesty in the course of execution.

Thus, at the heart of classical punishments, one finds...
not a total coercion of the body, but its incitements to right conduct. Suffering was a teacher of the pious. It delivered the condemned from a condition of affliction to a state of detachment and inward piety. It is not surprising then that the condemned furnished not only examples of justice, but also ethical models for emulation. How else might one understand the detailed descriptions of behaviour and the careful notation of poetry?

Through the incitements of ethical conduct, penal torture re-inforced status distinctions in three ways. First, while individuals were incited to express ethical virtues, the range of expression was conspicuously circumscribed. The highest virtues were expressed only by those who, either through birth or achievement, belonged to the highest social ranks.

Second, the behaviour of the punitive participants facilitated the practice of ta'arof. Ta'arof was a ritual practice that "underscore[d] and preserve[d] the integrity of culturally defined status roles." It characterized the modes of assertion available to each in an interaction; distinguished the obligations and virtues expected of each participant; and demarcated the comportment requisite for the exchange. In its various forms, penal tortures persistently invoked the virtues constitutive of ta'arof. Indeed, they linked the gravity of the moment with the exercise of ta'arof. Through penal tortures, relative distinctions in status roles gained solidity and weight.

Finally, penal torture re-inforced the activity of the 'urf. The 'urf or customary courts were judicial proceedings
based on social custom rather than on a corpus of legal rules. The justice of the _Urf_ was, no doubt, a justice of the rich and the powerful. These courts, even more so than the Shari'a courts, were excuses for graft and corruption. Yet it would be too extreme to argue that the verdicts of the _Urf_ were sustained by sheer repression or, alternatively, "derived from some abstract notion of moral justice." The authenticity of customary justice lay in an understanding of social obligations and ethical virtues. Penal tortures consistently emphasized this conception of conduct. They dramatized the tributes and services due to superiors as well as the virtuous favors and rewards granted inferiors, were they that fortunate.

Classical punishments then may be related to two points of reference: their rules and their effects. On the one hand, they may be located among the judicial rules that regulate their application. On the other hand, they may be traced to an incitement to right conduct. The individual was provided an opportunity to express a specific range of ethical virtues. These effects of punishment, in turn, served as a model for emulation by the pious and re-inforced social distinctions.

**The Power to Take Life**

There was, of course, a much older punitive demand, _lex talionis_. When an injured party could not compel observation of this demand through the courts, the injured party deemed that the power of punishment had reverted back to him. In the case of murder, "assassination [was] applauded and
through it, almost always occasion more murders, and
interminable blood feuds." In this fashion, blood feuds
erupted among families, city wards, tribes, and villages.

Many attempts were made to domesticate the law of
retaliation and avoid the wrath of the injured party.
Villagers would seize the offender, deliver him to the injured
party, and let his ill-will be the measure of the offender's
punishment. Similarly, tribal and Islamic law acknowledged
_gisas_ or legal retaliation, but sought to temper the demand
through arbitration. Appeals were made for forgiveness and the
offender would be required to pay compensation in money, goods,
horses, or women. If he was unable to raise the amount, he was
"obliged to wear a large iron collar round his neck and to beg
till he collected enough to discharge the fine." Nevertheless, considerable friction existed between the
requirements of classical punishment and the demand of _gisas_.
Occasionally, they conflicted. In 1888, "a number of male
collaterals of the royal family forced their way into the
compound of the War Office, where a prisoner was confined who
had murdered one of their relatives, hacked him to pieces with
their weapons and burned his body with petrolatum." In other
cases, the infliction of punishment took cognizance of _gisas_.
For example, in 1852, while the attempted assassination of the
Shah required severe punishment, the Grand Vizier "was fearful
of drawing upon himself and his family the vengeance of the
followers of the Bab." Consequently, courtiers pressed the
Shah "to deliver each [offender] into the hands of a class of
the people so that they may be executed...and that this crowd
[the Babis] may know that all the Iranian people are partners in their blood."

Given the enormous capacity of the blood feud to induce social conflict, tremendous efforts were made to wrest the power to take life from individuals and vest it in the Shah. Throughout the nineteenth century, historians and theologians sought to concentrate the absolute power of taking life in the figure of the Shah and to derive the lesser powers from it.

Classical punishments, consequently, were political as well as ethical and legal rituals. Punishment, regardless of the nature of the offense, was also a manifestation of the power of the Shah. It revealed the Shah's "power of life and death over his subjects." The Shah's claim to punish was absolute. It was exercised not only over individuals, but over cities and provinces as well. Fath 'Ali Shah Qajar threatened to have the province of Fars "ravaged by fire and sword. Crops were to be destroyed, villages burned, cattle plundered and survivors, whether villagers or tribesmen, were to be carried captive to Tehran." Muhammad Khan Qajar carried out this ultimate form of communal punishment in Kirman City: he "ordered his executioners to present to him seven thousand pairs of eyes of the despicable [and rebellious Kirmani] citizens."

Although the regal style of punishment was cruel, it was not, as some analysts maintain, a sign of lawless barbarity. It was grounded solidly on the classical power to punish. On the one hand, the Shah exercised punishment over his subjects as the Zil-Allah, the Shadow of God on Earth. His punishment
revealed the justice of Allah and established the place of execution as an extension of Hell." On the other hand, the Shah exercised punishment as the chief protector and patron of a social order. He was the 'Supreme Arbitrator', keeping the peace between all his lesser communities. As Qajar chroniclers often reminded their society, only the Shah "stood between communal tensions and total social anarchy."

These claims were re-inforced, in turn, by perhaps the most important judicial innovation of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of the Na'ib-i-Khass, Special Deputy of the Hidden Imam. In 1809, with the threat of war with Russia looming on the political horizon, jurists sought to buttress the Shah's domestic authority. Relying on the well-established theory of clerical authority, the well-known mujtahid, Kashi' al-Ghita, sanctioned the Shah's defensive activities. This action had two implications. The first implication is well-known. It provided the Shah with "temporary, partial and derived legitimacy. The notion thus emerged in Imami jurisprudence of a legitimate secular ruler." In this respect, the doctrine of the Na'ib-i-Khass re-asserted the originally Sunni thesis that right religion and monarchy were interconnected. The second implication, however, has often gone unnoticed. Like the concept of the Zil-Allah, the doctrine of the Na'ib-i-Khass linked the Shah's capacity to make war with the necessity to exercise punishment. It permitted the Shah to take whatever actions necessary "to repel infidels, rebels, and those who have abjured the faith." Consequently, punishment was juridically located in the person of the Shah and his delegated
officials. The mujtahids, religious leaders, retained the
correct interpretation of the law, but the execution of punishment was
given over to the Shah. 52

Criminal offenses, therefore, not only precipitated
social chaos, but also violated the justice of Allah. The
punishment of the Shah in turn satisfied Allah’s dictates and
re-instituted the proper order of social life:

According to royal command, their limbs and
members were severed by the sword and dagger; and their
souls bound in fiery chains were dragged to the lowest
abyss of Hell where they quaffed from the hands of
torturing Angels, the punishment of swallowing molten
metal and putrefying gore. Then in—the midst of the
army a herald proclaimed:

"Such is the reward of him who slays his lord!—
"Even the most Merciful Creator never pardons
"The servant who smites his master!"53

Through his emblems, the Shah pervaded the entire penal
process in a real but intangible manner. His presence was
decipherable from the initial investigation to the last stages
of the execution. A royal letter permitted judicial torture to
be applied. A portrait of the Shah was "unveiled when the
verdicts of the ["Urf] court were announced."54 Every
execution, no matter how secret, was presided over by a
representative of the Shah.55 Regardless of whether the
punishment was ordered by the "Urf or the Shari'a courts, only
the Shah’s officials punished.55 Finally, the Shah’s power over
life and death was embodied in two letters, the royal death
sentence and the royal pardon. Through these letters, the
presence of the Shah was felt until the last moments of the
penal ceremony. On the one hand, no execution would take place
without the display of the royal death sentence of the
offender. On the other hand, the arrival of the royal pardon could suddenly reprieve the offender and terminate the execution. Until the last moment, no one except the Shah knew the outcome of the ceremony. He alone controlled the balance of life and death.

We have, then, the transcendent figure of the Shah, invested with the power to punish, bearing the symbols of justice, surrounded by ceremonies worthy of his exalted status. Diametrically opposed to him, we have the body of the condemned man, possessing its own juridical life, and surrounded by its own ceremony of pain and punishment. These two figures marked the extreme limits of classical Iranian torture. Between them ran a cluster of signs, signs which simultaneously constituted terrifying manifestations of power and Divine revelations of knowledge.

One should not assume, however, that the classical power to punish was omnipotent and monolithic. Indeed, the politics of nineteenth century Iran is marked by numerous instances where the imposition of classical justice was resisted by local populations. These resistances usually involved the inversion of the status system and the obliteration of judicial distinctions. They tended to take two forms: acts of popular justice and the practice of penal satire.

Acts of popular justice brought together various communal groups in urban areas. These acts were always directed at violations committed by local authorities, such as unjust punishments or the hoarding of food during famines. They usually involved the looting of property and the public
execution or humiliation of officials. Holy days, with their stress on justice and spiritual equality, also precipitated such events. For example, during the height of the Muharram holy days, crowds frequently attacked town stocks and jails in order to release convicted offenders.

Penal satire was practised among groups who were dispossessed and consequently, openly contemptuous of the status system. Country brigands and luti, urban gangs, in particular, adopted this style. There was, for instance, the case of a judge who fell into the hands of brigands whom he had once punished. The brigand leader decided to horseshoe the magistrate, thereby branding him as an ass.

These two sorts of resistance, however, were short-lived. They usually dissipated after immediate local injustices had been resolved. Consequently, they rarely had any sustained impact on social relations. Furthermore, they were tolerated by authorities and generally retributive measures were not taken. In fact, the existence of these resistances proved to be quite useful to the Qajars and the luti. On the one hand, popular protests could be manipulated against dangerous princes and officials. Fath 'Ali Shah Qajar's handling of a major revolt in 1814 is a fine illustration of this tactic:

One of his sons, while governor of the strategic fortress of Astarabad, allied with the rebellious Turkman tribes and claimed the crown. The Shah, instead of directly confronting the rebel, dispatched three firman (royal letters): one to the prince pledging pardon if he laid down his arms; another to the religious leaders of the community, promising rewards and reminding them that the governor had unjustly imprisoned some of them; and the third to the city
populace, denouncing the governor for levying unlawful taxes and warning them that the dangerous alliance with the nomads could result in a mass plunder of Astarabad. The last two letters produced 'their desired effects'. A large crowd, led by the religious authorities, seized the rebel, and promptly delivered him to the government before the Turkmans had a chance to rally. Astarabad was handsomely rewarded, the prince had his eyes taken out, and the tribesmen were persuaded to disperse home.60

On the other hand, dispossessed groups were employed to control popular protests. For example, during the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1909), the Qajars utilized lutis to secretly assassinate pro-Constitutionalist 'ulema61 and employed brigands to crush Constitutionalist forces, as in the case of the notorious Rahim Khan who led the siege on Tabriz. Similarly, the 'ulema frequently patronized lutis in return for their services in fighting royal authorities, and later, Constitutionalist forces.62 In this manner, resistance was re-appropriated and utilized to extend classical justice.

In the past, nineteenth century politics has sometimes been presented as a struggle between two mutually exclusive judicial systems: the 'Urf and the Shari'ah. On one side, there was the Qajar shah who constantly sought to curb the activities of the Shari'ah courts. On the other side, there were the 'ulema who attempted to spread the moral and judicial principles of orthodox Shi'ism and, consequently, persistently questioned the legitimacy of the monarchy and its 'Urf courts.

This account of nineteenth century politics overlooks a number of points. In the first place, it ignores the fact that orthodox Shi'ism in Iran was not entrenched simply through the exposition of moral and judicial principles. Perhaps more
importantly, it was also elaborated through a punitive procedure that publicized punishable deeds and ethical conduct.

Moreover, this account does not mention that the Shi'i *fu'tuma* were unwilling to assume the task of executing punishments. Blood, especially human blood, polluted the purity of *mujtahids*. In fact, the execution of punishment by a *mujtahid* was a rare and disturbing incident.** Thus, while Shi'i *mujtahids* may have contested the Qajars' claim to pronounce the law, they were more than happy to relegate the task of punishment to the Shah and his officials, enshrining the sovereign power to punish in judicial practices. In this manner, nineteenth century *mujtahids* implicitly accommodated the *de facto* power of the Qajars.***

Finally, this account overlooks the fact that the Qajars needed to punish in order to maintain their claim to sovereignty. One should not forget that without the ability to take life, shahs were, in effect, impotent. Sovereign power, if it was to be recognizable, had to embody the power over life and death. Bodies were needed to demarcate this authority:

"I understand all you have said," he [Fath A'li Shah] observed; and after some reflection, he added—"Your king is, I see, only the first magistrate of the country. "Your majesty has exactly defined his situation." "Such a condition of power," said he, smiling, "has permanence, but it has no enjoyment: mine is enjoyment. There you see Suliman Khan Kajir, and several other of the first chiefs of the Kingdom— I can cut all their heads off: can I not?" said he, addressing them. "Assuredly, 'Point of adoration of the world,' if it is your pleasure."

"That is real power," said the king; "but then it has no permanence."**


Lacking a standing army or an extensive bureaucracy, the Qajars gladly assumed the task of punishment from the mujtahids. Without the power to punish, invested in them through Divine authority, they would have lost a central sign and justification of their power. It is in the light of this concern that one can understand why Qajar shahs, immediately after their coronations, executed the first group of brigands that fell into their hands. The Qajar's claim to inflict extraordinary punishments constituted one of the major pillars of an otherwise weak and ineffective dynasty.

Whatever disagreements followed during the course of the nineteenth century, this punitive link between the 'ulema and the Qajar shahs was never fundamentally disturbed. Until near the end of the century, the two great systems of 'Urf and Shari' were interlocked through the exercise of punishment. This connection was manifested both at the level of judicial discourse and in the actual application of classical punishments.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid.

3 This text is the primary text that remains on Safavid surgical technique and although it was written earlier that the period under consideration, the particular punishments described conform to a great degree with punitive practices during the Qajar period.


5 Elgood, p. 186.

6 Ibid., pp. 180-181.


8 Ibid., p. 98.

9 Ibid., p. 83.

10 Herbert J. Liebesnay The Law of the Near and Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), p. 229. If the crime could not be verified, magistrates were permitted to prescribe t'azir or discretionary punishments. Grounds for t'azir were less stringent that mandatory quranic punishments. Moreover, punishment was less severe and usually consisted of a certain number of strokes on the bastinado. However, the magistrate was legally responsible for t'azir punishments. If he applied t'azir inappropriately, he could be sued by the aggrieved victim. Liebesnay, pp. 229-230. Similar procedures were followed in the case of judicial torture. Ali Khan Qajar Zahir id-Dowleh Tarikh-i Bi-durush dar Vagav'a-i Qatl-i...
Nasser id-Din Shah [A True History of the Events concerning the Death of Nasser id-Din Shah] (Tehran: Ukhvat, 1336 [1957]), p. 69.;


The Dynasty of Kajars, with a succinct account of the history of Persia previous to that period, trans. Harford Jones Brydges (London: John Bohn, 1825), p. 38. Elgood makes a similar observation with respect to Galenic medical practice as it was practiced in Iran during this period: "Behind these ideas and taking its origin from the humours was the Spirit or Soul. This was the ultimate cause of life and all activity. In one respect, this Spirit resembles what a theologian calls a Soul. But the Safavid physiologist meant something much more. The Spirit to him was a subtle body, an intermediary between the physical body and the vital force which kept man alive and distinguished him from inanimate objects." Elgood, p. 14.


"By morality, I refer to a set of injunctions and prohibitions that hold in all circumstances, for example, those concerning good and evil. By ethics, I mean an attitude or manner of comportment that is relative to situations but, as far as the subject is concerned, has an objective hold on him, that is, it is a natural, expected and self-expected feature of himself. Thus, in morality, one asks "what is my duty according to universal religion or reason or this or that universal institution (e.g., the law)?" In ethics, however, one asks "what is proper at this moment, in this place, with this person, in this context?" or "How should I behave now?"

17Ittihad as-Saltaneh, Kitab-i Bah, ed., with an
Introduction, by Abd Al-lusayn Nava'i (Tehran: M'sood S'udj, 1333 (1954)), p. 41. Sources on judicial torture during the Qajar period are rare. The most important text available is The Interrogation of Marza-Reza Kirmani and Those Persons Related to Him. This interrogation was conducted in 1896 and was published during the Constitutional Revolution in Sfer-I-Iqatif, nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 (1907). The full report is available in Zahir id-Dowlah, pp. 60-105. Portions of the report are published in English in E.G. Brown, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), pp. 63-92.

The significance of this document lies in the fact that it contains an account of two torture proceedings: the official royal investigation and Kirmani's account of his unjust torture by corrupt princes of the court. The account that can be reconstructed from these proceedings bears a remarkable resemblance to old Ottoman torture proceedings. cf. Heyd, pp. 106, 118, 119, 132, 149, 252-254.

Zahir id-Dowlah, p. 85. See also p. 60.

Ibid., pp. 65-67.

Ibid., p. 64.

Ibid., p. 85.


Zahir id-Dowlah, p. 92.


27Browne, p. 444.


29Soleimani, p. 246. See also Liebesnay, p. 229.


31Hashemi-Rafsanjani, p. 440.


33Malcolm, 2:455.


36Malcolm, 2:461.

37See Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*


Ibid., p. 30.


Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudomodernism, 1925-1979* (New York:


"Muharram Azylas or passion plays were frequently used to establish the site of execution as Hell. In the performances, actual murderers were given the part of Yazid's evil soldiers and were executed during the course of the appropriate scenes. S.G.W. Benjamin, Persia and the Persians (Boston: Ticknor & Co., 1887), pp. 399, 405. A similar penal drama was sometimes enacted in the case of heretics in the course of which heretics were paraded through bazaars with blackened faces and burnt beards. E.G. Browne, A Traveller's Narrative, cited by Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), p. 138.

Abrahamian, Iran, p. 49.


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The Dynasty of Qajars, p. 38. For a discussion of this motif in Persian accounts of punishment, see D. Hardy, "Force and Violence in Indo-Persian Writing on History and Government in Medieval South Asia", in Islamic Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Aziz Ahmad, ed. Milton Israel and N.K. Wajle (New Delhi: Manohar, 1983), pp. 171-172, 183.


"It is not only in attention to persons, deputed by the Kings and Princes in Persia, that respect for royalty is shown; it extends to the reception of letters, dresses, and presents, and every inanimate thing with which their name is associated. The object is to import to all ranks a reverence and awe for the sovereign and those to whom he delegates power. In short, no means are neglected that can keep alive, or impress more deeply, the duty of implicit obedience.

Some time before we landed at Abusheher, the Envoys of Scind had been at that port on their return from Teheran. They carried, among other presents to their Prince, a picture of his Majesty, Fatteh Ali Shah. This painting was carefully packed in a deal-box; but the enclosed image of royalty could not be allowed to pass through his dominions without receiving marks of respect hardly, short of those that would have been shown to the sovereign himself.

The governor and the inhabitants of Abusheher went a state to meet it: they all made their obeisance at a respectful distance. On its entering the gates of the city a royal salute was fired; and when the Envoys who had charge of it embarked, the same ceremonies were repeated, and not a little offence was taken at the British Resident because he declined taking a part in this mummery." John Malcolm, Sketches of Persia, from the Journals of a Traveller of the East, 2 Vols. (London: John Murray, 1827), 1:83-84 (hereafter cited as Malcolm, Sketches of Persia).

Refer also to Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix III.

During the Qajar period, the custom prevailed that "the monarch was not only the judge or criminals, but the witness of the execution of capital punishments." Watson, p. 355. See
also Hasan Fasaei, *The History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, trans. Heribert Busse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 79 and Sheil, p. 280. It was in keeping with this observance that the shahs never personally executed criminals even when they were entitled to *gigas* or legal retaliation. The witnessing of the execution superceded all other legal obligations. *Itizad as-Saltaneh*, p. 43; Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, p. 40d. When the Shah could not personally observe an execution, this function was delegated to his representative, usually his governor, his court executioner, or his *farrashbash* or steward. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, pp. 432, 439-440; Yekrangan, p. 25; and Browne, *The Persian Revolution*, p. 95.

*Abrahamian, Iran*, pp. 41-42.

Benjamin, p. 405.


Aljar, pp. 19, 109-110.


Calder, pp. 3, 6.

"Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 46-47."
CHAPTER IV

DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES

"Fortunately, the visits of the Shah to Europe, and the increasing influence of civilized opinion, have had a wonderful effect in mitigating the barbarity of this truly merciless and Oriental code, and cases of unnecessary torture are now rarely heard of." In fifteen years, roughly from 1885-1900, classical punishments almost entirely vanished. By 1895, the worst offenders were strangled, decapitated, or had their throats slit. Even Mirza Reza Kirmani, guilty of the most notorious of crimes, regicide, was publicly hanged instead of receiving "a more horrible death." In some areas, the penal spectacle was completely abandoned. When the public stocks at Tehran were enclosed by high walls in the 1880s, it was almost as if the display of offenders had become an empty and useless gesture, as if its meaning could no longer be understood.

The age of classical punishments was apparently drawing to an end. Of course, its dissolution did not occur without delays. In villages and small towns, penal torture persisted for at least two more decades. Occasionally, as in the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1909), classical punishments would erupt briefly in urban areas. Moreover, certain elements of the old penal processions survived in the public hangings. Offenders were still paraded to a site of
execution. The tradition of reciting poetry prior to the execution persisted. The might of the Shah was still represented by a military guard stationed near or around the gallows. One might also add to these remnants the many, curious photographs of criminals taken between 1990 and 1920, photographs probably designed to preserve the exemplary effects of the execution.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that by the late-nineteenth century, classical punishments were rapidly disappearing. The old processions were replaced by two new institutions: the public gallows and the town prison. These substitutions do not follow the same timetable or serve the same purposes. Yet they mark a series of ruptures in the fabric of classical society as well as a shift towards a new penal style.

How might this shift be understood? The transformation does not clearly conform with standard histories of the Qajar period. It does not coincide with any determined state intervention in penal practices. It cannot be co-ordinated with a major change in the mode of production. It precedes the "drastic" legal reforms of the Constitutional Revolution by two decades.

Perhaps, rather than immediately seeking an explanation exterior to this transformation, one should begin by exploring the new terrain of punitive objects and procedures. Within this field of operation, two minute tactics are at play. The first tactic involves a shift in the object of punishment from the body to a point slightly beyond it. Neither the gallows
nor the prison act upon a particular offender. They do not distinguish specific criminal deeds through punishment. Quite the contrary, they are applied upon an abstraction: an interchangeable human 'unit', an asocial 'individual', or a juridical subject. They proceed by depriving this abstraction of its privileges. The hanging deprives the individual of its claim to exist. The prison deprives the juridical subject of its 'right' to freedom.

This change in objectives has a number of consequences. First, punishment tends to withdraw from the body. It only intrudes upon the body to deprive. Its moment of contact with the victim is brief. Indeed, with the formation of the modern prison, this moment becomes non-existent. Moreover, the reality of specific bodies tends to evaporate. Subjects of punishment become undifferentiated units. They do not bear any distinguishing scars or symbols of status. Throughout the application of punishment, they are prevented from displaying expression or distinction. In short, individuals become abstractions, uniform artifacts encasing immaterial subjects.

Finally, the body becomes the instrument of punishment. By restricting its movement or existence, punishment is delivered to the interior subject. The body becomes the conduit through which punishment strikes the 'soul'.

Punishment then shifts to a point interior to the body. However it also moves away from the body towards the penal machine. In the late nineteenth century, punishment is the process whereby bodies are attached to machines. It is the tactic by which order is imposed on the irregular and the
undisciplined. This procedure was at work not only in prisons, but also in colonial army units, private schools, military academies, missionary hospitals, and charitable organizations. It was the guiding principle of Amir Kabir’s reforms which treated society as a giant mechanism, a machine of order in which each demand would be perfectly implemented. In short, this procedure made possible a new ‘military’ model for learning, well-being, fighting, and punishing.

These two tactical lines overlap at numerous points. At the most general level, they tend to reinforce one another. On the one hand, the new machines supply increasingly sophisticated means of striking the soul of criminals. On the other hand, the abstractions provide the surface on which new regulative procedures can be put into motion.

This interplay of tactical lines, this assembly of forces, mechanisms, and objects, constitute what might be called the “disciplines.” The disciplines have three features. They fragment the mechanisms of control so that each body can be worked over individually rather than as part of a crowd. They bring to bear upon the body a series of techniques that break down its gestures, regulate its movements, and shape its activities over time. Finally, they indicate a new range of coercive techniques based on constant management and supervision.

During the late nineteenth century, minute disciplinary techniques proliferated across Iranian society. Although these techniques were adopted at specific moments for
particular purposes, together they made possible a detailed and meticulous control of bodies. Thus, the disappearance of the old penal ceremonies did not mark a shift towards liberalization or humanization in punishment. Quite the contrary, it marked the intensification of the grip upon the body and the deployment of a new strategy of power.

Disciplinary Matrices

Consider the founding of the Dar ul-Fonun at Tehran. The Dar ul-Fonun was to be, quite literally, a House of Sciences. Its course of study was composed primarily of "disciplines" such as artillery, infantry, cavalry, military engineering, mineralogy, chemistry, physics, cartography, medicine, pharmacy, and surgery. In addition, it taught "some subjects representing the arts" including geography, history, and foreign languages, especially French. The founders of this polytechnic did not overlook the fact that its influence on Iranian society would be "of considerable magnitude." The opening of the Dar ul-Fonun on December 28, 1851 was "a grand event which took place in the presence of the Shah." The state newspaper hailed the new institution as the place "where all the sciences were to be taught."

In 1863, an official paper ran a photograph of the Dar ul-Fonun (See Fig. 11). The photograph depicts the northern wing of the institution. At center is a line of weapons. At either end of this line, two disciplined men
stand at attention. Shoulders are held straight, arms fixed at the sides, and feet slightly parted. The line between them extends in an ordered pattern: two tripods of rifles, an artillery piece, two further tripods. Slightly behind this line and at right angles to the mortar stands a third disciplined cadet. The row of pillars continues the pattern set by the disciplined bodies, lending durability, strength, and support as if it were, to the rigid figures. Surrounding these objects is a piece of traditional architecture. The architecture is characterized by an arrangement of signions and suns for the shah, graceful Achaemenid designs representing ancient grandeur, a courtyard pool conforming to the harmonic four-ivan mosque plan. By contrast, the rows of instruments, bodies, and pillars represent a "tactical arrangement." This arrangement echoes the words of the reforming Prince 'Abbas Mirza to detractors of his military reforms earlier in the century. "In order to counteract this [criticism]," said the Prince, "I have caused a passage in the Koran that is favourable to the improvement of the means of attack and defence in the cause of religion, to be copied...and disseminated throughout the country." The passage the Prince alludes to is "Lo! Allah loveth those who battle for his cause in ranks, as if they were a solid structure" (Sura 61, Verse 4).

We have then what von Clausewitz calls "an assembly of forces over space." Yet the photograph also suggests "an assembly of forces over time." Prior to the nineteenth century, bells were never used to demarcate time and bell
towers were unknown in Iranian architecture. Consequently, the particular mechanism towering over the courtyards marks a new co-ordination of movement and time. The combination of clock and bells imply a series of activities adjusted to a specific timetable, perhaps quarter hours as the clock indicates.

What this photograph communicates is a new model for learning. According to this model, education only occurs through discipline. Indeed, discipline is the measure of education: "Even now a good school is considered to be one in which discipline is rigid, and the one in which no voice is heard save that of the teacher, the one in which pupils do not run or jump or cry during the recess period, but walk silently and gravely with dignity into the courtyards of the school." At the Dar ul-Fonun, for example, a thoroughly structured program pervaded its entire organization. The various disciplines were organized into seven branches. Students from each of the seven branches had their own distinctive uniforms. Each group of students pursued a regulated course of study involving three annual exams over a 'cycle' of six to seven years. In short, throughout their education, learning and disciplinary training were made co-extensive. As one visitor to the academy remarked, "the extent of the curriculum, the drill, and the evident success of the instruction in the shah's college were a great surprise to us."

I shall call the Dar ul-Fonun and similar ensembles "disciplinary matrices." A disciplinary matrix relies on at least three elements.
1. A means of coercion. A disciplinary matrix, in the first instance, turns on a means by which disciplines can be articulated upon the body. In Iran, and more generally throughout the colonial world, the drill provided this disciplinary vehicle.

"It is to the military genius of the French," writes Lady Sheil, "that we are indebted for the formation of the Indian army. Our warlike neighbors were the first to introduce into India the system of drilling native troops and converting them into a regularly disciplined force." In 1807, a French military mission arrived in Iran. Their arrival sparked the first of several military reforms of the Qajar armies. Although these reforms were often unsuccessful, by the early twentieth century, three major subsidiary and quasi-military units had been trained: the Persian Cossack Brigade (1879), the Gendarmerie (1911), and the South Persian Rifles (1916). As these names suggest, the reforms were quite heterogeneous. They involved French, British, Russian, Austrian, American, and Swedish military advisers. They were initiated for diverse purposes: to challenge foreign enemies, to delight the Shah's fancies, to collect revenue, to centralize authority, to appease imperialist powers, or to assert nationalism. Yet despite this diversity, each reform treated the drill as the essential ingredient of military training. The drill was viewed as indispensable for the education of recruits and the improvement of military efficiency.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the drill as an
exclusively military technique. Mission hospitals, private schools, and military academies also employed drills. In some areas, the drill functioned in a manner similar to military procedures. "Drill and regular movements of the body" were certainly requisite parts of any proper education. But drills also entered into programs in more subtle ways. Homework, for example, was a *gasha*, or drill, a process characterized by constant "exercise" of the mind and the memory. Similarly, training in personal hygiene, hospital procedures, and laboratory techniques all involved drills.

As a disciplinary technique, the drill had five characteristics. First, it regularized each body's posture and elementary movements. Physically distinctive movements were eliminated. Activity was co-ordinated through an efficient series of gestures. Thus, in military training, the old model of nomadic heroism was no longer a priority. Indeed, nomadic bravery revealed inefficiency and chaos. When Colonel Domantovich reviewed the royal cavalry for the first time, he was horrified by the "sorry sight" which was "full of disorderly galloping and shouting." Second, the drill regularized the relationship of bodies to objects. The use of desks, rifles, pens, and medical tools all required drills. Each activity was fragmented into mechanical gestures. A code articulated the precise moves necessary for utilization.

Third, each set of movements was elaborated across a timetable. Of course, the idea of regulating activities over time was already implicit in the Muslim cycle of daily
prayers. However, now the cycle was divided into smaller units, such as hours, quarter hours, and minutes. Moreover, time was regulated not so much to prevent idleness, but to make exhaustive use of each available temporal unit.

Fourth, drill movements were both organic and combinatory. In a drill, each body was the same machine. In any maneuver, each body was interchangeable with the other. Moreover, drills were based on functional arrangements. Drill movements could be combined according to diverse patterns. Forces could be assembled to perform multiple tasks.

Finally, insofar as drills involved an exterior imposition of order, a precise system of commands was required. Each drill was constructed through a system of orders, bells, signs, or signals. The relationship of the master of discipline to those subjected to his command was one of "signalization." The subjected were not to try to understand the sign; it was enough for them to perceive a "clear directive" and to react promptly by performing the proper code.

2. An order of performance. Within a disciplinary matrix, drills provided the means of coercion and training. However, discipline cannot be constructed upon isolated drills. In addition to drills, disciplinary matrices rely on programs, e.g. educational curricula, military precepts, hospital regulations, and municipal ordinances. Programs determine the ranking of goals and priorities. They provide the means of co-ordinating and situating drills in the most efficient manner. They establish procedural links between
different institutions.

In Iran, most disciplinary institutions utilized programs already outlined in European texts. French and Austrian models tended to predominate.23 During the brief tenure of Amir Kabir as Prime Minister (1847-1851), numerous European texts were translated into Persian. These texts included such titles as Degrees of the French Government Relating to Craftsman, The Science of Chemistry and the Recognition of Soils, Plans for Artisan Wells, Legal Precepts of the Army, and Gendarmerie Regulations.24 Between 1851 and 1914, teachers and students at the Dar-ul-Fonun augmented this collection with other books such as Military Treatise on the Science of Artillery, Austrian Cantimetry, Natural Philosophy and Mechanics, Surgery, Elementary and Secondary Geometry, The Science of Artillery and Fortification, Principles of Chemistry, Anatomy, General Regulations and Duties of the Barracks, Infantry Formations: Austrian Method, and The Soldier's Whole Duty.25 These texts provided the foundations for the programs implemented at the new disciplinary institutions. The subject matters conform closely to the disciplines being taught at the new schools. Moreover, the texts were published in limited numbers and were rarely distributed to the public. Indeed, "it does not appear...that the writings of Iranian authors were generally intended for wide distribution. Rather the aim was more generally directed toward utilization by students and teachers at the Dar ul-Fonun."26
administered and evaluated. Their implementation includes the possibility of intervention, either to correct defects or to increase efficiency. Thus, the third feature of a disciplinary matrix is a modality for correction. This feature implies both a technical apparatus for observation and a means of judgement.

Within disciplinary institutions, space is divided into cellular units across which bodies are distributed at regular intervals. This distribution of space serves two purposes: First, it provides multi-functional localities for training. Second, it institutes a "disciplinary gaze." It provides a means of surveying and correcting each body individually. In Iran, this kind of disciplinary organization was inscribed into two architectural forms: the drill square and the classroom.

The maydan or square is an old architectural form in Iranian society. However, the idea of a maydan exclusively for drills was a nineteenth century innovation. The immediate need for such a square emerged during Abbas Mirza's military reforms in 1807. Ouseley reports that "Abbas Mirza caused his troops "to be drilled in a separate court by themselves in order that they might not be exposed to the ridicule of the populace." A new maydan was laid out "for the troops he [was] organizing according to European tactics" and "surrounded with barracks." Although this local concern eventually became unimportant, the idea of a 'drill square' persisted. During Amir Kabir's reforms, military exercises were also conducted in a separate "parade square."
mid-1880s, Nasser id-Din Shah ordered the construction of the
Maydan-i-Masgh or Drill Square at Tehran. This Maydan was
"one of the largest enclosed grounds for maneuvering that
there [was] in the world," surpassed only by a similar one in
Peking." It provided a multi-functional space that could be
used for training infantry, cavalry, or artillery as well as a
site for hangings. Drill squares, however, were not simply
characteristic of military architecture. With the use of the
drill system in schools, the open drill square became a
requirement of educational architecture. As one educator
complained, "a great many schools have their rooms built
around a court in which it is impossible to carry out those
physical exercises prescribed by the course of study."34

The lineage of the classroom is more complex. In Qajar
Iran, most education took place in maktab. Maktab were held
at any location including mosques, shops, and private
residences. The education they provided was rudimentary, but
as Europeans conceded, it was cheap, generally available, and
useful.35 Nevertheless, they maintained, maktab education was
disorderly and unregulated:

...the Moollahs, or candidates for that profession, sit
in the school-room, writing, lessons or copying books,
upon the knee, while the scholars are scattered
promiscuously on the rush-mat over the room, all reading
aloud-each a different lesson at the same time; learners
constantly swinging the body back and forth as they sit
upon the knees and feet, to keep from weariness, and the
whole presenting a scene of singular confusion.36

Given this kind of education, argued Lord Curzon, it was no
wonder that the Persian 'character' was "obstinate,"
"retrograde," and "perridious."37 If Persians were to become
familiar with "the ways and standards of civilization", it would be necessary to "open the youth of Persia to the benefits of a European education." 38

Consequently, from the 1820s onwards, one finds a new kind of educational structure, the modern school building. The new school buildings often appeared to be modelled on the plan of the medieval madrassa or theological seminary. However, unlike the seminary, the new 'madrassas' were designed to articulate disciplinary technology. They were to be the instrument through which the "receptive, but lazy" Persian 'character' might be corrected. 39 In these buildings, space was carefully regulated. The classrooms were organized in grids. Desks were distributed at regular intervals across the room. Lighting was controlled so that each student could be independently surveyed. In short, these new buildings made it possible to entrench a disciplinary education, an education which might reshape the "dirty, slouchy looking" Persian into a "trim," regulated, and useful body. 40 "If I had any voice in the so called regeneration of Persia," dreamed Lord Curzon, "I would not bring out a company in London, but I would organize a coup d'état in the village schools." 41

The new observational architecture served to deploy a range of adjudicating procedures. These procedures were used to track and correct human beings during the course of their training. They had a number of specific characteristics. First, the ensemble of procedures constituted an artificial order. Wherever infractions occurred within this order, violators were isolated and distinguished by exclusion from the
group. Punishments were designed to be "derogatory to self-respect." Moreover, non-conformity was as serious an offense as an infraction of regulations. Punishment struck the "idle" as well as the "insubordinate."  

Jordan [the headmaster of Alborz High School] was a strict disciplinarian. He said people must stand straight, they must think straight, they must speak straight.... And when new students would come in, if they would see anybody slouching over here he would take care of that immediately. There were two boys from Birjand there, and then their younger brother came. And at the opening of school, they were standing around in the lobby or hall of the school and Ali Akbar was a tall boy and he was all slouched over like this and suddenly something hit him on the back and he looked around and Dr. Jordan said, ""Injah Jah darayeh shotek na-darim." We don't have any place for camels here!"

Second, punishments were designed to correct deficiencies, fill missing gaps, and perfect skills. Penalties were usually corrective drills such as "standing sentry with a shoulder gun." Of course, retributive punishments did persist, but they were utilized to re-inforce corrective procedures. At the Dar-ul-Fonun, the bastinado and the cat-o'-nine-tails were resorted to only when disciplinary punishments failed to achieve a corrective effect. Moreover, while "punishments [were] assigned by the class teacher," they had "to be confirmed by the head master." At Alborz, a high school run by missionaries, a similar "Christian discipline" was administered:

If a boy became very naughty and needed personal attention, Jordan would take him outside and say, "Now, let your pants down. You are sick. You've done this because you are sick. And you know when you are sick you go to the drug store and get medicine, don't you?" "Yes, sir." Now I'm going to give you some medicine. This is some black medicine and it will be very helpful to you." And he would take his belt off and would
administer what the boy needed. And then he would say to the boy when the medicine had been received, "When you get medicine, do they give it to you or do you pay for it?" "We pay for it, sir." "Now you can pay me two rials for this medicine that I've given you." And he would charge the boy for his punishment which he had given.  

Third, punishments were juxtaposed against rewards: while infractions and laziness were punished, "outstanding performances" were distinguished with prizes and gratuities. Penalties and rewards were two opposing facets of the same regulatory technique.

Fourth, individuals were ranked and graded according to a scale. This hierarchization set standards and indicated deficiencies. Simultaneously though, it awarded and punished individuals. Within the new schools, for example, grades provided a model for good behavior. Student who, through examinations, managed to conform to what was expected, received honors and prizes. On the other hand, there was "a policy for eliminating rather than salvaging students who ... not meet the arbitrary and rather artificial standards of academic excellency."

In this manner, these specific procedures brought into play a mechanism for normalization. They ensured homogeneity while at the same time regulating and hierarchizing persons on an individual basis. Within Iranian disciplinary institutions, 'normalcy' came to supplement and, in some cases, undermine social status and rank.

A _factory of knowledge_. A disciplinary matrix does not simply fix an individual within a field of observation. It also fixes the object of correction within a field of writing.
It facilitates the formation of individual documentation. In Europe, such systematic accumulation of knowledge made it possible to measure social phenomena, characterize social trends, analyze gaps between individuals, and judge their distribution within a given population. The social sciences (social work, criminology, social hygiene, military science, statistics, and business administration), in the first instance, were situated near particular institutions (prisons, hospitals, military academies, schools, and factories). These new scholarly disciplines were facilitated by disciplinary matrices and, in turn, re-inforced the practice of discipline through policy formulation and institutional reform.50

In Iran, the social sciences were introduced initially within a military and political context. "It soon became apparent, however, that military strength is derived from a varied and interrelated complex of technological and administrative skills, so the government revealed a greater interest in the educational system."51 The major social scientific disciplines taught at the Dar-ul-Fonun and other schools were sciences concerning military administration, strategy, and tactics. In 1901, the School of Political Science was opened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and eventually became one of the original colleges of the University of Tehran. In the twenties, the social sciences were increasingly centralized around the state. The emergence of the state was co-extensive with the accumulation of statistical knowledge and the formation of bureaucratic planning. Teams of foreign social scientists, such as the
Millspaugh missions, were employed to facilitate economic planning.

These developments, however, fell far short of the perceived needs of the modernization process. In the early 1960s, one Iranian social scientist observed, "the government will have to realize that research in social sciences...constitutes a most important and indispensable aspect of the dynamic and multi-faceted process of modernization." It was in this context that enrollment in the social sciences was encouraged and expanded throughout the sixties. In 1968, the Shah remarked that just as the natural sciences had alleviated physical diseases in Iran, the social sciences could play an equally important role in dealing with "social diseases." Indeed, the nation's aims would be best achieved when "technocratic specialization takes the place of ordinary work to the greatest extent possible." The range of the social sciences, consequently, would have to be extended beyond the military, political, and economic context. The social sciences were to play an equally important role in new areas such as health, education, family planning, and social work.

It is sometimes observed that the utility of the social sciences in Iran has been bounded by uncritical emulation and stereotypical education based on Western models. This tendency, however, was not so much a result of the so-called sense of backwardness and cultural inferiority. Rather, it was understood much more as a positive goal. Western disciplines, it was believed, would restore Iran to its rightful place in
the world. If Iranian intellectuals uncritically assumed that social progress in Iran would recapitulate European history and would be facilitated by European disciplines, they were no different than their equally uncritical North Atlantic contemporaries. As Samuel Huntington remarked, "discipline and development go hand in hand."55

Throughout the nineteenth century, Iranian modernists stressed the importance of discipline as a medium of power. No less a figure than Malkum Khan, the 'Father of the Constitutional Revolution', observed that the tremendous progress of European nations would not have been possible if Europeans had not created two kinds of factories:

They have constructed one type of factory out of bodies and metals and the other type, out of individuals [through which] they have ordered mankind. For example, they have made a factory from wood and iron in which they pour raw wool in one end and collect woolen fabric from the other end, and in the same manner, they have constructed a factory out of mankind in which they put in ignorant babes' from one end and bring out engineers and complete administrators from the other.56 He added that the products of the first kind of factory "are more or less well known in Iran, for example, clocks, guns, telegraphs, and steamships; of this kind of factory we are, in short, well-informed."57 However, if Iran is to progress, then "currently what is needed in Iran are factories for human beings: such as factories of taxation, factories of armies, factories of justice, factories of knowledge, factories of security, factories of order, and the like."58

By the early twentieth century, one can find numerous
disciplinary matrices throughout Iranian society. These different disciplinary projects were not planned by the same figure, class, organization, or nation. They were spread in a patchwork fashion beneath the veil of classical practices and discourses. They tended to lodge in a random manner at multiple locations, though once in place, they usually developed interconnections with each other. In the long run, these projects not only undermined the classical arrangement of powers but also formed the basis for a disciplinary society.

Is it not excessive to argue that discipline effected such broad changes in the texture of classical society? How is it possible that such minute and trivial mechanisms could act as circuits for a vast strategy of power?

One can, of course, view the rise of the disciplines as constitutive of two great historical processes: enlightenment and modernization. These terms capture important features of disciplinary training. Modernization highlights the process by which bodies are brought under the mechanisms of 'rationalization' and shaped into precise and regulated instruments. Similarly, enlightenment marks the 'effect' of disciplinary power. It is the discovery of an illuminated 'conscience' set free by the play of disciplinary practices.

By the same token, however, both these terms are embedded in a humanist tradition that views power and knowledge as antitheses. They suggest the "inevitable" recession of tradition and despotism in the light of science and positive law. Precisely for this reason, they are unlikely to register the multiple tactical engagements that made 'modernization' and
'enlightenment' possible.

Therefore, in describing the rise of disciplinary society in Iran, perhaps one should observe the following precautionary rules. First, do not view the spread of disciplinary practices as manifesting an immanent historical process. Instead, first specify the local effects of discipline on Qajar society. Second, focus on the extremities of power, where power and resistance come into a direct relation and attempt to identify the specific mechanisms through which discipline was relayed across society. Third, locate the tactical struggles, the forgotten traces of punishment, that entrenched a disciplinary society.

How then was discipline generalized? One can specify at least seven different processes.

The Colonization of Classical Practices

In the long run, most of the disciplinary projects introduced into Iran during the nineteenth-century were unsuccessful. Of the handful of successful projects, most persisted because they were attached to classical institutions. Some were entrenched within religious communities, especially Armenian and Nestorian Christians, and became interlocked with established churches and other local institutions. Many others were introduced and sustained by the Qajar court, nobles, wealthy merchants, and European legations.

For a long time, these disciplinary institutions hovered at the fringes of society. Gradually, however, they were
brought into play, either by accident or by design. They were usually used to patch gaps wherever a classical arrangement fragmented. This utilization indicated local availability. It did not necessarily conform to the interests of the participants or constitute a more rational and functional arrangement. Indeed, the effects of discipline were quite variegated.

In some cases, the introduction of discipline undermined classical practices. For example, the introduction of European discipline severely weakened the military capabilities of the Qajar armies in the nineteenth century. In fact, "even apart from the consideration or social and political accommodation; it can be argued that military reform weakened Iran from a tactical military point of view, at least in the wars against the Russians in the Caucasus." 60

The early Qajar shahs never possessed a standing army. The Qajar armies were composed of an irregular cavalry based on loose tribal coalitions and an irregular infantry drawn from provincial governors and landlords. Nevertheless, several factors contributed to the security of the Qajar dynasty. First, weak communication routes, isolated cities, autonomous and potentially hostile tribes, and the difficult terrain of the Iranian plateau all presented sizable obstacles to an invading force. European forces were particularly disadvantaged because their advance could not be sustained without logistical support networks; "the lack of compatible organizational capabilities in Iranian society made it extremely difficult for Russian (or British) armies to operate..."
on Iranian soil."61

Furthermore, the irregular Qajar army, especially the
cavalry, had important strengths. The cavalry was composed of
tribal warriors trained according to a model of nomadic
bravery, endurance, and excellence. "They were extraordinary
marksmen, either at full gallop or standing still and their
entire life was one of privation such that their power of
endurance bore no comparison to that of Europeans." Moreover,
tribal tactics made them "impossible to conquer in the European
sense of war. Their tactics might be likened to guerilla
techniques used by revolutionary movements today. They never
fought set piece battles and never engaged the army except on
their own terms."62 Finally, even if, in the event, they were
defeated, the autonomous tribal units "could maintain
indefinitely:"63 Thus, "they might be defeated but never
conquered. Therein lay their strengths when fighting against
Western-styled armed forces."64

All these factors contributed to the paradoxical
assertion that "Persia can be conquered by single company
without firing a shot; with a battalion it would be more
difficult; with a whole regiment it would be impossible for the
entire force would perish of hunger."65 On the other hand, when
'Abbas Mirza decided that "it was in vain to fight the Russians
without soldiers like theirs" and began reforming his
"undisciplined rabble" with the help of available British and
French advisers, he unknowingly undermined the strengths of his
own forces.66 Indeed, the destruction of his irregular armies
gradually forced him into "playing the game by Russian rules
and, it might be added, to Russian strength." Lori Curzon reports that when "General Yermoloff, the Russian Commander in Chief in Georgia heard that 'Abbas Mirza had begun to form a regular army, he exclaimed 'God be praised! I shall be able to get at them now which I never could do before.'"

By engaging in set-piece battles with Russian forces, the Qajar suffered two devastating defeats in 1812 and 1827. Not only did these defeats reduce the Qajar-shahs into pawns in Anglo-Russian rivalries, but they facilitated the introduction of European institutions, ideas, and practices, all of which, in the long run, thoroughly undermined Qajar authority. Thus, as Rawlinson concluded, "Whatever benefits Persia may have derived as far as regards centralization of the power of her monarch from the introduction into her armies of European discipline, she has been, as a substantive power, progressively weakened by the change and rendered less capable of sustaining pressure from without; and it follows therefore that if she had been in danger of absorption under the old system, she must long ere this have ceased to exist under the new."

