Self-Fulfilling Prophecies: The Government's Role in Generating Support for Ethnic Terrorists

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Abstract

Why do some ethnic groups support the use of terrorism and violence to change the status quo and others do not? Conventional wisdom suggests repression may provoke more violence, but consensus has not been reached on how this relationship works. I propose a Theory of Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism (TEST) that argues that the denial of political access to ethnic groups to resolve conflict through peaceful means creates conditions of structural repression. This structural repression then engenders ethnic groups to mobilize around seeking extra-institutional and often extra-legal avenues of change including terrorism. The avenue chosen depends upon the state’s response to ethnic group mobilization, which may include reforming repressive institutions, thus undermining support for violence and terrorism, or may include using agent-driven discrete acts of repression, triggering increases in ethnic group support for terrorism. The TEST is applied and assessed in light of the cases of Northern Irish Catholics and the IRA, Quebecois and the FLQ and Corsicans and the FLNC. Ultimately, the TEST demonstrates that states’ willingness to effectively address ethnic group grievances will marginalize, if not eradicate terrorism. In contrast, states that choose to neglect, alienate and discriminate against ethnic groups fail to enable them to use political channels to change the status quo, causing increases in support for terrorism.

Pourquoi certains groupes ethniques appuient-ils l’utilisation du terrorisme et de la violence afin de modifier le statut quo alors que d’autres s’y opposent? Il est généralement admis que la répression peut engendrer plus de violence. Or, le sens de cette relation ne fait toujours par consensus dans la littérature. Cette étude présente une théorie visant à expliquer l’appui des groupes ethniques au terrorisme (TEST) et qui suggère que les cas où les groupes ethniques se voient refuser l’accès au politique comme moyen pacifique de résolution de conflits créent des conditions de répression structurelle. Celle-ci devient alors un motif pour les groupes ethnique de se mobiliser afin de trouver des modes extra-institutionnels et des avenues extra-juridiques de résoudre les conflits, incluant le terrorisme. L’avenue choisie par les groupes ethniques dépend de la réponse offerte par l’État à leurs stratégies de mobilisation. Cette réponse peut inclure des réformes aux institutions répressives, minant l’appui des groupes à la violence et au terrorisme, ou l’utilisation discrète d’actes de répression conduits par des individus, générant une augmentation du soutien au terrorisme au sein des groupes ethniques. Dans le cadre de cette étude, la théorie TEST est donc évaluée à la lumière des cas des Catholiques irlandais du Nord et de l’IRA, des Québécois et du FLQ, ainsi que des Corsés et du FLNC. Elle démontre que, d’une part, la volonté des États de répondre aux revendications des groupes ethniques marginalise, si ce n’est éradique, l’utilisation du terrorisme par ces groupes. D’autre part, les États qui choisissent de négliger, d’aliéner ou de discriminer les groupes ethniques les empêchent d’utiliser les voies politiques de résolution des conflits, provoquant une augmentation de l’appui de ces groupes à l’utilisation de la violence et du terrorisme.
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*Deo gratias*
Introduction

Why do ethnic groups support terrorism?

The headline of the Philadelphia Inquirer March 12, 2009 read, “In N. Ireland, protests repudiate violence” in response to an attack by dissident republicans who killed three men: one police officer was fatally shot by the Continuity Irish Republican Army while sitting in his patrol car, and two British soldiers were killed by a bomb blast outside their base by the Real Irish Republican Army. Both of these groups remained committed to the traditional IRA goal of militarily forcing the British out of Northern Ireland and reuniting the island. (Inquirer March 12) In response, more than 10,000 Catholics and Protestants across Northern Ireland (BBC March 11) gathered together to “oppose Northern Ireland’s worst dissident Irish Republican Army violence since 1998”(Inquirer March 12). Placards and signs read, “No going back”. (Inquirer March 12) But it was not that long ago where this kind of violence was the norm. The signs that read “no going back” refer to the thirty years war, ‘the Troubles’, that killed 3700 people in a place with less than 2 million people. At one time, terrorist violence like this was seen as an acceptable tactic to fight a war against oppression and colonialism, now this kind of violence is condemned. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), who led the Catholic community into a power sharing agreement in May 1998, has denounced violence and most members disarmed in 2005. But clearly some extremist factions continue to fight. The difference now is that they have very little support. And leaders of the

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1 Shawn Pogatchnik A6 2009
2 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7936332.stm
Catholic community are making it very clear these dissidents have no support. In Dublin, Taoiseach Brian Cowen said those who carried out the attacks were a "tiny and unrepresentative group of evil people who have no mandate and no support for their actions". (BBC March 11) Eugene McGlone of the Unite Union, which helped organize the protest, suggested the 10,000 protestors "have come to show solidarity, I believe, with the police and to send a very clear message out to the people who killed Constable Stephen Carroll and the two soldiers that they do not represent them." (BBC March 11) The same community members that supported and engaged in this kind of terrorist violence less than fifteen years earlier are publicly condemning it. One protestor, Aidan Kane, said, “I’m a Catholic. I grew up in an area where the police were the enemy. Now things have changed so completely for the better…If my wee lad here wants to be a policeman when he grows up, I’d be proud”. These dissident republicans are now seen as extremists; they are marginalized and called thugs, criminals, and spoilers of a peace process that has been ongoing for over a decade. The question that must be asked is why? Why, at one time, was terrorism acceptable, but no longer? When, or under what conditions, do ethnic groups support terrorists?

The case of Northern Ireland is only one example of the shifts in popularity and support for terrorism and violence against the state. Evidence confirms that ninety percent (Hoffman 1998, 170) of terrorist organizations dissolve within one year\(^3\), mostly because individuals are caught by law

\(^3\) The longest lasting and typically the most successful are the ethno-nationalist/separatist groups, although rarely have they managed to attain their actual goal of self-determination or statehood. (Hoffman 1998, 170-171) “The resilience of these groups is doubtless a product of the relative ease with which they are able to draw sustenance and
enforcement. Once arrests are made, if there is no one to fill the vacuum, the organization dies. The fact that these organizations do not continue beyond the arrests or deaths of a few key individuals suggests that keeping together and sustaining a terrorist or insurgent organization is actually quite difficult and requires something more than a handful of volunteers willing to die for the cause. I am arguing that the we need to look to constituency groups and their willingness to support terrorist organizations if we want to understand when and why terrorist organizations and their campaigns are sustained, and thus, are much more likely to succeed in their quest to command public attention, disrupt the normal flow of life, and challenge authority. As Steinberg (2002, 7) observes, “in the long run, terrorist networks will reconstitute themselves unless we make it harder for them to recruit new members and sustain their activities.”

This dissertation aims to accomplish three goals: first, to initiate a discussion about the relationship between terrorists and their supporters and advocates. In the following pages, it will be made evident that this conversation is not occurring. The focus in the terrorism literature has almost entirely been dedicated to the terrorists themselves: who are they, where do they come from, how can we explain them, how can we stop them, why do they use these tactics? etc. This overlooks the connection between constituency group support and support from an existing constituency –namely, the fellow members of their ethno-nationalist group.” (Hoffman 1998, 171) “The ethno-nationalists derive a further advantage from their historical longevity by being able to appeal to a collective revolutionary tradition and even at times a predisposition to rebellion. This assures successive terrorist generations both a steady stream of recruits from their respective groups’ youth and a ready pool of sympathizers and supporters among their more nostalgic elders.” (Hoffman 1998, 171) Hoffman suggests the relative success of ethno-nationalist groups may lie in the tangibility of the goal. The articulation of so concrete and comprehensible a goal is by far the most potent and persuasive
terrorist leaders. Support for terrorists is the difference between marginalized criminal thugs and mainstream revolutionaries. The second goal is to determine the conditions under which terrorists gain support in the least likely context—advanced democracies. If conditions are present in this scenario, then we can begin to understand exactly what is required to prevent or mediate support for terrorism. Finally, the third goal is to tease out policy prescriptions for decision-makers, leaders and policymakers to reduce the possibility of terrorists achieving mainstream revolutionary status.

**Contributions to the Literature and Policy Relevance**

There are essentially three major contributions of this research. It will directly respond to the major criticisms of the terrorist literature as cited by Mani (2004) and Callaway (2006) by positing a general theory of group support for terrorism. With technology transfer and technological innovation, it is becoming more and more difficult to predict the multitude of ways countries and peoples are vulnerable to terrorism and terrorist attacks. However, by focusing attention on the conditions and causes that drive up group support for terrorism, we give ourselves a new opportunity to address potential sources of terrorism. 90% of terrorist organizations die within one year. While these organizations may cause damage, it is the sustained organizations that are especially problematic, dangerous and successful. If we uncover some of the major causes of group support, we also uncover some of the major causes of sustained terrorism, and then, we can adapt our tools and approaches to cripple terrorist organizations from living beyond that one-year mark.
The second contribution will be rigorously testing the theory using Alexander George’s ‘Structured, Focused Comparison’ (George 2005). This method is particularly useful for building a body of knowledge on the subject of constituency support for terrorism as it encourages the purposeful accumulation of comparative cases in an orderly and easily reproducible way. As will be laid out in Chapter 3, George’s method is the simple application of a predetermined set of questions to be answered for every case, which enables a close, detailed comparison of relationships, dynamics and variables.

The third major contribution is for policy-makers. To combat terrorism effectively and in the longer term, policy needs to address root causes (Newman 2006; Ross 1993; Chomsky 2003). These include the conditions under which constituency groups and vulnerable members of society support terrorist activity and push it from the periphery of society to the mainstream. Thus, the policy goal must be to keep terrorists and terrorism as the marginalized and criminalized activities of a few fanatics by undermining the potential for any growth in support for them. As experts have pointed out, we must “separate terrorists from the groups from which they derive support, to deny means of recruiting new members, and to prevent the appeal of their ideology and their actions from spreading.” (Richardson 2006, 9) Terrorist organizations that have no support are susceptible to quick elimination by government forces. Whereas, once terrorists succeed in garnering support and legitimacy from their constituency groups, conflict will intensify and quite possibly bring about sustained revolutionary activities that are significantly more destructive, destabilizing and irreversible. It
is for this reason that this thesis sets out to distinguish between terrorists and their constituency groups and posit a general theory of group support for terrorism. This is a major step in dissecting terrorism into manageable parts that policy-makers can actually address.

**Competing Explanations**

Simply put, the existing literature on terrorism does not ask nor answer why some groups might support terrorism or violence against the state while others do not. The terrorism literature suggests many conditions under which terrorism might occur, but because the terrorist literature has remained theoretically underdeveloped, we look to the abundant literature on other kinds of intrastate conflict and revolution. Terrorism is the latest and most popular tactic used to initiate a revolution. Terrorism draws attention to a particular problem or cause, garners publicity and media attention, and requires only minimal resources. Past efforts at revolution in the form of guerrilla warfare require armies, training camps, and can easily be detected with technological advancements like satellites. Terrorists can use apartments and houses to draw plans, make bombs and run operations in ways that armies of insurgents cannot. But both still require some degree of popular support to be sustained in the longer term. Thus, we begin by looking at both the terrorism literature and revolution/intra-state conflict literature to ascertain the extent to which they can help guide the development of a theory of support for terrorism. Conventional wisdom on revolution and intra-state conflict posits four broad explanations – relative deprivation, rational actor, elite-driven, and state response and repression.
The literature on terrorism has absolutely mushroomed since September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, most of it continues to focus on creating typologies of terrorists based on psychological or sociological factors (Callaway 2006; Victoroff 2005; Crenshaw 1981; Sederberg 1994), or terrorist organizations (Hoffman 1998). There is some work done on state or system causes of terrorists (Crenshaw 1981; Ross 1993); conditions that promote terrorist behavior (Crenshaw 1981; Whittaker 2001); and specific tactics of terror like suicide bombing (Pape 2005; Bloom 2006). Goodwin (2006) suggests three more general theories of terrorism have emerged that remain unconvincing and under-tested: weakness theory, which suggests terrorists take up arms after they have concluded non-violent politics cannot work; terrorism emerges as a response to state terrorism; and terrorism is the result of social polarization or extreme inequalities in wealth, status and power (Senechal de la Roche 1996; Black 2004).

There are two interrelated criticisms of most of the work on terrorism: first, research on terrorism generally lacks scientific rigor (Newman 2006; Callaway 2006); and second, almost all the work on terrorism is single case-study based and shies away from general theory (Callaway 2006). I will add a third criticism: none of the literature seriously distinguishes between terrorists and the groups that support them. The emphasis is always on terrorists and the terrorist organizations, even though most scholars seem to recognize that for organizations to last beyond the one year mark – to be successful and sustainable over a longer term – terrorist organizations need popular or group support (Crenshaw 1981;
Hoffman 1998; Richardson 2006; Gurr 2006; Bloom 2006). Hence, there is a clear need to develop theory that fills in this gap.

Relative Deprivation/ Economic hardship

One of the key recurrent factors responsible for driving the development of ethno-nationalist violence is economic underdevelopment. There are a few primary types of nationalist theories: developmental models, reactive ethnicity perspectives and ethnic competition perspectives that focus on the role that economic development plays in forging ethnic identities and ethno-nationalism. Relative deprivation arguments focus more on the short-term implications of perceptions of income inequality among competing ethnic groups. None of these arguments are able to determine with any clarity when violence may emerge as a means to change the status quo, they can only tell us this seems to be a recurrent condition for it.

The reactive ethnicity theory of mobilization (Gellner 1969; Hechter 1975), which arose out of the constraints of the developmental theories (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Butler and Stokes 1969; Ragin 1979; Leifer 1981) suggests that ethnicity will become more salient as economic development occurs, especially when internal colonialism –core and periphery kinds of distinctions (Wallerstein 1974; Nairn 1977) – or cultural divisions of labor occur. The ethnic competition perspective (Deutsch 1953; Van den Berghe 1967; Barth 1969) suggests that ethnic mobilization is the result of competition between groups for roles, resources and power. This is a perspective that is fairly consistent with more general resource mobilization models, which argue that more access to
scarce resources results in collective action and mobilization (Olzak 1982). It is the creation of new competitive opportunities that provokes ethnic mobilization (Ragin 1979).

Relative deprivation arguments (Gurr 1970; Seligson and Muller 1987; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Muller 1985) posit that a group’s perception of what it should have and what it does have cause groups to rebel. This has been widely tested in terms of income inequality but has mixed results and suffers from measurement problems because income inequality and relative deprivation are conceptually quite different (Dudley 1998).

In terms of relative deprivation and economic based causes of insurgent violence, research essentially confirms ‘yes, economics and class matter’. But this is over-deterministic – relative deprivation alone cannot explain outcomes. It is a ubiquitous condition that would seem to suggest violence should erupt all over the place, but this is not the case at all. However, what can be taken away from these arguments is that economic hardship is a precondition or a root cause around which ethnic groups are likely to mobilize to demand change.

*Rational Actor*

Rational action theories of rebellion argue that individuals make cost and benefit calculations when deciding to participate in rebellion. “Individuals do not rebel in a vacuum. If they are rational actors, they will take the costs of rebellion into account. If the costs of rebellion are great, or if peaceful strategies of political action are available that may be as effective or more effective than rebellion, rational actors will not rebel.” (Muller 1990, 625) The literature on rebel
recruitment also emphasizes individual choices, driven by greed or grievance, to join rebel groups (Popkin 1979; Lichbach 1994; Weinstein 2005; Regan and Norton 2005) These theories may work alone, or may work in conjunction with relative deprivation and repression arguments because repression and relative deprivation alone do not account for rebellion—something has to bring people together to act collectively and overcome the free rider problem (Lichbach 1994). Some arguments have been made that there are informal social networks that allow individuals to monitor the contributions of others (Moore 1995). But there is little empirical support for this argument.

The rational actor approach is useful and may be the internal mechanism at work in the minds of individual constituency/ethnic group members, however alone this gives no insight into the conditions under which individuals are more or less likely to opt for supporting violence because individuals weigh costs and benefits differently. Thus, the question of what the costs and benefits are and what should be done to alter them remains ambiguous. This research responds to this lack of clarity and aims to establish factors that may effect cost and benefit calculations, although there is no claim made in this research as to whether or not rational choice models are at work.

Elites

Following the rational actor approach is the argument is that small elite groups act rationally in pursuit of material gains, but use ethnicity as a tool to divide and conquer, or as a “rallying cry” to mobilize people.

Rational/instrumental approaches (Weingast 1998; Saideman 2001; Brass 1985;
Fearon and Laitin 2000; Deng 1995; Prunier 1995; Woodward 1995, Horowitz 2000, 2001) and constructivist (Brass 1985, Rothchild 1997, Fearon and Laitin 2000) approaches also tend to suggest that elites, and very seldom masses, intentionally create or manipulate ethnic differences.

The problem with the argument that political opportunists prey on or manipulate mobilized ethnic groups is that support is assumed. Leaders make strategic rational choice decisions based on whatever motivates them – greed, grievance, insecurity, power etc. – about the use of violence, and mobilized groups simply go along with it. Again, it is over-deterministic – not all mobilized ethnic groups listen to, support or rally around calls for violence: groups can constrain, ignore or reject the use of violence by elites.

There has never been a shortage of these revolutionaries, terrorists, political opportunists, radicals or marginalized group leaders advocating the use of political violence and terrorism against the government to change the status quo. They are literally in every corner of the map at all times from David Duke and the KKK, Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Army, Samuel Adams and the American Revolutionaries, Michael Collins and the Irish Republican Army, Huey P. Newton and the Black Panthers, Osama Bin Laden and Al Queda, Nelson Mandela and the Umkhonto we Sizwe, or Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement – to name a few. All stoked the fires of rebellion and revolution, often using terrorist tactics. Since the 1960s, terrorism is a growing part of the “repertoire of contention” (Tilly 1995) available to any insurgent group on the planet. Some become known as heroes and freedom fighters, while others as
extremists and terrorists. The successful ones convince others to heed their call to violence, take up arms, and fight for whatever the cause. But more often than not, these revolutionary cries are ignored. Terrorists or rebels may manage to operate for a brief time in any case, but they will not last very long without the support of the group they are claiming to represent. For instance, the Quebecois were a mobilized ethnic group with grievances and aspirations for a sovereign state, but they rejected the escalation of violence engaged in by the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) after the October Crisis of 1970. Existing literature fails to address the role that support and tolerance play in the success, or longevity of terrorism.

State Response and Repression

The final approach concerns government response (Muller 1985) and repression as the most prominent cause for the emergence of insurgency. However, there is no consensus in this literature at all about how, when, and what kind of repression drives groups to use violence or rebel. (Davenport 2007) Lichbach (1987) asserts that state repression causes groups to switch tactics between violent and non-violent forms of protest. Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993) suggest that repression either causes or deters protest behavior depending on the regime type. Rasler (1996) argues that repression deters dissent in the short-run, but encourages dissent in the long-term, and, further, accommodation in revolutionary situations spurs dissent. Moore (1998) tests all three of these theories and finds that only Lichbach’s has promise in so far as a state’s use of repression may entice dissident behavior to shift tactics from non-violent to violent, and vice versa. The most widely believed theory of repression is that
there is an inverted U-shape relationship between government repression and rebellion. When repression is high, the expected benefits of rebellion or peaceful collective action will be relatively low because of high costs and low expectancy of success; when repression is low, the expected benefits of rebellion will be exceeded by the expected benefits of peaceful collective action; when repression is intermediate, the expected benefits of rebellion will exceed those of peaceful collective action (Muller and Weede 1990; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Gurr 1970).

The problem with the latter explanation is that even if repression, and thus risk, is low initially, and thus, individuals choose to rebel, rebellion often causes increasing levels of repression by the state, which suggests that as soon as repression increases individuals should no longer be willing to participate, yet increases in repression often causes a spiraling effect whereby more people chose to participate.

The main problem with repression and state response arguments is that they have remained under-specified and under-developed. They focus too much on short-term shifts in government repression and fail to identify other conditions that facilitate or inhibit the repressive measures from becoming triggers to violence. It is quite clear repression alone cannot account for violence otherwise empirical evidence would be more conclusive; there must be additional factors that play a role and the literature has not successfully teased them out.

**Theory of Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism (TEST)**

It is evident, based on the aforementioned research, that we do not have any clear understanding of why or under what conditions an ethnic group might
support terrorism and violence against the state to alter the status quo. Thus, there is a remarkable gap in the literature on the relationship between terrorists, political entrepreneurs, or elites, and the constituency groups these people are manipulating, claiming to represent, advocating for, or trying to capture support from. It is over-deterministic to suggest that by definition political opportunists advocating and using violence to challenge the government or change the status quo succeed in winning constituency support for a variety of reasons including the extremely high failure rate of terrorist organizations who collapse within a year from lack of support and recruits, as well the relatively low levels of sustained political violence, rebellion or revolution. However, it is also apparent that there are cases where constituency groups, at least in part, support and sustain terrorists’ goals of challenging the state. It is this support that gives the terrorist organization legitimacy and replenishes it with new recruits, funding and key resources. Therefore, it is imperative we investigate the relationship between terrorists and their constituency groups to fill in this gap and advance our understanding of the dynamics of terrorism.

The theory I briefly introduce below and explain in greater detail in Chapter 2 attempts to bridge this divide and bring us closer to a theoretical grasp of the conditions under which groups support terrorist organizations. Analyzing ethnic group support for terrorism in advanced democracies is the first step towards building a substantive body of work on the support for the use of violence to change the status quo, and a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the dynamics of terrorist networks and support. The Theory of Ethnic Group
Support for Terrorists (TEST) takes cues from all of the literature cited above and isolates two key factors that explain ethnic group support for terrorism. First, the TEST assumes economic deprivation is a necessary cause behind ethnic group mobilization. As will be made evident in Chapter 3 on Methods, almost all ethno-nationalist groups engaged in unrest of any kind: protest, rebellion or communal conflict mobilize around economic grievances (MAR 2009). Second, the TEST posits that repression, understood in the broadest sense, is the key factor in explaining why an ethnic group will turn to terrorism as a tool to change the status quo. The repression literature has been quite unsuccessful in clarifying the relationship between state violence aimed at the group and group response, and the TEST argues this is a reflection of the narrow conception scholars have employed to define and operationalize repression focusing almost entirely on agent-driven discrete actions aimed at raising the costs of collective action. This understanding completely fails to incorporate institutional or structural forms of repression that may systematically exclude ethnic groups, and other population subgroups like women, from political participation. The TEST begins with a re-conceptualization of repression to account for the breadth of tools states have at their disposal to shape and control political behavior including both institutional and agent-driven forms.

Using a new definition of repression, the TEST then posits a series of dynamic relationships that can explain the conditions under which ethnic groups will turn to supporting terrorism as a means of forcing institutional change. First, institutions define the relationship all constituency groups, including ethnic
groups, have to the state and the degree to which their political access is facilitated, tolerated or repressed. Where groups are incorporated into the political system and open political access to air grievances is facilitated, and compromises can be reached, there is no need to go outside of the system to force change. However when groups do not have equal access and are merely tolerated by the system or, worse, repressed and shut out of the system completely, then they are going to mobilize around key grievances and demand change outside normal institutional avenues, which is stage two. In stage three, agents and institutions respond to mobilized ethnic groups either through reform, in which case violence and conflict are averted, or through repression, confrontation and refusal to address grievances. In stage four, the ethnic group responds to the government’s refusal to reform, and/or use of repression through the use and support for violence/terrorism to change the status quo. Ultimately, the government has the capacity to stymie, prevent, or undermine support for terrorism at every stage, and the degree to which the government is willing or unwilling to open institutional channels and incorporate marginalized or discriminated against groups determines the likelihood of moving a peripheral group of radicals to center-stage revolutionaries.

**Plan of the Dissertation**

Chapter 2 lays out the Theory for Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism (TEST) in detail, focusing first on the extension of previous conceptions of repression as the foundation for the theory. The TEST then builds a series of
action-reaction stages ethnic groups and states go through that explain the conditions under which ethnic groups will increase their support for terrorism.

Chapter 3 describes Alexander George’s method of “structured, focused comparison” and lays out how it will be applied to three comparative cases designed to test out the TEST. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 apply the TEST to the three case studies of Quebec, Corsica, and Northern Ireland. Finally, Chapter 7 compares and analyzes the three cases and draws some conclusions as to the applicability of TEST in broader contexts.
Chapter 1

Theory of Ethnic Group Support for Terrorists (TEST)

Under what conditions will ethnic groups support terrorism? Terrorists are strategic. They have motives and goals. They offer the possibility for change. But it is the support of the constituency group that plays a key role in the likelihood of their success or failure over the long term. “Terrorist groups cannot survive without support from a constituent community which, as in the case of groups such as Al-Qaeda or Hamas, is based on religious and ethnic ties.” (Sinai 2006, 39) To actively support terrorism is to accept the use of violence to change the status quo. It comes with a high price. Society is destabilized, the productivity of the economy is undermined, and supporters, as well as terrorists, put their freedoms, security and lives in jeopardy.

Normally, socialized men do not resort to violence except as a last resort (although the perception of what constitutes a last resort may be colored by an ideology). If acts of revolution are quixotic or inappropriate they will not be tolerated by other members of the system, and instead of terminating the system they will be dealt with as forms of crime or lunacy. (Johnson, 1982 13)

Yet, there are cases where terrorism is a strategy people are willing to support. Understanding the conditions under which groups in a state will be driven to increase their support for terrorism is essential because if states are able to address the concerns of constituent communities and undermine sources of potential support, then terrorists are less likely to survive or succeed.

As evident from the literature review in the Introduction, determining why ethnic groups might support terrorists and their activities remains unanswered.
The literature, however, consistently suggests that repression is a key variable that can trigger or cause violence in general. But there is no consensus on how this relationship works. The presence of observable, coercive forms of repression does not consistently produce violence or support for violence and, thus, is an insufficient answer. TEST asserts this failure can be rectified by acknowledging that there are two key types of repression: structural and agent-driven that work together to drive ethnic groups towards using and supporting terrorist violence as a means to change the status quo. The TEST posits there is a dynamic relationship between the state and an ethnic group that determines the conditions under which ethnic groups will support terrorism to change the status quo. To put it simply, the state’s willingness to shut out ethnic groups from seeking peaceful change through institutional channels, and willingness to permit agents (state or otherwise) to use threats and violence against the ethnic group causes the ethnic group to respond with violence and support for terrorism.

This chapter proceeds by first redefining repression to incorporate an institutional type of repression. Second, using this new definition, a theory of conditions that cause ethnic groups to support the use of violence is posited. Third, hypotheses are asserted to test the theory. Finally, a research design is constructed that enables us to test the hypotheses in three cases.

**Repression**

Most repression scholars agree governments use repression to control political behavior. (Tilly 1978, Lichbach 1987) But conventional definitions of repression are limited to discrete actions as Tilly’s popular definition indicates:
“Any action by another group that raises that contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978, 100). This kind of ‘Agent-driven’ repression is the standard understanding most scholar’s have of repression -- discrete actions taken in order to raise the contender’s cost of collective action. The underlying assumption here is that these actions are reactionary to a shift in the contender’s position and thus, to maintain the status quo, agents must raise the cost of mobilization or collective action. It captures Earl’s (2003) category of observable and unobservable coercion and focuses on the use of force by agents. The two keys to this type of repression are the use of actual force and the variety of agents who might use it. The actual use of force has been typologized in a variety of ways, Stockdill’s (1996) harassment, intimidation, assault, detainment and murder are as useful as any. Thus, the presence of one of these coercive tactics is evidence of agent-driven repression. Moreover, force and coercion may be used by anyone. As suggested by Earl (2003), the three types of agents are: state agents tightly connected with national political elites, state agents loosely connected with national political elites, and private agents. Agents can have variable connections to political elites and state authorities. While it would be possible to place repressive agents on a continuum of connections to state political elites, Earl makes distinctions among only three possible repressive agents in order to simplify the discussion. First, repressive agents may be state agents who are tightly linked to political elites (and hence more subject to their control), such as military/police agencies in authoritarian regimes or national police agencies in democratic countries. Second, repressive agents can be state agents who are only
loosely connected to national political elites, such as local police agencies in the United States. Finally, repressive agents can be private citizens or groups such as vigilantes or counter-movements (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; White 1999).

The problem with Tilly’s and Earl’s types of repression is these definitions focus on actions that raise the costs of collective action. Tilly’s definition, on which Earl’s typology is based, includes any action by another group that raises the cost of collective action. And collective action he defines as consisting “of people’s acting together in pursuit of common interests”. (Tilly 1978, 7) This seems to rule out codified laws that were established in the initial state building period, or from some other historical time period, that made the costs of collective action and/or mobilization extremely high initially.

