From Marginalization to Bounded Integration

Reassessing the Compatibility of Religion and Democracy: A Comparison of the State-Religion Relationship in Turkey and Israel

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Abstract

There is an inherent tension in the relationship between religion and democracy. While religion generally adheres to a single ultimate set of values, democracy requires political tolerance and the recognition of the coexistence of several truths. This is why, both intuitively and according to influential theories of modernization, the separation of religion and the state has been seen as a pre-condition for successful democratization. Yet a comparison of Israel and Turkey challenge the validity of such alleged “truths.” This is because existing theories cannot adequately account for the dynamic nature of the state-religion relations. Israel, which assigned a formal role to religion in the state, was able to maintain stable democratic rule despite some major internal and external political challenges. Nevertheless, after three decades of constructive collaboration between the state and religious actors, the latter have increased their demands on the state in a manner that challenged the foundations of the regime, although so far the state has been successful in effectively containing them. In contrast, the Turkish state attempted to enforce strict secularization on society by marginalizing religion from public affairs through constitutional measures and military repression. Yet after eight decades trying, Turkish society remained far from being truly secular and the attempts to enforce secularism seriously undermined Turkish democracy.

To understand why this has been the case, the dissertation develops a model for the state-religion relationship, the *Bounded Integration Model* (BIM), that overcomes the over simplistic, static and deterministic nature of existing theories. The model demonstrates that religious actors should be understood as potential members in civil society, the dynamic interaction of which with the state determines the boundaries of civil society and the prospects for stable democratic governance.

The study concludes that there is a need to re-evaluate the relationship between the state and religion over time, and reconsider deterministic conclusions about the ability of some religions - Islam in particular - to peacefully co-exist with democratically governed states.
Abstract

Il existe une crispation inhérente de la relation entre la religion et la démocratie. La religion, pour sa part, adhère à un seul et unique code de valeurs, tandis que la démocratie, elle, nécessite une tolérance politique et l’acceptation de la coexistence de plusieurs vérités.

C’est pour ces raisons que non seulement intuitivement, mais également selon les théories influentes de la modernisation, la séparation de la religion et de l’État est regardée comme la pierre angulaire d’une démocratisation réussie. Toutefois, une comparaison entre l’Israël et la Turquie conteste la validité de ces présumées vérités, et ce, parce que les théories actuelles ne peuvent expliquer convenablement la dynamique de la nature des relations entre la religion et l’État. D’une part, l’Israël, consacrant au sein de l’État un rôle officiel à la religion, a été en mesure de maintenir un gouvernement démocratique stable malgré certains enjeux politiques, internes et externes, importants. Néanmoins, après trois décennies de collaboration fructueuse entre l’État et les acteurs religieux, ces derniers ont augmenté leurs demandes envers l’État de sorte qu’elles s’opposaient aux assises du régime; jusqu’à maintenant, l’État a toutefois réussi à les limiter. D’autre part, l’État turque a tenté d’appliquer une sécularisation absolue en marginalisant la religion des affaires publiques par l’entremise de mesures constitutionnelles et de répression militaire. Pourtant, après huit années de persévérance, la Turquie demeure loin d’être un État réellement laïque et les efforts déployés dans le but d’appliquer ce laïcisme ont grandement nui à la démocratie.

Afin de comprendre le pourquoi de tels aboutissements, la présente dissertation propose un modèle intitulé le Modèle d’intégration limitée (MIL) illustrant la relation entre l’État et la religion en palliant la nature simpliste, statique et déterministe des théories actuelles. Ce modèle démontre que les acteurs religieux doivent être considérés comme étant des membres potentiels de la société civile dont l’interaction dynamique avec l’État déterminerait les limites de la société civile et les aspirations à une gouvernance démocratique stable.

Cette étude conclue qu’une réévaluation de la relation entre l’État et la religion au fil du temps est nécessaire et remet en question les conclusions déterministes sur la capacité de certaines religions – notamment l’Islam – de pouvoir coexister en paix avec des États gouvernés démocratiquement.
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This research was conducted in two countries that are a lot more than mere case studies for me. Israel is my homeland and this research was motivated by a personal commitment to make it a better a more just place. I was lucky to be hosted at the Gilo Center for Democracy and Civic Education at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem which provided a pleasant working environment during my field research in Israel, for which I would like to thank its staff. Along this study I came to know Turkey in an intimate way. Turkey is one of the most fascinating places in the world, and its welcoming people made my research there a unique and unforgettable experience. I would like to express special thanks to Canan Aslan from Middle East Technical University for her tireless help in organizing contacts and interviews and to my dedicated friend and assistant Onur Kara for an invaluable work.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

George Washington, 1796

Recent events in the Middle East and the growing entanglement of religion in politics throughout the region focus new attention on the role religion might play in transitions to democracy and its impact on the stability of democratic regimes. For many decades, dominant theories such as modernization theory and the “clash of civilizations” have advocated the secularization thesis which argues that religion and democracy are incompatible - the former is about an ultimate divine truth whereas the latter is based on the peaceful coexistence of different truths and the art of bargaining and compromise. The policy prescription arising from this was straightforward: for democracy to flourish, religion should be restricted to the private sphere and separated from the political realm. Although recently there has been a significant change in attitude in some of the literature regarding the compatibility of religion and democracy (Stepan 2001, 2005; Anderson 2004; Pell 2004; Abou El-Fadl 2001; Hanafi 2002; Ibrahim 1998; Korany 1994; Masmoudi 2005; Yavuz 2006; Zartman 1992; Turam 2007; Elshtain 2009), the view that they are incompatible is still predominant among scholars and even more so among the general public.

Based on the Western experience after the enlightenment era, modern sociological and political theories assumed that modernization and secularization would cause the shrinking of religion’s role in societies, until it would ultimately disappear. This notion was widely shared by classic scholars like Durkheim, Comte, Marx, Freud, Weber, Lipset and Deutsch, to name just a few. Contrary to their prediction, however, this is far from being the case. Not only has religion not disappeared over time, but in some places it became even more central as a basis for political mobilization and as a core layer of identity (Juergensmeyer 1993, 1995, 2001; Jelen and Wilcox 2002; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Tazmini 2001; Marty 1997; Hefner 2001; Berger 1999; Tepe 2008).
The resurgence of religion is especially apparent in the Middle East. In the last three decades since the Iranian revolution and the collapse of ‘Pan-Arab’ ideology, societies in the region witnessed an impressive revival of religion in political terms. In some cases this resurgence is manifested in growing social base (The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia). In other places it is reflected in electoral success (*Hezbollah* in Lebanon, the *FIS* in Algeria, *Hamas* in the Palestinian Authority, the Justice and Development Party (*AKP*) in Turkey).

In some of these Middle Eastern societies, however, religious empowerment involves intolerance, violence, systematic disrespect for civil rights, and discrimination against women (Norris and Inglehart 2003). This reality might support those who advocate the misleading notion that democracy and religion are incompatible. Indeed, if we accept this assumption, the flourishing of political religiosity in the Middle East means that the future of democracy in the region is bleak. Nevertheless, as much as some of the present-day manifestations of religion are irreconcilable with democratic principles, it is not necessarily due to the nature of religions or their inherent contradiction with democratic values. Alternatively, the causal arrow might be the opposite - namely, that the centuries long western domination in the world and the strict imposition of a narrow western-based interpretation of democracy on non-western societies is the real reason for contemporary extremist manifestations of religion.

From this perspective, the varying experience of Israel and Turkey, the only two democratic countries in the Middle East, represents a paradox that begs explanation. Turkey adopted the western secular interpretation of democracy but despite decades of constant attempts, some of which highly repressive, to marginalize religion from public and political life, ended less democratic and far from being truly secular. Strict secularism required three decades-long undemocratic state-building, recurrent military interventions in politics and substantial violation of individual rights. Strikingly, though,

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1 Israel’s democratic regime was never interrupted since its establishment in 1948. Turkey had a non-democratic regime between 1923 and 1946 and since then was governed mostly democratically, except for four coups, after which the military governed the political system for short periods in 1960, 1971, 1980-82, and a soft coup in 1997. Particularly in the 1980s, however, the military is considered to have exercised an important veto over civilian policies. The limited democratic nature of Turkey is discussed in more detail in chapters 4-5.
state repression proved unable to eliminate the religious component from Turkish life, and religion in the contemporary Turkish society and politics is trendier than ever.

In opposition, Israel deviated from the all-encompassing western-based secular model of democracy, granted Jewish religion a central public role, and consequentially has been able to maintain stable democratic regime throughout its history. Nonetheless, after three decades of constructive relationship between the state and the religious population, the religious factions confronted the democratic system with extremist and abusive political behavior. One segment of the religious population, religious-Zionism, has turned from constructive collaboration with the state to territorial-expansionist policy and concentration on extra parliamentarian, often illegal, activities. The other segment of the religious population, the Haredi Ultraorthodox, has increased its leverage in the fragmented political structure and exploited the democratic regime for sectarian benefits at the expense of other groups in society. As of yet the inclusive nature of the Israeli system vis-à-vis the religious sectors has been successful in containing these mounting challenges and preserving a stable democratic system, but at one and the same time this interaction had a negative impact on the quality of the democratic regime and on intra-societal relationship.

The dynamic history of the state-religion interaction in Turkey and Israel embodies perplexing processes and outcomes that existing explanations cannot adequately account for. Comparing these two cases reveals some relevant, surprising and counter intuitive lessons that challenge most of the existing scholarship on the relationship between democratization, democracy and religion, which require a new theoretical approach to the study of religion in democratic settings. Offering and testing such a model is the main purpose of this research. Throughout this study I quest to fulfill that goal, by way of developing a more nuanced and dynamic theoretical model for the state-religion interaction – the Bounded Integration Model (BIM), and test its applicability in the cases of Turkey and Israel.

Towards a new conceptual model for the state-religion relationship
As I will demonstrate throughout this study, the varying experiences of Israel and Turkey in regard the state-religion interaction and its dynamic outcomes at different
points in time cannot be adequately explained by existing theories, primarily the secularization thesis, but also the inclusion-moderation and the twin tolerations theses. This implies that a new model for the state-religion relationship should be developed to overcome the insufficiency of old theories. Such a model should be composed of two ingredients – descriptive and predictive. On the descriptive level, the suggested model should be able to account for various outcomes in the relationship between the state and religious actors, ranging from mutual respect and support for democratic governance to clashes and mutual attempts to undermine each other. In addition, such a model should be able to explain the dynamic dimension of the interaction, something that is overlooked by most existing theories of religion and state. The predictive component of the model should facilitate assessments regarding types of interaction that are likely to support democratic governance as well as types of interaction that might undermine or challenge the democratic regime.

I shall begin with the first component. A new model for the state-religion relationship must overcome the static perspective that governs most existing theories. Most of the current research on the nature of the state-religion relationship treats it as constant (Jelen and Wilcox 2002; Huntington 1991, Lipset 1959; 1996; Smith 1970, 1971; Heper 1991; Lewis 2002; Stepan 2001). This perception fails to explain the evolving nature of the state-religion relationship in different contexts and led some dominant schools of thought such as Modernization Theory and the derived Secularization Thesis (Lipset 1959, Deutsch 1961), the Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1991), Orientalism (Lewis 2002), but also the more nuanced Twin Tolerations (Stepan 2001) to offer a somewhat simplistic and over-determined account of the role of religion on democracy. This stream of research neglects the dynamic, evolutionary and interdependent relationship between the state and religious groups within society – both of which are social actors that constantly shape and re-shape each other (Midgal 1988, 2001; Oxhorn 1995).

As such, existing theories are unable to explain the puzzle raised by the evolving nature of the state-religion interrelationship in Israel and Turkey. On the one hand, Israel challenged the common secularist prescription and was able to achieve and maintain better quality of democratic government than any other country in the region. On the
other hand, Turkey, which strictly followed the secularist agenda, was not able to achieve comparable levels of democratic stability and quality. To understand these outcomes, which seem to contradict dominant theoretical approaches to the subject, it is necessary to trace the dynamic relationship between each state and its respective society, and provide an analytical account of the significant changes that occurred in the state-religion relationship in these countries overtime. Existing theories cannot explain howcome religion was able to overcome the severe restrictions set upon it in Turkey, and to effectively challenge the secular elite in the political sphere, towards a more pluralist and democratic reality today, albeit without formal reflection of this change in Turkey's institutional and constitutional arrangements. Similarly, they fail to explain why an accommodating policy, which created a healthy balance and constructive collaboration between religion and state in the first two decades in Israel, was later subject to mounting attacks by extremist manifestations of Jewish religion, with clear negative effects on the quality of Israeli democracy, albeit without being able to break or substantially modify the democratic regime.

The perspective that this project offers is intended to explain these outcomes that run counter to existing theories' understanding of the relationship between religion and democracy. It does not view the relationship between the state and religion as a static uni-directional process that is simply either bottom-up or top-down and largely predetermined. The relationship is instead framed as being reciprocal and dynamic. It allows room for significant changes in it overtime depending on the political behavior of each actor and their mutual impact on each other. In addition, it also accounts for the ways by which structural and ideational changes in the surrounding environment might influence the state-religion interaction. Employing such an approach to the study of the state-religion relationship can help us understand the determinants of the mutual influence that the state and religion have on each other over time and reconsider deterministic conclusions about the ability of religion to peacefully co-exist with democratically governed states. In particular, such an approach “brings civil society back in,” emphasizes the ability of groups in civil society to affect their relationship with the state from below, claiming space in the political sphere and influencing political outcomes.
A sketch of a new dynamic model for the state-religion relationship requires clarification on four related issues (which I discuss in full details in the next chapter). First, we need to question the common assumption that religion and democracy are inherently incompatible, meaning that they can never peacefully coexist in a stable democratic political system. Second, it should be critically examined to what extent the western model of democracy with its particular emphasis on separation of state and religion (i.e. – secularization) is universally applicable, especially when it is introduced to (or rather imposed upon) societies that did not go through the European experience of gradual political, social and economic development associated with increasingly secular polities. If our answer to one or both of these questions is positive further discussion on the subject is unnecessary since employing such departure points cannot translate into policies that prescribe any formal role to religion in public life.

In what follows I attempt to show that these assumptions are at best weakly based in both theory and historical record. On the contrary, even though some inherent tension do exist between religion and democracy, there is solid evidence that creative solutions in different places in the world can facilitate the peaceful coexistence of the two in various contexts and that no clear correlation exists between level of religiosity and support for democratic values. Furthermore, democratic theory does not contain any specific prohibition on religion in the public sphere, and the western understanding of secularization is based on the West's particular and exceptional historical experience and should not necessarily be implemented in other places in the world with varying historical and cultural experiences. Hence, in contrast to the core assumption of the secularization thesis this study holds that diverse societies can develop non-secular yet stable types of democratic order in which religion is represented to some extent in the public and political spheres without violating the basic conditions of democracy.

The conceptual acceptance of non-secular types of democratic regimes is a necessary yet insufficient step. We still need to tackle two additional issues in order to draw an accurate outline of a model for the state-religion relationship. First, it is essential to underline the factors which shape newborn democracies' approach towards religion. This is important because it sets the starting point for the relationship and establishes strong path dependent arrangements and institutions that more often than not
will have enormous influence on how this relationship evolves over time. This dissertation suggests that the roots of state policies towards religion should be sought for in the pre-state or pre-democratic era and more particularly in the level of integration of religion in the ideology of the national movement, which is, in turn, shaped and determined by structural and ideational factors.

Most important in this respect are the status and political power of religion in the old regime and the ability of the national movement to create and mythologize an alternative national identity that underplays the religious component in the national character. The stronger the religious establishment in the old political order is, the more it is perceived as a threat to the new national movement and thus provides a strong incentive to exclude religion from politics, and vice versa. Likewise, the ability of the nationalist movement to construct a collective national identity without the religious component will provide the national leadership more incentive to downplay the religious identity. Finally, the model I propose in this study pays special attention to the moment of the foundation of the state because it is at this critical moment that the national movement's ideology, including the weight of religion in it, is translated to state institutions and policies which create path dependency with long term consequences on the role of religion in the state.

The cases of Israel and Turkey nicely reinforce the above suppositions. In a nutshell, the role granted to Islamic religion in the Turkish Republic in 1923 was an outcome of more than a century-long reform in the ill Ottoman Empire that endeavored, unsuccessfully, to undermine the entrenched role of Islam in the Empire and made it necessary for the Kemalist revolutionaries to take drastic measures to eliminate religion from the public sphere. Likewise, the role granted to Judaism in the Zionist movement and in the state of Israel was a product of decades of deliberation among factions in the Zionist movement about the role of religion and the realization of the Zionist elite that religious content must be amalgamated into the Zionist project as being the most efficient available recruitment tool of Jews from all over the world. The varying circumstances that confronted the Kemalist and Zionist elites during the time of the proclamation of the state led the former to take drastic measures to marginalize Islamic religion, and the latter to recognize religion in the state in a significant manner.
The last point relates to the method by which religious actors should be perceived in society and politics. The secularization thesis was dominant for many years and advocated the relegation of religion to the private realm. This is why no serious attempts were made in the past to analytically conceptualize the behavior of religious actors in the public sphere. Being loyal to a dynamic perspective, this research holds that religious groups are social actors that can either be accommodated into or excluded from civil society. Their participation in civil society is not random or voluntary, but rather is largely dependent on state policies towards them, the responses of these groups, and the evolving nature of their interaction. According to this perspective the state is pivotal in shaping the boundaries of civil society over time. In return, the strength and vibrancy of civil society, including religious segments in it, is an important facilitator and promoter of stable democratic governance. Such an approach confronts the underlying assumptions of the traditional school of civil society (Almond and Verba 1963) which sees civil society as a harmonious arena, based on individual preferences and one that exists in constant zero-sum-game conflict with the state. Alternatively, this study adopts the premises of a new understanding of civil society, one that sees it as an inclusive arena of disagreement between groups and collectivities in the state and does not assume consensual values, one that treats the interaction between the state and civil society actors as an open end dialog with changing outputs over time (Migdal 2001; Walzer 1992; Oxhorn 1995; 2006).

This latter point is important because it touches upon a serious shortcoming in the existing literature that views the relationship between the state and religion in a static and deterministic fashion, and neglects their dynamic and mutual interdependence. Only such a dynamic perspective can account for the changes that occurred in the state-religion interaction in Turkey and Israel overtime that ranged from collaboration to confrontation and from parliamentarian and legal to extra-parliamentarian and extreme forms of behavior. Correspondingly, only a dynamic perspective can explain the way by which external trends such as the Cold War, the Iranian Revolution, territorial expansions or peace negotiations might have influenced a modification in the interaction between religious groups and the state.
The descriptive component of the *Bounded Integration Model* is complemented by a predictive ingredient, namely, a proposition regarding the conceptual boundaries within which religious integration in the political and public spheres might support and promote a stable democratic order. As I will demonstrate throughout this work, the tendency of religion to monopolize the public discourse and impose its worldview on society can be mitigated effectively in democratic settings by demarcating conceptual boundaries to the role of religion in politics. The criteria for these boundaries should overlap with a minimalist list of democratic conditions, a full definition of which I provide in Chapter Two.

The current study holds, in contradiction to the prescription of the secularization thesis but also to that of the inclusion-moderation thesis, that granting religion official recognition within the confines of the procedural conditions of democracy, in societies where religion serves as an important layer of identity for the masses and where religious groups operate and represent the preferences of significant parts in society, might support democratic governance. This definition is flexible enough to allow a range of manifestations of religious inclusion, which might include some or all of the following: allocation of state resources for religious purposes, autonomous religious institutions, official religious symbols, public religious education and/or state funded religious education system and religious parties. At the same time, the role granted to religion in democratic societies should not be unlimited. The same criteria that guide the state in granting religion public recognition, namely the basic conditions of democracy, should also determine the maximum bound of this recognition. The preferences of the religious sectors in society should be respected only as long as their integration does not violate the minimalist democratic rights of other groups in the state to become part of civil society and participate in the political game, and without abusing the democratic system or resorting to unaccepted forms of dispute resolution or coercion.