The introduction of discipline, however, did not always result in the "paradox of discipline engendering weakness." In other cases, it re-invested, interlocked, and extended classical practices. The rise of the Persian Cossack Brigade is a case in point. The Persian Cossacks Brigade was originally organized as a ceremonial guard for Nasser id-Din Shah and, for seventeen years, "never had an occasion to demonstrate its qualities except on the parade grounds." In 1896, the assassination of the Shah resulted in the first
military use of the Cossacks. The news of the assassination "threatened to loose mobs" throughout Tehran as well as spark a struggle for the throne. Moreover, the police were "impotent to control such mobs and the army could not be relied upon." Hence, the Cossacks were used to ensure order and a smooth transition of sovereignty. They served to patch a momentary fissure in the arrangement of power and to interlock the older classical practices. Once in place, however, the Cossacks gradually assumed further policing functions including executing punishments, arresting offenders, and disrupting political protests. They extended royal authority across the capital in a manner that had never been accomplished before. In fact, by 1900, the fortunes of the monarchy were interwoven with the growth of the Cossacks.

The rise of the Cossack Brigade illustrates the remarkable interplay between disciplinary institutions and classical practices. On the one hand, disciplinary techniques were used to re-invest sovereign power. They were utilized to protect and extend the authority of the royal court. On the other hand, disciplinary institutions used the court to entrench themselves, expand their operation, and introduce further disciplinary practices.

By the early twentieth century, sovereign power was articulated almost exclusively through the modality of disciplinary power. One indication of this transformation was that the Qajar shahs relied increasingly on disciplinary forces to retain their authority. Another, equally important indication was the ceremony at the gallows.
The use of the gallows marks an interesting moment in the practice of punishment in Iran. On the one hand, the hanging of a prisoner was a spectacle, one which marked the sovereign's power to take life. On the other hand, this ceremony was marked by an absence of the ethical, moral, and judicial features of classical Iranian punishments. On the gallows, there was no inscription of specific scars of infamy, no recollection of ethical propriety, and no anguished cries of repentance to mark the revelation of Divine Justice. There was only the steady rhythm of the military band, the regular rows of disciplined soldiers, and the silent moment of execution:

[Mirza Reza Kirmani] was publicly hanged early on the morning of Thursday, the 2nd of Rabi'i [August 11, 1916] in the Maydan-i-Mashq, or "Dull Square," at Tehran, in the presence of a great concourse of people. He was confined the previous night in the Cossack barracks (Qaznaz-Khana), and was accompanied to the place of execution by the Shuja'ul-Saltana, son of the Sardar-i-Kull, and sundry kinsmen of the Aminul-Sultan. It was said that Mirza Reza hoped until the last that the Aminul-Sultan would deliver him from death, and that when he saw the gallows and realized he was to die, he tried to speak to the people, but his voice was drowned by the music of a military band."

In the hanging of a prisoner, consequently, one finds a disjuncture between the enormous powers said to be exercised by the Shah and the discourses which invested such power in his person. The ceremony at the gallows marked the exercise of sovereign power at the price of isolating it from the discourses that characterized justice. It magnified the brute force used by a despot while obscuring the splendour of violence exercised by a divinely ordained Shah.

It is said that by the late nineteenth century, "the Qajars ceased being God's appointed protectors of His people-
and the bulwarks against social dissolution, and instead became an ineffective and corrupt family joining the plundering and the destruction of the country."

Undoubtedly, the avarice and weaknesses of the Qajars contributed more than a little to this sentiment. However, aside from the major political scandals, there was a more subtle erosion of royal legitimacy at the level of daily life. In the execution of punishment at the gallows, there was an everyday reminder that the Shah exercised a power at once excessive and unregulated.

The Critique of Capricious Power

It is well known that new educational institutions introduced during the course of the nineteenth century weakened Qajar authority. Although these educational institutions were established to perpetuate the aristocracy, "glorify the monarchy," or "train officers," they had the inadvertent effect of "contributing to the growing intellectual enlightenment." The new educational institutions introduced, among other things, "new concepts, new aspirations, new occupations" and most importantly, a new class of intellectuals.

These intellectuals, who characterized themselves alternately as "ruşhanfekr" and "munavvar al-fekr," enlightened thinkers, were often the leaders of anti-Qajar protests during the Constitutional Revolution.

By describing themselves as enlightened thinkers, these intellectuals reveal a great deal about themselves. They were clearly aware that they were not scholars in the classical
sense and could not compete with "the traditional literati" who could boast more scholastic learning." Consequently, they did not claim to be 'enlightened' based on the quantitative learning. Rather, they founded their claim on the grounds that they had a certain understanding of superior knowledge, an intuitive grasp of the modern state of affairs, and "a qualitative savoir faire to construct a modern society." There was in this assertion the consciousness of a rare freedom: the capacity to act according to one's conscience instead of being guided by tradition. There was also an extraordinary sense of responsibility: the duty to reform society. Above all, there was a certainty that "progress was not only possible and desirable, but also easily attainable." Their conscience would drive them to fulfill their duty, carry out their projects, and reform their society; for their conscience had made them regular, orderly, and calculable, even in their own self-image. Indeed, it was precisely because they had become predictable and regularized that they could stand not only for their future, but for the future of others as well.

In contrast to themselves, classical power was capricious and disorderly:

God has blessed Iran. Unfortunately, His blessing has been negated by the lack of laws.
No one in Iran feels secure because no one in Iran is safeguarded by laws.
The appointment of governors is carried out without laws. The dismissal of officers is done without laws. The monopolies are sold without any laws. The state finances are squandered without laws. The stomachs of innocent citizens are cut open without
laws. Even the servants of God are deported without laws.
Everyone in India, Paris, Tiflis, Egypt, Istanbul, and even among the Turkoman tribes, knows his rights and duties. But no one in Iran knows his rights and duties.
By what law was this mujtahed deported?
By what law was that officer cut into pieces?
By what law was this minister dismissed?
By what law was that idiot given a robe of honor.
The servants or foreign diplomats have more security than the noble princes of Iran. Even the brothers and sons of the shah do not know what tomorrow will bring—whether exile to Iraq or flight for dear life to Russia...

Sovereign power was chaotic. Its punishments were themselves crimes and violations:

I drink for wine the blood of the people; I eat for roast meat the flesh of the people;
I have no fear of torment and retribution; do not put me off with threats or to-morrow's Resurrection!
Put not thy trust in the words of the Franks; talk not of the maxims of the schools;
Do not find fault with such as love the ancient ways; do not exult in the awakening of the Nation!

One might say that what was being criticized was not so much cruelty or violation of 'rights', but a poor economy of punishment. The excessive arbitrary power of the Shah violated all limits and naturally encouraged protest and disorder.

How might order and security be restored? There were four proposals. First, shift the target of punishment to the juridical and moral subject. Let this subject be the measure of punishment. Punish by depriving it of its 'rights', restricting its freedoms, or cultivating its conscience. Second, change the scale of punishment. Punish not only crimes against Allah and the Shah, but also 'crimes against society'
such as corruption, inefficiency, irresponsibility, and "delinquencies." Third, introduce mechanisms that survey society. Render each subject responsible to society. Fourth, homogenize and regulate the application of punishment, both at the localized level of individuals and in its application on the social body. Let punishment render violators ordered and predictable. Therefore, "We propose two simple remedies to save Iran: law and more law."

One can now understand why the famous reformer Malkum Khan differentiated "both religious canons (Shari'a) and the old state regulations ('Urf)' from the concept of ganun, Law." This great Constitutionalist vehicle served two purposes. On the one hand, ganuns counterbalanced the excessive, arbitrary power of the Shah with the sovereignty of the people. They made society the source of punishment. The people now stood on guard over themselves. On the other hand, ganuns were interlocked with administrative principles, "Usuli idara." These principles were mapped onto the grid of juridical subjects. They operated either by excluding subjects from contractual arrangements, where violations occurred, or by rewarding good citizens and directing them towards public improvement. It was precisely for this reason that ganuns were "laws that would establish security and thus stimulate progress."

"Security and order" then were the "first conditions of any progress and reform." On July 16, 1909, the morning the Royalists were routed from Tehran, the Constitutionalists
decided that the Cossacks of the Brigade should not be disbanded and should receive back their arms after they had laid them down in token submission; and that they should be immediately employed in policing the town (to which, naturally, most of the Nationalist warriors were strangers), and in checking looting and disorder. This step was applauded as wise and conciliatory, and the Daily Telegraph correspondent declared that "the behaviour of the Revolutionaries was absolutely correct," that "they were perfectly capable of maintaining order," and that all were full of praise for their wisdom in preventing complications.91

To the Constitutionals, the issue of 'security and order' was of a higher priority than the classical belief in 'justice and retribution'. The paramount importance of discipline was not to be questioned. Consequently, it was not surprising that the Cossacks, "the tool of the Shahs in their struggle against the people," became the defenders of the Constitution.92

The Constitutionalist "vision" of the ordered and illuminated city was not the only model for a disciplinary society.93 There was also a model of a military "leviathan."94 This model envisioned a city that responded to commands, orders, and signals, a city of "orderly parliaments, responsible newspapers, disciplined publics and even punctual railways."95 Both of these models were constructed as tactical alternatives among disciplinarians. The Constitutional Revolution marked the victory of the proponents of one model, while the Republican Crisis of 1924 and the Coronation of Reza Shah marked the victory of the supporters of another alternative. Neither victory, however, constituted a rupture in the disciplinary field.
Generalized Surveillance

Throughout the Qajar period, discipline usually operated within the space of enclosed institutions, especially schools, hospitals, barracks, and drill squares. Over time, however, there was a tendency for the disciplinary gaze to be turned outwards. New procedures were instituted at multiple levels for observing and correcting the populace. There was an increasingly stricter control of movement, space, and behaviour. These controls centered about three poles.

First, disciplinary institutions began adding external surveillance to their functions. The reasons for surveillance were sometimes medical (controlling epidemics), religious (gaining converts), fiscal (locating sources of private funding), political (using connections to protect and expand operations), or educational (monitoring tardy or difficult students outside of school environments). Whatever the objective, external surveillance greatly expanded the scope of local institutions. Hospitals, for instance, no longer simply cared for the sick. They also directed their efforts in six new directions: "to the preventing and further spread of disease," "to visitation of homes," to "patrolling the town for the removal of afflicted persons dying in the streets," to dispensing drugs for the poor, to circulating and collecting information, and to informing and utilizing the offices of local administrators." Similarly, private schools no longer simply supervised and trained children. They also established contacts with parents, evaluated the quality of
family life, and became acquainted with family resources, activities, and social connections.

Second, new societies were formed and took upon themselves the duty of surveying society. The objectives of these societies were quite diverse. Some sought to enforce public morality, implement *Sharia* regulations, and check the spread of heathen ideas. The Society of Muhammad, for example, chastised the public to "obey God and his Apostle and be not refractory lest ye be discouraged and your success depart from you" (Sura 6, Verse 58). Other societies aimed at providing economic aid and assistance. For instance, the *Shirkat-i-Islami* sought to "preserve the country's independence by fostering such modern industries as textiles and by protecting the traditional handicrafts, particularly the miniature arts." Yet others, such as the Society of Learning, sought to encourage parents to send their children to modern schools and collected "taxes" from merchants and shopkeepers to this end. Finally, many societies had direct political intentions: to keep abreast of the Qajar court's activities, collect and publish political information, and organize social protests against state corruption. The overall effect of these associations was to bring large segments of urban society under observation. Through their local activities, these societies surveyed families, school children, foreigners, shopkeepers, merchants, soldiers, and politicians.

Third, foreign legations, sometimes in conjunction with local municipalities and missionaries, began carrying out surveillance operations. Medicine played a particularly
important role in this connection. Legation doctors were given access to areas usually prohibited to foreigners and, through their inspections, introduced a new range of controls. Doctors convinced upper class families to employ disciplinary techniques not only in the area of hygiene, but also in the area of education, household economy, and administration. Parents were advised to correct the unhygienic habits of their children and servants. Masters were encouraged to have their harems and bathhouses regularly inspected by doctors. Dispensaries were added to foreign legations, companies, and communication offices. From 1876 onwards, a sanitary council was established at Tehran to handle public health concerns, especially epidemics. The council was composed of European medical officers; although its powers were technically advisory, its decisions were frequently enforced in areas of British and Russian influence. Inspectors examined unhealthy environments and persons. Municipal officers were encouraged to broaden streets and keep them clean. Unofficial quarantine measures were introduced in southern Iranian ports and sanitary cordons established along Iran's northern frontier. In 1896, the royal court formally charged British officers with enforcing international quarantine regulations in southern Iran. The quarantine services introduced a stricter control of naval movements, screening procedures to survey diseased passengers, and regulations concerning the movement of corpses to the holy cities of Najaf and Karbella.

It should be noted that all these procedures were polyfunctional. Thus, networks of streets served the rapid
Deployment of a disciplined military force. Screening procedures helped identify slave traffickers and foreign agents. Control of shipping enabled British officers to "maintain their control of the Gulf," while Russian quarantine services were used "to strangle British trade from Northwest India." Location doctors served as "medium[s] of confidential intercourse between the Mission and the Shah," and as means of access "to many leading Tehran families who trusted their medical skills." Medical inspectors served as spies. Finally, medical services were utilized "in the interests of trade promotion." For example, dispensaries located at the Indo-European Telegraph Offices served to entrench this controversial project which was viewed by many Persians as "an ill omen, an unmistakable harbinger of evil, and could mean nothing else than, sooner or later, a complete subjection entire Persia to the British rule." Similarly, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company employed a "Political and Medical Officer" to help secure the good will of local tribal khans.

As a doctor of the British legation remarked:

The objective of both Russians and British was the security and supremacy of their own trade... In passing judgement upon the high-handed action of the Persians 20 years later when they ejected both Russian and British medical officers with small thanks, the political motives underlying the foreign sanitary intrusion into their country should not be forgotten.

It should also be observed that the introduction of medical surveillance frequently met with local opposition. In 1899, British attempts to take measures against an epidemic of the plague was met with "unconcealed" hostility by villagers and sparked riots in Bushehr. In 1906, the Tehran Sanitary
Council established a sanitary cordon in Khurasan province against another epidemic of the plague and met with similar resistance:

So effective and so unpleasant was their method of isolation and disinfection that at the end of March, the people of Nastatabad could stand it no longer, rose in a body and destroyed the isolation huts. At the same time, they vented their wrath on the foreigner by destroying the British Consulate Dispensary and by a half-hearted attack on the Consulate itself. 109

Occasionally, opposition took more subtle forms. For example, in 1813, in the midst of a smallpox epidemic, British doctors in Tehran began inoculating children against the disease. The Qajar court quickly dispatched agents to the consulate. While ostensibly acting as assistants to the legation, "their true purpose was to prevent any woman who brought her child for inoculation" from gaining access to the embassy. 110

The Productive Use of Discipline

Throughout the nineteenth century, the use of disciplinary practices was justified primarily on negative grounds. Discipline was introduced in order to overcome foreign enemies, eliminate health hazards, control disorderly crowds, exclude criminals, confine the sick, and drive the idle student. In short, its role was to handle dangerous conditions and uncertain possibilities.

Gradually, however, discipline was justified on the grounds that it could help Iranians achieve a standard of living similar to that of Europeans. Discipline was to be utilized primarily because of its ability, supposed or
demanded, to transform individuals into socially useful beings and to shape Iranian society in the image of Western civilization:

It is education that separates humans from animals, useful citizens from useless ignoramuses, civilized beings from savage barbarians. Education generates light in an environment of intellectual darkness. Education shows us how to build power plants, steam engines, factories, railways and other essential prerequisites of modern civilization. Education has enabled Japan to transform itself in one generation from a backward weak nation into an advanced powerful nation. Education, likewise, will enable Iran not only to regain its ancient glory but also to create a new generation that will be conscious of individual equality, social justice, personal liberty, and human progress. Education, in short, is a social factory that produces not material goods, but responsible citizens and fully developed human beings.111

Educational discipline then was justified on the grounds that it created useful citizens. Military discipline was grounded on the belief that it developed the endurance of the soldier and produced a more efficient military machine. Medical training was sponsored not simply on the grounds that it prevented epidemics, but also because it produced healthy children, and more importantly, resilient and productive soldiers.112

This new function of discipline sparked three major changes in early twentieth century Iran. First, it legitimated the multiplication of disciplinary projects. Subsidiary military units initiated training and recruiting programs. Hospitals introduced auxiliary programs for the training of orderlies and began campaigns "to eradicate the popular belief that nursing was not a respectable occupation."113 Modern schools formed translation boards, established libraries, and
encouraged philanthropic donations towards the building of new schools. In some cases, different disciplinary projects developed highly productive relations. For example, throughout the Qajar period, modern schools and subsidiary military units were loosely connected. Prevailing methods of military drill were often introduced into the physical education programs of schools and students were encouraged to pursue military careers. "As the need also arose for military training at the secondary level," schools and local military units co-operated in staffing and maintaining a new series of military academies. These military academies extended modern educational institutions while simultaneously facilitating the rapid growth of the Cossack Brigades and the Gendarmerie.

Second, this new function increased the "cope" of disciplinary projects attached to classical practices. Existing classical institutions were gradually brought under the control of disciplinary matrices. Thus, on February 20, 1921, Colonel Reza Khan Paniavi marched on Tehran with his Cossack Brigade, declaring that "he was tired of weak governments and was determined to establish a strong one that would be ready to oppose the Bolshevik advance...." Military discipline no longer functioned simply to strengthen the army. It also served as a means of fortifying Iranian society and integrating it with Western civilization.

Finally, this function facilitated the introduction of discipline into the most productive sectors of society. This applies not only to economic production, but also to production in the broadest sense of the word. Discipline was introduced
into areas concerned with the production of wealth, knowledge, health, skills, and destructive capabilities. Factories were run on the model of military discipline. The classical irregular army was disbanded and replaced by a new army, an army composed of all the disciplined subsidiary units. Professionalized medical experts "squeezed out traditional practitioners on a competitive basis that [had] little to do with treatment." Health and educational requirements were combined to eliminate or re-organize maktabs. Discipline dominated the transmission of knowledge, the formation of skills, and the fostering of aptitudes and health. In short, "the relentless demand for material progress" generalized discipline throughout Iranian urban areas, instituting what some believed to be "the quiet or a dungeon."

The Proliferation of Normalizing Discourses

"We must straighten out Iranians' ranks. To do so, we must divide them...." A norm is a principle of coercion that is exercised through disciplinary practices. The power of a norm of comparison, measurement, or ranking is twofold. In effect, a norm homogenizes groups, communities, and more generally, the social body. Yet simultaneously, to achieve this normalizing effect, each body is examined individually. Human beings are ranked and categorized. Their relationship with each other is hierarchized.

By the early twentieth century, normalizing techniques operated through specific institutions. In hospitals, the sick
were divided from the healthy. In mental asylums, the mad were distinguished from the sane. In "normal schools," the undisciplined and maladjusted were separated from the disciplined. In "Normal Courts," the delinquent and the criminal were isolated from the 'average' citizen.

Simultaneously, the discourses specific to these normal institutions were in free play. Increasingly, they characterized not simply the specific rationality of enclosed institutions, but also the exercise of public reason. In Iranian politics, the notion of modernity, for example, was regulated and elucidated through the use of normalizing discourse. To be modern meant that one was sane, healthy, orderly, educated, disciplined, and utile whereas to remain traditional meant that one was insane, diseased, disorderly, undisciplined, ignorant, and useless. In this respect, the demand for modernity was also a demand for disciplinary correction and homogenization of Iranian according to norms.

The political demand for normality became an increasingly more salient feature of Iranian political rationality. The norm of 'modernity' was invoked as a justification for revolt and as a ground for disciplinary action. Thus, it can be found among Constitutionalists who likened the Qajars to lunatics with "disorderly" (("مظالم")) or described them as "microbes in the belly of the Commonwealth." It can be found in the demands for societal order and 'treatment' advanced by moderate and socialist parties:
At the beginning of this century, reformers could claim that the main culprits were the despots who had a vested interest in keeping their subjects ignorant and unenlightened. After twenty years of Constitutional government, however, we cannot in good conscience give the same answer. We now know that the main blame rests not with the rulers, but with the ruled. Yes, the chief reason for underdevelopment in Iran, perhaps in most Eastern countries, is disunity among the masses.\(^{124}\)

If we desire the remedy the ills of Iran like true statesmen, we must focus our attention on the source of the malady - on the masses. We must save the people from corrupting superstitions, instill in them a love for their country, arouse in them the instinct for social progress, teach them to make personal sacrifices, and, most important of all, unite them into a nationally conscious people.\(^{125}\)

It was used by nationalists to justify a centralized, homogenized nation:

\[\ldots\text{the problem of communalism is so serious that whenever an Iranian travelling abroad is asked his nationality, he will give his locality-not the proud name of his country. We must eliminate local sects, local dialects, local clothes, local customs, and local sentiments.}\]^ {126}

It can be found in the conservative demands for a program of enforced disciplinization:

\[\ldots\text{our only hope is a Mussolini who can break the influence of traditional authorities and thus create a modern outlook, a modern people, and a modern nation.}\]^ {127}

In the 1940s, it can be found in leftist demands for "a modern society, a socially conscious public, and an economically useful citizenry."\(^ {128}\) It can also be observed among royalist demands for social conformity:

The whole trouble with this country is that amateurs like you are sticking their noses in politics. Electrical and civil engineers should spend their time building houses and bridges, instead of sitting here and shooting off their mouths on state issues and other matters they know nothing about. If everyone did what they were trained to do, the country would not presently be in such a sorry condition.\(^ {129}\)
Finally, during the Islamic Revolution (1978-1979), one can find the demand for political normality circulating between opposing camps. Thus, the Shah claimed the opposition was "obscurantist, and backward-looking" while Ayatollah Khomayni "turned the accusation against the Shah."130

In short, throughout the twentieth century, norms have characterized the exercise of political reason and provided the standard justifications for political action. Does this mean that the concept of normalcy was the organizing principle of modern Iranian politics? Not necessarily. One might say rather that norms came to supplement the other forms of public rationality such as those that appealed to social rank, tradition, and jurisprudence.

**The Formation of the Prison**

In the late nineteenth century, there were three places of confinement for offenders: the subterranean dungeons beneath the Shah's citadel, the private guardhouses on the estates of nobles, and the public stocks "where vulgar criminals may be seen with iron collars around their necks, sometimes their feet in stocks, and attached to each other by iron chains."131 These places of confinement functioned as an extension of classical penal practices in three ways. First, they were localities where the criminal act was annulled through its re-inscription on the offender: "The Persian theory of justice, as expressed both in judicial sentences, in the infliction of penalties, and in the prison code, is one of share rapid procedures, what
object is the punishment (in a manner as roughly equivalent as possible to the original offence), but in no sense a reformation of the culprit."132 Second, these places of confinement demarcated social status. The public stocks were the site where 'vulgar criminals' were displayed for the public, while women and 'male criminals of high rank' were detained in the houses of the 'ulema.'133 Similarly, the aristocratic guardhouses entrenched the privilege of nobles to punish those who might subvert their claims and rank or damage their property.

Finally, through these sites, the Shah could exercise his power to take life. He could, on the one hand, condemn "those guilty of conspiracy and treason" into the darkest pits of the citadel, depriving them of visibility among their status community and in the eyes of Allah. On the other hand, he and his governors could exercise clemency, restoring offenders to their proper status or releasing them on ritual occasions. "There is no such thing," concluded Lord Curzon, "as penal servitude for life, or even a term of years; hard labour is unknown as a sentence, and confinement for any period is rare."134

Gradually, this network of relations began to fragment. Two processes were at work here. First, as the Shah's security was handed over to the Cossacks, the old emblems of sovereign power were abandoned. As with the classical spectacle, the Tehran citadel no longer functioned as an expression of royal power. Second, as European intrusion in Iranian politics increased, the Qajar dynasty's relationship with the 'ulema
deteriorated. Increasingly, the Qajars were attacked as weak despots manipulated by foreign powers. Religious hostility towards the Qajars was expressed not only through strikes and protests, but also through the storming of public stocks and the releasing of prisoners. Aristocrats ran similar risks by maintaining their private prisons.

These two processes resulted in the abandonment or fortification of the places of confinement. The old citadel fell into disrepair and was finally destroyed in the interests of modern city planning. Walls were constructed around the public stocks, enclosing offenders in a central courtyard. The Cossack barracks assumed the function of a containment unit for treasonous offenders. Finally, as Swedish advisors took over the training of the police and Geniarmerie, a new Tehran prison was constructed. Modelled after European designs, this prison was an observational institution in which prisoners were distributed among cells rather than displayed for public inspection.

The use of these varied institutions was, of course, a new development. Yet this utilization did not significantly alter the role of these sites as places of containment. These new institutions mark a transition and, perhaps, an increased sophistication, but they do not constitute innovations or new directions in the area of penal detention. In short, none of these institutions provides the model for the reformatory, the prison of the Pahlavi period.

It would be hasty to conclude, however, that the prison was an autonomous development, imported directly from Western
societies during the Pahlavi era. There were, in fact, several institutions during the late Qajar period in which corrective detention was practised. Although these institutions were not directly connected with the penal apparatus, they provided the models for the new reformatory-prison.

Shortly after the Constitutional period, the Tehran municipality established a new set of charitable projects to assist the poor. The new projects included a workhouse, an orphanage, a lunatic asylum, an Arts and Crafts school, and "employment schemes for the unemployed."135 These municipal programs were grounded, in part, on the old aristocratic practice of assisting the poor in times of need. Simultaneously though, they were designed to reform Iranians and put them to productive tasks:

If you look at the deeds of Despotism and Constitutionalism, the differences between Despotism and Constitutionalism are countless. In the days of Despotism they sought dogs for the chase; In the days of Constitutionalism they seek men for work!136

The Constitutionalists were the first Iranians to locate a vast terrain of wasted and unutilized human beings such as beggars, women, unemployed workers, and abandoned children. This realization was not, strictly speaking, a discovery since these groups did play important roles in nineteenth century society. However, it did indicate a new attitude towards these groups. Their customary roles were now deemed marginal, wasteful, and simply another example of traditional inefficiency.
Consequently, philanthropic activities, both private and municipal, were directed at harnessing, reforming, and shaping these groups into socially useful people. Rather than waste abandoned children, let them be raised by the municipality, trained to perform tasks, and released as progressive and modern individuals. Establish "Colleges of Science" for young girls to learn crafts. Collect beggars and teach them a trade. Provide the poor with useful skills. Set the unemployed to work on municipal or private projects. In short, develop means by which these pockets of wasted life can be brought into the service of disciplinary society.

Thus, the purpose of these municipal projects was at least in part to reform the idle, the useless, and the abandoned. The vehicles for this reform were to be corrective detention and supervision. Corrective programs, it was believed, could achieve two effects. On the one hand, each person could be trained and taught a skill that might assist him in earning a living. On the other hand, constant supervision could be used as a device for fostering discipline. Whereas initially, the worker would be motivated by his superior, he could by varying degrees internalize this gaze. He would come to postulate and anticipate an external gaze. He would begin to inspect himself, supervise his own actions, and consequently develop a conscience.

During the Pahlavi period, this reformatory principle was assumed by the prison. Like the workhouse, the orphanage, and the crafts school, the prison emerged at the intersections of disciplinary projects and the juridical apparatus of
municipalities. The prison served, in this respect, a triple function. First, it continued to operate as a showpiece for sovereign power. Royal punishments, such as hangings, were still carried on within its walls. Shahs frequently pardoned prisoners on ritual holidays. There was even a status distinction among prisons, with some prisons being reserved for high status individuals.

Second, the prison furnished the foundation for Qanun legal theory. It provided the Constitutionalist reformers with an instrument through which modern law could be articulated. It excluded and isolated a juridical subject. It suspended his freedom and his rights on the basis of legal violations. In short, it represented an egalitarian and humane alternative to the 'barbarities' of the past.

Third, the prison functioned as a disciplinary mechanism. It introduced order, training, or "forced labour." It intensified subjection and docility while at the same time increasing utility. Convicts were monitored, tracked, and shaped into socially useful individuals. It should be stressed though that prison labour was not economically profitable and often failed to transmit useful skills. Its achievement lay in the fact that it created a useful receptacle, a human body that could be inserted into educational, military, or industrial machines.

At the juncture of these lines was the locus on which discipline was articulated, the criminal's 'soul'. This soul was not the material soul of nineteenth century Islamic theology. It was, rather, an abstract reality referent. It
was simultaneously an element through which power was exercised upon subjects and a space on which a certain knowledge of criminal life was constructed.

The prison brought this abstraction into play through its multiple mechanisms of supervision and discipline. Penal laws directed the application of punishment to this non-corporal reality referent. Technical discourses fostered this conscience through training programs. Educationalists took this psyche as the starting point of their discipline. In short, this referent constituted the interstitial link between modern Iranian law and disciplinary institutions. It was the common territory of the juridico-humanists and the technico-militarists. Despite future disagreements that followed between these two groups, this hidden link was never disturbed.

The legal reforms of the early Pahlavi period, then, were not responsible for the decline of classical Iranian torture. Nor did they eliminate the public hanging. Their chief accomplishment was to sanction the generalization of the prison throughout Iranian society. This generalization was founded on both the juridical and punitive role of the prison as well as its technical and reformatory capacity. Moreover, these reforms licensed rehabilitation experiments in prisons, and consequently permitted a "take-off" in new techniques of punishment.

Through these early legal reforms, the small network of town prisons gave rise to a vast penal "archipelago." In 1925, Qasr prison, the first long term penitentiary-workhouse...
in Iran, was established at Tehran. By the thirties, Iran had a penal system composed of short-term prisons, court prisons, penitentiaries, and labour camps. By 1975, exactly fifty years after the founding of Qasr prison, the Deputy Director of the General Prison Department estimated that there were 6,000 prisons spread throughout Iran.141

State Control of Disciplinary Mechanisms

"One of the characteristics that mark a nation is, clearly, the possession of a national police system."142 In nineteenth century Iran, the task of protecting city wards was carried out by neighborhood youths, guildsmen, or gangs of lutis. These groups not only patrolled the streets at night but also defended their wards against attacks from robbers and neighboring wards. In some cases, local citizens and governors would jointly employ a jarugha. The jarugha was entrusted with three tasks: to defend the community, to enforce turf and shari'a rulings, and to execute punishments at the public stocks. His subordinate officials "paraded through the streets and bazaars in the daytime and at night," settling disputes according to informal rules of propriety.143 His ferrashes, attendants, and mir asas, or nightwatchmen, would patrol the streets singing loudly and pounding the walls with heavy clubs.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, diverse organizations gradually displaced these traditional groups, limiting their activities to local bazaars and small towns. In the 1890s, the Qajar court recruited Italian advisers to
establish a security force modelled after European police systems. The new Tehran police introduced street patrols in upper class neighborhoods and assumed control of the enclosed stocks and prisons. Similar forces were established in provincial cities. Simultaneously, local military organizations began patrolling cities, displacing neighborhood patrols, ensuring order, and fragmenting mobs and luti gangs. British and Russian troops enforced order in southern and northern Iranian cities respectively. In 1906, the Persian Cossacks assumed control of Tehran and gradually extended their operation to other central Iranian cities after the Constitutional Revolution. In 1909, the Constitutionalists, with the assistance of American advisers, established a Treasury Gendarmerie to ensure the prompt collection of taxes. In 1911, Swedish military advisers were employed to organize a National Gendarmerie. The Swedish advisers recruited officers from the old Tehran police, established training programs, and attempted to patrol the roads in central and southern Iran. Moreover, they augmented the activities of the Tehran police. Swedish advisers founded a college for police officers in 1915, established a police hospital, and organized Iran's first secret police, the Tazminat or Securities.

For a long time, these organizations operated autonomously. Provincial police offices had almost no connections with the Tehran police and usually served local magnates and governors. Similarly, the Cossack Brigade and the Gendarmerie constituted largely independent organizations. In 1921, however, the Ministries of War and Interior assumed
control of all these various organizations. With the assistance of French and, subsequently, German officers, the Gendarmerie-Police complex, the Cossack Brigade, and the various provincial forces were integrated into a single arrangement. Moreover, their activities were quickly diversified. The new paramilitary complex soon included a National Police, a Gendarmerie, a Railroad Police, a Customs Police, the Amniyya or Road Guard, and the Red Lion and Sun Society, a mobile medical service attached to the Ministry of War. The Talmangat also persisted and was transformed into the new Intelligence Directorate, Kār Agahi.

The centralization of the military and police forces is regarded by many political scientists as one of the chief foundations of the modern Iranian state. It is associated with the emergence of a centralized state, the extension of parliamentary law, and the entrenchment of a new dynasty, the Pahlavis. Yet it must not be forgotten that the policing forces operated through the modality of disciplinary power, and that, although they were established through juridical and sovereign authorities, their techniques were more akin to procedures utilized in disciplinary organizations such as schools, prisons, and hospitals.

In general, the new police forces had three characteristics. First, they regulated space and movement. They ensured the movement of traffic and supplies into urban areas. They managed natural disasters and epidemics. They controlled large crowds efficiently. "At the time of the accession of the late Nasr ed-Din [sic]," remarked Colonel
Kosgoskij of the Cossack Brigade, "10,000 people had been killed throughout Persia; at the accession of this Shah - not one."

Second, the police forces surveyed the populace. They constituted a complex of eyes spread across the social body, making everything visible while simultaneously receding into anonymity. They were posted at crossroads, registering legal infractions, examining circumstances surrounding accidents, and enforcing modern dress codes. They moved in mobile units, investigating crimes, drafting tribesmen into military service, enforcing health and sanitary regulations, destroying squatter settlements, and inspecting schools, baths, and brothels. They were organized into institutional complexes in order to screen the movements of travellers, check the spread of diseases, register the movement of goods, and collect files on suspicious characters. In short, they composed an active, uninterrupted gaze:

The duties of a Police Officer are varied and therefore more interesting. He is always dealing with human beings, whether his men or with the public. What the next day may bring forth is never known. He is therefore always on 'active service'. New problems arise, and new methods have to be continually devised to meet the increasing skill of the criminal."

Third, the police forces brought into play a host of 'infra-laws'. They punished not only violations of the law, but also the failure to observe or conform to norms. They established their own domain of illegalities and social crimes: delinquency, drug addiction, vagrancy, squatting, prostitution, religious fanaticism, subversion, and nomadism. Their objective was to eliminate "filth [sic] and irregular" lives that cause...
"foreigners to think that Iran was a backward country."

The new police forces, then, did not simply protect, punish, and enforce the law. They also surveyed, controlled, examined and fortified society. Their activity extended into numerous non-juridical sectors, including health, education, economics, politics, and social custom. They served to eliminate dangerous problems and foster the general well-being of society. In this respect, they constituted policing forces in the original eighteenth century European sense of the word:

The purpose of policing is to ensure the good fortune of the state through the wisdom of its regulations and augment its forces and its power to the limits of its capability. The science of policing consists therefore in regulating everything that relates to the present condition of society, strengthening and improving it, in seeing that all things contribute to the welfare of the members that compose it. The aim of policing is to make everything that composes the state serve to strengthen and increase its power, and likewise serve the public welfare.

Consequently, it is not surprising that the introduction of policing operations met so little resistance from state officials.

The new policing forces were complex social systems, frequently instigating their own procedures, responding to local problems, and acting upon 'higher' institutions. In judicial areas, for example, the police mapped areas left empty by the law. The new domains of illegalities identified by the police frequently surfaced in courts and bureaucratic offices. The various infra-laws would then be re-articulated in judicial or municipal regulations, extending the operation of the police into new areas. Similarly, policing forces began curtailing the spectacles of sovereignty. One by one all the shining
blems of sovereignty were darkened. The glorious royal processions were curtailed and enclosed for security reasons. Religious rituals in which shahs once revealed their divine authority were banned. Public hangings were increasingly conducted in prisons to avoid charges of barbarity and to prevent public disturbances.

Thus, the formation of centralized policing forces marked two events. First, it indicated the colonization of the old ritual and judicial edifices: the parliament, the court, the patronage systems, and the old judiciaries. The new policing forces situated around these institutions brought into play an entirely new power throughout Iranian society. Their deployment heralded the end of 'government' in the classical sense, where prosperity was the function of the justice of the shah and his ministers. In the new society, prosperity required 'security and order', not 'justice and retribution'.

Second, the formation of a centralized policing system marked the founding of the Iranian state. Through these forces, government became co-extensive with the life of society. Increasingly, the state adopted various organizations as its own and assumed the responsibility for generalizing those disciplines. It used policing forces to introduce bureaucratic, judicial, and regal control into new areas. It even utilized policing forces to regulate its own functions.

Although the new state contributed enormously to the growth of a disciplinary society, it would be inaccurate to argue that the disciplines were completely embraced by the state. Discipline is a modality of power that can also b
exercised in independent, enclosed institutions, such as schools, prisons, and hospitals. It might circulate within families embedding itself in the old patriarchal structures regulating family life, particularly the relationship between parents and children. It can be used by pre-existing organizations, such as religious foundations, to ensure the proper functioning of their authority. In short, the state is not a pre-condition of disciplinary power. Discipline requires neither bureaucracies nor policing forces to ensure its circulation.

In the preceding pages, I have traced several minute processes, revealing their interconnections and effects. But what did all these micro-processes make possible? In the first place, they resulted in the formation of a disciplinary society. This new society was built around a generalized gaze—rather than a centralized spectacle. If, during the Qajar period, power was extended across society through extremely visible and spectacular events, in the new society, power was articulated through an invisible, persistent, disciplinary gaze. This gaze operated within large enclosed institutions or circulated freely across society in the form of policing activities (see Appendix III). The growth of a disciplinary society, however, did not mean that discipline completely displaced the old powers. Discipline simply re-invested, articulated, and redistributed their arrangement. It ensured the operation of judicial, ritual, and regal powers.

Second, the various micro-processes made available a political strategy for social reform. Disciplinary procedures
introduced subtle links between individuals and the abstract demands of modern institutions. They located each individual within a meticulous and detailed grid. Individuals were transfixed and supervised from multiple points. Increasingly, certain groups came to anticipate this supervision. They prepared for it, by inspecting themselves and assuming its functions. In this manner, they 'reformed' and 'modernized' themselves. Through discipline, modernizing society was born.

Third, these diverse processes made the control of biological life a direct political concern. Of course, biological life had exerted pressures on generations of Iranians, especially in the forms of famines and epidemics. However, in the early twentieth century, biological pressures were no longer treated as judgements of Allah or random events. Rather, life became the object of power/knowledge relation. It was examined, probed, manipulated, and controlled. Techniques were introduced to cultivate, fortify, and strengthen life processes.

This concern for life manifested itself both at the level of bodies and at the level of populations. At the local level, disciplinary activities sought to ensure good health, foster strong bodies, fortify diets, and produce intelligent minds. At the level of populations, policing operations gathered a huge statistical text on biological life. Administrative procedures were developed to manage populations, natural resources, livestock, diseases, and ecological disasters.

The new capacity to master life had two facets. On the
one hand, it could be used to fortify life processes:

One is amazed at the high level of centralization achieved within the last decade. The government now interferes in practically all aspects of daily life. Land is contracted for cash by the government, fruits get sprayed, crops fertilized, animals fed, beehives set up, carpets woven, goods sold, babies born, populations controlled, women organized, religion taught, and diseases cured—all by the intervention of the government.148

On the other hand, it could be employed to abandon living beings until they eliminated themselves. This ability to disallow life could be exercised in several ways. In some cases, it might be articulated through military strategy. For example, during the 1930s, Reza Shah initiated several campaigns against autonomous tribal populations. Rather than employ the army to eliminate the tribes, the Iranian military simply intensified its control over movements and space. Troops were dispatched to cut off the migration routes of tribes. Isolated from their seasonal pastures, the tribes were starved into submission, forced to settle in villages, and controlled to the point that the tribal way of life was almost altogether destroyed. In other cases, this ability to disallow life was exercised through economic planning:

Another senior official explained that the country would be divided into, on the one hand, twenty "poles of development," and, on the other hand, the "marginal" underdeveloped zones. The former would receive government assistance in the form of agricultural credits, irrigation works, roads, fertilizer, pesticides, tractors, schools, dispensaries, and cheap heating fuel. The latter would receive nothing, and thereby, it was hoped would lose much of its population. For the state bureaucrats, this was social engineering on a grand scale. For the "marginal" peasants, this would have been social destruction on a massive scale.149
One can, consequently, speak of the emergence of a power that takes life as an object, a power intimately concerned with biological processes. This "bio-power" stretched from the minute disciplinary practices swarming about society to the huge administrative apparatus of the state. Indeed, one could say that the new "power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" was substituted for the old Qajar power to take life or let live.

Historically, the disciplines emerged at the juncture of two well-known political developments. They were connected, in the first place, with a growing fear of large, disorderly populations that controlled the cities and the countryside. From 1900–1920, Iran was "a hotspot of misrule, enemy intrigue, financial chaos, and political disorder." Country bandits and tribal wars rendered the transport of goods and supplies extremely difficult. Huge urban protests made property families fear that "Bolshevik poison was rapidly working among the populace." Subsidiary military organizations grew discontent with weak central governments and a Qajar shah who was "so nervous for his own safety that he was no longer accessible to reason." With the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, popular agitation against the British peaked: "It does not appear to be realized at home how intensely unpopular the agreement was in Persia and how hostile the public opinion had become to Vosug's cabinet before it fell. It was believed that the agreement really aimed at the destruction of national independence and the Prime Minister had sold the country to Britain." In light of all these events, a need emerged for...
specifically anti-nomadic political technique.

Simultaneously, the disciplines were connected with the drive for modernization. Development programs required a new calculus for administering human beings, a calculus that ensured capital accumulation for financing economic growth. Western technologies required "increasing efficiency," "changes in scale," and precise, regular labourers. New means of training were necessary to handle increasingly more complex weapons, economic machinery, medical procedures, and academic knowledge.

In this context, the disciplines played a triple role. First, they were used to anchor disorderly populations. Disciplinary procedures transfixed and hierarchized individuals. They fragmented tribal and urban populations. They disrupted horizontal connections. As Lord Ironside realized in 1921, "Personally, I am of the opinion that we ought to let these people [The Cossack Brigade officers] go before I disappear....In fact, a military dictatorship would solve our troubles and let us out of the country without any trouble at all." Similarly, in 1922, 200 merchants addressed an open letter to Reza Khan praising him for his introduction of order: "Before our beloved commander saved us, the Islamic Empire of Iran was fast disintegrating. The army had collapsed, the tribes were looting, the country was the laughing stock of the world. Thanks to the army commander, we now travel without fear, admire our country, and enjoy the fruits of law and order." Second, the disciplines provided administrative
procedures necessary for capital accumulation. They introduced "mechanisms of integration and social control" compatible with socio-economic development. They promoted a "system of norms and social sanctions appropriate to higher levels of development." In short, they provided a means of subjection necessary for the emergence of capitalism in Iran.

Most importantly, the disciplines linked together the exercise of power with the growth of disciplinary institutions. The disciplines relayed power at the lowest possible physical, economic, and political cost. They extended supervision and visibility, bringing power to bear on every minute detail. They intensified docility while, simultaneously, increasing the utility of each body.

It has been argued that "although Reza Khan based his power predominantly on the military, his rise to the throne would not have been so peaceful and constitutional without significant support from the civilian population." One might add that neither Reza Khan's orderly soldiers nor his modernizing supporters would have been possible without the gradual growth of a disciplinary society. It was the disciplines that provided, at least in part, the basis for a new military Leviathan, "the context for the later capitalist development of Iran," and the foundation for a new political technology of punishment.
FOOTNOTES


2E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), p. 93 (hereafter cited as Browne, *Persian Revolution*). Aside from several instances during the Constitutional Revolution, the only recorded case of official penal torture between 1896 and 1921 is the exhibition of the head of Mirza Kuchek Khan, the leader of the Jangali movement in 1921. This exhibition appears to disly recall the classical style, but lacks many of the features associated with the spectacle. Indeed, the display was apparently prompted by a political need to provide proof of this legendary figure's death, rather than by a desire to re-assert the classical power to punish.

There was, in addition, a ritual execution that was sometimes practiced during the reign of Reza Shah. In this ritual, the executioner would place a cushion on the face of the condemned and sit upon it until the victim was asphyxiated. Reza Baraheni, *The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression in Iran*, with an Introduction by E.L. Doctorow (New York: Random House, 1976; Vintage Books, 1977), p. 42. This practice appears to be modeled after a much more ceremonial public execution that was practiced during the mid-nineteenth century. See Justin Perkins, *A Residence of Eight Years in Persia Among the Nestorian Christians* (Andover, MA: Allen, Morill & Wardwell, 1843), p. 455.


*Fard-Salji, p. 177.*


*Lorentz, p. 197.*


*Ibid., p. 192.*

*Ibid., p. 197.*


*J. Morier, *A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor to Constantinople, between the years 1812 and 1816*, with a journal of the voyage by the Brazils and Bombay to the Persian Gulf; together with an account of the proceedings of His Majesty's Embassy under Sir Gore Ouseley (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, & Brown, 1818), p. 213.*

*Clausewitz, pp. 276-277.*


21 Sadiq, p. 58.

22 Foucault, pp. 135-169.


24 Foucault, p. 166.

25 Kazemzadeh, p. 362.

26 Despite Russian and British attempts to dominate the transmission of skills and knowledge, until the Second World War, "it was French culture which proved to be the acceptable channel for the flow of most Western science and thought into Iran". T. Cuyler Young, "The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran," *The Middle East Journal* 2 (Winter 1949): 50. This Franco-Iranian cultural bond persisted largely because of the relative absence of any perceived French economic or political designs on Iran. Similar factors contributed to the persistence of Iranian ties to northern and central European nations, such as Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Sweden. Bradford G. Martin, *German-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1873-1912* (*S-Graenhage, Netherlands: Mouton &


22 Lorentz, p. 226.

23 Foucault, p. 174.

24 Morier, p. 216.


26 Amir Kabir, [Untitled Correspondence with Nassar id-Din Shah], cited by Lorentz, p. 289.


29 Perkins, p. 437; Curzon, 1:492.

30 Perkins, p. 437.

31 Curzon, 1:492.

32 Ibid., 1:494.
"Ibid., 1:495.

10 C. MacGregor, Journey Through Khurasan, cited by Curzon, 1:611.

11 Curzon, 1:492.

12 Ibid., 1:495.


14 Curzon, 1:495.

15 Afzal, p. 40.

16 Ibid., p. 40.

17 Lorentz, p. 220. See also p. 195.


19 Foucault, pp. 177-194.

20 Dreyfus and Rabinow, p. 160.


57Ibid.

58Ibid., p. 11.

59Katouzian, p. 45.

60Lorentz, p. 79.

61Ibid., p. 82; See also Atkin, pp. 102-104.

62Ibid., p. 72.

63Ibid., p. 82.

64Ibid., p. 72; See also Atkin, pp. 107-111.

65Russian officer cited by Curzon, 1:607. Muhammad Khan Qajar was clearly aware of the strengths of his forces when fighting the Russians in the Caucasus, as the following incident from Malcolm (2: 297-298) illustrates:

He told the assembled leaders of his army, that the Russians had presumed during his absence in Khurasan, to invade the opposite frontier of his dominions. 'But my valiant warriors', he added, 'shall be led against them; and we will, by the blessing of God, charge their celebrated lines of infantry, and batteries of cannon, and cut them to pieces with our conquering sabres.' The chiefs applauded the heroic resolution of their sovereign, and promised to support him with their lives. When they had gone, the monarch directed his minister, Hajee Ibrahim, to approach; and he asked him, if he had heard what he had said to the military chiefs. The minister said he had. 'And do you think,' said he, 'I will do what I have told them?' 'Undoubtedly, if it
is your majesty's pleasure,' was the reply. "Hajee,' said Aga Mahome Khan, half angry, 'have I been mistaken? Are you also a fool? Can a man of your wisdom believe I will ever run my head against their walls of steel, or expose my irregular army to be destroyed by their cannon, and disciplined troops? I know better. Their shots shall never reach me; but they shall possess no country beyond its range. They shall, not know sleep; let them march where they choose, I will surround them with a desert.