This is a significant problem. States do not just repress actions, they repress actors. They do not automatically grant rights to every person within their territory, and various groups have to contend and fight for basic rights that other groups possess, like women or Blacks in the US. Thus, it is a remarkable oversight that these kinds of situations – where structures of institutional rules and laws, that systematically discriminate and oppress whole constituency groups – are not considered also repressive. These definitions fail to capture the most obvious forms of structural or institutional rules and laws that aim to limit and constrain actors from engaging in collective action, mobilization, and moreover, any access to political participation or power, such as total or partial disenfranchisement, slavery, or gerrymandering. In fact, laws, rules and regulations are actually much more effective tools government’s have for
dissuading groups from vying for political power and access. Neutralizing actors through legislation is easier and more efficient than waiting until collective action is occurring before taking discrete actions against contenders. (Tilly 1978, 100)

This deficiency, coupled with the dismal failure of repression research to reach any kind of consensus on the effects of repression, indicates is a pronounced need to re-evaluate our conception of repression and broaden it to include two types: agent-driven and structural. As Davenport (2007) highlights this in his work, when “…one considers research that investigates the influence of repressive behavior on dissent (exploring one of the core aspects of collective action theory regarding the importance of costs), the results are highly inconsistent.” Most typologies of repression focus on the severity of repression, not the type of repression. (Earl 2003, 46; della Porta 1996) Even when “types” of repression have been discussed (Marx 1979; Carley 1997), “scholars have created catalogs of repressive tactics only loosely organized by salient, theoretically driven nomenclatures.” (Earl 2003, 46) Other scholars who have studied different kinds of repression: negative sanctions and civil liberties restrictions (Davenport 1995, King 1998), personal integrity violations (Poe and Tate 1994, Zanger 2000), torture (Hathaway 2002), genocide/politicide (Krain 1997), and combinations of these categories (Davenport 2004) have remained focused on very specific forms of agent-driven repression, rather than looking at definitional or typological issues.

The TEST proposes that an accurate definition of repression should reflect the full scope and spectrum of tools that can be used to control social and political
behavior. Repression is laws, rules, practices or actions that deny, limit, or constrain the mobilization or collective action of contenders. This definition acknowledges both the commonly held view that repression consists of discrete actions of agents that might raise the costs of mobilization and collective action, as well as incorporating a second type of institutional, also termed structural, repression.

**Theory for Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism (TEST)**

The theory for ethnic group support for terrorism asks under what conditions will ethnic groups support terrorism? The answer is when both structural and agent-driven repression are present. Structural repression is the root cause of ethnic group mobilization and grievances, and defines the extent to which an ethnic group can use political and non-violent avenues to change the status quo. Agent-driven repression is the trigger which will cause mobilized ethnic groups to resort to violence and support for violence to force change. Alone these two types of repression are insufficient to explain support for terrorism, but together they not only explain when ethnic groups will support terrorism, but also the degree to which they are likely to support terrorism.

**Root causes: Structural Repression**

States – which are the most prevalent perpetrators of repression (Tilly 1978, 100), and their institutions have the capacity to enable political participation, to provide opportunities for political engagement and the airing of grievances, and offer the possibility for changing the status quo among the population in general, or subsets of the population. Alternatively they can limit,
constrain, or deny them. Institutions identify in- and out-group, or power holders and contenders; and establish the rules of the game for each. The rules of the game establish who votes, the structure of voting, the regime type, allocation of resources, and basic rights and freedoms, as well as more specific regulations like campaign finance rules and political party regulations. Some subgroups may be systematically oppressed, such as the case with slavery; others may be denied only some rights like women pre-1930s enfranchisement; and finally, some groups may be privileged and have extended access to political power. Thus, structural or institutional repression exists along a spectrum with facilitation on the other end.

Figure 1: Facilitation – Repression Spectrum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitative</th>
<th>Tolerant</th>
<th>Repressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Structural facilitation is defined as structural conditions that enable and engender high degrees of access to political power with few or no codified rules or laws that limit or constrain political engagement for any particular group; structural repression is the comprehensive denial of political access for specific subgroups of the population, examples of structural repression may include, but are not limited to, gerrymandering, total or partial disenfranchisement, legislation that prevents free association, political parties, or organizations of specific

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4 Tilly creates this spectrum in relation to agent driven repression, and here I am applying the same logic to structural repression. (Tilly 1978)
population groups. Finally, structural tolerance is a ‘mixed bag’ where there is some access to use political institutions to change the status quo but it is not equal to other constituency groups, or inconsistently applied with some facilitative rules and some repressive ones generating a mixed message for subgroups wanting to use the institutions to gain access to political power. In other words, structural repression exists in degrees. The government, in particular, has many institutions and often layers of authority such as the case of federal systems and thus, the result is that structural repression can be low (facilitative), medium (tolerant), or high (repressive).

Ultimately, then, *institutional repression determines the degree to which subgroups can use the system to change the status quo*. So in cases where institutions facilitate political access, groups and subgroups can use the institutions to try to challenge the status quo. They provide open channels for communicating grievances and participating in the deliberative decision-making of the government, and consequently, groups and subgroups have political access and an avenue available to seek change. On the other hand, when structural repression does exist, groups or subgroups of the population are denied equal access to airing their grievances, making political demands, or challenging the status quo. The assumption here is that the design or configuration of the institutions was not intended to constrain everyone’s political access. The institutions facilitate access to political power, or mobilization, for at least some subgroups of the population. Thus, the limitations and constraints are particular to a subgroup rather than everyone in general. Here one might argue that
authoritarian regimes that are highly repressive may intend to repress everyone and deny everyone political access, but there is little evidence to suggest this is actually the case. Even the most repressive authoritarian regimes grant political access to some subgroup of elites, usually fellow party members, ethnic, or kin group members.

Ethnic groups subjected to structural repression may remain subjugated for an indefinite amount of time, where state institutions discriminate, penalize, or disenfranchise groups of people for decades or longer and not necessarily face confrontation from the victims. It is possible, as well, that marginalized groups never end up confronting the state and demanding reform because those in power reform the institutions pre-emptively, although examples of this are few and far between. Usually, a shift in political opportunity or an exogenous shock forces an opening in the otherwise repressive environment. Then the subgroup becomes aware of its political marginalization, mobilizes, and demands reforms of the institutions to be more inclusive. The most relevant and widely cited example of this was during the 1960s when worldwide revolutions against oppressive and colonial regimes provided a catalyst through which many groups and subgroups came to challenge discrimination, oppression, and disenfranchisement. Ethnic group members became conscious of their shared identity and shared destiny resulting in a collective effort to identify, discuss and air grievances. Often collective action groups are formed by community leaders, and protests, demonstrations and marches took place. Mobilized ethnic groups engage in contentious politics and collective action in order to change the structure and state
institutions, because they are the source of the repression and political marginalization. Such as the case of the US Civil Right’s movement where the decolonization of Africa provided an impetus for black Americans to demand equal and fair treatment. As will be shown in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, decolonization is frequently cited as the stimulus that shifted awareness among Catholics in Northern Ireland, Corsicans in France and Quebecois in Canada to mobilize around grievances and demands for change.

**Trigger: Agent-driven repression**

When state agents engage in a ‘discrete act’ of repression specifically against the ethnic group it becomes a trigger for the ethnic group to engage in collective violence or support terrorists and other political entrepreneurs in their quest to use violence against the state. The use of agent-driven repression is a trigger because it changes a situation of raising grievances and demanding reforms of institutions to protecting oneself and one’s kin group from physical threat and harm. A fight or flight response emerges when the state sanctions agents to engage in violent repression. The group is either forced to submit to the state and end their protests or escalate their confrontation until the state submits, collapses or, in the worst-case scenario, commits genocide.

**Ethnic Group Response: Support for Terrorism**

Once agents use discrete acts of repression against the ethnic group, the ethnic group is compelled to respond. There are three possible responses: ‘return to the barracks’ and end the confrontation, maintain current levels of violence and continue to observe the state’s response, or escalate the confrontation. The choice
of response is determined by the extent to which the state is willing to reform institutions. Ethnic groups use and support violence as a last resort and only to the extent required to effect change. The goal for ethnic groups is effective institutional reform. If institutions facilitated effective, and equal, political participation for subgroups and ethnic groups, and they could use that political power to address grievances and seek reforms, they would not need to support the use of violence or terrorism to change the system. In environments with structures that facilitate, there should no terrorism and no support for violence. The more likely scenario, however, is that agents will use discrete acts of repression against collective action, and against the ethnic group in general, in order to maintain the status quo.

If there is a mix of reform that fails to meet demands for change and some degree of agent-driven repression, ethnic groups are likely to tolerate and have some degree of support and sympathy for violence, as is the case in Corsica. If some institutions are repressive, but others are not and agent-driven repression is present subgroups are likely to tolerate and have mixed support for terrorism because the group itself is likely to be divided over the degree to which violence is, in fact, necessary to change the status quo. Thus, it is likely there will be some toleration of violence and some support for terrorism, as well as perhaps some counter forces within the group that are antagonistic to the use of terrorism or even change.

If reform is not at all sought and agent-driven repression is employed to quell demands for change, ethnic group support for terrorism is likely to increase,
and potentially erupt into a low level insurgency or conflict, as was the case with Northern Ireland. In environments with highly repressive structures and agent-driven repression, subgroups are most likely to support terrorism because it requires more to bring attention to state repression, to force the state to change, and defend themselves against high degrees of agent-driven repression. In this case, the motive for institutional reform may shift to one of forcing the state to collapse because the state has lost all legitimacy in the eyes of a substantial portion of the ethnic group.

Based on this analysis, the following hypotheses can be set forward:

1. In environments with highly repressive structures and the presence of agent-driven repression, ethnic groups are most likely to support terrorism.

2. If some institutions are repressive, but others are not, and agent-driven repression is present, ethnic groups are more likely to tolerate and have mixed support for terrorism.

3. In environments with low structural repression and agent-driven repression is not present, terrorism may be tolerated, but it will not be supported.

4. In environments with structures that facilitate, there should no terrorism and no support for violence.

The key here is that both types of repression are necessary to explain ethnic group support for terrorism. Institutional repression can be sustained indefinitely without provoking any ethnic group response. Agent-driven repression can occur, but if
institutions are not repressive then ethnic groups will have channels available to them to hold agents accountable for their discrete acts of repression. Even if the ethnic group mobilizes around repressive institutions and institutional reform does not occur, or fails to effective engender genuine political participation for the group, but agents do not engage in additional repression, collective action will continue and may escalate, although not to sustained, organized violence. The latter is an unlikely scenario, or a scenario that will almost certainly be temporary. It is far more likely that if institutions are repressive, then agents (private state or local) will reflect this and engage in discrete acts of violence or repression against the group, in which case the ethnic group will respond with support for terrorism.

**Conclusions: TEST**

The TEST asks under what conditions ethnic groups are likely to increase their support of the use of terrorism against their own government. It should now be clear that the answer does reflect the widely held consensus that governmental repression is the primary causal factor. But there are two key types of repression: structural and agent-driven and both work together to drive up support for terrorism. Structural repression incorporates institutional rules, laws and regulations that fail to provide peaceful channels of conflict resolution equally for everyone. Structural repression establishes the nature of the relationship between the state and its various ethnic, and other constituency groups. This relationship can be facilitative, tolerant or repressive towards ethnic groups making it more or less difficult to have political avenues to bring about change.
Ethnic groups that are subjected to repressive governmental institutions at some point are going to have the opportunity to mobilize and challenge these institutions to change. As ethnic groups mobilize community leaders, violent entrepreneurs, and terrorists will emerge from the group and attempt to lead the rally for reform, and the stat’s response determines the likelihood that violence and support for terrorism will be become a salient issue. If the state institutions are changed to become more facilitative and grant equal access to ethnic groups, then groups will no longer need to go outside the system to force a change. If institutions remain unresponsive and inflexible, and then state agents engage in discrete acts of repression that trigger physical fears of insecurity, then ethnic groups are likely to respond with increasing levels of support for violence and terrorism until the system is reformed or collapses. Ethnic groups are more likely to support terrorist activities when the institutions completely deny them any alternative means to achieve change.
Chapter 2

The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison

The TEST will be analyzed using Alexander George’s (2005) Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. The method is structured because it asks the same general questions of each case, and focused in that it bears in mind a particular theoretical, research objective in mind. (George 2005, 70) The goals of the method include enabling a systematic comparison of cases, both those included in this work and those that might be added in the future; and, allowing for the accumulation of knowledge with regards to a specific research question.

There are three general phases of George’s method: first, the objectives, design and structure of the research are identified and explained. Phase one consists of five integrated and interdependent tasks that should complement each other to achieve a synthesized and systematic approach: puzzle identification and defining the research objective, developing a research strategy, selecting cases, variable description, and question formulation.

Phase two of the research design is the analyses of case studies where a set of pre-determined questions are answered. It’s important for researchers to be clear, structured, and systematic in the analysis of a case to allow critical audiences to be able to verify and repeat the analysis. Explanations for outcomes in cases arise through causal imputation, which is different from causal inference found in statistical studies. Initially, explanations of outcomes are provisional, but they become more robust and plausible when consistent with available data, support from other relevant work, and/or testing against other theories.
Finally, in phase three, the findings are discussed and their contribution is assessed in light of past research. In general there are, according to George, implications for theory development and theory testing on three levels. First, findings can establish, weaken or strengthen historical explanations of a case. Second, finding that a theory does or does not explain a case may be generalized to the class or subclass of cases, and this is an important discovery for future researchers. Finally, in the broadest terms findings will be generalized “to neighboring cells in a typology, to the role of a particular variable in dissimilar cases, or even to cases of a phenomenon”. (George 2005, 110)

In the application of George’s method of focused, structured comparison, task one of phase one will be addressed in the introductory and theory chapters. Tasks two through five of phase one will be fulfilled in this methods chapter. The case studies’ chapters three, four and five will constitute phase two, and finally, phase three will be executed in the concluding chapter.

**Applying the Method: Identification of Variables**

As highlighted in the introductory and theory chapters, the dependent variable is ethno-nationalist group support for terrorist organizations. Group support for violence has largely been acknowledged in the literature as relevant to understanding terrorists but understudied and this may be due, in part, to the general difficulty in measuring group support. There are two aspects of this variable that require specification: defining ‘the ethnic group’ and defining ‘support’. First, ethnic groups are not coherent units. An ethnic group is comprised of individuals who vary in their sentiments, opinions and ideas. What
is meant here by ‘ethnic group’ is some portion of the ethnic group; it need not be a majority or even a substantial portion because terrorism, to be successful, requires that only some portion of the ethnic group to tolerate, have sympathy for, or support with resources and recruits.

It is historically evident that if the state maintains power and legitimacy, the terrorist organization remains marginalized and peripheral – members are arrested and the group cannot sustain itself; public declarations of support, recruitment, and mobilization are not forthcoming. The ethnic group failed to give financial, physical, and public support to the terrorist organization. On the other hand, if the terrorist organization succeeded in gaining some measure of legitimacy and credibility by winning over a significant portion of popular ethnic group support, then public expressions of support from the group were forthcoming whether through local media, community organizations or statements from community leaders.

There are several degrees of support for terrorism. First, there are cases of minimal support for terrorism. In many instances, terrorist organizations would not even last beyond the one-year mark (90% of cases) as indicated by Hoffman (1998). For the few that manage to last beyond one year, but do not garner public support, the terrorists remain peripheral and marginalized perceived as criminals. Second, the ethnic group may have mixed support for terrorism. In this case, the ethnic group is clearly and publicly divided with some portion of the group supporting terrorism and some portion of the group denouncing it or using counter-strategies against it. This is the case if the ethnic group has competing
terrorist organizations fighting against the state and fighting for the maintenance of the status quo, or if terrorism subsides when institutional reforms are enacted, demonstrating a willingness of the ethnic group to use institutions avenues to bring about change should any be given. Finally, ethnic groups may have high degrees of support for terrorism. The most obvious measures of support are public declarations for it by community leaders, community recruitment, and fundraising for the terrorist organization. When agents use repression against the group, one would expect to see the group’s support for the terrorist organization increase with an observable growth of the organization, an increase in activity, recruitment, and funding. Because the universe of cases is confined to groups in advanced democracies, almost all of the cases are historical and the outcome is known.

**Dependent Variable:**

*Ethnic group support for terrorists:* Some portion of the ethnic group actively supports the use of violence against the government. Ethnic group support will be measured qualitatively through observations regarding the activities of both the ethnic group and the terrorist organization. If there is no support, no recruitment, no sustainability of the terrorist activity, then the terrorist organization ceases to exist at all. If some portion of the ethnic group is willing to support terrorism with resources and recruits, then terrorists are active but their activity does not grow into a low-level or, for that matter, high-level conflict. It is less likely one would observe an increase in activity, or more importantly, that the terrorist organization would make the transition from a terrorist organization to a
revolutionary organization or army. By definition the presence of terrorist activity for more than one year by definition means the ethnic group is willing to tolerate some degree of violence; however it does not mean the terrorists won over popular support. Finally, if there is a substantial shift in popular support for terrorism among ethnic group members, then one should expect to see terrorism flourish and grow into a small-scale insurgency or revolution.

Independent Variables:

*Structural Repression:* State political institutions limit, constrain or deny political access of the ethnic group, or every member of the group by virtue of their identity. The group is under-represented either because of historical neglect, governance structures, and/or intentional discrimination. Political access includes any structural constraints that discriminate against any given minority group. This centers around, but is not necessarily limited to, regime type, access to campaign financing, voting rules and practices, and political party representation. It also includes, for instance, majoritarian systems where a fifty-plus-one system could mean systematically marginalizing forty nine percent of the population. Limited political access could arise from policies or practices that disadvantage, or discriminate against, a particular ethnic group in any or all of these areas. To have political access limited through any of these factors is sufficient to cut off the ethnic group from equal access and to cause frustration, alienation, and unfair political disadvantage.

In terms of measurement, there are degrees of structural repression: low, medium and high. Low structural repression is also understood as facilitation. In
this case, institutions do not discriminate based on ethnic identity AND they recognize minority rights. All persons have equal rights and status under the law and minorities are granted special status to make sure there is no tyranny of the majority. Medium structural repression is where institutions are mixed, with only some limitations and constraints on political access for a specific group OR the structure fails to acknowledge minority rights to ensure that in majority-plus-one systems a whole minority is not limited in their ability to effect any kind of change. An example of medium structural repression is the local gerrymandering of only a few electoral districts. High structural repression is when institutions clearly intend to discriminate and deny a particular group or ethnic group access to any kind of political power. An example here is total disenfranchisement.

Agent driven repression: Agents, as posited in Chapter 2, can be closely tied to the government, loosely tied to the government, or private. In this case, only agents clearly tied to the state in someway are included: police, army, and government or elected officials. Private agents, such as contending ethnic groups, are excluded from this research. This type of repression is defined as any specific act that raises the costs of mobilization (Tilly 1978). Acts could include, but are not limited to, internment, suspension of civil liberties, murders, torture or disproportionate shows of force. Because agent-driven repression is the trigger, it is either present or absent. The degree of agent-driven repression is irrelevant in terms of ethnic group support for terrorism. As long as there is a ‘discrete act’ of repression taken against the mobilized ethnic group, then it is present.
Case Selection and Scope

The cases will be selected according to the scope of the research design and on the variation that exists in the independent variables. Below, I will define each of the factors used to guide case selection. Then, the universe of cases will be addressed and cases will be selected based on this criteria. Finally, there will be a preliminary discussion of each of the cases included in the study.

Regime type: Advanced democracies are the focus of this study for two reasons: first, indigenous terrorists should be least likely in a democracy because of the state-society social contract. There is a pledge of representative government, equality, opportunity and freedom that should mean that people do not need to use violence to influence or change the political system. Second, and not unrelated, the most cited resolution to countries facing any kind of political violence, contestation or terrorists is to democratize. The promise of democracy is the promise of inalienable rights and access to power. If people have non-violent ways to try to change what they do not like, then they are much less likely to try to use violence to bring about change. For this study, all the cases are least likely cases of terrorists in advanced Western, industrialized democracies5.

Terrorist Organizations: Organizations identified and included in the START6 Terrorist Organization Profiles database qualify for this research as terrorist organizations.

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5 MAR’s list of advanced democracies includes Japan, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the countries of Western Europe. Minorities at Risk Project. (2005)
Ethno-nationalist group: Ethno-nationalist groups are identified and defined according to the criteria laid out in the Minorities At Risk (2005) dataset. ‘Ethnonationalist’ is “regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government, who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945.” (MAR 2009) Furthermore, the group has a population of more than 500,000 where “the group collectively suffers, or benefits from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-a-vis other groups in a society; and where the group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.” (MAR 2009) Ethno-nationalist groups in advanced democracies, as identified by MAR, are potential cases.

Structural repression: Structural repression exists in degrees of high, medium, and low. Degrees of structural repression are determined by the extent to which ethnic groups are formally denied access to voting, political party representation, and equal rights.

Agent-Driven Repression: State agents’ use of discrete acts of force to intimidate, coerce, physically threaten, torture or kill, members of the targeted subgroup. It is measured in terms of presence or absence as determined by public historical record.

The following group contains the universe of cases of ethno-nationalist groups in advanced democracies according to MAR:

Canada: French Canadians, Quebecois

France: Basques, Corsicans
Italy: Sardinians

Spain\(^7\) : Basques

United Kingdom: Catholics in Northern Ireland, Scots

Table 1: Case Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnonational group (MAR)</th>
<th>Sardinians</th>
<th>Scots</th>
<th>French Canadians</th>
<th>Quebecois France</th>
<th>Basques- Corsicans</th>
<th>Ulster Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad. Democracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Org.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Repression</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Med</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent-Driven Repression</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using the preconditions as parameters for case selection, French Canadians, Scots, and Sardinians can all be eliminated because none of them had terrorist organizations, thus making it impossible to establish the degree of support, tolerance or sympathy. The Basques in France are a particularly difficult case to analyze because they are so intertwined with the Basques in Spain.

The risk of rebellion by French Basques is likely to be substantially influenced by what happens in Spain. When the Basques in Spain slow down their terrorist activities, the same occurs in France, and it seems that terrorist acts committed in France are often, if not always, bolstered...

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\(^7\) Spain is included in MAR as an advanced democracy but made the transition from a dictatorship in the mid-1970s after terrorism had already gained support and spread to low-level conflict. The regime shift adds additional factors that make it difficult to compare to other advanced democracies that have been consolidated for decades or more and did not experience a recent history of authoritarianism. Thus, ethno-nationalist groups in Spain are excluded from case selection.
by Spanish activists. ETA activists continue to take refuge among welcoming kindred on the French side of the border. (MAR 2006)

Thus, the Basques in France experience an additional set of external factors that complicate an effective comparison and therefore, are excluded from case selection. Each of the remaining cases – Catholics in Northern Ireland, Québécois, and Corsica – fulfills the criteria for case inclusion and will constitute the controlled case comparison. Moreover, these cases reflect variation on the independent variable of structural repression: low repression (Quebec), medium repression (Corsica) and Northern Irish Catholics (high) as well as dependent variable variation of low (Quebec), medium (Corsica), and high (Catholics in NI) support for terrorist violence.

Canada and the Québécois

The Québécois are the French-speaking majority within the Canadian province of Quebec. Originally French settlers, after the French lost to the English in Queen Anne’s War, the French were forced to surrender much of their land to the English. The Quebec Act of 1774 would finalize the deal and bind Quebec to English Canada leaving the French speaking peoples surrounded and dominated by Anglophones. A Québécois rebellion in 1837-1838 against English domination resulted in a swift and serious loss, but become a symbol of Quebec nationalism in the 1960s.

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8 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=22002
9 Québécois are not to be confused with French Canadians in Canada who are all of the French speaking peoples outside of the province of Quebec. The two groups are treated distinctly because of their relationship to the territory of Quebec.
10 Details on the Quebec Act can be found at http://www.linksnorth.com/canada-history/thequebecact.html
By the mid-twentieth century Canada had an advanced, industrialized economy that the Québécois were largely excluded from. Moreover, the city of Montreal, in Quebec, became the business hub of Canada and was dominated by Anglophones who discriminated against the Francophone majority in the province. In addition, the Anglo business class and the Catholic Church collaborated in politically and economically marginalizing the Québécois, albeit for different reasons. With the birth of the Civil Rights Movement in the US and de-colonization across the globe, Québécois began to see themselves as colonized peoples who suffered from discrimination and disadvantage. In the late 1950s there were calls for reform and revolution. A period then ensued, called the Quiet Revolution (1960-1966), which brought about dramatic changes to both the political and economic structures in Quebec. Universities were created specifically for French-speakers; funding was made available for primary and secondary schools; steps were taken to minimize the role and power of the Catholic Church; labour laws and regulations were enacted to protect workers; and the government established a wide range of programs and plans to help alleviate past injustices on French speakers in the province. In the meantime, however, some came to believe these efforts were not sufficient. Small groups of activists calling for Quebec’s independence emerged, and some of these groups used terrorist tactics to garner attention and try to build support. In particular, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) was created in the early 1960s and used terrorist tactics over the course of a decade to draw attention to the independence cause and to drive support for revolution. Their terrorist activities culminated in
the October Crisis of 1970 where the FLQ kidnapped two prominent politicians, killing one. The October Crisis was the final act of the FLQ and ended the question of violence in Quebec. A revolution never happened and the question of separation remained a politically salient one, to be determined by ballot box only.

Quebec and the Québécois fit neatly into the parameters of this research design because this is an ethno-nationalist group who has a history of political disadvantage, has articulated demands for both reform and independence, and has had a terrorist organization, active for ten years, using violence as a tool to achieve its goals. The puzzle of Quebec is why there was never an increase in support for terrorists.

**Britain and Northern Irish Catholics**

Northern Irish Catholics constitute a significant minority of the population in Northern Ireland and have been struggling for independence from Great Britain since Britain colonized Ireland in 1691. Ireland was divided after a war with the British and a civil war within Ireland in 1922. The South became a free state and formed a republic in 1949, while the North remained under British control with Protestants in the slight majority. Catholics in the North were economically and politically discriminated against, fueling the ethno-nationalist sentiments they harbored for the British. The Catholics of Northern Ireland have been seeking reunion with the Republic since the civil war ended, and have staged many uprisings throughout the early 20th century. In the 1960s, a civil rights movement emerged in Northern Ireland demanding equal rights, protection, and treatment for Catholics, mimicking the US Civil Rights Movement. Protests were a popular
form of mobilization and often resulted in altercations with police and state officials. In 1972, one of these civil rights marches resulted in the police shooting and killing 13 civilians. The incident is now known as ‘Bloody Sunday’ and marked a turning point in the relationship between the Catholic community and the state. The Catholic community demanded the resurrection of the historic Irish Republican Army (IRA) to protect them.

The IRA was established in 1916 by a group of Irishmen fighting for independence from Britain. They led the Easter Rising of 1916, fought in the Irish War for Independence and the Irish civil war. The IRA split in 1922 over the division of the North and the South. Part of the IRA remained active in the North for decades after the split between the North and the South. In the 1950s, they ran a border campaign of insurrection against Northern Ireland that failed and ended in 1962. In 1969, the IRA split into two organizations: the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA (PIRA). The Official IRA was Marxist and wanted to use class politics to undermine partition. They also did not want to engage in sectarian violence with the Protestant paramilitaries attacking Catholics. The PIRA wanted to wage a war for independence from Britain and protect the Catholic community. After Bloody Sunday, PIRA support, recruits, and funding increased dramatically setting off a violent conflict between the British, Northern Irish Protestants, and Northern Irish Catholics that would last through 1998 and beyond. The IRA’s use of terrorist tactics to inflict pain, instill fear and garner support from their own population probably make them one of the more successful terrorist organizations of the twentieth century.
Catholics in Northern Ireland also fit into the parameters of this research question since they are an ethno-nationalist minority who were historically discriminated against and faced political and economic hardship in a democratic state. Upon demanding change and equality for the community in non-violent protests, civil rights activists were met with resistance or even violence. In this case, the government did attack and kill several group members engaged in non-violent protest. Subsequently, the IRA – later to become the Provisional IRA – arose from the ashes to wage a violent terrorist campaign for three decades on behalf of the disadvantaged and threatened Catholic community. The question for this case is: under what conditions and when did the PIRA succeed in garnering support and approval to use terrorist tactics?

France and Corsicans

Corsica has a history riddled with conquest and foreign domination, experiencing only a brief period of independence between 1755-1768. It was purchased by the French from the Genoese which instigated a brief war of independence, resulting in incorporation into France in 1770. Since then, Corsicans have maintained a desire for independence and a nationalist spirit. Corsicans speak an Italian-French dialect and consider themselves an ethnically distinct group from the French.

As an island people, the Corsicans have always felt distanced from France and France has historically ignored all minority issues including Corsican grievances of economic hardship, neglect and political under-representation. In the 1960s, Corsica became a popular destination for decolonization resettlement.
French Algerians, called *Pied Noirs*, were given incentives, such as cheap land and vineyards, to resettle in Corsica. The Corsicans resented the unequal treatment and protested against the French state. They demanded more autonomy and control over decision-making, even independence. The French government ignored the grievances and demands and continued their resettlement policies, resulting in an escalating nationalism among Corsicans. The tensions erupted in Aleria in 1975 when a dozen or so nationalists occupied a local vineyard that had been cheaply sold to *pied noirs*. The owners were asked to leave while the armed nationalists staged a protest. The French government responded with twelve hundred *gendarmes*, leading to a shoot-out that left two guards dead and one nationalist injured. The incident marked a turning point in the tensions because a significant portion of Corsicans believed the French government over-reacted.

Soon after, the *Front di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica* (FLNC) was created out of several smaller groups. They engaged in thousands of bombings to bring about independent and the protection of Corsican language and culture. They failed to achieve any noteworthy support and lost any sympathy they might have had when the French government gave special status to Corsica, granting Corsicans more autonomy, better representation, and more economic resources.