More specifically, this study argues that in states where there is a significant religious population that seeks recognition and the right to express its worldview and defend its preferences in the public and political spheres, attempts to impose a western-type secular model of democracy will only impede transitions to democracy. Forcing a secularist agenda from above will alienate large segments of the population that cannot
freely advocate their worldview within civil society and politics. Alternatively, states that grant some role to religion in politics within the bounds of basic democratic conditions can strengthen their base of support and cooperation with civil society and consequently facilitate more democratic governance. Notwithstanding, the state must ensure that no religion exploits its political power at the expense of other, less privileged groups, leads to their exclusion from the civic arena, or occupies additional roles and powers to religion independently of the democratic political process.

Case Selection – Why Compare Israel and Turkey?

Israel and Turkey are appropriate candidates for comparison in this research for several reasons. Although the two cases are similar in many domestic factors, two different features and the relationship between them make this comparison useful and compelling. First, Israel and Turkey adopted very different policies towards religion. Second, they vary significantly in terms of their democratic stability precisely because of the first distinction. Israel maintained stable democratic regime since its creation while Turkey suffered several interruptions to democracy and military coups during the 20th century. These striking differences and the correlation between them across cases provide the theoretical puzzle of this study.

The difference between Israel’s and Turkey’s experiences with religion is illuminating. For different historical and structural reasons, the Zionist nationalistic movement and later the state of Israel gave Judaism a positive, formal role in their ideologies and policies, while the Kemalist nationalist movement and the Turkish state exercised a strict separation between state and religion, marginalizing Islamic culture and identity. These different strategies generated very different roles for religion as an identity and as a political tool, and had very distinct effects on democratization, which make each of these cases a good candidate for study and the comparison between them very telling.

Also, the two states are located in the same region of the world – the Middle East, and both of them are the only instances of democracy in this region (Diamond et al. 2003). This fact alone puts them in a unique and similar position, and the comparison between them very interesting on the regional level. Moreover, Palestine had
been a province of the Ottoman Empire for more than 400 years, and the two countries share some related and relevant historical experience. The most relevant point in this respect is that the British mandate in Palestine and later the State of Israel chose to adopt the *millet* system which grants autonomy to every religious community in society and was originally implemented in Palestine by the Ottoman Empire.

In addition, the establishment of the two states was the accomplishment of two successful national projects - Zionism and Kemalism - that borrowed national and modern agendas around the same period of time - late 19th and early 20th century - from the European intellectual discourse (Lewis 2002; Avinony 1981). Similarly, both national movements benefitted from an exceptional leadership that was manifested in the personalities and leadership skills of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and David Ben-Gurion in Israel, two men of rare qualities who set the foundations of their states and were central in dictating the initial arrangements of the state-religion relationship (Bar Zohar 1987; Mango 2008). Also significant is that the foundation of the two modern states was the ultimate outcome of a long and costly war of independence that consolidated the prominent status of their national leaderships and facilitated their long term rule over the state.

The two cases are also comparable in domestic features. Both Turkey and Israel are composed of a significant majority group that identifies itself with one religion – Judaism in the Israeli case and Sunni Islam in the Turkish case, and both countries had to deal, since their establishment, with a large minority group of another ethnicity/nationality that put forward demands for collective recognition by the state. In the Israeli case there is an Arab minority of approximately 20 percent of the population (1.4M people out of 7M). In Turkey there is a Kurdish minority of roughly the same percentage (12-14M people out of 70M). Both countries have dealt with these large minorities in ways that limit the quality of their democratic systems, albeit using different methods of treatment in each case (Smooha 2002; Doğu 2000; Peleg and Waxman 2007).

Furthermore, there are good reasons to compare the state-religion relationship despite variation on the religion level, especially when considering the commonalities between Judaism and Islam. Although the compatibility of Islam and democracy is
generally doubted, an Islamic state will not necessarily reject democratic governance. The Turkish experience demonstrates that Islam might be, under some circumstances compatible with democratic governance, especially after the rise of the Islamic AKP to power in democratic election in 2002. The same is true in other Muslim states such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Mauritania. Currently the Islamic Middle East is admittedly the region most resistant to democracy and modernization. But, it is not necessarily due to the nature of Islam (Bellin 2006; Diamond et al. 2003; Posusney-Pripstein and Penner-Angrist 2005; Zakaria 2004; Stepan 2001). Likewise, there is no reason to assume that Judaism will be supportive of democracy under every circumstance. Although people speak of Judaism as part of the West or the ‘Judeo-Christian Tradition,’ the apparently positive correlation between Judaism and democracy is not necessarily guaranteed. Recently for example, during and after the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip, there was a trend among some religious groups to criticize and challenge the democratic system of governance in Israel (Ben Meir 2005). Therefore, it is not the type of religion itself that determine its compatibility with democracy. Rather, it is determined by the specific circumstances and continuing dynamic interaction between the state and religion in different contexts (Schwedler 2001). In both Turkey and Israel, this relationship changed significantly over time and produced different experiences with democracy. The over determination of existing theories fails to grasp democratic transitions in the Islamic world or the changing role of religion in politics in different historical periods. This is where the dynamic model might serve as an effective instrument of analysis to explain trends in the state-religion relationship over time and account for changes in the role of religion in transitions to democracy.

Finally, Islam and Judaism share many doctrinal features. To begin with, both are based on practice and not on faith. These religions require their adherents to follow a comprehensive code of behavior as oppose to different strands of Christianity according to which faith need not necessarily be manifested in particular behavior. Both have a very detailed religious legal code – the Islamic Sha’ria and the Jewish Halakha - that regulates every aspect of life, including the political realm. In both there is no clear hierarchical order such as that that is found in Catholicism, and there is no clear distinction between the political and the spiritual spheres (Lazarus-Yafeh 2003; Fradkin
Also, both religions share many belief principles, ceremonies and traditions. A partial list of similarities includes: strict monotheism; dietary laws (Kosher and Halal); circumcision; rabbis and ulema that are scholars and theologians but no priests; both believe that Avraham/Ibrahim is the father of the faith, the owner of the Temple Mount/builder of the Ka’aba; Moses as a role model for Muhammad; same original direction of prayer to Jerusalem (Bunzl 2004, 7).

As I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation, The Bounded Integration Model is particularly suitable to analyzing the state-religion relationship in Israel and Turkey. In both these countries the relationship between the modern state and religion started very differently, witnessed considerable changes overtime, and in many ways resulted in opposite outcomes. In the late Ottoman Empire several factors, particularly the strength of religion in the old order and its opposition to cultural change, pushed the leadership of the nationalist movement to get rid of religious influence in the new order. Consequently, following its establishment in 1923, Republican Turkey applied the common Western prescription - modernization and democracy require secularism - and attempted to marginalize religion from state affairs by imposing secularism from above through constitutional measures and military repression. Nevertheless, after eight decades of often coercively enforcing this policy, Turkey remained far from socially secular with significant problems of democratic instability (Zürcher 2005; Liel 2003; Oniş and Keyman 2003; Rustow 1985; Cizre-Sakallioğlu 1996; Karaman and Aras 2000).

Despite recurrent restrictions on religion in Turkey, however, it only became socially and politically stronger. The most dramatic changes occurred in the last two decades. In 1996 the Islamic Refah party was elected to lead a coalition government for the first time in modern Turkey, though it was disqualified and removed from power by the military merely eight months later, in what is commonly referred to in Turkey as a “soft coup,” or The 28 February Process. Since 2002, however, with the ascendance to power of the Islamic AK Party, the secularist agenda and its defenders suffered recurrent defeats, the peak of which was the election of an Islamist figure - Abdullah Gül - for presidency in August 2007, and recurrent calls to alter the secular, military designed, 1982 Constitution.
Throughout Turkish Republican history religious actors have altered their behavior and strategies of engagement with the Kemalist state and were able to gain broad popular support and challenge the foundations of the Kemalist regime more effectively. Nevertheless, century old institutional arrangements and the Kemalist holding of political power proved very resilient and hard to break. Path dependency dictated merely conditional and informal tolerance of Islamic religion in Turkish politics and society. Whenever religious actors threatened the secular order the Kemalist establishment restricted religion by constitutional and coercive measures and never really allowed religious groups to openly and fully express their worldview and alter the political system in accordance with their preferences, within the accepted boundaries of the democratic regime. Today imposed secularism, the official state policy since the foundation of the republic, is still a significant barrier to formal integration of religion into state affairs and impedes the construction in Turkey of a meaningful pluralist democracy.

In contrast, underlying structural conditions dictated the early integration of religious content into the Zionist ideology. Consequently, despite Zionism being essentially a secular movement, post-independence Israel challenged the standard secularization thesis and chose to grant a formal role to religion in state affairs. Even though the state-religion relationship in Israel deviates from the common western prescription, arguably exactly because of it, since its establishment Israel has become more socially secular and was able to maintain stable democratic rule, despite some major internal and external political challenges (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1984; Smooha 2002; Arian 2005; Rustow 1985). By integrating religion into the public and political spheres Israel was able to develop a stable democratic regime and facilitate a relatively peaceful coexistence of secular and religious worldviews, at least during the first two decades following independence.

Notwithstanding the positive impact of the integration of religion in politics, the evolution of the state-religion relationship in Israel also reveals the dynamic engagement between religious actors and the state, and the dangers that might arise from distorting the delicate balance between them. In the Israeli case, the state-religion interaction should be divided historically into two distinct periods with different impact on the
democratic regime. The first period, between 1948 and 1967 was based on pre-state understandings between the dominant national movement and religious groups and was characterized by constructive collaboration, mutual respect, and stability between religious actors and the state. During this period most of the engagement between the state and religious factions had been within the boundaries of the law and through parliamentarian channels. Since 1967, following the Six Day War victory, and especially after 1977, following the collapse of Mapai’s (Israel's proto Labor Party) hegemony, religious actors have endeavored to occupy disproportionate power in the political sphere, and to violate the principles of democracy by coercing their narrow worldview on different realms of social life. While Israeli democracy has been able, so far, to contain these challenges in an effective fashion, and retain the democratic principles of the regime, they arguably eroded its quality.

The mounting challenges on the part of the religious sectors against the democratic state appeared in the domestic arena as well as in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Domestically, the relative moderation of Mafdal on religious issues and its genuine commitment to the state of Israel were replaced after 1977 by the opportunist behavior of the Haredi parties, which have exploited their political leverage in a malfunctioning political structure to legislate laws that strictly benefit their sectors while standing in contradiction to the preferences of the general public. These laws govern, among other issues, immigration, marriage and divorce, burials, military service and education, and establish different types of 'citizenship' in Israel as far as this term implies a cluster of rights and duties vis-à-vis’ both secular Jews and the non-Jewish populace. In terms of the Arab-Israel conflict, since 1967 the settler community has served as a greenhouse for militant and violent activities. Militant segments in this population established copious illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, have been involved in extreme manifestations of violence which peaked with the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995, and have conducted active, often violent, opposition against state authorities when the latter took measures to accelerate the peace process. This behavior demonstrates that, in opposition to common thinking, Judaism has the same radical and fundamentalist potential which can be found in other religions. Despite the challenges it posed to Israeli democracy, a major reason why it has been contained
successfully and failed to expand beyond the boundaries of relatively limited populations is the inclusive nature of Israeli democracy vis-à-vis the Jewish religion.

The lessons derived from the two cases challenge simplistic assumptions of existing theories about the conceptual relationship among democracy, modernization and religion. Turkey imposed secularization from above as a mean to modernization and democracy but this project failed in three respects. First, it was not able to secularize the population. Second, it failed to leave Islam out of politics. Third, this project did not facilitate democratic stability and required recurrent military involvement in politics in order to impose the secular order. In contrast, Israel rejected the secularist agenda, and was nevertheless able to maintain an unprecedented level of democratic stability in the region, even when considering its serious shortcomings. While later developments confronted the democratic regime in Israel with mounting religious challenges, it has so far managed to contain them in a successful way. These rather counter-intuitive outcomes beg a new conceptualization of the role of religion in democratic politics, and support the application of the Bounded Integration Model as a descriptive and predictive tool of analysis for the dynamic interaction between the state and religion. Comparing the dynamic relationship between the state and religion, how it evolved over time, and its impact on democratization processes in Turkey and Israel, by utilizing the Bounded Integration Model, sheds light on our understanding of the state-religion relationship and its influence on democratization more generally, and may assist in predicting under which circumstances this relationship is likely to support democratic governance.

Structure of Dissertation

The rest of this work in arranged in the following order. In the second chapter I develop the core premises of the Bounded Integration Model and show how it accounts for the state-religion relationship overtime, their impact on the boundaries of civil society and on the development of stable pluralist democracy. The remainder of this dissertation will test and apply the Bounded Integration Model to the cases of Turkey and Israel. Each case is discussed in three consecutive chapters that correspond to three chronological epochs.
Chapters three through five explore the Turkish experience. Chapter three presents the conditions in the pre-republican Ottoman Empire that determined the role of Islamic religion in the Turkish Republic. Chapter four discusses the non-democratic phase of Turkish politics which stretched between 1923 and 1950 and was, to a large extent, a necessary product of the Kemalist program to impose secularism on society from above. The fifth chapter deals with the democratic phase in Turkish politics, between 1948 and 2007. It demonstrates how Islamic religion was able to curve its place in Turkish politics, despite assertive attempts by the Kemalist establishment to contain its growing social and political power, and how this interaction changed the strategies of engagements of religious actors with the state in recent years which brought religious parties to political power in a formally secular regime.

Chapters six through eight discuss the evolving relationship between the state and religious actors in Israel. The sixth chapter covers the emergence of the Zionist movement in the late 19th Century and the factors that influenced the role that this movement chose to grant to Jewish religion in its ideology and institutions, first in diaspora and later in the institutions of the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv). In the Seventh chapter I investigate the arrangements that organized the role of religion in the newborn State of Israel and the positive impact they had on the sustainability of a stable democratic regime in the first two decades following Israel's independence. The eighth chapter demonstrates how changes in the role of religion due to changing political and security circumstances between 1967 and 1977 subverted the constructive collaboration that characterized the state-religion interaction, produced mounting challenges by the religious publics against the state, and the manner by which the latter has managed to effectively contain them within the boundaries of democracy.

In the ninth chapter I assess the applicability of the Bounded Integration Model as a tool of analysis and provide, based on the findings from Israel and Turkey, some general lessons about the role of religion in democracies as well as possible paths for future research.
Chapter 2: Re-conceptualizing the Role of Religion in Democratic Regimes:
From Marginalization to Bounded Integration

For almost two centuries the so called 'secularization thesis' that was born in the enlightenment era had been the dominant and a widely shared assumption among scholars and the common public alike when the intersection between religion and politics was considered. This thesis was derived from modern liberal thinking and the conviction that scientific and positivistic values would replace the role of religion in the modern era and would bring with it the eventual disappearance of religion from public life. But secularization being a natural product of modernization was only part of the story. In many places the national elite reversed the causal arrow of the secularization thesis and attempted to impose secularization from above. The guiding principle of this policy was the belief that restricting religion and isolating it from the public sphere would assist in modernizing their societies faster. This theory, however, has been under growing attack recently given the surprising convergence of two parallel yet simultaneous processes – rapid modernization together with the resurgence of religion throughout the globe. These two trends produced social and political phenomena that the secularization thesis was unable to explain and thus made the latter unintelligible. This surprising advancement did not skip Turkey and Israel. Both countries experienced an impressive growing popularity of Islam and Judaism in recent decades, respectively, in both political and social parameters, together with fast modernization during the second half of the 20th Century.

The resurgence of religion as an identity and political force, in spite of the sweeping assumptions about its inevitable demise, brought some prominent scholars to acknowledge the fallacy of the secularization thesis and the need to re-conceptualize the relationship between religion and the public sphere in democratic settings. Peter Berger, a renowned sociologist and an advocate of the secularization thesis during the 70s admitted a decade ago that:

The assumption that we live in a secularized world is false…This means that the whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled
"secularization theory" is essentially mistaken. In my early work I contributed to this literature. I was in good company – most sociologists of religion had similar views… (Berger 1999, 2)

In the same fashion, the keynote speaker at the 2008 annual lecture in Washington, in memory of Seymour Martin Lipset, Jean Bethke-Elshtain, concluded her lecture with the following comment:

The secularization hypothesis has failed and failed spectacularly. We must now find a new paradigm that will help us to understand the complexities of the relationship between religion and democracy (Elshtain 2009, 16).

Indeed, the secularization thesis failed both as an analytical tool as well as in its predictive capability, at least in regard the non Western world. Yet, even among western countries, where the secularization thesis was developed, its applicability is subject to disagreement (Neuberger 2002; Stepan 2001). This is especially true regarding the thesis's underlying assumptions about the relationship among societies, states and religions in modern democratic setting, that are oversimplified, static, deterministic and insensitive to contextual differences. This leaves students of religion and politics with an important task of filling this theoretical vacuum with an alternative conceptualization of the interaction between religion and politics and its political consequences.

This is the primary goal of this chapter. In what follows I develop an alternative framework for understanding the interaction between religion and state in democratizing societies. This alternative approach will be useful and persuasive only if it overcomes the main shortcomings of the secularization thesis - namely, its static, deterministic and dichotomous view of the relationship between religion and state as two isolated realms that are in inherent conflict, and consequently its extreme prescription that negates any possibility of accommodating religion in the public and political spheres.

In order to achieve this goal four related propositions, each of which touches a different aspect of religion-state relationship in democratic societies, will be suggested:
1) *Religion and democracy are not inherently incompatible* - despite the fact that some tension exists between the two, under certain circumstances they can peacefully coexist.

2) *The western model of democracy is not universally applicable* - The Western model of democracy with its particular emphasis on separation of state and religion (i.e. – secularization) is neither universally applicable nor solidly grounded in democratic theory, especially when it is introduced to (or rather imposed upon) societies that did not go through the European experience of gradual political, social and economic development associated with increasingly secular polities.

If either propositions 1 or 2 cannot be established, further discussion on the subject is unnecessary, since such guiding principles (i.e. those of the secularization thesis) cannot translate into policies that tolerate some role to religion in public life. Below I intend to argue and demonstrate that the core assumptions of the secularization thesis - according to which religion is incompatible with democracy and that the secular western model of democracy is universally applicable - are at best weakly based in both theory and historical record. On the contrary, although some inherent logical tension exists between religion and democracy, solid evidence suggests that creative solutions can facilitate peaceful coexistence of the two in various contexts and that no clear correlation exists between personal religiosity and support for democratic values. Also, democratic theory does not contain any specific prohibition on religion in the public sphere. The western understanding of secularization is based on the West's particular and exceptional historical experience and do not necessarily apply to other places in the world that had varying historical and cultural experiences, without contextual adjustments.

Further, after facilitating some role for religion in the public sphere two additional propositions need be addressed in order to fully grasp the complex and dynamic relationship between religion and the state in democratic societies and be able to offer an adequate model to describe and analyze it:

3) *The Role of religion in the state depends on structural and ideational factors and is shaped prior to the establishment of the state* - I suggest that the roots of state policies towards religion should be sought for in the pre-state or pre-democratic era
and more particularly in the status granted to religion in the ideology of the dominant political movement, which is shaped by structural and ideational factors. Most important in this respect are the extent to which religion is embedded in the old regime and the ability of the national movement to create and mythologize an alternative yet persuasive national identity that undermines the religious element. The foundation of the state is viewed here as a critical moment because it translates the national movement's ideology, including the role of religion, into state policies and institutions, and creates path dependent structures with long term ramifications on the role of religion in the state and the relationship between the two parties.

4) Religious actors are potential members in civil society- After establishing that religion can play some role in democratic politics as well as identifying the root sources of the relationship it still remains to determine what is the proper analytical prism through which the interaction of religion and state be analyzed. Since the secularization thesis was dominant for many years, no serious attempts were made to offer a theoretical prism for the role of religion in state affairs. The presence of religion in politics has been understudied and neglected for decades in political science (Wald and Wilcox 2006). This research suggests that religion, or more accurately its social representations, should be viewed as social actors that can either be accommodated into or excluded from civil society. Their participation in civil society is not entirely voluntary, but rather is largely dependent on state policies towards them, the responses of these groups, and the evolving nature of this relationship. This reflects a theoretical perspective that views the state as pivotal in shaping the boundaries of civil society over time. In return, the strength and vibrancy of civil society is an important facilitator and promoter of stable democratic governance. This latter point is important because it touches upon a serious shortcoming in the existing literature that views the relationship between the state and religion in a static and deterministic fashion, and neglects their dynamic and mutual interdependence.