66 Morier, p. 211.

67 Lorentz, p. 83; See also Atkin, pp. 136-144.

68 Curzon, 1:580.


70 Ibid., p. 31.

71 Kazemzadeh, pp. 360-361

72 Ibid., pp. 361.

73 Browne, Persian_Revolution , p. 40.


75 Idem, Iran , p. 53.


78 Abrahamian, Iran , p. 50.
Manjol Bayat-Phillip gives a slightly different account of the enlightened thinkers. Through an analysis of the writings of Afghani, Talebzadeh, Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani, and Mostashar ol-Dowleh, Bayat-Phillip argues that the enlightened thinkers were in fact inheritors of an Irano-Islamic tradition of academic elitism and a mystical-philosophic tradition centered about the concept of the Perfect Man. Manjol Bayat-Phillip, "Tradition and Change in Iranian Socio-Religious Thought," in Continuity and Change in Modern Iran, ed. Michael E. Bonine and Nikki R. Keddie (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 35-66. While such intellectual traditions did persist and may have influenced "modernist" scholarship to a certain degree, it is not at all clear whether the classic texts Bayat-Phillip analyzes are the best expression of the assumptions of the enlightened thinkers. Indeed, they are, quite possibly, the worst guides to the work of nineteenth century modernists. If one analyzes the book published during the Qajar period, one finds that modernist scholars were pre-occupied with four tasks: writing narrow technical manuals on European techniques (the majority); translating European literary classics, histories, and works on Iran; composing biographies and travelogues; and analyzing the European concept of "rights."<ref> Ashraf, "Remonstrance or a Reactionary," trans. E.J. Browne, in Browne, Press and Poetry, lines 6-10. See also "Muhammad 'Ali Mirza's Despair," in Browne, Press and Poetry, pp. 242-246.</ref>
Malkum Khan, "A Letter from Qazvin," Qanun 6 (July 1890), cited by Abrahamian, Iran, p. 69. "When they are punished," wrote Issa Sadiq in 1931, "the teacher must make them understand that the punishment is not by caprice but by the community's will formulated in some regulation." Sadiq, p. 102.

Abrahamian, Iran, p. 68. This distinction was also emphasized, in the nineteenth century, by several of the fakhr who declared the notion of Qanun to be bid'a or a heretical innovation. However, if Qanuns were, in principle, at variance with the shari'ah, why then did many leading fakhr back the Constitutionalist forces? The answer appears to be linked with the tactical considerations of the fakhr during this period. As Calier has pointed out, some of the fakhr viewed either Constitutionalism or Monarchy as an intrinsically legitimate form of government. What was at issue among them was the question: what kind of government would serve to ensure the fulfillment of the Shari'ah's dictates and resist the intrusion of European powers? Thus, while different fakhr sided with one group or another, in general, the dimensions of the debate never changed. In each case, practical expediency and anticipated effectiveness had a priority over the question of legitimacy. Norman Calier, "Accommodation and Revolution in Imam Shi'a Jurisprudence: Khomeini and the Classical Tradition," Middle Eastern Studies 18:1 (January 1982): 7-9.


Abrahamian, p. 68. Modern day supporters of the Constitutional Revolution still retain much of its disciplinarian spirit:

The Persian Revolution was not fought for a social contract; rather it aimed at a contract—a legal framework—which would make life and labour less insecure and more predictable. The revolutionaries did not demand equality before the law, for there existed no law (in the European sense of this term) before which men could be equal. That is, 'the law' itself was the expression of the arbitrary whim of those in positions of power, each of whom—according to his station—could decide to treat different men differently at different times. Thus, the law itself was as changeable as the law-giver, his interest, his mood and his pleasure. By fighting against despotism, the revolutionaries fought for law itself....

The Iranian revolutionaries demanded freedom not from legal restraints, but from organised and
official lawlessness; not to enjoy socio-economic equality, but to divide the absolute power of the state, and share it out between them. In its 'negative' aspect, their concept of freedom involved a positive demand for a legal framework-for law itself; in its 'positive' aspect, it involved neither more nor less intervention by the state in the political economy, but a hierarchal and geographical division and democratisation of state power. It was freedom from political impotence, social indignity, and economic insecurity. It was a struggle by 'subjects' and 'servants'-including landlords, merchants and others alike-to become not so much citizens (in the strict European sense of the term) as persons. It was a demand for all to enjoy security of life, limb and property from unconstrained and unpredictable bureaucratic licence. That is why the revolutionaries simply assumed that all other social and political desiderate-economic progress, social welfare, and national integrity-would be ensured by their triumph against despotism. (Katouzian, pp. 56-58)

90 Sadiq, p. 24.


92 Kazemzadeh, p. 363.


94 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 342.

95 Ibid., p. 171.

96 John G. Wishard, Twenty Years in Persia (New York: Fleming D. Revel Co., 1908), p. 220. For information on medical and educational practices during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see also Cyril Elgood, A Medical History of Persia and the Eastern Caliphate: The Development of Persian and Arabic Medical Sciences from the Earliest Times until the Year A.D. 1322, including the Mongol domination and Western influences based on original and contemporary sources with additions and corrections from the author's copy (Amsterdam: A.P.A.-Philo Press, 1951; reprint ed., 1979); Byron J. Good, "The Transformation of Health Care..."


9Malekzadeh, Tarikh-i Ingiliz-i Masqueeh-yi Iran [(History of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran), cited by Abrahamian, Iran, p. 75.

9Sadiq, p. 36. See also Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 75-76.

100Jood, p. 63


102Wright, p. 125.

103Elgood, p. 523.

104Ibii., p. 126.

106 Wright, p. 126.

107 Elgood, p. 530.

108 Ibid., p. 524.

109 Ibid., p. 528.

110 Abbas Iqbal, "Abelal Kubi [Smallpox Inoculation], Yadgar 4:3 (1326) [1947]: 69.

111 Al-Motakallimun, [untitled], cited by Abrahamian, *Iran*, p. 76.

112 Good, p. 68-69.

113 Wilber, p. 211.

114 Arasteh, p. 88. See also Fard-Saidi, pp. 120-124, 134-137.

115 Wright, p. 182.


120 Arasteh, p. 89.

121 Baraheni, p. 214.


125 A. Kasravi, "Why We Are Not Politicians," Payman 1 (May 1942), cited by Abrahamian, IRAN, p. 126. See also p. 127.

126 "Religion and Nationality," IRANSHAH 2 (December 1924), cited by Abrahamian, IRAN, p. 123.

127 A. Kazemi, "What Do We Want?" Farengestap 1 (August 1924), cited by Abrahamian, IRAN, p. 124.

128 Abrahamian, p. 343.


131 Curzon, 1:458-459.

132 Ibid., 1:459.

133 Ibid., 1:458.
136 Abdu'l Majid, [untitled], trans. E.G. Browne, in Browne, PRESS AND POETRY, p. 300.


138 This practice was continued intermittently throughout the Qajar period. See IRAN ALMANAC, 1962 (Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1962), p. 292.


140 This spatial metaphor, borrowed from Solzhenitsyn, describes the Iranian security system equally as well as it describes the Gulag, the system of corrective labor camps in the U.S.S.R. See Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, 1918-1956: AN EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION, 3 vols., trans. Thomas P. Whitney (NEW YORK: HARPER & ROW, 1974), 1:x.

141 Halliday, p. 85.


144 Kazemzadeh, p. 362.

145 CEYLON POLICE HANDBOOK FOR PROBATIONERS, 1939, cited by Jeffries, COLONIAL POLICE, p. 179.

146 Tehran Police officer cited by Farhad Kazemi.


149 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 439.


151 Lord Curzon, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series, vol. 4, cited by Wright, p. 179.

152 "British Minister to Foreign Office," Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, vol. 13, cited by Abrahamian, Iran, p. 117.

153 "The Commander of the British Military Mission to the British Minister" Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, vol. 13, cited by Abrahamian, Iran, p. 117.


155 Lord Ironside, [From the Personal Diaries of the late Field Marshal the Lord Ironside], cited by Wright, p. 131.

156 M. Makki, Tarikh-i Baist-Saleh-ye Iran [Twenty Year History of Iran], cited by Abrahamian, Iran, p. 131.

157 Rotblat, p. 294.
159 Ibid., p. 303.

159 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 120.

160 Halliday, p. 23.
CHAPTER V

CARCERAL REGIMENS

It is well known that pre-revolutionary Iran possessed a notorious police force, a complex of torture centers, a long history of brutal repression, and an abysmal record of human rights violations. It is often forgotten, however, that Iran also possessed an innovative civilian judicial and penal system, one which actively experimented with procedures which have not been tried or are just being attempted in the U.S. and other Western countries. Indeed, there are at least three areas in which pre-revolutionary Iran was noteworthy.

First, pre-revolutionary Iran possessed an extensive system of "open prisons". The model of the open prison had been developed initially during the sixties by liberal critics of North American and European closed prison systems. In theory, the open prison involved permitting prisoners to work in the community without being subject to systematic police supervision and expecting prisoners to return in the evening to spend the night at the prison under lock and key. While this system was rarely employed in North America, in Iran, it was utilized "on a very large scale." In this system, prisoners were neither systematically supervised nor forced to wear prison garb. Moreover, quite frequently, they were not expected to return to their prisons for the evening and were permitted to spend "the night in huts provided for this
purpose." Consequently, one European jurist characterized the Iranian system of open prisons as being a system of "semi-liberty" rather than one of "external work."¹

Second, Iran possessed a sophisticated drug maintenance and rehabilitation system. In less than twenty years, the Iranian government moved from a laissez-faire policy with regard to drugs to a complete prohibition and finally to a massive drug maintenance and rehabilitation program. This latter policy included the use of a methadone maintenance program, a program which is still controversial in the U.S. It also involved specialized training for Iranian narcotics officers which was provided by United Nations technical assistance programs. Through these policies, the Iranian addict population was reduced from, conservatively speaking, 1.5 million in 1955 to 400,000 addicts in 1974.²

Finally, Iran possessed a relatively unique civilian judicial system. This judicial system was utilized by lawyers of excellent quality (whether it was a matter of judges, the prosecuting authorities, the members of the bar, the university staff, or senior officials) who are fully aware of all that is implied by devotion to the fundamental principles of enlightened humanism.³

Indeed, the ordinary criminal judicial system incorporated a surprising number of liberal procedures. Authorities did not make excessive use of provisional detention and in 1975, reforms were introduced for limiting the length of detention. Similarly, innovative legal provisions were introduced for the handling of the mentally abnormal and juvenile delinquents. For example, from the moment a juvenile delinquent was arrested in Tehran and
taken to the prosecuting authorities, the public prosecutor, if he does not immediately set the child free, transfers him at once to the [re-education] centre. The judicial examination is then carried out on the premises, the examining magistrate coming to the institution in order to avoid the accused from being traumatized by the atmosphere of the courts. Equally, the juvenile court sits on the premises twice a week.

Thus, ironically, pre-revolutionary Iran possessed, simultaneously, a highly experimental and draconian set of punitive practices. How might one account for this curious society of enclosed public spaces and open prisons?

Perhaps we should recall several developments that occurred between 1920 and 1975. First, numerous institutions were established for the supervision of abandoned and delinquent individuals: orphanages, nurseries, mental asylums, leper colonies, police-supervised brothels, prisons, and hospital barracks for the retarded and addicted. Second, several carceral institutions were re-organized. For example, between 1959 and 1975, the prison system underwent four major reforms. Third, policing tactics were re-evaluated and modified. In 1957, the old internal security system was abandoned and a new police organization, the National Information and Security Organization (SAVAK) was established. Simultaneously, the National Police, which had been for a long time a military organization, was gradually "demilitarized." This "demilitarization" was "accompanied by the upgrading of the quality of the personnel, the modernization of virtually all aspects of their operations, and the doubling of the size of the force between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s."

There can be no question here of writing the account of
these different operations. I simply intend to map some of the essential techniques that most easily spread from one activity to another on a series of examples. These techniques were always minute and detailed, but they had their significance in that they defined a specific practical rationality constitutive of modern torture.

How might this rationality be distinguished? It can be characterized in the terms of the element on which procedures were applied and from which knowledge was gathered: the psyche. It can be identified in the terms of the practices employed to open the private concerns of bodies to public controls: the psychological and medical disciplines. It can be characterized in the terms of the social knowledge that were produced: human profiles or life histories of individuals. Finally, it can be distinguished in the terms of a minute circuit, the 'case file', which constitutes, simultaneously, a form of knowledge and a means of disciplinization.

The Policing of Criminals

Throughout the twentieth century, broad measures were introduced to disaggregate milieus of delinquency in Iranian society. Prostitutes were collected and confined on moral and medical grounds. Beggars and criminal gangs were arrested and relegated to supervised areas for punishment and reform. Abandoned and retarded children were gathered in order to prevent them from leading wayward lives. Addicts and mentally
abnormal individuals were quarantined for therapeutic rehabilitation.

Yet as early as the forties, it was evident that these measures neither reformed individuals nor diminished the crime rate. In fact, if carceral institutions were contributing to any process at all, this process was to maintain, augment, and produce delinquencies. There were a number of factors that ensured this production.

First, carceral institutions gathered together, in large numbers, delinquent populations. They were sites which bred promiscuity (homosexuality, prostitution, abuse of retarded children); immorality (pregnant or addicted children, married women leading lives of prostitution); and crimes (theft, murder, and the creation of juvenile gangs). Carceral institutions constituted in themselves milieus of delinquency. "Who is it that has not inspected our prisons, asylums, and hospitals, and has not felt the enormous and horrifying danger posed by these improprieties and diseases which unfit habitats and people's neglect of the "societal and municipal environment have fostered?"

Second, carceral regimes failed to reform, rehabilitate, or otherwise transform individual behaviour. In carceral institutions, authority was brutally abused through the excessive use of force. Within forced labour programs, individuals occupied the place of "slaves," a place which invariably bred resentment and resistance. They rarely received skills that would enable them to earn a living upon release. Furthermore, carceral institutions were manned by
unqualified personnel who failed to supervise and care for the destitute in their charge (nurseries, leper colonies, orphanages, and barracks) or made profits out of human misery (brothels, addict barracks, pauper asylums, and prisons). "We should not praise ourselves by saying that once upon a time Cyrus the Great conquered the whole world. In what other country can you find so many traitors, adulterers, and embezzlers all immune from punishment?"9

Third, carceral institutions professionalized delinquents. Children born into brothels and pauper asylums were likely to pursue the same activities as their parents.10 In turn, "anti-social" children "gatherd by the police in courthouses and prisons are being exposed to an enormous danger since as a result of their association with other delinquents, they will commit repeated and more serious offenses."11 Similarly, arrested students and political dissidents came into contact with a variety of other political prisoners during their imprisonment and established relationships which were utilized for later political activities.12

Fourth, incarceration created recidivists. This was especially true in the case of addicts and ex-convicts. In both cases, incarceration constituted an interruption of their socio-economic activities. Moreover, upon release, residence requirements were imposed on individuals which prohibited their movement. Lacking employment and unable to move to other areas to earn a living, individuals were constrained to live in the same environments that produced their original delinquency. Individuals were likely to engage in other criminal activities.
and circulate between institutions during the course of their lives. In this manner, the state was paying the high costs of arresting, retaining, and supporting recidivists.¹³

Fifth, incarceration impoverished families by removing the head of the family who was often the sole means of support. Consequently, the families of prisoners were frequently forced to lead lives of crime and delinquency.¹⁴ Furthermore, sometimes poor families deliberately had relatives incarcerated in order to avoid paying for their sustenance.¹⁵

All these observations, of course, presuppose that the purpose of punishment was to reduce illegalities, that the function of the law was to determine crimes, and that the objective of incarceration was to reform individuals. Yet if carceral regimes were such failures, why then were they not abandoned? Why was every criticism of incarceration coupled with a movement to re-inforce carceral institutions? One could reverse the question and ask what purposes were served by the persistent failure of carceral regimes. It might be helpful, in this respect, to consider the place of carceral regimes in the general field of illegalities.

By the mid-twentieth century, the disciplinization of Iranian society had made possible three new major illegalities. First, disciplinary training had made possible the illegal strike. Throughout the twentieth century, factory workers had been subjected to inflexible disciplinary training. The purpose of this training was to render undisciplined peasants into a productive workforce. However, disciplinization also made available a new kind of resistance, the industrial strike.
In fact, the industrial "strike" was the predicate of disciplinary training. The organization of demonstrations, the enforcement of picket lines, and the policing of strike discipline, all would not have been possible without the creation of a disciplined workforce.

Second, although paramilitary forces had managed to effectively control brigandage and tribal rebellions, their very success had precipitated the growth of well-organized smuggling operations. These operations smuggled slaves, jun., and drugs, though increasingly it was the latter that came to dominate the field. The emergence of drug smuggling operations had two major effects on modernization programs. First, drug addiction impeded modernization efforts by lowering economic productivity. For example, in 1945, the Society Against Opium and Alcohol estimated that there was a daily loss of one-half million work hours that could be directly traced to addiction. Moreover, drug smuggling cut into the state revenues collected from opium cultivation, revenues that were necessary to finance modernization. Furthermore, police efforts to crush drug smuggling and close opium dens contributed indirectly to the expansion of the black market in narcotics. This market not only exploited the needs of addicts, but, by the fifties, also "began to have a definite impact on Iran's balance of payments in that large amounts of gold were leaving the country to pay for smuggled drugs."

Finally, increased police efficiency resulted in the creation of a new political resistance: guerrilla warfare. The police's capability to crush open public protest:
the radicalization of the student movement. As one group put it:

The bloody repression of 1963 was a major watershed in Iranian history. Until then, the opposition had tried to fight the regime with street protests, labor strikes and underground parties. The 1963 bloodbath, however, exposed the bankruptcy of these peaceful methods. After 1963, militants, irrespective of their ideology, had to ask themselves the question "What is to be done". The answer was clear: "guerrilla warfare."[sic]¹⁹

One should note three features of this general scheme of illegalities. First, each illegality had important political and economic implications for modernization efforts. Second, each illegality involved linking together old isolated offenses into broad, cohesive activities. Thus, infrequent wildcat strikes were now rendered into labor movements; isolated peasant resistances in Mazanaaran province were utilized as the first base for guerrilla operations; and old tribal offenses, such as brigandage, were now organized into well-armed smuggling activities. Third, each illegality was an explicit articulation of a social struggle against the law. What was questioned was not simply the legal claim to punish the specific crime, but also the very legal claim to punish. This was even true in the case of drug smuggling operations, many of which were organized by tribes who had been subjected to intense repression or forced off the land on which they lived.

It is in the light of these illegalities that one can understand the significance of carceral regimes. In contrast to the new illegalities, carceral regimes managed to produce a specifically asocial illegality. Delinquents had little or no economic significance. They were unable or unlikely to
organize themselves into a political movement. They were rejected by established society as a subhuman class. Furthermore, unlike other criminals, delinquents could be easily supervised. The conditions imposed on their liberty enabled the police to locate and question them. They could easily be arrested, isolated, and coerced. Their constant or suspected state of criminality ensured that they would constantly be at the mercy of the police. In short, delinquency constituted an asocial, apolitical, and independent illegality. "It is obvious that, in the formulation of these rules, the aim of rendering criminals harmless (neutralisation) is more the subject of attention and supervision than the aim of reforming the behaviour and manners (re-adaptation) of criminals." 20

This is not to say, however, that delinquency was useless. Quite the contrary, delinquents turned out to have a number of utilities. First, delinquents were sometimes employed as political agents. They were organized as demonstrators on behalf of various politicians throughout the forties and fifties. They disrupted crowds of protesters in the streets. 21 They were introduced into prisons to bait political prisoners and into factories to intimidate workers. 22

Second, delinquents were utilized to infiltrate more dangerous illegal activities. For example, by 1974, police forces had managed to utilize networks of delinquent addicts so successfully that they had driven drug manufacturing operations into the countryside. 23 Similarly, between 1963 and 1979, SAVAK managed to employ student informers in such a manner as to
dismantle most radical student groups in Iranian universities.24

Third, delinquents served as mediums for indirect profiteering. They were employed to run drugs on behalf of the police and government officials. In fact, Teymour Gakhtiar, the first head of SAVAK, built a fourteen story apartment in Tehran, "which Tehranis dubbed the 'Heroin Palace', since rumors had it that it was financed by his profits from narcotics."25 Moreover, delinquents were utilized to repress and gather prostitutes in specific police-supervised brothels. In this manner, policemen managed to extract indirect profits through the exploitation of sexual pleasures. It was no accident that during the Islamic Revolution, the aggrieved prostitutes of Tehran marched in groups chanting: "Muhammad Reza, Shah-i Mai; Khahar-i Shah, Khahar-i Ma' (Muhammad Reza is our Shah; The Shah's sister is our sister).

Thus, delinquency proved to be a highly flexible device. Numerous objectives were achieved by incarcerating offenders, structuring milieus of delinquency, and permitting delinquents to circulate in society. Indeed, it is in this context that one should understand the continued existence of the government-sponsored "gray market" in drugs,26 the provision of open prisons, and the "inability or unwillingness of the authorities to curb what they [the ulama] saw as a precipitous decline in public morality."27
Consider the detention of the petty abuser of opium:

The suspect is arrested on the grounds that he possesses a small amount of opium. The police question him regarding his misdemeanour and attempt to identify the source through which he purchased the drug. The offender is then delivered to the public prosecutor who constructs a dossier on the circumstances of the arrest. This dossier is presented to the court. If the accused has been arrested previously, the dossier is accompanied with legal and, if possible, medical records of recidivism.

On the basis of these documents, the court delivers a verdict sentencing the offender to prison for a period of one to three years. He is then delivered to penal authorities for detoxification and rehabilitation. The possibility of rehabilitation is evaluated. The type, severity, and duration of the addiction are assessed. The extent of physical and psychological deterioration are determined. If the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation, he is detoxified, set to work, and where possible, encouraged to undergo therapeutic counselling. Release is determined on an evaluation of the prisoner's behaviour during the course of incarceration. If the prisoner is incapable of rehabilitation, the official drug regimen is prescribed. A card is provided which permits the addict to purchase opium at a specific dispensary.

In either case, when the prisoner is released, his prison file is not closed. Conditional liberty is granted on
the grounds that he remains in constant contact with the police and prison authorities. No probation is granted even upon demonstration of good behaviour.25

Thus, the offender moves through a multiplicity of minute proceedings. In the course of these proceedings, a dense cluster of knowledges is formed: police records, legal dossiers, medical files, therapeutic case work, and prison evaluations. These knowledges do not simply constitute a record of a misdemeanour. On the contrary, through minute interrogations, one has moved from a knowledge of a misdemeanour to the knowledge of a whole life. The offense of the petty abuser has been rendered into the psychological profile of a criminal. A whole account has become available of the factors that constitute a specific criminological pathology.

Here then was a monotonous procedure, one that was endlessly repeated for beggars, delinquents, prostitutes, and criminals. It was unravelled according to seven rules.

First, inspect and distinguish different categories of prisoners. Let separation reduce medical dangers, prevent moral improprieties, and facilitate treatment and questioning. Consequently, distinguish first offenders from recidivists; the sane from the criminally insane, the retarded, the diseased, and the malformed; the passive from those "prone to violence";36 juveniles from professional vagrants and prostitutes; petty abusers of opium from pushers, traffickers, drug magnates, and other kinds of addicts; and murderers from thieves, troublemakers, and foreign agents. "Students are
treated differently from dope smugglers, communists from
general dissidents such as writers and poets and others whose
activities are confined to the dissemination of ideas; is
distinguished from political dissidents who rob banks or kidnap
officials for political purposes."

Second, isolate the criminal behaviour. Do not question
the subject about his good deeds since these are incidental to
your interest. Examine only the factors that induce this
criminal behaviour.

Third, postulate a general source of causation. Consequently, demand a complete account of the criminal behaviour. If your subject is a delinquent beggar, solicit a history of his "problems and needs." If your subject is a juvenile, "prepare a social study of the child and his family." If your subject is a criminal, extract a full history of his illegal activities:

"What were you doing in 1953?"
"I was studying."
"Politically! What were you doing politically, you jackass?"

Fourth, identify common environmental factors that
induced an unhealthy disposition and consequently manifested
themselves in "social maladjustment." This common
environmental factor might include a profession (mendicity,
prostitution); an association (drug addicts, communists); or a
condition (a neighborhood, a childhood, a university).

Fifth, give these factors a central role in explaining
pathologization or normalization of behaviour. Trace the
mutations of a single factor into various pathological
behaviours. "Orphan abandonment, before it is an individual misfortune, is a major social problem in which the origin of many delinquencies, social failures, retardations, murders, suicides, prostitution, and psychological diseases must be sought." Subsume all other aspects of the individual's life to this factor. Render his good behaviour contingent to an explanation of his life.

Sixth, detain persons upon determination of factors leading to criminality.

According to the police report, a crowd of about three hundred persons, carrying banners and chanting slogans, was moving along a Tehran street where they allegedly "damaged public and private property." At the sound of an approaching police van, the demonstration dissolved. By the time the police arrived on the scene, the demonstrators were already widely dispersed. But crowd or no crowd, the police were determined to make arrests, so they fanned out in the neighborhood, accosting "anyone with a beard and a book," according to one eyewitness, and demanded to know the person's profession. "Student" was the answer they wanted to hear, and they eventually arrested nineteen people. The defense's contention that "all these people have been arrested simply because they are students" is supported by the fact that the police immediately released three of the nineteen who were able to prove they were not students.

Seventh, give the offender's pathological disposition a place in judicial proceedings. For example, in 1960, the General Criminal Law of the civil courts was reformed to introduce measures to deal with delinquents considered dangerous by reason of their antecedents and their personality. The law of 1960 authorized the detention of the insane in asylums, of repeated recidivists in deportation camps, of vagabonds in work camps or in agricultural colonies, of alcoholics or drug addicts in medical treatment centers, and of young delinquents in education centers.
Similarly, in 1965, members of the League of the National Movement of Iran were arrested and brought before a military court. Although "the court could not recognize the four guilty of any specific crime," it "wanted despite this to 'punish' their 'antimonarchial ideas'." In all these cases, a minute mechanism is at work, one which finds "a state of danger (a serious probability of a future offence)" in the criminal's life profile.

Thus, the criminal becomes intrinsically dangerous. This danger is determined not only through an examination of deeds, but through the identification of factors leading to a pathological disposition for criminality. In this manner, there is a shift in the objective of punitive procedures. Policemen, jurists, analysts, and prison officials are no longer simply concerned with the juridical crime (violation, felony, capital offense) or with the disciplinary non-conformity of behavior (misdemeanor, contravention), but also with the danger embedded in the pathological personality.

"We just proved you were a criminal. We don't have to go to a court to prove the already proven thing. You are a criminal. We start from there. The rest is mere ceremony."

The Carceral Clinic

The use of medical technology in carceral regimes is not a development peculiar to Iranian society. In Europe and North America, medical technology has always occupied an important place in the treatment of the incarcerated. There were at
least four areas in which medicine played, and continues to play, a major role.

First, medicine was employed to maintain the health of individuals during the course of their reformation. Second, medicine was utilized to intervene directly in the rehabilitation of individuals, such as in the case of the detoxification of addicts. Third, medicine served to neutralize abnormal or dangerous behaviour. One might cite, for example, the lobotomy or violent, mentally abnormal delinquents in asylums. Fourth, medicine was employed to execute criminals. The American electric chair, for example, brings together two sets of medical practices. On the one hand, it introduces the electric shock which was initially used in the treatment of the insane. On the other hand, it brings into play a knowledge of anatomy and neurology through the innoculation of drugs to deaden the nervous system of the condemned.

Consequently, it is not surprising that between 1910 and 1930, the growth of disciplinary institutions in Iran was coextensive with the spread of medical technology. The first Tehran prison contained, among other services, a hospital to maintain the health of prisoners. Mental asylums commonly employed electric shocks to treat patients and neutralize violent behaviour. The police rented 'Alimid-Dowleh hospital' in Tehran for the execution of criminals. The technique commonly used was "the fatal injection of an air bubble by Physician Ahmadi." In addition to these roles, medical technology acquired a further utility: to assist in the
examination and punishment of arrested suspects. Medical procedures were introduced into police interrogations. Some of these procedures, such as shock treatment, were derived directly from local asylums and hospitals. Others, such as the German weightcuff, were imported from abroad. In both cases though, the new instruments were built according to a knowledge of physiology, neurology, and anatomy.

Through these medical techniques, a new knowledge of pain was extracted from the body. This knowledge contributed to a further production of punitive technology. By the 1970s, the new penal technology included new methods such as "the gallows" where "they hang you upside down, and then someone beats you with a mace on your legs or uses the electric baton on your chest or your genitals." It also included a new range of punitive machinery such as the "hot table" and "the pressure device which imposes pressure on the skull to the extent that you tell them what they want or let your bones break into pieces." Finally, the new technology included the organization of space as a form of pain. For example, the cells of Evin prison, Tehran's most modern prison facility, were constructed according to physiological requirements. Many of the Evin cells were built to be just short of the full height of the human body. Regardless of whether the prisoner stood up or lay down, he could never completely extend himself. The cell itself constituted a punitive device. A whole science of minor pains ran along its walls.

Like all medical procedures, the new penal technology was employed to control the biological processes of life. This
control enabled the technician either to allow the body to flourish or control it until the body lay on the verge of death. "You recant and you stay alive; you don't recant and you rot or die in prison." But there was more to it since this technology could also eliminate the possibility of death: "...he was kept awake for 50 hours during his interrogation, then given a beating that led to his admission to an army hospital, where the interrogation proceeded as he lay in bed." 55

In this manner, the penal technician gained a new hold on his victim's body. He could inflict pain continuously. However, the converse was also true. Death marked the failure of a medical technology designed to manipulate and control life. No doubt this explains why throughout his detention, the victim received medical advice from his guards and torturers as to how to maintain his wounds. 56 It also explains why bodies of dead torture victims are so rarely found; such a physical testimony could be embarrassing and detract from the terror of the new punitive technology.

Thus, beneath the unrestrained, blustering violence, one finds in modern punishments the regulative principle of the operation: the imperative to maintain life at all costs. Let there be no mistake: modern punishments are articulated onto the victim through a bio-medical representation of the body not through the ceremonial requirements of justice. They are clinical, rather than ritual, tortures. As Muhammad Reza Shah put it so succinctly, modern punishments were "not the torture in the old sense of torturing people, twisting their arms, and
doing this and that. But there are intelligent ways of questioning now."

**Dispositional Effects**

Historically, in Europe, torture has been associated with the confession. As the confession came to occupy a pivotal place with the legal framework of the Latin Church, torture was increasingly valued for a specific effect, the production of a confession. Torture, it was believed, should not be employed to force an admission of guilt but, rather, to gather the specific details of a crime that could only be known to its perpetrator.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that torture is linked, in every case, with the production of confessions. In modern Iran, such confessions of the truth were rarely solicited from suspects. This is not to say that modern torture did not produce specific effects. It is only to observe that the supposed utility of torture should not be sought solely in the practice of the confession.

In fact, the effects for which torture was valued were numerous. First, torture was employed to neutralize opposition to authority. For example, prominent leaders and intellectuals were constrained to publicly recant their statements and activities on the national media. As a consequence of this recantation, they were "isolated from the mainstream of the opposition and considered a traitor."

Not only was the victim rendered harmless but his public appearance was believed to
influence the activities of his audience. His recantation incited his audience to be more self-vigilant, unobtrusive, and innocuous:

The idea of arresting and jailing persons who act against the higher interests of the State is to punish the condemned person and to make an example of him for others. If a prisoner realises his mistake, and if authorities become aware of it, he will not be kept in prison much longer.

Second, torture was used to deprive victims from protection under the law. Often a condition for release from torture was an admission of guilt to a lesser charge. The charge to which one admitted may have had little to do with reasons for detention, may not have been committed by the suspect, and may not have even occurred. Moreover, the admission of guilt did not automatically entail immediate prosecution. Usually, the victim purchased his freedom upon signing the proper forms. Yet this procedure opened new avenues of action for policing agencies. The admission of guilt made it possible to harass, blackmail, torture, discredit, detain, prosecute, or imprison the victim at some later date. It could be used to justify subsequent detention of the victim before domestic and international audiences. It also re-inforced the legitimacy of the security agencies. Without the production of crimes, it would have been difficult to justify the existence of a group of well-armed men with the exclusive right to bear arms, watch one's home and one's public activities, and torture one's relatives and acquaintances.

Third, torture served to supplement and expand the activities of policing agencies. Some victims, for example,
became informants rather than suffer further maltreatment.\textsuperscript{61} Similarly, on the same grounds, certain intellectuals assisted SAVAK in disseminating "confusionist opposition thinking" and, thereby, inciting factionalism among opposition groups.\textsuperscript{62} As Halliday remarks:

Such is the suspicion of Iranians about SAVAK and so multifarious are its forms of activity that, almost anyone who does voice protest against the government runs the risk of being suspected as a SAVAK agent. Conversely, at home and abroad, the regime encourages a climate of hostility among dissidents in which each and every one is suspicious of the other working for SAVAK. It is a very effective and insidious way of demoralizing any opposition.\textsuperscript{63}

Finally, there were the effects that followed the torture interrogation. There was the distortion of the prisoner's felt image of his body:

There are weird symptoms which, when taken in conjunction, present a picture of incipient mental disintegration. Often when I lie on my bed I feel as if my soul is separating from my body.... My limbs, my trunk and my soul float gently to the ceiling, where it coalesces and embodies itself into a shape which lodges in the corner and which starts at me, calmly, patiently and without emotion. It is my own owl, my own I. It is I staring at myself. What's more I am aware of the whole process as though there is yet another self, which watches the I staring at myself. I am a mirror bent on itself, a unity, and yet infinite multiplicity of internal reflections.\textsuperscript{64}

There was the process through which the victim's life was raised above the threshold of description and constituted as a separate body of knowledge. Through questioning, the details of the prisoner's life were solicited and gathered into a body of knowledge:

The interrogation moves on from my days as a student at the University of Istanbul, Turkey, to my military service in Tehran, to my visits to Egypt, the United States, Britain, Greece, then back again to Turkey and Tehran. The faces of my family members and
acquaintances and those of men and women I have known, be it in my private or social life, rise from the abyss of my memory and tell me, "Forget us! We've got kids and family obligations; we can't afford to lose our salaries and our jobs; we can't stand torture! We don't want to accompany you to hell!...

The name of a friend leaps to the surface almost of its own free will, invading my senses, and I try to hide the colors and the lines and the sounds. As soon as I have subdued one, another leaps up in its place, and another and another. Memory! My curses on you! I spit on you!*

There was, quite frequently, the self-imposed prohibition of communicating this knowledge. There was also the tendency to distort this body of knowledge, either by the interrogator or by the victim:

I know that I am dealing with a crisis of conscience. I am also dealing with a crisis of consciousness and the subconsciousness, be it individual or collective, familial or social. I am dealing with the distortion of faces, names, memories, languages, patterns and colors. I distort them first, then I transport them through the invisible channels of my mind into the pockets of my subconscious. I have a huge fist, a clenched fist in which everything is hidden. It has grown like an enormous tumor in my spirit, and no "doctor," including this Dr. Rezvan will be able to descend far enough to extract it or perform an autopsy...**

In short, the prisoner came to view his body, his recollections, and his self-characterizations as foreign and external to his condition. Through the interrogation, the prisoner entered into a struggle with his alienated life. Of course, the victim's condition was not a battle between an alien 'tumor' and himself. One might say rather that the problem was one of a badly beaten and poorly integrated body.

Nevertheless, these observations elucidate several features of modern torture. In the first place, it is in this context that one may understand many of the symptoms that
characterize torture victims upon release: inability to govern basic life functions, impaired memory, communication disabilities, deterioration of self-image, unsociability, introversion, anxiety, and vigilance.

Furthermore, these observations make it possible to understand the pastoral character of the torture interrogation. No longer at home in his being, the prisoner lived in a condition of dread, self-mortification, and helplessness. Consequently, the interrogator sought to assume a position of confidence and trust. He presented himself as a mediator between the victim and his condition:

"If we act according to the laws by which you say you abide, your government itself turns out to be a criminal government, and all political prisoners should be acquitted overnight and all interrogators go to prison. According to the constitution, a torturer is a criminal."

I have told him all I know of Iranian law. Dr. Sabeti suddenly gets up. He unbuttons his jacket and tries to reach out from across the table in the middle of the room to attack me. The General jumps up and puts both arms around him pleading:

"Forgive him, he is foolish, he doesn't know what he is talking about! If he were not a fool, he wouldn't be in prison in the first place!"

In essence, the interrogator said, "I am not torturing you; you are torturing yourself. I can, however, intervene on your behalf and liberate you from this unfortunate condition. But our success depends upon your co-operation." This procedure was rooted in the same practical apparatus as the psychological and medical disciplines. Indeed, its therapeutic character has continued to pose enormous difficulties in the subsequent medical treatment of torture victims:
One of the most striking difficulties recorded by therapists who have treated victims of torture is the extraordinarily degree of tact that must be used in therapeutic situations that bear even a slight surface resemblance to the original circumstances of torture. Questioning of victims must not be intensive; methods of physical therapy and medical examination must not be used if these (e.g., swimming or traction therapy, or EKG analysis) too strongly resemble the original methods of torture used. The temporary confinement in hospital quarters sometimes reminds patients involuntarily of their original confinement. Since the torture victim's only previous contact with medical personnel may have been in the place of torture itself, the medical personnel involved in rehabilitation work under this further strain and a further irregular aspect of their normal professional treatment of patients.

The pastoral character of the torture interrogation suggests an additional point. The practice of torture is interwoven with an attempt to govern the conduct of the victim. The victim was conducted (in the double sense of being led or learning to lead oneself) according to a requested norm. He was invited to recant, to admit guilt, or to co-operate. The point of torture was to achieve a dispositional effect. An attempt was made to incline the prisoner towards a certain course of action and to fix a habitual mental and/or physical disposition one could call normality.

It should be noted that such dispositional effects were, in part, voluntary. They depended upon the prisoner's acceptance of 'professional' advice and his willingness to follow the suggested course of action. Thus, a certain degree of freedom was essential to the torture interrogation and its 'follow-up' procedures.

This essential freedom posed an intractable difficulty for torturers. Prisoners could reject the advice given either through force of argument or by physical resistance.
execute the victim in such circumstances would only confirm a successful resistance. Here, then, was an ironic inversion. During the Qajar period, death marked the confirmation of the judicial process. During the Pahlavi period, death marked the failure of the penal apparatus and attested to the deceased's fortitude:

"I thought you said you would kill me."
"We don't need another stupid martyr in our history. But we can kill you at any time we want. You are always in our clutches."

The essential freedom required by torture always made possible an implicit and accessible ground for resistance. This characteristic explains why the death of torture victims was so often attributed to trivial causes: "fell out of a window," was shot "resisting arrest," or "shot while trying to escape."

On the Field of War

In the early twentieth century, internal war was waged by armies. The history of Iranian wars was primarily a history of military campaigns, maneuvers, and security operations.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, British and Russian forces controlled provincial cities, policed roads, and regulated waterways. Russian forces intervened to disarm Constitutionalist forces in northern Iran while British forces sought to disrupt arms shipments to tribes in southern Iran. British and Russian forces conducted separate military campaigns against the Jangali (Forest)
guerilla movement in the province of Gilan (1915-1919). In World War I, British and Russian forces conducted joint operations against Ottoman forces along Iran's western frontier.

In the twenties and thirties, the Iranian army assumed the responsibility of maintaining domestic order. In 1921, a Persian Cossack coup led by Col. Reza Khan assumed control of Tehran. Subsequently, the army intervened to crush provincial uprisings in Azerbaijan and Gilan. It also played a major role in disbanding religious resistance to Reza Shah's secularist legislation. Most importantly, Iranian forces conducted a series of campaigns against various tribes: the Kurds of Western Azerbaijan (1919-1920); the Shahsevan (1922); the Kuğgiluyeh (1923); the Sanjabi Kurds of Kurdistan (1923); the Baluch (1924); the Lurs (1924); the Turkmans (1925); the Kurds of Khurasan (1925); the Arab tribes of Khuzistan (1925); the Kurds of Western Azerbaijan (1926); the Lurs (1927-1928); the Haft Lang Bakhtiar (1929); the Qashqa'i (1934); and the Boir Ahmadi (1934).

In 1941, Reza Shah was ousted by British, American, and Russian forces. In the course of the Allied occupation, (1941-1946), Russian and British forces controlled various Iranian cities while American troops supervised, protected, and policed the transport of supplies and war materials to Russia. Following the Allied withdrawal, the Iranian army moved to crush provincial uprisings in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In 1953, the Iranian military, assisted by the C.I.A., intervened to re-install Muhammad Reza Shah on the throne. Between 1953
and 1957, Iran was ruled through military governors as troops arrested members of the Tuden (Masses) party and crushed labor activism wherever it appeared.

At this juncture, military intervention becomes sporadic and then almost completely disappears for two decades. The last major military operations occurred in the early sixties when Iranian forces disbanded protesters led by Shi'ite religious leaders and conducted a campaign against the Qashqa'i tribe. This interlude does not mark the dissolution of armed conflicts but, rather, the new predominance of paramilitary organizations in Iran. As one U.S. officer remarks, "after 1963, when the Shah used the army to put down street demonstrations in opposition to his 'white' revolution, internal security was relegated to a secondary role for the armed forces...Responsibility for internal security, including intelligence operations was relegated to the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie and SAVAK."73

What accounts for this sudden re-deployment of forces? The explanation lies, at least in part, in the impact of U.S. strategic thought on Iranian security strategies. In the fifties and sixties, U.S. strategic thought was concerned with the problem of communist insurgency and the means of combatting it. After the dissolution of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, particular emphasis was laid on improved police administration, well-trained police personnel, and paramilitary operations. Such improvements had been the key to succes in operations against the Huk guerrillas and, it was believed, could be effective elsewhere. In the mid-fifties, the U.S.
government created the Office of Public Safety Program which was designed to assist in upgrading policing agencies in developing countries. The rationale for this program was laid out succinctly by the U.S. Agency for International Development:

[The OPS Program] is based on the premise that, to maintain internal order, local governments depend primarily on their police and gendarmerie supported as necessary, by the army. Police constitute the first line of defense against subversion and terrorism. The earlier the police can meet such threats, the less it will cost in money and manpower and the less interruption will occur in the vital process of development. Moreover, the police are a sensitive point of contact between government and people, close to the focal points of unrest, and more acceptable than the army as keepers of order over long periods of time. The police are frequently better trained and equipped than the military to deal with minor forms of violence, conspiracy and subversion.

Through improved policing and paramilitary capabilities, state security strategies did not have to be predominantly reactive strategies. States could shift towards more pro-active strategies, modifying potential violence and inhibiting its accumulated effects.

In this context, one should not forget that internal security was among the first areas where U.S. officers came to occupy tutelary roles in Iran. In 1953, U.S. officers arrived in Iran to advise the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie. Iran was also among the first countries to receive aid through the O.P.S. program in the late fifties and, with the dissolution of the program in the early seventies, U.S. aid was re-routed through the International Narcotics Control Program of the U.S. A.I.D. In 1959, U.S. and Israeli advisers assisted in the re-organization of the Iranian secret police and the subsequent
Consequently, by the early sixties, internal security was based on an overwhelming pro-active strategy designed to localize, isolate, and neutralize opposition. Violence became a matter of minute struggles throughout the society: a migrant refusing to be marginalized, a worker refusing to be disciplined, or an upper class opposition leader refusing to recant his views publicly. Grander episodes might be a guerilla movement in Tehran or brief battles between gendarmes and tribesmen in the provinces. These struggles were carried out either by the force of arms or by force of argument, as in the case of Jalal Al-e Ahmad's attack on blind imitation of Western forms of subjectivity.

One consequence of a pro-active strategy was the emergence of modern torture. One does not have to posit hypothetical torture schools in the United States in order to explain torture in Iran. The success of a pro-active strategy depends upon advanced information and, consequently creates an enormous demand for means of procuring it. As in other kinds of warfare, a pro-active strategy induces "the seeking, at any cost, at every moment, always with the greatest urgency, of intelligence from which resulted the creation of special services and special methods of interrogations." Torture responded to this demand not because it was particularly utile or rational, but because the elements constitutive of it were immediately available and well known to correctional and police agencies.

What is remarkable about Iranian torture is that it
cannot be fully explained with exclusive reference to this priority. It is a mark of the complexity of Iranian torture that it was not governed solely by the pursuit of intelligence or by a conscious entity which directed it towards this goal.

Intelligence may have been an initial reason for resorting to torture. In the long run, however, torture became a complex social system in which forms of subjection were constituted. One might distinguish three features of this complex. There were the discourses that characterized communication between actors, that is, the kinds of questions and answers, the marks that assigned different values to beings, and the signs of obedience and understanding. These discourses included psychiatric and medical reports, judicial instructions, penological programs, rehabilitation schedules, and military regulations. There were the actions which worked upon the conduct of persons, including those who tortured: hierarchies, rewards and punishments, and panoptic surveillance. There were the particular dispositional effects achieved: co-optation, neutralization, or de-politicization.

The complex interrelationships between these elements is an account of what people do and why they do it when they torture or are tortured. It describes a practical rationality that characterizes a torture complex. A torture complex is also a practice, a way of acting upon oneself or others. More specifically, it is a way of fixing norm-governed behavior and normalizing forms of subjectivity. It is in the light of this system of subjection that one can understand the full range of resistances that appeared in late twentieth century Iran.
These resistances were not merely struggles against the state, but also rebellions against forms of normalization.

A second consequence of a pro-active strategy was a re-orientation of the military. As the military was increasingly released from internal security matters, its development and expansion was oriented towards foreign policy issues. Its principal concerns lay in the strategic situation among nations in the area: the Soviet threat, confrontations with Iraq, and communist insurgency in Oman.

This observation is crucial for understanding why a notorious secret police and an immense army proved to be impotent in the face of mass protests during the Islamic Revolution. In the case of paramilitary agencies, a pro-active security strategy placed little emphasis on combatting organized resistance once it had emerged. Security arrangements could fail if various resistances coalesced too quickly, could organize more effectively, or could mobilize more people that the security forces could handle. It was precisely these factors that overwhelmed SAVAK and other agencies in the fall of 1978. As a result of their enormous expansion during the sixties and seventies, religious institutions could organize isolated resistances more quickly than ever before. Moreover, Ayatollah Khomayni's intransigent opposition to the Shah provided a focus around which various opposition groups could coalesce. Khomayni tactfully arranged alliances with nationalist parties, guerilla groups, and factions within the Shi'ite foundations and schools.

Simultaneously, when the Shah turned to the military to
repress street demonstrations, the army proved incapable of doing so. Due to its re-direction in the previous decades, "the military had lost whatever capability for effective internal security it had possessed." Hickman analyses the results of this deterioration succinctly:

This outward orientation meant that weapons and training for domestic disturbances were not emphasized. Without these essential weapons and necessary training, when the military was ordered to break up the mass revolutionary demonstrations, it responded with disproportionate force. The casualties sustained from the lethal weapons employed fueled the crisis by providing martyrs and touched off a cycle of increasing violence and repression.

The defeat of the Shah's forces was not due to any technical failure. This defeat only points to what von Clausewitz calls "friction," the irreducible element of change in conditions of warfare. It is this element of friction that distinguishes real war from wars fought on paper. Policing, paramilitary, and military organizations had been prepared to fight under specific conditions and according to specific plans. However, the change in the character of resistances and the conditions of battle altered these ideal strategies and tactics. By a twist of chance, the strengths of Iranian security agencies suddenly proved to be deadly weaknesses.
FOOTNOTES


3Levasseur, p. 70.

4Ibid., p. 67.

5Nyrop, p. 371.


7Saliqi, cited by Nasir id-Din Sahib oz-Zamani, Javani-yi-Pur-Ranj [Suffering Youth], with Short Versions in English and German (Tehran: 'Ata'i, 1344 [1965]), p. 325.

98-99.


10Prigmore, pp. 98-99.


14McLaughlin and Quinn, p. 498.

15Prigmore, p. 94.

16McLaughlin and Quinn, p. 488.

17Ibid., p. 489.

18Ibid., p. 497.


23 McLaughlin and Quinn, p. 512.


26 McLaughlin, p. 742; McLaughlin and Quinn, pp. 505, 514.


29 McLaughlin, pp. 751-753.

30 McLaughlin and Quinn, pp. 493, 507.


32 Priage, p. 99; McLaughlin, p. 748; McLaughlin and Quinn, p. 508.

33 Levasseur, pp. 68-69.

34 McLaughlin and Quinn, p. 503.

35 Nyrop, p. 384; Levasseur, p. 69.

36 Levasseur, p. 67.

Two Reports by William J. Butler, Esq., and Professor
Georges Levasseur (Geneva: International Commission of

*Prigmore, p. 98.

*Ibid., p. 95.