Thus, Corsican fulfills the requirements for a comparable case as well. As an ethno-nationalist group, they have experienced hardship, discrimination, and political marginalization by virtue of France’s general policies on minority rights. The FLNC emerged, advocating violence and terrorism against the state to change the status quo. But their goals and methods were met with resistance and some
counter-independence terrorist groups, also claiming to represent Corsican interests, emerged, threatening to pull apart the island. The FLNC is still active as a terrorist organization fighting the French government for independence, but the most recent polls indicate Corsicans do not want independence or violence.

In conclusion, from the universe of cases, three stand out as appropriate for this research design: Corsica, Québécois in Canada and Northern Irish Catholics in Britain. Each group is an ethno-nationalist group as identified by Minorities At Risk (MAR), has the shared experience and history of political marginalization and economic hardship. All the groups exist within democracies where there is a promise of fair representation, equality of opportunity, freedom and justice. Finally, each group had, or has, an organization willing to use terrorist tactics to achieve greater autonomy or independence. The remaining groups that exist within the universe of cases as identified by MAR are excluded because they are missing at least one of the key factors.

**Questions**

This research design is focused on answering the general question of ‘Under what conditions do ethno-nationalist groups in advanced democracies support terrorists?’ The theory I have developed argues that mobilized ethno-nationalist groups support terrorists when they experience structural repression and agent-driven repression. In accordance with George’s “focused comparison” I lay out a set of questions to be answered in each case that will enable a structured analysis across cases and establish causal connections among these variables.
1. Do state institutions facilitate, tolerate, or repress any particular subgroup of the population?
   a. What is the structure and regime type of the system? Federalism or unitary state?
   b. Are there political parties that represent the subgroup?
   c. Are voting practices discriminatory or disenfranchising?
2. Does the ethnic group, or subgroup, engage in collective action to change the system?
3. How do the state and agents of the state respond?
   a. Do agents engage in discrete acts of repression?
   b. Are institutions reformed?
4. To what extent does the ethnic group support the use of terrorist tactics against the state?

Interpreting Results

According to the theory laid out in Chapter 2, understanding whether or not an ethnic group will support terrorists is a relatively straightforward equation. If the ethnic group experiences both structural repression and agent-driven repression, they are likely to support terrorism. The higher the degree of structural repression, the more support ethnic groups will give to terrorists to use violence to force institutional reform. Thus, it must first be determined the extent to which institutions repress ethnic groups from access to political power. If the rules of political institutions facilitate equal access with other groups and ensure
minorities a political voice then there is low structural repression. It is likely that institutions failed to do this at some point, but were reformed. If institutions were reformed in part, but did not fully address ethnic group grievances giving them the power to achieve change, then structural repression is mixed or at medium level. Finally, if institutions systematically discriminated against or denied political access to a group, then there is a high level of structural repression.

Once ethnic groups mobilize around grievances, we look to determine if agent-driven discrete acts of repression occur against the group. As explicated in Chapter 2, this is dichotomous: government agents either do or do not use repressive tactics against ethnic group members. Since agent-driven repression is a trigger, then one expects to see the ethnic group respond. If terrorism diminishes or ceases to occur at all, then the ethnic group failed to increase support for it. If terrorism continues but does not flourish into a low level conflict, then the ethnic group maintained some degree of support and tolerance for it, but did not significantly increase their support. Finally, if terrorism becomes the primary tool to force change and flourishes with new recruits, resources and aid, then the ethnic group has significantly increased support for it.

Conclusively, to establish the validity of the theory of ethnic group support for terrorism, it needs to become evident that the degree to which ethnic groups experience structural repression reflects the degree to which they are willing to support terrorism against the state to force a change in the status quo. Ethnic groups that have institutional channels of political access, however minor, to air grievances and seek change should not engage in and support high levels of
terrorism and conflict. Ethnic groups that have equal and effective political access to make reforms using the system should be unwilling to tolerate or support terrorism. Finally, ethnic groups that are shut out of the system completely should be willing to escalate conflict and the use of terrorism to force the state to reform.
Chapter 3

Québécois and the FLQ: Rejecting Terrorism

As a case study Quebec occupies the position of institutional facilitation. Historically, the Québécois people experienced some limited structural repression that was primarily economic. In the early 1960s the Quiet Revolution brought forth systematic reforms of all of the key provincial institutions enabling francophone Quebeckers full and equal access to political power. But the effects of institutional reform were not felt and recognized immediately and in the decade following the Quiet Revolution, terrorists emerged demanding Quebec’s separation from the rest of Canada. Throughout most of the 1960s, terrorism continued but remained peripheral. Government officials did not engage in any clear acts of repression against the Québécois community. It was not until a crisis erupted in October 1970 when the terrorist group, Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), kidnapped two prominent politicians that state agents used discrete acts of repression including internment and the suspension of civil liberties. This was the moment when the Francophone populace of Quebec might have resorted to supporting the use of violence. But this did not happen. The Québécois community rejected violence and terrorism as tools in their struggle for independence. As will be made evident in the following pages, despite a history of structural repression and the use of agent driven repression Québécois not only failed to support terrorism, but lost their willingness to tolerate it because they had accessible alternatives for change through reformed institutions.
The chapter will proceed in three stages: first, a brief review of Quebec’s history, second, the questions as laid out in the methods chapter will be answered and analyzed in light of TEST, and finally, some conclusions will be drawn.

**History of the Québécois People**

The key grievance of the Québécois was that economic opportunity had been limited for French Quebecers since the British conquest of New France, where the English defeated the French settlers and affirmed English dominance across Canada. The result was that Quebec had grown into two distinct societies with symbiotic and asymmetrical class structures. The business class in Quebec was overwhelmingly Anglophone (Gagnon 1990, 103) with French Canadians accounting for only 6.7% of this group, even though they made up 30% of the Canadian population, (Milner 1978, 47-48) whereas the working class was mainly Francophone, and engaged in subsistence farming or petty commodity production. While a small portion of the French-speaking community acted as intermediaries between the Anglophone business class (which controlled the English-Canadian and US based multinational corporations) and the overwhelming French-speaking populace, few French Canadians were economically powerful in their own right. (Gagnon 1990, 104) Moreover, the attitudes of French Canadian politicians were largely those of a colonized people, unable to overcome feelings of inferiority and use positions of leadership to usurp power away from the ruling minority. This subjugated position of French speakers was the result of two key relationships: the relationship between the provincial government and big business, and the relationship between the provincial government and the Catholic Church. The
provincial government saw its primary role as facilitator of commerce and capitalism. “The social realm was viewed as properly left to individual and family resources. To the extent that public charity was considered at all, it was viewed as the responsibility of charitable institutions largely under the control of the Roman Catholic Church.” (Gagnon 1990, 40)

In the decades prior to the October Crisis of 1970, Maurice Duplessis (1936-1939, 1944-1959\(^\text{11}\)) dominated Quebec’s politics. Duplessis’ premiership was characterized by propping up the Anglophone business class, playing the nationalist card by vigorously defending provincial autonomy against the encroachments of a centralist federal government, and reinforcing the dominant role the Roman Catholic Church played in controlling the daily lives of Francophones. In terms of business,Duplessis opposed Ottawa’s reform liberalism and Keynesianism; his credo was classical liberalism based on respect for private enterprise through which Quebec would attract large corporations and capital investment. To do this, he used provincial law to give companies wide powers, sold forest and mineral rights at low prices, and collected minimal taxes. Companies had few obligations or regulations. In terms of workers, minimum wage was kept low; there were few benefits, and working condition standards were minimal. (Linteau 1991, 195) Business was conducted in English, and French-speakers were seen as useless or inferior. Québécois were either exploited as cheap labour or ignored, leaving them with very limited economic mobility or opportunity. Québécois were socioeconomic second-class citizens in their own

\(^{11}\) Dates of Duplessis’ Premiership of Quebec
land. In 1961, their average income was significantly lower than that of most other ethnic groups. A Québécois was paid less than an Anglophone with the same ability and experience. In terms of employment and income, “the percentage of Francophones in total employment is lower among salaried staff earning over $5000 per annum in all groups of firms, and it decreases with rising income levels in all groups of firms except those owned by Francophones.” (Morrison 1973, 6)

In terms of unemployment levels, “the average rates of unemployment between 1957 and 1976 were: Quebec 7.4 per cent, Ontario 4.3 percent, Canada 5.6 percent.” (Milner 1978, 45) Québécois occupied the lower positions in corporations and had great difficulty getting middle management or executive jobs. They were subtly discriminated against at all levels of the economy. Québécois workers also paid higher taxes, lived in more polluted cities and generally received poorer services. On the other hand, Quebecers of British origin were in a dominant position in the economy and society, even though they were a minority. (Linteau 1991, 147) Thus, the relationship between the government and big business appeared designed to marginalize and discriminate against Francophones.

In addition to big business, the other centre of power was the Catholic Church. It also offered thousands of prestigious and influential positions as church trustees and leaders of religious or charitable parish associations. The Church’s influence went beyond the strictly religious sphere and included many hospitals, social services and schools. (Linteau 1991, 214-215) Duplessis and the provincial government supported the power of the Church by emphasizing religious values
and a conception of society based on respect for the established order. He used the courts, the police, and legislation in his fight against groups and individuals he considered subversive: communists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, trade union leaders and members, journalists, intellectuals and those who favored reform. The clergy supported Duplessis in these struggles, especially since the government maintained the Church’s traditional role and privileges, notably in the areas of education and social affairs. (Linteau 1991, 215)

The Catholic Church played a particularly damaging role in education. Education in Quebec had two notable features: it was segregated between Catholic and Protestant. The Catholic education system was largely Francophone, and the Protestant mostly English-speaking peoples with the Catholic Church running the Francophone school system; and the same laissez-faire approach the government applied to economics, the Catholic Church applied to education. Neither the state nor the Church was concerned with educating Francophones out of their position as an underclass. Education was not compulsory; there were very limited post-primary educational opportunities for rural Québécois; French high-schools were few and far between; there was tuition for pre-university schooling; and the Church used the schools to recruit any able-minded young people into the priesthood largely ignoring math, science, and history as subjects worthy of being taught. Francophones were woefully under-educated to compete with educated Anglophones in the business sector. All of this served to reinforce the economic disadvantages of the Francophone population. A 1972 report reflects upon the overall problems of the education system in Quebec. In general, there was a
Comparative failure of institutions of advanced learning in Quebec, whether Universities of technical institutes, to develop a technologically-sophisticated, managerial skill group of sufficient numbers among the French Canadian population, capable of entry into, and also taking over, positions of command in the commercial and industrial decision-making elite in Quebec. (Report 1972, 10-11)

Education and the role of the Catholic Church in general became sources of growing tension in the post-WWII environment as the population, and demands for services and education, grew rather dramatically.

In 1960, the Liberal Party, after decades of Duplessism, won an election and Jean Lesage was elected Premier. Lesage ushered in an era of serious economic and institutional reform, called the Quiet Revolution. The Quiet Revolution was the name given “to the gradual but far-reaching transformation of Quebec society since the Second World War.” (Fournier 1984, 15) It had three key goals: first, to increase the role of government and the welfare state by making the Quebec government a major player in the economy and a partner with private enterprise, as well as regulating business activity more closely. (Linteau 1991, 337) The second goal was to modernize the Quebec economy – *rattrapage* – which would be done by promoting the modernization of traditional manufacturing facilities and establishing new companies involved in the production of capital goods and high-tech industry, thus transforming Quebec’s industrial structure. Third, change the role played by Québécois in the economy and improve their socio-economic status by raising their standard of living through better education, better working conditions and more highly developed social policies, including increasing their participation in economic leadership. In
general, the government would use intervention to counter the negative effects of federal and past provincial policies on Québécois. (Linteau 1991, 338)

The QR marked a major turning point for Quebec political leaders with a radical attitude change after 1960 to one of government intervention. The provincial government, under Lesage, decided to have “empowerment of French Canadians, enterprises for French Canadians, hire French Canadians, protect French Canadians.” (Interviewee J.P.L.) “Quebec was in transition from traditional anti-statism to the aggressive state intervention embodied in the Quiet Revolution; it was reeling from the impact of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and from the persistence of government nonintervention; and finally, it was evolving from traditionalism to modernity.” (Gagnon 1990, 39) The new elites favored it as much as the old elites opposed it. Lesage changed the dominant approach to politics and the economy after decades of Liberal and Union Nationale laissez-faire economics. This new direction was inspired by nationalism, reform liberalism, and the general goal of modernizing Quebec. (Linteau 1991, 338)

Economically, the Lesage government used the government itself to train and employ Francophones. “The growth of the state bureaucracy, the establishment of new social welfare institutions, the rapid creation of state regulatory bodies, agencies, commissions, etc., multiplied the number of positions in public institutions available to educated Québécois.” (Milner 1978, 93) The Quebec government also brought a lot of privately controlled or church controlled aspects of society under public control like hospitals and social services creating a

Two prominent examples of these public corporations that became incredibly important in the establishment of a new state middle class were Hydro-Québec and the Société générale de financement (or General Finance Society). Hydro-Québec was the result of the government’s nationalization of the existing private hydro-electric companies and incorporation with Hydro-Québec, a Crown corporation since 1944. Hydro-Québec “shifted the working language within this sector to French, thereby opening up key professional positions to Québécois. It gave preferential purchasing treatment to Quebec-based enterprises and was an important factor in the government’s regional strategy.” (Gagnon 1990, 54) The Société générale de financement (SGF) was an economic development agency designed to stimulate the provincial economy. The SGF attracted the support of the banking co-operatives (Mouvement Desjardins) thereby channeling substantial private savings within the province into Quebec based-entreprises. “Its early activity was aimed at Francophone companies in the province, and it purchased, in whole or in part, a number of Quebec-based and family-owned secondary industries that were in need of new capital expenditures and financial liquidity.” (Gagnon 1990, 53) Thus began the formation of a new middle class – a state middle class – consisting of professionals, semi-professionals, experts, and specialists who worked in and ran these new government institutions. The
expectation was that this class would alter the ethnic division of labour by placing more wealth, more economic opportunity and more control over resources into Francophone hands.

The Quebec government also recognized it needed to “foster an educational system secular enough to meet the needs of a modern technological society”. This amounted to a complete overhaul of the entire education system. In 1964, it established the first Ministry of Education in the province since 1873 that brought the key educational field under state control, facilitated educational reform, and shifted power from the Church to the state. (Gagnon, 1990 50-51) From the preeminence to which it had become accustomed, the church’s role was reduced to specifically pastoral activities. (Linteau 1991, 476) Despite all the government initiatives and substantial growth of the state apparatus, economic mobility for Québécois was painfully slow. It was not until the mid 1970s that these initiatives began to prosper and succeed. Both the SGF and the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement (General Deposit and Investment Fund), which was another part of the state strategy of resource development under Quebecois control, experienced only limited success until the mid-1970s. (Gagnon 1990, 55) Even with a steady decline in the English-speaking population in Quebec (from 15% in 1931 to 13% in 1976), the economic elite in 1972 were still overwhelmingly Anglophone. While the proportion accounted for by French Canadians increased slightly from 6.7% in the early 50s to 8.4% in 1972, they were still underrepresented. (Linteau 1991, 413) A 1973 report indicated that the mobility of Francophones was still notoriously low both within and outside Quebec.
And Francophones were still overrepresented in less well-paid jobs and less desirable occupations, while Anglophones were overrepresented in better-paid, desirable jobs. (McRoberts 1976, 338) As late as 1977, scholars suggest that,

There is little evidence to suggest that there is at present a French-Canadian group, of social stratum, which wields any amount of effective economic power on a scale comparable to that of the Anglo-Canadian or American business interests. (Milner 1978, 49)

With the changes brought forth by the government, urban industrial workers, among others, became conscious of ‘Quebec’s division of labor’, in which Anglophones held a disproportionately large number of the province’s higher-status positions while Québécois tended to be clustered in lower-paying positions. (Gagnon 1990, 43) This spurred a growing sense of frustration and resentment among Francophones at their economic immobility that would eventually lead to sympathy and support for nationalist ideas of independence.

Questions and Answers

Do state institutions facilitate, tolerate, or repress any particular subgroup of the population?

Quebec’s political institutions were clearly facilitative, especially after the reforms of the Quiet Revolution. As a federal government Canada granted much autonomy to the provinces and Quebec had purview over most internal affairs. Francophones in Quebec did not suffer from any explicit political discrimination or disenfranchisement even before the reforms, but the use of the French language was often the source of friction in the business world. Once political and
economic institutions were overhauled and Francophones were handed political and economic access, there was very little standing in the way of their ascension to power except having a mass political party willing to represent Francophone interests. Political parties in Quebec had long been limited to two conservative parties – the Union Nationale and the Liberal Party. Up through the 1960 election, campaign financing for the only two parties was the tool of big business. Providing cash, slush funds, campaign materials and general financing allowed big business to monopolize party loyalties. Once the Quiet Revolution started under Lesage, the Liberals recognized a need to reform some of the most basic ways outsiders were able to finance incumbents to help keep them in power. One of the most important reforms to electoral rules was changes to the Election Act in response to “the abuses perpetuated by the Union Nationale during its long years in power”. (Clift 1982, 32) The Liberals believed the long tenure of the Union Nationale was due to “the distortion of electoral processes resulting from the multi-million-dollar slush fund accumulated by the governing party. It was constantly being replenished by contributions from large companies, contractors, and professionals who had regular dealings with the provincial government. The fund gave the UN an almost insurmountable advantage at election time.” (Clift 1982, 32)

Thus, the Liberals enacted the Quebec Elections Act of 1962 that promised to reimburse candidates from recognized parties a percentage of their campaign expenditures on a per elector basis in general elections. Recognized parties were defined as parties with at least 10 candidates either in the last or
present election. It also lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. (Angell 1996, 63)
The act was intended to curb corruption and vote purchasing, and decrease the overall cost of Quebec’s elections, which had been notoriously expensive. While it was one-of-a-kind in North America and essentially amounted to the partial payment of campaign expenses by the government, it did achieve the intended effects. It gave members of the legislature a greater measure of independence from traditional sources of funding. It also imposed a ceiling on election spending. Ultimately, the law “helped neutralize powerful vested interests which might have stood in the way of the expanding power of politicians and bureaucrats”. (Clift 1982, 32) Subsequently, it also opened up avenues for new political players who otherwise would have been unable to compete financially. This would be one Quiet Revolution reform that would have immediate effects, as will be shown in the discussion of political parties.

*What is the structure and regime type of the system? Federal or unitary state?*

Canada is a federal system. Three British colonies became Canada in 1867 when the British Parliament declared them to be a ‘union’. (Leach 1984, 10) But Canada did not have a written constitution of its own until 1982, thus in the 1960s when Quebec was in turmoil the relationship between the federal government in Ottawa and the provincial government was defined by the British North American Act (BNA) of 1867. The BNA “and the subsequent judicial interpretation” made it clear that the provinces had power over most aspects of their internal operations, including education, social and health services, municipal institutions, and natural resources. This meant that provincial governments had authority over
“the intimate affairs of their residents”. (Leach 1984, 11) The federal government had control over foreign affairs, the military and some taxes. Both governments aspired to greater power resulting in stress and tension. In addition, the parliamentary system “under which all eleven governments of Canada operate has provided powerful incentives for each government to pursue its governmental mission on an individual course”. (Leach 1984, 12) The latter resulted in a standard practice of holding intergovernmental conferences, as many as 700 per year or more, to negotiate and manage important domestic policy issues. Many consultations end up as bilateral agreements between individual provinces and Ottawa. (Leach 1984, 13)

In the 1960s the federal government, in the course of an unprecedented era of prosperity, was actively promoting modern Keynesianism, producing policies for the welfare of all Canadians, but often at the expense of provincial jurisdictions. Ottawa wanted to modernize Quebec – its education, welfare and university systems. In some ways this propelled Quebec into “an atmosphere of rivalry with the federal government as the provincial government of Quebec created its own welfare, cultural, and economic programs and expressed a fresh new will to regain jurisdictions it had lost to Ottawa over the years”. (Balthazar 1995, 43) Quebec leaders had always opposed federal government encroachment, and posited the province as the main possessor of sovereignty, but until the 1960s they “had never acted in such a decisive and positive way”. (Balthazar 1995, 43) Quebec’s approach to federalism was one that allowed “for the divisibility of sovereignty and the sharing of power between two levels of government,
coordinated but not subordinated to one another, each exercising supreme sovereignty in its constitutional prerogatives”. (Balthazar 1995, 43) Quebec wanted, as of 1966,

to be master of its own decision-making in what concerns the human growth of its citizens- that is to say education, social security and health in all their aspects—their economic affirmation—the power to set up economic and financial institutions they feel are required – their cultural development—not only the arts and letters, but also the French language—and the Quebec community’s external development – its relations with certain countries and international bodies. (Balthazar 1995, 45)

Quebec politicians agreed that the central government would remain in control of defense, the armed forces, foreign policy in general, the central bank, commercial banks, currency and exchange rates, customs and international trade, the postal service, citizenship and transportation. Leaving a few areas like agriculture, immigration, communications and broadcasting to be shared between the two governments. Of course the problem was that the federal government wanted more control over the provinces. Quebec, unlike most of the other provinces, was not willing to give the federal government more power and jurisdiction over its welfare, in part because they did not trust the federal government to treat Quebec fairly or effectively manage the issue of the use of the French language. (Balthazar 1995, 44) As the federal government continued to push and try to exert more influence over Quebec, the stage was set for the birth of the independence movement in Quebec, including the emergence of the FLQ.

Are there political parties that represent the subgroup?

The only two parties until the early 1960s– the Union Nationale and the Liberal party (of Canada) –were bourgeois parties supported by business and
industrial financing. Large contributions from business and industry financed local party candidates and the parties bought votes through patronage. (Angell 1996, 35) As Francis Simard\textsuperscript{12} (1987, 67) suggested Francophones saw the Liberal Party as the guys who directed, administered and planned the division of the world that seemed so unfair; and the Union Nationale as the “same damn thing, the same damn bunch. The Flags might be different colours but they all blow the same breeze.” This monopoly of party representation remained for decades until the late 1960s with the birth of the \textit{Parti Québécois} (PQ). The PQ was the first mass party interested in shifting the status of francophones. The goal of the PQ was for Francophones to control and dominate Quebec’s affairs including prioritizing the use of the French language. It dramatically shifted the landscape of democracy in Quebec, ultimately providing a political communication channel specifically for Francophone grievances.

\textit{Union Nationale}

The Union Nationale (UN) party was created in 1935 and came to represent the political Right in Quebec, continuously upholding authority – cultural, political, and economic. (Milner 1978, 110) The remarkable aspect of the UN was its unwavering popularity for two decades among both rural and urban working class Québécois in spite of the relationship it had to big business. This popularity kept the UN in power throughout the post-war period until the Liberal victory in 1960 that would usher in the Quiet Revolution.

\textsuperscript{12}Francis Simard was an FLQ member who wrote several books on his involvement in the October Crisis of 1970.
The Union Nationale, under Maurice Duplessis, controlled Quebec’s economy and government in 1936-1939 and 1944-1959. Duplessis was deeply conservative in the economic, social and political spheres. He supported private enterprise and trusted big capitalists based in the United States and English Canada to spur economic growth in Quebec. He opposed the idea of a welfare state and increasing government intervention, and defended the established order – resisting trade union militancy and reform. Subsequently, the UN systematically favored those who supported the status quo. “It cyclically excluded all others whose ideas of progress and freedom led towards the Liberal Party. The exclusion was not aimed solely at individuals: it affected entire social classes as well as cities and ridings where the opposition happened to be in a majority. Public funds constituted the main instrument of discrimination.” (Clift 1982, 8)There are three reasons the Québécois supported the UN for so long. First, the UN used patronage politics to win over rural support. Duplessis appeared sufficiently populist. “His government made money available at low interest to farmers and supported schools, hospitals, and roads in rural communities – always seeing to it that contracts and jobs went to loyal Bleus, thus ensuring for the Union Nationale the consolidation of the necessary rural popular base.” (Milner 1978, 112) Second, the UN also took a very anti-Ottawa posture, which played to the nationalist interests of Québécois. Duplessis’ ideas were widely shared by the traditional elites and the clergy, whose ascendancy over Quebec was threatened by modernization. So the UN kept its distance from Ottawa, and appeared populist, all while serving the interests of American and English Canadian big capitalists,
at the expense of the French Canadian workers. The UN left all social issues and problems to the Catholic Church, and the Catholic Church was quite happy to collaborate, keeping its coffers and pews filled. “With its army of priests, nuns and brothers, the Catholic Church remained in control of education, health and social services.” (Linteau 1991, 150) Finally, the UN also retained a solid French-speaking, urban working class base. A poll conducted in 1960 found that two-thirds of skilled and unskilled workers supported the UN. Hence, “the paradox that in a highly industrialized and urbanized province like Quebec, with a steadily growing working class and a militant trade union movement, a party of unrestricted ‘free enterprise’ openly collaborated with foreign industrialists and partial to the farming interests, was able to obtain the support of a majority of the voters in most French-speaking urban areas, including a large number of districts which were predominantly working class”. (Quinn 1963, 71)

In 1960, the Liberal Party was finally able to unseat the UN, and ushered in a substantial period of reform and change to a more interventionist state apparatus. But after six years of massive and somewhat destabilizing reform, the UN was able to defeat the Liberals. In 1966, the Union Nationalists, under Daniel Johnson and later Jean-Jacques Bertrand, scaled back the Quiet Revolution reforms to some degree. Johnson and his successor, Bertrand, were not as overtly committed to the state-building process, to the full use of Quebec’s state powers, or to the rate of growth in government expenditures as had been their liberal predecessors, but they did not abandon the statist approach altogether. The Johnson and Bertrand governments continued to expand certain aspects of the
previous Liberal government, particularly those concerning economic growth and social modernization. They created a Quebec Housing Corporation, an industrial credit office, and more ministries to answer the needs of the private sector. (Gagnon 1990, 57)

In the 1970 election the UN was virtually wiped out in the cities of Quebec and Montreal, where the PQ emerged as the only real opposition to the Liberals. In 1970, the PQ had not yet penetrated very deeply into the outlying and rural areas of the province, but even here the UN lost ground to a new force on the political Right – the Creditistes, who won twelve seats and thirteen percent of the vote. (Milner 1978, 121-122)

*Liberal Party*

The Liberal Party started out on the political right as well. Before the Second World War, Liberals, especially in Montreal, were associated with industrial, financial and commercial interests. Moreover, the financing of the Liberal campaigns was almost exclusively limited to business all the way through 1970. (Angell 1996, 6) It was only after losing power in 1936, when Liberals moved towards the centre, or even slightly left of centre. (Milner 1978, 109) In 1960, the Liberals, led by Lesage, finally defeated the UN on the first comprehensive platform in Quebec. They ran a campaign on a proposal of reform: nationalize electricity production, make a new labour code to encourage unionization, provide hospital insurance, provide free and universal education, and establish an economic planning council and a new ministry of cultural affairs. (Quinn 1963, 180)
The Liberal party of the early and mid-sixties won the loyalty of an increasingly urban, upwardly mobile middle class which drove it to victory in 1960 and 1962 and lent much credibility and support to the Quiet Revolution reforms. However, the traditional petit bourgeois middle class changed into a state middle class – due in large part to the reforms of the Quiet Revolution – who was predisposed to independence and social democracy. Soon after, in 1964, and in response to the growing nationalist sentiment in Quebec, the Liberal party divorced itself from the federal Liberal party and became the Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ). This change would become important later on as the independence movement grew in popularity, because the Liberals would have to appeal to the nationalism sentiments of Québécois to compete with the PQ. In 1966, the Liberal party (PLQ) lost to the Union Nationale in what was symbolically understood as an end to the optimism of the Quiet Revolution in the face of mounting limitations. (Milner 1978, 135)

In the next election, 1970, the Liberals under Robert Bourassa, had largely disassociated themselves from Quiet Revolution goals and ran a campaign platform based on increasing employment by 100,000 jobs, which won them the election. But shortly thereafter, the Liberals would lose a lot of support because of their decision to allow the federal government to impose the War Measures Act and send in the army during the October Crisis.