After basing the abovementioned propositions I will offer a dynamic descriptive model that enables better understanding of state-religion interaction and its ongoing influence on democratization processes in different contexts. Finally, I will add a predictive
dimension to this model by conceptualizing the boundaries within which the state-religion interaction is likely to support the democratic regime.

(I) Religion and democracy are not inherently incompatible
Before basing the proposition in the title, providing a clear definition of ‘democracy’ and its conceptual boundaries are a necessary first step. Democracy is one of the most complicated, multi-faceted and disputed terms in the discipline. The complexity of the concept and its contested meaning led to considerable confusion regarding its definition. Also, the label ‘democracy’ provides a stamp of legitimacy to political regimes, and therefore in many cases it is used and exploited for purposes of legitimating regimes that are very far from meaningful democratic governance (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond 1996; Zakaria 1997).

What is the basis according on which democracy should be defined? Huntington argues that democracy has been defined in the literature in three different ways – 1) as an accepted set of procedures; 2) according to its desired goals, and; 3) according to its source of authority. The latter two have been found very problematic, and consequently the procedural definition is the most commonly used one (Huntington 1991).

Robert Dahl was the first to provide a sound definition of procedural democracy (Dahl 1971, 3). This definition includes the following components:

- Freedom to form and join organizations; freedom of expression; right to vote; eligibility for public office; right of political leaders to compete for votes and support; alternative sources of information; free and fair elections; Institutions

2 Going into an elaborate discussion about the difficulties arising form the two other types of definitions of democracy is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to note that both of them are dependent on unique historical-cultural contexts and particular sets of values. With regard to the goals of democracy there is wide disagreement on the economic goals of democracy. Some believe that democracy is a vehicle for alleviating high levels of socio-economic inequality, and thus should intervene in the market (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998; Karl 2003). Others argue that democracy should be detached from the market as much as possible (Hayek 1944; Friedman 1962). Still others argue that true democracy requires wide redistribution of resources that will achieve equality in society (Petras and Vieux 1994). With regard to the source of authority, difficulties arise as well. While democracy is widely considered a system in which the people are sovereign, several scholars argue that because of inherent deficiencies in democracy the masses do not really have a significant input on state policies (Schumpeter 1944).
for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference;

This list of conditions was later extended by Schmitter and Karl with two additional procedural conditions that are most relevant when the role of religion is considered: First, that democracy must respect the political autonomy of elected authorities, and second, that democracy should guarantee the independence of domestic political regimes from external influences (Schmitter and Karl 1991). These additions are instrumental when religion is considered due to religious actors' tendencies to seek undemocratic veto powers that do not necessarily reflect the preferences of the electorate, as well as take into consideration extraterritorial demands and preferences that stem from transnational religious interests and might not be in line with the results of the democratic process.

Another crucial theoretical argument regarding the uniqueness of democracy compared with other political regimes is a high level of uncertainty about the results of the political process or what Adam Przeworski (1986) calls ‘institutional uncertainty’. Przeworski argues that meaningful democracies should allow an open-ended political result. All ideological streams and political actors that agree to abide by the democratic procedures are accepted and the principal actors in the political game collaborate with and respect this notion of uncertainty. Conversely, in non democratic regimes the political result is either fixed or strictly limited by unelected actors and without deliberation. This lack of uncertainty of outcomes makes the electoral process meaningless or reduces it to being a marginal vehicle for political change (Przeworski 1986). Przeworski’s conceptualization of democracy is especially important because it explicitly rejects any predetermined substantive content that limits the capability of the political process to facilitate an open ended result.

The definition of democracy that I use throughout this research is comprised of Dahl's characteristics together with the additions set forth by Schmitter and Karl, and Przeworski. This definition has considerable advantages. It is widely used; it is relatively abstract and applicable in different social and cultural contexts including potential acceptance of religion in politics; it provides a universal standard to assess the level of
democratization in society (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Plattner 1998). As such, it is applicable to almost every political context, allowing for comparison across cases and generalizable conclusions. Moreover, while this definition is procedural, its conditions imply some important substantive rights, such as equality, freedom of speech, freedom of association and others.

Another possible and more recent conception of democracy is *liberal democracy*. According to Larry Diamond, the definition of liberal democracy largely overlaps with Dahl’s definition but there is an important difference between the two. In an attempt to correct the widely criticized over-procedural nature of Dhal’s definition, this definition elaborates more explicitly on the substantive elements of democracy such as the rule of law, equality, and protection of civil and minority rights (Diamond 1996, 23-24). What striking is that nowhere in either the 'procedural' or 'liberal' definition of democracy is there any restriction on the relationship between the state and religion, as long as individual rights, including freedom of religion, are respected. In these definitions secularism is not emphasized or even mentioned as a fundamental or necessary component of democracy.³

Indeed, the conceived incompatibility of democracy and religion can hardly be found in democratic theory. Rather, it is a result of exceptional western social and political development. Secularization was a product of modernization and the enlightenment in Western Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries. Together with secularization came the first wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). This simultaneous process of secularization and democratization led many scholars, like Tocqueville (2003), Lipset (1959, 1994), Smith (1970) and Huntington (1996), to argue that the presence of religion in the public sphere is a barrier to democracy. Even today there are scholars who suggest there is empirical correlation between societal secularization, modernization, and democratic governance (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Though both secularism and democracy stem from the ideas of the enlightenment era, the simultaneous development of secularization and democratization in the western

³ A survey of other definitions of democracy suggests that secularism as a precondition for democratic governance is also absent in other yet similar, offered definitions of democracy like those of Arend Lijphart (1999), Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996), and Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens (1997), to name just a few.
world was coincidental rather than necessarily interrelated. Nevertheless, it served as a very compelling support for arguing a strong connection between the two. This made leading scholars mistakenly perceive the two independent processes as inherently intertwined.

In his canonical text, *Political Man*, S.M. Lipset argued that one of the most important facilitators of democracy is the ability to develop what he calls “a secular political culture” (Lipset 1959, 89). Further, Lipset suggests that with the exception of Protestantism, which is more accepting of the segregation between the public sphere and the spiritual realm, “As long as religious ties reinforce secular political alignments, the chances for democratic give-and-take, and compromise, are weak” (Lipset 1959, 93). This line of thought is not unique to Lipset. Many scholars view religion in the public sphere as a barrier to the consolidation of democracy (See, for example, Najjar 1958; Smith 1970; Huntington 1991, 1996; Fradkin 2005a). Within this context, Islam is thought of by many scholars to be the religion most resistant to democracy. This is for the simple reason that historically, unlike the Church in Europe, there was no separation between the political and the spiritual leadership in the Islamic tradition, starting from the Prophet Mohammad onwards (Zartman 1992; Najjar 1958; Heper 1991; Lewis 2002). Some other major religions, however, such as Catholicism and Hinduism, were also perceived in the past to be largely incompatible with democracy and modernity (Nandy 1997; Madan 1997; Smith 1970; Lipset 1994).

It is true that, on the theoretical level, some logical tension exists between religion and democracy. No religion is entirely compatible with democracy. Democracy assumes relativity, the coexistence of several truths and the wisdom of the multitude in determining the common good. It therefore requires tolerance, acceptance of diverse perspectives towards life and a continuous pluralistic bargaining process between different groups in society. In contrast, every religion, especially the monotheistic ones, assumes an ultimate truth, manifested in a religious legal code and a set of divine

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4 This Protestant exception is in line with the most well known study of Max Weber – *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), in which Weber argues that the separation of the political and spiritual spheres is typical to Protestantism, as oppose to other religions, and is a key determinant of its accommodation with democracy.

5 In some religions this code is more complete and detailed than in others and regulates every aspect of life, including diet, personal status, prayers social obligations, etc. the extent to which a religious code is
imperatives that are absolute and not open to bargaining or compromise. As opposed to political practices, religious truth is preordained and is not dependent on the contemporary will of the people. It is determined by god and interpreted by religious scholars in a manner that isolates it almost entirely from public deliberation. Indeed, “Religion, at least the religion of the Abrahamic traditions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam), stresses moral absolutes. But politics is all about compromise” (Zakaria 2004, 13).

As I suggested above, however, secularism appears nowhere in accepted definitions of democracy as a theoretical requirement for democracy and there is no evidence that non-secular types of democracy cannot exist. In contrast, the historical experience demonstrates that this tension can be mitigated in practice. Around the world, countries with majorities from all three Abrahamic religions - from Italy, Britain and Chile, through Israel, to Bangladesh and Indonesia - were able to develop a framework to accommodate religion with political tolerance, civility and democratic governance. The same is true in countries with non-monotheistic religions - India is a prime example among them. This reality suggests that various religions can peacefully coexist in plural societies under democratic governance and are by no means strictly incompatible with democracy. Today there are many theoretical arguments and empirical indications that religion can be, at least under certain circumstances, compatible with democratic governance. On the empirical level, the best example of a shift towards democracy within a religion is Catholicism in Latin America. Until the 1960s the Catholic Church was a conservative political force and a barrier to democratization, but during consecutive decades it played a pivotal role in transition to democracy and resistance against authoritarian regimes throughout the continent (Oxhorn 1995; Cook 1994; Cleary 1985; Gill 1998; Fleet and Smith 1997). Similar evidence exists for other religions as well. A study by Richard Rose on Muslim and Russian-Orthodox attitudes towards democracy in Central Asia shows that religious belief has much less an impact on attitudes towards democracy compared with level of education and socioeconomic status (Rose 2002). Another study, by Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao, demonstrates that detailed determines whether a religion is based primarily on belief or on practice. In the case of the monotheistic religions Islam and Judaism are practice religions while Christianity is a belief religion.
impressive majorities in Middle Eastern states, many among whom are observers of Islam, believe that democracy is a good/best type of governance (2005).

Also, on the theoretical level, in both philosophy and theology, many scholars and clerics have suggested that the teachings of different religions can be interpreted in a manner that does not reject democratic governance, but rather complements and supports it (Stepan 2001; Anderson 2004; Pell 2004; Gülen 2001; Abou El-Fadl 2001; Hanafi 2002; Ibrahim 1998; Masmoudi 2005; Yavuz 2006). Over time, common interpretations of different religions change and make them more or less receptive to pluralism and democracy (Anderson 2004). Huntington admits, for instance, that one of the main reasons for the third wave of democratization in the 1970s and 1980s is the changing attitude of the Catholic Church towards democratic governance and human rights after the Vatican II Council (Huntington 1991).

In conclusion, in the last two decades or so there has been a significant shift from complete negation of the compatibility of democracy and religion towards a more sensitive approach, one that recognizes a variety of possible teachings in every religion, some of which compatible with democracy. Consequently, the emerging theoretical frontier is no longer how to limit and decrease the power of religion in democratization processes, but rather how to promote those voices in religion that might support democratization processes. Support for or opposition to democratization processes of religious groups is not predetermined but rather is dependent to large extent on the dynamic and evolving interaction between the state and religious segments in society. What it also suggests is that in exploring the reasons for the state-religion relationship in different contexts the specific doctrinal content of each religion is less important than the political and social circumstances that determine the political give and take between the state and its institutions on the one hand and the representatives of religion on the other hand.

(II) The western model of democracy is not universally applicable
If secularization is not based in democratic theory, how can we account for it being commonly accepted as a core principle of democracy? The answer for this is rooted in what can be referred to as European exceptionalism. The unique historical experience of
the West with Christianity led to a common, yet misleading, acceptance of secularization as a core element of democracy. This emphasis on secularization unjustifiably narrowed the conceptual boundaries of democracy and the applicability of democratic governance to societies in which religion plays an important social role. In some cases, attempts to impose this model led to considerable problems in the implementation of democracy, generating resentment towards this system of governance and alienating significant segments in society from active participation in civil society and the democratic process (Tilly 2004; Stepan 2001; Nandy 1997).

In the West, the process of secularization and democratization emerged through struggles among the state, the religious establishment, elites and the masses. Societies in Western Europe and North America gained independence and were able to develop politically, relatively without external interference. Although there are slight variations among different countries in the West, especially in terms of electoral systems, constitutional content and institutional designs, the institutional basis of western democracy is quite similar (Diamond 1996; Carothers 1997). The process of developing the western democratic model was slow and gradual and took place simultaneously with significant trends towards modernization – industrialization, secularization of the populace, nationalism, higher levels of education, economic development, urbanization and the emergence of a solid middle class (Bendix 1964; Eisenstadt 1976; Moore 1966; Tilly 1998, 2004; Lipset 1959; Deutsch 1961). In the view of many scholars, one of the core principles of this model is secularism - the separation of politics and religion. This principle reflects the unique European experience that included recurrent struggles for social control between the European states and the Catholic Church (Costopoulos 2005; Heper 1991). The agreement of Westphalia in 1648 signified the height of this conflict and a shift of political and social dominance from the Church establishment to the aristocratic elite that later established the archetypes of secular nation states.

This process was absent in the rest of the world, which was largely colonized by the Western powers. The colonial period ended when the colonized countries were

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6 This Eurocentric view of sociopolitical phenomena is by no means unique to democratization and secularization. As Anthony Smith nicely demonstrates, until recently the study of nationalism was almost entirely based on the European experience, making it less accurate a concept in the study of non-European societies (Smith 1984). Similarly, the study of civil society is dominated by a Eurocentric approach thus making it less applicable to non-western, non-democratic societies (Oxhorn 2006).
liberated by either being granted independence, or through violent struggles. In any event, they did not go through the same gradual path of determining their political rules of the game. In many regions, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East, the new states did not become de-facto independent in managing their internal affairs. The great-powers of the time still exercised their influence and intervened in local politics in accordance with their political interests.

The unique social development of Europe led European societies to amalgamate secularism and the secularization of the public sphere into their understanding of democratic governance. For them democracy meant, in essence, secular democracy. Other possible democratic practices that do include the secularization of the public sphere were simply overlooked and disregarded.

Nevertheless, after the western model was consolidated, the European colonizers exported and promoted it throughout the world as the only viable democratic model. When the colonial era ended in the 19th and 20th centuries, the European countries imposed their model of democracy on the previously colonized societies (Tilly 1991). They did not let their former colonies develop their own particular systems of government or type of democracy, but rather insisted on the strict emulation of the western model, including its embedded secularist agenda. The newborn states in the developing world had no other choice but to fully accept the European model or reject it altogether. As Tilly argues,

Northwest powers did not simply provide prestigious models of democratization; they often imposed those models…Regimes did not simply choose the most attractive forms of democratic government, but responded to strong international pressure” (Tilly 2004, 246-7)

As a result, states and societies in the developing world adopted forms of governance that did not match their cultural and societal characteristics (Madan 1997; Nandy 1997). Attempts to export the western democratic model without making necessary contextual adjustments often resulted in failure and generated fierce critiques. These countries were forced to either adopt the Western model as is without adjusting it to fit their specific cultural and historical content or give up on democracy and instead
develop undemocratic types of government as an expression of their independence from western influence. This is especially true regarding the role of religion. In several Middle Eastern counties, such as Egypt, Iran and Algeria, the struggle for acknowledging the role of religion in society and politics was tied to the struggle against western domination and neo-colonialism.

Some scholars argue that the western model of democracy might not be suitable in other parts of the world in which different traditions and cultures prevail. In terms of cultural heritage, Daniel Bell argues that Confucian values and traditions serve as a legitimate moral framework for the development of political regimes in South Asia that are not inferior to western democracy (Bell 2006). More generally, countries that have experienced a distinct historical process might conceive the appropriate relationship between state and religion differently. In many non-western countries there is longing for a genuine new fusion of religion and politics that is free of western ideological dominance (Juergensmeyer 1993; Nandy 1997). A study by Mark Tessler and Eleanor Gao on support for democracy in the Middle East shows that a solid majority of Middle Easterners supports democratic governance, yet about half of them would like to see an “Islamic democracy” - a democratic regime in which religion plays a significant formal role (Tessler and Gao 2005, 91). Similarly, Robert Hefner found that most Muslims in Indonesia, an emerging democracy and the largest Muslim country in the world, “continue to look to their religion for principles of public order as well as personal spirituality” (Hefner 2001, 493).

Moreover, despite the common perception about the necessity of secularization for democracies and its acceptance as an axiom in the western world, the majority of western countries do not strictly follow the prescriptions of the secularization thesis. There is actually a great diversity in the practice of separation between the religious and the political spheres in the western world. In fact, what is commonly understood as the Western model does not even properly describe western societies. Strict separation of state and religion is present as a constitutional principle in the American and the French systems. In Portugal, religiously based political parties are prohibited. But these are the exceptions rather than the rule. Aggregating data about Separation of Religion and State (SRAS) from 152 states between 1990 and 2002, Fox demonstrates that SRAS exists
only in only 22.3% of the cases when employing the most lenient definition of SRAS, whereas in the rest of the world there is some form of engagement between state and religion, and Government Involvement in Religion (GIR) is found to be substantial throughout the globe (Fox 2008, 101). In most of Europe there is a varying degree of acceptance of religion in the public sphere. In Six West European states – Denmark, Finland, Greece, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom – there is an established formal religion. In other countries, such as Holland, Austria and Germany, religiously based political parties are allowed and religious education programs are substantially funded by the state (Stepan 2001, 219-220; Neuberger 2002). Surprisingly, with the exception of the USA in most western countries there is funding for religious education, collection of religious taxes, government funding of clergy and a governmental department of religious affairs (Fox, 2008, 107).

What all of this suggests is that democracy is not a unified system of governance but rather a set of general principles that can be modified in any society as long as the specific model does not violate the general characteristics of democracy that were mentioned above. This, in turn, requires that the discussion shift from compliance of societies with a fixed model towards understanding how the basic procedural model and the principles it entails can be adapted to particular societies, both western and non-western alike.

Figure 1.1 below illustrates the difference between the two conceptions of democracy. In the upper box, the western model of democracy is seen as being narrow, rigid and insensitive to contextual specificity. It requires various societies to adopt a single model of democracy, one that imposes the secularization of the public sphere. This conception follows the reasoning of modernization theory, according to which there is one universal path towards development and democratization and the only way to achieve it is by strictly following the experience of those who already succeeded (i.e. western countries) (Deutsch 1961; Lipset 1959; Fukuyama 1989). In contrast, the lower box defines democracy in a more abstract, general and transferable way that respects the procedural and normative foundations of the concept. It adopts a framework of core principles (in accordance with the definition suggested above) that necessarily needs to
be adapted to fit into different contexts. It assumes that there is more than one single path towards development and democracy.

A possible adjustment is to allow some role for religion in democratic regimes, namely – accepting non-secular forms of democracy. Adopting the narrow conception of western democracy mistakenly requires the secularization of society and the public sphere. Conversely, accepting the conception offered in the lower box allows for a specific design of the relationship between state and religion in a manner that can best support the desired outcome of a stable democratic regime, without violating the basic requirements of democracy. This suggests that in certain societies it is not only possible, but perhaps even necessary to construct rules and policies for a democratic political system in which religion is not separated from the public and the political spheres, but instead plays a formal significant role in politics.

**Figure 1.1: Current and suggested democratic model in different contexts:**

(III) Identifying the roots of religion's role in the state

In the above discussion I have shown that in spite of the western emphasis on secularism and the analytical tension that exists between religion and democratic governance it is
not impossible to conceive some role for religion in democratic regimes and accept non-secular types of democracy. The next step is to understand what influences the initial standpoint of national leaderships towards religion. In other words, a key to understanding the dynamics between the state and religion is to provide an explanation for why some newly democratizing regimes choose to integrate religion into their politics while other prefer, and take measures to, get rid of it and restrict it to the private sphere.