*Dr. Rezvan, *SAWAK* interrogator, cited by Reza
Baraheni, *The Crowned Cannibals: Writings on Repression
in Iran*, with an Introduction by E.L. Doctorow (New York:

*Vreeland, p. 276.

*2 Nasir id-Din Saheb oz-Zamani, *Kitab-i Ruhi-i Bashar*
[1964]), pp. 94-95.

*3 Helmut Richards, "Carter's Human Rights Policy and the
Pahlavi Dictatorship," in Ali-Reza Nobari, ed., *Iran Erupts*
(Stanford, CA: The Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978),
pp. 91-92.

*4 Levasseur, p. 51.

*5 Dott. Giancarlo-Lannutti, observer for the Italian
Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, cited by
Butler, p. 9.

*6 Levasseur, p. 51.

*7 Dr. Parviz Sabeti, *SAWAK* official, cited by Baraheni,
p. 192.

*8 Between 1935 and 1955, over 70,000 lobotomies were
performed in the U.S. and England. Carol Ackroyd, et al.,
*The Technology of Political Control* rev. 2nd ed. (London:

*9 Just how common was revealed by a 1960 study of an
Isfahan mental hospital which revealed that electric shocks
were used a total of 1,163 times in the course of a year for a
This instrument was constructed originally by the SS to facilitate interrogations and was introduced into Iran by Nazi advisers. The technique consisted of cuffing the hands behind the back in such a manner as to put pressure on the shoulderbones, especially, the clavicle. It replaced another German method which employed a triadic stool to achieve the same effect. The weightcuff has been widely-distributed since its invention due to its economical size and cost.

Baraheni, p. 42.

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Ibid.

Ibid., p. 196.

Ibid., p. 196.

The Times, 6 January 1969, cited by Butler, p. 11.

Baraheni, pp. 149, 164-165.

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Baraheni, pp. 149, 164-165.

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., pp. 63-64.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., p. 187.
63Ibid., pp. 81-82.

64Albie Sachs, *The Jail Diaries of Albie Sachs*; cited by Ackroyd et al., p. 239.

65Baraheni, p. 175.

66Ibid., pp. 175-176.

67Ibid., p. 198.


69Baraheni, p. 198.

70Butler, p. 7.

71Halliday, p. 89.

72Ibid., p. 88.


78Halliday, p. 84. This is not to rule out the possibility that U.S. advisers have taught or participated in torture. There is some strong evidence that points to this conclusion. The chief CIA analyst on Iran from 1968-1973, Jesse Leaf, has provided the most damaging testimony in this regard:

Mr. Leaf also said in the interview that he and his colleagues knew of the torture of Iranian dissenters by Savak.... Furthermore, "a senior CIA official was involved in instructing officials in the Savak on torture techniques, although Mr. Leaf said that to his knowledge, no American did any of the torturing. The CIA torture seminars, Mr. Leaf said, "were based on German torture techniques from World War II"....

Mr. Leaf said that because of the CIA's complacency about the Shah, no one considered protesting about the Savak's use of torture. "Why should we protest? We were on their side, remember?"

Although the Iranian use of torture was widely known inside the agency, Mr. Leaf said, he knew of no Americans who admitted that they witnessed such treatment. "I do remember seeing and being told of torture. And I know that the torture rooms were toured and it was all paid for by the U.S.A." (Seymour M. Hersh, "Ex-Analyst Says CIA Rejected Warnings on Shah," *The New York Times* (7 January 1979), p. 3.)

Chomsky and Herman caution against overemphasizing the U.S. origins of modern tortures and draw attention instead to the extensive moral and technical support for "the widespread adoption of torture as an administrative practice by client fascist states." See Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, Vol. 1: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979), p. 49. Historically, modern tortures have proven to be adaptable to too many different regimes (including radically different Iranian regimes) for them to be attributed to a single source such as the U.S. or Germany. What is particularly troubling about such attributions is the way in which they sometimes serve to cover up for any precise historical analysis. It could be argued that, behind such reductionist arguments, there is a general refusal to consider the relation modern tortures bear to the rationalities that govern modern life.

79 Alec Mellor, cited by Peters, p. 106.

80 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 433.

81 Hickman, p. 3.

82 Ibid., p. 3.

There is a conventional account of torture in the early post-revolutionary period. It goes something like this:

During the Islamic Revolution, the issue of torture was a rallying point for opposition against the Imperial government. With the collapse of the government in February 1979, a period of popular justice ensued. Crowds stormed the prisons and many prisoners, political and otherwise, were released. Angry mobs seized and executed torturers on the spot. For a period, torture ceased in Iranian prisons. Then, three years later, the government took repressive measures against the political opposition and, especially, leftist forces. By September 1981, as deadly battles were being fought on the streets, torture was resumed in Iranian prisons.

This account of recent events overlooks three features of the immediate post-revolutionary period.

The Marginalization of Popular Justice

Throughout the month of February 1979, a "large number" of people were seized by crowds and publicly flogged for the consumption of alcohol. It is possible, in these cases, to point to the particular moralism at work or the brutality of the mob. There is, however, another issue that
is raised by these events: why was it that popular justice was so oblique? Why was it that, in the wake of the revolution, major officials were so rarely selected for justice by the crowd?

It is well known that members of the Imperial government were said to be guilty of "corruption on earth." There is, in this characterization, an assertion or self-approbation. To level the charge of corruption is to imply one's own lack of corruption, that is, one's decency and integrity. There is also the assertion of privilege. Since many of the accused insisted that they were innocent, it must also be the case that they were hypocrites. Since dissimulators cannot speak the truth, they must be spoken for by those competent in differentiating truth from appearance. Only through a discerning judgment could the corruption and inhumanity of former officials be fully revealed. Most of all, there was, in these characterizations, a profound fear. If criminals go unnamed and, consequently, unprosecuted, then spontaneous justice would ensue. This was a "danger which is worse than the danger of the previous regime." It would shatter the privilege of those authorized to speak about the truth. This elementary discursive act, the naming of a criminal, in turn, served as "a bridge" on popular justice. As Ayatollah Khomayni frankly observed on 26 April: "If the Revolutionary Courts did not prosecute them, the people would have gone on a rampage and killed them all."

It is often said that charges such as "corruption on earth" were so vague as to permit any action to be counted as
an excuse for severe punishment by revolutionary tribunals. It is also the case, however, that these same terms functioned to exclude, rather than grant license, to the populace. They gave profundity to the actions of religious judges and stability to the fragile revolutionary courts that appeared throughout the country. In the elementary act of constituting a criminal, popular justice was ipso facto ruled out and the authority of the revolutionary tribunals entrenched. Popular justice was a homogeneous, spontaneous event; it lacked the discerning judgment, the techniques of interpretation, and tests of authenticity that were required to bring out the horrific crimes of the important prisoners.

From the outset of the revolution, consequently, popular justice was almost completely marginalized. Members of the Imperial government were said to be so inhuman that popular justice could not impose adequate retribution. It is for this reason that, very early on, conflicts arose between the local populace and the revolutionary tribunals. It is also in this context that one can understand why the populace turned to the most trivial of offenders: SAVAK informers, prostitutes, homosexuals, adulterers, alcoholics, conscripted soldiers and local policemen. Through a minute sleight of discourse, the real targets of their anger were already beyond their reach.
The Adaptation of Pre-Revolutionary Procedures

It is often forgotten that the arrest of members of the Imperial government began under the last Imperial officials. In September 1979, Premier Sharif-Emami not only released political prisoners, but also began a well-advertised campaign against prominent figures who were alleged to be "thajis." Several officials and military officers were dismissed and Mr. Yazdani, a wealthy entrepreneur, was charged with grand larceny. In November, General Azhari ordered the release of more political prisoners and, simultaneously, arrested 112 former government leaders including former Premier Khoeyyda and General Nassiri, the head of SAVAK. In January 1979, Premier Bakhtiar released more prisoners and ordered the arrest of more former ministers, promising to hang "those convicted of the most flagrant violations." On February 10, Mehdi Najarian referred to "several hundreds of civil servants and senior officials" already under arrest or banned from leaving the country. This number increased considerably as many more former civil servants were placed under house arrest, prohibited from leaving the country, or unofficially detained by the Revolutionary Guards, local Revolutionary Committees, and other groups.

It should be observed that, throughout this period, many of those detained were identified not by any specific crime, but due to their prominence in the past history of the regime. This practice of identifying the criminal rather than the crime not only persisted in the area of detention, but
also in the new revolutionary legal procedure. Examine, for instance, the judicial procedures of the revolutionary tribunals.

Usually, an investigator was assigned to the case with "the duty of building up the case file." The investigator gathered documents and interviewed witnesses. A recommendation was then made as to whether prosecution should result. "The decision whether or not to draw up an indictment seems in most cases effectively to be a determination of guilt or innocence rather than whether or not there is a case to answer." If, on the basis of the case file, there was disagreement as to whether criminality had been established, the revolutionary tribunal ruled on the matter.

Upon the determination of guilt, the tribunal summoned the offender to court by public notice in the press or issued a warrant for his arrest. Following detention, an informal interrogation was conducted at the Revolutionary Committee headquarters or at the prison where the offender was detained. The questioning was informal, occasionally, notes were taken and passed on to the investigator. These notes were only of "secondary" importance. The primary material was gathered in a formal interrogation conducted by the investigator. The case file was then submitted to the revolutionary tribunal. The criminal was brought before the court, the case file was reviewed, and a sentence was passed.

The central device in revolutionary justice, in other words, was the case file. Its contents did not constitute evidence of a crime. Rather, they constituted a determination
of criminality. Through the case file, criminality was fixed.

There should be no objection to the trial of these people because they are criminals—and it is known that they are criminals. These are not people charged with crime, they are criminals. The objective of the trial, consequently, was to set forth the truth about the criminal, not to determine the guilt of the accused.

This court is not trying you [former Premier Mozeyda]. It is trying the system you are a representative of, an executor of.

You [Lt. Gen. Kashani] are being tried in this court as a criminal, not as an accused.

The trial of the prisoner was, in this respect, a formality. As Ayatollah Khomeini put it: "We try these people according to documents, but our objection is that criminals should not be tried. They should be killed." Quite logically, it was unnecessary to grant an "automatic right for a defendant adequately to cross-examine witnesses or to be told the source of the evidence against him."

The revolutionary tribunals, therefore, were not trials held under 'extraordinary conditions' 'like wartime' trials acting under their own rules and regulations. On the contrary, the revolutionary tribunals were well in the tradition of Iranian legal practice, operating with roughly the same procedures as those practised in Normal Military Courts under the Imperial Government. Not surprisingly, since orthodox religious leaders were trained to ascertain deeds rather than to evaluate personalities, they found this mode of judicial operation alien and questionable. On 13 May, Ayatollah Shariat-Madar, for instance, asserted that "persons
who were forced to earn a living by having contact with the previous regime should not be convicted on these grounds alone." More interesting, perhaps, was Ayatollah Azari Qomi's remark on 3 July that the delay in handling cases before the tribunals was due to "the reluctance of judges to officiate in the revolutionary courts."  

One might add that revolutionary tribunals not only adopted pre-revolutionary judicial procedures, but also observed pre-revolutionary procedures in the execution of punishment. The execution of capital punishment was done not through ritual penal torture, but through the firing squad or on the gallows. Most other offenders were punished by incarceration. In some cases, flogging, either on the whipping post or the bastinado, was also employed, and although this practice was not acknowledged by Iranian law, it was a common punishment in Iranian prisons under the Shah.

In short, in the post-revolutionary period, there was a reversal of positions. Those who were detained, tried, and punished were now those who identified, evaluated, and sentenced. Nevertheless, the procedures of identification, evaluation, and sentencing remained the same.

The Persistence of Torture

Despite the abolition of SAVAK in Spring 1979, torture was practised in Iranian prisons in the aftermath of the revolution. On 21 May 1979, in a letter to the Islamic Revolutionary Council, Ayatollah Tabatabai Qomi complained
that "unjust" and "unwarranted" tortures" were being administered to prisoners "even after they had been found not guilty." In May 1981, the official government Torture Probe Commission concluded that, in the period between December 1980 and May 1981, "certain exceptional cases of torture were observed in some of the prisons." An American journalist detained in Evin prison also observed that torture was practiced in Evin prison and elsewhere between July, 1980 and February 1981. Months before the outbreak of factional warfare, one despondent prison guard bitterly complained, "they've ruined the revolution - they've arrested too many people, they've tortured and executed too many people." Consequently, the belief that the factional warfare of 1981 triggered the re-appearance of torture is an implausible story. While the incidence of torture increased in this period, the earlier reports of the death of torture have been greatly exaggerated. Equally implausible is the belief that torture was re-instituted early in the revolutionary period by a new centralized security and intelligence ministry entitled SAVAMA. This ministry was said to employ former SAVAK officials and, by implication, to be responsible for torture in Iranian prisons. There is, however, little "hard evidence" that this organization exists or that if it does, it is of any importance.

The conventional account of the early revolutionary period is a fairy tale - a tragic but, nevertheless, fantastic story. From the outset, popular justice was marginalized, procedures
of the ancient regime were adapted, and torture was practiced. The common procedural and mechanical elements through which the torture complex operated were modified and deployed in the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. While it is, I think, possible to argue that factional warfare provided an important impetus towards the systematization of modern torture, it is a fiction to believe that somehow torture ceased.

Yet there is no question that, in the post-revolutionary period, there was strong opposition to torture. In spring 1979, leading ulama issued proclamations prohibiting torture and arbitrary punishment, including Ayatollah Sharabyani (17 February); Ayatollah Khomayni (18 February); Ayatollah Shariat-Madari (24 February); Ayatollah Shirazi (6 March); Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani (8 March); Ayatollah Taleghani (24 May); and Ayatollah Khomayni (24 June). On 3 July, the provisional government stated that "torture and cruel treatment were prohibited under Iranian law and any violation was punishable under Articles 131, 132, and 136 of the penal code." In autumn 1979, torture "for the purpose of extracting confessions or gaining information" was prohibited under Article 38 of the new Iranian Constitution. Among the newly elected parliamentary representatives, there was also strong resistance "to legislation in Majlis [Parliament] to create an Intelligence Ministry" to replace SAVAK. In December 1980, Ayatollah Khomayni ordered the creation of a Torture Probe Commission to investigate reports of torture. In April 1981, two venerable ayatollahs of the Mashad hierarchy issued a
proclamation, pointing out that "torture, arbitrary trials, confiscation of private property are all against Islam's precepts. Islamic courts are staffed by corrupt and cruel individuals." In December 1982, Ayatollah Khomeini once again sharply criticized "the courts and komitehs [Revolutionary Committees] for their excesses in arrests, executions, and invasion of privacy." What then accounts for the persistence of torture? How did torture continue despite religious prohibitions and popular opposition? What were the factors that maintained its routinization?
FOOTNOTES


3Ibid., p. 42.

4Amnesty International, p. 85.

5Ibid., pp. 41, 42.


7Amnesty International, p. 18.

8Ibid., p. 49.

9Ibid., p. 48.

10Ibid.


13Ibid., p. 63.

42.

15 Amnesty International, p. 44


18 Ayatollah Azari Qomi, cited by Amnesty International, p. 56.

19 For a complete list of punishments prescribed by the Revolutionary Tribunals in the early revolutionary period, see Amnesty International, pp. 138-139.

20 Ayatollah Tabataba'i Qomi, cited by Amnesty International, p. 54.


23 Prison guard at Evin Prison, cited by Dwyer, p. 284.


26 In an interview of August 1981, former President
Bani-Sadr was asked whether SAVAMA existed and if General Fardust, the former head of the Imperial Inspectorate, was directing it. Bani-Sadr replied, "People have told me this... I do not know if Fardust is really running SAVAMA. It does exist but it is not so important; it is mainly staffed by old SAVAK officials concerned with external intelligence and counter-intelligence." It has, he added, no "internal functions." Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, "I defeated the ideology of the regime," MEHR_Reports, 12:3 (March-April 1982), p. 6.


28Ibid.

29Sciolino, p. 900.

30Sepehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution (London: Croon Helm, 1982), p. 79.

PART II

TUTELAGE AND TORTURE
CHAPTER VII

THE DEFENSE OF SOCIETY

Refusing to question the Gulag on the basis of the texts of Marx or Lenin or to ask oneself how, through what error, deviation, misunderstanding or distortion of speculation or practice, their theory could have been betrayed to such a degree. On the contrary, it means questioning all these theoretical texts, however, old, from the standpoint of the reality of the Gulag. Rather than of searching in those texts for a condemnation in advance of the Gulag, it is a question of asking what in those texts could have made the Gulag possible, what might even now continue to justify it, and what makes its intolerable truth still accepted today. The Gulag question must be posed not in terms of error (reduction of the problem to one of theory), but in terms of reality...

We must insist on the specificity of the Gulag question against all theoretical reductionisms (which make the Gulag an error already to be read in texts), against all historicist reductions (which make the Gulag a conjunctural effect which can be isolated in terms of its causes), against all utopian dissociations (which would set it, with 'pseudo-socialism', in opposition to socialism 'itself'), against all universalizing dissolutions into the general form of internment. These operations all serve the same role (and they are none too many for the accomplishment of so difficult a task): to preserve the currency among us of a leftist discourse whose organizing principles remain unchanged.

Michel Foucault

In 1964, a text was published in Tehran entitled *The Defense of Society Against Crime and the Criminal*. The defense of society, it was asserted, turned on three "apparati": the reform and cultivation of persons through religious and secular rules or conduct; the discipline of
criminals through punishment, and preventative security measures, and the transformation of the material life of the population through economic development. Consequently, it concluded, "the defense of society is complete and rendered effective only when all these apparati of government including religious, judicial, cultural, economic and the like, completely and with the utmost synchronicity, perform their duties with meticulousness and zeal."

The emphasis in the passage is on the art of governing society. Government, in the broadest sense, is to fix a power relation that induces habitual subjection. Various apparati, that is, various constellations of actions work upon other actions to secure a certain behaviour. One is led or learns to conduct oneself with a certain disposition and, simultaneously, to find this conduct fulfilling.

Moreover, this passage enumerates three sets of practices through which government was achieved in modern Iran. First, there were the disciplines of public life: the drills that functioned as punishment but also as training, work, education, policing, and fighting. Second, there were the disciplines of material life: the bio-technologies characteristic of resource management, medical treatment, and also modern torture. Third, there were the disciplines of private life: the discrete policing that reformed corrupt behaviour and effected good habits.

This latter practices are what I shall call tutelary practices. Tutelage describes the forms of supervision that were concerned with child care, welfare, and, in general, the
physico-moral care of bodies. In the course of the twentieth
century, tutelary practices appeared in several areas of
Iranian society. They were introduced into families through
therapeutic counseling, pediatric manuals, and hygienic
instruction. They clustered about institutions in the form of
welfare bureaucracies, social services, community welfare
networks, and charitable activities. They moved about at large
through societies concerned with the dangers of drug addiction,
alcoholism, child neglect, delinquency, mendicity, and
excessive population growth.

In contrast to other disciplines, tutelage may appear to
be an innocuous activity. Nevertheless, its significance lies
in the fact that it has played three roles in modern Iranian
politics. First, tutelage came to play an important role in
the making of the modern Iranian working class. Second,
tutelage provided the vehicle through which resistances against
the Imperial government were successfully organized. The
Islamic Revolution was born on the practices of discipline and
tutelage. Third, tutelage became a major modality through
which 'the defense of society' was effected in the
post-revolutionary period. Nowhere is this change more
apparent than in the field of policing, where tutelary
supervision comes to support the cultivation of disciplinary
habits, and in the domain of carceral detention, where tutelage
accompanies and supports the practice of torture.

To trace the lineage of tutelary practices, I begin with
their humble appearance in the field of family welfare. More
specifically, I examine the manner in which tutelage responded
to a major social crisis in mid-twentieth century Iran: massive, uncontrolled urbanization with its concomitant effect of social 'corruption'.
FOOTNOTES


2 Ibid.
CHAPTER VIII

A SOCIAL QUARANTINE

There are currently several different accounts of the modernization of Iran during the twentieth century. Despite this diversity, however, it is generally agreed that the modernization of Iran was characterized by an increasing political capacity to intervene in the area of health, agriculture, and economic well-being. It is also agreed that this direct political intervention at the level of life initiated important demographic changes in Iranian society. The rapid growth of the Iranian population was certainly the most evident effect of this bio-political intervention. New policing operations improved transportation networks for the movement of goods and perishables; instituted better diets and nutritionary habits in urban areas; increased control over hazardous and unsanitary spaces; and corrected malaria-infested and other disease-ridden environments. All of these activities significantly lowered the mortality rate of the Iranian population. In turn, the combination of a persistently high birth rate and a decreasing, but still high, mortality rate precipitated a rapid growth in population. Indeed, between 1934 and 1965, the population of Iran doubled from 13.32 million to 26.40 million.

Direct bio-political intervention also initiated a major shift in the pattern of population movements.
Population patterns in modern Iran increasingly reflected "the influence of central government and private entrepreneurs, by their investment decisions, upon the distribution and characteristics of the population." Public and private investment in socio-economic facilities created an "acute imbalance" between different geographic regions. While several cities were favored by rapid industrialization and modernization, numerous other regions were neglected and impoverished. In tribal areas, the state's policy of forced settlements "did not produce peasants," as was hoped, "only starving tribesmen." In villages, "the overall effect of the government's various agricultural policies was to increase the difficulties most peasants experienced in trying to make a livelihood from their landholdings." Similarly, the industrialization of Tehran and other major cities occurred at the expense of numerous smaller towns.

These various regional imbalances induced a redistribution of populations. From 1934 onwards, rural-urban migration proceeded at an annual rate of 6-7 percent. Several urban areas fared no better. From 1900-1956, urban migration constituted 61 percent of all internal population movements. Of the 100 cities extant in 1900, 13 "dropped out of the urban category by losing population" by 1956. Major industrial cities and towns, by contrast, underwent a process of rapid urbanization.

This urbanization involves "the abrupt, unplanned, and uncontrolled influx of young migrants into the cities," the formation of "slums and squatter settlements," and the
proliferation of "poverty, ill health, child neglect, crime, addiction and other social problems." It also involved the emergence of protected enclaves within Iranian cities. This pattern of spatial segregation was especially pronounced in Tehran.

The city of Tehran is also interesting in this respect that it has brought into existence about itself a number of small satellite cities such as Narmak and Julkum so that portions of its overwhelming population may be transferred to them. Likewise, each of these satellite cities is more or less specifiable as the residence of a class or classes.

More specifically, distinct residential areas emerged for the upper classes in the northern part of the city. In the seventies, satellite cities emerged for the modern working class as well.

Many of the major industrial developments have associated housing programmes and it is clear that a far higher standard of social facilities have been provided than in both the traditional core and new housing areas within the city.

It is often stressed that this arrangement indicated inequalities in income and status, inequalities that had major implications for Iranian politics. Less emphasis is placed on the fact that coextensive with these developments, there emerged a new kind of social quarantine. This quarantine was composed of three distinct social regimes: a regime of enforced marginalization aimed at migrant families; a regime of guarded liberation characteristic of wealthy families; and a regime of supervised freedoms directed at middle and working class families. In this respect, the pattern of spatial segregation in urban areas was only the most visible manifestation of a specific social economy of bodies.
In 1979, an Iranian journalist asked a squatter from the South City Pits, "What is your most important problem?" The squatter replied bitterly:

Our total life is a problem. From the moment we recognized ourselves, we had nothing but problems. Look at the present situation. Now they say that the old regime is gone and the hands of the exploiters and oppressors are cut off, but my problem, and that of thousands of other squatter families, is lack of jobs and living quarters. I have had no income for the past year. I have eaten whatever I had. There is no food for tomorrow. Believe me, I don't know how I am going to live tomorrow.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Iranian migrant poor were excluded from any security, status, or economic well-being. Several factors ensured this condition of constant exclusion.

First, employment requirements for the modern sector of the economy excluded urban migrants. Government and private organizations insisted on a certain level of educational and technical training. The migrant poor frequently did not possess these skills.

Second, children of migrants who did seek educational training were frequently discriminated against within the educational system. Those children who did manage to attend good public schools were usually redirected towards poorer facilities that were deemed more "suited" for them.

Third, unskilled laborers who had secured jobs in small labor-intensive firms sought to exclude other urban migrants. Owners of these small firms "recruited virtually all of their unskilled and semi-skilled workers from among applicants appearing at the factory gates, most of whom had been informed
by friends and relatives working in the factory that new workers were being hired. This exclusion of non-related urban migrants not only ensured the accumulation of wealth within the family, but also served as a status distinction:

The industrial working class identifies himself [sic] as a worker, and makes a sharp distinction between his class and the traditional working class (artisans) and lumpenproletariat. To make this distinction clear, instead of the three-class terminology used by the upper classes, they usually use a four-class terminology, and thus identify themselves with the members of the third class, while identifying the lumpenproletariat with the fourth class.

Fourth, migrants who resorted to state placement programs were rarely hired since employers believed that the state-sponsored applicants were "mostlly workers who have been sacked by other factories" or "could not get work on their own." Fourth, migrants who resorted to state placement programs were rarely hired since employers believed that the state-sponsored applicants were "mostlly workers who have been sacked by other factories" or "could not get work on their own." 20

Fifth, local municipalities failed to assist the poor. The migrant poor rarely had any access to municipal organizations or polling booths. Their political support was usually deemed "immaterial." Moreover, state-sponsored publications chastised the migrant poor "for their deceitfulness and their preference for a life of equality." This argument not only justified the absence of public assistance but also licensed police harassment and extortion of migrant families.

Sixth, the migrant poor did not have access to mosques and, consequently, could not establish themselves within religious patronage networks. Furthermore, persons who did resort to Islamic charity programs found themselves being screened, excluded, and condemned for their immorality.
The clerk explained that there were two kinds of people: those who were really needy, often not even pressing their legitimate claims, were good people; then there were those, like this man, who ran their troubles as a kind of business and even would use children as a way to extract money.23

These various practices, of course, did not constitute a single system. Moreover, they were not necessarily introduced in order to divide the migrant poor from urban society. However, the overall effect of these practices was to systematically exclude the migrant poor. They induced a condition of perpetual need within migrant families. Largely as a result of this, the migrant poor were unable to establish self-help associations and remained apolitical throughout the twentieth century. Even during the Islamic Revolution (1978-1979), "their pre-occupation with the immense problems of day to day survival was far too great to permit sustained anti-regime activities."24 As one squatter succinctly put it, to demonstrate, "you have to have a full stomach."25

Thus, despite their increased income in urban areas, the migrant poor were constrained to live in slums and shanty towns. These sites, in turn, "produced a vast social problem with its typical symptoms - prostitution, alcoholism, drug addiction, delinquency, suicides, and, of course, a crime wave."26 It was not an accident that the migrant poor could be easily characterized as "unproductive,"27 "stupid,"28 and 'filthy'.29 Numerous dividing practices ensured that they would always be associated with criminals, delinquents, and other carriers of medical and "social diseases."30 Their social inadequacy was persistently attested to "by" their
socio-economic position as underclass, by their political position as nonparticipant, and by their status position as nonprivileged. This characterization of the poor as social pollution turned out to have important political utility. This characterization justified the introduction of a variety of practices to protect respectable families from social disease. It facilitated the creation of a host of social programs designed to preserve working class families from social corruption. It permitted religious leaders to institute new controls for ensuring proper morality in traditional neighborhoods and campaigns for cleaning the streets of the "unseemly social filth."

Thus, a twofold maneuver was at work. On the one hand, large segments of the poor were excluded and constituted as social delinquents. On the other hand, a whole series of procedures were introduced to guard, supervise, and preserve established urban society. The marginal supervision of the squatter settlements and slums was coupled with an intensified control of other urban areas.

This arrangement, however, was mobile and tenuous. The migrant poor were well aware of the forces that ensured their constant exclusion and social delinquency. In fact, they frequently resisted the "legal violence" directed at them. Migrants would avoid state programs that broke apart their familial and communal ties. They refused to abandon their homes during state demolition campaigns and, in some cases, resorted to physical protests.
They destroyed my home last spring. I was furious and wanted to attack them but my brother physically restrained me. I went and poured kerosene over my head and lit a match. Everybody gathered together and tried to put the fire out. I spent five months in a hospital and have no energy left....Now I sift dirt here and make a living selling it. The Municipality officers bother me. But ever since my self-immolation attempt, they say "don't go near him, he'll burn himself."36

In this manner, the lines of quarantine would be modified by points of resistance:

It is, of course, true that the migrant poor had other political and economic utilities. The migrant poor did provide some labour for the "informal sector" of the economy.37 Moreover, they did serve as political tools for factory owners and politicians. Migrants were occasionally organized into "yellow unions" during periods of worker radicalism.38 It is also well known that Mohammad Meza Shah was re-instituted on the throne with the assistance of a crowd of chayukeshan, cut-throats, and members of the "poorest of the poor."39 However, this direct political utility was small and infrequent. It was the presence, rather than the participation, of the migrant poor that turned out to be the most productive element of regimes of enforced marginality.

Defending Children

Early in the 1950s, a minute discourse emerged in medical and pedagogical literature that privileged the child. This line of argument concerned "the defense of children."40 Children, or at least children of respectable families, were being exposed to serious physical and moral hazards, hazards
which jeopardized not only their individual well-being, but also the welfare and stability of Iranian society.

Children were endangered on several fronts. First, they had become objects of numerous perverse desires spawned by urbanization; urban migration had increased the number of young men in large cities and had created an imbalance in the ratio of young men to young women. This disproportionate ratio, during the most critical years of adolescence, for a city of 2 million; (and) from the perspective of the "accumulation of frustrated sexual energy," must be understood as a behavioural and medical danger. Under such conditions, the prostitute market will flourish quickly, due to numerous sexual solicitations. Behavioural foundations in areas dealing with sexual and matrimonial problems will become subject to abnormalities and laxities.

Among these laxities and abnormalities, there was the sudden emergence of groups of youths intent on carousing and delinquent behaviour; the increase of sexual promiscuity among urban youths "especially in the higher segments of society"; the rise of perversions among lower class youths which "are manifested in sexual crimes" such as homosexuality, rape, and prostitution; and the increased incidence of children born outside of marriage to the younger generation which "endangered the ancient customs of the family." These sociological problems rendered neighborhoods unsafe for children. Unsupervised children passing through city streets were now more than ever before in potential danger of delinquency, rape or perversion.

Second, children were being stimulated into excessive (sexual frenzy. Modern society was hastening the sexual
maturity of children. Radio, films, and books were inducing greater sexual awareness among young children. The "physical and sexual growth" of young children was no longer on par with their "rational and emotional maturity." Consequently, children were now more prone to engage in improper sexual activities. The increase of juvenile delinquency, remarked one criminologist, can be linked to "the appearance of modern civilization through films, theatre, evil magazines and television programs...each of which constitutes an academy for corruption and a school of criminality for innocent children." One child psychologist went so far as to recommend that children must not see any romantic material that "stimulates the emotions and enters into their thought" and suggested that children be permitted to see only those films that concern nationalism, science, and hygiene.

Third, this delicate situation was being aggravated by lower class mothers who failed to socialize their children properly. In a pediatric manual aimed particularly at "the second and third class," mothers were warned that the sexual perversions of puberty can be directly linked with improper maternal care in earlier periods of childhood.

Experience has proven that one must not pamper children too often and touch their bodily parts. This accurate observation is not well-attended and, out of love, [mothers] hold, kiss, caress and pamper their children. This extremely simple and superficial activity has a profound and bad influence on the psyche and body of the child which stimulates the movement of personality traits and emotions and brings the final force to a frenzy.
There was, in this observation, an oblique message to upper
class families as well. Since many lower class women served as
nannies and servants in upper class families, the danger could
be transferred. Consciously or unconsciously, such women
perverted children through improper maternal care or by
introducing them to playmates, including their own children,
who might corrupt them.

Finally, the educational system was corrupting children,
creating social maladjustments, and producing delinquents.
Children were caught between two forms of "despotism." On the
one hand, parents were making excessive demands of their
children. On the other hand, teachers and school officials
were treating children arbitrarily based on their "uncritical
whims." Caught between high expectations and poor academic
performances, children were resorting to acts of
self-destructive aggression. "It is sufficient for a youth to
receive a poor mark in high school or university for him to
decide that his future is ruined and to turn to suicide." Other
children were turning to alcohol, narcotics, gambling, and
delinquency. "Many of these delinquent youths," said one
alarmed analyst, "are not from poor families, and even youths
from middle class backgrounds and higher than middle class
backgrounds form robber bands and similar organizations."
These problems, as a team of American analysts, suggested in
1949, did not constitute a "technical failure of the schools."
The school system was, in fact, accomplishing "with relative
success the aims which consciously or unconsciously motivated
its founders...that of producing a distinguished intellectual
elite." Part of this educational process simply involved the eliminating of students who failed to conform to the requirements of the "stereotyped" curriculum and the "authoritarian methodology."53

Thus, children were in peril. They were in danger on the streets, in the classrooms, and even in the shelter of their homes. The defense of children was, consequently, imperative.

The prevention of delinquency is not an easy matter and is possibly the most difficult one that mankind has confronted. Consequently, its prevention cannot be the responsibility of any single organization. The war against delinquency is the responsibility of every person animated with a new spirit of humanitarianism, with this meaning that each person, whether man, woman, son or daughter, must struggle with delinquency and the corruption of habits.54

At stake was not merely the happiness of the family or the well-being of children, but the nation itself. The protection of children "concerns everyone...The life of the young generation is [the life] of this nation and if it is lost, it cannot be recovered."55

Such then was the beginning of a diffuse social campaign against juvenile promiscuity and delinquency. It was assisted at various points by politicians, doctors, families, feminists, and religious leaders. Compared to the grander events of Iranian politics, this concern may appear trivial. Its effects, however, were not. This pedagogical campaign brought to bear new techniques for 'liberating' children from moral hazards and bringing into existence guarded zones in which they might live out their innocence. Although the campaign was fraught with contradictions it could not overcome, the
procedures of surveillance and examination it legitimated proved to have a far greater utility than was originally conceived.

Family Surveillance. One impact of urbanization and its concomitant dangers was to mobilize the extended family and transform it into a policing unit. Children played a double role within the Iranian extended family. They were, on the one hand, invested with a certain genealogical value. They were repositories of a name, a heritage, or a line of prestige. On the other hand, children had a particular tactical value. Since Islamic inheritance procedures did not recognize a system of primogeniture, children were the only means by which families could preserve their possessions. Without family alliances forged by children, the wealth and position of families could fragment within a few generations.

Although these two roles did not necessarily complement each other, they did privilege children by giving them a pivotal place within a system of alliances. Conversely, nothing terrified families more than the possible corruption of their children. Corruption simultaneously threatened the child, shamed the family, and eroded the system of alliances.

Consequently, the extended family met the moral hazards of urban life with increased vigilance. A study of lower and middle class families highlights some salient features of this transformation. "Many mothers were fearful of having their small children of either sex play outside the compound because of bad influences and dirt." Several mothers "spoke of the need to keep them [their daughters] from playing with neighbor
boys even inside the compound." Fathers who desired more children were afraid to have more because of the difficulties of surveilling them and the hazards to which the children were constantly exposed. 57

Even more severe precautions were taken among upper class families. Families quarantined all forces prejudicial to their status, prestige, and standing. Playmates were screened. 58 The activities of servants and their families were discreetly observed. 59 The movement of adolescents were confined: "after sunset, the children should not leave the perimeters of the house for cruising, partying or games." 60 Furthermore, "suspicous of what a child may do when away, parents require constant reporting of his whereabouts, even if the son is in his twenties." 61 Measures were also taken to isolate children from the medical and social dangers of old city neighborhoods. The migration of families to northern Tehran, for example, was initially undertaken on the grounds that the more temperate climates of the Alborz foothills protected families from contracting cholera and other hazardous diseases. Families established patronage relationships with local policemen. They demanded that the police constantly survey their neighborhoods and evict squatters, beggars, and other undesirable. 62 Finally, the protection of children was entrenched in the law. It is no accident that the "Special Criminal Law" of the Iranian Penal Code placed "offenses against children and offenses against the respect due to the dead" immediately after offenses against the state and attacks against the physical person. 63 Children and the dead stood at
opposite ends of a vast system or family allegiances.

2. **A hygienic-and-social-psychology.** It was in this context of hyper-invigilation that a "hygienic and social psychology" came into circulation. The role played here by doctors, psychologists, criminologists, and sociologists was not negligible. Hygienic psychology was closely associated with pediatric concerns, an association that greatly facilitated the prevalence of 'psycho-hygienic' explanations, techniques, and procedures among the leisured classes.

One should remember that during the late nineteenth century, European doctors were not capable of providing qualitatively better care for children than traditional Iranian practitioners. Even in Europe and North America, child mortality was high, pediatrics was virtually unknown, and the care of children was usually left to marginal practitioners. Moreover, vaccines for child-killing diseases did not become available until well into the twentieth century. Thus, doctors did not achieve their monopoly in the field of child care through superior medical knowledge. Quite the contrary, their dominance was initially established through their association with foreign governments, and by the early twentieth century, was reinforced by the state. Assisted by state regulations which prohibited the practice of unlicensed classical hakim, doctors came to monopolize the field of child care and maternal health. They established an exclusive domain of private practices for upper class families.

Although doctors did not possess superior knowledge, they did argue that they provided distinctly better health
care. This claim was based on their use of a specifically European medical procedure: the examination. The medical examination was at best a peripheral element of Galenic medicine as it was practiced in Iran. European-trained doctors, however, made it the centrepiece of their administrations. They persistently insisted on examining bodies and opening spaces to instant medical inspection. Indeed, this medical ritual became the emblem of their superiority. It distinguished real doctors from quacks. 67

Before the modern doctor was a healer, he was an inspector. He had the role of expert, analyst, and patriarch. In the examination procedure, he located his claim to survey bodies, his demand to be told the truth about a patient's symptoms, his privilege to counsel, and his right to intervene in the care of bodies. In this manner, the doctor emerged as a policeman for children. His task was to ensure the "protection, observation, and preservation of children from the period of pregnancy to adolescence." 68

Gradually, this role mutated due to changing social conditions. Between 1949 and 1960, infant mortality rates decreased, especially among wealthy families. 69 This decline had less to do with the success of Iranian pediatricians and much more to do with the introduction of pasteurized milk and the availability of new vaccines for child-killing diseases in Iran. With opportunities available only in the second class public health system, pediatricians redefined their significance for the general public. 70 In popular pedagogical literature on children, emphasis shifted from medical concerns
to psycho-medical themes. These themes were, properly speaking, pseudo-scientific but they achieved widespread use as explanatory and therapeutic devices.

The body, it was maintained, was not a mechanical system but a delicate psych-somatic material. Physical and psychical processes were inscribed into one another. Ill health and social maladjustment were, consequently, two facets of the same disease. Social and environmental stresses were responsible for physical and neurotic disorders in the psycho-soma. Conversely, structural disorders were manifested in social diseases.

Social and physical disorder required a careful probing of the psycho-soma. Both physical symptoms and self-descriptions had to be examined. The personal history of the subject was reconstituted in writing. This dossier was cross-checked against supplementary information and codification. Clusters of psycho-somatic disorders became more evident. The codification, in turn, made it possible to provide a new formulation of the patient's condition, one that facilitated health. The point was that, whatever the particular pattern of self-invalidation prescribed, the recodification of the self-understanding had to be such that "the person seeking counsel willingly follows."71 Good health was a product of good "mental hygiene."72

Not surprisingly, within this discourse, the figure of the child was set at the plexus of social and medical diseases. Childhood became a general source which, in the long run, determined the health of the individual in adolescence and
Insofar as childhood was identified as the basic factor in hygienic psychology, the family emerged as the crucible of societal health and degeneration.

The social dangers of urban life could now be located in family structures. Both the modern and traditional family facilitated these dangers. The modern family neglected the proper socialization of children. "Even in the formative years of their child's cultivation," remarked one sociologist, "some parents will not sacrifice their desired amusements such as night life, gambling and the like." In this neglect lay the source of juvenile promiscuity and delinquency in better families. As one criminologist remarked:

That is, for women who are engaged in work exterior to the home and whose children are cared for and raised by others, it is not possible to cultivate those habits and humanness in the child and as a result the child is deprived of public-minded habits and internal harmony.

Consequently, the crimes of juveniles in adolescence are coming into existence and whereas once they did not exist at all, currently they have emerged and while they are quite small, they are unfortunately on the rise.

The traditional family, by contrast, practised an unmitigated despotism over children. This "family organized along the lines of a disciplined military group" under the surveillance of a patriarch may once have served a function but was now wholly anachronistic. Such a family placed enormous demands
on children and, moreover, enforced their ignorance concerning their own sexual growth. In this extreme form of discipline, one could find the source of rebellion and social maladjustment. Psychologists, doctors, and journalists cited incidents where such patterns of discipline led to mental and physical harm to children. They called on the police to protect and liberate children from the despotism of such parents.

It should be noted that these criticisms were matched with attempts to re-inforce the disciplinary apparatus of the family. Their objective was to rationalize family behavior. Social health was possible only if families practiced a more discrete surveillance and a more meticulous discipline. "Discipline and fundamental principles fortify the child and prevent children from the plague of bad habits." 78

The policing of families began with the self-involvement of parents. Mothers were urged to inspect their own psychological and physical states, especially during pregnancy, since these states could have detrimental effects on the child:

...if the mother comes under the influence of harmful environmental factors, those factors will be imprinted into the body, in the spirit, of the baby; since the child in the uterus like a collecting apparatus, records the influences on the spirit of the mother and the circumstances of the mother's being; induce psychological traits in the future. 79

Parents had to be aware of the effects of their care such as "the effects of clothes on the child's psyche." 80 They had to recognize certain behavioral codes that would lead to promiscuity and delinquency: masturbation, inferiority
complexes, sibling rivalry, adolescent anger, and spoiled behavior. They had to rehabilitate the child through discrete and loving discipline. Different forms of discipline were suggested, graduated in their severity. Similarly, educational discipline had to be subtle. Parents and teachers should not "behave in such a manner that the child in kindergarten should decide that he is in a prison and revolt against the imposition of a heavy program." Finally, it was not sufficient for parents to stand on guard over their child's health and sex. Discipline had to ensure self-invigilation. The child had to internalize the policing of the family.

There was, however, a more basic source of danger, one which stemmed from the very values which families placed on their daughters and sons. On the one hand, since the daughter was instrumental in forging family alliances, her chastity and virginity were highly prized. On the other hand, while the son was expected to protect his sister's honor, he was also expected to prove his virility and assertiveness. Consequently, the son "is designated to be the protector of his sister but at the same time he is not at all restrained towards other girls. He is thus a real threat to them." This fundamental contradiction was not addressed by pediatric texts and reveals the basic flaw of the campaign to defend children. The double standard of the Iranian family set into motion a conflict that could not be neutralized either by family policing or hygienic psychology. Its dissolution was predicated on the re-valuation of the system of family alliances in Iran which no one, in fact, was ready to question. Not surprisingly,
then, the campaign to defend children was fundamentally incoherent and could not hope to attain the goals which it sought to address.

Yet the campaign did have side-effects which proved to be of greater significance. First, it served to generate protective enclaves in which upper-class families resided quite distinct from the remainder of the population. Second, it facilitated the circulation of new pseudo-scientific techniques. The formation of a psychological pediatrics marked the first time the psycho-medical disciplines had found a direct utility in Iranian society. For a long time, these disciplines had been confined to universities, where they had failed to achieve the status of scientific knowledge. They were, more often than not, associated with classical sciences such as philosophy, mysticism, theology, and physiognomy. This situation was reversed only with the new concern about children. The defense of children was seized as an opportunity to prove the scientificity and utility of the psycho-medical disciplines. It became the duty of psychologists, criminologists, and sociologists to "attend to this fundamental matter more than any other." From the fifties onwards, such techniques found their way into many other areas, most notably, into the socialization of the working class.

Socializing the Modern Working Class

Of course, the living conditions of the Iranian proletariat in the early twentieth century demonstrated
anything but a concern for their health, sexuality, or body. The working class was subject to "low wages, long hours, high consumer taxes, forced transfer of workers to the malaria-infested regions of Mazandaran, and labor conditions that, in the words of a European visitor, 'practically resembled slavery'."88 The health and reproduction of the working class was taken to be unproblematic since, in any case, more young migrants were always available. A number of changes were necessary before workers became the object of procedures designed to preserve and enhance their bodily health.

In the first place, conflicts had to emerge over medical space in urban areas. The migration of skilled and unskilled workers to industrial cities created not only a vast squatter problem, but also a major medical hazard. The possibility of the spread of infectious diseases, especially venereal diseases, cholera, and smallpox, precipitated a series of new health measures. All public places, particularly schools and factories, were inspected at regular intervals. "Vaccination certificates were required of all children at the time of entering school and of all job applicants."89 Health measures were enacted which "made the treatment of venereal diseases compulsory; made free medication available to needy patients; made willful, knowing, or negligent transfer of such diseases, as well as fraudulent promises of a 'cure, subject to punishment; and provided for periodic inspection and certification of brothels."90

Second, emergencies had to arise which required the creation of a healthy workforce. These emergencies included
the need for a competent workforce to carry out the state's industrialization programs; a growing concern about the effects of alcoholism, drug addiction and other 'social diseases' on economic productivity; and a demand especially after the 1955 census, to regulate population growth.

Finally, a whole new technology had to become available through which the welfare of working class families could be regulated. In order to transform the working class family from an asocial to a socially-mined association, procedures were necessary through which their private concerns became open to public scrutiny. Four processes highlight the diffusion of such procedures, the interpenetration of public and private welfare, and the emergence of a social welfare system.

1. Medical Agents. One process was the emergence of women as medical agents within the working class family. The demand for this transformation arose external to and in opposition to conventional medical practice.

It should be noted that in the early twentieth century, medical professionals did not see it either necessary or desirable that women play a major role in matters of health and hygiene. Traditionally, hakim entrust the medical care of women to men. It is true that midwives were believed to play important roles in certain cases, especially during pregnancy and abortion. It is also true, however, that in other areas, the care of the wife or wives was passed along to the husband. In the area of gynaecology, for example, texts were addressed to men and were given such titles as The Exhilaration of Princes in the Cure of Diseases of Women. The Restoration to
His Youth of an Old Man in His Sexual Powers, and Woman's Place in the Science of Medicine. As these titles suggest, these texts were as concerned with the sexual pleasures men could derive from women as they were with the treatment of female disorders. Indeed, they probably relied "for their popularity on their erotic contents."95.

Modern doctors, for their part, were pre-occupied with the control of communicable diseases passed through sexual contact, especially syphilis. While the responsibility for the spread of venereal diseases could have been attributed to either sex, it was women who were, through fiscal penalties and legal requirements, made subject to health inspections and pre-marital examinations. In short, modern medical practitioners emphasized the pathogenic rather than the erotic elements of female health. The role attributed to women was that of passive transmitters of disease rather than active promoters of their own health.

The first attempt to reverse this tendency arose within the Iranian feminist movement. In the period following the First World War, feminist writings stressed three issues: education, marital laws, and "concerns with hygiene and disease among mothers and children." Feminists were particularly concerned with the death of mothers and children due to poor medical care, unsanitary conditions, and superstitious medical practices. Syphilis was "the most often discussed disease" and "men were consistently blamed for transferring syphilis to their wives". A letter published in a woman's magazine went so far as to suggest that "the only way a woman could stay healthy
was by not getting married.” While early feminists were members of upper class families, their positions on hygienic issues was “classless.” There was, for example, “a great sensitivity to and an acute understanding of, the prostitutes’ condition, especially child prostitutes. They were viewed as victims of male trickery and intrigue.”

While the changes advocated by feminists applied “not only to the upper middle class, but also to the lower classes,” feminists were unable “to take their proposal directly to the lower classes, perhaps because social circumstances made it next to impossible to influence illiterate women who lived in their own small worlds.” This internal weakness of the women’s movement brought it into an alliance with the state for it was “a relief to be part of a government that possessed enforcement power.” Yet the concerns of the state did not coincide with those of the feminist movement. The state, to be sure, was concerned with the health of women, but only to the extent that it ensured the birth of healthy children and potential soldiers. As Muhammad Reza Shah remarked about his father: “Reza Shah never advocated a complete break with the past, for always he assumed that our girls could find their best fulfillment in marriage and in the nurture of superior children.”

The weakness of the feminist movement, in this respect, was advantageous for the state. Insofar as the feminist movement relied on the state for enforcement, independent women’s organizations could be brought under the scrutiny and direction of the state.