The October Crisis of 1970 in effect confirmed the divorce between the nationalist movement in Quebec and the Liberal party and, despite the fact that he made French the official language of Quebec in 1974; Robert Bourassa was incapable of reconciling the Quebec nationalists because the crisis had caused a serious trauma for them. (Milner 1978, 138)
Independence Parties and the PQ

In 1968, the Parti Québécois (PQ) was formed from the merging of a variety of independence parties and groups under René Lévesque’s charismatic leadership. The PQ took no time rallying all the pro-independence forces together, becoming a sort of “National Front” – a coalition party uniting various tendencies with the common aim of a sovereign Quebec,” (Fournier 1984, 137) which included a large number of nationalists unhappy with the federal regime (Guindon 1988, 156). This new party had several key factors that would turn it into the first mass party in Quebec: a strong, personable and popular leader; a broad band of support for independence including a high proportion of intellectuals and people working in the cultural sphere; and, finally, it embraced some of the populist style of the earlier independence groups: demonstrations, house meetings, and an egalitarian spirit. (Linteau 1991, 524)

During its inaugural convention, delegates adopted a far more radical program than the leaders had advocated including a unilateral, non-negotiable declaration of independence. (Saywell 1971, 22) Within days of the convention, a Gallup Poll indicated that 11 per cent of Quebecers supported separatism, with 17 per cent undecided, but the PQ had an estimated 25,000 members, and embryonic organizations were formed or forming in most provincial constituencies. Separatism became a major political force in Quebec almost immediately. (Saywell 1971, 22)

Over the course of the next 2 years, during the run-up to the 1970 election, the PQ and René Lévesque would only grow in prominence and popularity
throughout Quebec and globally. Levesque established himself as an outspoken critic of FLQ violence while at the same time a radical, youthful and charismatic leader appealing to the left, the young, “the discontented, to those tired of old parties and the wasted energy of decades of conflict with Ottawa”. (Saywell 1971, 32) “His radical image and appeal to youth was ideally suited to a society where thousands of students, newly enfranchised, were heading from the schools and the CEGEPS into a society that had little place for them, and where the working class was suffering from high unemployment.” (Saywell 1971, 24) Every survey in Quebec throughout 1969 demonstrated a rising popularity for the PQ and for independence. The Toronto Star (April 26, 1969) reported that 26 per cent of French-speaking Canadians supported the PQ, while 41 per cent believed that independence was inevitable. Within a few months, the Toronto Telegram (June 28, 1969) survey concluded that 26 per cent of the Quebec population favoured independence, and that among the under twenty-five age group support grew to 43 per cent. In addition, the credibility of the PQ increased dramatically when Jacques Parizeau, a well-known civil servant and economist who had served as an advisor to both the Liberals and the Union Nationale, decided he would run as a PQ candidate in the 1970 election. (Saywell 1971, 24)

The PQ ran its first candidates in the April 1970 election – an election that had become almost entirely focused on the question of Quebec’s separation from Canada. The independence movement succeeded in making independence an electoral issue, which had been the goal of the non-violent faction of the independence movement since the inauguration of the RIN in 1960 – ten years
prior. Journalist Claude Ryan published several long editorials in *Le Devoir* (April 23-25, 1970) suggesting that the choice between federalism and independence was the most crucial question of the election.

The people of Quebec must first decide whether they will vote to break the federal link with the rest of Canada or to retain this link during the next four years. They may have a thousand different reasons for supporting the Parti Québécois. They should not forget that, in voting for this party, they are voting in favour of Quebec’s political separation from the rest of Canada. (Saywell 1971, 37)

There was recognition among many that Lévesque and the PQ had truly succeeded in bringing together and channeling ‘countless sources of energy which would otherwise have been drawn into disgust, indifference, complete abstainment, or anarchy into democratic involvement’. (Saywell 1971, 37) Many of the PQ leaders were seen as great men and visionaries, and the PQ was seen as a real threat to the establishment. All of this resulted in the PQ receiving 7 seats with 23 per cent of the total vote compared to the Liberals who won with 72 seats and 41.8 per cent of the total vote, which put the PQ in second place in terms of the total vote, but fourth in terms of seats. (Linteau 1991)

*Are voting practices discriminatory or disenfranchising towards Francophones?*

Voting rules – formal or informal – were not an obstacle for Québécois. The same electoral rules, in theory and in practice, were equally applied to Québécois and Anglophones.

*Does the ethnic group, or subgroup, engage in collective action to change the system?*
Mobilization in Quebec took the form of the independence movement, which arose in conjunction with the worldwide decolonization movement. Members of many of the early independence groups, like the Rassemblement pour L’indépendence nationale (RIN), saw French Quebecers as a colonized people and used decolonization as an opportunity to mobilize French Quebecers around issues of workers’ rights, economic control, fair treatment and inequality:

At the present time, when peoples throughout the world are throwing off the colonial yoke and nations are demanding full independence, French Canada cannot willingly remain under foreign economic and political control. The ideal of national independence, which is allied to the ideal of clear-sighted internationalism, is as valid here as anywhere else. (Fournier 1984, 16)

And not unlike the decolonization movement, the French Quebecer independence movement became divided between those who thought violence was ultimately necessary, and those who wanted to find a non-violent way to change the system.

The Rassemblement pour L’indépendence nationale (RIN) was established on September 30, 1960 when thirty founding members met “to lay the foundations of the organization which marked the political debut of the Quebec sovereignty movement”. (Fournier 1984, 16) It was one of the earliest political groups to emerge based on the idea of Quebec’s independence and it was fundamentally non-violent, but a faction would emerge fairly quickly and break away to follow the path of violent revolution and eventually form the FLQ.

The founders and supporters of the RIN were mostly Montreal lawyers, Ottawa civil servants, intellectuals and artists, whose goal was to promote the cause of Quebec independence through popular education. (Linteau 1991, 545) Politically, the RIN was barely left of center – mildly socialist, (Simard 1987, 75)
and for most of its supporters, “the independence movement was part of the movement for a significant transformation of society: large-scale state intervention; some degree of nationalization; and separation of Church and State”. Thus, the RIN was not a purely nationalist movement, even though some changes it advocated were nationalist, i.e. making Quebec a unilingual, French province. (Fournier 1984, 16-17)

The RIN made three contributions to the independence movement. First it successfully turned itself into an official political party in 1963 and ran its first candidates in the 1966 election, winning 6% of the vote. (Butler 1978, 324) Second, it openly spoke of revolution and used new forms of demonstration to mobilize people, which the PQ would later mimic. “What made the RIN an avant-garde group was its choice of language and its style of action: demonstrations, picket lines, support for strikes.” (Fournier 1984, 16-17) Finally, the emergence and success of the RIN laid the foundation for several other non-violent independence parties to emerge in the mid-1960s including the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA), the Ralliement Nationale (RN), which also ran candidates in the 1966 election, and the Parti Québécois (PQ). (Linteau 1991, 524)

In addition to these positive contributions, the RIN also contained within it the seeds of the FLQ. In 1963, three young radicals founded the FLQ. These young men disagreed with the non-violent approach others were taking and decided to “set up an underground organization which would be both political and military”. There was a shared recognition that immediate armed struggle was out
of the question for the next few years, but that the goal should be building an infrastructure and politically educating future leaders and activists. They even set up a ‘training school’ where political theory and the history of revolutionary movements were taught including Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, the French Resistance and the *Patriotes* of 1837-38. (Fournier 1984, 25)

Within a year the FLQ became noticeably active. They released a brief communiqué, ‘Notice to the Population of the State of Quebec’, announcing they were a “revolutionary movement made up of volunteers ready to die for the cause of political and economic independence of Quebec. The main targets of its sabotage would be ‘all colonial symbols and institutions’”, including ‘factories which discriminate against French-speaking workers.’ The FLQ would also attack, ‘all vested interests of American colonialism, the natural ally of English Canadian colonialism.” (Fournier 1984, 13)

Over the course of the next decade, their consistent use and advocacy of violence, terror tactics, and calls for revolution set them apart from most of the other independence groups of the 1960s. These activities escalated over the course of 7 years. From 1963-1967 the FLQ planted about 35 bombs, most of them low-powered. From 1968-1970 the FLQ planted 50-60 bombs, most of them high-powered. (Pelletier 1971, 70) In 1970, the FLQ’s escalation of violence reached its apex. After 2 years of planning and almost ten years of commitment to the cause of independence, the FLQ executed its most daring and risky move: the successive kidnappings of two prominent Quebec politicians – Pierre Laporte and James Cross.
On October 5, 1970 the FLQ kidnapped British trade commissioner James Cross at his home in Montreal. (Globe and Mail, Oct 6) After the kidnapping, the FLQ released its Manifesto, and CBC aired the Manifesto to the public:

The Front de liberation du Québec wants to draw the attention of the world to the fate of French-speaking Québécois, a majority which is jeered at and crushed on its own territory by a faulty political system (Canadian federalism) and by an economy dominated by the interests of American high finance, the racist and imperialist ‘big bosses’. (Saywell 1971, 37)

This was a victory for the FLQ, because they wanted their message to get out and they wanted the Francophone people, particularly workers to rise up and foster a revolution. The manifesto aroused a certain amount of sympathy when it was broadcast, especially because of its simple and deliberately populist style. (Fournier 1984, 227) Others suggest that while the FLQ Manifesto revealed nothing new, because of the circumstances and atmosphere surrounding it, a large section of the population listened to it. (Pelletier 1971, 23) While the public’s reaction was mixed, there were no further calls for violence or revolution. The FLQ had not yet succeeded in its goal of inciting action to bring about independence. When a few days later the government failed to meet the demands the FLQ laid out in their Manifesto the FLQ looked upon it “as if the government didn’t take the kidnapping of James Cross and the demands of the Liberation Cell seriously.” (Simard 1987, 16) In response, a different cell – the Chenier cell, kidnapped Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte. (Butler 1978, 28)

In their final act the FLQ killed Pierre Laporte (Simard 1987, 55). On October 17, 1970 the FLQ delivered a communiqué to the authorities with a map leading them to Laporte’s body and a statement that read, “The arrogance of the
federal government and of its hireling Bourassa has forced the FLQ to act. Pierre Laporte, Minister of Unemployment and Assimilation, was executed at 6:18 this evening by the Dieppe (Royal 22e) cell. We shall overcome.” (Fournier 1984, 256) Laporte’s death marked the end of the Crisis; James Cross was released, and the FLQ members directly involved in the kidnapping negotiated a deal with authorities to be exiled.

How do the state and agents of the state respond?

The independence movement did not in-and-of-itself provoke repressive measures against Québécois. Police and authorities collected intelligence, arrested FLQ members and tried to infiltrate the FLQ, but there were no state responses aimed at the Francophone community as a whole until the October Crisis. Once the FLQ escalated their activities to kidnappings, agents of the state responded in kind. “This political kidnapping – the first of its kind in North America – touched off a crisis without precedent in Quebec or in the rest of Canada. The War Measures Act would be proclaimed for the first time in peacetime and the Canadian Army would occupy Quebec.” (Fournier 1984, 217) Internment, unprecedented search and seizures, and the presence of the Canadian army constituted the use of repression against the entire Francophone community.

On October 6, the day after the FLQ kidnapped James Cross, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and his cabinet decided that the authorities could not accept the FLQ’s demands as laid out in their manifesto. (Globe and Mail Oct 7, 1) The only concession the federal government offered was to give the kidnappers safe conduct to a foreign country in exchange for the release of the hostage.
Opinion polls showed that the great majority of the population shared the view that the government should not give in to the terrorists. (Morf 1970, 166) Besides this, the government response was cautious and subdued until October 16 when the second kidnapping occurred. In response to the second kidnapping, Trudeau and the federal cabinet, in a joint decision with the provincial government of Quebec, declared a state of ‘apprehended insurrection’, suspended the Canadian Declaration of Rights, declared the FLQ an illegal association, and retroactively put into effect the War Measures Act (Simard 1987, 47).

The shock of Pierre Laporte’s kidnapping almost reached panic proportions in government circles in Quebec City and Ottawa. It gave the impression that the FLQ was a powerful organization, extremely well-structured and coordinated, which could strike wherever it wanted to—whereas, in actual fact, the operation had almost been improvised. (Fournier 1984, 231)

There was a very public and widespread belief within prominent circles that the kidnappings were the preliminary stage of a revolution. (Globe and Mail Oct 14, 3) Robert Bourassa made a speech in the National Assembly and in his request that emergency powers be provided as soon as possible he stated, “according to the information we have and which is available to you, we are facing a concerted effort to intimidate and overthrow the government and the democratic institutions of this province through planned and systematic illegal action, including insurrection [sic].” (Haggard 1971, 60) “…They [the government] believed a counterattack against the FLQ was necessary to regain control of a population that was apparently sympathetic to the kidnappers…” (Simard 1987, 172) In addition, reports from far away places like France were circulated that suggested the FLQ would be engaging in more attacks, not just within Quebec, but against rail and
communications across Canada. (Globe and Mail, Oct 15, 8) The government wanted and needed to take actions to offset what they saw as popular support for the FLQ, and they thought a psychological war was a good addition to the physical presence of the army. (Interviewee J.R.)

The Canadian Army’s involvement occurred under the National Defense Act, and the War Measures Act (WMA) gave the government the right to suspend the Canadian Declaration of Rights to allow for internment, or arrest and detention without formal charges. When the WMA was proclaimed, a state of emergency was declared and it was purely a government decision whether or not civil liberties were to be abridged and to what extent. (Daniels 1973, 82) Proclamation of the War Measures Act was “conclusive proof that a state of war, invasion or apprehended insurrection exists.” (Daniels 1973, 9) Moreover, Prime Minister Trudeau stated he was prepared to go “any distance” using any means necessary to prevent the FLQ from becoming a parallel power in Canada. (Burns 1970, 4) As evidence of that he sent eight thousand troops to the Montreal area to guard public buildings and the homes of political figures and prominent businessmen, as well as to help police in their roundup operations. In Quebec City, soldiers were posted at the parliament buildings. (Fournier 1984, 245-247)

Under the veil of the War Measures Act, the army and police interned more than 500 people, and carried out more than 31,700 searches. The great majority of those interned, about ninety percent, were released without being charged. These police and army raids hit everywhere in Quebec: Montreal, Quebec City, the Ottawa River valley, the Trois-Rivières region, the Lower St.
Lawrence (Rimouski), Abitibi (Rouyn), central Quebec, and the Laurentian region. (Fournier 1984, 247) The most noticeable characteristic of the 497 interned detainees was their diversity, ranging from Pierre Vallières, the philosopher-patron of violent revolution, to university student Les Lasko who was unlucky enough to be working on a public opinion poll for the McGill sociology department.” (Haggard 1971, 70-71) The authorities wanted to smash the national liberation movement in Quebec. But this Act was not taken lightly by anyone. “Lawyer Jacques Yvan Morin declared the War Measures Act ‘the favorite weapon of totalitarian regimes’.” Even the British newspaper The Guardian wrote that by arbitrarily jailing hundreds of citizens ‘the Canadian government is itself taking hostages’. (Fournier 1984, 251)

Authorities implied that those arrested and interned excluded everyone except those directly or indirectly associated with the FLQ and their latest acts. But this was not at all the case. Most of those arrested were people engaged in general opposition and legitimate dissent. They were members of a Montreal group that ran in municipal elections. They were local trade union leaders, teachers, student organizers, writers, singers, and journalists. There were also anti-FLQ PQ members. (Harding 1973, 37) One of the main outcomes of internment was the blurring of all forms of dissent in French Canada. “Newspapers fell into the habit of referring in their headlines to the ‘FLQ sympathizers’ who were in jail, and they wrote about the round-up of ‘suspected terrorists’.” Reports indicate 99 per cent of those who ended up in jail were
opposed to terrorism, although a more accurate statistic would be about 90 per cent. (Haggard 1971, 71)

Does the ethnic group support the use of terrorist tactics against the state?

In terms of active support and sympathizers, it’s noteworthy that the FLQ was, in reality, a succession of various cells of Francophone Independentistes who recycled the name. (Fournier; Tetley 2007, 23) The police would infiltrate and arrest various felquistes over the years, and then others would step forward to take over the cause and the name. The fact that the FLQ was basically comprised of cells where a few recruits, often from other organizations like the L’Armée de libération du Québec (ALQ), (Tetley 2007, 22) and often recently-released-from-prison former members would emerge to consistently revive or keep the organization going indicates there was at least a minimal amount of support, resources and volunteers willing to risk imprisonment to keep the FLQ’s mission alive. In terms of numbers of active members, there is no consensus, but there is a range. On the lower end, it has been suggested there were really only nine cells of a few people each over the course of 7 years prior to the October Crisis. (Tetley 2007, 29) Louis Fournier, in his history of the movement, was able to list 355 members of the FLQ. William Tetley, in his recent book (2007), suggests the FLQ had about one hundred and fifty active members and supporters between 1963-1973. (2007, 18) On the higher end, Pelletier, a Liberal cabinet minister, claimed the FLQ had “40 to 50 extremists ready to plant bombs, kidnap, and even murder; a permanent information cell; 200-300 active sympathizers ready to assist financially or by concealment; and 2,000 to 3,00 armchair, passive sympathizers.”
Thus, the range is one-hundred to five-hundred activists over the course of ten years. This amounts to, on average, between ten and fifty active members per year. And most of these hard-core felquistes were socially marginalized members of society. “They usually had considerable education but most were not the dedicated blue-collar workers whose cause they espoused.”

The FLQ’s first kidnapping resulted in a public reaction to the FLQ that was initially a mix of sympathy for the frustrated, young felquistes, and outrage at their escalation of terrorism. Some people distinguished between aims and means while others did not. (Dumont 1971, 94) Journalist Jean-Paul Desbiens of La Presse reflected on the kidnapping and the FLQ: “the main thing is to keep calm. Nobody can win over people who aren’t so inclined. The terrorists’ strength depends on an understanding with the people. There is no such understanding here. There will be more acts of terrorism, but it doesn’t take root amongst our people. It is still a marginal phenomenon.” (Saywell 1971, 43) Others like Claude Ryan, of Le Devoir, suggested “Il y a dans cette observation, une part certaine de vérité: ceux qui voient une société satisfaite d’elle- meme rester sourde a l’appel de la justice eprouventé plus que jamais, ces années-ci la tentation de la violence.” Saywell 1971, 44) Michel Chartrand of the CNTU was typically outspoken on the subject: “I have no more sympathy for Mrs. Cross than for the wives of thousands of men without jobs in Quebec at the present time”. Rene Levesque, in the Le Journal de Montréal (October 8, 1970), disassociated the PQ with the FLQ and repudiated the ‘sewer rats’ that resorted to kidnapping. But he
also pointed out that “the blind brutality of bureaucracies, technologies, and so-called ‘growth’ economies appear more important than human beings” and that “the all too frequent and visible collusion between private exploitation and public administration’ were an understandable basis for terrorism and revolution.”

(Saywell 1971, 44-45) When the FLQ kidnapped the second victim, Pierre Laporte and the state responded with the WMA, internment and the Canadian army it appeared, according to the Globe and Mail (Oct 12, 1970, 21) that “the kidnappings of Mr. Cross… and Mr. Laporte… raised fears in Montreal of a chess game of terrorist action and police reaction.” In response, a popular front emerged– Opération démocratie – consisting of leaders of the three major trade unions centrals, the Parti Québécois, the leader of the powerful Quebec cooperative movement Desjardins, and Claude Ryan, editor of Le Devoir.

Rather than being scared into silence by the escalation of violence and repression, leaders of the front, joined by new groups of intellectuals, students, writers and artists, the Quebec New Democrats, the Quebec Civil Liberties Union, FRAP, and on some issues, the Catholic Farmer’s Union (UCC), and the Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne made three demands: that the War Measures Act be set aside and that the essence of the proposed new Public Order Act be radically revised; that the dignity, livelihood and civil rights of persons arrested by the Combined Anti-terrorist Squad be protected and persons not charged be compensated; and that radical measures be taken to root out the causes of alienation and violence by tackling the problems of massive unemployment, intolerable housing conditions and an electoral system that makes a mockery the declarations of those who hold that change can be brought about by the ballot box. (Smith 1973, 99)

These demands became known as the ‘Declaration of the Fifteen’, which seemed to provoke “a stronger current of public opinion in favor of ‘negotiating an exchange of the two hostages for the political prisoners’.” (Fournier 1984, 241)
Public support probably reached its climax at a revolutionary rally where some members of the FLQ, who were not directly involved in the kidnappings, came to speak about the FLQ, its Manifesto, and the need for action to the public. On October 15, *Le Grand Soir*, held at the Paul Sauvé Arena, brought together students and radicals to listen to prominent *felquistes* Pierre Vallieres, Charles Gagnon and others speak to some three thousand supporters chanting “FLQ, FLQ, FLQ!” (Tetley 2007, xxxiii; Fournier 1984, 241-242; Morf 1970, 167) Michel Chartrand, at the students’ rally, suggested that the ‘revolutionary goals represented by the FLQ were gaining new popularity among the people of Quebec’. He said “there is no doubt that there are infinitely more people now in accord with them, who understand and sympathize with the objectives of the FLQ than there were in 1963 and 1966”. (Haggard 1971, 31-32) They also passed around copies of the ‘Declaration of Fifteen’, which seemed to, at least on some level, legitimate the FLQ because it did not denounce the manifesto or the FLQ. (Tetley 2007, 37)

At this point in the crisis, the FLQ had incited reaction but not revolution. The rally on October 15 was the most public form of support the FLQ got throughout the Crisis. But, at the end of the rally, students went home and there was no violent riot or revolution.

In addition, the Quebec public clearly did not support the federal government’s repressive tactics, especially since the authorities showed a veritable lack of understanding of the Quebec context and situation by lumping all supporters of independence in with the FLQ. People felt repressed and betrayed.
by both the provincial and federal governments as they had collaborated in the
approval and execution of the WMA. However, this sense of betrayal did not
translate into any increase in calls for violence or terrorism. While francophone
Quebecers felt repressed by the WMA, the Canadian army, and internment, there
was no support for an escalation of violence. Public discourse was fairly focused
on the few felquistes who were desperately trying to bring attention to their cause,
and finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis.

However, any general sympathy was brought to a screaming halt with a
universal condemnation of violence by both the public and Canadian authorities
when it became clear that the FLQ had killed Laporte. “With the assassination of
Pierre Laporte, the FLQ lost all credibility and support among the Québécois”
(Guindon 1988, 152). General condemnation helped swing public opinion firmly
over to the side of law and order. The sympathy the kidnappers had enjoyed
disappeared and the popularity [sic] of the FLQ plunged after the assassination of
Pierre Laporte. (Interviewee J.P.L; Pelletier 1971, 23)

**Analysis and Conclusions**

As TEST posits, ethnic groups use and support violence as a last resort
and only to the extent required to effect change. The goal for ethnic groups is
effective institutional reform. When institutions facilitate effective, and equal,
political participation for subgroups and ethnic groups, and they can use that
political power to address grievances and seek reforms, they do not need to
support the use of violence or terrorism to change the system. The case of the
Québécois and the FLQ clearly demonstrates that once institutions were reformed
and the structures became facilitative, terrorism and support for violence became unnecessary and obsolete.

For Québécois, historically they had confronted economic disadvantage and limited political access because of it, but in the 1960s with the sweeping institutional reforms brought about by the Quiet Revolution a whole new world of possibilities opened up for them to channel their grievances peacefully. One of the main issues Francophones in Quebec had before the Quiet Revolution was that despite their majority numbers they did not vote as a block. The problem was the only two political parties – the Liberal Party and the *Union Nationale* – largely served the interests of the Anglophone capitalist class. For most of the history of Quebec, political parties revolved around the urban/rural divide, which also divided French Canadians into two segments and ultimately allowed them to be conquered by political parties that ignored the French/English class divisions. But, during the Quiet Revolution two major changes took place: the Quebec Elections Act of 1962, the emergence of a French Canadian independence movement. This election act would open up a previously closed channel for the democratic mobilization of Francophone interests, thus enabling a new mass political party to emerge to democratically challenge the status quo. In addition, the independence movement would articulate many of those Québécois interests. In 1968, one new party – the PQ – became the first mass party whose efforts were focused on making independence for Quebec a mainstream political position. The PQ drastically changed the political landscape in Quebec and became an alternative to both an old and stagnant political regime, and a violent anti-democratic terrorist
organization, the FLQ. The FLQ was making many of the same demands and articulating similar grievances as the PQ. The difference was that the PQ wanted to bring about change through elections and democratic channels and the FLQ was advocating violence and the use of revolution.

The presence of the PQ alone did not convince Francophones that change through the electoral system was possible. As was evident at the early stages of the October Crisis, there was still some limited sympathy and tolerance for the FLQ because of a shared frustration over inability to bring about change. But once the FLQ escalated its activities and tried to take a more center stage position, in the process killing Pierre Laporte, public opinion squarely shifted to an intolerance of violence and terrorism. In the same instant the Parti Québécois grew much stronger, “as its leaders lost no opportunity to point out it was the only credible and democratic alternative to the violence of the FLQ.” Within a year several key felquistes, like Pierre Vallieres, would leave the FLQ, join and publicly support the PQ exclaiming that,

In order to justify a revolutionary, armed struggle there needs to be: “absolute incapacity on the part of the ruling authorities to satisfy popular aspirations and grievances; suppression of civil and democratic liberties; a permanent state of repression and of political and economic and social crises; deepening antagonisms that cannot be resolved except in armed confrontations; the objective impossibility that a mass struggle may organize and develop within the electoral process and thus, that a party of the masses may win political power in the elections; the objective necessity for people to have recourse to armed struggle (or guerilla warfare) in order to achieve its political, economic, and social objectives. Can there be an intermediate situation in which armed and electoral struggles both exist, and the latter dominates while waiting for the former to take over? Some Quebec revolutionaries think so, believing that the PQ and FLQ must complement each other’s role. They know perfectly well that the present situation is not yet revolutionary and that the mass struggle therefore goes on through the electoral system.” (Vallieres 1972, 89)
Ultimately, Québécois rejected violence after the October Crisis because the PQ offered hope for change through the democratic system, rendering violent organizations like the FLQ unnecessary. In their first election just a few months prior to the October Crisis, in April 1970, the PQ successfully won 23 per cent of the popular vote. When the October Crisis arose and the people could have seized the opportunity to follow the FLQ’s calls for a violent revolution, they failed to react because there was enough evidence from the April 1970 election that the PQ could bring about change peacefully. Hence, the case of Quebec conforms quite well to the TEST by confirming the claim that violence is a last resort, and if change is possible through non-violent means, even in the face of repression, an ethno-nationalist group will dismiss calls for violence and ignore opportunities for violent change.
Chapter 4

Mixed Messages and Marginal Support: Corsicans and the FLNC

The case of Corsica occupies the mixed middle of the spectrum between institutional facilitation and repression. French state institutions and agents have both vacillated between reform and repression, which, depending on the moment, both undermined support for violence and terrorism, and engendered it. Corsican support for violence against the state was so divided there were anti-autonomist counter-terrorist groups actively engaged in attacking the separatist Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC). Thus, there was, at times, substantial violence occurring on the island that had support in two opposite directions – the maintenance of the status quo and a radical change to separate from France. It will become evident from this chapter that the French government’s failure to facilitate political access for more than just an elite minority of Corsicans caused terrorism to emerge as a viable alternative, but the attempts to reform institutions frequently succeeded in minimizing support for it. Ultimately, the separatist terrorists, the FLNC, remained a constant source of violence on the island from 1976-2001, when the French government finally broke with its extreme centrist position and granted Corsica some genuine autonomy.

This chapter applies TEST to the case of Corsica and will show why and how Corsicans mobilized, answer the set of questions laid out in the methods chapter, and finally there will be an analysis of the case in light of the TEST, with some conclusions drawn.
Historical Background

The history of Corsica is one of colonialism: first, by the Italians and then, by the French. Corsican nationalism emerged in part because of the imposition of foreign rule, but mainly it arose because the people on the island suffered from economic hardship resulting from French centralism, which denied Corsicans decision-making authority over their economy, resources, education and language. Corsica’s population of barely 260,000 inhabitants consists of a dominant group of Corsicans (70%), a minority of the French titular nation (20%), as well as smaller immigrant communities (10%). The existence of a separate Corsican people has never been officially recognized by the French government. The Corsican language (Corsu), which is spoken by about 65% of the population of the island, was not taught at all in school until the 1980s and continues to have no official status. (Daftary 2004, 122-123)

The island of Corsica became part of metropolitan France in 1769 after about 400 years of Genoese rule (1729-69). There was a Corsican national rebellion during which the Genoese were effectively pushed off the island. A constitution was written in 1755 thereby establishing self-government. Pascal Paoli became general of the Corsicans until the French annexed Corsica in 1769. Twenty years later the island was made a French department. (Hintjens 1995, 121; Savigear 1983, 3)

A desire for decentralized power emerged in the 1920s with a group called the Corsican Action Party (Partitu Corsu d’Azione). It was more regionalist than
autonomist at first, desiring “a government of the island by conscious representatives of the land, under the protection of our great sister nation: France.” (Beer 1980, 17) However, “the fascist inclinations of these movements during the Mussolini period and during the occupation of Corsica (1940-1943) meant their demise in the post-war period.” (Hintjens 1995, 121)

The period following the war was marked by economic, demographic and cultural decline. The French government responded by focusing on the relief of economic hardship. The French administration brought a “constant flow of funds” to the island. However, Corsican internal politics was dominated by clientalism, and the French government never addressed this problem. Funds that were transferred to the island were, in turn, seized and controlled by ‘clan’ leaders. (Kofman 1982, 303)

The clans competed for control of subsidies through elections for office, whether for mayors and municipal councils, for the General Councils, or for the position of deputy. Their involvement made electoral fraud synonymous with Corsican politics, not always with justification. “What must have seemed generosity of a high order in Paris, was transformed into grist for clan rivalry in the hills of the Castagniccia.” (Savigear 1983, 15) Thus, a form of colonialism was formed in the minds of the Corsicans who held the French government responsible for ineffective and corrupt governance as well as the economic hardship many Corsicans encountered. (Savigear 1983, 15)

Between the island’s general isolation from mainland France and clientalism, Corsicans faced significant economic challenges, particularly in the
twentieth century. First, it is one of the most under-developed regions in France, with a GDP nearly 30% below the national average and even higher rates of unemployment. (Daftary 2004, 122) Second, industrial and economic growth was stagnant with tourism as the primary sector, and a secondary sector was nonexistent. In tourism, the island was poorly provided for by way of accommodation, personnel training and necessary financing. High transport costs and poor transport links with the mainland were a handicap to tourism and to development in general. Moreover, “tourism was over 80 per cent controlled by French investors, and mainly non-Corsicans were employed in this sector”. (Lauwers 2003, 65)

Third, the balance of trade with mainland France showed a complete dependence of Corsica on continental France with virtually all industrial products, construction materials and food imported, which stood in stark contrast to the self-sufficiency Corsica had achieved in the mid 19th century. Fourth, there was no university in Corsica in spite of demands for establishing one dating back to 1770 when “the French closed down the one Pascal Paoli had founded.” (Ramsey 1983, 42-43) In response to all of these factors, Corsicans were often forced to leave the island to get a university education or to look for work in mainland France or in other French colonies. “This exodus has brought the depopulation of the villages and a steady drop in total population.” (Savigear 1983, 10) Anne Marie Guigue’s study entitled La Politique d’action regionale et la probleme corse (1965) showed that Corsica’s population had fallen from 323,854 to 246,995 by 1957.
In the post-WWII period, the French economy expanded but Corsica was left behind. Prime Minister Guy Mollet’s Regional Action Plan of 1957 (Plan d’Action Regionale) was initiated in response to Corsican demands, but it was made quite clear that any development programme “would be for the benefit of the French mainland, and effectively, the detriment of traditional Corsican agriculture and artisanship.” Two aid agencies were also set up: Societe pour l’équipement touristique de la Corse (SETCO) and Societe pour la mise en valeur de la Corse (SOMIVAC). SETCO was minimally effective as the semi-state body charged with the development of tourism, but “quickly established itself as an advocate for giant corporations”. They set up holiday camps for French tourists and they were often staffed and run entirely by ‘continentaux’, mainland French people, “remaining almost completely independent of the local Corsican economy”. (Hossay 2004, 408) SOMIVAC’s job was to build infrastructure for farming and industry. It did have a “major impact on the irrigation schemes, as well as on agricultural research, subsidies, and the politically contentious matter of the provision of agricultural land on the reclaimed eastern plain.” (Savigear 1983, 13) But SOMIVAC focused on providing pied noirs\textsuperscript{13} with land allotments, credit, and financing while excluding the local population. (Hossay 2004, 408)

The result was a significant decrease in the percentage of the working population involved in agriculture, and a labour migration to the continent. “Thousands of repatriates augmented other forms of French migration causing the percentage of the island’s population of self-described Corsicans to fall from 90% in 1954 to

\textsuperscript{13}Pieds noirs (black feet) was the name given to North African white French repatriates.
55% in 1975” (Hossay 2004, 409) Both programs were centrally administered and not done in consultation with Corsicans. Their effectiveness was undermined and they failed to demonstrate to Corsicans any kind of real commitment to change the conditions in Corsica.