In the study of nationalism, not much has been written about the factors that shape the construction of national ideology. On the two extremes one can find the primordialist view, according to which the nation is a perennial, organic social group whose history and ideology are fixed (Grosby 2000; Armstrong 2000), and the constructivist view, according to which nationalities are modern and imagined communities with identities and ideologies that are constantly invented and totally fluid (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 2000; Kedourie 1994). These approaches do not specifically investigate what determines the content of national ideologies because, according to primordialists, there is no selection of ideological content except what is an integral part of the nation’s true history and core values, and according to constructivists every “history” and components of “identity” can be incorporated into the invented nation.

The instrumentalist and ethno-symbolic approaches offer a more sophisticated argument according to which nations predate the modern era but are nevertheless fluid to some extent. Also, they contend that elites do manipulate ethnic and national symbols to some extent in order to pursue their national goals. In that, national elites take the role of, what Jan Kubik calls cultural entrepreneurs (Kubik 2003). But the spectrum of symbols, histories and values they choose from is limited and dependent on their long cultural and religious history (Smith 2008; Roshwald 2006; Marx 2003; Hastings 1997). 'Usable pasts' that are more central in the collective memory and identity of the masses are more likely to be incorporated into the national ideology, because they are easier to identify with and thus serve more effectively as bases of support and recruitment tools (Smith 2000, 1997; Kubik 2003; Kaufman 2001; Brass 1979; Kolás 1996). Moreover, different national movements throughout the globe, ranging from Slovaks to Mexicans...
to Irish, anchor their national ideology in what Anthony Smith calls the nation's *Golden Age* – a perceived glorious epoch in the history of the nation during which the nation flourished in territorial, economic or cultural terms (Smith 1997). The Turkish and Israeli cases support this argument. In both cases the national leadership glorified such a golden age. In Israel the Zionists emphasized the biblical Israelite Kingdoms of David and Salomon and the Hashmonite Kingdom that was the last period of Jewish sovereignty in *Eretz Yisrael* (the biblical land of Israel) before two millennia of existence in exile. Likewise, in Turkey the Young Turks and later the Kemalists 'rediscovered' and overrated the pre-Islamic Hittite roots of the Turkish nation. What perplexing, however, is that while Zionism chose a religious golden age the Turks chose a pagan pre-religious (i.e. pre-Islamic) one, though in Ottoman history one can definitely find 'golden ages' that were firmly related to the Islamic character of the empire, prominent among them is the era between the Sultans *Fatih Mehmet* (Mehmet the Conqueror) and *Kanuni Sultan Süleiman* (Süleiman the Magnificent) in the 15th and 16th Centuries which is commonly known as the golden age of the Ottoman Empire (Davison 1968). This still begs the question of what determines the national movement's approach towards religion.

In many countries religion is an integral part of national identity. This is because, as Anthony Smith convincingly argues, in the history of almost every society there is a *sacred dimension*, which makes religion a strong mobilizing force and something to identify with (Smith 2000; Hastings 1997). Nevertheless, some nationalist elites choose to incorporate religion into their national agenda while others prefer to disregard it or even restrict and marginalize it. Deciding one way or the other is dependent upon structural and ideational factors, which, in a given situation, make the incorporation of religion more or less supportive to the political goals of the nationalist movement. The content of the nationalist ideology in a given time is dependent upon external as well as internal social processes, distribution of power among groups in society, wars, economic transformation and the like (Smith, 2001, 31; Roshwald 2006; Marx 2003).

The interaction of ideational and structural trends also shapes the nationalist's movement's approach towards religion. Among these factors two deserve particular attention: First, the pervasiveness of religion in the old order – The stronger religion is in
the old political order, the challenge it represents to the new order is bigger, and thus it is likely to be downplayed in the ideology of the emerging national movement. In contrast, if religion is not a principal element in the old, contested regime, or in the cases of new states, where there is no independent regime at all, it is easier to use it as an effective recruitment tool without risking political challenge to the new emerging order. Second, the role of religion depends on the ability to separate different ingredients of identity without eroding the overall coherence and persuasiveness of the national identity. National identity is usually composed of several ingredients (ethnic, linguistic, religious identification, common culture, tradition and territorial affiliation), though not all of them carry the same weight in different national identities. In Canada's Quebec the national identity is primarily linguistic and cultural; in Rwanda it is based on race and tribe; in Sri Lanka it is mostly the religious element that is emphasized. When these elements of national identity overlap and are strong and unique, it becomes almost impossible to dismiss one component without weakening the entire national identity all together. In contrast, when these elements are separable, it is easier to emphasize only some of them while neglecting the others without undermining the construction of a strong and unique national identity. For example, Spanish and Catholicism in Latin America and Arabic and Islam in the Middle East are less necessary as components of national identity if a unique nation-state identity is the goal. This is because they are shared by several societies in the region and are not unique to one national project. Language and religion in these cases do not overlap with other components (ethnic, territorial) of national identity and this is why most states in these regions emphasized more particular elements as bases for a unifying and specific national identity. To put it differently, if there exists a possibility to form a convincing and coherent identity without the religious ingredient the nationalist movement will be more inclined, and capable, to do so. If, on the other hand, religious and other elements of identity are seen as fused together, it becomes unintelligible to try to construct a national identity without the religious component.
These two factors were instrumental in shaping the national leadership’s approach toward religion in Israel and Turkey. In the Israeli case religion was not a strong formal political force in the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine pre-independence) and hence did not challenge the new Zionist project. In addition, the religious and national characters of the Jews are fused and any attempt to separate the religious ingredient from the national identity would have been resulted in an incomplete or, at the least unconvincing national identity, one that could not have served to mobilize the masses in support of the Zionist project. In contrast, religion in the Ottoman Empire was strong both socially and politically and was perceived as a challenge to the new regime and as a competitor for popular legitimacy. In addition, it was possible to create or rediscover an ethnic-based historiography, one that emphasized the ancient pre-Islamic foundations of the nation and served as the basis for a new Turkish identity, without integrating the religious ingredient into it.

After the role of religion in the ideology of the national movement is formed the dominant national movement that controls the state after its establishment is likely to implement the fundamentals of its ideology into the institutional and political realms of the state. The emerging political elite came to power with a political worldview that built and strengthened their legitimacy before they established and came to rule an independent state. After coming to power, these elites are unlikely to reinvent themselves from the start and alter their political ideology without risking damaging their legitimacy and base of support. They are still committed to the national ideology that carried them to power and are therefore likely to implement it in the institutions and policies of the new regime. Therefore, the role of religion in state affairs after the establishment of the state will be very similar to and derived from the role given to it in the national ideology during the pre-state era.

This assumption holds true in many cases in the Middle East and beyond (the Ayatollah’s regime in Iran after the 1979 revolution, the Ba’ath regimes in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan), and appears clearly also in the cases of Israel and Turkey. The Zionist movement employed some religious aspects into its ideology in

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7 This argument will be developed more fully in the contexts of Turkey and Israel in chapters 3 and 6 respectively.
the pre-state era, which translated themselves to state structures following its independence in 1948. Conversely, the Young Turk and later the Kemalist ideology wished to separate modern Turkey from its Islamic past, and following the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923 Atatürk’s regime initiated a series of antireligious policies with the intention of marginalizing Islam from social and political life. This carries an important lesson to scholars about the foundations of religion-state relations. It argues that the foundations of political structures should be investigated in the period before the establishment of formal state institutions (Rubin 2009). In order to understand religion-state relationship post independence, it is essential to explore the characteristics of this relationship in the pre-state era, and how it was translated from one period to the other. Another implied consequence is the critical moment of independence or nationalist revolution for determining the role of religion in the state.8 Following this moment nation-building processes transform the ideology of the nationalist movement into an institutional matrix that, among other things, also expresses the role of religion in the state. This initial institutional design more often than not creates a path dependency with enormous long term influence on the role of religion in the state and the evolution of their relationship and thus should receive particular attention in the analysis of religion-state relationship.

(IV) Religious actors are potential members in civil society

It still remains to give explanation as to what is the most suitable analytical perspective through which the state-religion relationship should be analyzed. Religious groups and movements are part of the social fabric. They represent a coherent perspective on life and a code of moral and practical behavior. Billions of people throughout the world adhere to them. They have an impact on the dynamics within societies as well as between societies and states. In their various activities they cover a wide spectrum of social issues such as education, welfare, youth organizations and worship services. The legitimacy of the regime and the quality of its democratic governance are dependent to some extent on whether religious groups are accommodated into civil society or are

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8 This holds true also in transitions to democracy, in which the national character binds the ability of the new democratic regime to substantially alter its treatment towards religion.
marginalized from it (Nandy 1997; Pell 2004; Walzer 1992). Hence, representatives of
religion in the public sphere and in their interaction with the state should be understood
as social actors and potential partners in civil society. This argument first requires
clarification on the definition and nature of civil society.

There are two main schools of thought about civil society. The (until recently)
dominant school views civil society as a voluntary realm, independent of state influence,
in which high levels of trust, strong social networks and a similar set of values
embedded among individual members of society facilitate political stability and
democracy. According to this view, civil society is a non-conflict or limited conflict
arena. Individuals who belong to it agree on the fundamentals of their society and hence
are able to cooperate in harmony. Civil society works to curtail state power and thus it
must be independent and separated from the latter. Also, its relationship with the state is
viewed as a zero-sum-game - the stronger civil society is, the weaker the state becomes. This view is expressed by prominent scholars like Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba

Beginning in the 1990s a second school of civil society has emerged. This
school views civil society in an entirely different way. For it, civil society is not a
‘conflict free’ arena that flattens ideological rivalries. Rather it is an arena of conflict
and disagreement. Its great value is not the absence of conflict but rather the ability to
discuss and compromise on disagreements in a nonviolent way. It carries no normative
content except an agreement by all its participants to deal with their conflicts in a
peaceful, non violent way, and to accept the possibility that some room should be given
to alternative, even contradicting, points-of-view. As Michael Walzer suggested civil
society is ‘the setting of settings.’ It provides space for deliberation but advocates no
particular ideological content (Walzer 1992). No ideology is perceived superior in this
case. Every group can promote its interests and ideological goals within this
framework. The members of society do not share a ‘thick’ consensus, but rather a ‘thin’
consensus, that relates only to acceptable forms of expression and peaceful conflict
resolution in the political arena (Oxhorn 2006).

This school of civil society is different from the liberal one in several respects. Its unit of analysis is not free and equal individuals but rather groups of people,
collectivities. In addition, for this school the realm of civil society is not entirely voluntary and detached from the state. On the contrary, it assigns an important role to the state in defending, promoting and expanding the boundaries of civil society, especially when the relatively weak groups in society are concerned (Skocpol 1996; Oxhorn 2006). This notion highlights another important aspect of civil society that is fundamentally different than the liberal school – the nature of the relationship between the state and civil society. According to this view the relationship between the state and civil society is not necessarily characterized by complete detachment or conflict. Civil society needs a strong state and a democratic state benefits from a strong civil society (Walzer 1992; 1999; Skocpol 1996; Hall 2001; Migdal 2001). As Oxhorn convincingly argues:

The state controlled by democratically elected governments has an important role to play in fostering the kind of partners in civil society that it can work with to resolve pressing problems. Ultimately, then, the challenge of making civil society relevant is also a challenge of the state (Oxhorn 2003, 2)

This view sheds new light on our understanding of the relations between the state and civil society. Instead of viewing it as a zero-sum-game, the interaction between the state and civil society is one characterized by having a potentially positive-sum result. State and civil society can mutually empower each other, balance each other or compete with each other (Migdal 2001). The manner in which these two important actors interact will have a significant impact on the quality of democracy.

Finally, this school of civil society does not view the relationship of state and civil society as static and rigid. Conversely, it gives special consideration to the reciprocal influence of one actor upon the other and to the evolving nature of the relationship between them. The relationship is viewed as an on-going dynamic process rather than a static and competitive one. This mutual and dynamic view is advocated especially by Joel Migdal and other students of the ‘state-in-society’ school (Migdal 1988, 1997; 2001; Migdal Kohli and Shue 1994). According to Migdal:
If we are to develop a more useful way to approach the state, we will need to recognize it as the “limited state.” To accomplish that will mean blending the largely ignored culturalist perspective with the dominant institutionalist approach as well as shifting the analytic focus from the state as freestanding organization to a process-oriented view of the state in society (emphasis added) (Migdal 1997, 208-9).

This approach grasps in a better way the complex nature of the relationship between religious actors and the state. It accurately recognizes the ability of the state to shape the boundaries and strength of civil society and the influence of the latter on the stability and quality of democratic regimes. It is more realistic in that that it does not wish to flatten ideological disagreements. Rather, it sets a framework for coexistence and allows expression and resolution of disagreements in a peaceful process of exchange. It emphasizes dynamic interaction over rigid structure and by this acknowledges that changes might occur in the relationship between the state and religion along the time axis. This is important because, as is assumed by modernization theory, states change their developmental status over time and this might have an impact on how religion and the state interact in different periods of coexistence. Also, the dynamic and open ended result is more sensitive to changes in other factors - economic, ideational, structural, and others - that might influence, directly or indirectly, the state-religion relationship.

The difference between the two schools of civil society is reflected nicely in the way each of them views the relationship between religion and state and its influence on democratization. In most cases, the liberal school of civil society will oppose the accommodation of religion in the public sphere. This is because religion represents a collective set of values and beliefs that contradict the individualistic perception of civil society. Moreover, since this set of values is shared only by part of society it exposes the political sphere to fundamental disagreement, something that this school tries to minimize as much as possible. Finally, this school's static view of the relationship between the state and civil society supports the deterministic and flawed assumptions of the secularization thesis and thus cannot offer a dynamic analytical framework for religion-state interaction. Therefore, the liberal school of civil society is likely to reject...
any formal role for, or recognition of, religion in the public and political spheres. The political consequences of such categorical rejection might be negative. In particular, the state and will try to dismiss any influence of religious ideological content on politics. This policy is likely to generate resentment and lack of trust between the state and religious segments in society, especially in societies where religion serves as a central marker of identification. It narrows the regime’s base of support and might lead in the long run to political instability due to direct and often extra-legal challenges to the political system by religious groups that do not enjoy the legitimacy to express themselves in the public arena.

Conversely, the other school of civil society is likely to provide space for religion in the public and political spheres, and might even advocate granting a formal role to religion in the state as a possible outcome of the political process. This type of accommodation will give stronger incentives to religious movements and people to support and identify with the political regime. It is likely to promote cooperation between the state and religious groups in a manner that will better support political stability and pluralism. Instead of pushing religious groups outside the public realm, the state will accommodate them within it. This inclusive policy will produce wider commitment to democratic principles among societal actors and the outcome is likely to be better democratic governance. Conversely, constant marginalization of religious groups, especially in countries when the latter is socially strong and its adherents demand more inclusion of religious content in the state, might generate extreme reaction toward the state and low commitment among religious segments in society to respect the state and its democratic regime if the latter do not tolerate their public presence.

Finally, it is important to note that, in contrast with the liberal school of civil society, this study conceives political parties as part of civil society and their interaction with the state is thus viewed as part of state-society relations. This is because political parties represent collective preferences and can fight for political power in the political arena and thus should be treated as part of the range of religious groups and organizations that represent similar goals. As I will demonstrate below, in both Turkey and Israel this type of representation of religion has played a significant role in shaping the state-religion relationship.
Toward a dynamic conceptualization of the state-religion relationship: The Bounded Integration Model

Figure 2.2 below offers a new model, in accordance with the above propositions, to describe and analyze the state-religion relationship. The suggested model, the Bounded Integration Model, grasps adequately the foundations of this relationship, its complex and dynamic nature, and its impact on democratic politics. It is noteworthy that religion here serves as a prototype of collective identity and with necessary modifications the principles of the model and the dynamics it reveals hold true for every collective identity in its relation with the state.

The Bounded Integration Model asserts the following: First, the roots of the state-religion relationship should be sought for in the pre-independence era or, more specifically, in the role of religion in the ideology of the national movement before the new regime is established. This role is not determined arbitrarily but rather is shaped by structural and ideational circumstances.
Second, the role of religion is translated to state policies once the new regime is established. In this view the moment of independence is of critical importance because it shapes state policies and institutions toward religion and creates path dependency with vast influence on the evolution of this relationship over time.

Third, following the establishment of the regime a constitutive process begins between the state and religious actors within it. State policies towards religion condition whether religious groups will be included in civil society. These policies generate and are subject to responses from below and thus change over time. This reciprocal process shapes the behavior of each party toward the other and the relationship as a whole. Here, acknowledging the dynamic element in the state-religion relationship carries the most analytical value. The relationship between the state and religion is all but static or linear. Changes in the distribution of political power and developmental status might lead to changes in state policies towards religion from above. New interpretations of religious doctrines, as a consequence of ideational and social changes or external events, might also take place and alter the behavior of religious organizations and their strategies of engagement with the state from below. This dynamism requires sensitive and to some extent flexible policies toward religion in order to maintain peaceful and stable coexistence between the two along the time axis.

Fourth, the changing boundaries of civil society influence the quality of democratic governance. Strong civil society is an important facilitator of democracy and the state is instrumental in supporting a strong civil society (Hall 2001; Skocpol 1996; Walzer 1992, 1999; Oxhorn 2006). But in order to strengthen civil society, the state should stretch the former’s boundaries and incorporate more societal groups into politics. The state should not rule out, a-priory, groups in society that are willing to accept the democratic rules of peaceful deliberation and respect of its results from participating in civil society. Religious groups offer a good example of the importance of this principle of inclusion, as long as they are committed to democratic politics and restrain their monopolistic visions. More political inclusion of religion in the state will allow more pluralism, will require less repression from above to control ideological dissent and will result in a better and more stable democratic regime. Conversely, strict implementation of secularism will require repression of any political expression of, or
affiliation with, religion, will alienate large segments of society from participating in civil society and will result in a less stable and less democratic type of governance. This is also true if a dominant religion occupies too much power in the political realm that allows it to exploit state powers to exclude other groups from freely participating in civil society. In this respect, the negative impact on the democratic regime is similar if a fundamental worldview occupies monopolistic power in the political arena, regardless if it is a strict secularist agenda that represses religion, or strict religious agenda that blocks secularist and other religious worldviews in society from equal participation. Both situations undermine the role of civil society as the “setting of settings” and prohibit free exchange of ideas in civil society and in politics, hence the notion of bounded integration.

A bounded range of religious integration

As its name suggests, the Bounded Integration Model asserts that the inclusion of religion in the public and political spheres should be conceptualized as a bounded range with upper and lower limits. It still remains to define what should be the criteria for such upper and lower limits, or in other words, under which circumstances the state-religion interaction will likely produce positive outcomes to the democratic regime and when it might work against it. In the following section I argue that both the upper and lower limits should adhere to, and overlap with, the minimalist conditions of democracy that I defined earlier in this chapter.

Starting with the lower limit, it has been established by now that complete rejection of religion in accordance with the secularization thesis, in places where religion is a central component of collective and individual life, will not achieve stable and peaceful co-existence and will not assist in strengthening democracy. In such places transitions to democracy and the sustainability of vibrant democratic regimes require support and broad cooperation among the populace in the construction and long term stability of the regime. It is essential that a majority of the population acknowledge and promote the emerging political order. They will be willing, however, to ‘jump on the democratic train’ only if they feel they can identify themselves with the emerging character of the new state and that their collective preferences are regarded with respect
by the democratic regime. In these transitional-historical situations religion can act as a unifying and stabilizing political force (Juergensmeyer 1993; 1995). Granting active political status to religion in states where there are dominant religions, and allowing religious groups to participate in deliberating and designing state policies within the bounds of democratic practices, will make members of these religions willing participants in the democratic regime. Religion in this case might provide the core element of ‘national unity’ that Dankwort Rustow put forward as the single precondition for successful transitions to democracy (Rustow 1970). It will incorporate religion and religious perspectives into the arena of democratic deliberation and ease the potential to extreme antidemocratic behavior among religious groups in society towards the state.

Therefore, if the democratic project is to proceed faster and better among religious societies, religion need not only be tolerated or granted autonomous space in the private and civic spheres, as is suggested, for instance by Alfred Stepan's influential *Twin Tolerations* (Stepan 2001, 2005). Rather, it should be permitted to actively participate in politics including granting it some official role in the state as a possible outcome of the political process. This role is flexible and thus creates a bounded range of possible possible types of integration. It can be manifested in various ways, among which are some or all of the following: approval of religiously based political parties, state sponsored educational programs, state incorporation of religious symbols, allocation of resources to religious institutions, legal status to religious holidays, legal autonomy to religious authorities in issues of personal status, and approval of religious parties. As long as this integration is in accord with minimalist democratic principles and is an outcome of a due democratic process it will widen the boundaries of civil society and of those groups in society that will be willing to participate in it.