Despite considerable friction on political issues, both
feminists and state bureaucrats agreed that the care of women's health should be a primary concern, albeit for different reasons. They emphasized the positive rather than the negative functions of women with respect to female health. A woman's health was to be preserved and cultivated, not neglected and quarantined.

Such pressures from above as well as below brought about two important changes within medical care for lower class women. First, through hygienic instruction and pediatric literature, women were incited to self-involvement in matters of health and child care. They were warned about the symptoms of morbidity that could arise to the extent that medical care of the self was neglected. For example, in campaigns concerning overpopulation, women were persistently warned of the dangers posed by excessive childbearing to their teeth, breasts, figure, strength, and health.100

Second, women were encouraged to speak on matters of health that directly affected their bodies and their lives. In the medical context, doctors urged women to speak about their symptoms, habits, family life, and diets. This illocutionary aspect of the medical examination was particularly emphasized since Iranian women were hesitant to submit their bodies for direct physical examination.101 Insofar as women exposed their concerns and their problems within the family, doctors could prescribe treatment or enlist the help of authorities to support women's actions within the family.

In effect, women were rendered into agents for policing themselves as well as the family. For doctors and politicians,
this transformation meant better medical and hygienic care within the family on a more constant and durable basis. For women, the support of established medicine could serve to counterbalance the authority of the husband in some areas. Insofar as the state and the medical profession privileged the care of women and children, women could rely on other authorities to enforce their will in certain areas of family life. What was once evidence of a woman's secondary status - i.e. her procreative and maternal functions - now became, at least potentially, a point of resistance against traditional morality.

2. Collective patients. A second process involved the transformation of families into collective patients to be understood, advised, and treated. Between 1965 and 1969, social workers and hygienic psychologists posed the following problem: Given that modern society "has caused a horrifying increase in psychological diseases" among the lower classes, how can we encourage families to bring forward their problems and histories? How can we "discover and understand their mental needs, difficulties, and most intimate concerns, which [are] suppressed especially by the traditional 'kitman' or secretiveness"? In short, how can we generalize confessional procedures among groups where this practice is "practically unknown"?

The solution, as it gradually emerged during this period, was to rework the psycho-medical examination into a general advocatory procedure. Increasingly, personal histories were not longer demanded for therapeutic reasons alone.
Rather, they were solicited so that material and social needs of families could be ascertained and household needs could be brought before higher authorities.

This new advocacy procedure was first situated alongside community and family service programs offered by government and philanthropic organizations. Through this "two-way" procedure, social workers "learned about community problems and how to deal with them and neighborhood residents were made aware of the services available to them." This relationship, however, was hardly undynamic. In the first place, while families were made aware of social services, they could not make use of these services unless they were interviewed and approved. Second, approved families had to make themselves available to regular surveillance and questioning in order to preserve their access to food, medical assistance, and social programs. Finally, through tutelary programs, mothers and young girls were made into 'responsible' monitors of family crises and pathological behaviour in the community. In this manner, the advocacy procedure served as both a means of policing households and a device for gathering knowledge of families.

Gradually, the new advocacy procedure acquired other utilities. By the sixties, this mechanism was firmly established in several other areas. First, the procedure was introduced besides mechanisms of economic production. It was entrenched in the form of profit sharing programs, workers' insurance programs, and other social services tied to factories. Fiscal allocations were increasingly based on
assessments of family and personal histories. One should not
forget that one of the first areas social workers came to have
a direct utility for the state was in the field of collecting
case files on workers' families in order to assess the
feasibility of providing emergency loans.

Second, this procedure was entrenched alongside
mechanisms of incarceration. Here, one can point, no doubt, to
the adaptation of tutelary procedures in the forms of
questioning that characterized the interrogation of the
incarcerated from the petty abuser of opium to the political
prisoner. However, beyond this adaptation, one might point to
the host of societies created with the purpose of assisting the
incarcerated: the Society for the Protection of Prisoners, the
National Association for the Protection of Lepers, the
Association for the Guidance and Support of Defective Persons,
the Association for the Support of Invalids, the Dal-i
Prostitution Welfare Center, and the Society for the Protection
of Children.

Within this broader network of tutelage, advocacy
procedures served to render families of the incarcerated into
policing units. This effect was achieved through bail, fiscal
assistance, and provision of social services, all of which were
contingent on families monitoring, their relatives. The channel
could also be reversed: if delinquent individuals failed to
meet the expectations of authorities, families were subject to
taxual and moral reprimands.
If families of delinquent youths do not pay greater attention with respect to the behaviour of their children, in the event of repeated offenses by them, the name of the youths and their family names will be generally distributed for the information of the public.106

Moreover, this procedure was utilized to observe and gather a knowledge of families. For example, consider the discovery of the 'delinquent mother'. This figure was gradually constituted in the early sixties through the codification of physical signs (a degenerate body from excessive childbearing) and pathological behaviour ("never leave their homes": "are not only ignorant of the skills and crafts of urban women, but also have as a result of urbanization forgotten their rural skills"107). This prototype gained a wide circulation within academic circles as a causal source of delinquency.108 It was also employed to normalize other families. For instance, women who fit this typology were singled out for "the instruction of young women in the course of population control drives."109

Finally, the advocacy procedure was situated adjacent to legislative institutions. It was utilized to track crimes which were not open to judicial examination and control, such as child neglect and juvenile delinquency. It served to propose modifications to legislative procedures based on an expertise in the area of family behaviour. Indeed, such expert advice was a significant factor in the decisions to create juvenile courts and reform marital law.

In this manner, a certain kind of "pastoral power"110 was generalized among the lower classes. This pastoral power was a self-effacing power, and at times, a self-sacrificing
one. It advocated the welfare of each individual to the extreme. It was concerned with the welfare of the whole community as well as the care of each individual during the course of his life. It was linked to the production of a certain knowledge of families. It solicited views, explored thoughts, gathered personal histories, and produced case files. Finally, it was connected with the self-invigilation of behaviour. It interpreted behavioural codes, offered counsels, and directed activities.

3. **Socialized spaces.** A third process was the attempt to re-orient the lived space in which families existed. If the working class family was to play a disciplinary role, its lived space should serve to break down traditionalism, exclude inappropriate behaviour, and facilitate health and productivity. In this demand, there lay the inception of a politics of housing.

Such a politics emerged during the late fifties. It had two stated goals: to construct healthy intermediate housing located between the "luxurious palaces" of the rich and the "base hovels" of the poor and "simultaneously to reconcile class conflicts between these poles."  

To achieve this goal, three requirements had to be satisfied. First, housing had to preserve the medical health of the family and "respond to the needs of the human psyche." Second, it had to ensure economic productivity and encourage savings and investment. Third, it had to discipline the habits of the working class family. Housing was to be directly linked to the transformation of behaviour. It has "to
take into consideration changes in science and industry, and in particular, imitate today's life and style of thought and, through this vehicle, expose the Iranian to the world." 113

Conventional housing was unsuited for this task. It possessed secluded areas, the andarun, 114 which were not really open to surveillance and re-inforced the ostracization of women from modern society. Moreover, the rooms were multi-functional, a characteristic which posed dangers to health and hygiene.

There are no special dining-rooms, or bed-rooms, or drawing rooms in a Persian house. The meals are partaken of in any room, according to the momentary whim of the master of the house, and the night is often passed on the same spot which had just served as an apology for a dining room. 115

By contrast, in planned housing, rooms responded "to their real functions." They were arranged to suit specific tasks and re-direct those who live in the home: "...three important and central sections of residence, that is, sites of consumption, sleep and service, must be thoroughly arranged and articulated such that they are distinct and separate from each other, within reach of each other, and interrelated." 116

Moreover, housing arrangements were designed to be "logical," employing an economical use of space and a proper distribution of light. The residence was made available to a mother's psycho-hygienic surveillance, surveillance which could be employed to enhance child care and satisfy "the complete requirements of hygiene." 117

Thus, through a distribution of spaces, there emerged a "new architecture, from the perspective of behaviour and
function, which is directly linked to the customs, habits and spirit of our people."

4. **Tutelary complexes.** Finally, there was the process through which working class families were brought under sustained tutelage. No doubt, in this context, one could point to numerous state organizations established during the sixties which sought to preserve working class families in key industries. However, this enumeration would obscure the fact that the tutelage of lower class families had begun long before

direct state organization or family welfare.

From the twenties onwards, numerous social groups had assumed the task of policing families. Leftist women's groups, such as the Socialist Patriotic Women Society (c. 1920) and the Tudeh's Society of Democratic Women (1949), launched campaigns to mobilize and educate women. Wealthy women founded philanthropic associations such as the Family Aid Society, the Family Planning Association, the Community Welfare Clinics, and the Women's Organization of Iran. Local religious societies assumed the task of medicalizing and socializing child care. Religious leaders funded hospitals, schools, libraries, construction projects, and "rationalized welfare programs" centered about religious foundations such as the Daftar-i Khayrati-Islami, the Office of Islamic Charity.

These various agencies "came into existence gradually because of existing and perceived needs, not because of a preconceived grand plan." Altogether, however, these agencies constituted a tutelary complex built about middle class and working class families.
One should note several changes undergone by the tutelary complex since the early fifties. In the first place, many of the techniques characteristic of modernist organizations were adapted by chauvinistic organizations. Like many modernist reformers, religious reformers believed that the social problems spawned by urbanization were a threat to public morals and social decency. They argued that "the only way to solve these problems was to strictly enforce religious laws." In the 1940s, Ayatollah Khomayni advanced this argument in the following terms:

This shameless unveiling enforced at bayonet point, is materially and spiritually damaging to the country and is forbidden according to the law of God and the Prophet. This pot-like reject [a bowler] hat of the foreigners is the disgrace of the Islamic nation, stains our independence, and is forbidden according to the law of God. These schools mixing young girls and young passion-ridden boys kill female honour, the root of life and the power of manly valour, are materially and spiritually damaging to the country and are forbidden by God's commandment. These wine-shops and liquor-producing organizations wear off the brain of the youth of the country and burn away the intellect, the health, the courage and the audacity of the masses; they should be closed by God's commandment. Music arouses the spirit of love-making, or unlawful sexuality and of giving free reign to passion while it removes audacity, courage, and manly valour. It is forbidden by the Shari'a and should not be included in the school programmes.

He went on to argue that if Islamic punishments were enforced for one year, "the seed of injustice, theft and unchastity will be eliminated from the country."

However, not all religious leaders defined the notion of strict enforcement of religion so narrowly. For example, in his lectures on child care, Sheykh Muhammedi Taqi Falsafi, a popular conservative preacher, argued that the use of...
psychiatric procedures were in full conformity with the rational foundations of Islam and that by familiarizing oneself with these procedures, one could achieve a deeper and more complete piety. Simultaneously, psycho-medical professionals sought to enlist religious leaders in their effort to instruct families concerning proper care, diet, and hygiene. Among themselves, they argued that intervention in families would be most effectively accomplished if the approach suited and built upon the religious beliefs of parents.

This adaptation of psychological discourse to the practice of religious piety made possible new tactical alliances between religious and secular reformers. At the local level, social workers and mullahs often facilitated each other's welfare activities. At the political level, various groups would occasionally merge to form highly vocal organizations such as the important prohibitionist organization of the forties, the Society Against Alcohol and Opium.

Moreover, there was a gradual expansion of the tutelary complex. Three factors contributed to this expansion. First, government ministries, private charitable organizations, philanthropic individuals, and concerned citizens began to see some advantages in preparation of better educated social workers to man the social agencies in the country. Second, economic and political constraints led young adults to seek careers in teaching, social work, and nursing. These careers particularly attracted women from modern working class and propertied middle class families. Third, the prosperity of the sixties increased pious endowments to religious
foundations. The new wealth precipitated the expansion of the religious establishment. "By the mid-1970s, the religious establishment was big enough to send preachers regularly into shanty towns and distant villages, probably for the first time in Iranian history."\(^{130}\)

Finally, the task of securing the welfare of families was assumed by state agencies. In the late thirties, the Foundation for the Protection of Mothers and Children was created. In 1959, the Mental Health section of the Ministry of Health was established to monitor public mental health, disseminate information on mental hygiene, and take measures to encourage a healthier society. Most importantly, the task of securing the welfare of families was assumed by the police, especially by SAVAK. It should not be forgotten that since the early twentieth century, the task of the state's police had been to control diseases, ensure the movement of goods, and enhance public welfare. It was not unusual, therefore, for SAVAK to assume the task of managing the welfare of working class families.

In order to achieve this goal, SAVAK employed a number of tactics. First, rather than simply repressing strikes, SAVAK advocated demands on behalf of workers. SAVAK situated its agents between workers and owners, usually in the state-organized trade unions. SAVAK agents mediated labor disputes, and, if necessary, created "difficulties for management." "It would not be inconsistent if some of the wage rises in the mid-1970s had been urged on employers by SAVAK representatives in the trades union structure, aware of
discontent within factories where they were stationed."

SAVAK representatives also secured and administered welfare programs on behalf of workers. Representatives were quite militant on this issue since agitation served to "shift the locus of workers' demands away from wage demands as such on to the the form of benefit scheme set up by the state." This shift did not simply serve to "reflect pressure from wage rises" or "confer some legitimacy on these schemes." It also served to supervise workers, fortify their health, and gather a more complete dossier on their family and their activities.

Finally, SAVAK representatives would attempt to "incorporate workers into a number of welfare schemes related to insurance, housing, pensions, and the like. These are both a means of increasing the workers' sense of security (especially in the difficult housing market) and of encouraging saving." In promoting these programs, representatives would remind workers of the state's sacrifices on their behalf and "return again and again to the question of increasing output." They would urge workers to "work harder, improve their skills, and raise productivity in an effort to repay their debts to the Shahansnah." 

In the past, the relationship of the upper classes to the modern sector of the working class has sometimes been represented as a relationship based on deceit. Here, it was stated, was a free and rapacious upper class who disingenuously extended welfare to the proletariat while brutally eliminating any opposition. It would be difficult, on this account, to
explain why so much time and effort was spent by working class parents supervising themselves or why so many men and women devoted their lives to social work, that is, to spread a set of policing practices. To argue that this relationship was foisted on these individuals through ideological deception is to suggest, in less delicate terms, that they were imbeciles. To argue that these individuals chose to deceive themselves is to poorly disguise a methodological flaw.

At any rate, such a characterization overlooks three points. First, it ignores the fact that the upper class had been, long before the working class, the object of a dense set of policing practices. Second, it is to overlook the fact that the upper classes took their hygienic morality as an affirmation of their political superiority and, moreover, that they had extended this hygienic morality to include the industrial working class. Finally, it is to forget that, for a long time, working class families resisted the imposition of this morality, recognizing in its self-styled cosmopolitanism, an attempt to disaggregate their family practices and police their activities.

Therefore, perhaps one should avoid juxtaposing a set of autonomous rulers against an oppressed ruled. Instead, one might speak of the spread of a tutelary technology, one which first came into play among wealthy families and was refracted through various channels, to support an exploitative economic relation. Like discipline and torture, tutelary technology fixed a relation of power that, in turn, induced normality in subjects. One may put this observation more generally:
In the twentieth century Iran, the art of government can be characterized in the terms of a strategy of normalization. This strategy is the accumulated effect of numerous minor strategies. Minor strategies emerged in diverse places: families, medical institutions, charitable foundations, detoxification centers, correctional facilities, mental asylums, and government agencies. Their goals were quite varied: to protect children, to incite good health, to promote economic productivity, to reduce criminality, and to reduce political opposition. However, in effect, these minor strategies disciplined individuals and populations according to various norms. They defined a social economy of bodies, one characterized by specific procedures of correction, techniques of surveillance and methods for the accumulation of knowledge. These tactics had an immediate hold on bodies. They trained, divided, instructed, ordered, invested, and tortured human beings. They established behavioural standards, statistical averages, and norms of performance for personal, social and public conduct. Through the observation of these standards, subjects came to define themselves in terms of their experience of normality, that is, they explained and justified their activities and statements with reference to what counted as normal. They became normal subjects, subjects who were law-abiding in their own self-image and, simultaneously, norm-governed for the actions of social institutions. To the extent that a condition of normality was definitive of their subjectivity, disciplinary habits were entrenched in their comportment.
Despite the clarity of their objectives and coherence of their results, these minor strategies were rarely elaborated in a systematic and uniform fashion. Various tactics clustered about institutions or circulated in the society at large. Tactics deployed in one area were often adopted and adapted to suit other concerns. These adaptations did not occur according to systematic rules. More often than not, they were chosen only because they were immediately available and familiar to the practitioners at the moment a specific demand emerged.

Consequently, while one can identify a general strategy of domination, there is no single entity who can claim to have invented the overall strategy. Nor will it do to argue that this strategy was created to preserve and advance capitalism in Iran. To be sure, a strategy of normalization facilitated economic development under the Pahlavis but the practices constitutive of this strategy emerged in an oblique fashion and gradually acquired significant roles, only some of which had economic utilities.
FOOTNOTES


3 Clark, p. 108.

Clark, p. 83.


Prymogore, p. 119.


17Kazemi, p. 129.


20Bartsch, p. 318.

21Kazemi, p. 74.

22Ibid., p. 52. See also pp. 87, 124.


24Kazemi, p. 90. See also pp. 62-63.


26Abrahamian, Iran, p. 474.

27H. Baktar, Az_Sahar-ye_Tehran_Ceh_Hidani? [What Do We Know About the City of Tehran?], (Tehran: Jash, 1345 [1966]), p. 73.

28Hoojeld, p. 95.


31 Kazemi, p. 4

32 Ahmad Khomeini, cited by Abrahamian, Iran, p. 474.

33 See Kazemi, p. 124.

34 Idid., p. 85.

35 Idid., pp. 52-53.

36 Anonymous squatter, cited by Kazemi, p. 87.

37 Kazemi, p. 59.


42 Idid.

43 Behnam and Rasekh, pp. 435-436.

44 Saheb oz-Zamani, Kitab-i_Ruh-i_Bashar, p. 152.


56. Ibid., p. 206.

57. Ibid., p. 206.

58. Saeed Oz-Zaman, Amuz-yi Chihriha, p. 245.


60. Saeed Oz-Zaman, Amuz-yi Chihriha, p. 245.


63. Manganah, p. 6.

64. Sana'i, cited by Saeed Oz-Zaman, Javan-yi Surt-i Fasli.
During the thirties, forties, and fifties, foreign analysts frequently wrote on the communist threat faced by Iranian youth. See, for example, Vreeland, pp. 275-277. However, to the Iranians of this period, the figure of the sexual delinquent was much more dangerous. Thus the public hanging of Asghar Qutel, the infamous homosexual, rapist, and murderer of young boys, who terrorized Tehran for months in the early 1930s, overshadowed by far the trial of the 'Fifty-Three' leftists in 1937. One day perhaps an account should be written of how the figure of the sexual delinquent served to anchor the intense supervision of children and the policing of wealthy families.


"K. W. Bash, "Foreword," in Nasir id-Din Saheb 'oz-Zaman, Va Namidanand Chirat... [And They Know Not Why... ] (Tehran: 'Ata'i, 1344 [1965]), p. 3.
66Good, pp. 75-76.
67Ibid., pp. 64, 74.

68Iran, Vezarat-i Behsari (Ministry of Health), Idar-yi Kul-i Behdasht (Central Health Office), Guzareh-i Jall-i 1341 (Annual Report 1962), p. 120.

69Infant mortality rates dropped from over 50 percent in 1949 to 20 percent in 1961 to less than 12 percent in 1973. See Good, p. 72 and Abramian, Iran, pp. 44-447.

70This development had already occurred in North American pediatrics several decades earlier. See Pawluch, pp. 2-3.


73Idem, Javan-i-kul-han, p. 9.


75Hejazi, p. 172.

76Behnam and Kasekh, p. 173. See also p. 119.

77See, for example, Saheb oz-Zamani, Kitab-i Ruh-i Rashah, p. 149.

78Manjaneh, p. 35.

79Shafa'i, p. 116.
The spirit of the child is a mirror in which every kind of beautiful and ugly behaviour, angelic and heavenly traits, base and unclean behaviours, are reflected; [it] has the ability for every kind of correct and incorrect training and [consequently] the supervision and education of the father and the mother are, in themselves, not enough. Children and children alone must be good learners and prefer the path of education over following [the path of] the inclinations and deviation from wisdom." Shafa'i, p. 171.

I include in this term all sciences, analyses, or practices that take the study of the psyche as their point of investigation and correction. The psycho-medical discourses would thus include such sciences as psychology, psychotherapy, social psychology, sociology, psychoanalysis, criminology, and social work.

For a brief account of the ambiguous state of one psycho-discipline, sociology, see Gholam Husayn Sadigī, "A'vamel-i Peydayesh-i Nahanjawīa va Pamariha-yi Shahr-i Ma [Factors Causing the Appearance of Improprieties and Diseases in Our City], in Majā'īl-i Tahān, pp. 323-324. Even as late as the mid-sixties, mental hygienists were still trying to differentiate their field from phsiognomy and philosophy. See Sanæb oz-Zamani, Va_Namidān_e_e Chīrāγ, pp. 45-55.


Abrahamian, Iran, p. 162.

Sanænī, p. 65.

Ibid.
91 Halliday, p. 193, 202; Bartsch, pp. 322-326.


97 Ibid., p. 70.

98 Ibid., pp. 70-71.


101 Banani, p. 82. A number of factors were at work here: men's refusal to have their wives handled by another man; women's sensitivity and vulnerability to charges of immorality; and the fact that, in most cases, physicians were men. Elgood states that one of the chief issues in the medical treatment of Iranian women has historically been the theological division of the body.
And thirdly, there was the Islamic law on the impropriety of looking upon a woman, above all on looking at her genitalia. Theologians had divided up the organs of the human body into Organs of Honour and Organs of Shame. The second of these two classes was known by the general title of 'aurat', a word which by an obvious change has come to mean 'woman' in modern Urdu.

The word 'aurat' in theology means those parts of the body which must not be seen by another. In a man, this area extends from the navel to the thigh, in a woman from the neck to the knee though rigorists say to the ankle.

So unreasonable was this theological prohibition that both doctors and patients were perpetually at war with it. They secured the support of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a theologian of no lax principles. He stated that in his opinion it was lawful for a physician to look at a woman, even though not a relative and when need required it, to look even at the forbidden places. But in practice the strict interpreters won the day. And all doctors entered into their work without ever having seen or examined the pelvis of any woman except their wives or a prostitute. Elgood, p. 211.

102 Raza'i, "Afzayesh-i Bimariha-yi Ravani dar Shahr-i Ma" [The Increase of Psychological Diseases in Our City], in Masā'il-i Tahran, p. 388. See also p. 322.

103 Saheb oz-Zamani, Kitab-i Ruh-i Tahshar, p. 9.

104 Ibid.

105 Prigmore, p. 82.


107 Faqih, p. 342.

109 See Prigmore, p. 58.


111 Iraj 'Itisaam, 'Haskan: Dar Guzashteh, Haal, va Ayandeh" [Housing: In the Past, Today, and the Future], in Maga'el-i_Tehran, pp. 248-249.

112 Ibid., p. 249.

113 Hushang Sayhun, "M'emari-yi Novin-i Ma" [Our New Architecture], in Maga'el-i_Tehran, p. 270.

114 Traditional housing was composed of a birun and an andarun area. The birun embraced the reception area for guests. The andarun was the area in which women were secluded. Entrance to the andarun was limited to male family members and doctors of both sexes. See L. Bogdanov, "The Home and Life in Persia," Islamic_Culture 5 (1931): 419.

115 Bogdanov, p. 421.

116 'Itisaam, p. 249.

117 Ibid.

118 Sayhun, p. 265.

119 Fischer, p. 96.

120 Prigmore, p. 155.

121 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 474.

123Ibid., p. 325.


125Shafa'i, p. 49.

126Prigmore, p. 110.

127McLaughlin and Quinn, pp. 487-491.

128Prigmore, p. 120.


131Halliday, p. 205.

132Ibid.

133Ibid.

134Ibid., p. 206.

135Labor Minister Moini, cited by Halliday, p. 206.

136See Prigmore, pp. 125-126.
"The fight for victory shall be realized only when the rotten roots of the former regime and its supporters are uprooted..." ¹ Ayatollah Khomeini's emphasis on socio-political corruption is, to be sure, not novel. Since the fifties, psychologists, criminologists, social workers, women's societies, and politicians have been pre-occupied with the "vast corruption and turmoil of cities like Tehran." ² Nor is it unusual that theologians should emphasize moral decadence, social degeneration, and political corruption.

What is remarkable is the different practical circumstances in which this emphasis operates. Previously, corruption was stressed as a justification for the existence of protected enclaves. Vast sectors of society, like the slums and shanty towns, were wholly ignored. Other areas were supervised (e.g. milieus of delinquency, brothels, and drug markets)—although this supervision aimed not so much at eliminating corruption as it was at employing 'the corrupt' for intelligence, financial, and political purposes.

Currently, however, corruption is emphasized as a justification for the expansion of tutelary networks and the creation of custodial regimes. Tutelage, it is maintained, is necessary to maintain the well-being of the dispossessed and also to improve the manners of the corrupt. As Ayatollah
Khomayni explains "We have tried to refine their manners. If we don't succeed, then we imprison them. If this doesn't work, then we refine them for good." It is in this context that tutelage has assumed new, highly political characteristics.

Social Ministrations

By the seventies, it had become apparent to the religious establishment that the Imperial government, either consciously or unconsciously, was unable to adequately address major social problems typical of urban areas such as disease, hunger, unemployment, alcoholism, drug addiction, and sexual promiscuity. It was this evaluation that convinced many of the ulema to back Ayatollan Khomayni, act as grass roots agitators, and employ their tuteeary societies as vehicles of revolutionary protest. Even Ahmad Khomayni, the son of Ayatollah Khomayni, admitted after the revolution that many of the ulema did not support the revolution at first but "eventually joined the revolutionary movement because the regime had failed to attack moral decadence and clean the streets."

It was, thus, the requirements of ministry that convinced religious leaders to engage in political activities. For religious reformers, social reform could not be entrenched without reforming the government that often seemed to encourage social corruption. As Ayatollah Motahheri explained:
Any reformer... who is able to direct the attention of the minds towards the true Islam; who is able to banish corrupt practices and superficialities from the lives of the people; who can satisfactorily bring orders in the civic life by providing, among other things, the basic necessities of food, shelter, medical aid and education;... and who can give society a truly Islamic cadre of administrators to lay down rules and regulations for conduct of puritanic administration shall have, in fact, achieved the maximum success as a reformer.

Social ministry, consequently, had to operate in every corner of society. In the post-revolutionary period, numerous different groups undertook this task, elaborating new forms of tutelage.

Localized instruction. In the course of the Islamic revolution, revolutionary councils arose in factories, mines, military bases, schools, hospitals, and government offices. There is, currently, insufficient documentation concerning these various councils. I shall describe the workers' councils in factories, although this is not to attach special importance to these organizations or to suggest that other councils were of lesser consequence.

Since the sixties, many factories had been under the tutelage of various socializing organizations. These organizations were concerned with the discipline, health, and welfare of working class families. In the aftermath of the revolution, these responsibilities were assumed by workers' councils.

Workers' councils paid salaries, reached agreements with technicians, operated the factory, and maintained discipline on the shop floor. They eliminated "corrupt" members including irresponsible managers and former SAVAK informers. Moreover,
despite their political heterogeneity, the councils initiated moral edification campaigns. In some cases, these campaigns were imposed by workers' councils. The leftist council of one factory, for example, supplied workers with "radical Islamic writings" and held general assemblies not so much for discussion, "but to provide a lecture forum for council members." In other cases, these campaigns arose from among the factory workers. In the Caterpillar tractor factory, for example, "a zealot who, when the council was first set up, objected to the presence of leftists on it, had been allowed to set up an 'Islamic society' in the factory for purposes of 'education' and was clearly having an influence on some of the members." 9

In the post-revolutionary period, these councils undertook additional responsibilities. They hired workers, lowered managerial salaries, and administered regular health examinations. They "built libraries, instituted bus service to and from the plant, provided free work clothes, increased housing allowances for workers, and democratized and improved food services." 10 They also introduced "compulsory collective prayer, dispatching mullahs into the production units on a permanent basis." 11

Iranian Marxists often appear to believe that these councils were originally 'autonomous' and were later 'Islamicized'. 12 It is difficult to understand what is meant by this assertion. On the one hand, it is hard to understand in what way these councils were autonomous of power relations since the very possibility of the councils depended on the
exercise of discipline and tutelage. The councils were simply effects of disciplinary power. On the other hand, it is hard to understand how 'Islamicization' fundamentally changed the responsibilities which these councils undertook. Perhaps what is meant by this assertion of autonomy is simply that workers should learn to discipline and normalize themselves rather than be disciplined or normalized — but this demand hardly constitutes an account of an autonomous state.

**Generalized guidance.** In addition to occupational councils, there also appeared revolutionary committees responsible for the administration of neighborhoods. These committees undertook several responsibilities:

First, committees patrolled the streets, dispensed rough justice, confiscated property, and arrested counter-revolutionaries. Second, they distributed goods, set prices for the sale of goods, enforced price regulations, and supervised the collection of garbage. Third, they enforced moral behaviour. According to the Central Provisional Committee of Tehran, for example, the tasks of committees included the creation of "classes for persons in authority to familiarize them with their religious and ethical duties" and the establishment of "public gatherings for the purpose of delivering talks to inform the people about the Islamic Revolution and to 'familiarize them with their religious duties at this delicate time'." In practice, revolutionary committees often initiated other forms of guidance and instruction. Committees banned the sale of alcohol, records, and cassettes. They prohibited dancing, films, and other forms
of entertainment. They punished public behaviour that suggested sexual promiscuity and evaluated the clothing of citizens to ensure that public decency was not violated. In short, the revolutionary committees operated both as policing agencies and as societies for moral guidance.

Gradually, these societies were organized into administrative units or joined into broad movements. Many revolutionary committees, for example, came to replace local governments. Operating from neighborhood mosques, they "pass regulations, run courts, collect taxes, write schoolbooks, oversee the army, dispense ideology, recruit volunteers, and funnel rationed goods to the deserving masses." In other cases, reform societies formed broader reform movements. Islamic societies in the universities, for instance, engaged in a Reconstruction Crusade in rural areas. They built public work (roads, public baths, health centers, schools, and unfinished industrial projects); transformed the rural credit program into a welfare system; and initiated educational programs designed to improve peasant literacy and "propagate Islamic culture." Similarly, committee patrols formed the original corps of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. The Guards, who numbered approximately 30,000 prior to the Iran-Iraq war, maintained security but also established special labour groups in work places to provide "ideological, organisational, and military training" and supervised the operation of regular army units.

In the first year after the revolution, between 2.5 to 4 million people were
unemployed out of a total workforce of about 10 million. This situation was further compounded by the influx of 1.5 million Afghan refugees, 1.5 million refugees from the Iran-Iraq war, and 10,000 people expelled from Iraq.

Various religious institutions arose to meet the growing problems of housing, hunger, unemployment and disease. Some of these were well-established charities operating in major religious centers like Qom and Mashad. Others were institutions appropriated from the old regime and transformed into pious foundations. The Pahlavi Foundation, for example, was succeeded by the Mustafa Foundation, the Foundation of the Dispossessed. Still others were foundations created in the course of the revolution, such as the Foundation of Housing, the Center for Combating Sin, and the Economic Basiji (Mobilization) Organization. Finally, some were associations operating out of neighborhood mosques such as the Imam’s Assistance Committees.

In their breadth, these organizations constituted a loose welfare system. They provided employment, constructed housing, supervised rationing programs, and subsidized food and other basic necessities. They established tent cities, organized relief work, and supervised the health and hygiene of neighborhoods. They also served to win the support of those social groups considered by the government to be critical for political stability, the lower classes.

In their specific operations, these organizations simultaneously constituted forms of guardianship. While institutionalized charity assisted the dispossessed, it also
served as a vehicle for moral edification. Through welfare activities, preachers provided moral instruction on hygiene, child rearing, family life, and public behaviour. The concern for the well-being of the dispossessed was, consequently, also a concern for their salvation.

Systems of tutelage, of course, existed long before the Islamic Revolution. For the most part, tutelary networks focused on the care of the traditional and modern working class. In the wake of the revolution, however, tutelary networks not only expanded, but also enlarged their areas of concern. They were established in local neighborhoods, swarmed about in small mobile societies, colonized older, less charitable foundations, and occasionally entered into larger institutionalized movements like the Reconstruction Crusade.

In this dispersion of tutelary complexes, the care of the soul has become co-terminal with the cultivation of the body. It is in ministering to bodies (by nourishing their tissues, fortifying their muscles, training their movement, and improving their endurance) that the goals of the spirit (improving morals, fighting corruption, and undertaking proselitization) are won. Ironically, in the attempt to edify the spiritual element, it is the physical care of the body that has achieved a new prominence. One could even say that aside from martyrdom in war, the care of the body has become a major road to salvation in contemporary Iran.
Custodial Regimes

"The army personnel are dutybound to observe army discipline and the chain of command....Disregarding this command is contrary to the revolution and will be subject to reprimand."19 The Islamic Revolution was made possible through the disciplines in modern Iranian society. In order to occupy the state, the revolutionaries utilized those practices that were at hand: the tutelary organizations that could organize and mobilize vast numbers of people. Moreover, in order to secure the revolution against a possible counter-revolution, the revolutionaries turned to the apparatus that were immediately available: the torture complex that neutralized opposition. Finally, in order to manage the state bureaucracy and the army, the revolutionaries adopted and adapted the apparatus on which the modern Iranian state was carried: the disciplinary matrices. Thus, the Islamic revolutionaries succeeded in overthrowing the Imperial government only by maintaining and more deeply entrenching Iranian disciplinary society.

This is not to say that the Islamic Revolution did not bring about major changes in the character of social life. Quite the contrary, in the post-revolutionary period, there was a significant mutation in the character of Iranian disciplinary society: tutelage came to characterize not only the administration of private welfare, but also the administration of public discipline. Nowhere is this transformation more apparent than in the area of policing and punishment.
Mobile Societies. The Islamic Revolution brought several, previously obscure, Islamic societies to the forefront of Iranian politics. Historically, these societies had been concerned with the moral and spiritual corruption of Iranian society. Their goals had been to combat this trend through proselytization, protest, and, occasionally, violence. In the post-revolutionary period, however, these societies became concerned with political as well as social corruption. They supervised the political arena and played prominent roles in street battles, neighborhood committees, and revolutionary tribunals.

The oldest of these was the Anjuman-i-Tablighat-i-Islami (The Society for Islamic Proselytization) also known variously as the Anjuman-i-Zed-i-Bahiyat (The Anti-Bahai Society) or the Hujjativen. The Hujjativen was originally created in the fifties after several theology students engaged in the study of heresiology abandoned Shi'ism for Bahaism. This incident "humiliated the whole clerical establishment" and raised the fear that "Bahaism might not only influence uneducated lay people, but, even infiltrate the theological schools." Under the leadership of Sheikh MahmuTavalla'i (Hallaibi), the society was created to combat heresy within the theological seminaries. It established "a program of study aimed at opposing Bahaism" and worked hard at "surveying the people and watching the seminary students." In the subsequent two decades, the Hujjativen expanded. Since it was one of the few tolerated and activist reform societies, it drew a large following. Its membership included...
among others, mullahs, seminarians, civil servants, and elementary school teachers. By the sixties, the Hujiatiyah
"was able to set up branches in various cities and towns, each under the sponsorship of a local mullah."

It developed a national program which included "publishing abusive literature, disrupting Bahai meetings and religious services, and attempting to identify Bahais in public employment to pressure officials to enforce various discriminatory measures."25

Throughout this period, the Hujiatiyah enjoyed the support of both the Shi'i julema and the Shah's officials. One the one hand, since it was virulently anti-Bahai, the society was patronized by major ayatollahs and received financial donations from pious foundations. On the other hand, since it was dogmatically anti-communist, the government tolerated its activities. Indeed, given its emphasis on moral and religious corruption, the Hujiatiyah served to divert attention from pressing social problems and channel protest away from the regime towards minority groups. For this reason, the government often positively encouraged its activities and, in times of crisis, the Hujiatiyah frequently collaborated with SAVAK in anti-Bahai campaigns.27

In the early stages of the Islamic Revolution, the Hujiatiyah was neutral. Indeed, in 1981, a government newspaper chastised the Hujiatiyah for its ambiguous policies: "Before the Revolution, you were either against the revolution or indifferent towards it. Have you now changed your policy?"28 In the wake of the revolution, however, the Hujiatiyah was wholly embraced by the Shi'i julema. Lacking a
well-developed, centralized organization on their own, the
Hulāma relied on the Hūjātīyah. Apart from leftist groups,
the Hūjātīyah possessed the largest nation-wide organization
and, in addition, was properly fundamentalist. Consequently,
"overnight, individuals whom one might have expected to see
join their SAVAK patrons before the revolutionary firing squads
emerged instead as members of the komitehs [Revolutionary
Committees]."

Between 1979 and 1981, the Hūjātīyah emerged not only
as a major force within the Islamic Republican Party, but also
served as the party's mobile militia. In the deadly
confrontations of this period, the Hūjātīyah not only moved
against its customary targets, the Bahais, but also against
liberal groups (e.g. the women's movement); leftist guerillas
(the Mujahidin, the Marxist Fāgāvin, and the Pāykar); and
radical workers councils. For Hūjātīyah members, these
activities were logical extensions of their reform activism
since the latter groups were, like the Bahais, declared to be
"apostates" and "whores."

Apart from the Hūjātīyah, there were smaller groups.
The Fardāvīn-i Islām (Crusaders of Islam), for example, also
engaged in anti-corruption drives and attacked political
demonstrations. Ayatollah Khalkhali, their self-appointed
leader, explained their rationale: "I haven't executed anyone
for zinā [adultery] or lāvāh [homosexuality] unless they were
[drug] addicts as well... But generally speaking, I agree with
punishing sinners. After all, we've made an Islamic Revolution
so we should act 'Islamically'."
At the outset of the revolution, the charge of "corruption on earth" applied most often to Bahais and members of the Imperial government. Subsequently, however, the identification of corruption came to be considered a complex problem. The issue was not a judicial one of identifying prominent members of the Imperial government—these officials were well known. Nor was it a political one of deciding which revolutionary was a good Muslim and which one practiced a corrupted Islam—this was or would be determined by Aytollān Khomāyīnī. The problem was the identification of corruption at the level of the everyday. As former Prime Minister Ḥasan Ḍażā'ī explained, "I know Tūdeh [a socialist party] people who pray. My brothers and sisters, I have myself an experience with a member of Paykār [a leftist guerilla organization] being a chaplain and followed by a few Muslims." The problem, in other words, was that the corrupt could dissimulate and appear to be righteous and upstanding citizens.

How could one distinguish the hypocrite from the pious man? What kinds of activities made corruption visible? First, there was the act of omission:

About three weeks ago, the Pādžaran [Revolutionary Guards] went into a high school in Tehran and arrested four teachers. The teachers had neglected to have their students sing the official national anthem, to observe the obligatory prayers—in short, they were suspected of counter-revolutionary activity.

Nurses are arrested and charged with neglecting wounded Pasdars in the hospitals."
Second, there was the articulation of difference:

Any non-conformity - from the refusal of workers to pray in an Iranian factory to the refusal of women to wear a headscarf - was treated as "un-Islamic," and, therefore, suspect. Third, there was the hidden breach of routine:

The demand for a 40 hour work week is a political deviation. It means the imposition of a one day strike on the nation's economy. Fourth, there was the peculiarity of behaviour such as "looking at the scene of a bomb blast" or "shaming money out of the country." In short, corruption was articulated on a set of disciplinary practices. It was recognizable against a background of regulative rules, standardized behaviours, and norms of performance, and the identification of corruption was, simultaneously and effectively, the exercise of normalizing judgment.

Since there would always be minute lapses and breaches in norm-governed behaviour, corruption was at once, potentially present, ever pervasive, and almost invisible. Its identification required persistent surveillance and evaluation of even the most minute activity. Precisely for this reason, "the regime has publicly urged teachers to inform on students, students on teachers, landlords on tenants, tenants on landlords, neighbour on neighbour - the list is endless." Such hidden surveillance had to be uninterrupted and discrete if it was to catch evidence of corruption. As Ayatollah Beheshti remarked to a group of school children: "It is not enough to be honest and simple; one must be honest and crafty."

In the nineteenth century, moral discourse took hold on
bodies through a series of signs. Specific acts signalled the violation of moral limits. They were punished, in turn, by hudud punishments, limit punishments, that, through the marking of the body, signalled the borders of the moral domain to others. Contemporary moral discourse, however, grasps bodies through disciplinary technology. It is not so much a question of crossing limits as it is of deviating from “the straight path” (Sura 1, Verse 5), or rather, the prescribed norm.

The current traditionalism, like the modernism that preceded it, is a form of normalization. Just as the modernists called for homogenization, according to one set of norms, the traditionalists use disciplinary technology to enforce another set: “Western patterns of life have to be eliminated in all areas: food habits, clothing fashions, architecture and city planning, education and manners.”

Ironically, the Islamic Revolution has not eliminated Western disciplines but, on the contrary, facilitated a greater totalization. It is not the case, consequently, that the contemporary traditionalism and modernism are somehow diametrically opposed. Indeed, any analysis that proceeds by asserting this distinction ignores the fact that in contemporary Iran, both traditionalism and modernism function as normalizing discourses.

3. Purgative technology. The punishment of the impious, declared Mujjat ol-Islam Lajevardi, “is not torture; in fact it purifies their soul.” But how is this purification achieved and through what devices?

Consider the most common kind of punishment currently
administered, the practice of flogging. In the case of men, flogging is usually administered to every part of the body and especially the testicles. Sustained whipping in this area induces an inability to urinate. As a result, the victim is caught in a physico-moral dilemma. On the one hand, if he acts co-operatively, "a guard will bring in some drugs" to induce urination. On the other hand, the failure to co-operate will lead to further flogging and "after days of trying unsuccessfully, their area counts rise. If they are not treated, they die." More typically, victims lose sensation in part of the body or faint due to extensive flogging. Doctors are brought in to revive the victim and the victim is administered "shots for extreme pain." Once the victim regains sensation, the punitive program is resumed.

Medical technique, in other words, still figures prominently in the contemporary administration of punishment. Carceral medicine, however, plays a number of other roles. It is still employed to maintain the well-being of the incarcerated. It is used to evaluate the moral decency of women. For example, women's genitalia are probed upon arrest "to prove that they are not decent girls" and thereby justify arrest. Medicine is also administered to restore the health of prisoners wounded in street battles and prepare them for interrogation: "A Mujahed named Hamid Ghafouri, son of Habib, was taken from the hospital bed to the torture chambers." Carceral medicine has also been integrated into the war effort. In a memorandum issued to all Islamic Revolutionary Courts, the Chief Prosecutor's Office stated that the Revolutionary Guards
wounded in the course of street warfare and at the battle front are dying due to the unavailability of blood plasma. Consequently, the following order was issued:

In order to solve this problem, you are requested to give the order that the blood of those persons who are sentenced to death and whose executions is to be carried immediately should be transferred by means of a syringe, and under supervision of trustworthy medical personnel into suitable containers. 

Finally, there are reports that punishments also involve the use of the conventional electric and other mechanical punitive devices employed in Iranian prisons prior to the revolution.

The purification of the soul, consequently, is achieved through either the disallowment of life processes or the cultivation of the body. The imperative is not to take life, but to maintain it, for as long as possible, on the threshold of death. As in prior decades, death is treated as a failure to purify the soul and the bodies of the tortured are frequently hidden: bodies are buried inside the prison, large fees are posted for the collection of bodies, or announcements are made that the arrested person is dead "so that no questions will be asked if the victims later die in captivity." 

Recently, a great deal of concern has been raised by the government's introduction of a penal code which restores Islamic punishments. However, Amnesty International reports that only "a few instances of amputation of fingers or hands and of stoning to death as judicial punishment have been reported in the press outside Iran" and available documentation on torture in contemporary Iran registers one case of ritual punishment. Furthermore, there is a great deal
of evidence that suggests that Islamic punishments, like the punishments that preceded them, are bio-technologies. It is true that contemporary punishments are said to be tutelary procedures designed to purify the soul. Nevertheless, in the effort to induce purification of the soul, it is the disallowment of the body that has remained the central target of punishment. Indeed, if the care of the body constitutes one form of tutelage, the purgation of the body has come to constitute another.

4. **Pedagogical instruction.** "This is not a prison it is a university! We are happy to be here." Aside from punishment, there were more oblique ways of purifying the convicts. One might identify three basic forms of instruction that are currently employed in Iranian prisons.

First, instruction is conducted through **mnemonic devices.** Recitation, for instance, is a common feature of prison routine. It is by reciting short parts of the *Quran* or slogans like "God is Great, Khomeini is our leader" that the full meaning of religious morality are understood. By reciting a part, the meaning of the whole becomes instilled in the reciter. Second, instruction is carried out through **metaphoric devices,** sometimes in conjunction with metonymy:

Mojahed supporter Habibolah Eslami, was hung at Evin prison in front of the entire prison population, who were forced to chant **Down with Rajavi** [the leader of the Mujahedin guerillas], while **they watched him die.**

Third, instruction is pursued through **paralelptic devices.** For example, victims are exposed to torture equipment in the
prison, but no mention is made of torturing the victim. It is as if the tutor is saying, "Let me make no mention of the instruments of torture here. I am sure you will handle yourself with distinction." Fourth, instruction is born on cacaphonic devices.

The sound of the firing squad from the courtyards of other areas of the prison were continual reminders of where we were and of what was happening beyond our walls.57 There are four storeys in the Komitah building, each ringed by a circular balcony. The guards call the prison the "Hen house," probably because many of us have to squat for days on end on the balconies....You are left blindfolded for days....Every night until the early morning hours, people were tortured either in the open courtyard or in the rooms off of it. The screams were terrible.58

Finally, instruction is conducted through symbolic devices. "The regime may keep some prisoners, 'reformed' by the prospects of torture and execution and give them privileges as an incentive to the others."59

Immediately after the revolution, Ayatollah Khomayni "made it an absolute 'to turn the prison into an educational institution, where Islam and the Revolution dominate."60 Since that time, there has been a marked de-emphasis on disciplinary training through hard labour and the introduction of new tutelary techniques. The Iranian prison has become a novitiate where prisoners are taught the elements of good behaviour and the punishments that are won by evil conduct.

31--The Recantation: "We have Tazir here [discretionary punishment through flogging], I confessed to a crime, it is better to confess."61 In the pre-revolutionary period, torture was frequently employed to secure a recantation. The
recantation functioned to neutralize the victim, discredit a political cause, and instruct the populace.

Currently, the recantation retains its central place among the effects of torture. Prisoners are still reminded that they can help themselves "by giving testimony the interrogators wanted to hear" or by recanting their crimes publicly "using a prepared and rehearsed script [sic]." As in the past, torture is used not so much to crush victims, but rather to win "their souls." What is perhaps notable is that the recantation has developed two additional uses since the Islamic Revolution. First, it is used to render key political figures suspect. For example, in May 1982, former Foreign Minister Saleq Qotbzadjen recanted publicly stating that "he hoped to unseat the current government" and claimed that Ayatollah Shariat-Madari "was aware of his plan, provided financial assistance, and promised to bless the takeover of the government if it succeeded." While Qotbzadjen was executed in September 1982, Qotbzadjen's allegations "were used to organize an intense campaign against Shariat-Madari." Second, it is used to retroactively justify the arrest of various revolutionary factions. In the summer of 1982, for instance, the entire leadership of the Tudeh party, led by party leader Kianuri, appeared on national television and "abjectly confessed to a series of offenses ranging from espionage to treason and pleaded forgiveness." Their public appearance enabled the government to justify the original purge of the Tudeh in May 1982 before national and international audiences.

One might add that, in securing recantations, torturers
still have the same difficulties as those they succeeded. The procedure for securing a recantation still relies on the willingness of the victim to recant and this willingness, frequently, has not been forthcoming. Torturers continue to sway uneasily between releasing or executing victims, recognizing that, in either case, it is the procedure itself that is discredited.

**The Tutelary Society**

"The next time we take Evin prison, we'll destroy it."