Ultimately, stagnant economic conditions became the source of growing frustration among Corsicans and the anger was directed at the central French government, largely due to the fact that local government had no authority or power to rectify the situation. In the 1960s Corsicans mobilized largely around economic issues demanding more regional power. As their demands were ignored, grievances gave way to ethnic nationalism and eventually separatism emerged as a viable alternative. As will be made evident in the following pages, the FLNC arrived on the scene in the mid-1970s ready and willing to use terrorism to force the French government to heed Corsicans calls for more political power.

**Questions and Answers**

*Do state institutions facilitate, tolerate, or repress any particular subgroup of the population?*

The unitary, centrist French state repressed minority rights in general, but did not specifically target Corsicans any more than any other group or region in France. Historically, the problem in Corsica resided in the relationship between the central government and institutions, and local politics. First, there was no power at the local level and all decisions were taken from Paris for the good of the country as a whole, which usually meant Corsican problems were ignored.
Second, the Corsican system of clientelism that the French government purposefully supported, undermined genuine democratic engagement for a substantial portion of the Corsican population.

Clientelism was maintained through clans. Local notables and the prominent families in Corsica gained hold of administrative and economic institutions that the French had established early on. The clans retained the loyalty and subservience of the local population, particularly through local office, as was the case with the municipal office of mayor. (Savigear 1980, 127) When Corsican locals protested the clan system and demanded the French government step in and reform it, the state responded by encouraging and facilitating the consolidation of power by clan leaders over every aspect of the Corsican society. A reinforced clan system flourished with partisan alliances overlaying existing clan structures, dividing the island into left and right factions, each sustained by an extensive and exclusive clientelist network that controlled nearly all access to employment, security, and government services. (Gil, 1984) It also had the effect of immobilizing “the Corsican public sphere, leaving little room for dissent or alternative visions of loyalty”. (Hossay 2004, 408)

Clans controlled political access through the domination of political parties and through electoral manipulation as well. Thus, it was not that French institutions intentionally discriminated against Corsicans, but rather that they failed to ensure broad and fair representative government. The government tolerated unfair and discriminatory practices against substantial portions of the Corsican population.
What is the structure and regime type of the system? Federal or unitary state?

The French Republic is an indivisible, unitary state. It is highly centralized and run entirely from Paris. There is no recognition of minorities or special status for different regions, dialects or cultures. The country is divided into regions and each is comprised of several departments. Departments are subdivided into arrondissements, which are further divided into cantons. All divisions exist as administrative units that facilitate and enact French central policies. None have any authority, ability to enact their own legislation, regulate or tax. (Elazar 1997, 244)

In 1970, Corsica was granted the rank of Regional Action Area by President Georges Pompidou, which consisted of two departments: Haute-Corse and Corse du Sud. This gave Corsica a Development Commission similar to other regions. However, the individuals running the Commission were not elected by universal suffrage, but merely drawn from members elected to other posts, which was a French tradition. Thus, the Commission was seen as symbolic and not within local control. (Beer 1980, xxiii)

Are there political parties that represent the subgroup?

There are two sets of political parties that have some relevance to representing Corsican nationalist interests. There are many French nation-wide political parties that participate in parliamentary politics in Paris, but there are no nation-wide Corsican nationalist political parties. As well, there are local Corsican political parties, which are dominated by the clans, as discussed previously. Due to the fact that that local-level administrative units have no authority, it is
irrelevant whether or not there are nationalists holding office. In order to effectively change French institutions to grant more decision-making power to the local level, reforms have to be made in Paris. Ultimately, the fate of Corsican demands for institutional reform laid with those mainstream French political parties who were in power during the Corsican nationalist resurgence.

There were two political parties that played a significant role in the future of Corsican autonomy: the right-wing Union of Democrats for the Republic, or UDR, (which in 1976 became Rally for the Republic –RPR— in 1976) and the Socialists under Francois Mitterand. The UDR and the RPR followed in the line of Gaullist parties stemming from de Gaulle’s Rally for the People party (1958). They dominated French politics from the advent of the Fifth Republic. Gaullism was particularly focused on the growth and maintenance of a strong central state with global power. Right-wing Gaullism held the position of head of state from 1958-1974, when a split in the movement allowed a right-centrist, Giscard D’Estaing to be elected President, although they still dominated parliamentary politics and appointed Jacques Chirac as Prime Minister. Chirac resigned in 1976 to form a new Gaullist party, the RPR, in order to regain power over the republican institutions. The RPR position on Corsican nationalism was consistent with past Gaullist parties. It was simple and clear: French citizens are unified and indivisible. There could be no recognition of special identities that would undermine the French conception of national identity. (Safran 2009, 91; Hossay 2004, 414)
The Socialist Party (PS) represented left-wing politics in France. It was an collaboration of several left-wing parties of the 1960s and 1970s: the *Parti socialiste unifie* (PSU) and the *Mouvement des radicaux de gauche* (MRG). (Safran 2009, 97) In general, politicians on the left were more inclined to support a pluralistic view of the nation, “endorsing *la droit a la differences* and decentralization”, although they never went so far as to call into question the “Republican image of a united and homogeneous France too sharply”. (Hossay 2004, 414) They were not only less centrist than the RPR or the Communists, but they proposed new legislation for a policy on Corsica that they developed in 1976 called the special statute. (Savigear 1980, 133) This was a plan for institutional change in Corsica that would have made them a special case, outside the National framework in France, but it got no traction. They were not in power, the autonomists thought the plan was not enough, the Communists thought Corsica should not be viewed differently than other regional areas that needed to be addressed, and the Right dismissed it altogether as too much. (Ramsey 1983, 125)

In 1980, the Socialists came to power and brought Francois Mitterrand to the Presidency on a platform of *Les 110 Propositions du Candidat Mitterand* that promised no less than six proposals devoted to decentralizing power and increasing regional authority, as well as a specific proposal promising to respect minority cultures and to promote the teaching of minority languages (proposal 56). (Loughlin 2007, 61) Thus, there was a “notable change in Paris’ willingness to recognize Corsican distinctiveness”. Giscard D’Estaing’s long touted stance that there was no Corsica problem was replaced with Francois Mitterand’s
recognition of “‘Corsican specificity’ and even the discussion of the ‘Corsican people [as a] small homeland in a great nation’.” Mitterand proposed a programme of extensive decentralization and a *statut particulier* that included a Corsican Assembly and recognition of a Corsican personality. (Hossay 2004, 414)

*Are voting practices discriminatory or disenfranchising?*

Corsican politics have historically been categorized by electoral fraud, which has successfully undermined effective democratic participation in favor of the maintenance of clientelism. There are three main elements of this electoral fraud: the falsification of the electoral rolls; the abuse of actual voting procedures; and the ‘doctoring’ of results returned from polling stations. There are two background elements that frame how electoral fraud was perpetuated: the returning officer in each polling district is the local Mayor, himself often a politician; and “‘the correction of the universal suffrage system’ (in plain terms, cheating at elections) has traditionally been more or less tolerated by the population at large.” (Ramsey 1983, 14)

Inflation of the electoral rolls is the foundation of electoral fraud. State financing “under many headings is granted in France to municipalities and communes on a per capita basis, local mayors have had an interest in returning as high population figures as possible.” In addition to the many Corsicans who have moved to the continent but remain registered in Corsica, which is legal, are the continued registering of people who have died. In 1976, the official branch of statistics published an article asking whether the population of Corsica is 200,000 or 300,000 suggesting that there were some serious internal inconsistencies in
local statistics. (Ramsey 1983, 14) Within the actual polling stations fraud has taken the form of impersonation, intimidation, and the stuffing of ballot boxes with unclaimed ‘correspondance votes’. Returns amounting to 98% turnout of the electorate have been known, while on the other hand, returns made by Mayors have been known simply to fail to take account of whole batches of ballot boxes. (Ramsey 1983, 15)

In December 1975, a law was passed abolishing the vote by correspondence in favour of the vote by proxy. This was a major step forward in eliminating fraud. “Official commissions have also been at work, purging the electoral rolls and examining voting practices generally.” (Ramsey 1983, 14-15)

The March 1976 cantonal elections were the first to be held under these arrangements. Sixteen percent of the votes were cast by proxy, but critics of the electoral practices in Corsica could still point to the unsatisfactory nature of the actual electoral rolls. (Ramsey 1983, 117)

*Does the ethnic group, or subgroup, engage in collective action to change the system?*

In the 1960s, Corsica had an awakening and began to make new social and economic demands on the French government. Over the course of the period between 1960, when the first activists appeared, and 1976 when the FLNC appeared, it is evident there was a steady progression to more radical politics and positioning among Corsicans culminating in the marginalization of non-violent autonomist activities in favor of the FLNC terrorist campaigns.
The advent of Corsican regionalism in 1960 arose from a few factors: first, the end of the colonial era had direct implications for Corsican employment; second, there was an attitudinal shift across Europe from super-patriotism to social and economic pre-occupations; third, there was a rising level of affluence across Europe that Corsica did not experience. Corsicans grew aware that their island had been neglected. (Ramsey 1983, 31) One of the main complaints concerned the low level of employment opportunities on the island. Unemployment levels were never more than a few percentage points above the national average, but the numbers failed to reflect the “extremely high emigration rate and appreciably lower activity rates”. (Ramsey 1983, 32)

The first group of concerned citizens were mostly professional people, local businessmen and journalists with “no particular axe to grind, nor did they have a party political platform, but they called themselves ‘Le mouvement du 29 novembre’ – the significance of this title being that it was on November 30, 1789 that the original decision had been taken to include Corsica within the French state”. It basically signified that Corsica didn’t feel integrated into the French state, although there was no anti-French sentiment attached to the movement. This movement rallied around the potential loss of the Ajaccio-Bastia railway line. It was costly and under threat, but remained vital and the Corsicans didn’t want to lose it. In addition, there was a general feeling the Programme of Regional Action of 1957 was making little impact on the island. So the movement of 29 November acted as a “ginger group, alerting public opinion to the issue involved, organizing ‘round tables’ to bring together elected representatives and commercial interests,
and attempting to put pressure on the Government to pay more attention to the economic and development needs of the island.” (Ramsey 1983, 33-34)

In addition to *Le mouvement du 29 novembre* in 1960, Corsican students in Paris formed the *Union Corse* with the goals of increasing awareness, mobilizing Corsicans around the absence of any regional policy or planning for development on Corsica, and “the sterility of traditional political life in the hands of the clans”. (Kofman 1982, 303) Resentment found fertile ground “among those marginalized by economic development and those left out of the government aid programmes – young farmers, small hotel owners and shopkeepers.” Nationalism provided an alternative to both clans and dependence on the state. (Hossay 2004, 410)

Soon similar groups like this also began to emerge. The most important was the Bastia group, led by Michel Martini, called DIECO (Défense des Interêts Économiques de la Corse). The two groups worked together and articulated demands including a resolution to the threatened railway, a special ‘fiscal regime’ for Corsica, which would include tax reductions in certain spheres, and for Corsica to be treated distinctly from Provence-Côte d’Azur. (Beer 1980, 26)

But most of the umbrella organizations, like 29 November, did not go so far as to call into question political and administrative structural arrangements; nor did they have a political focus. But in 1963 Dominique Alfonsi and Charles Santoni founded a new ideological group called the *L’Union Corse l’Avenir* that took on a more political orientation. This group focused on engendering new
political ideas on Corsica and development among Corsica’s youth who were “in any case beginning to resent the necessity of emigration”. (Ramsey 1983, 42)

The mid 1960s witnessed unsuccessful attempts to fuse a variety of socialist and politically neutral groups within the *Front Regionaliste Corse*. This led to the formation of the *Action Regionaliste Corse* (ARC) in 1967 from the ‘politically neutral’ elements. From then on they received most of the support from the regionalist resurgence. (Kofman 1982, 307) By 1972, the ARC had become quite powerful and was able to mobilize large numbers of people to take part in direct action quickly.

In 1972, the ‘Red Mud’ affair gave the ARC a real opportunity to raise the stakes and escalate their activities to a higher level. It became apparent that the Italian chemical company, Montedison, was dumping waste from the manufacture of titanium dioxide into the sea about 40 miles off of Corsica’s coast and it was killing fish and sealife. Protests erupted from various sectors, and the French government got “in touch through normal diplomatic channels” with the Italian government, but the company continued to dump its waste. The ARC then took the lead and denounced the French government for its lax approach. In February 1973, “an explosive charge was set off against the hull of an Italian-owned ferry boat” in one of Corsica’s harbors. A few days later an organized protest shut down all Corsica’s ports, which turned into violence with police being attacked and Molotov cocktails being thrown. The government building had been attacked and the French tricolor flag had been replaced with the Corsican flag. (Ramsey
1983, 71) This essentially marked a turning point in the nature of autonomist activities, demonstrating a willingness to engage in direct action.

In 1973 the ARC, the Corsican Regional Front (FRC), and militant farmers’ organizations made autonomy “a corner stone of their respective policies” as evident by a joint declaration called the *Chjma diu Castellare* (‘The Call of Castellare’). This Call was addressed to the Corsican people urging them to unite against the threat of being destroyed by French Imperialism. The document also had a left wing slant stating that, “the hour has come for us to take into our hands our means of production and trade in order to achieve our full potential in the framework of our natural milieu, which means primarily the ability to earn our living and to educate ourselves in our own country”. While the tone was markedly different from the early 1960s, it did stop short of full independence. (Ramsey 1983, 73-74)

In July 1973, both the ARC and the FRC changed their names to reflect their demands for autonomy. The FRC became the Party of the Coriscan People for Autonomy (*Partitu di u Populu Corsu*) on April 15, and the ARC became the Action for Corsican Revival (*Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa*) at its Annual Congress on August 19. Also at the Congress meeting, leader Edmond Simeoni’s call to action made it very clear that autonomy and the ARC’s demands were not going to come without a struggle,

Autonomy will not be granted to us. It will have to be grasped. Consider the interests involved and the important of the outcome – on the one hand the French State, deaf and blind and relying on its local accomplices. It has important strategic and economic interests. The French State is condemned to a repressive role! –on the other, Corsican people, now on alert and determined at all costs to ensure its survival,
which is at present threatened. The Corsican people is condemned to rebel! (Ramsey 1983, 74-75)

In the meantime, underground groups began using violence, mostly targeted bombings. In the fall of 1973, a group calling itself the _Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazioni_ (the Native Corsican Liberation Front or FPCL) published a manifesto in October entitled ‘Ultimatum to the French Government’, demanding the expulsion of all colonizers, land re-distribution to Corsicans, replacement of French civil servants by Corsicans, and, the obligatory teaching of the Corsican language from nursery school onwards. Moreover, the ARC was ambiguous about these clandestine activities. Simeoni, the leader of the ARC, suggested he understood the frustration behind them although he neither openly approved nor condemned them. (Ramsey 1983, 75)

Into 1975, tension continued to build and erupted at Aleria. It began when some Corsican nationalists attempted to draw attention to fraud in the Corsican wine trade. “They accused the SOMIVAC of bias in favour of non-Corsicans in the allocation of land and they pointed out the widespread abuse known as ‘chaptilisation’, the excessive sugaring of wine, which had come to light with the huge increase in the importation of sugar.” (Savigear 1983, 13) To demonstrate their anger, on August 21, 1975, a small group of twelve ARC Corsican autonomists occupied the Aleria vineyard of a local _pied noir_, M. Henri Depeille, who had been repatriated from Algeria in the early 1960s. He owned a vineyard of just under 200 hectares near Aleria and also traded as a wholesale wine merchant. The ARC leaders peacefully took over the Depeille family property and allowed the residents to leave unharmed. The leader of the group, Edmond
Simeoni, “spoke on the telephone to some press correspondents; the news broke; crowds began to gather at the Depeille estate; and shortly afterwards Simeoni was holding what amounted to a continuous press conference.” (Ramsey 1983, 101; Bernabeu-Casanova 1997, 99)

On the second day of the occupation of the Depeille estate twelve hundred French riot police (CRS) backed by helicopters and armoured cars arrived on the scene. The Simeoni group (and Corsican public opinion) was shocked at the reaction of the government. An ultimatum was delivered to the occupants and, when they refused to comply, the CRS began to close in. Shots were exchanged\(^{14}\), two CRS men were killed and one member of the ARC group was seriously wounded. (Bernabeu-Casanova 1997, 99) Simeoni negotiated with police and the ARC group was “allowed to come out, still in possession of their arms, to be arrested later, while Edmond Simeoni personally surrendered and was taken prisoner.” (Ramsey 1983, 102)

The authorities’ dramatic showing of force galvanized support for the autonomists. Equally sensitive was the over-dramatic statement made by government officials immediately after the incident that painted the ARC as an ‘armed group’ who killed two gendarmes: “those responsible in the ARC organization thus succeeded in their criminal plot to have blood flow in Corsica.” (Ramsey 1983, 103) In response, the authorities charged ten ARC members with serious offences and banned the group. This immediately “sparked off trouble in Bastia that afternoon; serious rioting went on into the night, shooting broke out

\(^{14}\) It was later a matter of controversy as to whether the Simeoni group had fired or whether shots had come from the nearby vineyard where a large crowd had gathered. (Ramsey 101)
and another CRS man was killed. In all nineteen people were injured and the city was in a state of siege until the following day.” (Ramsey 1983, 104)

The subsequent trial and imprisonment of Edmund Simeoni was followed by “intense interest throughout the island. Young Corsicans protested in the streets and declarations of independence appeared on walls across the island. There was an outpouring of sympathy and support for Simeoni and his cause. “Aleria permitted a permanent and daily revolutionary debate. Public places, cafes, became places where events are systematically discussed.” (Hossay 2004, 411)

After Aleria in 1975, the ARC and the autonomist movement grew in strength and popularity with as many as 5000 Corsicans flocking to their annual conference in 1975. (Savigear 1980, 130) After the ARC was banned, they reformed themselves into the *Associu di I Patrioti Corsi* (APC). Holding a ‘constituent assembly’ of the new movement in Aleria February 1976 with 3000 supporters. Nothing much changed between the ARC of August 1975 and the APC of Feb 1976 except the tone, which was emphatically not separatist. (Ramsey 1983, 115) In March 1976 it was announced that the trial for the Aleria activists would begin in Paris in Mid-May. As the trial date approached there was a build-up of tension and a general fear of the repercussions should these prisoners be given stiff sentences. On May 4 a coordinated and dramatic outbreak of twenty-one bombings occurred across Bastia, Ajaccio, Sartene and other towns targeting public buildings, the estates of *pied noirs* and estate agents’ offices. The public was surprised since the FPLC on 26 April had announced its disbandment
because of lack of will and support. On May 5 a new group, the Front de la Libération Nationale de le Corse (FLNC) released a bi-lingual pamphlet\textsuperscript{15} claiming responsibility for the attacks. The FLNC was “from militant elements from the Front paysan corse de liberation (FPLC) and Giustizia Paolina.” The FLNC wanted total separation for the ‘Corsican nation’ from France. (Savigear 1983, 4) The advent of the group marked a turning point in the history of the conflict (Olivesi 1998, Loughlin and Daftary 1999). Support for the use of violence surged and the FLNC was formed to use force to pressure the government to change the institutional structure and give them more regional autonomy\textsuperscript{16}, if not complete independence. (Lauwers 2003, 61) The FLNC’s use of violence and bombings was intense. In 1977 alone, there were 246 bombing attempts, 7 armed commando raids, 5 fires and 30 machine gun attacks. In 1978, there were about 400 bombings. (Beer 1980, 27)

The arrival of the FLNC caused a split among Corsican nationalists between radical and moderate factions. The FLNC criticized the ARC-APC for its lack of full commitment to the nationalist cause. The use of violence increased

\textsuperscript{15}The document stated that “a decisive stage (that of armed struggle) had now been reached in the fight for liberty and that the FLNC were prepared to spearhead it. They put forward a six-point manifesto, demanding:
1. The recognition of the ‘National Rights’ of the Corsican people;
2. The removal of the all instruments of colonialism – the army, the French administration and colons;
3. Setting up of a popular democratic government which would express the will and needs of all Corsican patriots;
4. The confiscation of colonial estates and property of tourist industry trusts;
5. The carrying out of agrarian reform, to fulfill the aspirations of farmers, workers and intellectuals, and to rid the country of all forms of exploitation;
6. The right to self-determination for the Corsican people.” (Ramsey 1983, 119)

\textsuperscript{16}“As with decentralization, autonomy involves a devolution of power from the centre to the periphery but differs in that powers are not merely delegated by transferred, and may not be revoked without consulting the autonomous entity.” (Daftary 2004, 117)
these tensions and marked a sharp and enduring division between the FLNC, formed by ARC radicals and small nationalist factions, who fought for self-determination and the ‘destruction of all the instruments of French colonialism’, and the more moderate UPC, formed by the moderates of the ARC. The UPC had an “ambiguous programme that called for autonomy as a possible prelude to independence and an unambiguous rejection of the use of violence.” (Hossay 2004, 412)

How do the state and agents of the state respond?

The French government was consistently inconsistent in its responses to Corsican demands for more autonomy. Under the leadership of the conservative Gaullists (UDR and RPR) between late 1960s-1980, state agents used overwhelming shows of force and, on occasion, violence to repress demonstrators and suppress direct action. (Hintjens 1995, 122) Courts were harsh on autonomists arrested in conjunction with even non-violent activities. As well, an anti-autonomist terrorist organization (FRANCIA) emerged to counter the autonomists, and the government showed them preferential treatment. At the same time, they implemented tokenistic institutional reforms, including the 1976 Special Statute, in an attempt to undermine support for collective action and demands for autonomy. When the Socialists came to power in 1980, they softened the French government’s approach to the nationalist demands and made a more credible attempt at institutional reform by way of the statut particulier that established a new Corsican Assembly. (Hintjens 1995, 122) Subsequently, it is
again made evident that the French government’s response was mixed – neither wholly repressive nor facilitative.

In the late 1960s, when it became evident that Corsican nationalism was spreading, President De Gaulle proposed a series of reforms aimed at substantially increasing regional power, both economically and in terms of identity that was put forth in a nationwide referendum. However, it failed causing his resignation. Although the French populace was not actually against the proposed reforms, as indicated by many polls, the referendum was tainted by the anti-Gaullist sentiment rising quickly in response to the widespread unrest and riots in 1968. The Corsicans did favor the reforms with a vote of 55,879 in favor of the referendum as opposed to 47,351 against, which just reaffirmed their feelings of separateness as compared to the rest of France. (Ramsey 1983, 53)

Between 1970 and 1975 there were a few political changes, but none of them amounting to a meaningful decentralization of power. As highlighted previously, in 1970, the island became a ‘region’; in 1973 the cantonal structure was reorganized and, in 1974, “Corsican” was recognized as a “language” in accordance with the Deixonne Law of 1951 (which had implications only for the teaching of the subject and also for broadcasting time). (Savigear 1983, 13) In 1975 a bill was finally passed into Law that created two departments within Corsica: Southern Corsica and Upper Corsica which gave it a fourth seat in the national assembly and two senators instead of one. Corsica’s new Regional Council was reduced to thirteen members and each of the new departments was to have a new General Council, elected from the cantons. (Ramsey 1983, 90,
The Government also appointed the first Corsican Prefect in Corsica in 105 years, Jean-Etienne Riolacci. “His knowledge of Corsica and the local people, his sure touch in handling difficult situations and his flair for putting across Government policies through the mass-media did much to calm a situation which in August 1975 had threatened to get seriously out of control.” (Ramsey 1983, 105)

In addition to the half-hearted attempts at reforms, the authorities approach to many of the direct action incidents, including the ‘Red Mud’ affair, was “an initial show of force, which was taken by the demonstrators as a provocation,” followed by over-reaction at a critical moment and finally, “an apparent capitulation in the face of the determined action by the opposition.” (Ramsey 1983, 72) In the ‘Red Mud Affair’ the police used tear gas and arrested Edmond Simeoni, whom they later released with no charge. As well, the government referred any militant Corsicans arrested for collective action, whether violent or not, to the State Security Court, which was seen as provocation and intimidation since the State Security Court was a special court for treason. (Ramsey 1983, 72)

After Aleria, in 1975, the government banned the ARC and popular unrest broke out. (Hossay 2004, 411) It was within months of this that the FLNC emerged as a militant and violent terrorist organization prepared to fight the state for independence. In response, several anti-autonomist groups, including FRANCIA (Front d’Action Nouvelle Contre l’Indépendance et l’Autonomisme) that emerged a few years earlier to combat the autonomists, now stepped up their
activities and campaigns to scare off the FLNC and support for it. They engaged in a number of attacks on targets associated with autonomists including blowing up the hotel and an aircraft of a General Councillor (Radical of the Left) from Calenzana. FRANCIA blew up the Arritti Printing Press after sending several Corsican journalists letters threatening reprisals for “anyone issuing communiqués emanating from the FLNC and all declarations by individuals openly advocating independence, whether the channel is the local press or not.” (Ramsey 1983, 141)

The security situation deteriorated as the government and the anti-autonomists appeared to be colluding when a new radio station, Radio-Corse International (RCI), was set up on the Italian island of Elba and began broadcasting across Corsica with a platform for “all legally constituted parties and movements to debate freely the problems of Corsica to help find solutions”. The French Government set up a “jamming station” designed to jam the frequency that was only moderately successful. Soon after, an autonomist group assumed to be FRANCIA fire-bombed the apartment block of the owner of RCI. (Ramsey 1983, 183)

When the government and FRANCIA sabotaged the establishment of a radio free Corsica (RCI) the FLNC announced “a new offensive in the liberation struggle” and, in particular, warned police they planned to target government under-cover agents, or barbouzes. There was a belief that all autonomists shared that the government was behind FRANCIA. “Despite blanket denials from the authorities, the administration’s opponents had been convinced for years that people holding government jobs were the backbone of FRANCIA and that these
activities had the blessing, indeed the material support, of the Prefecture.”