At the same time, there exists a threat that if religion’s role in the polity becomes too powerful, the outcome of such unlimited accommodation might turn counter-productive and subversive to the democratic regime. In the extreme, granting unlimited

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9 Here I discuss the consequences of granting some role to religion in societies where one dominant religion is shared by a majority in the population. This emphasis is important for at least two reasons: 1) giving preference to one dominant religion in the public sphere might have negative influence on the equal right of other religions to express their particular worldview; 2) It still remains to explore the proper status that the state should grant to minority religions and the relationship between them and the dominant religion.
power to religion in politics can lead to a theocratic regime, like that of Iran, in which a small group of religious leaders hold veto power on every social and political aspect of life. This reality empties the democratic regime of any meaning. The threat of going too far in accommodating religion into state politics might also become true in democratic regimes in which religion occupies disproportional power in the polity and uses it to exclude other groups, religions and beliefs from promoting their values, or uses the democratic arena and state authorities cynically and selectively only when they suit its goals. It is thus imperative to identify an upper limit, above which religion and its representatives will not be able to determine the outcome of the political game. This upper limit should be as inclusive as possible and block only those religious activities that violate the minimalist principles of democracy. In other words, state policies towards religion should make sure that, while granting official role to religion in politics and the public sphere, it is assured that no other world views or groups, religious or others, are excluded from participating in civil society and in the democratic process. It is crucial therefore, that state laws will secure the collective and individual religious and political rights of other publics within the state, to the maximum possible extent. Additionally, it requires that every formal role granted to religion in state affairs is only an outcome of a due democratic political process and does not violate the conditions of democracy. The state should resist and block attempts by religious groups to alter the role of religion in the state without deliberating it first in the democratic arena. If the rule of law is to be respected, unilateral actions in accordance with religious agendas but in contradiction to state laws or to democratic conditions should not be allowed and tolerated.

In essence, religion should be granted the same space like any other worldview or collective identity as long as it does not violate the thin consensus that lies at the core of civil society (Oxhorn 2006). The state must ensure that no religion, or any other group, exploits its political power at the expense of other, less privileged groups, leads to their exclusion from the civic arena, or occupies additional roles and powers to religion independently of the democratic political process. Keeping religion within the boundaries of democratic conditions will have the best prospects for stable and cooperative relationship between the state and its religious sectors. Likewise, it is
expected that below and above these boundaries - too little or too much integration – the interaction between religious actors and the state might develop in destructive and mutually harming paths. In that the Bounded Integration Model differs from the inclusion-moderation thesis, according to which there is a linear positive correlation between religious accommodation, de-radicalization and regime stability (Baylouny 2004; Hamid 2004; Rosefsky-Wickham 2004; G. Robinson 1997\textsuperscript{10}).

Of course, this theoretical framework implies that state behavior and policies are pivotal in determining the evolving relationship with religious actors, defining the role of religion in the state and maintaining its political and public activities within proper civil limits. Complete marginalization of religion might push religious actors outside the realm of civil society and into fringe and unlawful behavior. Alternatively, state tolerance of religious groups that exploit their political power, demand preferential treatment by the state at the expense of other groups and subvert the political preferences of the general public might also harm the quality and stability of the democratic regime. The goal of the state in regard the role of religion, indeed with regard to every group or worldview in society, is to maintain a stable relationship among the state, religious groups and the entire society and to promote mutual acceptance among these actors by confining religious activity and its public role within the above mentioned boundaries.

To reiterate, the Bounded Integration Model predicts that as long as the recognition of religious groups in the state is in accord with the basic conditions of democracy the state-religion interaction will have a positive impact on the democratic regime. On the other hand, the exclusion of religious actors in a manner that violates their basic democratic rights and preferences, or excessive incorporation of religious content and actors in the state in a manner that violates the democratic rights and preferences of other publics in the society, are likely to have negative impact on the democratic regime.

\textit{Conclusions}

\textsuperscript{10} Importantly, only some of these studies deal with Islamic moderation in a democratic environment. The political environment, however, does not change the theoretical premise, that is more inclusion of Islamic groups and values into the political system, democratic or not, will result in the moderation of these groups.
My goal in this chapter was to highlight the shortcomings of the secularization thesis and to offer an alternative analytical framework to explore the state-religion relationship in democratic societies. In order to do so, the assumptions of the secularization thesis were challenged and the dynamic *Bounded Integration Model*, which overcomes most of the weaknesses of this thesis, was offered. Specifically, the *Bounded Integration Model* is sensitive to particular historical and cultural contexts and does not attempt to impose a 'one size fit all' prescription on very different societies. Also, it does not view the interaction between state and religion as a static one. Instead of complete rejection it offers a flexible range within which religious groups in society should be tolerated and encouraged to participate in politics. The *Bounded Integration Model* is general and flexible enough to offer insights that go beyond state-religion affairs. In fact, this model can be applied as an analytical tool to every type of interaction between the state and societal groups and organizations within it. In the rest of thesis the model will be implemented and tested in exploring the state-religion relationship in Turkey and Israel.
Chapter 3: Religion and State in Turkey's Pre-Republican Era

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 the nationalist government under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk took extensive measures to uproot Islamic religion from the public and political spheres. As the *Bounded Integration Model* suggests, the motivation to adopt such sweeping and repressive policies towards religion cannot be adequately explained without exploring the development and interplay of structural and ideational factors in Ottoman society that predated the foundation of the republic, and their influence on the agenda of the revolutionary elite at the time of independence. Although formerly a debated issue, it is now broadly accepted that the political and social reforms that took place after the foundation of Turkey should not be understood in dichotomy to earlier Ottoman history (Lewis 2000). On the contrary, Kemalist policies toward religion, though more radical than ever before, signified merely a final stage in the development of Ottoman society and politics. They did not come out of ‘thin air’ but rather were preceded by recurrent, though largely unsuccessful, attempts to modernize and secularize the Ottoman Empire, beginning in the late 18th Century.

As I show in more details below, the enduring tension that existed between strong social identification with Islamic religion among the masses and traditional elites and the modernizing desires of the western-inspired elite in light of the waning vitality of the empire led to exacerbating disagreements between the two groups, and generated repeated attempts to establish a new equilibrium between religion and tradition on the one hand and western modernization on the other hand. The eventual downfall of the Empire after WWI ended this long time disagreement with the victory of the Westernizers.

The interplay of structural and ideational constraints, namely the strength of religion in the old order and the nationalist movement's desire to distinguish the Turkish nation and state from the rest of the Muslim world, as well as to detach the Turkish people from cultural affiliation with Islam, drove Atatürk's regime to conceive both folk religion and formal institutionalized religion as challenges to the Kemalist project. The regime endorsed strict western interpretation of modernization, one that equated
modernity with secular and scientific society. In the eyes of this regime the only way to set free of Turkey’s backwardness was by getting rid of everything that is traditional (i.e. not western). Therefore, the motivation of the Kemalist revolutionaries to conduct such a radical policy vis-à-vis religion can be understood only in the context of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the entrenched role of Islam in its society and evolution of the ideational environment, particularly the development of western-based nationalist ideas among Turkish intellectuals.

I shall begin this discussion with a brief chronological history of the Ottoman Empire and highlight the centrality of Islamic religion in it. Later I will discuss pre-republican reforms, with special consideration to their incapability to uproot religion from Ottoman state structures, and how it, in addition to structural factors and the development of substitute national ideology, shaped the agenda of the Kemalist movement.

The Ottoman Empire and the role of Islam
The starting point for understanding the trends that brought about strict secularizing policies following the establishment of the republic is a brief introduction into the history of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the reasons for its demise and the entrenched role that Islamic religion occupied in its society. The noted Turkish Historian Sina Akşin divides the history of the Ottoman Empire to four periods. The first period, the establishment of the Empire, begins in 1299 with the foundation of the Ottoman dynasty by Osman Bey, continues with a series of land conquers by his inheritors, including the old city of Bursa, and stretches until the mid 15th Century. The second period, the Ottoman golden age, starts in 1453 with the occupation of Istanbul (the byzantine Constantinople) by Sultan Mehmet II (Fatih Mehmet – Mehmet the conqueror), continues with occupations that stretch from Crimea to North Africa and Eastern Europe, and ends with the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (Kanuni Sultan Süleyman) and Prime Minister (Grand Vizier) Sokullu Mehmet in 1579. Importantly, during that period the Ottomans conquered Egypt from the Seljuks after which the royal dynasty assumed the role of Caliph, the head of the Ummah - Muslim community of believers. The third period, from 1579 to 1699 is a period of stagnation, in which the Empire
reached its territorial limits and suffered the consequences of a consecutive series of unskilled rulers. The last period, between 1700 and 1922 is a period of decline, land losses, deteriorating economic situation, political instability and eventual disintegration (Akşin 2007, 7-8).

Islamic religion occupied a pivotal role in the political and social affairs of the Ottoman Empire ever since the emergence of the latter. In fact, Islam was introduced to the Turks around the 10th Century, three centuries before the establishment of the empire, by nomads from other Muslim territories. In contradicition with the experience of other Muslim societies, Islam was not imposed on the Turkic people but rather was accepted voluntarily by them, especially by Turkic worriers that spread it further to conquered territories. When the Ottoman Empire was established, Islamic religion was already well entrenched throughout the territories under its rule. Indeed, from its very emergence until its collapse, the Ottoman Empire was devoted to the defense and promotion of Islamic religion. In correspondence, the Empire, its regions, worriers and leaders all identified themselves as predominantly Islamic (Lewis 2000, 10-11).

The entrenched role of Islam in the Empire was reflected in every realm of social and political life. Islamic scholars enjoyed a unique status that protected them from persecution without trial or confiscation of property by the Sultan (Aksin 2007, 13), as well as broad autonomous powers in law and education. The empire applied Sharia laws in every aspect of life, more than any other Muslim society in history (Lewis 2000, 11). Also, throughout the Ottoman era Islam functioned as a principal cultural and political element and a primary source of identity for the inhabitants of the Empire. The Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire identified with Islam so much so that until the mid 19th Century they completely neglected their Turkish identity, and recognized themselves primarily as Moslems (Lewis 2000, 2, 10-13; Toprak 1981, 27; Kushner 2006, 163; Ahmad 1991, 3).

More specifically, identification with Islamic religion was strongly reflected in the institutional and administrative systems of the empire. There are numerous illustrations of this point. The head of the Empire carried both secular and spiritual-religious positions. He was at the same time Sultan – the ruler of the Ottoman Empire, and Caliph – the leader of the Ummah (community of Muslim believers). The legal code
of the Empire and its education system were based on Islamic doctrines – the Koran and the *Sharia*. *Sheikh-ul-Islam*, the most senior religious scholar, was second only to the Sultan in the administration. The *Ulema* (religious scholars) were extensively involved in state institutions. As Toprak suggests:

> The religious hierarchy assumed many of the functions that state institutions perform in administrative set-ups of a more differentiated character. Most importantly in this context, both the judicial and the educational processes were under the direction and control of the Ulema… (Toprak 1981, 29).

The formal institutional role of religion in the Empire was complemented by two additional social functions. First, religion served as a conceptual bridge or common discourse between elite and masses and functioned as a solidarity mechanism among Muslim subjects in the Empire. Second, in addition to the existence of 'high' religion, which occupied formal roles in state institutions, there existed mystic popular manifestations of Islam which operated for centuries in the form of *Tarikat*, or dervish orders. Historically, these two religious realms often clashed with each other but toward the end of the Empire an amalgamation of the two took place and brought with it significant presence of *Tarikat* members in the structure of government (Mardin 1971, 203-206).

Between the 13th and 16th Centuries the Ottoman dynasty consolidated and maintained a prosperous Empire that stretched from Persia, to Vienna to Egypt. Its armies were the might of Europe and its economy flourished. The pinnacle point in the life of the Empire was the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent who established a legal code based on the *Sharia* and expanded the territory of the Empire to its maximum limits. Nevertheless, during the second half of the 16th Century the Ottoman Empire began to decline. A detailed account of the reasons that brought this decline is beyond the scope of this work. In brief, it was a combination of European military advancements, especially of Portuguese marine forces and Russian and Austro-Hungarian land forces, an incapacitating economy due to import of natural resources and goods from the Americas, and consequential decline in the quality of the Ottoman civil service, which brought with it administrative inefficiency and rampant corruption. This
process was exacerbated by an Islamic 'superiority complex' that did not facilitate the borrowing of new knowledge and technologies from the European empires (Lewis 2000, 17-31; 2002).

The long and gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire generated recurrent attempts, by elites with Western orientation, to reform the state and society and make them more efficient and modern. However, in opposition to this trend, there existed a powerful anti-reformist alliance that desired to preserve the status it enjoyed in the old order. Subsequently, earlier reforms were characterized by inability to replace the religious order with a secular system of institutions that in turn created an incoherent system of dual institutionalism, a parallel system of secular and religious institutions in various administrative dimensions. Importantly, this institutional character was founded in the end of the 18th Century, long before the eventual collapse of the Empire, persisted throughout the 19th Century and was abolished only with the foundation of the Republic in 1923 (Mardin 1997; Berkes 1964).

Early Ottoman Reforms (1789-1839)

It is common to relate the beginning of the reform era to the reign of Sultan Selim III (Davison 1968, 67; Zürcher 2005, 39; Akşin 2007, 20). Selim III was fascinated with western progress long before he became Sultan. In 1792, shortly after being sworn to the throne, Sultan Selim III initiated a broad reform program, Nizam-i Cedid (the new order), that sought to strengthen Ottoman central government as a means to overcome the stagnation and decline of the Empire. In particular, Selim III sought to westernize the military and education system and to increase efficiency and lower the levels of corruption in the bureaucracy. Trying to gain western knowledge, the Sultan hired the services of foreign officers, especially French military man, to guide the reforms (Lewis 2000, 48). Nevertheless, Selim III failed to complete his reforms due to strong opposition by three interest groups which proved very influential throughout the reform era. The first was the Ayans, a group of semi-independent notables in the peripheries of the empire who denied a centralizing reform that might have diminished their autonomous status. The second was the old guard of military personnel, the Yeni-çeri (Janissaries), who opposed the intention of the new reform to substitute them with modernized troops.
The third was the *Ulema*, religious scholars who enjoyed significant status and institutional influence in the Sultan’s administration and thus had an incentive to align with the Janissaries in maintaining the old order (Findley 2008, 12).

This alliance proved very powerful and played an active, conservative and anti-reformist role from the onset of reforms. When the Janissaries revolted against the Sultan in 1807, it was with the support of the highest religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, *Sheikh-ul Islam*, who issued a *fetva* (a religious decree) stating that the new reforms contradicted the principles of religion and hence were void (Zürcher 2005, 43). Selim III lacked the coercive capability and political support needed to stand against the revolting troops and was removed from office shortly thereafter. The Ulema and Janissaries reversed most of Selim III's reforms and crowned his cousin, Mustafa IV, as the new Sultan. Though the *Nizam-i Cedid* initiative had a very limited success, its main achievement was in creating new channels of communication and interaction with the western world, and a first break with the traditional order, after which more profound attempts followed.

The next major reform took place a year later. The *Ayans*’ approach to reforms was complex. On the one hand they rejected Selim III’s ambition to tighten the Empire's central control on their territories. On the other hand, they opposed the conservative coalition between the Ulema and Janissaries. In July 1808, fearing the growing power of the Russian Empire in the East, one of the strongest *Ayans*, Mustafa Pasha *Bayraktar* ("carrier of the thrown"), took Istanbul by force with the intention to re-crown Selim III. Those who kept Selim III in prison assassinated him before he was released, but Mustafa Pasha succeeded to save and crown Mahmut II, a cousin of Selim III and supporter of reforms (Zürcher 2005, 46). Mustafa Pasha himself served in the Palace and became the de-facto ruler of Istanbul. Four months later Mustafa Pasha lost his life in another Janissary revolt, but during this short period in power he was responsible for two important developments. First, he organized a modern military force, the *Segban*. Second and more importantly, he convened the leading *Ayans* in Istanbul and made them sign the *sened-i ittifak* (Document of Agreement), in which they committed to just rule, fair collection of taxes, loyalty to the Sultan, support for economic and bureaucratic reforms and establishment of a modern military. This document, commonly referred to
As 'the Ottoman Magna Carta' was a turning point in the relationship between the notables and the Sultanate (Akşin 2007, 22-23). Although essentially an agreement among the elites, without reference to the masses, it introduced basic principles of law and justice to the Ottoman Empire and sewed the seeds for the later Tanzimat reforms.

A month after the sened-i ittifak was signed the Janissaries-Ulema alliance revolted again and took control over the Capitol. Mahmut II killed his male son, the only possible heir of the Sultanate, and after bargaining with the revolting forces the parties reached an agreement according to which Mahmut II will remain Sultan but in return will freeze his intended reforms.

The impasse between Mahmut II and the anti-reformist alliance lasted two more decades before the former was able to alter the distribution of power in the Empire in his favor and initiate a new wave of reforms. Mahmut II waited for an opportune time to break the stalemate imposed upon him by the Ulema and Janissaries and in the meantime gradually built his military capabilities. In June 1826 this moment finally arrived. The Janissaries rebelled again in protest of the growing power of the new army, but this time the Sultan's troops were ready. The Sultan ordered the massacre of several thousands Janissaries and immediately thereafter declared the abolishment of the Janissary troops. This move, referred to in Turkey as the Auspicious Event, eliminated the main opposition to the Sultan and cleared the way for new reform initiatives (Davison 1968, 74-75; Findley 2008, 12).

Despite the setback, during the 1830s, where no opposition restrained his plans, Mahmut II was able to accelerate the pace of modernizing reforms, which served as preparatory steps for the later Tanzimat period. In the realm of the armed forces Mahmut II built a new modern army with the active assistance of Prussian officers, and structured a modern navy, the third biggest in Europe, with British and American guidance. Military officers and civil servants were sent to training and education in Western countries, and later became agents of westernization in the Empire. In the bureaucratic realm, the Sultan closed down old administrative positions in the Palace and founded new ones in their place. In particular, he eliminated traditional offices that served in the palace for centuries and transformed them into modern ministries such as foreign affairs, the interior and the treasury. The Council of Ministers acted as a Cabinet and the Grand
From Marginalization to Bounded Integration

Vizier as Prime Minister, instead of his traditional role as deputy of the Sultan. This era had also seen the creation of a first Ottoman newspaper, founding of a formal translation chamber and the first western-like medicine, civil service and war schools (Davison 1968, 75; Akşin 2007, 25).

The Tanzimat Period (1839-1876)
The next major reform took place under Mahmut II’s successor Abdülmecit and his reformist mentor Mustafa Reşit Pasha. Recognizing the crumbling situation of the Empire and ascendance to power of European countries, the initiators of the Tanzimat (reordering or reorganization), feared from European intervention in Ottoman territories, especially in an attempt to protect the Christian inhabitants of the Empire from discrimination by its Muslim majority. At the same time, the Ottoman administration was desperate to get some economic assistance from European countries, which was the only possible path to recover its collapsing economy. Under such circumstances, the rational of the Tanzimat initiative was that formal adaptation of western values might facilitate deliberation with western countries, prevent European aggression or interference in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and increase the chances for meaningful and much needed economic assistance.

The Tanzimat was proclaimed in the Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu (the Decree of the Rose Chamber) on November 3, 1839 and from the onset was a combination of old and new. On the declarative level it blamed the decline of the Empire on the non-observance of Koranic precepts, by this maintaining its obligation to an Islamic-based order. On the practical level, however, it initiated a series of secular and modernizing reforms, especially in the realms of property rights, equality for all regardless of religious belief, emphasis on individual rights, secular reforms in government and separation of powers among branches of government (Davison 1968, 78-82).