It is evident that punishment, even under the Islamic Republic, bears almost no resemblance to classical punitive practices. Contemporary punishments arise out of the same notions of rationality, government, and conduct that characterized Pahlavi society. The Islamic Republic, far from returning society to a medieval state, has continued and diversified the character of Iranian society as a modern one.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were, in Iran, two distinct visions of what a modern Iranian society might look like. One was a Constitutionalist vision of an illuminated society in which each citizen invigilated over the civic well-being of others. Another was a military vision of an infinitely productive society in which supervisors reformed and increased the potentialities of each citizen. In the late twentieth century, these two visions were joined by a third, a vision of the tutelary society. This depiction was not simply a theoretical conception of the *Muslim umma* or body faithful
under the pastoral governance of a jurisprudent. Strangely, this ancient Middle Eastern image of the pastoral ruler had its corresponding reality already present in late Pahlavi society. Tutelary society was an order of custodial institutions, mobile points of instruction and guidance, degrees of apprenticeship, and multiple forms of guardianship concerned with the edification of mental habits and comportment.

It is sometimes suggested that this tutelary society constitutes a "parallel government," one which to a certain degree displaces older state ministries. Given the heterogeneous character of tutelage, this is probably an extreme statement. The matter, however, could be put differently.

In the course of the twentieth century, Iranian governments have relied on several different ways of administering populations. These modes of government have included, among other procedures, disciplinary regulations, judicial prohibitions, police surveillance, economic incentives, and tutelary instructions. In the aftermath of the Islamic revolution, state functionaries placed greater emphasis on tutelage as a mode of governing although they did not dispense with other ways of governing populations.

No doubt, there are several reasons for this new emphasis on tutelage. The rapid success of the Islamic revolution seemed to confirm the efficacy of tutelary techniques as an important way of examining and regulating populations. The rise of the ulama to positions of political prominence brought to the fore a network of pastoral
institutions, institutions that were administratively coherent, managed large populations, and vigorously pursued the intense ambitions of various religious leaders. More generally, the Islamic revolution in Iran made direct contact with a politically charged and complicated reality that constitutes the Middle East. This region is defined not only by its strategic geo-political position and economic powers held by Muslim countries but also by an identity as a great, living civilization in mortal conflict with the West. In this context, tutelage seemed to hold the key not only to socio-political dominance but also to the vitality and re-assertion of Islamic culture. It is in this light that one can understand the rapid diffusion of tutelary techniques not only in Iranian society but also among various social groups around the Middle East.

These observations may suggest an uncomfortable relationship between the Islamic revolution and the terror that followed in its wake. Faced with this problematic, some might prefer to ask in what way the subsequent violence constituted a betrayal of the spirit of Islam or Nationalism or Revolution. They might concern themselves, as many Iranians have done, with characterizing the violence as a consequence of theoretical error (finding the violence anticipated and condemned in the works of Marx, Mossadegh, Shari'ati or Taleghani); rendering it as an effect of historical necessity (by pointing to the retarded political development of Iran, the peculiar role of religion in Iranian politics, or the specific economic difficulties and class alignments of post-revolutionary Iran.
that made the violence causally necessary); disassociating Ayatollah Khomayni, and the violence of the Islamic Republic, from Islam 'itself' (making possible a convenient utopianism according to which all violence is condemned); or dissolving the violence in an acid bath of historical terrors (i.e. equating Khomayni with Hitler, Pol Pot, and Gengiz Khan and, thereby, arousing a spirit of universal moral condemnation).

I have chosen a rather different position: to question the Islamic revolution from the standpoint of the specificity and reality of today's violence. Rather than seeking to point to errors, deviations, and misunderstandings in revolutionary theories and practices, I prefer to ask what it was in modern Iranian society that made the terror possible, that may continue to justify it, and that makes its presence palatable even today.

To undertake this task is not to posit an identity between those who revolted and the state functionaries who govern them today. It is not to suggest the cynical observation that revolution today is colonized by Realpolitik to such an extent that to revolt is to play into the hands of strategic planners (e.g. professional revolutionaries, religious leaders, politicians, or generals). There is this danger to revolutions: revolutions are consolidated, sometimes extremely violently, and neither historical experience nor modern political thought has suggested any way through which this subsequent phase of consolidation can be bypassed.

But one cannot avoid this danger in revolutionary activity by turning to the apparently more secure activity of
reformism. If revolution brings with it the possibility of terror, so too does the effort to reform Iranian society by appealing to the rule of law. Throughout the twentieth century, the struggle for the law has been a means by which older social relationships were undermined and destroyed and, *ibidem facto*, a struggle against the majority of Iranians. Under the rule of law, reformers advanced new modes of administration for regulating Iranians. Laws served as much to confirm these new arrangements as to contradict them. Law, in Iran, has been very far from being based on actual consensual acceptance, let alone an understanding of the values that lay behind the majority of the Iranian population. Even when there was a co-incidence between the aspirations of reformists and the majority of Iranians, the process through which these laws were enacted was unrelated to popular consultation. In governments that are animated by a belief in modernization, legal administration is an enormous task, involving intervention in many new areas of society. The enormity of this task alone leaves little room for popular deliberation. It is not surprising, consequently, that reformers administered more by disciplinary regulations, tutelary instructions, economic incentives, and police surveillance than by popular consultation. In short, in a modernizing society where norms are rapidly being undermined, altered, or entrenched, the rule of law serves as much to repress as to protect.

I am not arguing that all political activity is futile but, rather, that all political activity carries with it certain risks and dangers. The Islamic revolution was, in this
sense, a dangerous enterprise. But now that the results of this revolt are at least partly manifest, is one to conclude that the revolution was useless? In this thought, there would be a profound misunderstanding of what is valuable about rebellion.

The enigma of revolt is that, despite past failures, enormous risks, and future dangers, men and women revolt: a vagrant protests his eviction by the police; prostitutes march against their exploitation; and a whole population pites itself against an oppressive regime. One does not have to support these revolts because they manifest a true consciousness, a genuine desire, an existential condition, or a rationality imminent in history. One need only listen to these revolts for they occur in conditions where there is so much to silence them. It is in searching for what revolts say about such conditions that reality undergoes a disenchantment.

What is sometimes taken to be characteristic of modern societies is a narcissistic concern with oneself and a less effective understanding of the ways in which a conception of selfhood is caught up in relations of domination. What rebellions point to is another characteristic of modern societies: a deeper suspicion than has ever prevailed in past societies that claims to communality (e.g. national, religious, class, or normal identity) are instruments of arbitrary power and a more forceful assertion of individuals against such subjection. Revolts, in this sense, are critical activities. They set into motion a disenchantment of communal realities, cast doubts on the seeming coherence of the present, and
introduce subjectivity into history.

The Islamic revolution was important precisely because it made possible this critical reflection on modernization and the kinds of subjection with which it was associated. If the Islamic Revolution poses a overwhelming political issue today, it is not whether Iranian prisons should be dismantled or whether the rule of law should be re-inforced. It is not even whether this regime should be overthrown and another established. It is rather how Iranians can continue to be associated with a modernity that is, unhappily, crisscrossed with so many dangers. The violence that followed the Islamic revolution, however severe, in no way undermines the possibility or the urgency for such critical reflection on the present.
FOOTNOTES


3. Ayatollah Khomayni, cited by ISF-Iran, p. iv.


5. Ahmad Khomayni, cited by Abrahamian, p. 474.


12See Azad, p. 14; Goodey, p. 7; and Bayat, pp. 19-20.

13Amnesty International, Iran, p. 20.


20Ahmad Ashraf, "Bazaar and Mosque in Iran's Islamic Revolution," MERIP Reports 13:3 (March-April 1983): 18. Bahaiism is counted among the world religions. However, it was born in the Shi'ite religious milieu of mid-nineteenth century Iran and, for a number of theological reasons, the ulama declared it a heresy. The 30 or 40 of his followers were executed, including the Baha'is who plotted to assassinate the Shah in 1851 (Cf. Chapter II). Nevertheless, Bahaiism has survived in Iran.


22Ibid.

23Ashraf, p. 18.

24Mehdi Tayyeb, cited by Martin, p. 32.
30. The Hujjatlyeh and similar groups served in this capacity much more than the well known Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In the first two years following the revolution, the Islamic Republican Party's control over the Gueris was extremely tenuous. Ferdows, p. 11. Furthermore, the Gueris did not have a centralized organizational structure. It was only after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war that the Gueris expanded, developed a centralized command structure, and came to displace the Hujjatlyeh in similar Hizbollahi, Party of God, societies as the military wing of the Islamic Republican Party. Joe Halliday, "Year Three of the Iranian Revolution," p. 4; Nima, pp. 136-137; Cheryl Bernard and Zalmay Khalilzad, "The Government of God" in Iran: Islamic Republic (New York: Columbia Press, 1984), pp. 123-124; Eric Rouh-Adad, "The War and the Struggle for the State," Middle Reports (July-August 1991): 5-6; and Farrokh Tari, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Mobilization? (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 183-207 passim.

31. Tari, p. 185.

32. ISP-Iran, p. 27.

33. The Kademerya-islam revives an older organization with the same name that existed during the forties and fifties. It was re-established at the beginning of the revolution and developed a small but highly committed membership. Many members subsequently joined the Revolutionary Guards. See Amir Perows, "Khomeini and the Kademerya's Society and Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies (1983): 241.

34. Ayatollah Khaikhali, "All the people who are opposed to our revolution must die," Middle Reports 12:3 (March-April 1992): 31.
35 Raja'i, cited by Bayat, p. 23.
36 ISF-Iran, p. 68.
37 Ibid., p. 15.
38 Sciolino, p. 901.
39 ISF-Iran, p. 55.
41 Ibid., p. 11.
42 Ibid.
43 Ayatollah Beheshti, cited by Sciolino, p. 898.
45 Muhjat ol-Islam Lajevard, cited by ISF-Iran, p. 32.
50 Ibid., p. 19.

51 Irfani, pp. 265-266. Cf. Martin, p. 54. There has not been as yet an independent confirmation of this charge by human rights organizations like Amnesty International. However, there are reports of such procedures from organizations that have little in common: the Mujahidin
Organization and the Baha'i ministries. Consequently, while this evidence does not constitute conclusive proof, there seems to be a high probability that extracting blood from the condemned does occasionally occur.


54ISF-Iran, p. 20. This is the case of the body of Yusef Yusef executed on 10 September 1981. Among the signs of torture on his body, there was a phrase branded onto his torso reading "God is great, Amin is our leader."


56ISF-Iran, p. 1d.


59Dowden, p. 8.


61Dowden, p. 8.

62Dwyer, p. 271.

63Ibid., p. 266.

64Dowden, p. 8.
Shaul Bakhash, "The Revolution Against Itself."

Martin, p. 68.

Martin, pp. 66, 65; Dwyer, pp. 270, 271, 275; Amnesty International, "Prisoners," p. 5; Carlsen, p. 157; and ISF-Iran, p. 182. A more recent development, in this regard, is the use of crude medical techniques by prisoners as a means of undermining the authority of the carceral doctor and the torture of the interrogator. According to one report, in some prisons, prisoners have learned how to "induce urine" and have "hidden medical instruments away in their cell block to help their fellow prisoners." Amnesty International, "Prisoners," p. 8.

Tehran bus driver, cited by ISF-Iran, p. 16.

Bakhash, p. 19.
PART III

THE LIMITS OF MODERNITY
CHAPTER X

THE SUBJECT IN QUESTION

It is a self deception on the part of philosophers and moralists to imagine that by making war on decadence they therewith elude decadence themselves. This is beyond their powers: what they select as an expedient, as a deliverance is itself only another expression of decadence — they alter its expression, they do not abolish the thing itself.

Friedrich Nietzsche

For some observers, the succession of punitive events in this study may raise some questions. Modern Iranian politics, it is well known, supposes at least three major transitional periods: the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1909), the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), and the Islamic Revolution and its immediate aftermath (1978-1981). The first period was characterized by the creation of democratic institutions and the articulation of nationalistic sentiment. The second period involved political centralization and economic development. The third period was perhaps the least anticipated: it was the moment when the program for societal reform was permeated with extensive theological reflection. Is it not reasonable then to think that the chronology of punishment would conform to these divisions?
If my analysis tends to understate these events, this should not be taken to deny their importance. These events may be viewed as major disruptions in power relations insofar as they mark a shift in alliances (between political parties, social groups, and classes). But what this study is concerned with is not really the origin of power (its nature or concentration in this or that period) but the manner in which and through which power is exercised. This means that it focuses on a different domain, one which concerns the use of certain techniques and the schedule for their distribution. If there were certain crucial moments when one form of domination replaced another, it should be observed that this domination could not have proceeded without a certain range of techniques necessary to its consolidation. And this is to say that the techniques and procedures must have preceded it in order for them to have been available at all and, therefore, possessed a different periodization.

It is not surprising then that the sequence of punitive techniques does not conform to the "grand history" of Iranian politics since punishment was one of the central means through which the domination of a particular alliance was entrenched. Constantly in the course of this study, it has been necessary to draw attention to more obscure but no less significant periods when certain practices were first employed; to map across a social space the various means by which these practices were distributed; and to indicate how they found their way, often quite co-incidentally, into an overall strategy for domination. These exercises, which might be
called chronological reminders, have their importance in this sense: they cast doubt on the grand events of Iranian politics as ruptures. The three events to which I alluded at the outset may or may not mark a shift in political alliances; this is a matter for other analysts to determine. They do mark continuity with respect to the means through which power is exercised. Let us recall some essential points.

At issue in the Constitutional Revolution was the question of who should exercise power — Parliament or the Shah? Also at issue was the question of how power could be exercised to promote economic prosperity and strengthen national sovereignty. For the Constitutionalists, the question was this: what kind of practice permits society to exercise a permanent influence on state policy (i.e. keeps it responsive to national needs) and allows society to exercise a sustained cultivation of the nation’s resources? In responding to this question, the Constitutionalists did not introduce any radical innovations. They agreed with past Qajar reformers that these goals could not be achieved through a form of power that was exercised through royal signs, spectacles, and ceremonies. They promoted the intensive use of European discipline, a form of power that had been exercised in several areas prior to the Constitutional Revolution. They argued that subjects could be disciplined through the exercise of their civic rights and responsibilities and, consequently, proposed Qanun, the Law, as a general mechanism for economic and political reform. Indeed, the Constitutionalists drew a close relation between
juridical sovereignty and social discipline: a populace, in exercising its sovereign rights, could act to move the state towards sound economic and political policies and, simultaneously, induce in itself a more thorough discipline in political and economic affairs. Something like this had occurred briefly during the Tobacco Rebellion of 1891-1892, "the first successful mass protest in modern Iran combining ulama, modernists, merchants, and ordinary townspeople in a coordinated move against government policy." This general strike and national consumer boycott revealed, among other things, the possibility for a new kind of government and, for the Constitutionalists, this new kind of government was indistinguishable from the exercise of popular sovereignty.

The Pahlavi reformers were especially concerned with how power was to be exercised - in this case, to promote political centralization and economic development. The Pahlavi reformers also promoted discipline as a means to national sovereignty. Their questions concerned the scope, duration and intensity with which discipline was to be exercised. The Pahlavi reformers, pointing to the experience of the post-Constitutional period, maintained there was no essential link between the exercise of rights and the promotion of discipline. For them, the law-governed Iranian was a subject who conformed to the law as necessity dictated, not a subject who continually disciplined himself according to self-governing norms. Consequently, they rejected judicial power as the principal means to discipline: it secured only superficial changes, always leaving open the possibility for
social anarchy. The problem of power was to promote discipline even where state regulation was absent. More precisely, the question was this: how can we exercise power in such a way as to promote a subject who is infinitely retrainable for different tasks; who constantly measures himself against modern norms; who is instrumentally rational in social interactions; and who, by virtue of these characteristics, promotes the interests or reasons of a modern state. It was a matter of scope (e.g. incorporating whole populations under a general state surveillance); intensity (e.g. promoting severe but brief discipline at a particular time and place for a specific population); or duration (e.g. supervising specific social groups or 'persons over the course of their lives). Here again, the Pahlavi reformers were not innovators but systematizers: they borrowed and adapted pre-existent techniques for a strategy of normalization.

The Islamic revolution addressed the question of the 'how' of power in the following terms: what kind of practices can we exercise upon ourselves and others that will disrupt and undermine the forms of domination that characterize Pahlavi society today? To this end, protesters adapted discipline to revolutionary struggle. Economic exploitation, for example, was disrupted by the strike discipline of Iranian workers and merchants. Political control was challenged through disciplined mass confrontations with the Imperial army. Similarly, western cultural domination was contested through the use of tutelage. Here again, the revolutionaries adapted a well-established technique for exercising power over
subjects. Through a supervision at once personal and generalized, the Pahlavi state had set out to instruct Iranians in certain Western habits. Now the procedure was used to reform Iranians according to entirely different norms. Through tutelage, protesters were encouraged to alter Western habits (e.g. by wearing veils, refusing ties, or growing beards) and to express a certain moral authenticity in their conduct (e.g. by praying or chanting).

It is not difficult, consequently, to think of the grand events of Iranian politics as moments when a specific problematic of government was addressed through a range of pre-existent techniques. At any rate, it is a mistake to take these events as marking changes in the manner in which power was exercised or, for that matter, moments when the exercise of power was somehow suspended. The point here is not to replace a simplistic interpretation with another but, rather, to think about what might have been at stake in these events.

**Patterns of Politics**

Modern Iranian politics has been characterized by three kinds of social struggles. There have been struggles against the political domination of a particular group (defined by its tribal, social or religious affiliation) over individuals. There were struggles against kinds of economic exploitation that separated individuals from the products of their labor. Finally, there were struggles against the modes of conduct through which individuals characterized themselves and
subjected themselves to others.

It is true that struggles against relations of subjection have not received extensive treatment by other political analysts. Until recently, they have occurred primarily alongside struggles against exploitation and domination. In the eighteenth century, the prevailing form of conflict was against the domination of particular tribal confederations (the Afghan, the Afshar, the Zand, and the Qajar), although other factors, especially economic exploitation, may have played a role. In the nineteenth century, protests against Western economic exploitation became more important, although rebellions against political domination or, for that matter, protests against Western modes of conduct were not absent. More recently, the prevailing conflicts have been concerned with relations of subjection. Of course, there have been notable popular movements against political domination (The Constitutional Revolution) and economic exploitation (The Oil Nationalization Movement of 1951-1953). Even the Islamic Revolution exhibited these kinds of popular protest. However, what gives the Islamic Revolution its particular importance in Iranian politics is that so many Iranians contested the modes of conduct that characterized themselves. Iranians set out to disrupt the relations that held them to themselves, relations that placed them with reference to a kind of subjectivity and disposed them to submit to the actions of others.

It can be argued, of course, that these struggles against subjection may be explained with reference to more fundamental
relations. For example, numerous analysts have tried to derive the "religious" or "anti-Western" character of the Islamic Revolution from class conflict, political xenophobia, or social anomie. These explanations have always seemed, to say the least, somewhat forced. Perhaps now we are in a position to advance a different interpretation for this kind of social struggle.

The Islamic Revolution, like the popular revolts that preceded it in modern times, took issue with a particular and currently evolving form of power, the state. This political structure does not define a universal institution but rather a historically limited phenomenon.

It has been argued that there was nothing remotely resembling a state, in the conventional sense of the word, in nineteenth century Iran. The Qajars were despots, but they had at their disposal neither armies nor bureaucracies and possessed little ideological legitimation. Qajar rule involved not the art of government, but the art of equilibrium. Its general strategy, divide et impera, was supported by "the collection of ordinary taxes, the infliction of extraordinary punishments, and the disposition of periodic rewards." Unfortunately, less has been said about the techniques of power that characterized Qajar society. I have argued that the element through which power was exercised (and through which it was constrained to be exercised) was the sign as it was manifested upon bodies. Through comportment, gesture, and inflection, individuals indicated familiarity and distance, subservience and authority, or repentance and
spirituality. It is in this light that one can understand the central place occupied by public, illuminated rituals: spectacles of punishment, ceremonies of status, and demonstrations of tribute. This style of conduct still persists in Iranian society, but what is important is that it no longer occupies a central place in the general exercise of power. For that matter, the signification of individuals was adequate for only the most superficial control of public life.

The problem of power, as it was posed in the nineteenth century, was one of reliability: to what extent is this individual dissimulating his intentions behind this sign? It was not so much a question of ascertaining whether signs were true or false (the social exterior, zahie, of each individual was always a mask and so always deceptive) but one of gaining access to the hidden flaws, weaknesses, passions, ambitions or, in short, the batin or interior of individuals. Each individual struggled to protect the purity of his batin from being violated by others and, simultaneously, tried to uncover and gain access to the batin of others through social dissimulation. What follows from this kind of interaction is "the politics of distrust," a politics that does not demonstrate features of the supposed Iranian psyche but rather a problematic posed by a certain play of power.

There is, consequently, a crucial difference between Qajar society and those that followed. In Qajar society, power was exercised principally through the process of representation. In later societies, it was exercised through modes of subjection. The problem of gaining access to the
interior of individuals was displaced by the problem of fixing a particular type of subjectivity upon individuals. I have attempted to document this transition by describing the kinds of subjection associated with the Constitutional Revolution, the Pahlavi modernization programs, and the Islamic Revolution. The Constitutionalists sought not only to promote discipline through each individual's exercise of his rights and responsibilities but also to foster subjects who conformed to the law by the force of an inner necessity, their conscience. The Pahlavi reformers endeavored not only to induce discipline through the supervision of the state but also to create subjects who disengaged themselves from traditional values and conducted themselves according to objective norms. The Islamic revolutionaries are engaged not only in purifying society through discipline and tutelage but also in shaping subjects who express authentic Islamic norms in their conduct. In each of these cases, a particular technique of power (law, discipline, or tutelage) is exercised on or through a particular kind of subjectivity (juridical, normalized, or authenticated). We have then a general type of power that is exercised through subjects, not signs.

One suspects that not even Safavid society, with its bureaucracies, armies and Shi'ite ideological hegemony, possessed this particular way of exercising power so characteristic of the state. I am not arguing that the state is something that can only occur in a particular type of society at a specific moment in modern history. I prefer to make a more modest suggestion, a suggestion to reconsider the
Iranian state.

Of course, analysts have never ignored the state. They have treated it as a locality of conflict where theoretically collective but, usually, particular groups struggled to have their interests satisfied. Nevertheless, there remains the question of why this historically limited formation endures despite continuous struggles against and within it. Is it not interesting that the grand events of Iranian politics have, far from disrupting the process of "state building," resulted in re-inforcing the state? How is it that struggles for political reform and popular sovereignty have lent themselves to a re-intrenchment of this institution? From where does the state derive its strength?

Part of the answer lies in analyzing the modes of subjection that characterize modern Iranian society. It is a curious feature of Iranian politics that each major revolution or reform seems to have at least two dimensions. On the one hand, it promotes another systematicity in procedures for governing populations. On the other hand, it encourages the proliferation of specific techniques for individuals. These techniques separate him from others, isolate him from specific communities, force him to reflect upon himself and bind him to his character in a constraining way. The state, it would seem, draws its strength from this particular combination of political structures that, simultaneously, individuate persons and systematize populations. To be sure, the stability of the state may also be explained with reference to specific forms of economic exploitation and political domination, and this is
precisely the point: none of these relations are more or less fundamental than the others. These relations interact in intricate and diverse ways.

There are good reasons, consequently, to take the Islamic Revolution at face value. Its anti-Western character is not a epiphenomenon but neither does it suggest a more fundamental explanation. It is merely that, in the course of the twentieth century, the subject has come to be situated at the locus of power and so, quite appropriately, at the locus of political struggles.

Historical Ontologies

One way of gauging the importance of relations of subjection in modern Iranian politics is by examining the changing patterns of political conflict. Another way is to examine the changing approaches of Iranian intellectuals to the analysis of their society. As relations of subjection became more important in modern politics, Iranian writers began to critically analyze their political conditions by questioning contemporary Iranian subjectivity. In this respect, my argument is not entirely original, and it might be well worth reflecting on two earlier treatments of the subject.17

One might begin with a famous diagnostic and polemical work of late Pahlavi society, Al-e Ahmad's Qar'azadegi.18 Among its many remarkable features, this essay might be noted for the manner in which it approaches Iranian politics. Here, the
exercise of power is analyzed in terms of the question of subjectivity.

Almost a century ago, Mālkum Khan explained to Iranians that the progress of the West had been made possible by two kinds of factories: one that transformed inanimate objects into finished products and one that reformed animate beings into trained individuals.1 In a similar vein, Al-e Ahmad explains the dominance of the West with reference to two processes: mechanization and regimentation. The West, he explains, comprises "all of the countries which, with the aid of machines, are capable of converting raw materials into something more complex and marketing it in the form of manufactured goods." In these countries, the process of mechanizing industry was inseparable from the process of "regimenting people to the machine," that is, mechanizing human industry. Through economic production, these societies produced not only finished products, but finished natures for human beings. "Conformity in the face of the machine, regimentation in the factories, going to and leaving work on time, and a lifetime of doing the same tedious job because [sic: becomes] second nature, to all those who work with machines." However, it is not simply that regimentation becomes second nature (i.e. self-regimentation) to all those who work with machines. It is also that regimentation disposes individuals to having a "third nature," one that is characterized by a desire for conformity and normalcy in socio-political interactions. "Attendance at party meetings and unions which require uniformity in dress, gesture,
greeting, and thought is also a 'third nature' conforming to the machine." In this manner, Al-e Ahmad concludes, "regimentation of the people is itself also one of the unavoidable results of mechanization." In the act of industry, "you have cause and effect together."

Al-e Ahmad's goal, however, is not to explain the reasons for Western progress but rather the reasons for its dominance in the world and over Iranians in particular. Al-e Ahmad observes that while Western politics takes its general forms from "a liberal inheritance from the French revolution," it draws its vitality from mechanization and regimentation. There is, he maintains, a certain lack of fit between the democratic values embodied in liberal institutions and the processes that make these institutions possible. Occasionally and inevitably, these processes erupt onto Western political life in the form of militaristic politics and undermine the democratic process as such. He observes that "conformity in the workplace leads to conformity in the party and the union, and this itself leads to conformity in the barracks; that is, for the machines of war!"

It is not surprising, consequently, that "one of the basic problems of Western civilization (in the Western countries themselves) is the constant threat of the seeds of fascism within the body of 19th century liberalism." Fascism is merely one political form that the process of regimentation takes:
This conformity of behaviour, dress, and thought in the service of machines...in unions, political organizations and parties, and in barracks turns into the conformity of thought and dress of the Black Shirts and the Brown Shirts, which every twenty years, as we have seen, draws all the western states into bloodshed.

Imperialism is yet another political manifestation of regimentation:

I will say it more directly: militarism (apart from the fact that it appears on the heels of intensive industrialization and in the search of new export markets) derives its fundamental practices and customs from the machine. From the machine which is itself a product of Pragmatism, Scientism, Positivism, and other such "isms". These days even children know that once a machine reaches the surplus production stage and finds the wherewithal to produce goods for export, the owners of the machine (the companies) in order to gain a monopoly in export markets will enter into open warfare with their competitors.

Here, Al-e Ahmad cautions against a strictly Leninist interpretation of imperialism. Imperialism may be partly explained with reference to the competitive search for new export markets but it must also be explained with reference to forms of regimentation, the particular practices, customs, and knowledges associated with the machine, that make that global domination and competition possible.

In this manner, Al-e Ahmad draws attention to three ensembles of practices and customs that are associated with the machine, ensembles that entrench Western dominance throughout the globe. These are relations of exploitation, relations of investigation, and relations of regimentation.

First, he points to an ensemble of practices that renders non-Westerners into subjects for exploitation. He observes that non-Westerners participate in the global economy by producing raw materials for export and this task requires
importing and consuming the finished products of Western societies including its machinery. Non-Westerners, consequently, do not approach machines with the object of understanding, constructing, and controlling them. Rather, they seek to use them to earn a living. This customary use of machines makes for a psychological dependence of machines. The non-Westerner does not possess machines but rather "is possessed by it because he must live in the shadow of its protection and find refuge in it." The psychological dependence, in turn, is reinforced by practices that ensure an economic dependence on the West: the importation of ready-made equipment, the reliance on foreign expertise, the prohibition of the sale of specific technologies and, in general, all the maneuvers designed "to insure that this one-way relationship shall remain stable forever and that the ties between buyer and seller will never be broken." Al-e Ahmad does not speculate as to which of these various factors is more causally salient but rather emphasizes their general effect. It is not surprising that, in this context, non-Westerners mistakenly judge their economic roles to be natural and inevitable and, for this reason, do not resist the exploitation of their specific national economies. As he puts it "our sense of competition has been lost and a sense of powerlessness has taken its place, a sense of subservience," e.g. "they take the oil because they're entitled to it and because we lack (the necessary) capability." Second, Al-e Ahmad points to the ensemble of practices through which non-Westerners became subjects for knowledge. He
notes that once Westerners collected this knowledge in a haphazard fashion and only for immediate political and economic purposes:

It was as a result of this new type of tourism that foreigners became acquainted with our nature and habits and learned just how to keep us impoverished and how to make loans to us and, later to take control of our customs houses."²⁵

Today, however, Western experts study the natures and habits of non-Westerners for its own sake. Sometimes they do so by objectifying non-Westerners, i.e. by observing social behaviour, analyzing institutional norms, and collecting statistical data. In other cases, they subjectify non-Westerners, i.e. by engaging in cultural conferences with them, articulating the hidden meanings behind their art and religion, and interpreting the general significance of their culture for them. In this manner, each national culture has become "an object suitable for investigation either in a museum or a laboratory."²⁶

It is a mistake then to think that the West only processes inanimate raw materials from non-Western areas. "These raw materials are not just iron ore or oil or gut or cotton or tagancanth. They are also myths, principles of belief, music, and transcendental realities."²⁷ The factories that process these materials are Occidental universities, institutions in which specialists constitute an opposite, an Other, for the West entitled "the East":

The principles of anthropology, sociology, ethnology, dialectology, and a thousand other "ologies" could be recorded based on fieldwork carried out in Africa and Australia. The professors at Cambridge, the Sorbonne, and Leyden by using these same "ologies" could become
established in their university chairs, and see the other side of the coin of their own urbanization in the primitive areas of Africa.}

Finally, the West exports finished products for "Easterners," "developing nations," or "primitive cultures." These finished products are economic policies that are taken to suit particular nations or values that are said to be authentic expressions of particular cultures. Ironically, Al-e Ahmad points out, even the self-knowledge of non-Westerners has now come to bind them to particularly constraining notions of the ways they are. As he puts it, "we not only no longer feel ourselves worthy and justified... but, when justifying something which has to do with our livelihoods or religion, we even rely on their standards and on the instruction of their advisers to evaluate it." 3

Third, Al-e Ahmad notes the ensembles of practices through which non-Westerners were made into subjects of discipline. In this context, he offers a general account of how Iranians came to be disciplined:

But as for us, a people who know nothing about democracy and nothing about the machine and therefore no realistic perception of the regimentation necessitated by the machine, the funny thing is that we also have a tailor made party system and democracy! With mechanization we become regimented and then we are induced to join parties and become a democratic society, then introduce that same regimentation into the military—it is as if we have started from the bottom. That is, starting which the military (which by the way is never used for military purposes, except in street fighting) we grow used to lining up, being regimented and uniform, so that as soon as the machine arrives, our progress (i.e., the machine's progress) will not be slowed down. And this is the most charitable way I can describe our present day reality. In the West, they arrived at regimentation, political parties, militarization via technology and the machine, however, we were just the opposite, i.e. we went from the
One might draw attention to two features of this account of Iranian regimentation. First, Al-e Ahmad emphasizes that in Iran, and probably elsewhere in the South, regimentation was not a consequence of working with machinery but was, rather, an autonomous process that preceded and supported the introduction of machinery into Iranian society. Second, Al-e Ahmad makes the point that regimentation, unlike exploitation and investigation, is a localized process. Exploitation and investigation involve the export of certain materials to complexes in the West. Regimentation, however, involves the import of disciplinary complexes to the rest of the world.

Why were disciplinary practices accepted and integrated into non-Western societies? Al-e Ahmad does not give a general answer. Rather, he points to specific local conflicts. In the case of Iran, he observes, discipline gained a hold on social life initially through the protracted conflict between the `ulema and the shahs. He notes that the creation of the Safavid dynasty not only united Iran on the basis of Shi'ite separatism but also initiated a protracted struggle between the `ulema and the shahs for political authority. Over the centuries, these two groups developed "their own separate facilities, greetings, customs, and regulations." Moreover, Iranian political leaders turned to the West for support. They imitated Western patterns of organization in the hope that they could entrench their authority and force the `ulema into
subservience or irrelevance. Ironically, however, these struggles did not assist either the political leaders or the 'ulama. Rather, they served only to further entrench the process of regimentation:

What I have to point out here is that, contrary to the opinions of our bearded historians, our past popular, political, and religious revivals never got us anywhere. (I mean past uprisings and movements which exaggerated nationalism and sectarianism.) If they did accomplish anything, it was to lay the foundations for the structure, ramparts of which were completed in Safavid times. That is, during the Safavid period national government and religion (the monarchy and the clergy) slept in the same bed... Today the process of division between religion and its old rival has reached such a state that our government goes to ever greater and greater lengths in its reliance on westerners and in its insistence on aping foreigners.32

This development marks "a new stage in the confrontation, a stage in which the spread of culture and the expansion of enlightenment shall completely bypass these two rivals."33

What Al-e Ahmad especially emphasizes is that the spread of regimentation has given rise to a particular mode of conduct characteristic of Iranians. It is not that Iranians feel unworthy, unjustified, and helpless before Western corporations. Nor is it that they can only justify, recognize, and define themselves through the procedures and knowledge that is provided by the Western social sciences.

But what is really interesting is that we get married exactly the way westerners do; we mimic the cause of liberty as they do; we judge the world, dress, and write as they do; and we even rely on them to confirm whether it is day or night. One would think that all of our own standards are extinct. It has reached such a state that we are even proud to be their vermin form appendix. Today the fate of those two old rivals is, as you see, this: one has become a lowly groundskeeper and the other the owner of the ballpark.34
Al-e Ahmad calls this mode of conduct *sharazadegi* or 'westitis' but this quasi-medical metaphor is misleading. What Al-e Ahmad draws attention to is the manner in which Iranians imitate Western culture. Iranians may feel helpless and alienated but these factors, in themselves, are not sufficient reasons for such blind and avid imitation. What is required is not so much a sense of subservience or a feeling of self-alienation but rather a strong disposition for conformity.

Such a disposition, as Al-e Ahmad points out, arises through the practices of regimentation and becomes a "third nature" for regimented individuals. It is a relation of power that grasps individuals not from without but "from within." It is, in other words, a kind of subjectivity that accompanies and entrenches disciplinary habits, i.e., normality.

In fact, Al-e Ahmad defines this kind of subjectivity, normalizing subjectivity, in great detail. A west-stricken man disengages himself from any social context:

He is like a dust particle floating in space, or a straw floating on water. He has severed his ties with the essence of society, culture, and custom. He is not a bond between antiquity and modernity. He is not a dividing line between the old and the new. He is something unrelated to the past and someone with no understanding of the future. He is not a point on a line, but an imaginary point on a plane in space — just like that dust particle.

He views himself from an objective, neutral point. He tends to be self-manipulative and socially opportunistic, adopting ethical values with an indifferent attitude:

The west-stricken man is of no particular religion. He has no faith in anything, and yet he believes in everything. Being opportunistic, he picks and chooses what he wants to believe. Everything is the same for him. As long as he can attain his goal the means are of
no importance. He has no faith, principle, ideology, no belief in God or humanity. He is not even irreligious, he is opportunistic. Once in a while he will go to a mosque, just as he would go to a club or a cinema. But wherever he goes, he is only a spectator.37

Similarly, in politics, he is manipulative and instrumentally rational.

Emulation of the West dictates that anyone who reaches a position of leadership in this country must be easily led, derivative, unprincipled, rootless, and devoid of any footing in the land.38

He is disposed towards a managerial style of politics, one which requires objective social scientific evaluation and bureaucratic management of resources:

Of course, you are probably asking: then, how has he risen to a position of leadership among people? He has done so through the pre-determined degree of the machine and the prerequisites of politics which cannot but conform to the politics of the great nations.39

Lacking any internal criterion by which to evaluate himself, he is responsive to changes in his cultural or political environment:

Without a political compass, he knows the direction of the forces of power. Therefore, he has to be everywhere at once.40

He, his house, and his speech are colorless, representative of everything and everybody. Not "cosmopolitan." Never! Rather he is a nowhere man, not at home anywhere.41

He is, consequently, infinitely malleable. He can be molded to any activity and knows how to govern himself according to the specified standards. "The ordinary man on the street is not at fault here; his voice is not heard, his record is clean. He will go in any direction you point him; that is, he will assume any shape you train him to."42

In this manner, Al-e Ahmad explains why Iranians are so
disposed to imitate western culture and, more generally, how western dominance is entrenched in Iranian society. It is entrenched not only from without (through the control of technology and knowledge) but also from within (through practices that normalize subjects). Iranian normality may be defined objectively (i.e. in the terms of universal norms that are applicable to all modern societies) or intersubjectively (i.e. in the terms of culture-specific norms that are recognized as authentic expressions of the community). In either case, insofar as a normalizing subjectivity has come to be an element of power, it has come to be the central issue that concerns non-Westerners:

Today the issue is not whether they want the oil of Khuzestan or that of Qatar, or whether the diamonds of Katanga are cut or, the chromite ore of Kerman is processed. It is, rather, that I, the Asian and African, must even preserve my literature, my culture, my music, my religion, and everything else I possess exactly as if they were freshly unearthed antiques so that these civilized gentlemen can come, dig, take them away and place them in museums and say, "Yes, here we have another primitive culture!"

For Al-e Ahmadi, the problem of Western domination is not primarily a question of exploitation. It is a question of subjection.

Over the last two decades, Al-e Ahmadi's Qasr-e Zadeh has come to mean different things to different people. It would be premature to reduce it to a single theme - nor is this necessary. For the purpose at hand, it is sufficient to observe that the question of the subject has been in the air for some time in Iran. It has not been raised in the course of political struggles alone. It has been posed just as
forcefully in intellectual diagnoses of Iranian politics. If there is a question behind all these considerations, it might be put in the following terms: What are Iranians right now? How did contemporary Iranians come to be themselves? Can one give an account of the specific practices that played a role in their formation?

It is interesting that these questions have received their most potent formulations in the course of reflections on political violence in Iranian society. Ali-Akbar Ahmad wrote his analysis in the early sixties just as efforts to liberalize Iranian politics were being undermined by the Shah's military administration. He observed that what had emerged out of the protests was apparently a Western constitutional monarchy. Beneath this new show of democracy, there existed a society in which "the army dominates all issues, determines the final outcome in all situations, and is the 'big winner in the budgetary sweepstakes.'" The constitutional monarchy was not supported by any pre-existent liberal tradition but rather was supervised from within by a newly created security agency, SAVAK. This new agency, Ali-Akbar ironically remarked, constituted the new 'democratic' intelligentsia:

The successes of SAVAK have been directly proportional to the defeats of the country's intellectuals and whatever our thinkers have managed to string together has merely become a net in the hands of this newly created agency. So that with terror, threats, cooptation, imprisonment, and exile, SAVAK can make it appear as if nothing is happening on the surface and the two legislative assemblies can open right on time, like two blossoms, but why has it turned out this way? Because the people knew nothing about democracy, and even if they once did, they saw no good in all the clamor for liberalization; so now they have quietly and peacefully turned their fate over to the successors of
the intelligensia."

In the early sixties, even the call for liberation had been colonized by (and the democratic process integrated into) a politics of normalization. As Al-e Ahmad bitterly remarked, "we mimic the cause of liberty just as they do."

For Al-e Ahmad, what had occurred in this period was not a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society. What had occurred was a shift away from the domination of local patrons to a more centralized military domination. At one time, he observed, politicians complained "about the absence of political freedom, for the last person to have control over the popular vote (aside from the village headman, the gendarme, the local ruler, the landowner, and the county supervisor) was the person who paid the voters to miss a half day's work and brought them to the ballot boxes." However, now state officials use the democratic process to extend their control over local patrons as well as over the proponents of popular sovereignty. "But today, when the agents of SAVAK stuff the boxes and supply the list of representatives, what can one say? Nowadays even shouting does not do any good." It is not accidental then that Al-e Ahmad emphasizes regimentation and conformity as explanations for westitis. These were integral features of the political situation with which he was confronted.

To take another example, consider the powerful formulation of subjection and violence which Reza Baraheni advanced in the late seventies. Baraheni drew attention not to practices of regimentation (which were comparatively new) but
to the long tradition of torture in Iranian politics, a
tradition which seemed to culminate in the highly repressive
torture complexes of the Pahlavi state. For Maraheni, this
political repression was the extension of sexual repression in
Iranian society. Maraheni maintained that Iranian politics had
been a "Masculine History" in which "the subject-victor
emasculated the object-victim." The emasculated victim, in
turn, discharged his repression by emasculating men beneath him
or, in the case of women, alienating them from their female
characteristics and making them emasculated men:

The guard's statement represents the sexual extension of
the Shah's rule. The Shah has turned all his political
prisoners into meat and has included in this category
event he quarantines themselves; this guard was taking his
turn as the slave had taken his turn with his wife.

The same happens in the torture chambers. The
torturer pulls down the prisoner's pants and raping him,
or tells him that he will rape him tomorrow. This means
that tomorrow is the day he will turn into meat and be
deserved to the executioner-who is, after all, the Shah's
representative and heir apparent in prison. This simply
means that the crowned cannibal is raping us all and
eating us up."

Self-conformity found its dark twin in self-repression which
led, in its turn, to increasingly more private forms of
violence and more discrete pressure for conformity. In this
manner, "repression and oppression multiply oppressors." 30

Maraheni, consequently, saw the Iranian disposition to
conformity as having indigenous roots. Iranians had been
subjects of localized "cannibalism" long before they became
subjects of Western exploitation. Indeed, the latter was made
possible by the former.
The situation in the East is quite different. We are alienated not once but twice. We did not create this technology, this advanced capitalist system and the administrations and the bureaucracies involved, but they make use of us as their raw materials, subjecting us to a process of reification from afar... This is one layer of our alienation, a system grafted on us from above and through our Masculine History, which sucks our blood for the benefit of other species of things somewhere else, is as blind to us as we are alienated from it. The West estranges us from itself by coming like a rapist in a masquerade—a rapist who devours, ravishes and departs. The West is another planet with a very advanced structure of things; its emissaries contact the peak of our pyramid, the Shan, submit their proposals, have their contracts signed and fly back to their home planet.51

In this manner, Srahendi concludes that "our indigenous Masculine History has finally turned into a pimp, a comprador pimp, and pandered us all to the West."52

Srahendi maintained that he was continuing the project outlined by Al-e Ahmad but this claim is misleading. Al-e Ahmad emphasized the need for a historical diagnosis for specific processes such as regimentation. Srahendi, however, conducted an ahistorical psychoanalytics, one that explored the "reiteration of the earlier almost primeval thesis" in Iranian politics.53 What these writers do share is not a common project but a common question. Each was confronted with and subject to political violence and each was compelled to ask the question: how did we Iranians come to be like that?

States of Violence: States of Subjection

It would be difficult to underestimate the role of political violence in forcing Iranians to reflect on what kind of individuals they had become. In Iran, the question of the
subject often arose, in the course of struggles, individual or collective, to understand and change the systematic violence exercised by the state. Throughout the twentieth century, there has been a strong and often complicated relationship between the increasing ability of the state to exercise systematic violence and the tendency to problematize one's subjectivity.

If I have focused on punishment in this study it is because the exercise of punishment helps clarify certain aspects of this relationship. It serves to illustrate several techniques that facilitated the state's ability to exercise systematic violence and to characterize some of the ways in which Iranians came to be themselves. With regard to these aspects, I will now put forward the following conclusions derived from this study of Iranian punishments.

\textbf{1. Classical Punishment.} Political violence seems to bear no relationship to the question of subjectivity in the nineteenth century. In this period, there were a multitude of loosely associated courts with uncertain jurisdictions and a marginal capacity to exercise systematic violence. This confusing situation existed, in part, due to political factors: the concerned parties (the imams, the shahs, and local authorities) would not surrender their general claim to judge and could not force their rivals to recognize their monopolistic pretensions. The situation existed also due to economic factors. One should not forget that religious courts were often inherited and that local notables competed for and
purchased judiciaries from the Qajar court. Jurisdictions were jealously guarded because they were sources of revenue for the court officials. Of course, this pursuit of pecuniary gain is hard to distinguish from the claim to political privilege in practice. A judge did not receive payment but rather acknowledged tribute. He did not perform a service duty; he exercised *noblesse oblige*.

In this context, punishment lacked the predictability associated with a general legal code and yet, it was not entirely arbitrary. Penal proceedings served a variety of purposes, but these ends were secured through a common set of techniques, techniques of representation. It is in this light that one can understand the importance accorded to signs as they were inscribed onto bodies, manifested in actions, or articulated in speech. It punishment was a means of ensuring domination in one's jurisdiction, then signs occupied a pivotal place by illustrating the nature of the political authority that exercised violence. In penal rituals, signs were used to illustrate royal presence, reveal religious prohibitions, or instruct others in the natural hierarchy of society. Punishment was, in the broadest sense, a political signature.

Political violence may have lacked systematicity due to conflicting jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it retained an overall coherence through the techniques of representation. These techniques involved the inscription of signs and it is not surprising, consequently, that the violence about penal rituals involved the misrepresentation of signs. In these struggles, participants engaged in a violent, farcical play, a
mashhara-pazi, of the accepted personifications of piety, justice, and political virtue. They took issue with the qualifications of a local authority, not with their subjection to a particular identity. There were probably certain contexts in which people were bound to a particular identity e.g. through training in proper manners in princely courts or through instruction in the minutiae of ritual purity in masjassas. What is important is that the punitive context was not one of them.

2. Reformatory Punishment. How is it then that the exercise of punishment came to be a mode of subjection? Classical punishments have this much in common with the punishments that followed: they were practices that inflicted pain upon an offender. They differed, however, in the meaning that was ascribed to the infliction of pain. In the nineteenth century, the infliction of pain compensated for an offense, retaliated for an injury, or deterred future misbehaviour. Increasingly, it was also said to reform offenders. Attention was drawn away from the control of outward behaviour towards the shaping of internal states of character.

If this new philosophy of punishment went unnoticed, it was largely because its proponents re-interpreted and explained classical punishments in their terms. Punishment, it was said, involved the inscription of a sign of moral condemnation and this was surely a way of communicating to the offender, as far as external symbols can, the immorality of his conduct. What was aimed at by signification was the improvement of the offender's internal character. Moreover, if this use of signs
alters the moral character of an offender, can it not have a general moral effect on the population that observes it? Finally, if the infliction of pain deters individuals from crime, it must surely do so by making them habitually law-abiding. And while men do not become morally reformed by habitual observance of laws, is this not a way of making them more disposed to enter into a state where they do behave on the basis of internal motives?

It was through arguments such as these that reformers redescribed older accounts of punishment (deterrence, retribution, and retaliation) as special cases of reformation. Moreover, they advanced a general criticism of classical punishments: if the purpose of inflicting pain was really to reform internal states of individuals, then it was evident that classical punishments either affected only temporary improvements in character or (what was more likely) altered these states for the worse. It became possible now to introduce and justify new punishments.

3. The rationalization of coercion. Can one treat this trend towards reformatory punishments as a movement of rationalization in coercion? One might observe that what is considered to be rational in penal practice seems to depend on the nature of a particular society. What an analyst counts as punitive rationality exists in the context of specific impediments and opportunities for action. Punitive rationality incorporates within it the demand for specific foresight and calculation in the face of this situation and, consequently, describes a form of conduct that fixes one's
actions or the acts of others within a particular style.

Capitalist rationality, for example, might be said to arise out of the constraints and possibilities that exist in a market situation. It captures the particular quantifying form of foresight that is required in managing capital and, consequently, describes a conduct that constrains affects and behaviour for the sake of economic interest. This quantifying rationality is only an example of a more comprehensive social phenomenon; Western "bourgeois-capitalist man" is not, after all, the only rational being on the face of the planet.33

In the study of Qajar Iran, one encounters at least two types of non-capitalist rationality, each of which is an example of what Max Weber calls "ethical rationalization."34 The rationality that characterizes ta'arof defines a kind of foresight found in a court society. It involves a sharp curbing of one's comportment, speech, and action in order to make people, honor, and prestige calculable as instruments for political advancement.35 The rationality that concerns ritual purity is distinctly different from that of ta'arof. What is at stake is one's future salvation, not one's immediate prestige within a stratified arrangement. A particular circumspection is required to deal with the acts that might jeopardize one's salvation. One is highly self-conscious of bodies and the foods, liquids, objects, and beings with which they come into contact. One also learns to decide when, where, and how to apply purgative procedures so that bodies may be cleansed and souls prepared for salvation.