(Ramsey 1983, 184) The relationship between autonomists and the government had grown particularly tense, with an increase in attacks between 1976-1980, (Savigear 1983, 4) but noticeably the level of autonomist activity seemed to have declined. In January 1980, when three people were killed in Bastelica/Ajaccio as a result of confrontations between autonomists and those opposing them (FRANCIA), violence and repression became commonplace with 463 attacks in Corsica and 54 on the mainland claimed by Corsican organizations. (Kofman 1982, 308)

But in the 1980 election, the RPR was replaced with the Socialists in the French government and the newly elected French President, Francois Mitterand promised to give Corsica a ‘new deal’ in 1981. (Savigear 1983, 4) Mitterand enacted a major reform – *statut particulier* – in March 1982 establishing a new Corsican Assembly to be elected through Proportional Representation. (Hossay 2004, 416) Consequently, sixty-one *counseillers* were elected to Corsica’s firstly directly-elected regional assembly. Elected for six years, the Assembly had budgetary powers and could make proposals modifying legislative provisions to take account of Corsica’s economic, social and cultural development. (Hintjens 1995, 123) The Assembly was assisted by a number of new bodies, notably the Corsican Economic and Social Council. Further the Corsican region was elevated to the status of a *collectivite territoriale*, having the same legal status as French communes, *departements* and regions.” (Hainsworth 1983, 165)
The victories of the Socialists in 1981 were also followed by several measures designed to alleviate nationalist concerns: amnesty for political prisoners, the abolition of the State Security Court, the dissolution of the Gaullist secret police (the SAC) active within Corsica, the plan to open a new University at Corte in 1982, the appointment of a Corsican as Delegate for Corsican Affairs. (Hossay 2004, 416) “The Socialist regime hoped to alleviate Corsican grievances, promote wider participation and, at the same time, deflate separatist tendencies.” (Hainsworth 1983, 165)

*Does the ethnic group support the use of terrorist tactics against the state?*

Fundamentally, Corsicans are divided between those desiring the maintenance of the status quo\(^{17}\), and the nationalists, who are also divided. Of the nationalists there are those who believe autonomy can be won within the French state (autonomists) and those who believe independence is the only solution to Corsica’s problems (separatists). The autonomists were represented by the ARC until it was replaced by first, the APC (*Associu di Patrioti Corsi*), and then the UPC (*Unione di u Popul Corso*), all of which were led by Edmund Simeoni. (Savigear 1983, 4) The separatist and violent militants were represented by the FLNC. However, there is an overlap in membership among the various groups. There was no inconsistency in supporting both the violent separatists, and the more direct action oriented autonomist groups. (Savigear 1980, 130) Overall, there was a general unity among the majority denouncing violence. Opinion polls consistently demonstrated that less than 10 per cent of the population favoured

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\(^{17}\) This group is represented by FRANCIA in particular, but because this group is not using violence against the state as such, it is discussed in the section under government repression.
independence, but nearly half of the island’s population sympathized with the nationalist aims. (Hossay 2004, 421) Ultimately, Corsican regional separatist terrorist groups had “a degree of popular support”. (Shapiro 2003, 69)

Support for terrorism, violence, and the FLNC was contingent on the French government’s inability and unwillingness to substantively reform institutions granting more power to the local level. When the French government used repression against the autonomists, banning the ARC in 1975, and ignoring demands for institutional reform, the FLNC emerged in 1976 with a more radical agenda eclipsing the support the ARC had, with terrorist activities increasing in frequency and intensity throughout the remainder of the 1970s.

In early 1977, Leftists and elements of the autonomist groups attempted to unite forming the new Fronte di u Populu Corsu (FPC). It was comprised of Communist and socialist groups, a student group, and autonomists. They came together under a manifesto of nationalism and socialism, and argued that the anti-colonial struggle and the class struggle overlapped in Corsica. The Fronte’s position “as regards both illegal and violent action was ambiguous”. (Ramsey 1983, 137) The FPC represented a certain mainstreaming of the acceptability of violence. Essentially it was moving closer to the position of the FLNC. The centrist and non-violent banned ARC had re-emerged as the APC and felt threatened and undermined by the more extremist positions so they attempted to bridge the gap. The leader of the APC, Edmund Simeoni, responded in an

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18 This manifesto “demanded ‘the emancipation of the Corsican people’ and proclaimed a commitment to achieve a recognition of the ‘national rights of the Corsican people’, stating that this demand went far beyond a claim for the safeguarding of the cultural identity ‘by means of an administrative regionalization of a special statute’.” (Ramsey 1983, 137)
interview predicting an autonomist victory ‘within five years’ and suggested eventual independence might be ‘economically viable’. However, the sad truth was that the “APC was losing members and morale was sinking”. Thus, in April, 1977, the APC restructured “along the lines of a political party”. The party was given a new name, the *Unione di u Populu Corsu* (UPC). Although it was a party and had set up a first Congress for August, they did not commit themselves to participating in any elections. The APC, and all other significant autonomist groups, had boycotted the municipal elections held in March. (Ramsey 1983, 138)

The advent of the FPC and its ambiguity around violence, as well as the marginalization of the autonomist APC/UPC marked a shift in support for the FLNC and they used it as an opportunity to step up activities, “despite the fact that the police estimated the total membership of the organization at that time to be no more than two to three hundred.” It was also around this time that FRANCIA and the government were stepping up their counter-terrorist activities, and as a counter to FRANCIA’s attack on the printing press, the FLNC raided a French military installation at Fort-Lacroix and destroyed the waiting-room at Bastia railway station. On Bastille Day (July 14) the FLNC hit no less than 27 targets, and a few days later blew up a TV relay station affecting TV reception for months. (Ramsey 1983, 141)

Popular support moved in the early 1970s from direct action and the ARC to violence and terrorism and the FLNC in the late 1970s. The late 1970s was a period of harsh measures, repressive tactics, allegations of collusion between counter-terrorist groups and the government, and no attempts at reforming
institutions to give Corsicans greater local control or autonomy. However, in 1980 with the electoral swing to the left and the victory of François Mitterand, a moment of quiet among the nationalist population ensued. Mitterand’s plan for the new Corsican Assembly drew pause from many Corsicans and the FLNC called a truce. But optimism over the new legislation was short lived. The first election after the new Assembly was struck showed the level to which the Corsican population was divided. Over one thousand candidates were presented across seventeen positions. “With 1.6 per cent of the votes necessary to secure election, even those with minimal support participated. Autonomists received just under 13 per cent, a disappointment that many attributed to continued clan patronage. (Hossay 2004, 416) The FLNC and most nationalist activists interpreted Mitterand’s *statut particulier* as a trick, “a subtle refinement of Corsica’s colonial status vis-à-vis France”, so they promoted an abstentionist policy. (Hainsworth 1983, 165) A mainstream clan party won the position of the President of the Assembly. The UPC refused to support the new President, calling him a puppet for the clan system. “This led to a hardline policy by the state and echoes of past hostilities. When the Assembly deadlocked due to a UPC refusal to participate and a right-wing rejection of the second budget, the executive was forced to seek dissolution four years early.” (Hossay 2004, 416)

After it became apparent that the new Assembly was a failure, the FLNC resumed its activities in 1982 and claimed its first victim, *caporal-chef* Renato Rossi.” (Savigear 1983, 4) By the end of that year, more than 1000 incidents of violence had been reported on the island, even though most were not specifically
claimed by the FLNC. And the violence continued to increase throughout the subsequent years. The FLNC was declared illegal on Jan 5 1983, but continued to use terrorism against the French government through 2001. (Savigear 1983, 5)

**Analysis and Conclusions**

As the TEST argues, if there is a mix of reform that fails to meet demands for change and agent-driven repression is present, then ethnic groups are likely to tolerate and have some degree of support and sympathy for violence. Ethnic groups are likely to be divided over the degree to which violence is, in fact, necessary to change the status quo. Thus, it is probable there will be some toleration of violence and some support for terrorism, as well as perhaps some counter forces within the group that are antagonistic to the use of terrorism or even change.

Applying the TEST to the case of Corsica demonstrates the process by which the willingness of the state to engage in institutional reform or use repression can undermine or engender support for terrorism. The fact that the French government was unable or unwilling to accommodate demands for genuine political participation for a substantial portion of Corsicans reflects the degree to which Corsicans were willing to step outside the boundaries of legal behavior and use violence and terrorism to force a change in the status quo. When the government responded to Corsican cries for autonomy with disproportionate force and repression, terrorism became a more prominent feature of Corsican politics such as was the case with events at Aleria. (Savigear 1980, 130) Yet, when the government shifted positions and attempted to give Corsicans more
autonomy, as was the case in 1980 with the *statut particulier*, terrorism lost support and the FLNC called a truce, until it became evident the reform was insufficient and did not actually change the status quo.

Institutionally, it might be argued that Corsicans had the opportunity to express “his view and to exercise his control over the body politic through the democratic electoral system”. They did have the capacity to try to apply constitutional pressure through the elected deputies, through the election of representatives to the councils and committees of the elaborate and extensive institutions of French local administration, and through the professional and other delegates attending the various committees of the regional administration. (Savigear 1980, 128)

But the problem was that the French government failed to ensure open political access and participation by consistently propping up the power of the clans. “Politics, especially electoral politics, was distorted by the corrupting influence of France and its colonialist hold over the clans who used all means of malpractice to retain their position and to subject the Corsicans.” (Savigear 1980, 128)

When Corsican collective action emerged early in the 1960s as a protest to the economic conditions on the island and changes failed to occur or improve those conditions, collective action radicalized into nationalism, became more commonplace, and took on more virulent forms of direct action and later violence. The primary instigator of autonomist collective action starting in the late 1960s was the *Action Regionaliste Corse* (ARC). Their goal was simply to get the French government to grant them more authority and autonomy to successfully address Corsica’s problems.
The ARC and the autonomists attempted to engage in electoral politics very briefly in 1967, but found that “their early ventures produced very little support for their parliamentary candidates”. For example, in the legislative elections in Bastia in March 1967, the ‘regionaliste’ candidate (Max Simeoni, later to become a leader of the ARC and UPC) obtained only 1160 votes of the 31,527 votes polled in the first round. This confirmed the autonomists’ feelings and arguments about the corruption of politics. So they quickly spurned electoral politics and developed as a Corsican movement operating outside the normal range of politics.

(Savigear 1980, 128)

After this brief bout with electoral politics, the ARC focused on more ‘direct action’ from 1968 onwards. Typical of the sort of direct action was the road tax boycott of 1969. The ARC encouraged people not to pay the road tax as a means of drawing attention to the grievances suffered by the island. These grievances included “the inadequacies of the transport policy, which gave a monopoly to a shipping group controlling links between the island and the continent, to the closing of schools in rural areas, the lack of job opportunities and the alleged higher cost of living” on the island. Tensions also arose around SOMIVAC whose offices were bombed by plastiqueurs. There were also demonstrations against the sale of land to a pied noir entrepreneur in Alzitone in July 1969, and a few sit-ins to protest poor road conditions and infrastructure problems. (Ramsey 1983, 56-57)

In the early 1970s several new groups emerged wanting to protect Corsicanness. They launched publicity campaigns, held cultural events, festivals,
and even a ‘Summer University’ to learn about Corsican traditions, language, and culture. Along with this came a “renewed emphasis on specifically Corsican emblems and symbols” which became part of these public events at the expense of the French symbols and flags. (Ramsey 1983, 69)

The demands changed to independence dates only in the mid 1970s. Until that time, nationalist Corsicans did not seek independent statehood but merely political autonomy within France. “However, violent street clashes and the fact that this demand for autonomy was not given due consideration led to a radicalization of the movement. Several terrorist organizations made their appearance resulting in a gradual shift from a quest for autonomy towards a struggle for independence.” (Lauwers 2003, 50)

Aleria was the first major turning point in the emerging crisis, and the government’s over-reaction drove moderate Corsicans into the hands of autonomists. A public opinion poll held in the island soon after Aleria posed the question: “Do you think that the action taken by the ARC at Aleria was initially justified? 62% answered ‘Yes’, 21% answered ‘No’, while 17% of those asked did not express an opinion. Furthermore, Corsicans were shocked at the overreaction of the government. (Ramsey 105) Aleria successfully rallied Corsicans around the cause and marks the highpoint of autonomist popularity, which was sustained through the trial of those involved a year later. (Savigear 1980, 130)

The government’s response to the increase in direct action and terrorist activity was to repress all of it driving nationalist Corsicans to more extreme
positions. The ARC, which started off as a largely non-violent autonomist group, radicalized focusing on actions “which were not considered locally to be irresponsibly violent or damaging, but which nevertheless were far enough over the line of legality to provoke a response from the authorities.” (Ramsey 1983, 56) When Aleria occurred and the state responded with 1200 gendarmes there was public disbelief at the extent of the display of force used to combat twelve ARC activists, driving many moderates to more extreme positions. At the same time, there was a series of small reforms aimed at quelling nationalist cries that were never genuine and consistently failed to meet the demands for autonomy. In addition, when the anti-autonomist terrorist groups, like FRANCIA, began engaging the autonomist movement in general, the Government made a serious error by “appearing to treat pro-French underground organisations much more leniently than those which were anti-establishment.” Again, they drove significant sections of Corsican public opinion into hardline positions, which would otherwise have remained indifferent. The mass of this Corsican public was, as Jean-Noel Colonna wrote in the October edition of Kyrn, confused between the increasing extremism of both the autonomist-separatists, on the one hand, and the Government on the other. (Ramsey 1983, 195)

Ultimately, at least some Corsicans turned to supporting violence. The FLNC emerged as a force for change, demanding separatism. With the emergence of the FLNC the Corsican population itself divided very quickly over the question of independence, autonomy or the status quo. A significant portion of the population desired more autonomy in particular regards to economic decision-
making and resource allocation on the island and saw the solution laying “in seeking a real political accommodation with the existing political parties”.

(Savigear 1980, 133) There were, and still are, only a small minority of Corsicans interested in independence. Yet, in spite of the quite small portion of the population that supported independence, the FLNC was, and continued to be a significant force for change on the island for the next forty years. (Ramsey 1983, 167)

In 1976 the FLNC engaged in some 300 bombings, which was an increase of 40% from the year before. The willingness to use violence and terrorism stemmed in part from the youth of the ARC. They saw violence as the only option after watching their fathers and the ‘old guard’ of the ARC fail to change anything over the course of the previous two decades of pushing for change. They were willing to attack property, particularly property associated with the colonial state: banks, foreign companies, security forces and government buildings. Although they were unwilling to attack people (until the 1990s) and made an effort to ensure their targets were vacant before bombing them. (Savigear 1980, 133)

Moreover, when arrests of 27 suspected FLNC members were made interrogations and investigations revealed,

an alarming trend: the group consisted of mostly twenty and thirty somethings who were not the ‘red revolutionaries’ nor racketeers they had often been made out to be in a popular rumour, but were rather a cross-section of the Corsican population – wine growers, teachers shop-keepers, small businessmen, commercial travelers, builders and tradesmen. (Ramsey 1983, 150)

Their previous political affiliations also ranged from the right to the left. “So the veil that had been lifted revealed an organization so widespread in its
geographical, political and family connections that any hopes which might have been cherished that it could be snuffed out in one or two operations were plainly groundless.” (Ramsey 1983, 150)

Support for terrorism was usually relatively marginalized but it was not confined to a certain group, class, region or just a few families demonstrating the tenacity and strength of the support. The 1970s trends suggest it increased when the government used repression and failed to address the autonomists’ demands. But when the shift in power occurred at the national level in France and the Socialists were elected into power in 1980, and they made a serious attempt to reform institutions through the Corsican Assembly, and meet some of the Corsican demands, terrorism lost support and the FLNC called a truce. (Lauwers 2003, 50) But this Corsican Assembly had “no legislative power whatsoever”. “It could merely solicit the Prime Minister, without any guarantee that he would give its proposals serious consideration. The same was true at the fiscal level: the Assembly was granted the opportunity to present Paris with an annual list of its priorities on how to spend the state budget for Corsica, but the government was not in any way obliged to follow this advice.” (Lauwers 2003, 50) “Certainly, ‘in all areas relating to sovereignty over the island’, the Assembly had only ‘consultative, not decision-making, power’.” It was further granted some administrative competence in areas such as culture, transport, energy, planning and education, but these powers were limited. (Lauwers 2003, 50) And within two years of the establishment of the Corsican Assembly, it had failed and the FLNC not only ended its truce but stepped up its activities.
The inability of French institutions to provide an avenue for seeking political change created a need to seek change externally. The focus on economics has not been by virtue of a desire for more financial support as such, but rather on achieving more political power over their own economic development. It was a question of ‘who benefits?’ and who controls the funds being distributed by the French government to the island? “Corsican nationalism in the period after 1945 was therefore not solely the result of economic decline nor a cry from a declining cultural group, but was the demand for an answer to political questions about power.” (Savigear 1980, 124)

As the state responded to Corsican nationalism with mixed messages, both repression and reform, the reaction from the Corsicans was to sustain terrorism as a possible option, never truly committing to a revolution but causing enough political upheaval to threaten the state and force change. “The relationship between the political and economic changes and direct action has not been completely lacking. Direct action by autonomists, publicizing abuses and what they regarded as defective and partial administration of the island, have coincided with a variety of changes and improvements since the start of their activity in 1966.” (Savigear 1983, 12)
Chapter 5

Embracing Terrorism: Irish Catholics and the IRA

Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland exemplify a repressed ethnic group. Catholics and Protestants have been fighting over control of the island since the British colonizers arrived there in the 17th century. During the course of the next few centuries, numerous attempts at Catholic rebel insurgency and uprising failed to garner support from the Catholic community, and thus, repeatedly failed. The 1960s, however, brought a significant change: Catholics mobilized around a civil rights movement, akin to the US Civil Rights Movement, that demanded institutional reform. They held peaceful marches and demonstrations. It was not until the government failed to both pass meaningful reform and engaged in fairly severe acts of repression, including internment without trial, and then killed thirteen unarmed protestors on ‘Bloody Sunday’, that a significant portion of the Catholic community turned to the use of terrorism and violence as a necessary tool to force change. Catholics called for protection from the Irish Republican Army who arose from the ashes to become a well funded, supported and resourced mainstream revolutionary terrorist organization (PIRA) that drew the British government into a low-level conflict for thirty years. In 1998, new institutions were agreed upon in the Good Friday Agreement and a very tenuous peace has existed since then.

This chapter will proceed by first, laying out a brief history of the relationship between the ethnic group and the state. Second, it addresses the
questions as laid out in Chapter 2. Finally, analysis is rendered and conclusions are reached.

History of Irish Catholic-British Relations

At the Battle of the Boyne in Ireland, William of Orange defeated King James and ‘restored a Protestant ascendancy’ which set the stage for communal tension between Catholics and Protestants for the next several centuries (Kee 1972, 17) The ‘Williamite’ period followed where Protestant settlement was encouraged throughout Ireland. (Loughlin 1998, 3) The colonial system pitted the settlers against the native population - a common feature of colonialization. London was always suspicious of Irish politics and religion and the natives were considered threats to order, leading to the imposition of restrictions on them. Catholics were deprived of political and other rights. (Terchek 1977, 51) They were subjected to the British ‘Penal Laws’ enacted in 1701, which excluded them from all forms of political power and public life. Protestants ruled with iron fists and the British government sanctioned this behavior. In spite of the division of the island in the 1920s into the North and the Free State in the South, the nature of this relationship did not change, until 1968 when the Catholic Civil Rights Movement emerged.

In 1920, the British parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act which gave Ireland two governments: one for the six counties of the North and one for the South. However, the Irish independence (republican) party, Sinn Fein, boycotted Westminster, set up its own government in Dublin, and entered into an a military struggle to force the British off the island. This resulted in the Irish War
for Independence from 1919-1921 which succeeded in turning the South into
‘Free State’ ruled from Dublin, achieving complete independence in 1950.
Modern Ulster was created in 1921 as a result of Protestant resistance in Northern
Ireland to inclusion in the Irish Free State in the South. Ulster remained within the
United Kingdom with a 65% Protestant majority. Northern Irish Catholics largely
rejected the legitimacy of the statelet and found themselves as a significant
minority in a hostile environment dominated by Protestants who feared their
uprising. Civil strife in the 1960s was in many ways a “continuation of the issues
left unresolved at the time of partition”. (Terchek 1977, 48)

As a result of their fears, Protestants seized the opportunity early on to
establish clear political domination over the Catholic minority. “The state founded
for northern Irish Protestants in 1920 neither knew how, nor had any desire, to
incorporate the Catholic community into the political process. Catholics were
regarded as disloyal and untrustworthy and therefore unworthy of exercising
power.” (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 11) The intentional obfuscation of political access
was observable across virtually all institutions. Nearly everyone who had ever
served in a Stormont government was a member of the Orange Order\(^{19}\), an
exclusively and determinedly Protestant organization.

\(^{19}\) To buttress the political order, Protestants banded together in a semisecret society, the
Orange Order. It was founded in the 18th century by the Anglo-Irish middle classes and
saw its primary role as resisting Catholic and radical Protestant demands for
independence, like the Americans and the French. (Moloney 2002, 43) Orangeism and
the Orange Order was only open to those born Protestant and it acted “as an umbrella
under whose generous frame factory boss and factory worker could both find shelter”. It
became an instrument of sectarian division and privilege and, by the 1950s, “no unionist
politician could aspire to elected office if or she was not a member. The Prime Minister
and his cabinet were almost always Orangemen, and they held huge parades throughout
Belfast and Derry celebrating the victory of William of Orange at the Battle of the Boyne.
Leadership within the Northern government made no secret of the fact that the state existed first and foremost for the benefit of the Protestants; and whenever the common interests of the working class favoured reforms that threatened the interests of the Protestant elite, the leadership ‘played the orange card’ to greatest advantage. (Galliher, 1985, 6)

Protestant domination and control over the Northern Irish Parliament resulted in the systematic exclusion of Catholics “from the exercise of political power at virtually every level in Northern Ireland. No Catholic was ever included in the government based at Stormont.” (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 10-11) A public and straightforward brand of sectarianism marked the terms of the North’s first three prime ministers: Lord Craigavon (1921-40), J.M. Andrews (1940-43), and Lord Brookeborough (1943-63). Lord Craigavon (James Craig) declared openly in 1932 that “ours is a Protestant government and I am an Orangeman” (Wallace, 1970:84), and Lord Brookeborough (Sir Basil Brooke) publicly encouraged discrimination in employment with words such as these uttered at a public meeting: “Many in the audience employ Catholics, but I have not one about my place. Catholics are out to destroy Ulster with all their might and power”. (Wallace, 1970, 84-85) (Hastings, 1970, 22)

One of the key tools the Unionist government employed to assuage their fears, maintain domination, and quell any possibility of rebellion was the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act. It was intended to be used to restore order in the province after the Irish Civil War, but the statute continued to be employed long after political violence had disappeared whereupon it became a tool of repression used to silence support for union with the South. The Special Powers

There were demonstrations of Protestant domination designed to remind the Catholics of their subordinate place in the political, social and economic order.” (Moloney 2002, 44)
Act give the authorities exceptional powers to arrest, detain without trial, and suppress political dissent. (Moloney 2002, 39) Moreover, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), established to replace the defunct police force in 1922, was never less that 80% Protestant. (Jackson, 2003, 225) The SPC became the legal recourse for the RUC to ‘flog’ Republicans, and for the government to introduce internment, province-wide curfews, and the proscription of the IRA. (Loughlin, 1998, 13, 16, 18)

At the time the SPA was passed in April 1922, there had been 80 political murders with 50 additional attempts. Within five months these numbers fell to one actual political murder and 11 attempted. Thus, the SPA was seen as highly effective. “In response, the government gradually shifted its emphasis from broad measures designed to return civil order to the province to more preventative regulations aimed at suppressing the threat posed by republican aspirations.” (Donohue, 1998, 1092) Thus, in 1933, the SPA was made permanent on the grounds that it had brought tranquility and would keep it.

Between 1922-1950 the ministry of home affairs, who had oversight over the SPA, banned more than ninety meetings, assemblies, and processions in the province. The vast majority of these were republican or anti-partitionist in character. But the government never used the SPA to prohibit a loyalist gathering. (Probert, 1978, 73) It was used to censor and prohibit newspapers, books, or periodicals of any kind that in any way advocated “an alteration to the constitution or laws of Northern Ireland by unlawful means”. (Donohue 1998, 1102) It banned the tricolor flag, songs, and symbols of Catholic nationalism as
well as organizations associated with Irish culture or nationalism such as Sinn Fein, the Gaelic League, and the Irish Volunteers. Moreover, it placed the burden of proof on the “defendant to demonstrate his or her absence of association with the proscribed entity”. (Donohue, 1998, 1111) The government completely failed to distinguish between republicanism and nationalism. “It denied the entire minority community access either to a political platform or to the possibility of obtaining political power.” The SPA, not only in content, but also the manner in which the regulations were applied, denied legitimacy to the political aspirations of a broad portion of the minority community. “Put simply, the government failed to distinguish between violent and non-violent challenges to the government.” (Donohue, 1998, 1114)

Although the British could have challenged the legitimacy of the SPA based on section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 when there was no conflict, they were simply not prepared to intervene on behalf of the Catholic minority, or to protect Unionists from the possibly disastrous consequences of their actions. (Moody 1978, 29) London chose to ignore Northern Ireland’s affairs. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), representing the Protestant majority, dominated Ulster politics and government. The Unionists were economically and politically conservative. They encountered little opposition from anyone, including the minority class-based party, the Northern Ireland Labour Party. The Catholic minority’s response to the UUP regime was divided between compliance and resistance, “but there was little support for the regime or hopeful involvement in the political system”. (Power 1972, 224) “Catholics voted for parties dedicated
to ending partition, and their elected leaders, rejecting the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland government, often boycotted their seats in the Ulster Parliament and refused to accept the title of loyal opposition when they did take their seats.” (Terchek 1977, 49)

Essentially from the mid-1920s to the late 1960s, Ulster was fairly peaceful with only about 18 deaths from ethnic conflict. Catholics and Protestants were almost entirely segregated. They attend their own schools, married almost exclusively within their own faiths, and found most of their friends among their own coreligionists. (Terchek 1977, 49) However, they were not equal in their separation. Catholics experienced political disenfranchisement, economic disadvantage and an unfair justice system. The local council franchise was based on the householders’ taxpayer rates, and Catholics, who were often forced to rent and had extended families living under the same roof, were disproportionately penalized by the regulation. “Indeed, about a quarter of those qualified to vote in the parliamentary elections were disenfranchised from local council elections.” (Terchek 1977, 53) Gerrymandering assured minority Protestants control of local councils in all but the most Catholic areas. In addition, Protestants staffed the courts and police and favored their own, but employed harsh, retributive justice for the Catholics. Especially offensive was the Ulster Special Constabulary, or the B-Specials.” The B-Specials were a “part-time reserve police unit, which sometimes operated under legal sanctions as vigilantes against Catholics”. (Terchek 1977, 53)
Economically, Catholics were much more likely to be unemployed (Miller 1983, 78). If they were employed, they were largely confined to the unskilled labour force. Protestants dominated the upper occupational classes while Catholics were found in the lower classes. There was a small Catholic middle class that was largely the result of the high degree of segregation that existed in Northern Irish society. This “segregation creates the conditions which support the existence of a professional and business class whose role is specifically to satisfy the needs of their own religious group”. (Aunger 1983, 27-28)

Some of the discrepancy between the two groups was due to the fact that industrial development was concentrated in the two Northeast counties of Ulster, the Protestant dominated areas of the province. In particular, Belfast was a prosperous hub of shipbuilding and textiles that resembled more of an industrious English city rather than an Irish town. Education, income, and economic opportunity were high compared with the rest of Ireland. Whereas, the Western and majority Catholic counties were far more agricultural. (Terchek 1977, 52)

However, in the Post-WWII period, agriculture, shipbuilding, and textiles were in serious trouble. Employment in these sectors was in rapid decline. (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 32) After a series of dire economic predictions made during the 1950s suggesting that industry in Northern Ireland had become outdated and “the entire economic infrastructure needed modernizing”, Prime Minster Terence O’Neill proposed reforms in 1963. (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 32) The reforms, which were essentially quite limited and failed to address Protestant domination of either employment or governance structures, aroused deep resentment within the
Protestant community. O’Neill encountered serious opposition in general, but in particular from an emerging critic, Reverend Ian Paisley. In 1966, Paisley published the first edition of “a virulently anti-Catholic paper, the Protestant Telegraph, which ritually condemned O’Neill’s appeasement policies”. He publicly disavowed “O’Neill’s form of Unionism and of the Prime Minister’s stated intention to act as a bridge to the Catholics”. (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 37) In general, Protestant objections to the reform process took fairly peaceful forms, but in the mid-1960s resistance took more extreme forms with the re-emergence of the Protestant Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The UVF rearmed and “declared war on the IRA and engaged in a spate of sectarian killings”. As a result of these murders, O’Neill outlawed the organization in June 1966, forcing them to go underground until the spring of 1969. (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 38)

In the meantime, a group of young Catholics, having benefited from a free education system, but confined in their economic mobility, (Kennedy-Pipe 1997, 41) saw O’Neill’s reforms as an opportunity. Departing from the minority’s traditional ideology (republicanism), issues and tactics, a nonviolent civil rights movement emerged in 1967 to benefit from the O’Neill Government’s outlook and to press for further reforms.” (Power 1972, 224) The movement had barely organized itself before encountering resistance. O’Neill backed away from his proposed reforms under too much pressure from his own community and the UVF attacked civil rights marchers. This marked the beginning of the civil rights phase from 1967-1969. (Power 1972, 224)
Questions and Answers

To what extent do state institutions facilitate, tolerate, or repress any particular subgroup of the population?

The institutions created and dominated by Protestants after the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 are the key to understanding why, after fifty years in the absence of war, Northern Ireland descended into violent ethnic conflict in the late 1960s. The institutions codified and perpetuated a specific set of norms and practices based on the discrimination and repression of Irish Catholics living in the six counties of Northern Ireland.