On the downside, the main failure of the Tanzimat was its inability to uproot the powerful status and influence of religious doctrines and institutions from the public sphere and check the powers of the Ulema strata. The Tanzimat reformers developed new secular state institutions but failed in altering or abolishing the old religious ones. This institutional dualism was prevalent in the Ottoman Empire until its eventual
collapse and replacement by the republic and was perceived in retrospect by the Republican reformers as a pivotal reason for the failure of consecutive reforms. More specifically, institutional dualism thwarted comprehensive reforms in the bureaucracy, created two sets of laws, courts and education systems, and preserved the power of the Ulema in the regime. It stood in the way to unified governance and inhabited the ability of the administration to exercise a coherent and unitary *modus operandi* for the state. A century later, these failures prompted the Kemalist movement to take harsh measures against anything related to religion once the Republic was founded (Toprak 1981, 32-33; Berkes 1954).

The most celebrated illustrations of dual institutionalism and its ramifications were found in the realms of law and education. In education, the government established a new western-oriented schooling system, introduced modern secular curriculums, subjected the entire secular education system to a modern Ministry of Education and officially divorced it from *Ulema* supervision (Findley 2008, 22-23). At the same time, however, the vested interest of the *Ulema* in traditional education made the old system untouchable. The government kept operating the *mekteb* and *medrese* (elementary and higher religious schools, respectively) systems with their traditional religious content (Berkes 1964, 106-110). Noteworthy, this educational dualism was instrumental in creating and widening a gap between the relatively traditional rural population, where religious education preserved its influence, and the urban population which was more receptive to modern-secular ideas. Certainly, such a rural-urban schism was not unique to the Ottoman Empire (Huntington 1967; Moore 1968), but when complemented and amplified by an overlapping religious-secular schism it created a significant cultural and perceptual disparity between the urban western-oriented youth who enjoyed superior and more developed education and the villagers who got their education in the traditional religious system. Later, this gap played a significant role in the interaction of state and religion during the Republican era.

A similar bifurcated development took place in the legal arena. The *Tanzimat* reformers developed new legal codes based on western secular principles but at the same time were politically unable to eliminate the religious *Kadi* (religious judges) court system that was managed by religious scholars and implemented religious laws. The
penalty code, land code and commercial code were revised in accordance with western principles but at the same time Sharia laws were codified as well and were kept active side by side the new codex. In essence, the court system was separated to two parallel sub-systems, with Sharia courts supervised by Sheikh ül-Islam, and state courts under the supervision of a secular Ministry of Justice. Moreover, the Ulema continued to serve in the new courts and eroded what otherwise would have been considered substantial secularizing reforms (Findley 2008, 20-21). That dual court system maintained significant pockets of backwardness, such as gender discrimination, inferior economic practices and ethnic inequality. In the eyes of the republican revolutionaries such laws and practices were impossible to reconcile with modern government. Essentially, the failure of early reforms to eliminate the grip of religion on state affairs convinced the nationalist movement half a century later that the only way to transform Turkish society into a modern one was through coercive marginalization of religion from the public and political spheres.

Furthermore, the conceived intention of the reforms to decrease the leverage of Islamic religion in the Empire was a source of social and political unrest. In contrast to the developmental experience of European countries, the Tanzimat reformist policies had not been a response to, or accommodation of, mass demands. Instead, they were forced upon the society from above by the Sultan's administration and therefore never benefitted from popular support. More so, the elitist and secular nature of the reforms stimulated growing opposition by the Muslim majority in the Empire and was central in causing some violent reactionary riots in 1859, 1860 and during the 1870s. Even among the reformist elite there were loud voices who criticized what they perceived as a dishonored attempt to imitate Europe and its values at all cost, including giving up Islamic traditions and values that served for centuries as core elements of Ottoman culture (Zürcher 2005, 87-89).

The Hamidian Era (1876-1908)
The Tanzimat period ended with the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. There is high degree of controversy regarding the true intentions of Abdülhamid II when reforms are considered. While some regard his rule as a regression in Turkey's modernization, others
argue that he followed the reformers of the *Tanzimat* in many respects. There is no controversy, however regarding the centrality that Abdülhamid II endowed to Islamic religion and identity during his rule. After almost a century of recurrent attempts to relegate religious influence in the Empire, Abdülhamid restored religion as the primary identifier of Ottoman state and society. This policy heightened the tension between traditional and modernizing forces in the Empire. In particular, it facilitated the formation of the Young Turks movement from which the Republicans emerged, and ended with the triumph of the latter over traditional forces (Fortna 2008, 38-39; Lewis 1983, 144).

The end of the *Tanzimat* and the beginning of Abdülhamid II’s rule was marked by the foundation of the first Ottoman Constitution in December 1876. As I mentioned earlier, the *Tanzimat* stimulated considerable criticism and the development of new ideas within the reform movement. Central in this trend was the *Yeni Osmanlilar* (the Young Ottomans) group. The Young Ottomans criticized the *Tanzimat’s* superficial imitation of western culture. Instead, they aspired to base modernization and liberal ideas on Islamic principles and to restore and guard the role of the *Ulema* in the Empire. Their most important thinker was Namik Kemal, a translator and journalist whose writings attempted to derive liberal and constitutional values from Islamic foundations, which would have allowed all subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to identify with the Empire and be loyal to it (Davison 1968, 85; Zürcher 2005, 89-90; Kadioğlu 1996, 180).

The Young Ottomans consolidated their power in the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman Cabinet) and succeeded in removing the inefficient and corrupt Sultan Abdülaziz and crowning Murad V, who supported the proclamation of a written constitution. Unfortunately, Murad suffered from mental illness and after several months, on September 1st 1876, he was replaced by his younger brother Abdülhamid II.

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11 Noteworthy, however, Namik Kemal was a religious observant and highly committed to Islamic principles. He stated occasionally that: "Our only real constitution is the Sheriat," and that: "the Ottoman state is based on religious principles, and if these principles are violated the political existence of the state will be in danger" (in Davison 1968, 86). In some of his late works he attempted to reconcile Montesquieu's *Spirit of the Laws*, among the most important intellectual foundations of western-liberal political thought, with the principles of *Sharia* (Lewis 1983, 115). As I will elaborate below, the Young Ottomans’ attempt to advocate the promotion of constitutional and liberal ideas while preserving the primacy of Islamic religion bore some inherent tensions and exposed this ideology to serious critique.
At the beginning of his incumbency, Sultan Abdülhamid II had no alternative but to further pursue the constitutional reforms supported by his ill brother and the powerful Young Ottomans. In December 1876, a constitution was promulgated and general elections took place for the first Ottoman Parliament. The constitution was based on the Belgian and German Constitutions and promised a series of individual rights, changes in the tax system and limits on the power of the ruler. But both the Constitution and the Parliament were short-lived (December 1876 – February 1878) and completely impotent due to Sultanic decrees that restored power in the hands of the Sultan and emptied the new institutions of any political meaning (Zürcher 2005, 99). In 1878 both the Tanzimat period and the Young Ottoman movement came to an end. From that point onward Abdülhamid II consolidated his rule which was characterized primarily by return to religion and tradition:

…his religiosity seems to have been genuine, and appears to have sustained him through the most trying of times. More importantly, Islam and its history provided him with an important political and social compass” (Fortna 2008, 41).

Throughout his kingship Abdülhamid II manipulated religious symbols, played out his role as Caliph (the additional role of the Ottoman Sultan as leader of the Ummah – the community of Islamic believers) and promoted Islamic solidarity and identity (Davison 1968, 95). He surrounded himself by conservative Sheikhs and Ulema and took active measures that reflected the return of the Empire to the Islamic world at the expense of its relations with the west. One step in this direction was the construction of a railway between Damascus and the holy city of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Another was the restoration of Pan-Islamist ideology, on which I elaborate below, as a source of identity for Muslim inhabitants in the Empire as well as for Muslim minorities in non-Muslim countries. A third policy was the advancement of the medrese school system.

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12 For many Islamists Abdülhamid II's reign is considered a golden age of religion in the Empire. Thus, it is not surprising that during recent elections in Turkey supporters of religiously oriented parties hanged his pictures next to pictures of contemporary religious political leaders.
and multiplication of *Tarikat* (folk religious orders). More members of the *Ulema* were positioned in schools and the curricula directed special attention to Islamic content.

Abdülmelik's pro-religious policies were shaped, at least in part, by political constraints. Significant territorial losses to European countries and nations in the Balkans during the 19th Century turned the population of the Ottoman Empire more Asian and Islamic. Subsequently, Islamism united most of its inhabitants more than ever before. In addition, this policy provided the Sultan considerable leverage among Muslim minorities outside the Empire that could have been mobilized as a political tool against neighboring countries should the latter decided to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire (Landau 2004, 21-29; Fortna 2008, 46-53). At one and the same time, Abdülmelik's dictatorial behavior generated substantial opposition against his regime, composed of non-Muslim subjects, liberal intellectuals and army officers, who perceived Abdülmelik's regime as both a step back from what was achieved in the *Tanzimat* and a primary reason for the continuous decline and territorial shrinking of the empire (Hanioğlu 2008, 64). This opposition eventually brought Abdülmelik's rule to an end.

**The Young Turks and the Second Constitution (1908-1918)**

The period between 1908 and 1918 was the last decade in life of the Ottoman Empire. In many respects political and ideological circumstances during this decade shaped the nationalist movement and the policies it exercised following the foundation of the Republic in 1923. The opposition group that removed Abdülmelik from office in 1908 and served as a prototype to the Kemalist movement emerged two decades earlier. It was established 1889 by four medicine students in the military school, and before long gained wide support among students in military schools all over the country. Their other headquarter was based in Paris, where they became familiar with European positivist philosophy, and published some newspapers critical of Abdülmelik's regime. This group named itself The Association (or Committee) for Union and Progress (CUP), also known as the Young Turks (Lewis 1983, 158-166).13

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13 The Committee of Union and Progress was the main opposition to Abdülmelik II's regime but not the only one. For an elaborate discussion of other opposition movements to the Sultan between 1875 and 1908, with particular focus on the Freemasons, see Hanioğlu 1989.
It took the CUP more than a decade of failing attempts (1896-1908) to topple Abdülhamid's regime, during which their ideas gained momentum among the Ottoman military's field troops. In 1906, a group of officers, among whose was Mustafa Kemal (later Kemal Atatürk), founded a revolutionary cell of Young Turks in Damascus (Rustow 1959, 522). Similar cells were formed in Salonika, Palestine, Macedonia and other provinces. In 1907, a merger took place between the Paris-based leadership and the Salonican Association of Ottoman Officers, which expanded the CUP's base of support. In July 1908 time was opportune for a revolution. Following several violent riots in the provinces of the Empire the Young Turks demanded that the Sultan restored the Constitution. Shortly thereafter the Sultan complied with their demands and the CUP seized *de facto* control over the Empire (Hanoğlu 2008, 64; Lewis 1983, 165-168).

The CUP was not a popular revolutionary movement in the fashion of earlier European revolutions, and the ideas it advocated were not shared by the conservative masses. Lacking both political status and broad political support, the CUP reckoned that it made more political sense to maintain the old political order and exploit it as a platform for gradual reforms instead of conducting an immediate comprehensive reform. On the other hand, the CUP was genuinely committed to scientific, modern and constitutional ideas and to the equality of the non-Muslim citizens of the Empire. The irreconcilable conflict between the CUP's necessity to sustain the old order and its commitment to far reaching reforms resulted in indecisive policies, sometimes zigzagging between two or more policies on various issues. Such indecisiveness characterized the CUP's treatment of religion (Hanoğlu 2008, 111; Ahmad 1968, 35).

The CUP included radical secular and materialist factions that opposed any role for Islamic religion in the public sphere. They conceived religion a barrier in the way of development and modernization and quested to restrict it to the private sphere, embracing the Protestant ethic and Lutheran reforms as examples to follow. The most ardent advocates of secularism and Westernization were the Garbcilik (Westerners) Movement whose leader, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, was among the CUP founders (Hanoğlu 1997). Also, the CUP's executive was suspicious of Pan-Islamist ideology and wary of any religious representation in the political sphere. Pan-Islamist ideology, the official

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14 For a detailed comparison between the French and the Turkish revolutions see Mardin 1971.
ideology of the Hamidian Sultanate, was perceived as a threat to the unity of the Empire and to the loyalty of its non-Muslim subjects. Accordingly, the CUP introduced some profound secularizing reforms, especially in law and education. The curriculum in the medrese system was revised and new, western oriented, civil and family codes were introduced. Sheikh-ul-Islam was removed from the cabinet. The Sharia court system was subjected to the secular Ministry of Justice. Women were granted more legal privileges (Zürcher 2005, 147-148; Hanioğlu 2008, 104).

In chorus, the CUP recognized the social and political strength of religion and thus embraced Islamic religion whenever the political situation necessitated it. One example was the CUP's attempt to win the political loyalty of Arab and Muslim subjects of the Empire during WWI by declaring it a Jihad (holy war). Another was censorship against anti Islamic publications, such as Ictihad, the Garbcilar movement's mouthpiece, and the confiscation of translated anti-religious European books (Zürcher 2005, 157; Hanioğlu 1997, 139). Furthermore, aiming to recruit the political support of the Ulema, the Young Turks emphasized, at least in rhetoric, that the Sharia was the normative source of the constitutional regime, and accepted a variety of religious demands, such as that the codifying of Sharia will persist, that prominence will be given to the Islamic character of the state, that the favorable status of Sheikh-ul-Islam in the Cabinet will be restored, that theatres and drinking places will be closed, and that women will be veiled in public (Farhi 1971, 279; Zürcher 2005, 120).

Although the CUP initial intentions were progressive, before too long it adopted dictatorial methods in order to sustain its rule. Thereafter an organized opposition to secularizing reforms, composed of religious factions and liberal forces who opposed the undemocratic ruling methods of the CUP, emerged against its rule. An important section of this opposition was the militant Ittihadi Muhammedi (the Muhammadan Union), which opposed modernization and advocated full reimplementation of Sharia laws. In combination, the CUP confronted resistance against the restoration of the constitutional order and granting equal rights to the non-Muslim inhabitants of the Empire. Riots against non Muslim communities sparked in different places throughout the Empire and
a wave of opposition gradually came closer to Istanbul (Farhi 1971, 279-282; Ahmad 1968, 28).15

On April 13th 1909, the Muhammadan Union, religious soldiers and students of religious schools (Softas) initiated a revolt against the CUP,16 demanding the restoration of Sharia laws. In the short run the revolt was successful. Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was officially still head of state, accepted most of the rebel's demands and the CUP leadership fled out of Istanbul. The events ended ten days later with the reinstatement of military order under the CUP's leadership, removal of Abdülhamid II from office and prosecution of the rebel's leaders, including Sheikh Vehdehti, the leader of the Muhammadan Union.

Despite the CUP's ability to recapture government the uprising shocked it, because it lucidly demonstrated the power of religious forces in Ottoman society and the fragility of the CUP's government. From that point on the CUP treated religion with silky gloves and avoided new frontiers with religious actors. Even the removal of Sultan Abdülhamid II from the throne, a necessary step given his support in the rebellion, was authorized by a fetva (religious decree) signed by Sheikh-ul-Islam, to provide it religious legitimacy (Farhi 1971, 285; Ahmad 1968, 34; Zürcher 2005, 124).

The CUP regime began to crumble around the beginning of WWI, when the Ottoman Empire found itself fighting on the German side and suffering serial defeats in the battlefield. The end of WWI left it beaten and devastated. In Anatolia alone the country suffered between three to four million casualties, three quarters of whom civilians. The Empire lost its Arab, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Balkan provinces and the British army occupied Istanbul and the Bosporus Straits. The CUP leadership lost its grip on government and fled the country to Europe. An Ottoman delegation was forced to sign a humiliating ceasefire agreement with the winning powers in Mudros on October 30th 1918 (Kayali 2008, 112-125). These consequences hastened a fundamental

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15 The most well known large scale violent event against a non-Muslim community in the Empire was the massacre of Armenians in 1915-1916 but there were many others.

16 It is noteworthy that senior Ulema did not support the revolt and later even denounced it overtly, but the lower ranks Ulema, religious students and the Sheikh of the Sufi Dervish orders were intimidated by the constitutional regime and sought its replacement with principles of the old order Farhi 1971, Ahmad 1968; Zürcher 2005, 120-123).
crisis of legitimacy in the torn country and facilitated the ascendance to power of the nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal.

To conclude, the Young Turks decade was an important transition period towards all encompassing secularizing reforms in consecutive decades and at the same time yet another round of indecisive policies toward religion which proved unsuccessful in uprooting the latter's embedded role in the imperial order. Hanioğlu's words summarize the main problem of the Young Turks and the lesson they provided to their inheritors:

The CUP leaders resembled the Tanzimat statesmen who, promoting the new while preserving the old, fostered an ambiguous dualism. They kept the Sultan, but introduced the Committee; maintained the Islamic identity of the regime, yet endorsed secularism...It was up to a younger generation of revolutionaries, no longer burdened by the responsibilities of Empire and the challenge of nationalism, to abandon the Ottoman past and build something radically new (2008, 111).

**Ideational factors - the burden of Islamic religion**

After exploring the structural and institutional trends that characterized the pre-republican era it is time to investigate in more details changes in the ideational environment that developed in the Empire and prepared the ground for secularist policies following the proclamation of the Republic. In this respect, the most significant ideational trend was the fading importance of Islamic religion as a component of identity among intellectual circles and consequent attempts to replace it by alternative ingredients of identity.

As long as Islam was conceived a primary identity among Ottoman subjects attempts to substitute it were deemed to failure. Nevertheless, toward the end of the Ottoman era, identity substitutes began to emerge, although they had been crystallized in a new nationalistic form only following the shift to republican order. As I already emphasized above, until the beginning of the reform era in the end of the 18th Century Islamic religion served as a primary source of identification for the Muslim subjects of the Empire. The reference community for Turks was the *Ummah*, whereas other
concepts with more secular meaning such as devlet (state) or vatan (motherland) were rarely used or discussed. Throughout the 19th Century and until the war of independence in 1918 the question of what element should serve as a primary component of identity in the Ottoman Empire began to be debated. Three main ideological alternatives and their respective political agendas were suggested and exercised during this long period: 1) Pan-Islamism; 2) Ottomanism (or Pan-Ottoman), and; 3) Turkism (and Pan-Turkism) (Landau 2004). In what follows I shall discuss the three ideologies and the interaction among them during the 19th Century, which brought Turkism to the fore.

Pan Islamism - The most ancient and culturally embedded identity in Ottoman society was based on Pan-Islamic Ideology. Islamic identity was present in Ottoman society since the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, and was shared by masses and elites alike. This collective identity was in retreat beginning in the mid 19th century due to the emergence of nationalist awareness among the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, mainly in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. While pan-Islamism was replaced for a short while by Ottomanism, it was brought back to the fore during the reign of Abdülhamid II in the end of the 19th Century. Pan-Islamism served the Muslim elite as an important legitimizing tool but at the same time generated local accusations of discrimination and aspirations for independence in non-Muslim provinces such as Macedonia and Serbia. In addition, Pan-Islamism risked legitimizing European involvement in the domestic affairs of the Empire, for protecting the rights of its non-Muslim inhabitants.

Ottomanism - In response to the problematic consequences of Pan-Islamism and in order to secure the Empire from internal and external threats, an alternative, Pan-Ottoman ideology, was developed. The aim of Pan-Ottomanism was to establish a constitutional political order that would grant equal rights to every subject of the Empire regardless of ethnicity, religion or language, and, in return, gain the loyalty of the Empire's non-Muslim population. Pan-Ottomanism was first introduced toward the end of the Tanzimat period and reached its peak popularity in 1876, when the first Constitution was approved. After a period of conservative setback during the reign of Abdülhamid II this system was restored by the Young Turks and served as the formal ideology of the regime until its final collapse in 1918 (Kushner 2006, 162).
Pan-Ottomanism was confronted by the Muslim majority that perceived it as a threat to their superior status as well as to the predominant Islamic character of the state. This conflict of interests led to recurrent violent riots against non-Muslims and to ridiculous political situations. The deposition ceremony of Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1909 reflects nicely the problematic nature and inherent inconsistency of Pan-Ottomanism:

The fetva left the decision between abdication and deposition in the hands of the Evliya-yi umur [those appointed in charge of affairs]. This underlines the acute structural contradiction that existed in the Ottoman State, which sought at one and the same time to be a supra-national State based upon equality between different religions and people, and a Moslem State. … While giving the Sultan's deposition the semblance of a step taken under the Şeriat, it had to place the matter in the hands of the Evliya-yi umur, who consisted in part of Christians and Jews. The crowning indignity was that a deputation consisting of two Moslems, an Armenian and a Jew came to present the Caliph, 'God's shadow on earth', with the fetva confirming his deposition (Farhi 1971, 294).