Both these rationalities can be observed, to a certain
extent, in the way actors behaved in punitive contexts although they are forced into existence in other contexts such as princely courts and theological seminaries. Now, did the move away from classical punishments, the turn towards punishments that were said to reform individuals, mark the birth of a new type of rationality? No doubt, this shift marked a moment when the punitive context, perhaps for the first time, came to play a role in rationalizing subjects. However, it might be more accurate to say that this context made possible several rationalities. In this new space for action, there emerged statutory, disciplinary, tuteary, and carceral punishments, each of which illustrates a way of rationalizing subjects.

Here it is important to caution against a misleading interpretation. There is no reason to think that because all these punitive styles can be characterized as reformatory, they must have some common rationality that defines them, i.e. capitalist rationality. As I have already observed, even classical punishments could be characterized as reformatory although they could scarcely be described as bourgeois-capitalist forms of punishment. Little insight can be gained by using the characterization of punishment as a guide here. It is necessary not to think, but to look: the issue requires empirical comparison, not theoretical assumptions.

In considering the four kinds of punishment mentioned above, one does not find a common element but rather various similarities and relationships. Consider, for example, statutory punishments. In such examples, pain is inflicted indirectly through the deprivation of rights. Deprivation
occurs according to certain universal principles specified in written statutes, the laws. The laws constrain, instruct, and so habituate individuals in the proper exercise of their rights.

Now look at disciplinary punishments. They are similar in practice to statutory punishments. In disciplinary actions, individuals are isolated and punished by deprivation. They are targets of general institutional rules that govern their detention. Through these rules, they perform exercises that habituate their behaviour to certain routines. Yet there are important respects in which disciplinary punishments differ as well. Whereas statutes do not distinguish between persons who have committed the same offense, disciplinary regulations do involve such distinctions. Disciplinary regimes distinguish individuals according to their performance of routines. These judgements are based on variations from specified norms of behaviour rather than on the earlier violation of the law. Individuals are treated as objects to be normalized by the exercise of discipline rather than as subjects of a freedom to be realized through the proper training in their rights.

Turning to tutelary punishments, one finds that punishment is effected once again through isolation. In this case, individuals are placed under custody. As with discipline, the tutelary exercise is a normalizing procedure. Custodians check the progress of individuals against certain norms of behaviour and habituate them to perform correct actions. There is, however, an important difference. Custodians achieve normalizing effects not through disciplinary
drills but rather through dialogue. Individuals are not treated as objects that require training. They are treated as subjects of questioning and guidance. Tutelage emphasizes iteration, auriculation, and allocution as three ways of altering self-understanding and so behaviour. In this respect, it draws closer to statutory punishments. Both kinds of punishment involve the expression of a deeper self within the individual. It is only that, in the case of statutory punishments, individuals realize themselves as free members of a juridical community whereas, in the case of tutelary punishments, they realize themselves as normal members of a moral speech community.

Finally, consider carceral punishments, e.g., electro-shock therapy, traction therapy, drug treatments, lobotomies and other such medical remedies for criminality. They differ from the earlier examples in a general way: they involve the direct infliction of pain on an offender. However, a closer analysis points up several similarities in detail. Like statutory punishments, carceral punishments involve the isolation of an offender from society. As with discipline, their application is regulated by judgements of normalcy. In carceral regimes, individuals are characterized with reference to norms like corretable/inorretable or curable/incurable. If disciplinary punishments work over the bodies of the corretable and the curable, remedial punishments operate on the incorretable and the incurable. In both cases, the life processes of individuals are objectified and made available to manipulation. Their bodies are treated as machines which
direct pain to and alter the state of the psyche. There is also an illocutionary feature that corresponds to tutelage. The progress of individuals is followed by questioning after their personal states (How do you feel? What are you thinking of?) and their recollections (Where are you now? Where were you then? Whom do you recognize?). Individuals are enjoined upon courses of action that render them more malleable and so more receptive to observing specified norms of behaviour. In this manner, they recover and are recovered for society.

It is difficult to find something common in all these punishments which permits one to use the word 'reformatory' for all of them. Nevertheless, they do exhibit certain family resemblances that sets them apart from classical punishments. The four kinds of punishment are related to one another through a complicated network of relations. Occasionally, there are overall similarities and, sometimes, only similarities of detail.

Disciplinary rationality. No doubt, the turn to reformatory punishments is an instance of a more diffuse trend towards political reformation. Over the last century, political reformation has been the goal of many Iranians. Sometimes it was attempted through rapid and violent change (political revolution) and, at other times, through more limited, moderate changes (political reform) in policy, leadership and organization. Iranians supported one reformist faction against another but what they never questioned was the urgency of political reformation itself. Political reformation defined the state of modern Iranian politics: it was the
direction towards which most political activity tended although it was interpreted differently by contending factions.

There was once a slogan that signalled the beginning of reformatory politics in the Middle East: Nizam-i Jadid. Nizam-i Jadid is usually translated as the New Order or, sometimes, the New Army, but it might also be translated as the New Discipline. It was the phrase used to describe the measures enacted by Selim III and Mahmud II in the Ottoman Empire; Muhammad 'Ali in Egypt; and by Prince 'Abbas Mirza in Iran.

It is true that the Nizam-i Jadid was short-lived historical event in Iranian politics. These days, nobody would think of describing modern Iranian politics in these terms. The phrase itself has an archaic sound and, no doubt, all the political institutions with which it was associated disappeared a long time ago.

Yet it might be useful to distinguish carefully two aspects of the Nizam-i Jadid, to distinguish between the political institutionalization which was sought and rarely achieved in the nineteenth century and the disciplinary activity which has long since spread and proliferated outside political institutions.

In the course of the nineteenth century, an important event was taking place within the body of Qajar society: civil society was being modified by a new rationality, disciplinary rationality. This mode of thought and action was generated through the compulsion of disciplinary matrices. [See Chapter 4, Section 1, pp. 97-111.] Within these matrices, individuals
exercised a particular foresight on their conduct. They evaluated actions that maximized or impeded operational efficiency and economized their affects and behaviours accordingly. This self-corrective foresight regulated their conduct for the sake of functional interests and enabled them to manage multiple detailed tasks.

Some analysts have already pointed to the nascent appearance of capitalist rationality in Qajar Iran. They have identified numerous small and often unrelated economic activities that generated "possessive individualism" within Iranians. Less attention has been drawn to the emergence of disciplinary matrices in the latter half of the nineteenth century. They were, for the most part, quite small and fulfilled very limited aims. As with the emergence of capitalist enterprise, the degree of systematization was not as important as the historical effects of these reformatory initiatives. Disciplinary matrices inculcated corrective individualism within Iranians or, to put it another way, encouraged Iranians to practice a disciplinary ethic. Wherever such individuals came to dominate in society, they brought this form of rationality to their station.

Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated than in early modern Iranian politics when reformers, whether liberals or conservatives, gradually transformed political structures into disciplinary matrices. The reform of the military is only an example of a more general phenomenon. One could also point to the new political parties which subjected individuals to party subordination; to the new government bureaucracies which
policed and trained employees; and finally, to the court of Reza Shah itself which rewarded and punished subjects for their discharge of royal commands. In short, it was disciplinary rationality that the liberal intelligensia brought to the new Parliament during the Constitutional Revolution and that the Pahlavi reformers brought more generally to the army, the bureaucracy, and, of course, the court.

For generations, the court had been a major political formation in Iranian society. Despite considerable political chaos, the princely court and its representative members had shown a remarkable durability. Of course, there had been considerable change in courtly life over the centuries. There had been periods where some dynastic court achieved greater prominence and displaced lesser princely courts and other periods when lesser courts co-existed uneasily with one another. Nevertheless, any retrospective would repeatedly show that a prince could die, a monarch could be violently deposed, and even a particular dynasty could be completely eliminated without the character of Iranian society as a dynastic court society being altered in the least. Sooner or later, the court would be re-established by some tribal leader and individuals, calculating on political advancement and expending their prestige, would seek a place in the new court.

It is only recently that the tendency to regenerate similar courtly structures has become increasingly uncertain. It is true that the princely court survived late into the twentieth century. It existed largely as a disciplinary institution. In this respect, it was not only one among many
other reformatory organizations, but also comparatively less efficient. These considerations in themselves made the court appear to be an expendable political institution. Nothing illustrates its increasingly superfluous character as well as the constant effort to abolish it in favor of some other way of government: by Colonel Reza Pahlavi in 1924; by Premier Mossadegh in 1951; and by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. The eclipse of the royal court scarcely left a lacuna in the reformatory state.

Today, the reformatory state exhibits the same tenacity that was once characteristic of the princely court. Leadership, parties and even whole classes may be violently ousted without altering in the slightest the character of Iranian society as a society in which practices and practitioners of discipline play major roles. It is not so much that the disciplinary aspects of the state are "stable in contrast to the political structures of traditional Iran, especially that of the previous dynasty."59 Nor can one say that this training inheres in society, that is that Iranian society has become a disciplined society. One might say rather that the state is more stable than other political structures are in the present social context. This context is one in which many Iranians have learned to exercise disciplinary rationality on their conduct. Insofar as they can act according to a disciplinary ethic, they can be managed and organized into military squadrons, police patrols, administrative departments, literacy corps, and other such social formations. Reformatory states endure largely for the
same reason that allowed princely courts to resurface after political crises in the past: since so many Iranians conduct themselves according to a disciplinary ethic, it is simply easier to organize political structures according to this rationality than any other. It has become customary.

5. Capitalist Rationality. The Iranian state is not only a coercive social formation. It did not suddenly appear on 20 February 1921 hovering above, bullying, and oppressing individuals from all walks of life. It was not developed by ignoring individuals or at least a certain type of individuality. It came into being gradually by integrating disciplined individuals into particular social arrangements and, at the same time, liberating this kind of individual from the clutches of society. People passing into the orbit of the state were charged with a new savoir faire, disciplinary rationality. The state, in this respect, was a matrix of subjection.

Marxists make a similar point in their discussion of Iranian economic reforms and the state's role in promoting capitalist development. Briefly, they argue that the Iranian state guarantees the condition for capitalist development in two ways. First, the state employs violence to break down pre-existing barriers to exchange and to protect the prevailing forms of property, i.e. private property. Second, the state manages, invests, and distributes wealth in order to promote and advance the progress of a capitalist class. In both cases, state functionaries set up opportunities and impediments for economic action in such a way as to promote possessive
individualism. In undertaking economic activities, individuals come to view themselves as sole proprietors of their own persons and capacities and free only to the extent that they possess these capacities and what they have acquired by their exercise. 50 In short, the state promotes the form of subjectivity that entrenches orderly market behaviour and thereby reproduces and expands capitalist ownership and production i.e. production for exchange.

This argument becomes strangely awkward, in a European context as well as in the Iranian context, if it is insisted that possessive individualism is the only form of imposed subjectivity fostered by the state. For example, in his penetrating analysis of the Iranian state, Halliday maintains that the state promotes a class that exercises a possessive ethic but is forced to distinguish between two components of this class that display "a considerable degree of hostility" towards one another: the "private capitalist component" (defined as "capitalist landowners since the early 1960s, the bourgeoisie in trade and industry since the 1940s") and the public capitalist component (identified as "the upper stratum of state employees since the 1920s, prior to the launching of capitalist growth"). 61 This strange distinction raises some very difficult questions. Why does the upper stratum of state employees find it rational to act for and support state policies that do not promote capitalist development (at least as far as the private capitalists are concerned)? Why do state employees generally find it reasonable to implement these policies when they do not belong to either component of the
capitalist class?

One can avoid these thorny issues altogether by distinguishing disciplinarians from capitalists. The upper stratum of state officials, as Halliday observes, "depend for employment and privileges entirely on state policy."62 They and, more generally, all state employees operate within a matrix that promotes disciplinary rationality. They intervene in society (either by disposition or compulsion) as much to promote political discipline as economic exchange, as much to accumulate disciplined individuals as capital, and as much to train self-correcting individuals as to promote self-possessive individuals. From this perspective, it is not surprising that sometimes state officials conflict with capitalists. A policy may be rational from a disciplinary perspective but wholly irrational from a capitalist perspective and vice versa.

The state promotes possessive individualism not only because it reproduces and encourages capitalist enterprise, but also because, like corrective individualism, it makes subjects that are politically calculable or reliable. Individuals subject to capitalist rationality become governable in the sense that they respond to economic incentives in predictable ways and as such can be relied upon to perform certain tasks on behalf of the state. Similarly, individuals subject to disciplinary rationality become governable in the sense that they respond to regulations and commands in predictable ways and, consequently, can be relied upon to perform specific tasks on behalf of state officials. The Iranian state derives its enormous capabilities by structuring fields of action in these
ways and expecting disciplined individuals and possessive individuals to act in a predictable fashion to promote the state's goals.

Just as state officials guarantee the conditions for reproducing economic structures, they also guarantee the conditions for reproducing political structures. One cannot accept, without serious qualifications, Halliday's statement that the capitalist class "provides the social basis of the state, the sector on whose cooperation it rests and without which it could not remain in existence." As has been suggested by events in numerous countries, it is entirely possible for the state to reproduce itself in the absence of this sector and this is because capitalist rationality is not the sole rationality that characterizes the state. Socialist states may not promote a possessive ethic in their subjects, but they are no strangers to the task of promoting a disciplinary ethic. Halliday is incisive in his argument that many analysts of the Iranian state, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, fail to consider it in "the socio-economic context in which it is located." Nevertheless, by insisting that the Iranian state is characterized solely by capitalist rationality, he is "precluded, by theoretical choice, from trying to answer the broader questions raised by the Iranian state."  

**Tutelary rationality.** The Iranian state is an unfolding political structure. Perhaps one is well advised to concentrate less on the state and more on the kinds of rationality that state officials exercise and count on to
govern Iranians. Capitalist rationality describes and explains one way of governing subjects. Disciplinary rationality characterizes another form of governance. Tutelary rationality draws attention to yet another aspect of the Iranian state.

One learns to exercise this kind of forethought in the course of one’s participation in tutelary regimes. [See Chapter 8, Section 3.4, pp. 251-264 and Chapter 9, Section 2, pp. 289-301.] In these regimes, individuals are subjected to discrete kinds of observation, instructed in the care of their selves, warned of the damage any neglect of instructions may cause, and admonished, sometimes violently, for the good of their selves. In this manner, they come to guide themselves according to sound and solicitous advice. They develop a habitual disposition to observe a power that furnishes guidance rather than one that issues commands or provides incentives. They find it reasonable to observe tutelary instructions because they have an analytical solicitude for their inner self. Tutelary rationality is a qualitative reflection on the actions that may foster or damage one’s self and its constitutive elements, e.g. one’s health or sex. It describes a circumspect conduct that regulates actions in the interests of protecting this fundament.

So much has been written about the modern state’s efforts to marginalize religious institutions7 that it is difficult to think of the state as exercising what amounts to a pastoral power on its subjects—at least until recently. One should not forget, however, that political reformers marginalized the traditional pastorate largely by stripping it
of its functions. Traditionally, religious leaders instructed and advised on physical health, sexual relations, family affairs, economic well-being, protection against accidents of all sorts, and spiritual salvation. Although they never entirely surrendered their claim to deal in such matters, several other social formations assumed these functions: families, the medical establishment, educators, feminists, social workers, psychologists, employers, and the state. These groups were not concerned with the minutiae of ritual purity and how they might affect the soul. They were more interested in changing attitudes concerning the self, in demonstrating its real importance as the fundament of personal happiness and, in this manner, reforming the way in which individuals conducted themselves in various contexts.

But how important is this pastoral power to the Iranian state? From the reign of Reza Shah onwards, most governments relied on some combination of disciplinary regulations, financial incentives and tutelary instructions. They contested the right of the 'ulema to advise on anything except spiritual matters. Even this last function was disputed when, just before the Islamic Revolution, Pahlavi bureaucrats proposed a Religious Corps, on the same model as the older Literacy Corps, whose function it would be to instruct Iranians in spiritual affairs. By 1976, the state-sponsored Resurgence Party was describing the Shah as essentially exercising a power of a pastoral type over his subjects:
The Shah-in-Shah of Iran is not just the political leader of Iran. He is also in the first instance teacher and spiritual leader, an individual who not only builds his nation roads, bridges, dams and qanats, but also guides the spirit and thought and hearts of the people.

Aside from illustrating the apparently boundless enthusiasm of Pahlavi officials for the Shah, this statement also describes a style of leadership reminiscent of similar enthusiastic descriptions of Ayatollah Khomeini's authority: they are political leaders not so much because they manage capital well or promote discipline efficiently but because they exercise and govern according to a tutelary rationality. Tutelary rationality was inscribed into the structure of Pahlavi government and it was not surprising, consequently, that the effort to reform society under an Islamic tutelage found such ready supports in a multitude of political activities characteristic of the pre-revolutionary state.

All these observations point to the spread of a pastoral power to the state prior to the Islamic Revolution. One way in which Iranians became governable was by interesting them in the care of their health, sex, personal security, and salvation. By pursuing instructions regarding the care of elements deemed essential to themselves, solicitous individuals acted in predictable ways and so became more or less calculable and manageable. This was the way in which parents were taught to govern children, doctors governed patients, state social workers governed working class communities, or religious charities governed the poor. What we have is a confluence of groups around a particular way of individuating beings that is
distinctly different from disciplinary and capitalist rationality. This rationality has its importance in that it
draws attention to another way in which the state is entrenched
in Iranian society.

7. Carceral rationality. What about the state's repressive apparatus? Doesn't the Iranian state govern as much
by torture as by discipline, tutelage, and economic incentives?
Now one point should be quite clear: although a state can
mutilate, murder, or cause untold suffering by means of
torture, it cannot govern by torture. Rather, it governs by
means of rationality characteristic of carceral institutions.
Torture may play a role in supporting or even generalizing this
rationality but it does not constitute its principle or basic
nature.

Carceral rationality is not fear or terror or, to put it
another way, it refers to a particular kind of fear and terror.
For clearly every form of conduct that has been discussed thus
far is made possible by an uneasiness concerning an element
constitutive of one's subjectivity (i.e. one's health, sex,
possessions, prestige, functional abilities or salvation) if
certain actions are not undertaken. It is in learning to care
for these elements of the self that one comes to exercise a
particular rationality and so becomes somewhat predictable and
governable. Thus, to say that the state governs by means of
torture in the sense that it governs by means of fear is to say
very little indeed. The rationality with which we are
concerned here is not something as general as fear but rather
something quite specific.
Out of the new disciplinary order, there emerged a new type of supervision involving certain discourses (medicine, psychology and criminology) and procedures (treatment, detention, and policing), a type of supervision over individuals who resisted disciplinary or tutelary normalization. The carceral was a government for the incorrigible: addicts, alcoholics, recidivists, vagabonds, mendicants, lunatics, the retarded, and the sexually perverted. [See Chapter 5, Sections 1-4, pp. 172-194.] Incarceration was a ceaseless effort to instate, work over, and supervise an element of danger in such individuals. It was not so much a way of reformation as a mode of insulation.

Individuals were isolated through three tactics. The first tactic was to localize, render more conspicuous, and isolate individuals. It was often a question of disassociating individuals from the shelter of their social milieu by warnings concerning the dangers they posed to the public. As such, isolation was a task not merely carceral agents (policemen, social workers and educators) but for the informed public or, rather, a public of informers. One can call this tactic moralization. The second tactic was to question, diagnose, and treat individuals. Here, it was a question of handling the dangers specific to their personalities by applying the right reformatory technology (penal, medical or psychiatric). One can call this tactic remediation. The third tactic was to induce individuals to report on a regular basis. It was a question of providing them conditional liberties, exploiting their dependance on certain commodities (e.g. drugs), rewarding
constant reporting, and suggesting the possibility of further treatment. This tactic presupposed the existence of a hierarchy of surveillance, one that was partly official (officers, welfare inspectors, and doctors) and partly private if not secret (relatives, employers, informers, and undercover agents). One can call this tactic parole.

To the extent that individuals were made insular, dependant, and vulnerable through this kind of regimen, they were fairly easily co-opted and deployed by carceral agencies. Indeed, carceral government produced and relied upon insular individuals, individuals who were set apart from society as much by their own activities as by the process of incarceration. The delinquent was the most visible example of this kind of individual. Delinquents were tolerated precisely because they could be so easily identified and controlled. They were not only criminals but often also informers, pimps, or agents provocateurs. Delinquency was a controlled illegality. It was a way of life that simultaneously ostracized individuals and made them more manipulable.

How important were incarcerated individuals in modern Iranian politics? By the 1940s, delinquents had become visible agents of social control. They were employed to crush factory unrest, to disrupt anti-government demonstrations, and to control other kinds of illegalities such as prostitution. They also played a role in restoring Mohammad Reza Shah to the throne in 1953. Their increasing prominence marks the disturbing moment when criminality was integrated into the procedures through which Iranians were governed. The
Delinquent had joined the soldier, the bureaucrat, the social worker and the capitalist as a representative figure of the modern state apparatus.

Delinquents were only the first incarcerated individuals to play significant political roles. In subsequent years, other incarcerated individuals assumed many of these roles: "workers, farmers, students, professors, teachers" as well as members of guilds, "political parties and other associations." These individuals were not only isolated by incarceration but also isolated themselves by informing, recanting or confessing to raise crimes. To the extent that they were incarcerated by these activities, they were easily governable once they were released. They developed a habitual disposition to observe a carceral power, a power that provided conditions and served warnings. They found it reasonable to observe police instructions because they had a stake in their insularity. Carceral rationality was a calculus of the actions that disclosed or disguised one's identity. It describes a hyper-vigilant conduct that regulates actions in the interests of anonymity.

How important were these incarcerated individuals to the operation of the Iranian state? One can get an idea of their importance by considering the enigma of the Pahlavi secret police, SAVAK. Although SAVAK had a reputation for being a pervasive force in Iranian society, the actual organization was quite small. Estimates of its size vary from 3120 to 60,000 members. It would be difficult to explain the enormous power attributed to SAVAK without referring to its carceral
networks. SAVAK may have been a small organization but it governed a vast number of incarcerated individuals. In 1974, it was estimated that approximately 3 million Iranians served this carceral agency as "part-time informers." This participation accounts for the enormous capabilities attributed to SAVAK for it made possible a constant, pervasive surveillance of Iranian society.

SAVAK was able to function only with the support of a carceral archipelago. What I have called a torture complex [Chapter 5, Section 5, p. 198-200] was a carceral regime for political prisoners, a "poliregime" to use Solzhenitsyn's expression. A poliregime did not differ from other carceral regimes in the tactics that characterized it. It was also a regime concerned with incorrigibles, individuals who resisted disciplinary or tutelary normalization. Incarceration was still an effort to instate, work over and insulate a state of danger in individuals. Prisons were still the great instruments of recruitment. Individuals were not only isolated but encouraged, by violence or persuasion, to isolate themselves. Carceral agencies used incarcerated individuals to initiate or participate in anti-government agitation and thereby to control political resistance. In short, torture complexes were only that part of the carceral archipelago that stood in political waters.

But it would be a mistake to make too much of this formulation. From a strictly juridical perspective, it can be argued that torture complexes involve an extension of carceral rationality on a political, rather than a civil, register. But
this would draw attention away from a much more salient feature of the carceral archipelago, namely, that in that context, the distinction between political and civil crime is glossed over by the emphasis on normality. Individuals are incarcerated not so much because they have committed crimes but because, inherent in their acts, there are indications of the potential danger they pose to society. Crime, whether it is political or civil, is a symptom of abnormality and, consequently, requires incarceration to insulate the danger posed by the criminal. To the extent that judicial distinctions become increasingly superfluous in this context, the juridical perspective also becomes less adequate as a description of carceral government.

It is well known that the Iranian state has a particularly violent history. What is interesting is that "the degree of state political control in Iran has gone far beyond that in other capitalist states in the third world which have superficially similar repressive regimes." The Iranian state has been particularly violent even by the standards of similar states. What accounts for the extent of violence? There have been periods when the state encountered extensive political opposition but it would be difficult to explain the degree of political violence simply with reference to these political crises. As Halliday puts it, "in itself this is not an adequate answer since the repression continued long after 1953 and 1963, when it might have been thought to be most needed to crush opposition." The question is why did such extensive violence persist in the absence of any coherent opposition to
the state?

Some analysts have argued that the persistent violence points to the extremely fragile foundations of the Iranian state. Abrahamian puts the matter in these terms:

But [the political structure built by Reza Shah] was unstable in comparison with the political structures of the modern world, particularly those of the West. For the new regime, despite impressive institutions, had no viable class bases, no sound social props and was thus without firm civilian foundations. The Pahlavi state, in short, was strong in as much as it had at its disposal powerful means of coercion. But it was weak in that it failed to cement its institutions of coercion into the class structure. 76

Insofar as the state was unable to enlist a class to exercise coercion on its behalf, the state itself was prone to violence.

The state increasingly resorted to violence to control class and ethnic opposition, so much so that by 1941 many Europeans as well as Iranians were speculating whether repression would work indefinitely, whether junior officers would overthrow the regime, or whether social tensions would sooner or later bring about a bloody revolution. 77

Halliday explains persistent state repression in a similar way:

A further reason [for continued repression] would seem to be the uncertain base of the Pahlavi monarchy itself, the uneasy link to the Iranian bourgeoisie and weak ideological support which the latter provided. The fragile implantation of the Pahlavi state even half a century after it was founded is probably the fundamental reason why it has to suppress discussion of criticism, even when no coherent opposition movement was presenting a challenge to it. 78

Both analysts construe the sole function of the state's carceral apparatus to be crushing any resistance to the state. From this presupposition, it follows that if the state persists in detaining and torturing civilians in the absence of a visible political crisis, it must be that there exists considerable tacit opposition. And this must imply that the
state has no reliable civilian foundations.

This argument is incomplete insofar as it presents a curiously partial description of the Iranian carceral archipelago. Incarceration was not merely a way of repressing open opposition but also a way of accumulating utile and manipulable individuals. It was a way of supporting a general surveillance. Carceral agencies, in this respect, were nodes in a complicated nexus of subjection. Their constant surveillance served to incorporate individuals by the force of their circumstances into various reformatory initiatives. It is in the light of this richer characterization of the carceral apparatus that one can understand not only why violence persisted in the absence of formidable opposition to the state but also why it was inflicted even on those suspected of the most trivial of offenses.

Is this to say that the Iranian state does not have fragile civilian foundations? There have been periods, of course, when the state lacked the support or even provoked the active resistance of ethnic groups, religious denominations, and economic classes. In this sense, the state did have weak civilian foundations at particular moments. However, this observation falls short of the broad generalizations concerning fragility of the state. While the support of a particular class or group might be useful to the state, the state was capable of governing in the absence of such support. The range of capabilities that characterized the state would not have been possible without specific kinds of individuals. The state produced and counted on subjects who conformed by habit to
discipline, tutelage, policing, incentives, or laws. It exercised enormous powers on classes and groups through such individuals. This feature of the Iranian state does not suggest a fragile implantation. Furthermore, each successive effort to resist or seize the state has involved a further dispersion of specific forms or conduct, habitual dispositions upon which the state relied. In this sense, the state was not only cemented into the civilian population but was becoming increasingly more entrenched into this population with each successive social struggle. One can put this claim more generally:

Over the last century, there have been major ethnic and class conflicts in Iranian society. Analysts conventionally describe these situations as struggles to seize power and direct political structures to function in the interests of those who govern. This kind of description would be misleading if it is supposed that power was something that could be found in Tehran or somewhere therein and all that these groups did was seize it. In such a statement, there would be a failure to recognize that the problem was not to seize power, but to make power.

A century ago, Iranian society was characterized by the overwhelming absence of power. There was little or no power to be seized and that which did exist was lost just as quickly as it was gathered. The exercise of power involved an enormous expenditure of highly limited resources for temporary gains. The Qajars described their own capacity to exercise political
violence in precisely these terms. "That is real power," said the King; "but then it has no permanence." 79

Remarkably, in less than a century, such power has become a permanent element of Iranian society. It has been made by shaping groups and subjecting individuals to specific rationalities for reform, some of which are illustrated by reformatory punishments. Many Iranians learned to organize their actions according to a certain rationality and, what amounts to the same thing, to become predictable for the actions of others. New durable social structures came into existence because they could count on these habitual patterns of individual action.

The Iranian state was one such structure. When reformers assumed control at Tehran, they did not really seize power. Rather, they brought a particular way of conduct to political structures. They systematized coercion and reformed subjects according to particular political rationalities. Once any particular rationality gained this kind of political salience, it was understandable as a general strategy for reform.

Modern Iranian politics finds its most general expression in the idea of government. Government is the art by which subjects come to provide a rationale for their conduct and, through habitual subjection to this rationality, become politically reliable or calculable. In Iran, the particular constitution of government has shifted over time. Specific governments have relied on different combinations of discipline, tutelage, policing, incentives, and laws. These shifts occurred due to the support or resistance of groups and
classes. They facilitated the domination of particular ethnic and religious groups (e.g. Shi’ites or Persians) and supported certain exploitative economic relations (i.e. capitalism). It would be difficult, however, to reduce these relations of subjection to either economic exploitation or political domination. The state derives its tenacious grip on Iranian society as much from its subjects as from its economic resources and its coalitions.

The analysis of the Iranian state cannot be separated from the subjects Iranians have become. The political development of the state is intimately bound up with who, what and how Iranians are. For some time now, Iranian writers have been concerned with uncovering the essence of this relationship. Is it the link between wastitis and regimentation as Al-e Ahmad argued? Or is it revealed in the primordial connection between torture and cannibalism as Baraheni insisted? Or is the essence of Iranian subjection to be found in some other relation? There are good reasons for doubting whether such reductivist efforts can ever sufficiently clarify this vinculum.

Contemporary writers speak of modern Iranian character as if some older authentic essence had been displaced by some counterfeit imposition. Lurking behind their analysis is a romantic longing for the restoration of true Iranian selfhood. Baraheni expresses this longing in this way:
So many values—and styles of values—have been imposed on us, that we cannot be sure of any kind of indigenous roots or identities. Wherever we look, we find objects, faces and values from other places, and we ask: Where are our own objects, our own values and faces? Where are our identities? Where are we as human beings? Baraheni, however, cannot have it both ways. In order to even ask these questions, one must suppose some knowledge of what is authentic to Iranians, namely, that such authenticity exists. But this is precisely the kind of knowledge that Baraheni has ruled out. Nostalgia of this sort betrays not simply the inability to follow the logical consequences of an argument but also an inability to confront the meaningless-ness of the Iranian condition. To say that Iranians can no longer be sure of what is authentic to their identities is to undermine the very search for an authentic Iranian identity.

If Al-e Ahmad and Baraheni are correct in their evaluation of the Iranian condition, Iranians cannot escape their condition through the restoration of some authentic subjectivity. To yearn for this lost essence is to engage in a form of self-deception. It is to avert one's face from the death of Iranian authenticity and to engage in the sterile, even disingenuous, task of contriving some equally counterfeit form of "authentic" selfhood. By this maneuver, one does not alter one's condition; one merely alters its expression.

What is intriguing is not the search for our supposed being or Iranian-ness but the different reports to the self that are glossed over by this "essence." Iranian identity is not an essence, but a history. It is nothing other than the relations we have to ourselves and each of these relations have
a history. From this perspective, the Iranian character plays two roles. On the one hand, it is a partition that divides us from others by immobilizing and incarcerating us. On the other hand, it is a persona that simultaneously expresses and suffocates us. Iranian identity plays the double role of subjecting us and handing us over to the state.

The death of our authenticity would be an event that would be celebrated far and wide were it not for the hold of this identity that simultaneously individualizes and binds us to a totalitarian state. Today, we play a dangerous game in which some struggle for an authentic Iranian consciousness and others claim to have restored it. In this politics of authenticity, the danger is to think we have a stake in the outcome.

We cannot hope to rise above the relations that bind us to ourselves by appealing to our Iranian identity. This too is a relation of subjection, a nihilistic value that exacts a gruesome price in flesh and blood. But we can modify this subjection - as we have done for most of this century - by our critical activities in the present.
FOOTNOTES

1. The periods to which I refer can be specified to a certain extent. They are the late Qajar period (1880-1904); the late Constitutional period (1911-1925); and the period following the Second World War (1945-1959). These periods are not as thoroughly documented as those that followed them. What I offer here is an interpretation of their significance to the formation of modern Iranian politics.


3. Harney provides the most extensive inventory and evaluation of the tactics that characterized the Islamic Revolution (Desmond Harney, "Some Explanations for the Iranian Revolution," Asian Affairs 11:2 (June 1980): 937). His argument is important insomar as it puts into question an often unspoken impression of the Islamic revolution, namely, that the revolution was an anarchic and disorderly event.

What then were the weapons of the revolution? Most important—and this is what gave it its religious hallmark—was the use of the masses. Next was the use of the strike weapon, selectively applied where practice showed it to be most effective. And then there were the attacks on popular targets like banks, and the co-ordinated slogan and graffiti campaigns and the use of the Press, and of psychology such as the devilishly successful Central Bank list of those who had sent their millions abroad. At one stroke, this ruse destroyed the morale of the upper class. Violence, contrary to the received opinion, was not a weapon except in so far as by encouraging the "martyrdom" of its adherents, the revolution sought by provoking violence from the security forces to inculpate them in the eyes of the people and world opinion—and succeeded. And finally, confusion by rumor and doubt. So many of these tactics are unmistakably those of the radical Left than the mullahs. I am sure if I asked some of you to recall you reading of the press last year and to say what were the characteristics of the revolution, you would reply "disorder and anarchy." I would say the reverse. I would say "discipline and orchestration." If you watched the revolution, little of it happened by accident: it was carefully orchestrated. And the other thing that one noticed was that the mobs on the street were not mobs: they were demonstrators doing certain things. And if you watched a million people marching, you could only be impressed by the astonishing display of discipline. It was something one
way always told, knowing Tehran traffic, that the
Iranians were entirely incapable of. (emphasis mine)

To revolt is not to act with wild abandon but, as Harney puts
it, to do certain things to oneself or to others (organize,
instruct and discipline) and each of these ways of conducting
subjects has a cultural history. No doubt, one can question
Harney's suggestion that the Islamic revolution was carefully
orchestrated by some (Leftist?) source. Nevertheless, it would
be difficult to deny his claim that the tactics and modes of
conduct that made them possible were integral features of
revolutionary activity.

"In an important analysis of political conflict during
the late Safavid period, Reid emphasizes both the diverse and
the widespread nature of social resistance. See James J. Reid,
Tribalism and Society in Islamic Iran 1500-1629 (Malibu, CA:

Reid points out that "blocks of social resistance to
central authority, or to subordinating authority, represented
every state of social organization possible at that time, from
genealogical and semi-genealogical tribes, to religious orders,
guilds and associations of the Safavid netherworld" (Reid, p.
141). He observes that this heterogeneous resistance in the
lower levels of society possessed the same goals as the
organized diplomacy or the royal court: to break down any
emerging tribal confederation. "There must not have been a
great deal of unity among them at the outset, but they had one
thing in common with each other and with the Shah—they opposed
domination by greater qizilbash cneftans" (Reid, p. 143).

Reid concedes that economic exploitation played an
important role in triggering such diverse conflicts (Reid, pp.
135-138), but he notes that such exploitation did not bring to
the fore a new class of social actors defined by their relation
to the mode of production. Rather, economic struggles tended
to reproduce the old forms of political domination. "The
widespread nature of these lower-level social movements must
not be overemphasized, however, since on many occasions, these
bands became tribalized or actually formed part of a tribe to
begin with. Their existence was nonetheless a fact, whatever
social form they eventually evolved into....The processes of
disruption on the lower levels of society certainly resembled
class struggle, though in fact the processes were not" (Reid,
p. 143).

As Reid observes, the collapse of Safavid society led to
the re-emergence of large tribal confederations in the
eighteenth century, a period in which most regions of the
Iranian plateau "became tribalized" (Reid, p. 151). For a
historical account of this transition, see Laurence Lockhart,
The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation
of Persia (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1958); John R. Perry, Karim Khan Zand: A History of Iran 1747-1779
(Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 1979); and Nikki R. Keddie,
Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran


Abrahamian provides a particularly rich description of political conflict under the Qajars, relating it, on the one hand, to communal organization and, on the other hand, to the style of Qajar rule. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Limited Paperback Editions, 1982), pp. 26-32 (hereafter cited as Abrahamian, Iran). Abrahamian maintains that there is an important transition from communal conflicts to class conflicts in the course of the nineteenth century (Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 33-36). Similarly, Keddie notes that "in the early nineteenth century, ties between richer and poorer in tribe or clan, city guild, faction, or quarter, religious community, including Sufi orders and the ulama corps, were often felt more strongly than were regional class ties between persons with similar relations to the mode of production." However, by the late Qajar period, the nature of political conflict has changed, and "we find nationwide mass movements with unprecedented coordination and some self-conscious regional and national social and class groups" (Keddie, pp. 36-37).

Hodgson agrees that economic exploitation was an important factor in shaping social conflict in this period. Nevertheless, he adds that "more subtly, the Western cultural presence overshadowed men's minds. A European physician was looked to necessarily as a sage; and the European embassies--already in the Napoleonic time representing the British-French rivalry--were at the center of foreign policy and of the sense of status that was bound up in that for an Iranian monarch." See Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Volume III: The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Ties (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 154-155.

*Here, I follow the suggestion of several scholars who have emphasized the importance of subjection and struggles against it in contemporary societies including Frantz Fanon, Octavio Paz, Edward Said, Michel Foucault and, as I shall argue, several modern Iranian writers. For some important treatments of the subject as well as its pertinence to the

More recently, Eric Wolf has drawn attention to the question of subjectivity and its relation to economic exploitation in developing areas. See Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History*, with Cartographic Illustrations by Noel L. Diaz (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), pp. 354-356. Wolf observes that while most analysts emphasize the emergence of new laboring classes throughout this region, they do not ask how and through what devices these populations became a proletariat, that is, behave and think as *animal laborans*. He notes that most research on economic exploitation is concerned with what is absent in laboring classes, namely, the conditions and characteristics that would lead to class conflict, conditions "that had once been and no longer were or conditions yet to come." "Less was said," he points out, "of what was present, the relational matrix and content of working class existence." Wolf attempts to compensate for this deficiency by laying out the elements of what he calls a "labor regime," a regime through which individuals becomes subjects of their labor.

In this manner, Wolf makes valuable progress in mapping out genealogies of labor in the Third World. His work is, nevertheless, only preliminary. It still remains to examine not merely the traffic in goods and workers, but also in peoples and diseases; not only the relations of production, but also of war; not only the accumulation of capital, but also of health, sexuality, sanity, and discipline; not merely the order of the plantation and the factory, but also the distribution of space's in general; not exclusively the genealogy of labor, but also the genealogies of subjects.

In his statistical study of political violence in modern Iran, Kazemi concludes that political violence is only

Kazemi's analysis has the additional merit of emphasizing the diverse character of political violence in modern Iranian history. Kazemi observes that in certain types of conflicts (especially tribal rebellions), political factors have been as salient as economic factors. He remarks that there may be changes in the type and quality of political violence, changes which a quantitative approach would not necessarily register. Finally and, for my purposes, most importantly, he notes that the nature of political violence may also vary with respect to the changes in the way the state represses its population (Kazemi, p. 82).


There can be no question of providing a complete history of the various analyses of subjectivity written by modern Iranians with all their individual differences. I only intend to use the works of Ali-e Ahmad and Baraheni to illustrate the importance of this theme and to draw attention to two rather different approaches to the analysis of Iranian political conditions. It might be useful, nevertheless, to briefly distinguish this interpretation from Hillman's important analysis of the Iranian writers' movement in the twentieth century. See Michale C. Hillman, "The Modernist Trend in

Hillman takes issue with the claim that modern Persian literature has been, for the most part, non-political. Hillman observes that, in this literature, social commitment is a corollary of literary commitment. He argues that modern Iranian writers have constituted "since the 1920s, an important social movement" and must be analyzed partly in these terms (Hillman, p. 8).

Hillman's analysis, however, is hampered by his notion of a social movement. Hillman defines social movements either with reference to their distinct socio-political consciousness or to their capacity to mobilize human resources. Hillman's difficulty is that neither the idealist approach nor the materialist analysis explains the characteristics of the Iranian writers' movement. On the one hand, Iranian writers did not develop 'positive group plans and programs' that might serve to attract a large popular following (Hillman, p. 24). They explicitly rejected the notion that they were a movement akin to a political party. As they remarked in a self-assessment of their own activities in the late seventies: "We assert that we did not define any specific course of action or aims" (Golshiri, cited in Hillman, p. 73). On the other hand, they did not seek to develop an authentic political consciousness that would distinguish them as a group from the power structures they criticized (Hillman, p. 19). They did not see themselves as embodying a proletarian or a religious consciousness, or, at any rate, 'right' consciousness was not a prerequisite for being an Iranian writer.

It is this explicit rejection of conventional traits of a social movement that Hillman finds distressing. He objects that a social movement that does not set out to mobilize a population is doomed to irrelevance (Hillman, p. 23) just as a social movement that does not develop a genuine political consciousness is doomed to colonization by existing power structures (Hillman, p. 24). It is not surprising that he concludes that the Iranian writers' movement was politically irresponsible or, in other words, "a failure" (Hillman, p. 17).

No doubt, if one accepts Hillman's criteria for a social movement, the Iranian writers' movement was a failure. But it might be well worth considering this movement on its own terms rather than forcing upon it criteria for what counts as a social movement. This approach is appropriate in this case given the fact that Iranian writers themselves were fairly self-conscious of the ways in which they differed from other social movements.

What is important about the Iranian writers' movement is that it was principally defined with reference to its conflict with state functionaries on the issue of censorship. Various writers may have been concerned with economic exploitation, political domination, and Western ideological hegemony, but, as a social group, the main concern of Iranian writers was the overwhelming presence of censorship (Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, "Protest and Perish: A History of the Writers Association of Iran," *Iranian Studies* 18:2-4 (Spring-Autumn 1985): 189-229).
It is probably appropriate that the death of the
Constitutionalist poet Bahar, the last poet to receive the
title *Malik Ash-Shu'ara* [Prince of Poets] from the court
coincided with the emergence of a new relationship between the
state and writers. The Pahlavi state was concerned less with
rewarding and punishing intellectuals and more with
disciplining and promoting them. It did not set out to
suppress particular writers as much as it sought to cultivate a
particular attitude on the part of the intelligentsia. See
Michael C. Hillman, "Reza Baraheni: A Case Study of Politics
and the Writer in Iran, 1953-1977," *Literature East and West*
Hillman, "Baraheni").

Not surprisingly, Iranian writers became interested
with the question of subjection: not only because it was a
question that seemed to confront Iranians but also because it
was a question that confronted writers in particular. By 1941,
in a preface to his *Varag-e-raz-e-za-yi Zendan* [Scrap of Paper
from Prison], Bozorg Alavi was already alluding to the forms of
self-censorship that were set into motion within the prison
system. By 1979, Iranian writers were pointing to the spread
of this carceral rationality throughout society. Bayazzati
described this development as a two-pronged strategy,
involving, on the one hand, "an agency for direct supervision"
and, on the other hand, "a flowing invisible force...rearing
its head now as an economic threat, now as a local influence,
now as the head of an office, now as an old maid guarding
female virtues" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 206). Similarly, Sa'edi was
concerned not only with concrete cases of censorship but as a
particular form of artistic subjectivity in which the
individual learns "to censor himself" (Karimi-Hakkak, p. 205).

The Iranian writers’ movement does not display the
characteristics usually associated with social movements but
this does not mean that it ‘failed’ as a movement. Instead, it
suggests the emergence of a new kind of social movement, a
movement concerned with localized achievements rather than
universal mobilization and with critical examination of
subjection rather than reproduction of new totalized forms of
consciousness. Iranian writers may have been, as Hillman
argues, vain and pessimistic characters, but, as writers, they
were familiar with state censorship and did organize to
confront this new political relation. This is no small
achievement. Nor is their any indication that the nature of this
conflict or the difficulty of the intellectuals’ task has
altered in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution (contrary to
Hillman, p. 25).

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an English translation, see Jalal Al-e Ahmad, *Plagued by the West* (Gardzazegi), trans. Paul Sprachman,
English translation includes passages that are missing in the
Persian text in my possession and appears to be based on a more complete Persian edition. Consequently, I shall cite both works, the Persian text first and, subsequently, the Sprachman translation (hereafter cited as Sprachman).


15. Al-e Ahmad, p. 5; Sprachman, p. 3.
16. Ibid., p. 102; Sprachman, p. 99.
17. Ibid., p. 7; Sprachman, p. 4.
18. Ibid., pp. 102-103; Sprachman, p. 99.
19. Ibid., p. 101; Sprachman, p. 97.
20. Ibid., p. 103; Sprachman, p. 99.
21. Ibid., p. 103; Sprachman, pp. 99-100.
22. Ibid., p. 61; Sprachman, p. 56.
23. Ibid., p. 65; Sprachman, p. 59.
24. Ibid., p. 21 (incomplete); Sprachman, p. 19.
25. Ibid., p. 31; Sprachman, p. 32.
27. Al-e Ahmad, pp. 5-6; Sprachman, p. 3.
29. Al-e Ahmad, p. 21; Sprachman, p. 19.
30. Ibid., p. 104; Sprachman, pp. 100-101.
31. Sprachman, p. 50.
32. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
33. Ibid., footnote 100, p. 50.
34. Al-e Ahmad, p. 21; Sprachman, p. 19.
35. Ibid., p. 5; Sprachman, p. 3.
36. Ibid., p. 71; Sprachman, p. 67.
37. Ibid., pp. 73-74; Sprachman, p. 69.
See Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons, trans. Ephraim Fischhoff (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1963; Beacon Paperback, 1964). In this work, Weber provides a pluralistic interpretation of rationalization. He distinguishes between economic rationalization, political rationalization, and ethical rationalization. Ethical rationalization refers to the efforts of a priestly class to systematize ethical precepts, an effort which usually occurs in moments of conflict with political authorities (Weber, pp. 30, 24). Weber observes that ethical rationalization is not only distinguishable from economic rationalization by its interest (i.e. salvation rather than wealth), but precisely for this reason comes into conflict with it (Weber, p. 216) Similarly, he notes that political rationalization comes into conflict with economic rationalization by virtue of its different end (Weber, p. 235). These observations would seem to suggest that Weber's analysis of rationalization ought not to be taken as a conflict between rationality and irrationality, but as the interrelation and conflict between different activity-related rationalities.


*Ibid., p. 61.*


*Ibid., pp. 82-83.*

*Ibid., p. 84.*

*Ibid., p. 78.*


Charles Issawi ed., The Economic History of Iran: 1800-1814 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). Issawi's selections draw attention to diverse economic initiatives that led to the integration of Iran in the world market and the gradual formation of a national market. Such a transition depended on individuals who would sell and buy labour, that is, on the creation of a working class and a bourgeoisie. The selection from the work of a Russian political scientist, Z. Z. Abdullaev, provides an account of the formation of such individuals (Issawi, pp. 42-52).

Abrahamian, Iran, p. 149.

Several analysts have made this point in their studies of the emergence of modern European states including Weber, Foucault, Oestereich, Dunn, and Elias. It might be added that sometimes possessive individualism is not even a form of imposed subjectivity since modern states often require individuals to think of 'their' capacities as products of 'their' state and so at the disposal of the state to expend in a variety of activities, e.g. in war.


Halliday, Iran, p. 42.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 41.

Communist states inherit this disciplinary ethic from Leninism. Lenin's heritage includes, among other things, an emphasis on party discipline (What Is To Be Done? (1902), One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back (1904)) and a role for a disciplined, delegated bureaucratic structure that would suppress remnants of the old ruling class, and regulate the distribution of economic resources in the transition to communism (The State and Revolution (1917)). Huntington and Wolin have drawn attention to Lenin's emphasis on organizational discipline (Huntington, pp. 334-343), and Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), pp. 421-429). For a more recent treatment of the relationship between Leninism and the development of communist states, see A.J. Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984).


The enigma of SAVAK concerns not only its size but also its efficiency. Graham emphasizes the inefficiency of SAVAK:

This said, the aura of efficiency that tends to surround SAVAK is exaggerated and misleading. SAVAK is clumsy, interfering and cruel; and, as an organisation, riddled with administrative and personal pettiness, frequently blinded by a bully-boy mentality. Though effective, the blanket approach to security that SAVAK had adopted is inefficient.