It need hardly be stressed that sectarian bitterness in Ulster long pre-dated partition. But it is also emphatically true that the devolved government presided over a remarkable elaboration of inequality and an intensification of protest; and it seems quite clear that the Government of Ireland Act provided little effective protection against the infringement of minority rights. (Jackson, 2003, p.222)

The British government’s creation of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 was meant to be a resolution to the ‘Irish question’—a question that had plagued the English for centuries and culminated in the war for independence a few years prior. This act established ‘home rule’ institutions that would give the people of Ireland an opportunity to exercise more independence from Westminster. Institutions, rules, and laws were left to the people to decide upon. The Unionist majority took every opportunity to cement their domination and subjugation of Catholics in the early years of state formation, such as with the Local Government Act of 1922 and the Leech Commission discussed below. The Republican boycott of the new ‘statelet’ did not help, leaving the Protestants to completely dominate the decision-making processes and allowing the institutions to be used as tools to
perpetuate discriminatory policy. The result was that Catholics were alienated from the political process and decisions were made almost entirely by Unionists.

Over several decades, Catholics became fairly accepting of their status and sectarian violence was minimal. The power relations between the Protestants and Catholics became so imbalanced that rebellion or outright conflict was averted for many decades. The Protestants were able to use institutions to constrain the power of the Catholics. The opportunity the Nationalists had after the Government of Ireland Act was passed to be involved in the decision-making process was a lost one. The high degree of structural repression against Catholics was entrenched and systematic, intensifying over the next fifty years of Protestant domination of Northern Ireland’s institutions.

*What is the structure and regime type of the system? Federal or unitary state?*

Stormont, the Northern Ireland Parliament, was set up as a ‘statelet’ with Home Rule in the Government of Ireland Act. The Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a federal system, with Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland all having seats in the British Parliament as well as having their own Parliaments. Thus, there were three levels of government: federal level (Westminster), state level (Stormont), and local level (councils, committees). Westminster retained all the important powers of defense, foreign affairs, coinage, and taxation, but the home rule would manage internal affairs. (Loughlin 1998, 6) It also retained all authority to deny the final passage of any and all Northern Irish legislation, but often lacked the impetus or pressure to do so. (Moody, 1978, 29) (Hastings, 1970, 26) (Loughlin, 1998, 16) At the ‘statelet’ level, the Government
of Ireland Act power was to rest, nominally, in the hands of a Governor in the
name of the Crown. Under him, the province’s internal affairs were to be
governed by a Northern Ireland Parliament in Belfast (later known as Stormont).
This parliament consisted of a House of Commons of fifty-two members and a
Senate of twenty-six (the latter holding very little power). Northern Ireland had its
own Prime Minister and Cabinet. The province would pass its own domestic
legislation, and within limits, could choose which laws enacted by the British
government came into effect in Northern Ireland. Finally, there was local level
government. Local authorities had extensive powers, including the allocation of
public housing.

The British government had the right to block the discriminatory
legislation by withholding the necessary royal assent, but under pressure from
Unionists, they usually confirmed it and demonstrated the extent to which they
would not interfere. “London was not prepared to act either as a policeman for the
constitution or as a guardian of minority rights.” (Jackson 2003, 224) This would
become a theme with Westminster: in spite of its capacity to constrain the
unionists, it ignored the degree to which the Catholics were discriminated against
and “abrogated any attempt to oversee the internal affairs of NI, thus allowing the
regime to pursue policies that would eventually result in the civil disorder of
1969.” (Loughlin, 1998, 13) (Jackson, 2003, 224) Thus, in a system where there
should have been a check on local abuses of power, the national government
failed to use its authorities in ways that ensured minority rights protection.
Are voting practices discriminatory or disenfranchising?

Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act prohibited discriminatory legislation: the Northern Ireland Parliament could not ‘make a law so as either, directly or indirectly, give preference, privilege, or advantage, or impose any disability or disadvantage on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status’. (Jackson, 2003, 223) But it failed to ban all forms of electoral manipulation, and it bestowed significant power on the new Northern Ireland parliament to ‘alter the qualification and registration of electors, the law relating to elections and the questioning of elections, the constituencies, and the distribution of members among the constituencies’ (section 14.5). Although this freedom applied to parliamentary elections, the Government of Ireland Act also allowed the Northern Ireland parliament the right to interfere in local government electoral matters. (Jackson, 2003, 223) Virtually all-electoral decisions could be regulated by the new Northern Ireland institutions.

Protestants used this power in two key ways: The Leech Commission and the Local Government of Ireland Act of 1922. The Leech Commission, 1922, was in charge of drawing local government boundaries and with the republicans boycotting it, were initially able to place nationalists at a disadvantage and “subsequent gerrymanders in Derry, Omagh and Enniskillen further suppressed or disenfranchised local nationalist minorities”. Moreover, these gerrymanders were embodied in legislation that was formally approved by the Northern Ireland Parliament. (Jackson 2003, 223)
The unionist parliament also passed legislation, the Local Government Act of 1922, enabling the gerrymandering of local electoral districts. (Jackson, 2003, 221) This Act abolished proportional representation and instead made all franchise contingent upon ‘rated occupancy’, which meant voting rights were based on housing allocation as decided upon by local, gerrymandered councils dominated by Unionists. “The Councils exercised considerable power: they gave employment, built public housing, and decided whether Catholics or Protestants would get the housing.” (Moloney 2002, 62)

Only householders have a vote in local elections: subtenants, lodgers, adult children living at home are all without a vote, and thus a quarter of the electorate is disenfranchised... So it is very important where you build houses and for whom you build them. Too many houses for Catholics could upset the majority on a Protestant council, or vice versa. (Devlin, 1969, 58)

This resulted in the Unionists winning, basically permanently, 40 of the regions 52 seats in the new Parliament, (Loughlin, 1998, 13) in spite of the fact that Catholic constituted thirty-five percent of the population. (Jackson, 2003, 222)

The only change or reform made to voting or electoral rules throughout the 1920-1960 period was the Elections and Franchise Act of 1947 which maintained the pre-war government election structure, based on “’rated occupation’ and actually increased the number of business votes a local government elector could claim to six”. This, combined with gerrymandering, reinforced the disproportionate percentage of Protestant control over the vote and kept secure their government hegemony. (Loughlin, 1998, 13)
Are there political parties that represent the subgroup?

In general, the Catholic nationalist community had political party representation since the statelet was formed. There were no institutional laws constraining political parties, except at times when Sinn Fein was banned. The key to understanding political parties in Northern Ireland is to recognize that there are basically two types of Catholics: nationalists and republicans. Nationalists are constitutionalists who by-and-large believe that change and the unification of Ireland can occur through institutions. They had quite a few political parties emerge over time to represent their interests: The Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), the Irish Labour Party (ILP), the Nationalist Party, the New Democratic Party, and so forth. Most of the parties transformed and morphed in and out of existence between the period of 1922-1969. In 1970, there was a turning point for nationalist political parties in Northern Ireland with the

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20 The NILP was a left wing party formed in 1924 that was non-sectarian. In 1948, the Irish Labour Party expanded into the North from the South and siphoned off the anti-partitionist membership leaving the NILP dominated by pro-unionists. The NILP then took an official pro-union stance. (Staunton 2001, 338)

21 The ILP was formed in 1912 and has been in government and in opposition South of the border since partition. In 1948 it decided to expand into the North, drawing nationalist elements away from the NILP. In 1949 they ran candidates in local elections and “made a clean sweep of two Belfast wards and won control in Newry and Warrenpoint.” But it only declined in strength and size because of internal struggles and clerical opposition, and vanished almost entirely by the start of the Troubles. (Staunton 2001, 336)

22 The Nationalist Party was formed after partition out of the Irish Parliamentary Party. It was plagued with problems of disorganization and internal struggles. In 1965 it became the official opposition party at Stormont but withdrew from that role in 1968 after the civil rights violence in Derry. Soon after it collapsed and most of its members joined the Social Democratic and Labour Party when it formed in 1970. (Staunton 2001, 337)

23 In the late 1950s nationalism supporters formed the National Unity movement and later the National Political Front. Their goal in both cases was to push the Nationalist Party to reform and progress. When the NP failed to transform itself, the National Democratic Party arose out its ashes. (Staunton 2001, 337)
The emergence of the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP)\textsuperscript{24} which would incorporate a variety of elements from other parties to become the party for Catholic Nationalists, second in size only to the mainstream Unionist party. The problem here was simply that because of voting rules, restrictions and gerrymandering, none of these parties ever had enough voting power to overcome the significant Unionist majority.

Republicans\textsuperscript{25} form the other group of Catholics. The party of republicans since 1906 is Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein is a rather complicated political voice for three reasons: first, it works in conjunction with the IRA to collectively define the republican movement. Second, the republican movement is an all-Ireland movement, and was historically run out of Dublin. Finally, it was founded upon policy of abstentionism and therefore, even if candidates were put forward, they would refuse to take an oath of loyalty.

Republicanism is a movement consisting of two pieces: the political and the military. Sinn Fein is the political arm, whereas the Irish Republican Army is the military wing. “In the beginning, Sinn Fein was not actually a political party

\textsuperscript{24} The SDLP became the principal party of the northern minority in the early 1970s. It was founded in 1970 and pulled together nationalists from the NDP, the NILP, Republican Labour and leftover Nationalist Party members around the common goal of involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. (Staunton 2001, 339)

\textsuperscript{25} Irish Republicanism, or the belief that Irish Catholics were going to have to physically force the British off the island, goes back a few centuries. Terrorism is just the latest and most feasible tactic Republicans have used to achieve this goal. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) embodies the Republican movement in the twentieth century and its success and longevity was absolutely dependent on community support, which they knew\textsuperscript{25}. There was hardly a decade where the IRA was not trying to instigate change and revolution, but most of the time there was no audience reception to it and thus, they failed to achieve anything substantial until the Troubles, when the majority of the Catholic community shifted quite dramatically to a position of supporting the use of violence against the state to change the system.
at all and did not run candidates for office. It has always been one-part of a
double-sided movement for Irish self-determination in which the political and
military strands jockeyed for control, and has never been a truly autonomous
political party in its own right.” (Feeney 2002, 11) After the Irish Civil War was
fought between two factions of the IRA, Sinn Fein went into rapid decline in both
the North and the South. It was basically non-existent until 1948 when the IRA took
over Sinn Fein and “had run it to be the IRA’s legal political mouthpiece”
with the goal of an offensive military campaign against Northern Ireland, called
the ‘Six Counties’, which was waged unsuccessfully from 1956-1962. (Feeney
2002, 214)

In 1963, a new group of young Dublin Marxists took over the IRA and
Sinn Fein, signifying a major shift where it was “transformed into a revolutionary
socialist organization with an extreme left-wing agenda”. The new IRA still
“made obeisance” to the use of military force to unite Ireland, but the new leaders
did not really believe in it and did not intend to pursue it. This was a departure
from traditional republicanism. (Feeney 2002, 243) But in 1964, Sinn Fein was
banned as a political party in Northern Ireland. The politics of republicanism
continued underground and Sinn Fein played a key role in publicity, propaganda
and agitation during the ‘Troubles’.

26 The relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein is complicated and explained
later in this chapter under political parties.
Does the ethnic group, or subgroup, engage in collective action to change the system?

In the 1960s dramatic changes would sweep through both the world at large and Northern Ireland. First, decolonization and fights for independence against oppressive regimes were challenging colonial powers. Second, and most importantly, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States had emerged to demand reforms and equal rights for Blacks. Third, a generation of educated Catholics emerged from university to find themselves underemployed and discriminated against. The result of these changes was a growing awareness of the degree of inequality and subjugation Catholics experienced in Northern Ireland.

Catholic and nationalist politics had been characterized for many years as meek, in spite of the fact that many knew they were the victims of discrimination in housing and jobs. In 1967, The Campaign for Social Justice emerged and collected information to show just how much disparity existed between Catholics and Protestants in the North. This information propelled the creation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) based on the NAACP in the United States. NICRA was launched in 1967 and its main goal was the extension of civil rights to Catholics that were enjoyed by the rest of the citizens of the United Kingdom. Their list of grievances centered around institutional reform: fair allocation of housing, legislation against discrimination in local-government employment, tools to deal with grievances arising out of local government, the redrawing of electoral boundaries by an independent commission to ensure fair representation, universal adult suffrage, repeal of the Special Powers Act, the
withdrawal of the Public Order Amendment Bill before parliament which, among other provisions, proposed to extend the power of the Minister of Home Affairs over public processions, and the disbandment of the “B” Specials. (Galliher, 1985, 25)

NICRA pursued a “quietest” policy between its foundation and the summer of 1968, after which, adapting the strategies of the Civil Rights movement in the southern states of the USA, it began to stage high profile marches. (Jackson, 2003, 236) The first protest march for civil rights was August 24, 1968 in Dungannon. To the complete surprise of the organizers, it attracted 4000 marchers. (Geraghty 1998, 13) When NICRA announced the second civil rights march on October 5, 1968, the government banned the march, which infuriated moderates, pushing them into taking part. (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 20)

During the next six weeks of October and November 1968, a civil rights campaign, more or less confined to Derry, brought thousands of people out on the street to demonstrate. (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 19)

“Catholic quiescence had come to an end.” (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 11) Civil rights activists were demanding that Catholics be given the same political access as Protestants. Mobilization served to raise awareness and consciousness of the institutional discrimination and subjugation of Catholics, and it worked. Catholics did grow in their awareness of their second-class status and took to the streets to demonstrate and protest.

In January, 1969, a march from Belfast to Derry marked a turning point in the civil rights movement when marchers were ambushed by an angry Protestant
mob. It was a violent confrontation and it spread into Derry’s major Catholic enclave, where throughout the night the ‘bogside’ resembled a village under siege. (Geraghty 1998, 17) This spawned a series of violent clashes that continued for the next six months, and by July 1969, Northern Ireland was in crisis. In Derry, where many of the marches had taken place, there was often regular and unprovoked rioting in the streets. On August 12, 1969, the provocative annual Apprentice Boys of Derry march turned into fifty hours of continuous fighting known as the ‘Battle of the Bogside’. The unionist marchers were escorted by the RUC alongside the Catholic bogside. Young Catholics responded by hurling stones and bottles at the Apprentice Boys and the RUC charged into the bogside followed by Protestant mobs. The Derry Citizens Defence Association (DCDA) was prepared and erected barricades before most of the mob arrived. The RUC responded with tear gas. Rioting ensued and the RUC and B-Specials violently attacked the community. Catholics across the North responded with eruptions of violence in ten other urban areas, in part to force the RUC to pull back and take pressure off the Bogside.

In January, 1969, the Burntollet bridge attack on civil rights marchers narrowed the space for ambiguity and neutrality and ratched up tension in Northern Ireland. “Events surrounding Burntollet demolished what little faith there was in Catholic areas of Derry in the RUC as a police force. It led to the establishment of the first no-go areas in Derry and for the first time the civil rights campaign began to take on the appearance of an insurrection.” (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 33-34) Catholic opinion swung behind the civil rights marchers when the
RUC stood by and watched or participated alongside the Protestant mob as they were attacked. (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 39)

After the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ it was evident that the Catholic community was under attack from the state and from Protestants, and they had no defense. Bogside residents built barricades to keep the RUC and the Protestants out of their community. As will be discussed in the following pages, the demand for armed defense and protection by the Irish Republican Army would take root and grow through 1973.

At this point, debates about regime legitimacy and defense began to prevail over discussions about civil rights and grievances, marking an evolution to the next stage. This was characterized by a severe decline in civil protest, shifts in power both in Ulster and Britain, and between them an acceleration of, and shift to, offensive IRA violence along with the spreading of militant republican and Ultra (UVF) sentiments. Internment without trial opened the final phase of the Troubles. This phase featured a sharply increased alienation of the minority from the regime, a further rise in desperate IRA violence, British paratrooper repression of civilian protestors, and active diplomacy by the Irish Republic. (Power 1972, 224)

After a brief hiatus, a final march of the civil rights movement was organized for Sunday, January 30, 1972 in response to the British policy of internment. NICRA held a protest with approximately 5,000 people around the Bogside. The march veered off the marching path and a confrontation between British soldiers and a mob of youths arose: the youths threw stones, and the
British soldiers responded with riot guns, rubber bullets and CS (tear) gas. As the rest of the marchers continued, a shot was heard and the British Parachute regiment (‘Paras’) on duty stormed into the Catholic ‘Bogside’ and opened fire. The British Paratroopers (‘Paras’) shot at least twenty-six people, killing fourteen of them. The killings become known as ‘Bloody Sunday’. (Loughlin 1998, 61)

*How do the state and agents of the state respond?*

There were multiple responses to Catholic mobilization and the civil rights movement and all of them ended in violent repression. Several Prime Ministers sought reform, but hardline Unionists dissented, causing them to fail. Most Unionists wanted to use any and all forms of violence to protect the status quo. The RUC reflected this position. There were also Protestant paramilitaries (UVF) whose primary goal was to attack Catholics. The institutions in place remained steadfastly Unionist and failed to in any way constrain any of these agents – official or not—from engaging in acts of repressive violence. To make matters worse, when the British government finally stepped in and sent troops, they failed to protect Catholics and instead treated them like a colonial power would, with unconstrained and brutal violence.

In 1969, Prime Minister O’Neill countered the NICRA’s list of demands with a five point program of reform that, while matching many of the demands, failed to include guaranteed universal suffrage – probably the most important demand of the Civil Rights movement. (Galliher, 1985, 29) (Hastings, 1970, 67) “The outstanding weakness of his reform programme was the failure to address Catholic complaints in a substantive way”. (Loughlin, 1998, 28) O’Neill’s plan
failed to receive support from either Unionists or Catholics. He attempted to attract Catholic support by making economic concessions without tackling the structures of sectarianism. (Jackson, 2003, 237) But the Protestant community responded by ousting the Prime Minister as well as increasing violence and attacks on Catholics. They saw Catholics as a threat to the union and formed a paramilitary organization called the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), named after the “huge private Protestant army that early Unionist leaders had mobilized in 1912 to resist Home Rule. They aimed to kill IRA leaders, but as the ‘Troubles’ intensified, they were content to target any Catholic. (Moloney 2002, 61) When the new Prime Minister, James Chichester-Clark, took office (1969-1971), he finally “conceded one person, one vote and declared an amnesty for all those charged or convicted in connection with civil disturbances since the previous October.” (Galliher 1985, 38) But Protestants were outraged and communal violence increased.

The response from state agents (RUC) was repression. They attacked civil rights marchers and the Catholic community in general. In August 1968, the RUC baton-charged protestors, (Geraghty 1998, 14) In January 1969, when a Protestant mob ambushed civil rights marchers on Burntollet bridge, the police not only failed to protect the marchers, they participated in the violence against the Catholic community. (Galliher, 1985, 35) Eighty-seven people were severely injured and needed hospital treatment. Immediately after what is now known as the ‘Burntollet ambush’ the RUC made an unauthorized, punitive raid on the Catholic bogside district of Londonderry that resulted in another 163 people
requiring hospital treatment. Rioting and violence between the Catholic community residents, the RUC, and angry Protestants continued for days. (Geraghty 1998, 17)

When it became clear the RUC alone was not able to quell the violence, the Unionist government requested British troops. On August 14, the British government authorized their troops to enter Northern Ireland “to restore order at the request of the RUC; they were to use common-law powers, which require any citizen, military or civilian, to assist a constable if called upon”. (Geraghty 1998, 21) The unionist government’s response to every incident was more British troops, more stringent measures of repression, and more violence. (Moloney 2002, 95) By the end of 1970 there were over thirteen thousand troops in Northern Ireland, an increase from the original three thousand in 1969. The British government followed the Unionist government’s hardline approach from 1970-1972. On July 1, 1970, the Joint Security Committee for Northern Ireland decided on a military crackdown on any signs of street violence. On July 3, in Belfast, violence erupted after a British army squad discovered a small cache of arms. Crowds gathered and threw stones, an army driver crushed a civilian against railings, and a mob surrounded the army truck trapping them within. More troops were deployed and tear gas (CS gas) was used. Petrol-bombs, nail-bombs and hand grenades were thrown and five soldiers were hurt. Eventually a curfew was enacted over a large Catholic enclave in Belfast, known as the Falls Road, where the locals were erecting barricades. The British army was then ordered to attack. Gunfire and the curfew continued for days. Many civilians defied the curfew and
were arrested. (Geraghty 1998, 39) Six days of rioting followed the curfew resulting in injury, death, and many arrests. The Court cases that arose from the riots followed the pattern of discrimination and repression where “outrageously partial judgments were handed down, favouring Protestant offenders. (Geraghty 1998, 40)

In August 1971, the RUC and the army re-introduced internment without trial. From January 1 to August 8, 1971 twenty-nine people were killed by political violence. To counter this violence, the British government introduced the policy to arrest troublemakers, not charge them with a crime, but hold them indefinitely. The first raid on August 9 resulted in the arrests of 342 people, all members or supporters of the Catholic community. (White 1995, 330) The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, refused to take any action against Loyalists to improve the situation. “Internment was applied only against the Catholic community, despite that fact that Loyalist violence was ongoing”. (Loughlin, 1998, 58) Loyalist ‘rifle’ clubs were allowed to proliferate and the Unionist community proceeded to arm itself. Internment lasted four years and a total of 2158 internment orders would be made. “Rather than ending unrest, internment spurned it on. From August 9, 1971 to December 31, 1971, 139 people were killed by political violence.” (White 1995, 330)

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27 Internment had been used before in 1956-1958 when 187 Republicans were locked up without trial. (Geraghty 1998, 43)
Does the ethnic group support the use of terrorist tactics against the state?

At the onset of the civil rights movement, there was no support for terrorism or violence among the Catholic community. The IRA was not an active terrorist organization. In the years up through the start of the Troubles, the IRA had morphed into a Marxist organization interested in agitation. They disarmed and turned away from militant revolutionary ideas. They joined forces with the civil rights campaign but stayed on the margins, engaging in demonstrations and protests but rarely taking the lead. (Geraghty 1998, 9) The Catholic community nicknamed the IRA “I Ran Away” because they were nowhere to be found. As the IRA leader in the 1960s, Cathal Goulding suggests, “So, we were broke. We hadn’t got the wherewithal to buy arms. We were in no position…to get arms by military means…Any raids or military activities would obstruct the development of those political agitationary tactics.” (Geraghty 1998, 8-9) Catholics were so enraged at the IRA’s inability to step forward and defend them that new leaders and recruits emerged to takeover the IRA, which lead to a split and the advent of the Provisional IRA (Provos or PIRA) and Provisional Sinn Fein. (Moloney 2002, 80) Thus, the Provos were truly a grassroots organization that came from within the community in response to their fears, demands and needs.

A 1968 Strathclyde survey completed after the civil rights campaign had begun, but before demonstrations were outlawed showed Catholic opinion to be divided about equally among responses of acceptance, rejection and ‘don’t know’ as to the legitimacy of the constitutional order. In the middle of the civil rights phase the minority community had a sizable majority opposed to violence and a sharply divided outlook on civil protest as civil disobedience. (Power 1972, 225)
In April 1969, for the first time ever, the Derry Republicans held their Easter commemoration in the city centre. The civil rights campaign was in disarray and the prospects “for an internal reconciliation in Northern Ireland had receded”. (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 45) The 5,000 strong march gathered a lot of attention from the Catholic community and grew to be larger than any previous civil rights demonstrations in the city. “The Republican parades traditionally drew crowds numbered in the dozens and, although many came along as they would to any march, it was a big change. There had been a distinct resurgence of basic nationalist feeling in Derry.” (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 45)

As violence, attacks on Catholics and, thus, demands from within the community for defense, increased, a new group of young angry men who were not interested in social agitation wanted the IRA to re-arm. Consequently, in 1969, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) splintered into the IRA and the Provisional Irish Republican Army, (PIRA or Provos) headed by Gerry Adams, Joe Cahill and Daihi O’Connell. The PIRA began to mobilize and arm, to defend the Catholic enclaves from attack in Belfast and Derry. The more alienated the Catholic community became, the more demand there was for the PIRA to use violence against the state. (Jackson, 2003, 247)

Within a year of the creation of the Provos, recruitment numbers swelled exponentially. (Moloney 2002, 96) The Provos were just a year old but British and unionist violence against civil rights protestors gave the organization an “undreamed of boost”. They gathered strength and grew quickly, nourished “on a rich diet of rumour, introspection, atavistic fears and ill-conceived actions by the
British army and the RUC”. Sinn Fein distributed bulletins and propaganda in both Derry and Belfast. Soon thereafter the new Provisional organ, Republican News, was on sale door to door. (Feeney 2002, 262)

While support had been building in general, there was a particular recruitment pool among men who were motivated by a fear of “loyalist violence and an overwhelming need to strike back. Known as sixty-niners, they joined the IRA literally to defend their own streets”. (Moloney 2002, 80) As new PIRA recruits, they turned Catholic enclaves in Belfast and Derry into “quasi-autonomous island-communities, with their own ‘defence committees’, pirate radio stations and ‘free names’”. (Gerharty, 1998, 4-5) They shut out the British and Northern Irish security forces and took to manning the barricades with armed PIRA members. (Feeney 2002, 264)

This pool expanded significantly after two key events: the introduction of internment and ‘Bloody Sunday’. Internment was introduced in an effort to stymie Republican violence. The first round of arrests under internment targeted only IRA suspects. No Loyalists were arrested in spite of their active campaigns of violence against Catholics, starting in 1966. In addition, internment accompanied an unlawful shoot to kill policy that some very powerful elements within the British government were advocating. (Geraghty 1998, 45)

Internment was a victory for the PIRA because it was so one-sided. “Although loyalist violence was also growing, the operation was directed solely against republicans, and even then political activists who were in no way associated with the IRA, student civil rights leaders (for instance) were included
in the swoop.” (Moloney 2002, 101) This enormously increased nationalist alienation. The Catholic community responded with outrage and young men flocked to the PIRA. Catholic community support increased for the end of Stormont and the overthrow of the state. It was now clear that the Nationalists, who in July [1971] had seemed interested in the reform of Stormont, had come to believe that the institution could be overturned, and that nothing less would serve their interests”. (Jackson, 2003, 251)

The Catholic community responded by radicalizing. Leaders resigned from public positions and recruits flocked to the PIRA. The NICRA and other Civil Rights groups were becoming sympathetic or aligned to Republican clubs. In October 1971, the Northern Resistance Movement was formed as an umbrella organization of Republican and Civil Rights groups which demanded the outright overthrowing of Stormont. Internment rallies were organized across the North in late summer 1971 and 1972. Faulkner banned the marches in August, 1971, but they still continued. (Loughlin, 1998, 61) “At Stormont, the nationalist opposition party, a pro-reform coalition called the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) had already withdrawn in protest against British security policy, but now its leaders announced plans to establish a rival parliament. Internment had united Northern Catholics against the state in a way nothing had done since 1921.” (Moloney 2002, 102) “The failure of internment made direct rule almost inevitable. The alienation of the Catholic community was expressed in the Social Democratic and Labour Party’s (SDLP) refusal to negotiate with the British
government until internment was ended, so no political accommodation was possible.” (Gerharty, 1998, 4-5) (Loughlin, 1998, 250)

The violence that resulted, post-internment, was unprecedented in Northern Ireland. In 1971, the PIRA was launching bomb attacks with tremendous speed and efficiency. In September alone they bombed two hundred times. “In its official history the IRA claimed that all but a tiny number of the violent incidents, shootings as well as bombings, logged by the British after August 9 were its responsibility: 999 in September, 864 in October, 694 in November and 765 in December.” (Moloney 2002, 103) The death toll also rose climbing to 86 in 1971, while the British killed 45. Civilians made up the largest category of deaths, as they would throughout the ‘Troubles’; 92 died in 1971, compared with 16 since 1969. (Moloney 2002, 103)

With the political and military circumstances shifting and their popularity growing, the PIRA moved from a defensive mode to one of attack and retaliation. They started by assassinating three young protestant males. The PIRA did not boast about this operation, but it did mark the beginning of a new phase. (Moloney 2002, 97) It was around this time that the PIRA went from being a crude tool of defense against governmental attacks to the use of terrorism to overthrow the government and oust the British from the island.

Bloody Sunday was the final push the PIRA needed to move them from the periphery to center stage revolutionaries. The January 30 march to contest internment led to the violent deaths of 14 unarmed Catholic civilians. Ten thousand protestors descended on the bogside and the British ‘paras’ opened fire.
“None were IRA, and eyewitness testimony said they had been killed in cold blood. The deaths on Bloody Sunday outraged nationalist Ireland. A wave of anger swept through the entire country. In Derry, local SDLP leader John Hume, said the mood in the bogside was now for ‘a united Ireland or nothing’.” Young people jumped in line by the hundreds to join the IRA. (Moloney 2002, 110)

Bloody Sunday also resulted in the ending of Stormont, which was a victory for the IRA because it did fundamentally change the system. Northern Ireland would be operated out of Britain and Westminster. Unfortunately, for all sides, Britain would only replicate the Protestants’ attitude and treatment of Catholics, ensuring continued support for revolutionary activity. (Moloney 2002, 112)

**Analysis and Conclusions**

The Theory of Ethnic Group Support asserts that there are two key factors that lead to substantial increases in support for terrorism as a viable means to change the status quo: institutional repression and agent-driven repression. If the institutions are reformed and enable the ethnic group to resolve their grievances through political channels, then the ethnic group will use those tools to change the status quo rather than supporting violence. In the case in Northern Ireland, the institutions were completely repressive and failed to offer any channel of peaceful change. When Irish Catholics mobilized and demanded equal civil rights, state agents (RUC, B-Specials and the British army) and local Protestants (UVF, mobs) used every available resource to suppress the civil rights marchers and the community as a whole.
The response of the state to the Civil Rights Movement was, ultimately, brutal repression. While a few attempts at institutional reform were made, none of them met the demands of the civil rights movement and the Protestant majority denounced all of them. The Catholic community responded by not only reconstituting a new Provisional IRA and demanding protection from them, but lining up for recruitment and filling the ranks with able bodied men to engage the British in a war for reunification with the rest of the island. This level of violence would be sustained for several years before moving into an advanced stage of targeted terrorism by both sides. It is clear that the overwhelming support and sympathy the PIRA received from the Catholic community in the early 1970s was a direct result of the complete failure of the institutions to reform, instead, facilitating violent repression.