_Turkism_ - The third ideological alternative, Pan-Turkism, was developed much later, in response to the relative failure of the other two ideologies.17 While Pan-Ottoman ideology was based on West European civic nationalism, Pan-Turkism was based primarily on East European ethnic nationalism, and embraced the family of ethnicities and nations who speak Turkish dialects and are spread throughout Eurasia. Paradoxically, Pan-Turkism was not a manifestation of a genuine and spontaneous nationalist sentiment among Turks but rather a response to the emergence of militant nationalism among the non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities in the Empire. Growing nationalist sentiments among different people across the Empire left its Turkish-Muslim subjects the sole remaining loyal community. Gradually, Pan-Turkism was replaced by a local Turkish patriotic version (Lewis 1983, 275-276). Turkish identity was adopted and advocated by scholars and public figures who published books and articles that

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17 See, for example, a discussion on an article from 1904 that elaborated on the failure of both Ottomanism and Islamism by Yusef Akçura, a Tatar Turkic intellectual (in Lewis 1983, 261-262).
"rediscovered" the pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic history of the Turkish people and emphasized its richness and glory. Turkist thinkers mythologized the history of the nation and linked it to the ancient Hittite people who ruled Anatolia two millennia ago. The celebrated Hittite past was exploited in developing a sense of ethnic pride and identification among the Turkish people as well as a proof that the sources of the Turkish people can be traced to long before the birth of Prophet Muhammad and the beginning of Islam in the 7th Century. In the same manner it was argued that Turkish ethnicity share the same origins to European ethnicities, an assumption that served to strengthen the linkage between Turkey and the Western Civilization (Kushner 2006, 164-167).18

Toward the end of the 19th century the ideological discourse became more secular. Published works challenged the assumption that Islam was a sufficient bond among the people of the Empire. At the same time, Islam was under attack by Young Turk intellectuals who perceived it a barrier for development and prosperity and quested to replace it with positivist, materialist and scientific principles. Consider, for instance, the following famous quote of Abdullah Cevdet, the leader of the Garbcılar (Westerners) movement:

Religion is the science of the masses [whereas] science is the religion of the Elite. The science which is the religion of the elite has been continuously expanding and elevating whereas religion which is the science of the masses cannot be expanded and elevated in accordance with science and this is the most important illness of the Islamic World and Turkey (in Hanioğlu 1997, 140).

The shrinking size of the Empire and the fact that it remained mostly Turkish and Muslin made Pan-Ottomanism less appealing. Most intellectuals favored "Turkist" strand of nationalism that involved the promotion of a primarily secular interpretation of Turkish history, language and culture (Landau 2004, 29). Ziya Gökalp, the most

18 It is noteworthy that while the identity discourse was very much alive among the intellectual and political elite it did not really penetrate the Ottoman masses, who remained "largely indifferent" (Landau 2004, 24).

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celebrated Turkish-nationalist thinker was influenced by the works of Emil Durkheim and especially by Durkheim's ideas about the superiority of the nation over the individual and the need to merge between an ancient ethnicity (Turkish) and a developed civilization (the west). Later, Gökalp's writings greatly influenced Atatürk's nation building policies (Berkes 1954).¹⁹

The simultaneous growing distaste for Islamic religion and promotion of Turkish ethnic identity facilitated the creation of an alternative national ideology, one that emphasized secular ethnicity at the expense of imperial and religious sentiments. Young Turks intellectuals understood that Westernization required much more than administrative and institutional reform. For them it was:

Fundamentally a trans-valuation of values, a transformation of one's view of oneself, of one's history, and of one's place in the body politic...And according to European political theory this indispensable feeling of solidarity existed at its strongest only in nation-states, where it was nationality and language, not so much religion or loyalty to a dynasty, which bound men together (Kedourie 1968, 21-22).

The emerging ethnic secular Turkish identity served later in the foundation of the Republican regime which advocated a new fusion of Turkish-patriotic strand of nationalism in replacement of earlier ideologies.

Another practical problem, namely the Turkish will to distinguish their identity, and political and territorial attachment from that of the rest of the Muslim world, particularly from its Arab component, for both economic and cultural reasons, facilitated the emergence of a distinct secular Turkish nationalism. Economically, Arab societies, many of which (Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Jordan) under centuries-long Ottoman rule, were relatively underdeveloped. While the Turkish leadership promoted a developmental project, the Arab world preserved its traditional values and market structures. Thus the latter placed a heavy burden on the anyway crumbling economy of the Empire.

¹⁹ Unlike other (Pan)Turkist thinkers, however, Gökalp tried to incorporate Islamic identity as a core element of his nationalistic understanding (Zürcher 2005, 158-159).
Culturally, Arab societies have always been perceived inferior by the Ottomans. Modernization required affiliation with the values of the highly-developed western countries and detachment from the backwardness of the Arab world. Preserving identity bond with the Arab world risked the generation of new demands and expectations by the latter regarding the responsibility of the Republic toward its former provinces. The only way to distance the two societies was by downgrading the Islamic component in Turkish identity. A lucid reflection of this attitude can be found in a speech by Mustafa Kemal, before the National Assembly, in 1921:

Gentlemen, we are not chasing grand illusions and we do not pretend to do things that are beyond our capability…Instead of chasing after ideas we were unable to fulfill and in the way invite more threats and pressures upon us, it is better to return to our natural and legal boundaries, and acknowledge our limitations (Translated by the author from Lewis 2000, 283).

To conclude this point, the changing ideological discourse and the dire situation of the new Republic served as strong incentives for the Turkish leadership to define and distinguish Turkish territorial and ethnic boundaries by means of downgrading the centrality of Islamic religion as a component of collective identity.

*From Empire to Republic – The War of Independence*\(^{20}\)

The transition from Empire to Republic continued between 1918 and 1923. During that time a combination of devastating political situation, severe crisis of legitimacy to what was left of the Ottoman government and intellectual discourse that blamed religion for this dire situation facilitated the emergence of a nationalist movement that eventually founded an independent Turkish nation-state on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

Concentrating all its efforts during the war in defending the national territories, the nationalist movement paid very little attention to other policy areas, including the role of religion. Nonetheless, this period is important in two respects: first, it serves as a chronological link between the Ottoman and Republican regimes and as a founding

\(^{20}\) This section is based mainly on Bernard Lewis's account of the events (Lewis 2000).
moment in the life of the Kemalist movement. It thus signifies an important political juncture that had crucial impact on state-religion relationship after statehood was achieved. Second, and arguably more important, in striking contrast to the Republican era, during the war of independence the nationalist movement respected the traditional role of religion and did not launch any reforms that were later so identified with the Kemalist project. The nationalists acknowledged the power of religion as both a recruitment tool and a legitimizing mechanism and thus did their best to avoid confrontation with such a strong social and political force at a time when broad support for the national struggle was needed. They even occasionally manipulated Islamic religion in accordance with their needs.

It took almost a year between the signing of the Modrus Armistice Agreement in 1918 and the emergence of the nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal. The devastating situation throughout the defeated Empire invited recurrent aggressions by Western Empires, neighboring states and former provinces. In order to defend the attacked regions the Muslim population and former CUP officers established between 1918 and 1919 local Associations for the Protection of Rights (AFPR) throughout the country, in Izmir, Trakya (Thrace), Edirne, Kars, Erzurum Trabzon and Urfa.  

The spark that ignited the Turkish struggle for independence was Greek invasion to Izmir in May 1919 in an attempt to occupy and annex Western Anatolia. Although the defeated Turkish people almost got used to frequent violations of their sovereignty, such an assault by a former Ottoman province was too humiliating. The AFPR and remnants of the Ottoman army organized to fight the Greeks, under the leadership of General Mustafa Kemal who was appointed general inspector of the Samson region. From that moment Mustafa Kemal devoted himself to building a Turkish nationalist movement and headed the struggle for the preservation of Turkish lands and the foundation of an independent Turkish state.

Mustafa Kemal's exceptional leadership and military skills enabled him to form a nationalist army by rearranging the scattered troops under his command. When reports about his independent activities arrived in Istanbul Mustafa Kemal was ordered by the

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21 These associations were also been known as "societies for the defense of rights".
22 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the biography of Atatürk in length. For an excellent elaborate discussion on Atatürk see: Mango 2008.
government to return to Istanbul. In response he resigned from the army, took off his uniform and from that point on led the nationalist movement as a civilian (Lewis 2000, 200). Kemal joined the AFPR in Eastern Anatolia which served as an institutional platform for the activities of the nationalist movement. The association organized two conferences in Erzurum and Sivas in 1919 in which a National Congress was formed, Kemal was officially elected Chairman, and a National Convention was approved. Ankara, a small Anatolian city became the movement's headquarters in December 1919 and later became Turkey's Capitol. From this point onward there had been in Turkey two rivaling governments – a formal, yet ineffective one, located in Istanbul, and a nationalist one, led by Kemal, in Ankara. While the formal government tried to appease European powers and save whatever parts of the Ottoman Empire, the nationalist movement concentrated its efforts in defending the territories of Turkey proper from foreign invasion and later in replacing the incapable government in Istanbul.

The disparity of goals between the national movement and the formal government escalated following the signing by the latter on a humiliating armistice agreement in Sèvres on August 10th 1920, which permitted Western Empires to annex pieces of territory in Anatolia. This agreement hastened transition of power and popular support from Istanbul to Ankara. Between December 1920 and September 1922, the Nationalist forces conducted successful battles against Greek troops in the Battles of İnönü and Skarya, against Armenian and French troops, and also against the Chaliphate Army, Ottoman troops which remained loyal to the Sultan (Lewis 1983, 550). The successful military outcome led to the approval of the Lausanne Agreement in July 1923, which restored Turkish territorial integrity and national pride. It also consolidated the legitimacy and leading political role of the nationalist movement and its leader Mustafa Kemal, and legitimated the establishment the Turkish Republic on 29 October 1923 (Lewis 1983, 204-206).

Importantly, in early stages of the War of Independence the nationalist movement repeatedly declared its loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph and refrained from any anti-religious rhetoric. While accusing the official government in corruption and treason,

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23 Even though Kemal was by then a civilian he personally commanded the crucial stages of the Skarya battle.
the nationalist movement stated that its main goal was the protection of the Caliph. This policy changed in April 1920 after Sheikh ul-Islam issued a fetva declaring that killing the rebels (i.e. the nationalist movement) in the name of the Caliph is a religious obligation. Surprisingly, though, instead of disregarding or denouncing the manipulation of religious authorities for political aims the nationalist movement employed the same strategy. In May 1920, the Mufti of Ankara, supported by more than 150 Islamic scholars, published a counter fetva, according to which religious decrees written and published under external pressures were void, and Muslim soldiers should assist the nationalist movement in freeing the Caliph from political imprisonment. Likewise, when Mustafa Kemal consolidated his rule over Turkey in 1922 and abolished the Sultanate, he was careful enough not to touch the Sultan's other title of Caliph, knowing the great meaning it symbolized for Turks. The Caliphate was abolished two years later, only after the Republic was founded (Lewis 203-204), although months before the inauguration of the Republic, Kemal himself provided a clue regarding his plans for the Caliphate, and religion in general, in a press conference on 16th January 1923:

This state has no relationship with the Caliphate anymore… We cannot go one step forward if we leave the people to themselves… The law of revolution is superior to other existing laws and rules (Encyclopedia Cumhuriyet).

Several months later, following the inauguration of the Republic, the long term political and ideational processes described above came to full expression and the implementation of a new radical and comprehensive policy towards religion was unleashed.

Conclusions
This chapter surveyed the evolution of structural and ideational factors which were in play during the final phase of the Ottoman Empire. This review reinforces nicely the proposition of the Bounded Integration Model according to which the role of religion was subject to significant changes during the pre-Republican era, which shaped the nationalist movement's worldview towards Islamic religion and its desired role in Turkish Republic society and politics. In particular, the failure of former reforms to save
the Empire from eventual collapse, complemented by their constant inability to uproot the entrenched role of religion in Ottoman society, both as a pivotal layer of identity and central component in the institutional structure of the Empire, as well as the pressing need to detach the fate of the Turkish nation from that of other Muslim non-Turkish societies, set the ground for the nationalist movement's conclusion that religion must be marginalized from public and political life. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, this was the departure point to a radical and comprehensive secularizing policy conducted by the Kemalist movement following the proclamation of the Republic.
Chapter Four: Turkey's Authoritarian Laicism 1923 – 1950

This chapter discusses the introduction of restrictive state policies toward religion during the first three decades following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, between 1923 and 1950, societal responses to these policies and the resulting patterns of religion-state relationship that took shape. This period had been distinctly different than subsequent decades in modern Turkish history in two respects. First, during this period the nationalist movement reengineered the socio-political structure of the republic and initiated a radical secularizing campaign that set the foundations for the current state-religion relationship in Turkey. Second, in the absence of popular support the nationalist elite, who had been determined to carry out this ambitious secularizing project, gave up on democratic practices, multiple political parties and tolerance of official opposition in order to be able to accomplish its ideological plan. This long undemocratic phase in the history of the Turkish Republic shaped the relationship between different segments in Turkish society and the state. In particular, it was responsible for the formation of a strong alliance between the Kemalist leadership, the armed forces and the bureaucracy that enforced a repressive and intolerant social transformation on Turkish society while excluding and repressing deviating groups and worldviews. In accord with the assertions of the Bounded Integration Model, this had long term negative consequences on the degree of pluralism in Turkish politics and the relative weakness of its civil society. The repressive policy toward religion and religious manifestations influenced the type of responses from religious segments in society. Some of the responses were characterized by peaceful dissent while others were violent, but both types met by harsh measures on the part of the state, and created a vicious cycle of dissent and repression throughout the one party period. Essentially, the state-religion dynamics in Turkey during this period is a nice illustration of the negative consequences that might arise from restricting religion below the minimum bound of constructive integration in a largely religious society.

Revolutionary Transformation

Following the successful outcome of the war of independence the nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal established itself as the unchallenged leadership of the Turkish
Republic. The main goal of this leadership was to build a modern society on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. As is discussed above in Chapter Three, religion was perceived a key reason for the backwardness and eventual disintegration of the empire and thus an obstacle in the way of achieving modernization and westernization. Therefore the post independence government sought to alter the role of religion in Turkish society and to marginalize it from any public and political influence (Shmulevitz, 2006; Ahamd 1980). But Kemalism was far more ambitious than just an attempt to restrict religion to the private sphere and isolate it from political influence. The goal of Atatürk's social project was to comprehensively transform Turkish society from one civilization (Islamic) to another (Western) by engineering new Turkish social values and behavior. For Mustafa Kemal and his followers, becoming "civilized" was the most important task for Turkey, one that must not be ignored or resisted, because only it can secure the future of the nation. Secularism was seen in this respect as part and parcel of the modernization project, which advocated the adoption of scientific rationalism at the expense of religious beliefs and practices. Indeed, "Turkey was made secular because secularism and rationalism went hand in hand" (Ahmad 1980, 754). Mustafa Kemal's enthusiasm about the civilizing project that Turkey must take upon itself is nicely reflected in one of his most well known speeches, in Kastamonu, on 24 August 1925:

> Our thinking and mentality will have to become civilized. And we will be proud of this civilization. Take a look at the entire Turkish and Islamic world. Because they failed to adapt to the conditions and rise, they found themselves in such a catastrophe and suffering. We cannot afford to hesitate any more. We have to move forward...Civilization is such a fire that it burns and destroys those who ignore it (Kasaba 1997, 27-28).

This transformation was perceived so essential that realizing it justified every extreme measure. On the social level these measures included hyper engineering of society, the abandonment of old habits and social conventions, and their replacement with new practices (a process that was practiced before in the west and was by no means unique to republican Turkey) (Scott 1998). The new republican elites desired a complete adoption of a (western) civilized behavior, identity construction and values:
Hence, the ideal attributes of a progressive and "civilized" Republican individual included wearing neckties, shaving beards and moustaches, going to the theater, eating with a fork, husband and wife walking hand in hand in the streets, dancing at balls shaking hands, wearing hats in the street, writing from left to right, and listening to classical western music (Göle 1996, 23).

It is noteworthy, though, that contrary to Atatürk's rhetoric this project was elitist in nature and limited in scope. It aimed mainly at the urban centers and within them especially at the already western oriented elite. The Kemalist elite left the Turkish masses to their own fate while socially reengineering only selected parts in society (Ahmad 1980, 755; Kadioğlu 1996). This selective modernization, in both cultural and structural terms, had impacted only part of society and was responsible, in the absence of the uniting force of religion, for the creation of a center-periphery cleavage (Mardin 1997).

No less important, the modernization process which Turkey adopted at the time was superficial in the sense that it included only behavioral and structural practices but did not borrow the social, political and moral elements of modernization that include social mobilization, pluralistic political discourse and acknowledgment of basic civil rights. The Kemalists embraced a misleading perspective according to which transition to modernization requires the marginalization of religion from the public sphere and justifies a strong and intolerant state, at least in the transitory phase, in order to accomplish this ambitious project. The capacity to take radical and arbitrary measures in a polity, however, is limited in democratic regimes. This is because democracies must respect basic human rights and civil freedoms and to allow various channels of expression. Moreover, in democracies the regime is dependent on popular support and thus cannot conduct policies that will most likely not bring the electorate to reelect it in the future. Therefore, governments with intentions to carry out radical policies on various issues face a dilemma of choosing between two costly alternatives: One is to take the time and effort to persuade a majority of the populace that the suggested

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24 Professor Ibrahim Kalin, director of SETA, an interview on 11 May 2009.
25 Professor Attila Yayla, founder of The Association of Liberal Thinking, an interview on 12 May 2009.
policies are beneficial, and risk the possibility that they will not be successful in doing so. In this case the incumbent government might be forced to give up its policies or, even worse, to lose its control over political power. The other alternative is to abandon or temporarily give up on democratic principles and procedures and impose what are believed to be necessary steps toward deep social change.

The undemocratic option seemed more effective to the Kemalists, but its long term social and political costs were higher than expected. The insistence of the Kemalists to transform society into a modern, secular and western one required a strong centralistic state (Devlet) and came at the expense of democratic practices and tolerance of plural civil society. While the Kemalist regime largely failed in consolidating its worldview in society, especially in regard uprooting religion as a source of identification and element of social organization, undemocratic practices and weak civil society had become, and still are, important features of contemporary Turkish politics (Göle 1996; Toprak 1996; Heper 1991, 48).