Others argue that SAVAK's inefficiency has been exaggerated by opposition forces. Cottam prudently summarizes the argument in this way: "How efficient was SAVAK? There is really no way of knowing" (Cottam, p. 326).

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Not surprisingly, analysts have been skeptical of such descriptions. Although the extent of civil violence has been substantial when compared with regimes like Brazil, there is no evidence to suggest that it bears any similarity to such extreme cases as Cambodia and Uganda. For a criticism of post-revolutionary accounts, see Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 176-177.

75 Ibid., p. 50. See also Rubin, p. 178.

76 Abrahamian, Iran, p. 149.

77 Ibid., p. 164.

78 Halliday, Iran, p. 50. Halliday makes a more specific claim with reference to the role of the army in the Islamic Revolution (Halliday, "Theses," p. 86). He argues that "the army could not seize power from the Shah because it had no supporting civilian activists. This empirical observation, however, does not support his more general claim that the army had extremely fragile civilian foundations.


80 Baraheni, p. 83.
CHAPTER XI

IMAGES OF TORTURE

It is easy to imagine and work out in full detail events which, if they actually came about, would throw us about in all our judgements. If I were sometime to see quite new surroundings from my window instead of the long familiar ones, if things, humans and animals were to behave as they never did before, then I should say something like "I have gone mad"; but that would merely be an expression of giving up the attempt to know my way about. And the same thing might befall me in mathematics. It might e.g. seem as if I kept on making mistakes in calculating, so that no answer seemed reliable to me. But the important thing about this for me is that there isn't a sharp line between such a condition and a normal one.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Any serious exploration of occult, surrealistic, phantasmagoric gifts and phenomena presupposes a dialectical intertwine-ment to which a romantic turn of mind is impervious. For histrionic or fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious takes us no further; we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize it in the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday.

Walter Benjamin

This study may need more than two concluding chapters, but in the end it would still be possible to doubt whether or not one could be brought closer to the subject of torture by means of conclusions. There have been many writers who have wasted no time in responding to questions posed by modern tortures. They have asked questions such as "What is
torture?"; "How is it related to contemporary values, practices, ideologies, or philosophies?"; and "What place should it occupy in political theory and policy?" They have been eager to establish the truth of these questions and, as it often turns out, they have been in secure possession of their questioning. There is very little one can say about such definitive and decisive conclusions. Except, perhaps, that in such cases, one should not give the impression that one is questioning. And it might be well worth reflecting on the fact that the questions posed by modern tortures have become no clearer despite so many decisive conclusions.

By way of illustrating this last point, consider two recent reviews of the literature on political repression. The first review is addressed to members of the American Political Science Association by David Pion-Berlin, the winner of the 1985 Gabriel A. Almond Award for the best doctoral dissertation completed and accepted during 1983 or 1984 in the field of comparative politics. The second assessment is by Michel Foucault and is addressed to a group of radical French historians. These reviews do not agree on every point but they are united on one; viz. the absence of any analysis of political repression.

It is indeed remarkable, given the extent and gravity of human rights abuses in the last ten to fifteen years, that so little theorizing has been done about it. The subject of political repression in Latin America and throughout the world has not received the attention it deserves. In fact, the first volume to concern itself exclusively with the subject of state terror—as opposed to civilian terror—was not published until 1984!

The non-analysis of fascism is one of the most important
political facts of the past thirty years. It enables fascism to be used as a floating signifier, whose function is essentially that of denunciation. The procedures of every form of power are suspected of being fascist, just as the masses are in their desires. There lies beneath the affirmation of the desire of the masses for fascism a historical problem which we have yet to secure the means of resolving.2

For both these theorists, the problem is not that there are no studies of political repression. On the contrary, they acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on this issue.3 The problem lies in the fact that there are no studies of political repression conducted without the support of "conventional wisdom."4 Wherever conventional wisdom has assisted in the writing of a study on repression, what has been written has not been a thought-provoking analysis of repression but a further conclusive "non-analysis."5

There are several ways of writing a conclusive non-analysis of torture. One can write a sensationalist account of torture. In this approach, one describes the real truth about torture by emphasizing the mysterious horrors associated with a secretive practice. In this manner, one not only renders torture even more incomprehensible but, unhappily, plays a role in supporting carceral rationality. Social scientists often point to the role of ideologies in explaining torture, but very few consider the important role of "rumor, gossip, story, and chit-chat"6 in weaving "a dense web of magical realism"7 about torture. Or one may write a reductionist account of torture. In this approach, one describes the real truth about torture by reducing it to theoretical errors, historical circumstances, perversions of
otherwise pure ideologies, or the general problem of political imprisonment throughout the world. This was the way European Marxists wrote about the Soviet Gulag and the way in which American politicians accounted for Latin American tortures. Unfortunately, it is not difficult to see how, through such accounts, convictions become prisons: torture is not only explained, but also made more tolerable.

While we have no trouble recognizing the ways in which these accounts of torture are misleading, we have a much harder time recognizing the ways in which our philosophical accounts of punishment mislead us when we approach the subject of torture as political theorists. These accounts narrow the field of legitimate social scientific inquiry while our scholarly activity further entrenches the theoretical accounts. It is no wonder that Foucault and Pion-Berlin are suspicious of studies of repression that are guided by conventional wisdom. In these studies, conclusions become theoretical consolations: the immanent account of punishment through which one sees torture never comes into question while the literal re-presentation of torture is taken to be the real truth about torture.

In this study, my task has been preparatory. I have analyzed modern tortures through a cautious empirical approach, one that hazards to set torture free for thought. By this characterization, I do not mean to suggest that I have described torture as it really is, if such were possible. (One might observe that there is no shortage of accounts that tell us what torture really is.) Rather, I have experimented with
what it might be like if one considered torture without the support of conventional presuppositions about punishment. I have sought to provoke critical thought concerning torture and, perhaps, to make all-too-easy, philosophical habits much more difficult to exercise. I have set out, in other words, to dislodge certain natural and tempting misconceptions. In the case of torture, these temptations are particularly inviting and, correspondingly, a different perspective much more difficult for us to appreciate. Insofar as I have a positive account of torture, it is an account whose chief purpose is to act as an antidote to mistaken or misleading claims about torture.

But what does this exercise prepare us for? It makes it possible to ask a simple and possibly naive question. Do the accounts for understanding political violence that have been developed over the last century have any real residual capacity to direct us in the face of the world which now confronts us, a world in which one out of every three governments tortures its citizens? Do they still have any real explanatory, imaginative, or even moral purchase upon this world or are they simply consoling stories ritualistically recited in the face of events they cannot grasp or understand? Having established this questioning as my prospective task, I will now consider four possible explanations of modern tortures: the humanist-progressivist hypothesis (pp. 3-4); the developmentalist hypothesis (pp. 14-15); the state terrorism hypothesis (pp. 15-17); and the revisionist-Nietzschean hypothesis as it is formulated by Michel Foucault (pp. 8-9).
A century ago, many historians argued that torture had been permanently abolished from Europe and would shortly disappear throughout the world due to the spread of progressive democratic governments, rational jurisprudence, and enlightened regard for human rights. Contemporary humanists acknowledge that modern history has not conformed to this description and fault earlier humanists for their naive confidence in the inevitable progress of mankind. Nevertheless, they do have an explanation for why torture exists in the contemporary world, one that preserves important features of the humanist-progressivist hypothesis.

The revised humanist account builds on an important observation made by Weber concerning modern states. According to Weber, there is a tension between bureaucracy and law in modern states. On the one hand, modern mass democracy requires a bureaucracy that rejects privilege based on social, material or honorific preferences and administers the law according to abstract regulations. On the other hand, modern mass democracy comes into conflict with bureaucracy. Bureaucracy requires specialists to manage the complex task of administering large populations and involves increasing intervention in new areas of society. Democratic theory, however, insists on the equal rights of the governed which includes, among other things, the prevention of a closed group of experts in favor of universal accessibility of as many state offices as possible and the minimization of administration in favor of an expanding sphere of public life. Not surprisingly, Weber remarks:
Thereby democracy inevitably comes into conflict with the bureaucratic tendencies which, by its fight against notable rule, democracy has produced. The generally loose term 'democratization' cannot be used here, in so far as it is understood to mean the minimization of the civil servants' ruling power in favor of the greatest possible 'direct' rule of the demos, which in practice means the respective party leaders of the demos. The most decisive thing here—indeed it is rather exclusively so—is the levelling of the governed in opposition to the bureaucratically articulated group, which in its turn may occupy a quite autocratic position, both in fact and in form.

"The problems that open up at this point," Weber remarks elsewhere on this issue, "belong to the theory of 'democracy'."

This observation constitutes the point of departure for humanist political theorists writing on contemporary politics. Following Weber, contemporary humanists argued that modern political violence, including torture, occurs whenever administrative life overwhelms the public life of modern societies. Once administration occupies the whole realm of political experience, men no longer interact as equal subjects deliberating together on the common good but, rather, as objects within an extensive chain of command. They no longer act according to the rule or law (i.e. a substantive theoretical understanding of human dignity) but, rather, according to administrative rules and quotas (i.e. a technical-instrumentalist rationality). In this context, bureaucratic imperatives overwhelm any remaining personal notion of dignity with disastrous results.

In short, contemporary humanists argue that torture exists because the public sphere has been undermined by the expansion of the administrative sphere. They have used this
line of reasoning to explain fascism\textsuperscript{11}, Stalinism\textsuperscript{12}, and contemporary torture in the Third World.\textsuperscript{13} But if earlier humanist scholarship can be criticized for a rather naive notion of historical progress, contemporary humanist scholarship may be criticized for a vacuous concept of bureaucratic or state administration.

In the revised humanist account, the public sphere and the administrative sphere are asymmetrical concepts. The ideal of public life is set forth and everything which is not part of this sphere is labelled "administration." The notion of rule of bureaucracy is constructed not on the basis of observations but rather as a hypothetical antithesis to rule of law. This fact is reflected in several empirical limitations of this concept. For example, consider the conventional presupposition that the administration of terror is essentially static and repetitious. In the Iranian case, such a static image is untenable. In fact, the administration of terror appears to be changeless only because it is defined in a way that allows for no differences between competing rationalities for governing populations and recognizes no significant change save that which occurs in the direction of rule of law. Moreover, since the public/administrative dichotomy focuses on the presumed unity of all administrative procedures as technical/instrumentalist rationality, it does not register the multiple rationalities through which Iranian society is governed. [See Chapter 10, Sections 3.4-3.7, pp. 350-366.]

Diverse modes of government are thrown together in the same category, sharing little more than the label "administration."
By ignoring the diverse modes of government, this dichotomous approach ignores also the specific trends that shaped the character of repression in Iranian society. It is highly probable that the notion of administration would have these same limitations when it is applied cross-culturally as it has when it is applied across time for a specific society like Iran.

These observations reveal the defensive character of the revised humanist account. The revised account attempts to shift attention from the inevitable abolition of torture by enlightened jurisprudence to the obstacles that prevent the abolition of torture by enlightened jurisprudence. Such a shift is effective to the extent that such obstacles can be described but, unfortunately, the revised humanist account provides only the vaguest idea of the obstacles that have marginalized humanist jurisprudence. We are left with a vocabulary through which a confidence in enlightened jurisprudence is re-affirmed but only at the price of being unable to talk about political repression except in the most nebulous terms. Our situation is not unlike Wittgenstein's description of the labyrinth of language: "You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about."

At any rate, Weber's more empirically inclined heirs also recognized the importance of bureaucracy in the contemporary era but they drew very different conclusions than the humanists concerning its implications for political repression. They argued that, in Europe, torture disappeared
not so much due to enlightened public sentiment but rather due to the steady expansion of rationalized bureaucracies, disciplinary institutions, and labor discipline. Following this argument, early modernization theorists argued that civic discipline and capitalist accumulation would lead to politically stable conditions in modernizing countries, conditions marked by the absence of political violence.

Like contemporary humanists, later modernization theorists acknowledge that the course of events did not conform to earlier predictions and they criticize their predecessors for a naive understanding of the modernization process. They point out the destabilizing consequences of progress. In particular, they argue that social mobilization and expectations can rise faster than the rate of economic development and that this gap can lead to political frustration and civil violence. On this modified view of modernization, governments react to civil strife by trying to control it through repression.

It would be difficult, however, to explain modern Iranian tortures on this modified account and this for three reasons. First, while there is evidence for a significant relationship between political violence and economic growth/social mobilization, there is no clear evidence that would suggest a relationship between political violence and repression in Iran. [See Chapter 10, Section 1, p. 321 and pp. 378-379.] Second, the new account suggests that governmental violence is primarily reactive while, in the Iranian case, the pro-active element was an important feature of governmental
repression. [See Chapter 5, Section 5, pp. 194-201.] Third, the new account suggests that governmental violence occurs in proportion to the extent of civil opposition whereas, in the Iranian case, the intensity of government violence seemed to bear no particular relation to the extent of civil opposition. [See Chapter 10, Section 3.7 pp. 367-372.]

One might note that while later modernization theorists cannot easily explain these features of Iranian torture complexes, Chomsky and Herman would have no difficulty in explaining the "pro-active and disproportionate" nature of government violence in Iran. On their account, torture appears due to the creation of national security states in developing countries, states whose task it is to crush any class protests while maintaining economic growth on behalf of local and multinational capitalist interests. This line of analysis suggests that torture exists in order to maintain labor discipline and to keep the cost of labor within a range acceptable to capitalist interests.

One difficulty with this kind of argument, one that assumes the capital-logic of commodities (such as labor) to explain torture, is that it becomes entangled in certain confusing contradictions and while it is not exactly mistaken, it does not give sufficient consideration to at least two points. First, while torture may be useful in maintaining exploitative economic relationships, this does not explain why torture is employed over, for example, a more intensive disciplinary system. More precisely, if labor is a valuable commodity in Iran, why utilize a system that specifically
involves the impoverishment of labor (including specialized, well-trained and highly productive labor) not to mention the destruction of laborers? Second, while capitalist rationality may explain why local and multinational entrepreneurs support a regime that tortures, it does not easily explain the behavior of those who torture. In Iranian torture complexes, functionaries engaged in petty subversions of command, transformed their performance of duty into the personal pursuit of pleasure, allocated their time poorly and, nevertheless, received large salaries for what were remarkably poor results. To claim a capitalist rationality for this behavior is not only misleading but makes this behavior a little more tolerable. No doubt, Iranian torturers would also prefer to claim that they were fulfilling an essential function in the process of development.

These considerations explain why Chomsky and Herman have such great difficulties when they try to give content to their state terrorism hypothesis. Chomsky and Herman recognize that torture occurs within a "mode of governance" which is characterized by "standard operating procedures in multiple detention centers...applicable to hundreds of detainees and used with the approval and intent of the highest authorities." However, they have difficulty moving beyond statistics and personal narratives of detainees to descriptions of this mode of governance. The problem here is theoretical, not empirical. In the Iranian case, there is evidence to suggest a mode of government defined by a carceral rationality, one in which torture occupies an institutionalized position.
Nevertheless, since Chomsky and Herman insist on describing carceral government in the terms of capitalist rationality, they have difficulty understanding "the real terror network." 17

None of these arguments weakens Chomsky and Herman's general claim; viz. that torture is not a dysfunction of modernization, an accidental excess of force by states, or an atavistic survival of traditional society. The Iranian case study suggests that torture is part of modern life in the sense that carceral government can be elucidated only by means of the everyday features of modern civil society. Although we can evade the relevance of modern tortures by invoking the term 'developing societies' (logically, something belonging to the past of the 'developed' world and, consequently, saying little to the present of the developed world), we should be aware that, in this brave new language, "becoming modern" no longer functions as an empirical category but, rather, as a moral one. We are left once more with a vocabulary through which we can re-affirm our confidence in the celebrated aspects of modernity and modernization, but only at the price of being unable to talk about political torture except in the vaguest way.

Writing on torture guided by conventional wisdom then leads us to a decisive conclusion, by forcing us into an awkward silence. It may be that political situations are often much less transparent than the ways in which they are described but, common as this experience may be, this does not make our situation any more agreeable. As Foucault remarks:
What is troubling is that an affirmation covers up for the lack of any precise historical analysis. In this I see above all the effect of a general complicity, in the refusal to decipher what racism really was (a refusal that manifests itself either in generalization—fascism is everywhere, above all in our heads—or in the Marxist schematisation). Foucault emphasizes the need not only for a precise historical analysis of European fascism but also for a similar analysis of "the Gulag question." The Gulag, he maintains, "is not a question posed for any and every country. It has to be posed for every socialist country insofar as none of these since 1917 has managed to function without a more-or-less developed Gulag system." In proposing this research project, Foucault suggests a number of questions that might be posed:

How to relate concretely, both in analysis and in practice, the critique of technologies of normalization which derive historically from Classical internment with the struggle against the historically growing threat posed by the Soviet Gulag? What should the priorities be? What organic links ought we to establish between the two tasks?

Although Foucault often reflected on these questions in his later writings, he never wrote a study relating his analysis of classical disciplinary power to a discussion of fascism or Stalinism. Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* ends abruptly with the words, "At this point I end a book that must serve as a historical background to various studies of the power of normalization and the formation of knowledge in modern society." What follows is an awkward silence about the political experience of the present.

Foucault was interested in fascism and Stalinism at least partly because these were disciplinary regimes that employed extremely wasteful and violent forms of power
including torture and genocide. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault had argued that classical tortures disappeared and were superceded by new disciplinary techniques, techniques that were more efficient than the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power and more useful in a modern economy. There would be no reason, on this account, for a disciplinary regime to resort to torture and genocide and yet, Foucault was well aware the modern European politics pointed to some kind of relationship between discipline and torture. In *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault contrasts the regulated practice of inquisitional torture with the "savage" and "unrestrained torture of modern interrogations." In the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* (1976), Foucault describes Nazism as a "combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power." In *Iran: The Revolution in the Name of God* (1979), Foucault describes the Shah's regime as a disciplinary regime with a police that "was certainly not very effective but made use of violence and cruelty as a replacement for finesse." In "The Subject and Power" (1982), Foucault describes Stalinism and fascism as involving a "relationship between rationalization and the excesses of political power." He adds, "and we should not need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognize the existence of such relations."27

In these descriptions, Foucault implies that modern political violence occurs when disciplinary power undergoes acute spasms of excess. Torture, by implication, is an unregulated and wasteful event that occurs in the course of
such paroxysms. Foucault adopts this explanation for, apparently, two reasons. One reason is that Foucault's account of modern political violence is based on an essentially "European vision of Europe." As Edward Said has remarked:

He [Foucault] seems unaware of the extent to which the ideas of discourse and discipline are assertively European and how, along with the use of discipline to employ masses of detail (and human beings), discipline was used also to administer, study, and reconstruct—then subsequently to occupy, rule, and exploit—almost the whole of the non-European world.

There is, in Foucault's descriptions, an unfortunate and suspiciously nostalgic vision of the nineteenth century. Foucault's nineteenth century, as it is portrayed in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, is a period of relative moderation, a period shaken by the First World War and punctured by the subsequent violent absurdities of fascism and Stalinism. However, as Amnesty International observes, "European domination of the world reached its apogee before World War I and the five centuries of European expansion have been accompanied by many crimes including torture and genocide." What may have been a paroxysm of disciplinary power in modern Europe seems to have occurred with some frequency in European colonies. (Consider, for example, Bugeaud's administration of Algeria.) Nor has this situation changed appreciably in the twentieth century. In modern Iran, paroxysms of disciplinary power are rather hard to distinguish from the normal course of events.

More fundamentally, Foucault draws his characterization of modern political violence from Bataille's notion of "waste." Bataille argued that human economies could not be
understood simply as systems of production through which human lives were sustained. Human needs were much more diverse than this restricted notion of economy allowed. Human needs included not only the need to preserve life but also to release its vital forces in moments of anguish, nausea, or orgiastic excess. In this way, Bataille gestured to a general economy of waste beyond the instrumental realm of the restricted economy. He pointed, for example, to rituals of gift-giving in primitive societies, rituals which often involved the massive non-reciprocated expenditure of commodities. If human economies have been identified exclusively with systems of production and distribution, it is only because, today, the dynamics of capitalism and socialism have marginalized moments of waste to such a degree that they are manifested only occasionally in daily life.

Foucault employs Bataille's concept of waste to explain modern violence but, in doing so, modifies Bataille's account of modern life in an important way. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault appears to identify with the restricted economy of the utile. Discipline is efficient and allows for an economic and political take-off in early modern Europe. Modern tortures, on the other hand, belong to the general economy of waste. They are costly expenditures of commodities and life. In this, they are similar to the time-consuming, expensive and ceremonial forms of power that preceded them. It is only that in an increasingly technological world, our moments of waste take highly technological forms. To understand torture in this fashion is to see it as part of a vast arsenal that has emerged
to disallocate life in modern times: biological warfare, chemical warfare, nuclear warfare, and genocide. Torture belongs to this bio-political arsenal that, in its construction and ultimate results, can only belong to a general economy of waste.

In this way, Foucault provides a possible explanation for why Chomsky and Herman have difficulties in explaining the behaviour of torturers and the destruction of commodities, life and labor. Chomsky and Herman are encountering difficulties in explaining carceral government because they are trying to explain waste in the terms of utility, a task which is a contradiction in terms. This explanation, however, encounters difficulties of another sort, for it cannot explain the ways in which carceral government turns out to be useful. The Iranian case study suggests that carceral government played a role in supporting the domination of specific political groups and classes. [See Chapter 10, Section 3.7, pp. 364-367.] In other words, it supports Chomsky and Herman's claim that carceral government is useful for some people.

At this juncture, one might recall John Stuart Mill's observation that "the usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion—as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much as the opinions itself." Mill's observation serves to remind us that utility is a formal concept and, consequently, that judgements of utility are done with respect to some predetermined agreement of what counts as utile. In the case of torture, utility signifies a ratio between the amount of work performed and the total amounts of
energy expended. In order for this judgement to make sense, standards are required in terms of which work and energy can be identified and measured. But to choose standards involves an interpretation of what is important in political situations of a certain type. Useful, one might ask, in terms of what factors: money, labor, suffering, time, consumption of precious fuels, or some other factor? Chomsky and Herman do not encounter difficulties because they are trying to explain waste in the language of utility. They encounter difficulties because they have interpreted utility in the terms of the capital-logic of commodities. From this perspective, certain aspects of carceral government do appear wasteful and, consequently, incomprehensible. This fact, however, does not rule out the possibility that carceral government might be made comprehensible from some other perspective. Conversely, discipline may be useful from the perspective of capitalist rationality but it is not, as Foucault seems to imply in Discipline and Punish, inherently useful. In the Iranian case study, there were cases where the introduction of discipline, far from being useful for a political take-off in administrative practices, turned out to be remarkably wasteful and useless. [See Chapter 4, Section 2, pp. 113-119.] In short, there can be no judgement of utility without an interpretation of what counts as useful or wasteful and, consequently, there can be no inherently utile or wasteful economies of violence. The utility of economies of violence are open to dispute.

This theoretical consideration has important
implications for practical debates about torture. If the utility of torture is a matter of interpretation, one line of argumentation might be to suggest that torture is inefficient even from the perspective of administrators who sanction it. It is possible to argue, as I have suggested above, that torture is useless from a disciplinary or a capitalist perspective. This strategy may be more persuasive in international forums because it does not naively suppose -- and this is a supposition shared by both the proponents and the opponents of torture -- that "torture works." It cuts across conventional distinctions between proponents and opponents of torture and makes possible alliances that were hitherto seemingly impossible. It may be objected that to do so is to abandon the high moral stance of the contemporary abolitionist movement. Peters, for example, cautions that abolitionists should not be misled by any practical successes they may have by means of realpolitik and should not forget "to preserve the reason for making it [torture] illegal and dangerous -- to preserve a notion of human dignity that, although not always meticulously observed, is generally assumed in the public language, if not the unpublic actions of modern societies, and assumed, moreover, in a generally universal and democratic sense."

While there are, no doubt, good reasons for supporting democratic institutions and enlightened jurisprudence, Peters' language here is misleading in several ways. First, there are many ways in which we describe politics in modern societies and there is no consensus, either among those who practice politics
or those who theorize about it, as to what the public language of modern societies is. Even in the sphere of contemporary analytic political theory, rationalists and utilitarians disagree among themselves and with each other as to what our public is and ought to be, e.g. consider the variety of competing claims advanced by Rawls, Dworkin, Nozick, Hart, Gewirth, and Hare, to name but a few. Some analytic theorists have even suggested that we have no public language and that what we possess are "the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts of which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived."36 Second, utilitarians have argued that our public language does allow for the use of torture in modern politics37 while rationalists have acknowledged that even the tradition of rational jurisprudence provides grounds for the use of torture in modern societies.38 Finally, even if there was a consensus in theory and practice, as to what the public language of Western societies is or ought to be, this consensus would not make our public language any more persuasive in areas where it lacks institutional supports. To argue that "torture works, but only in the short term"39 (or that "in the long term, even non-democratic societies cannot function without politics" in the form of a public language40) might be persuasive in Ottawa or, maybe, Washington, but it is more an article of faith in Santiago, Seoul, or Tehran. If political theorists must address torture, then political theorists must learn to address not only politicians who speak our language but also politicians who don't. In this last respect, however, we have been woefully negligent.
We are well advised by Peters to keep in mind the reasons for abolishing torture -- not the least of which is the humanist argument -- but we are not well served in our endeavour by a single-minded search for a public language that can resist or serve to abolish torture. Salutary as this argument may be in dealing with instrumental tendencies within the abolitionist movement, endless -- even if endlessly clarifying -- debates on what our public language is or ought to be carry with them too much of an aroma of fiddling while Rome burns. Even the best public language is not a very effective protection against disastrous political choices and the great candidates for such a language in modern societies (i.e. humanism, rationalism, and utilitarianism) have been used to justify too many disastrous political ends including, unhappily, torture.

If we wish to address torture as political theologists, we need some other skill in addition to the ability to debate on what "we could coherently and justifiably wish the world to be or become." One of these skills would be to uncertain "how the social, political, and economic setting of our lives now is and in understanding why it is as it is." Such a skill would enable us to identify the kinds of rationalities one encounters in political situations in which torture occurs. Another skill would be the ability to judge "how far, and through what actions, and at what risks, we can realistically hope to move this world as it now stands towards the way we might excusably wish it to be." In the case of torture, this would mean the ability to address the argument that suggests the utility of
torture and to show that these arguments are, in fact, open to dispute. It is true that these additional skills do not lead to decisive conclusions and leave us in some doubt concerning our arguments. Political situations always seem to require new analysis and the utility of torture is open to dispute by its proponents as well as its opponents. But, for that matter, discussions of what our public language is or ought to be has been open to considerable dispute and uncertainty as well.

When Foucault attempts to account for modern political violence, he is misled by Bataille's life-philosophy of power, i.e. a notion of power that incorporates a restricted economy of utility and a general economy of expenditure and waste. He is unable, as a result, to describe the relationship between disciplinary power and its pathological forms without engaging in the seemingly impossible task of describing wastefulness in the language of utility. Yet Foucault, like Chomsky and Herman, does not avoid talking about these phenomena because he suspects that it is precisely here, in the midst of things that are known right nasty, that the study of political theory becomes important. Foucault is unable to talk about modern political violence but, nevertheless, he uses it as a touchstone for his analysis of power. "Everybody is aware of such banal facts," he remarks. "What we have to do with banal facts is to discover—or try to discover—which specific and perhaps original problem is connected with them."42

In "Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject" (1992), Foucault explains that the reasons for studying power are not derived from the abstract questions raised by
traditional political theory but, rather, from the historical circumstances in which political theorists live:

...for us it is not a theoretical question, but a part of our experience. I'd like to mention only to "pathological forms"—those two "diseases of power"—fascism and Stalinism. One of the numerous reasons why they are, for us, so puzzling, is that in spite of their historical uniqueness they are not quite original. They used and extended mechanisms already present in most other societies. More than that, in spite of their own internal madness, they used to a large extent the ideas and devices of our political rationality. As a consequence of this political experience, political theorists have two tasks: to prevent statements from "going beyond the limits of what is given in experience" and "to keep watch over the excessive powers of political rationality."

Political theorists are familiar with the task of ensuring prudent political behaviour but they have difficulties addressing modern political experiences such as fascism and Stalinism. More specifically, they have yet to develop a line of analysis that can address political communities tending towards or undergoing diseases of power related to modern political rationality.

Foucault rejects the line of analysis suggested by humanist-rationalist theorists. He observes, in the first place, that the appeal to rational, enlightened jurisprudence does not clarify the actual political experience of modern times but serves only to judge it. The analysis of this experience, however, "has nothing to do with guilt or innocence." Furthermore, the appeal to reason in politics is misleading for this experience derives its character not from irrationality but from aspects of our political rationality.
Finally, the appeal to reason is distracting because the issue is not being for or against reason in modern life. It is, rather, understanding its dangers as well as its indispensability in modern societies.

Foucault also rejects the line of analysis suggested by Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. He suggests that our modern experience is not shaped exclusively by the *Enlightenment*. It would be a mistake, he maintains, to take the Enlightenment as the starting point of every analysis of modern political experience. "Even if the Aufklärung has been a very important phase in our history and in the development of political technology, I think we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to understand how we have been trapped in our own history." Moreover, Foucault is suspicious of the notion of "rationalization" for such a concept seems to mask too many diverse historical processes that shaped modern politics. "I think the word rationalization is dangerous. What we have to do is analyze specific rationalities rather than always invoking the progress of rationalization in general."46

Instead of these approaches, Foucault suggests a line of analysis that would privilege political conflicts. His approach "consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point."47 This would entail not a global study of rationalization, but a series of case studies that "analyze such a process in several fields, each with reference to a fundamental experience: madness, illness, death, crime, sexuality and so forth."48 These studies
would involve "linking together as tightly as possible the historical and theoretical analysis of power relations, institutions, and knowledge to the movements, critiques, and experiences that call them into question in reality." Foucault maintains that the task of such case studies is to test ideas but argues that a case study in the positivist sense is insufficiently experimental. "If I have insisted on all this 'practice,' it has not been in order to 'apply' ideas, but in order to put them to the test and modify them." One might illustrate Foucault's more severe notion of testing by means of the Iranian case study.

In this study, I have examined the experience of torture, an experience which ties together certain empirical generalizations about modern political violence with movements that have set out to question modern tortures in reality. I have argued, on the one hand, that political scientists analyzing modern tortures cannot avoid the vocabulary of political theory and, in particular, theoretical accounts of punishment. Such theoretical accounts narrow the field of legitimate social inquiry by directing social scientists to look for specific features of modern tortures and ignore others. Consequently, empirical case studies that presuppose such accounts often end up re-intrenching immanent theoretical biases. What is achieved in this way is not more truth (i.e. better empirical generalizations, more accurate explanations, more refined hypotheses) but more literal truths. Conventional case studies take for granted the language in which they are posed. Yet it is precisely these literal truths that urgently
need to be tested, tested not so much through a controlled case study but in the practice of describing modern tortures without the support of conventional wisdom.

On the other hand, I have argued that political theorists cannot be content with abstract analyses of power. What is theoretically significant about this turn to an empirical approach is not the possibility of certainty which such a move might suggest. What is important is that this empirical approach emphasizes the contingency and indeterminacy of politics as it is exemplified in contemporary political violence. When politics is raised to the level of law-like generalizations, torture acquires a questionable quality of necessity. What is lost in this move, as the Iranian case study suggests, is the contingency of torture. Torture occurs at the juncture when men come into conflict and the strongest criticisms of torture are those that occur in practice, not in theory. In the constant struggles between torturers and their victims, procedures and techniques are persistently questioned and modified. Since carceral rationality shifts with these conflicts, it is not surprising that modern tortures always seem to escape the literal truths with which we domesticate them.

"Philosophy," Wittgenstein once remarked, "is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language." One contests literal truths not by engaging in empirical explanation or by turning to abstract theorizing but by practising description:
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such'--whatever that may mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in spite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.  

What Foucault recommends to political theorists is the practice of describing the fundamental experiences of modern times, experiences that involve down right nasty conflicts. Perhaps it is by engaging in this practice that political theorists can recognize the contingency of politics, sound out the literal truths of the age, and prevent the bewitchment of political rationality -- but this is not likely.
FOOTNOTES


3See Pion-Berlin, p. 50. For Foucault's review of previous efforts to understand fascism, see Michel Foucault, "Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject," in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 210 (hereafter cited as Foucault, "Why Study Power").

4Pion-Berlin, p. 49.

5Foucault, p. 139.


7Ibid., p. 469.


12A.J. Polan, Lenin and the End of Politics (Berkeley,


Ibid., pp. 112-113.

Ibid., p. 115.

Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 139.

Ibid., p. 135.

Ibid., p. 137.

Ibid.


Ibid., p. 221.

Ibid., p. 40.


Amnesty International, p. 25.

See Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from*


35Peters, p. 185.


38Peters links the resurgence of torture with a feature of Romano-Canonical law, the crimina excepta or exceptional crimes. He shows that, in the context of contemporary legal codes, this juridical category makes possible the re-introduction of torture. In this way, Peters clarifies a crucial point: the debate concerning torture is not a debate with activists who have the law on their side and politicians who are rationalizing their practice of torture. It is rather a debate between two kinds of lawyers, both of whom may appeal to Romano-Canonical law to justify their positions. It is, in other words, a debate arising out of the very nature of the public language of Western societies. Thus, Peters reluctantly concludes:
The discovery of Algeria completed a lesson that finally had to be learned by the world of the late twentieth century: torture had not died with the Enlightenment, legislative and judicial reforms and their optimistic view of human nature. Nor was it exclusively the eccentric practice of deranged and psychotic governments. It was no longer likely to turn up only in the fragile circumstances of Marxist revolutions, and it was not an importation from barbarous European peoples. It was practised by Europeans upon Europeans and non-Europeans alike, in spite of legislation forbidding it and reformers intent upon exposing it. It could no longer be dismissed, written off, or ignored. The lesson was sobering, and the answer to its questions have not yet been found. (Peters, p. 40.)

39 Ignatieff, p. 30.
40 Ibid., p. 31.
43 Ibid., p. 209.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 211.
50 For a clear and important statement of this relation between political theory and the case study, see Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, Vol 7: Strategies of Inquiry, edited by Fred. I Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 79-137.
Szwittpenstein, p. 47e, Section 109.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
This appendix covers a conventional chronology of Iranian history over the last two centuries. The events listed are mostly those to which this book refers. For a more detailed description of these events, see Nikki Keddie, *The Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran*, with a Section by Yann Richard (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

1790-1797 Under the leadership of the Qajar tribe, a northern tribal federation conquers much of Iran.

1796 Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar establishes the Qajar dynasty.

1797 Aqa Mohammad Shah is assassinated in the course of a military campaign.

1797-1834 Fat 'Ali Shah ascends to the throne.

1804-1813 First Russo-Iranian war leads to the defeat of Iranian forces and the cessation of Caucasian territories to Russia.

1826-1828 Second Russo-Iranian war leads to the defeat of Iranian forces, the cessation of further territories and extra-territorial and tariff concessions.

1833 'Abbas Mirza, the heir to the throne dies as he is preparing for a campaign in Western Afghanistan. War with England is narrowly averted.

1834-1848 Mohammad Shah ascends to the throne with British diplomatic and military support as well as Russian consent.

1844 Sayyid 'Ali Mohammad proclaims himself Bab, and preaches against the corruption of the *Juma* and the civil authorities. Babism gains a devoted following.

1848-1896 Nasser id-Din Shah ascends to the throne with British and Russian protection.
1848-1851 Babi revolts occur throughout Iran and are severely repressed.
1850 The Bab is executed at Tabriz.
1852 A small group of Babis attempt to assassinate the Shah.
1856-1857 A second campaign in Western Afghanistan triggers the Anglo-Iranian war. The war is concluded with the Peace of Paris (1857) in which Iran renounces its claims to Western Afghanistan.
1891 A tobacco concession to England sparks the first successful mass protest in the nineteenth century. A national boycott of the sale and use of tobacco leads to the withdrawal of the concession.
1896 Nasser id-Din Shah is assassinated.

1896-1905 Muzzafar id-Din Shah ascends to the throne with the support of the Persian Cossack Brigade and British and Russian diplomatic pressure.

1905 Urban protests lead to the provision of a parliament and a constitution.

1905-1909 Muhammad 'Ali Shah ascends to the throne. While pledging to protect the Constitution, the Shah moves politically and militarily to crush the Constitutionalist movement. The period that follows is a period of struggle between Royalist and Constitutionalist forces as well as British and Russian diplomatic and military intervention in Iranian affairs. The Constitutional Revolution, as this period is called, ends when the Shah departs for Russia in 1909.

1909-1925 Ahmad Shah is installed on the throne.

1911-1918 Russia occupies two northern Iranian cities. From this point on, Iranian politics is characterized by a weak central government, autonomous tribal chiefs, provincial rebellions, and strong British and Russian influence.

During World War I, Iran was the site of hostilities as Ottoman, British, and Russian forces fought in Western Iran.

With the withdrawal of Russia from the war and the defeat of the Ottomans, Britain emerged in a position of strength in Iran.

1919 The Iranian government tacitly agrees to the Anglo-Persian Treaty, which, in effect, made Iran into a British protectorate. The Treaty was met with intense hostility in Iran and remained unsigned although British
policy was directed as if an agreement had been reached.

1921 Under the leadership of Reza Khan, the Persian Cossack Brigade undertakes a coup and installs Sayyid Zia, a pro-British civilian, as Prime Minister. Reza Khan assumes the position of Minister of War.

1924 In Parliament, a liberal majority introduces a bill proposing the abolition of the Qajar dynasty and the creation of an Iranian republic. The conservative deputies oppose the bill while, outside Parliament, guild elders and the 'ulema lead public protests denouncing the idea of a republic. Reza Khan persuades the conservative minority not to champion the cause of the Qajar dynasty and convinces the liberal majority to withdraw the controversial bill.

1925-1941 Ahmad Shah is deposed by Parliament and Reza Khan ascends to the throne, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. He undertakes the consolidation, centralization, and modernization of Iran.

1941-1946 The Allies fear that Reza Shah's severely repressive government and the Shah's personal unpopularity might lead to a pro-Axis coup by junior military officers. For this reason, as well as with the purpose of creating a secure supply route to the Soviet Union, the Allies occupy Iran and depose Reza Shah.

1941-1978 Mohammad Reza Shah installed on the throne.

1941-1953 This period was a period of often perplexing party politics and royal maneuvers. For an excellent account of the rise of the Tudeh (Masses) Party, the Premiership of Qavam and Mussadeq, the Oil Crisis of 1951-1953, and Muhammad Reza Shah's departure from Iran, see Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Limited Paperback Editions, 1982).

1953 Mohammad Reza Shah re-installed on the throne through a military coup assisted by the U.S. C.I.A.

1961-1963 The Shah encounters growing opposition to his regime. The 'ulema lead public protests, Student groups turn to guerrilla activities.

1978-1979 (The Islamic Revolution) Mohammad Reza Shah is deposed.
1979-1987 Ayatollah Khomayni declares the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1981 Revolutionary Guards begin a campaign to destroy the organized leftist parties. Civil war breaks out as the Guards and guerillas engage in gun fights in many cities.

App.::ndix II

GLOSSARY OF COMMON PERSIAN WORDS UTILIZED

akhund: teacher, master, preacher
andarun: the segregated interior area of a traditional Persian home
ayatollah: literally, a sign of Allah, a title of veneration given to the highest theologians
bast: a place of sanctuary from the ill will of others or the law, usually a religious shrine
bid'a: an innovation or novelty, a thing or mode of action the like or which has not existed or been practised, dissent or independence of action going to the point of heresy although not of actual unbelief
birun: the reception area of a traditional Persian home
chaqkesh: a rogue, a bully, a petty criminal
darugha: headman, superintendent of a town or market
ferush: one who spreads the carpets or cushions, the chamberlain in the palaces of kings and great men, an officer who superintends the pitching of tents, a footman
fetva: a judicial or religious sentence pronounced by learned men in the science of religion
firman: an injunction, an order to be obeyed by all, an imperial mandate
hakim: a physician, especially one trained in Galenic medicine
hudud: limits, extremities, a restrictive ordinance of divine law, punishments specifically prescribed by the Quran
hujjat ul-Islam: one who guides others in the path of religion, a preacher, a scholar
luti: a rascal, a bully, a jester, a sodomite, an
impudent forward fellow

madrasa: a school, seminary, university, academy, or college

maktab: a place or time of writing, a writing school

mavian: an open field without buildings, an arena, a place for exercises or walking

mashg: an example, a model for imitation, a copy to write after, exercise, practice.

meemghazar: literally, master of wrath, a royal executioner

mir asa: a nightwatchman

mulah: a learned man, a judge, a preacher

mujaahid: one who strives hard to acquire sound views, arrived at the highest degree of legal understanding, a title given to the highest ecclesiastical dignitaries.

pasdar: a sentinel, a guard, a watchman

qanun: law, regulation, rule

qiyas: retribution, reproof, correction, the law of retaliation, revenge or homicide.

safa-yi_barin: interior purity, transparency, harmony, purity of faith

shari': making a road straight, law prescribed by the Muslim tradition of jurisprudence

shari'a: the path which the believer must tread, the totality of Allah's commandments, the laws of Islamic jurisprudence

ta'arof: etiquette, a manner of comportment with respect to various social occasions

t'azir: reproving, censuring, discretionary punishments prescribed by a judge

t'aziya: consoling, enjoining patience, mourning for the dead, a performance of the story of the life and martyrdom of Imam Husayn

'tulema: learned men, scholar-theologians.

umma: Quranic word for people or community, ethnic, linguistic, or religious bodies of
people who are objects of the Divine plan of salvation.

being known, public, a just and lawful action, a benefit, favour, generosity, customary law
APPENDIX III

A STUDY OF POLITICAL VISIBILITY

Over the last century, there has been a shift in the exercise of power in Iran. The exercise of sovereign power has given way to the exercise of disciplinary power. One way of delineating this shift in power relations is through the use of lived space. Historically, there is a gradual shift from ceremonial visibility — where a central space is highlighted for a undifferentiated audience — to panoptic visibility — where space is organized for the surveillance and correction of those who use it.

The photographs in this appendix point to this redistribution of lived space. Figures 1 to 3 and 5 to 9 portray the manifestation of sovereign power through its various signs: the exercise of punishment, the likeness of the Shah, or the delegated representatives of the Shah. The sign is the point at which all observation is directed. The observers of the sign are barely noticed. They are lost in a crowd (Fig. 1, 2, 4, 5, 9), have their backs to camera (Fig. 8), or ignored altogether (Fig. 2, 6, 7).

Figures 10 through 20 are made possible through the deployment of an entirely different kind of visibility. Here, there is no central focus of observation only a careful, meticulous individuation of space, the space for surveillance, examination, and disciplinary correction. These examples also
point up the remarkable variety of places where panoptic visibility was deployed: in schools and academies (Fig. 11, 12, 18), in military and police units (Fig. 13, 14, 15, 20), in dormitories (Fig. 19), in orphanages (Fig. 17) and in prisons (Fig. 10).

Figures 9, 10, and 16 mark an interspersion of the two deployments of visibility. In Figure 9, while there is a central focus of attention, there are regular rows of soldiers on either side of the royal sign. In Figure 10, there is a spectacle of punishment but there are no observers, only supervisors: guards watching from the side and even, apparently, a guard surveying the prisoners from the tower at the rear of the prison courtyard. In Figure 16, once again, we have a spectacle and, simultaneously, a display of drill and discipline taking place at the base of the gallows.

The disjuncture between panoptic and ceremonial visibility becomes even starker when one contrasts what are typically considered to be 'similar' practices. Take, for instance, Figure 4 (punishment at the writing school) and Figure 12 (examination at the ḫiṭṭaṭ or ḫubūn). In the writing school, there are a variety of tasks going on at the same time: pupils are writing, punishing, or reading aloud to themselves. The tutor (at the rear and to the left) cannot see and much less supervise his pupils from his position. The right hand side of the room is obscured in shadows. The pupils are sitting in a random arrangement. Many are not even facing him or are hidden from him by other pupils. The only arrangement that is distinctive is the execution of punishment
at the bastinado in the center of the room. By contrast, in the Dar-ul-Funun, the students are sitting on a well-lit porch. Their bodies are placed at regular intervals. Each bench is divided into four slots. In the front row, students occupy slots 1 and 3, in the row behind them, students occupy slots 2 and 4, and in the third row, the students occupy slots 1 and 3. This grid of individuation continues down the length of the porch. A walkway at the right and left permits invigilators to move beside the benches and examine each student.

Or again, take Figures 7 (the Qajar constabulary) and Figure 14 (the Tehran police). In Figure 14, the two front rows are organized according to the same pattern found at the Dar-ul-Funun. The men in the front row sit at regular intervals and the men in the second row sit either to the right or left of those in front. Each policeman has the same comportment as the others and holds his rifle according to a standard procedure. By contrast, the older watchmen stand in no particular order, have no specific style of comportment, and observe no particular rule as to the handling of their weapon. Their effect derives from the particular fear they invoke as signs of sovereign power rather than as hidden surveyors of behaviour.
Figure 1: Clive Bigham, *A Ride Through Western Asia* (London: MacMillan Co., 1897), opposite p. 102.

Figure 2: David Fraser, *Persia and Turkey in Revolt* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1910), opposite p. 198.


Figure 4: Muhammad Hejazi, *Miyan-i Ma* [Our Country] (Tehran: Ministry of Culture Publications, 1338 [1959]), p. 442.

Figure 5: Ahmad Tafrishi-Husayni, *Ruznameh-vi Akhbar-i Mashrutiyat va Ingilab-i Iran* [A Diary of Documents Concerning the Constitutionalism and the Revolution of Iran], ed. Iraj Afshar (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1351 [1972]), from the appendix of photographs following p. 302.

Figure 6: Ibid.

Figure 7: John H. Wishard, *Twenty Years in Persia* (New York: Flemming H. Revel Co., 1908), opposite p. 274.

Figure 8: Tafrishi-Huseyni, from the appendix of photographs following p. 302.


Figure 11: Issa Khan Sadiq, *Tarikh-i Farhang-i Iran az Aghaz ta Zaman-i Hazir* [The History of Education in Iran (Persia) from the Earliest Times to the Present Day] (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1336 [1959]), p. 338.

Figure 12: Ibid., p. 351.

Figure 13: Tafrishi-Husayni, from the appendix of
photographs following p. 302.

Figure 14: Ibid.


Figure 17: Hejazi, p. 323.

Figure 18: Ibid., p. 331.

Figure 19: Ibid., p. 327.

Figure 20: International Solidarity Front for the Defense of the Iranian People's Democratic Rights (ISF-Iran), *The Crimes of Khomeini's Regime*, 2nd ed. (Geneva: ISF-Iran, 1982), opposite p. 84.
Figure 2: "The Governor of Isfahan has revived the old Persian punishment of burying brigands alive"
Figure 3: "A Criminal About to Be Blown from the Mouth of a Fieldpiece"
Figure 4: Punishment at the Writing School: Student on the Bastinado
Figure 5: "The Capital Punishments of Fereydun Parsi"
Figure 6: Prisoners in Stocks
Figure 7: "Some of the Persian Constabulary"
Figure 8: "The Day They Were Taking the Picture of Muhammad 'Ali Shah to the Blessed Parliament instead of the Shah Himself."
Figure 9: Official Salaam (Audience) Before the Portrait of Nasser id-Din Shah
Figure 10: The Tehran Prison
Figure 11: "Part of the Northern Side of the Dar ul-Fonun. On All Four Sides of the School's Courtyard, There Existed Similar Rooms and Porches"
Figure 12: "The Porch of the Dar ul-Fonun during Examinations"
Figure 13: The Persian Cossack Brigade
Figure 14: Members of the Tehran Police Force
Figure 15: "Execution of Mujahidin in the Jungle Revolution after Arrest by Tehran Government"
Figure 16: "Drilling Assyrian Levies near Hamadan"
Figure 17: Dining Room of Orphanage No. 2 of the Charitable Society of Soraya
Figure 18: School of Arts and Crafts for Young Women
Figure 19: Reza Shah Personally Inspects a Dormitory While the Crown Prince Stands in Attendance
Figure 20: "Some of the Dedicated Supporters of Khomeini's "Holy War" against the Kurdish People"
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