The confrontations that occurred between marchers and the state, particularly the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), brought forth a chain of events that “caused large sections of the Catholic community to lose confidence in the RUC as a police force. This process seriously undermined the state.” (O’Dochartaigh 1997, 19) By late 1969, the conflict moved from one between civil rights activists and the state, to one between Catholics and civil rights activists (who were by and large Catholic) and Unionists, who dominated the government, the police and security forces. The UVF, the RUC, Protestant mobs, and B-Specials were all attacking Catholics and the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland. Attacks ranged from petrol bomb and stone throwing by Protestant youths to unlawful RUC searches to unwarranted beatings and arrests.
by the British troops. The violence was often limited to interface areas—sections in Derry and Belfast where Protestant and Catholic communities intersected, but violence would erupt and last for days. Violence increased so dramatically that Stormont was forced to request the help of British troops. Northern Ireland was in serious crisis. It became clear to Westminster that their ‘absentee landlord’ approach to Northern Ireland had made Northern Ireland impossible to control and now they had to step in and try to resolve a very bitter situation.

In the earliest stages, Catholics welcomed the British soldiers as protectors and neutral peacemakers. But within twelve months the soldiers would be treated as enemies because they “acted in support of the RUC”. (Geraghty 1998, 26) Soldiers went on foot patrols and took to using batons on local teenagers, beating them in barracks before handing them over to the police, lying in court resulting in prison sentences for innocent nationalists, and indiscriminately using CS tear gas. (Feeney 2002, 264)

The British army’s approach to the Catholic areas was to use whatever methods were necessary to hold down the occupied territories in spite of the fact that most intelligence gathered by the British clearly indicated that the Northern Ireland government, security forces, and Protestants were overreacting to civil disobedience and there was no revolution nor was the IRA in any position to start one. British policy treated “Northern Ireland like another rebellious colony, to be punished accordingly. This policy would prove to be the IRA’s most able recruiting sergeant”. (Geraghty 1998, 29)
Accordingly, the government introduced internment. In colonial settings like Algeria, Kenya, Aden and Borneo, internment was used to extract information instantly from Prisoners of War. In Northern Ireland the interrogators took the same approach in spite of the fact that they were not running tactical, battlefield interrogation sessions, nor were they engaged, officially, in a colonial war or even an acknowledged counter-insurgency campaign. They were still relying on their powers at common law and, probably illegally, the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (NI) of 1933. (Geraghty 1998, 47) Not only did internment fail miserably, it exacerbated the situation immensely. In August, 1971, 35 people were killed, 100 bombs went off and some 200 houses in Belfast were burned down.

The final act of agent-driven repression that drove the community into the hands of the PIRA and terrorism was ‘Bloody Sunday’. When marchers protested internment through the streets of Derry and the British troops opened fire on them injuring twenty six and killing fourteen, there was no longer any hope that the state could be maintained. “The public and political evaluation of Bloody Sunday is that it was a massacre of innocents and a disgrace to a professional army.” (Geraghty 1998, 63) ‘Bloody Sunday’ was a major turning point in the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’. Not only did it result in a significant shift within the Nationalist Catholic community to supporting the use of violence and the activity of the PIRA in order to defend them, but it also resulted in the complete collapse of Stormont – the government of Northern Ireland. The British government re-
imposed direct rule after fifty years of Northern Ireland’s home rule and subsequently engaged the PIRA in a thirty-year low-intensity war.

The TEST quite accurately captures the dynamics involved in Northern Ireland. The Catholic minority moved from a position of no support for violence in 1968 to support for terrorism and revolution by 1972 because they were systematically denied political avenues to change the status quo and because they were on the receiving end of substantial force and violence. There were moments early on when institutional reform could have halted the violence. The Catholic community looked to the justice system to hold RUC officers accountable for murder and the system failed them. They looked to the British government and army to protect them from Protestant rage, and instead they were attacked. They became utterly defenseless and from within the community ‘terrorists’ emerged to defend the Catholic communities. As it became clear that there were no options available besides using violence to force the system to change, Catholic community support for terrorism increased. Ultimately, both Northern Irish government and the British government could have quelled the violence and stymied the terrorism had they addressed the grievances of the Catholic community and constrained the repressive actions of all of the agents involved. But the total and complete failure to do so left the Catholic community with few alternatives besides violence to change the status quo.
Chapter 6

Conclusions: Terrorists are the alchemists of revolution.\textsuperscript{29}

Conventional wisdom suggests that political opportunists prey on or manipulate mobilized ethnic groups. Leaders make strategic rational choice decisions based on whatever motivates them – greed, grievance, insecurity, power etc. – about the use of violence, and mobilized groups simply follow. The problem with this is that it is over-deterministic – not all mobilized ethnic groups listen to, support or rally around calls for violence: groups can constrain, ignore or reject the use of violence by elites. Terrorists or rebels may manage to operate for a brief time in any case, but they will not last very long without the support of the group they are claiming to represent. The Québécois were a mobilized ethnic group with grievances and aspirations for a sovereign state, but they rejected the escalation of violence engaged in by the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ).

Existing literature gives us very little insight into when or why this occurs, in part, because none of this literature differentiates between leaders, elites, or terrorists and their constituency groups.

Evidence confirms that ninety percent (Hoffman 1998, 170) of terrorist organizations dissolve within one year\textsuperscript{30}, mostly because individuals are caught

\textsuperscript{29} Taken from the title of Rubenstein’s 1987 book: Alchemists of Revolution- Terrorism in the Modern World

\textsuperscript{30} The longest lasting and typically the most successful are the ethno-nationalist/separatist groups, although rarely have they managed to attain their actual goal of self-determination or statehood. (Hoffman 1998, 170-171) “The resilience of these groups is doubtless a product of the relative ease with which they are able to draw sustenance and support from an existing constituency –namely, the fellow members of their ethno-nationalist group.” (Hoffman 1998, 171) “The ethno-nationalists derive a further advantage from their historical longevity by being able to appeal to a collective revolutionary tradition and even at times a predisposition to rebellion. This assures
by law enforcement. Once arrests are made, if there is no one to fill the vacuum, the organization dies. The fact that these organizations do not continue beyond the arrests or deaths of a few key individuals suggests that keeping together and sustaining a terrorist or insurgent organization is actually quite difficult and requires something more than a handful of volunteers willing to die for the cause.

I have argued here that we need to look to constituency groups and their willingness to support terrorist organizations if we want to understand when and why terrorist organizations and their campaigns are sustained and successful.

Consequently, the question posed in this research is not who are the terrorists, or why are they terrorists, but under what conditions do people support them? Most of the time violent political opportunists are ignored, but occasionally they become center-stage revolutionaries that seriously challenge the state’s monopoly on violence, stability and prosperity. This dissertation set out to determine under what conditions people, even in small numbers, support terrorists. In particular, the study examined ethno-nationalist group support for terrorists in advanced democracies. Ethno-nationalist groups are self-identified out-groups, usually with grievances, who mobilize to seek change. I chose cases in advanced democracies because ethnic groups should be less likely to support terrorism in regimes that, theoretically at least, are designed to encourage broad political participation. Representative government is seemingly structured to allow change to occur through non-violent political channels. Consequently,

successive terrorist generations both a steady stream of recruits from their respective groups’ youth and a ready pool of sympathizers and supporters among their more nostalgic elders.” (Hoffman 1998, 171) Hoffman suggests the relative success of ethno-nationalist groups may lie in the tangibility of the goal. The articulation of so concrete and comprehensible a goal is by far the most potent and persuasive
obtaining ethno-nationalist support for terrorists in advanced democracies should be unlikely because there are other tools available for them to change the status quo besides violence. However, this study found that democratic regimes do not always guarantee democracy for everyone equally. Thus, in several cases, terrorism became a viable option.

The remainder of this chapter will look closely at the findings, compare the three cases of Corsica, Northern Ireland, and Quebec in light of the TEST including their commonalities and differences, and discuss the limitations of the cases. The implications of the TEST will be analyzed and some suggested future areas of research will be identified. Finally, policy implications will be highlighted.

*Case Studies and the TEST*

Scholars identify repression, defined as “any action by another group that raises that contender’s cost of collective action” (Tilly 1978, 100), as a key factor in ethnic group violence, but have, thus far, been unable to identify the precise nature of the relationship in spite of extensive research. (Davenport 2007). The reason for this has been a failure to acknowledge the full spectrum of tools governments use to control political behavior. Institutions and structures play an extremely important role in defining relationships between the state and constituency groups. Institutions can facilitate, tolerate, or repress political access for groups. This has been a major oversight in the repression literature and research, and the definition of repression should be broadened to account for it.
The TEST is based on a definition of repression that includes institutional repression and thus, does account for this gap in the literature.

The TEST posits that where groups are incorporated into the political system and open political access to air grievances is facilitated, and compromises can be reached, there is no need to go outside of the system to force change. However when groups do not have equal access and are merely tolerated by the system or, worse, repressed and shut out of the system completely, then they are going to mobilize around key grievances and demand change outside normal institutional avenues. Agents and institutions will then respond to mobilized ethnic groups either through reform, in which case violence and conflict are averted, or through repression, confrontation and refusal to address grievances. If the government refuses to reform so the ethnic group can use institutions to bring about change, and agents use repression to physically threaten the group’s attempts to demand change, then the ethnic group is likely to respond through the use and support for violence/terrorism to change the status quo. Ultimately, the burden rests with the government. The government has the capacity to stymie, prevent, or undermine support for terrorism; alternatively it can encourage it, based on its willingness or unwillingness to open institutional channels and incorporate marginalized groups. Groups that have limited, or no, non-violent means to change the status quo are much more likely to support terrorists and can push terrorism from a peripheral, criminal activity to a mainstream, revolutionary force of change.
When the TEST was applied to the three cases of Quebec, Northern Ireland and Corsica, research confirms that when ethnic groups have an institutional channel open to use to air grievances and try to change the status quo, they will shun terrorism and opt for the peaceful alternative. Quebec is the clear instance of an institutional shift that enabled Quebecois to change the system from within. The advent of terrorism coincided with dramatic institutional reform in the early 1960s with the birth of the FLQ in 1962 and the Quiet Revolution from 1960-1966. But reforms were slow to materialize particularly economic advances, and terrorism was tolerated throughout the 1960s, as the economic plight of French Quebecers did not change. But when a new political party emerged, the PQ, articulating the same grievances and the same solution of independence as the FLQ, it became clear that there was another option. When the FLQ tried to deny the possibility for change through the democratic system and kidnapped two politicians, provoking a series of repressive measures against the community in general, rather than winning support for their extreme and radical measures, they lost what little support and sympathy they had. The PQ grew in strength and popularity, and terrorism was no longer tolerated at all. This case is particularly straightforward because the messages of the two groups, the FLQ and the PQ, were quite similar, but one group chose terrorism and bombs, while the other one chose the ballot box. In addition, timing seemed to play a relevant role with the PQ running candidates in the April 1970 election, and while they did not capture the majority, they won the second largest number of seats. Thus, a few months later when the FLQ instigated the October Crisis, many independence supporters
could point to the success of the democratic alternative still fresh in the minds of the electorate. It was very evident that violence would not be necessary to achieve change, because change was already in motion.

Northern Ireland, on the other hand, is a clear example of why an ethnic group supports terrorism and violence. When the Northern Ireland civil rights movement emerged in 1968 demanding reforms, particularly focused on universal suffrage and political access, both state agents and the Protestant community immediately met it with hostility and repression. The Catholic community was under physical attack and the government refused to reform institutions to incorporate the significant minority into the political process. The civil rights marchers continued to engage in non-violent marches and protests, but as violence increased and grew to indiscriminate attacks and days of rioting, cries from within the Catholic community brought forth terrorists as a way to defend the community. With all the community support and no political alternatives the PIRA was able to grow in strength and number to become mainstream revolutionaries interested in causing the state to collapse, and they succeeded. The British government was forced to take control of the statelet, pro-rogue the Northern Irish government, send in troops, and engage the PIRA in thirty-year low level conflict. Attempts at institutional reform were too little too late because the institutions had ceased to function, and violence had became the only manner of communication.

Finally, Corsicans and their fluctuating support for terrorism and the FLNC, demonstrated the shifting dynamics of government reform and repression.
Corsicans began mobilizing around demands for more economic planning on the island in the 1960s, but as the French government ignored the need for improvements, the grievances became more extreme, escalating to a desire for more regional power. The French government made irrelevant concessions to Corsicans in the early 1970s, which was an acknowledgement of a problem, but failed to address any substantive issues. Corsican autonomists responded with direct action and more demands. When the government used repressive tactics to try to quell the activists, popular support surged and the activists radicalized, eventually giving way to terrorism in 1976. The FLNC’s terrorism superceded non-violent activities between 1976-1980 until the Socialists came to power and attempted to make some genuine reforms. The FLNC called a truce while the Socialist government in Paris enacted reforms granting more regional autonomy to Corsica. But when it became clear these reforms were still quite superficial and no genuine authority had been de-centralized, the FLNC ended its truce and stepped up its terrorism campaign. It is particularly interesting in the case of Corsica that there was minimal support on the island for independence from France, which was the goal of the FLNC. Yet, the FLNC enjoyed quite a bit of support in their terrorist activities suggesting that many Corsicans believed the use of violence and terrorism was a more effective tool to achieve a change in the status quo than non-violent activities.

When the three cases are compared, it is evident that they started from the same point of institutional repression but had varying levels of support for terrorism. The TEST argues this variation in outcome is explicable based on
reform. In addition, however, case comparison reveals that the timing of reform may also play a role. In Quebec, institutions were reformed from the top-down at the same time, or even before the Québécois were beginning to mobilize. Mobilization occurred anyway, but the necessity of it was undermined by the institutional changes that had already taken place. However, there was a lag between the initiation of political and economic reforms and the time before those reforms materialized. It took five years for a new mass party to emerge to take advantage of opportunities for political power (the PQ in 1968), and it took a decade for the economic measures to amount to tangible change felt by average French Quebecers. Thus, Quebecers mobilized around a desire for more political power and access until events in 1970 made it apparent that earlier reforms had filtered to real possibilities for change. Thus, when agent-driven repression triggered an ethnic group response, Québécois denounced terrorism and violence.

For Catholics in Northern Ireland reform came too little to late. While more than one Northern Irish Prime Minister made attempts to reform institutions to incorporate Catholics into the system, at least superficially, the reforms usually failed to be enacted by the Northern Irish Parliament. When some reforms were finally enacted, the government consistently dragged their heels in their implementation. Moreover, the Protestant majority responded with violence and calls for more repression. More importantly, by the time reforms, such as universal suffrage, were in place violence had already gained in momentum, communal conflict took root, and the use of repression by state agents became so widespread that opportunities for political solutions became obsolete. It no longer
mattered that reforms had been instituted because order was completely disrupted and no one was engaging in politics as usual. The last stage of this degeneration was the pro-roguement of Stormont in 1972, less than four years after the civil rights movement emerged. Northern Ireland seems to illustrate that reforms may be instituted but if repression continues anyway, the reforms may not successfully undermine terrorism and support for violence.

Corsica demonstrates an aspect of this dynamic as well. When the French government used repression, Corsicans responded with increases in terrorist activity and support for terrorism. When the government shifted hands to the Socialists in 1980 and proposed a series of reforms instead, the FLNC called a temporary truce and waited to see the effectiveness of the reforms. Only when the reforms did not amount to meaningful change did the terrorist activity resume and increase. Therefore, violence and support for terrorism waxed and waned depending on when reforms were introduced and how long it took for people to recognize the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of reforms. But in the case of Corsica, it seemed that the government either attempted to reform or responded with repression, so it becomes easier to see the fluctuations in use of, and support for terrorism over time. This is to state that the relationship between reform and repression is complex. In every case, repression was used at a point and triggered a response from the ethnic group, but the question of what happens when agent-driven repression is present and reforms are pursued seemed to complicate predictable outcomes.
While the TEST accurately captures the roles of reform and repression, case comparison uncovers an additional dimension of repression that may be a contributing factor in increasing ethnic group support for terrorism. In both Corsica and Northern Ireland, there were opposing groups of terrorists engaging in violence as well. In Corsica FRANCIA as well as a few other terrorist groups attacked the FLNC and autonomists because they did not want the status quo to change. As well, the French government was accused of collaborating with FRANCIA to undermine the autonomist movement. In Northern Ireland, protestant paramilitaries such as the UVF (Ultras) arose in the mid-1960s in opposition to proposed reforms to make institutions inclusive for Catholics. The UVF became active before the civil rights movement emerged and openly attacked Catholics. The Northern Ireland government has also been accused of collaborating with Protestant paramilitaries against both the PIRA and the Catholic community. The TEST argues that agent-driven repression is a trigger, and paramilitaries, or counter-terrorist organizations like FRANCIA and the UVF who engage in terrorist activity are clearly within the definition of agent-driven repression. However, the fact that in both Corsica and Northern Ireland – the two cases that had some support for terrorism – had the addition of these contending terrorist/paramilitary groups suggests there may be more to this relationship than is evident in this research. In may be that the presence of other terrorist or violent groups makes violence more acceptable, or that there is a kind of cumulative effect of agent-driven repression. It also begs the question as to whether or not state agents alone would be enough to trigger an ethnic group response, or do
communal contenders play a vital and necessary role? It is not clear from these cases exactly which actors – communal or state or both— are the catalyst. This does not undermine the validity of the TEST, but applying the TEST to more cases might shed more insight into the specifics of the relationships.

In addition, in Northern Ireland most scholars pointed to the cumulative effect of internment and Bloody Sunday that secured the center-stage role of the PIRA. The TEST’s focus on agent-driven repression as a trigger does not give clarify whether or not the degree of agent-driven repression matters, or to what extent it may play a role in escalation. This is an area where future research might be useful.

Case comparison indicates there was variation in the type of political system among the cases with Quebec and Northern Ireland both in federal systems and Corsica in a unitary state. While this difference alone did not account for any particular outcome, the case of Corsica reflects previous observations (Cohen 1997) that the structure of unitary states may be inherently problematic for ethnic groups. The French government, unlike either the Unionist majority in Northern Ireland who feared Catholics or the Anglo dominated Quebec government (Pre-Quiet Revolution), showed no intent to discriminate against Corsicans because they were Corsican, rather there was a complete denial of ethnicity and minority group status. The French government simply ignored the differences between Corsicans, and their plight on the island, and the continental French. The suggestion is it that it may take significantly less intention to discriminate in a unitary system to produce a disenfranchised or politically
marginalized ethnic group. Thus, based on the TEST, unitary systems may engender more support for terrorism by definition than other types of regimes. However, more cases of unitary states must be analyzed to conclude anything about the role of particular regime types.

There are also some noteworthy differences among these ethnic groups, however, none of them give great insight into outcomes. First, Corsicans and Quebecers spoke different languages than the majority in the country. Language is an easily identifiable differentiating factor, making it very easy to exclude and discriminate based on this characteristic. Both Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Quebecois had a different Christian denomination than the Protestant majority, but in Ireland everyone spoke English. The Catholics in Northern Ireland were discriminated against the most and, yet, were the least different from the majority. However, only the Irish had a long history of violence and struggle against their ‘oppressors’. The FLQ in Quebec pointed to the Patriot Uprising of 1837 against the British, but it was not a rebellion based on language or culture; rather English and French speakers alike were fighting over the nature of British governance. Corsica achieved a very short-lived independence after a twenty-six year war until they were conquered again, this time by the French. Ireland, however, had a very rich history of rebelling against British rule. There were major rebellions in 1641, 1798, 1848, 1865, 1867, 1916, and 1919-1921 (War for Independence). The War for Independence divided the island leaving six counties within the Kingdom of Great Britain, which most Irish saw as an absolute injustice. But since this division, there had been no rebellion in the North until the
‘Troubles’. A history of violence, however, gives little insight into when or why a rebel group succeeds in garnering support at one point, but not another. As was highlighted in the chapter on Northern Ireland, there had been an effort at rebellion, the Border Campaign of 1956-1962, that failed due to lack of support from the community. This lends credence to the effective of the TEST in explaining both conditions and timing of ethnic group support for violence.

Another difference among these ethnic groups is the underlying reasons for lack of effective political access. The source of Québécois grievances was mostly economic disadvantage that, in part, was the result of a Francophone elite collaborating with the Anglo business elite and the Catholic Church to maintain a system of subservient and undereducated peasant French speakers. Québécois comprised the majority in the province of Quebec. But it was this complex set of relationships that enabled the Anglo elite to maintain a position of dominance. Political institutions did not deny political access formally, they were just instruments the elite minority were able to manipulate to maintain the status quo using economic power. Whereas in Northern Ireland, Catholics made up 35-40% of the population and essentially needed minority rights, or some kind of power-sharing arrangement, to protect them from a tyranny of the majority. The British system is based on proportional representation, and thus, had the Unionists not gerrymandered and manipulated institutions Catholics would have at least had some political access, which might have been enough to undermine the desire for independence. But the Protestants used every tool available to exclude Catholics from any political access through housing, voting, and economic power. Finally,
as mentioned previously, the character of the French unitary state meant that Corsicans were not viewed as distinct from other French citizens. The French government did not discriminate against Corsicans specifically, but by failing to recognize their differences and the fact that they lived on an island, separate from the mainland, and were a group of people that spoke a different language, was the equivalent of being discriminated against in the eyes of Corsicans.

Ultimately, the outcome, rather than the sources, of institutional repression was the focus, and when worldwide changes brought decolonization, all three groups self-identified, at least to some extent, as victims of colonialism where foreign, external, or minorities dictated political and economic decisions for them. Some Québécois related their economic disadvantage and the fact that they were the majority yet shut out of economic and political power, to colonized peoples in Algeria. Comparisons were made as well to ‘Nègres blancs d’Amérique’. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association modeled itself after the teachings of Martin Luther King, Jr. and saw itself as an extension of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. Corsicans made the least references to colonialism, but had a clear history of it. The English defeated the French in Canada; the British colonized Ireland, and the Corsica has been occupied continuously except for a brief period between 1755 and 1768 when they had independence.

After thoughtful case comparison and analysis, it is evident the Theory for Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism (TEST) maintains its integrity. There are

31 Pierre Vallières wrote Nègres blancs d’Amérique, autobiographie précoce d’un "terroriste" québécois in 1969, which translates to “White Niggers of America, an early autobiography of a Québécois ‘Terrorist’.”
some areas that require more research and more testing, and more of these will be highlighted below. But the TEST accurately describes the stages of evolution ethnic groups move through that can push marginal, violent, political entrepreneurs to center stage revolutionaries capable of destabilizing the state because of increased support from constituency groups. It also reveals the key root condition of limited political access (institutional repression) that sets the process in motion, as well as the trigger of agent-driven repression that pushes ethnic groups to respond to the state. Finally, the TEST offers feasible solutions to undermining terrorism: effective political participation in governance.

*Limitations of the TEST and this research*

The Theory of Ethnic Group Support for Terrorism has a few obvious limitations: first, it is focused on ethnic groups. It does not attempt to explain support for terrorism that does not appeal to ethnic constituency groups. For instance, explaining when and why Marxist terrorist organizations like the Red Brigades might or might not have support is beyond the scope of the TEST. Explaining why the Black Panthers or the KKK might get support or not is also beyond the scope of the TEST because race as a category is distinct from ethnicity, and while the TEST may be able to explain support for racial groups, it does not set out to do so, nor does the research compiled here suggest it can do this effectively. Second, the TEST is only concerned with domestic ethnic groups. It does not attempt to explain why transnational terrorist organizations get support. It cannot explain why diasporas fund insurgencies or terrorist organizations abroad, for instance, why Irish Americans funded and supported the
IRA. In addition, the TEST is focused on support at the outset of the conflict. Dynamics change once conflict between a state and an insurgent group becomes entrenched and the reasons terrorists gain support initially are not necessarily, nor likely the same as when they are sustained. For instance, after the initial phases of conflict, the IRA began to receive substantial resources and financial support from Irish Americans enabling them to sustain their activities potentially without the support of their constituency group. In addition, as terrorist organizations take on the role of quasi or parallel states, they often police their own communities and can use coercion and force to sustain their activities, making genuine support potentially less important.

In terms of the research done in this dissertation, the TEST was applied only in advanced democracies. Theoretically, these are least likely cases where ethnic groups should not have to turn to extra-legal and extra-institutional options because they are supposed to have peaceful avenues of change available to them. However, is possible that by virtue of being in a ‘democracy’ there is an expectation that they should have political access and thus, when they feel they do not, it becomes the source of contentious politics? This is to state that it is possible the TEST can only explain support for terrorism in democracies where groups anticipate having political access in the first place, and when it is limited or denied, then problems arise. In authoritarian regimes, there is no expectation initially of political participation, and being denied political access is the norm. The application of the TEST to three cases cannot resolve these questions and further research must be done, which will be discussed in the next section.
Areas of Future Research

The TEST should be applied to more cases, and across a wider variety of regime types and regions to determine its robustness. First, this preliminary testing reveals we need to understand more about institutional repression. The TEST looked at political access in state institutions generally, but which institutions matter more? This may become clearer as research is collected across different types of regimes. We may find that it needs to be expanded or altered to account for different expectations of governance. In an authoritarian regime that institutionally represses all ethnic groups equally, will terrorism still garner support? To what extent does relative repression matter? If one group is institutionally repressed, but to a less extent than the next group, will they still seek change through violence and terrorism? If agent-driven repression is continually present, as is the case in many non-democratic regime types, is there a different trigger? As well the TEST could be applied to other types of violence. Terrorism is but one tactic among many in efforts to bring about revolution. Are the conditions that provoke support for terrorism the same when the tactic is guerilla warfare? Because there has been so little research on the question of constituency group support, there are many directions future research should follow. What alterations could be made to account for racial groups rather than just ethnic groups? How can the TEST shed light on transnational terrorist organizations like Al Queda?

Policy Implications

The most relevant policy implication for the TEST concerns counter-
insurgency strategies. The TEST’s effectiveness in identifying the conditions under which people are driven to support terrorism enables us to then create effective counter-insurgency strategies. The two primary counter-insurgency strategies: ‘Hearts and Minds’, and ‘cost-and-benefit’ currently being employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, did not succeed in undermining support for terrorism in the West. This presents a major problem, as the ideological divide should be much narrower among groups within Western, advanced industrialized countries. According to the TWEED dataset, ethnic nationalist groups have waged 78.3% of terrorist attacks in the West since 1950. Ethnic nationalist groups like the IRA, ETA, and FLQ have historically not been interested in regime change; they are interested in leadership or structural change. The logic here is that it should be far easier to effectively counter insurgency in industrialized Western countries, where order is largely a given and basic security is guaranteed. Yet, Western governments have not been any more successful in eradicating homegrown insurgency than fighting insurgency abroad with approximately 16 terrorist/insurgent groups active for more than a decade in different places. Five of them kept up their struggle for more than 20 yrs. (Engene 2004, 73) The question that analysts and academics should be asking is, “if we can’t win using these strategies at home, what makes us think they are going to be useful abroad where the situation is exponentially more complicated by problems like permeable borders, small arms proliferation, cultural/linguistic
differences, high degrees of corruption, and warring neighbors?”

‘Hearts and minds’ analysts attribute insurgency to the trauma of modernization, the revolution of rising expectations, and Communist meddling. According to this approach, to comprehensively combat the potential for insurgency governments have to confront the two basic political problems behind it: bad administration and under-administration. In either case, the solution is reform—making governments law-abiding, administratively strong, and responsive. (Shafer, 1988) The Cost-benefit strategy assumes people are neutral and attempts to undermine insurgents by trying to provide the same benefits the insurgents are offering. Essentially, the cost-and-benefit strategy will also make the government ultimately more responsive or reformed as it is certain that whatever the insurgents are offering in exchange for popular support is something the people ultimately want. The main difficulty with both of these approaches is lack of focus – too broad and non-specific. It is simply not enough to aim for reformed administration, democracy, or better accountability. There needs to be more precision and guidance in counter-insurgency strategies.

There is an emerging sense among some US experts from RAND that much of what drives popular support for insurgency is local conditions and grievances (Long, 2006). The TEST responds directly to this and asserts that not only is it local conditions and local grievances, but in particular, it is the ability and opportunity to act within the system to change the conditions of the ethnic group: access to political power and freedom from institutional repression. Ethnic groups fundamentally desire the right to affect their own future, allocate their own
resources, make decisions for themselves and have autonomy. There is little in this research that suggests independence is a requirement; rather what is shown here is that effective political power and freedom from repression should be sufficient in quelling demands for secession and will effectively undermine support for violence, terrorism and insurgency.
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