The nationalist movement was a reaction to the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire, the blame for which was directed at the relative backwardness of the empire, which was caused, according to the Kemalists, by the pervasive and anti-reformist role of Islamic religion in it for more than a century. This reality together with the ability of the national leadership to protect the national territory and preserve Turkey's independence granted the national leadership the legitimacy to undertake controversial political measures and made it committed to a radical change in the political and cultural circumstances that brought the Ottoman Empire to its end. Consequently, building a stable, modern and western-like nation-state was perceived the primary goal, and certainly more important than democratic practices. This order of preferences is also reflected in the six guiding principles of Kemalism - republicanism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism and statism – that do not include democracy.\footnote{Although these were formally introduced into the Turkish Constitution as a constitutional amendment only in 1937, they served as the political compass of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party – RPP, in Turkish CHP) since the foundation of the Turkish Republic on October 29th 1923.}

Therefore, whenever any of these principles had been in conflict with democratic or liberal principles the Kemalists preferred the implementation of the former at the expense of democracy.
The Kemalist Alliance

As many scholars of Turkey argue, the Kemalist transformative project was an elitist, from-above one. Unlike other famous revolutions (French, American) the Turkish revolution had not been generated from below by grass-root activists or forces in civil society, and did not enjoy the support of the masses (Mardin 1971, 199; Heper 1991). This characteristic of the Kemalist nationalist project was responsible for two political occurrences. First, the Kemalist elite did not have the capacity to penetrate the peripheries of the state and to organize mass mobilization to support its political goals. Hence, it was not able to compete with political powers that expressed and utilized more popular ideas and had better capacity for mass mobilization. This meant that multi party democracy might have worked against the hold of the Kemalists over political power. Hence, until the Kemalist political platform - the Republican People's Party (RPP) - improved its mobilization capacities, it was neither willing nor politically able to allow political opposition to its rule (Penner-Angrist 2005). Second, the absence of mass political support forced the RPP to look for alternative allies that would have supported its modernizing project, would have secured it from political challenges and would have assisted in pushing it forward. These circumstances created a strong alliance between the RPP, the military and the bureaucracy with the intellectual backup of the intelligentsia, the legal profession and the media (Lewis 2000, 370). The formation of this alliance took place during the war of independence and was further strengthened after the establishment of the Republic. It created very committed and intolerant elite that coerced its worldview on Turkish politics and society since the foundation of the republic and still has a strong grip on certain realms of state power and politics in contemporary Turkey.

The armed forces have been the political cornerstone of the state throughout the life of the Ottoman Empire. In this regard Heper argues that "the state model in this polity essentially came from the military" (Heper 1991, 46). As is elaborated in Chapter Three, most of the pre Republican reforms dealt with the modernization of the military, especially through modern education and guidance by Western armies. Consequently, the military became both a target of and a catalyst for modernization. During the last
decades of the empire the military became more involved in politics and the peak of this trend was the Young Turk revolution of 1908, which had been lead by military officers and had ruled the country for a decade.

Beginning in the War of Independence the military became Mustafa Kemal's strongest ally and supporter of reforms. Atatürk himself and his second in command İsmet İnönü were reputable military generals and the same was true regarding their closest circle of followers, advisors and political allies. Atatürk was part of the Young Turks' group of military officers and participated in their activities since 1906. When the government in Istanbul removed Mustafa Kemal from his military position in 1919, out of fear of his growing political influence, a majority of high ranked military officers remained loyal to him (Zürcher 2005, 186). In fact, "for every top-ranking front commander who remained in Istanbul until the end, there were two who joined the Anatolian cause" (Rustow 1959, 533). Their formal education in military schools during the time of the CUP regime (1908-1918) and their military experience trying to curb the nationalistic revolts among the non-Turkish minorities of the empire generated in them strong nationalist feelings. Finally, the military successes against Greek aggressions during the War of Independence under Atatürk's command made his leadership skills admired by the military (Rustow 1959).

After the foundation of the Republic it was only natural that Atatürk would have sought political support from among the ranks of the military. It is true that Atatürk took some measures to isolate the military from politics, especially as a response to potential political challenges from this direction, but the close intermingling between the two realms continued throughout the history of modern Turkey. There is solid evidence about strong ties between military officers and civil politics. For instance, 20 out of the 25 generals who served during the War of Independence entered into politics and were recruited to the Cabinet and Parliament. Between 1920 and 1943 the ratio of former military officers in the Grand National Assembly was between one-sixth and one-eighth (Rustow 1959). This historical alliance created a perception among the commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) that the military is responsible to, and is the guardian of, the social transformation of Turkey. As Ümit Cizre asserts:

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TAF's legitimization of its dominant role lies in its identification of its 'interests' with those of the nation; it sees its mission as a continuing transformation of the country's values in the direction of modernity. Secularism is the pillar, the principle and the proof of its role (Cizre 2008, 303).

The reliance of Atatürk on the political backing of the military made him consult with the military and seek the approval of its commanders before executing important political moves. This was true also with regard to the disestablishment of Islamic religion from the republic. Before taking his first important secularizing reform, the abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, Atatürk met in person with military commanders and made sure that the military supported his intended political moves, which they did (Weiker 1981, 101). Obviously, this long lasting alliance between the nationalist movement and the armed forces came at the expense of forming broad civil coalitions in support for reforms in the early years of the Republic. It also consolidated the political role of the military in the Turkish Republic with long term negative consequences on the future nature of Turkish politics and its democratic culture (Rustow 1959; Weiker 1981, 101; Yavuz 2009, 31).

The other partners in Atatürk's campaign were the Turkish bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, the legal profession and the media. During the reforms era in the Ottoman Empire the Turkish bureaucracy modernized and westernized and became an agent of reforms in the Ottoman state. This social strata adopted western values, imitated western behavior and in general quested to bring Turkey closer to the west. A new generation of bureaucrats replaced the old Ottoman bureaucracy and brought with it the perception of a strong state as the base of the Republic's social model, and a new 'operational code' which was responsible for the formation of new state institutions under administrative secular law, "all of which had a tacit background of positivist rationality" (Mardin 2006, 12). The tendency to empower the state at the expense of individual freedom and initiative was further strengthened in the republican era and especially by making statism one of the formal constitutionally protected pillars of the Kemalist movement. The bureaucracy was both a tool and a partner in Atatürk's transformation of Turkish society and saw Kemalism as the only possible path towards stability and prosperity. This intolerant vision dictated a very strict attitude in the service of the nation and thus
did not welcome civic participation or civil spheres of operation outside the realm of the state. Indeed, this legacy of strong and intolerant bureaucracy has had its impact on Turkish society and politics until today. As Toprak argues, "A major obstacle to the development of civil society is an over-empowering bureaucracy which leaves little room for individual initiative and collective pursuit of interests within autonomous domains, free from state interference" (Toprak 1996, 91).

The role of the intelligentsia in developing modern nationalist ideas and its influence on the thinking of the Young Turks and later on Atatürk himself was already detailed in Chapter Three. The legal profession and the media became new professional domains only in the late Ottoman Empire, the former because the legal system rested until the 19th Century on the principles of Sharia and the latter because of very low rates of literacy in the empire until this period. Nevertheless, these two professions had played an important part in the transformation of Turkey (Lewis 1983, 370). The legal profession was responsible for the replacement of the old religious legal system with modern continental legal codes, which were based on modern positivistic principles. The role of the media became a tool of the Kemalist regime for spreading its ideology and reforms in a populist manner. In the period between 1923 and 1950 the government did not allow a free media. The only daily newspaper that operated throughout the period was Cumhuriyet (Republic). This newspaper was affiliated with the regime and practically served as its mouthpiece. All other newspapers that were not under government control were closed down in 1925, except for one liberal newspaper, Yarın (Tommorow) which belonged to a friend of Atatürk and thus was allowed to operate until 1931 (Zürcher 2005, 212).

To conclude this point, Atatürk did not enjoy popular support for his secular and nationalistic reforms. Nevertheless, he was determined to carry out these reforms, based on his strong belief that this was the only possible path to preserve the Turkish nation-state and bring it to the level of the most developed countries. In the absence of mass support Atatürk recruited and allied with those sectors in society that accepted the vision of the Kemalist movement. This alliance formed a very strong coalition that controlled the country for decades, but this came at the expense of democratic transition and pluralistic discourse. It also created a path-dependent power structure in Turkish politics.
with long lasting consequences. This coalition still struggles to preserve its grip over Turkish politics and has been responsible for most of the non-democratic tendencies in Turkey until today. Moreover, the power of this group was responsible for the creation in Turkey of political duality which is an important characteristic of contemporary Turkish politics. As Attila Yayla, the founder and head of the Association for Liberal Thinking, who is known as the father of liberalism in Turkey, and who was sentenced to prison in 2006 after criticizing Kemalism and the cult culture around Atatürk, explained to me:

> In Turkey there are two governments. One is democratic elected government… it is expected to act within the limits of the constitution and it is accountable…the other is a bureaucratic government. It is not accountable but it limits democracy and it limits the democratic elected government.\(^{27}\)

I shall now describe the reforms that this coalition imposed which were responsible for shaping Turkish institutional design as well as its political culture, and the responses it generated among the religious and traditional population.

*Secular Reforms*

Comprehensive state policies that aimed to uproot and isolate religion from Turkish social and political life commenced immediately after the declaration of independence. Most of the reforms were introduced during the formative years - the first five years post independence, between 1924 and 1928. A second wave of reforms took place in the mid 1930s. These reforms eliminated the role of religion in the Turkish republic, defining the relationship between the state and religion in a way that has determined the evolution of this relationship throughout the republican era to the present (Kuru 2007).

Acknowledging the importance of Islam in the life of the general populace, Atatürk's secularization campaign did not try to establish an American type of secularism, one that maintains a strict separation between the political sphere and

\(^{27}\) Professor Attila Yayla, 12 May 2009.
religion but at the same time respects the right of every religious group to conduct its rituals in public, or what Ahmet Kuru calls passive secularism. Instead, it adopted from the French experience a more assertive and repressive form of secularism which is called laicism (*laicite* in French, or *laiklik* in Turkish). As opposed to passive secularism, the goal of laicism is to subject the religious establishment to state control and supervision. Historically, such a radical form of secularism had been exercised by the Jacobins during the Third French Republic (Toprak 1981; Stepan 2005, 17; Kuru 2007; White 2008, 357; Bethke-Elshtain, 2008; Yilmaz 2005, 387; Kadioğlu 1996). The reason for adopting such form of secularism in Republican Turkey was the leverage of Islamic religion in Turkish society and politics which made Atatürk fear its capability to challenge its regime, in addition to his belief that religion should not be a significant dimension in a truly modernized society.

As I am going to demonstrate in more details below, the Kemalist revolution attempted to relegate Islam to a marginal status in every dimension of Turkish public life. It had done so by taking measures against formal Islam (i.e. Islamic state institutions) and folk Islam, namely the Islamic orders (*Tarikat*) that were very popular and served as important socializing institutions among the lower classes, as well as by eliminating cultural and social aspects of Islamic identification and making the Turkish public sphere more secular and western (Zürcher 2005; Toprak 1981).

Secularizing reforms began less than five months after the foundation of the state. The first step was to remove potential challengers for political power and legitimacy, in order to consolidate the rule of the national movement and complete the political transformation of Turkey from an Islamic empire to a modern republic. On March 3rd 1924 Atatürk passed an act in the Grand National Assembly (GNA) that abolished the *Caliphate* (the complementary role of the Ottoman Sultan as head of the *Ummah* - Islamic community of believers) and sent the remaining members of the Sultan's family into exile. This act followed the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 and the declaration of a Republic in 1923, which together consolidated the rule of Atatürk and signified the construction of a new political system in Turkey (Akşin 2007, 192). This act generated significant dissatisfaction even among ardent supporters of secular reforms. After all, the *Caliphate* was an institution of 500 years old and it symbolized...
above all the Islamic nature of Turkish society and its ties with the rest of the *Ummah*. But this was exactly why the reformers saw it essential to dissolve it: "An institution which had its theoretical base in a supra-national concept of solidarity was, of course, inimical to the interests of the nationalist movement" (Toprak 1981, 45).

On the same day Mustafa Kemal passed two additional laws that began a broad series of secularizing reforms. The first law unified the education system under the Ministry of Education. This outlawed the old system of religious schools (*medreses*). Also, private courses of Koran outside the public education system were prohibited by law. The second act abolished the Ministry of Religious Affairs and instead established the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*), a bureaucratic institution that was controlled by the Prime Minister's office. The logic of this act was to eliminate the autonomous political influence of religion in the government and subject it to the Prime Minister's authority (Yilmaz 2005, 388).

A month later, in April 1924, the state enacted another major secularizing reform with the closing down of the religious *Sharia* court system and the abolition of the position of *Sheikh-Ul-Islam*, which was the highest Islamic authority in the state. Although by that time the religious courts were responsible only for matters of personal status, this act terminated the duality that characterized the legal system in the Ottoman era for more than a century and subjected the entire system to a secular Ministry of Justice. This act was followed by the adoption of western-oriented civil and criminal codes in 1926. Finally, on February 25, 1925 a law was passed in the GNA that prohibited any use of religion in politics and treated such uses of religion as treason against the nation.\(^{28}\) This set of laws radically undermined the formal status of Islam in state structures and drove it out of the three most important realms of life – politics, education and law.

The next phase involved a full scale attack on folk Islam and its individual manifestations. In November 1925 the state outlawed the wearing of the *fez*, a hat that was common in the Ottoman Empire. All civil servants were now forced to wear a western type hat. The irony was that this hat was not an authentic Islamic symbol. It was imported to Turkey from Europe in the beginning of 19\(^{\text{th}}\) Century during the rule of

\(^{28}\) *Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia*, 25 February 1925.
Sultan Mahmut II as part of his modernizing reforms. Nevertheless, as far as the state was concerned this symbol became too closely identified with the old regime and with religiosity, and hence it had to be abandoned. Together with the hat reform the state prohibited the wearing of religious cloths, not only in public but also during prayers in mosques, and outlawed the use of epithets or titles with religious identification such as dervish and sheikh.29

Another aspect of repression against folk Islam was the abolishment of the Tarikat, the religious orders that were very popular among the masses and the lower classes throughout the country. These institutions were based in nomadic culture and combined Islamic practices with pagan ceremonies and different types of worship. They served as key elements in the Ottoman social matrix and provided a socialization framework for many subjects of the Empire. Most famous and popular among them were the Mevlevi, Bektashi, Nakshibandı, and Suleimancı orders and they all established strong ties, both formal and informal, with the central administration of the Empire (Mardin 2006). According to Bernard Lewis, although the initial target of reforms was mainly state Islam, Atatürk soon realized that the real danger might come from the religious orders that were not submissive to state authority and opposed secular reforms. Consequently, in 1925 the state issued laws that closed down the orders, their lodges (tekke) and places of worship (zaviye), and also forbade entrance to tombs of religious saints which were used by the orders for religious rituals (Lewis 1983, 328).

Another, positive, aspect of social transformation was a significant change in the status of women in Turkish society. Reforms in this realm were also perceived as antireligious because Islamic religion is patriarchal in nature. In fact the discriminating nature of Islam against women is one recent explanation given to the democratic deficit and lack of liberal rights in the Arab and Muslim world (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Part of this change was achieved by abandoning the religious legal code and court system that systematically discriminated based on gender. In addition, the state pushed women to pursue careers in masculine professions, such as academia, law, media and even aviation. For example, one of Atatürk's adopted children, Sabiha Gökçen, became the first female combat pilot in the republic and maybe the world. In March 1929 the first

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29 Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia, 30 November 1925.
beauty contest in Turkey took place,\textsuperscript{30} and during the same year the Minister of Internal Affairs declared that women will soon be given the right to vote and be elected.\textsuperscript{31}

With regard to symbolic secularization, undoubtedly one of the most important reforms was the adoption of the Latin alphabet instead of Arabic script for the written Turkish language in November 1928. Although it was not directly aimed against Islam, it created a social and cultural revolution in Turkey for two reasons. First, it was another symbol of the transformation of Turkey from the Islamic civilization to the western one. Adopting Latin script brought Turkey closer to the western world and away from its Arab neighbors and Middle Eastern past. Second, Arabic script was the language of the Koran and it maintained the connection of the population with Islamic religion and with their Ottoman foundations. By eliminating the ability of the masses to read the Koran in Arabic, the Kemalist state disconnected them from their cultural and religious roots and made it easier to indoctrinate them into becoming a different people. The next phase in this direction was the purging from Turkish of Persian and Arabic vocabulary and later the prohibition on teaching these languages in Turkish high schools in a law that was enacted in 1929. Indeed, "That the Kemalist language achieved its objective of closing the door on the Islamic-Ottoman cultural heritage is unquestionable" (Toprak 1981, 42).

Other symbolic reforms that also intended to ease connections with the west included the replacement of the old religious measurement method with the western numeric and weight systems in 1928, adoption of the Gregorian calendar instead of the Islamic lunar one in December 1925\textsuperscript{32} and adoption of the western time system in 1926.

The first round of reforms ended with a legal and symbolic act – the removal of two articles from the Constitution of 1924, which completed the divorce of the Turkish Republic from Islamic religion. These were the 2\textsuperscript{nd} article that stated that Islam is the state religion in Turkey and the 26\textsuperscript{th} article that stated that the application of Sharia is one of the responsibilities of the GNA. In 1924 the Kemalist state faced stronger opposition, felt politically insecure and did not dare to erase Islam from the 1924 version of the constitution. Yet, after five years in power and considerable success in coercing reforms Atatürk's government felt secure enough to take this bold move. This change

\textsuperscript{30} Cumhuriyet, 8 March 1929. \\
\textsuperscript{31} Cumhuriyet, 7 April 1929. \\
\textsuperscript{32} Cumhuriyet, 26 December 1925.
completed the disestablishment and marginalization of Islam from Turkish society and politics.

After a few years without significant new legislation on religious issues, a second wave of reforms started in the beginning of the 1930s. In 1934 the GNA passed a law that mandated the adoption of family names by all citizens, and according to it granted Mustafa Kemal the surname Atatürk (father of the Turks). Another symbolically important reform was changing of the weekly Sabbath or official day of rest from Friday, which is the Islamic holy day to Sunday, the European holy day, something that improved commercial connections with the West but was foreign to most Turks and came at the expense of social alienation. The reforms that generated most opposition from the public during the 1930s, however, were attempts to create an artificial Turkish variant of Islam by translating the Koran and the call for prayer (Ezan) into Turkish. It was another attempt to isolate Muslim Turks from their religious foundations. Added to this was the weaning of religious schools off any state resources until there remained no allocation of state funding to religious schools in 1932 (Toprak 1981, 49).

This massive and rapid campaign of reforms was unprecedented. Externally, it portrayed Turkey in bright colors and raised excitement among European scholars about the ability of traditional societies to transform and modernize. Upon closer observation, however, the measure of success of these reforms was very limited, primarily because of its inability to penetrate to all the sectors and regions of Turkey. While the urban center had gone through revolutionary transformation in values and habits, the peasant population of Turkey had not been influenced very much by these reforms. The penetration of the education system to villages was limited, rates of literacy remained low and people did not use modern things such as family names in their daily life. In this respect the Kemalist modernization project was partial and selective (Zürcher 2005, 227).

After Atatürk's death on November 10th 1938 the state did not launch significant new reforms. Nevertheless, the state's manipulative and political treatment of religion during the 1940s until the end of single party rule only deepened the cleavage and tension between the state and religious segments in society. I shall discuss this in more

33 Cumhuriyet, 27 November 1934.
details later but first I would like to explore the society's responses to secularization reforms and the patterns that had been developed in the relationship between religion and state throughout this period.

**The emergence of a vicious cycle - societal responses to coercive secularism**

The *Bounded Integration Model* predicts that religious marginalization in largely religious societies might alienate religious sectors in the society from the state and channel their frustration to extreme forms of behavior. This creates a destructive pattern of state-religion interaction which harms both the religious groups and the regime. The social responses to religious marginalization in Turkey reinforce the propositions of the *Bounded Integration Model*. The full scale attack on the practices and beliefs of Muslim Turks and the significant downgrading of the public and political roles of religion were not welcomed by Turkish society. Although antireligious acts enjoyed the umbrella of the law, they were foreign to the lifestyle of most Turkish people, especially in rural areas and the small and medium sized cities in the periphery. The response of religious people was diverse and could generally be divided to three categories: 1) peaceful individual dissent; 2) peaceful collective dissent; and 3) violent dissent. The authoritarian regime, however, treated all these types of protest and manifestations of belief in the same repressive way. Wearing a *fez* or calling for the restoration of *Sharia* were considered an offense against the state and against its modernizing project, and were treated in the same manner as armed revolts or violent acts. This extreme and insensitive state response polarized and further alienated society from the state and its reforms. The chronology of events demonstrates that this polarization escalated the tension between the state and religious groups and individuals in society and generated both harsher state measures as well as more extreme manifestations of dissent. The first round of state-society interactions around antireligious reforms started with the foundation of the republic and continued until the Menemen incident in 1930 which symbolized an important turning point in the relationship between the two factions.

The first documented incident of peaceful individual dissent took place in January 1924, before the beginning of reforms. In this incident a religious man, Hafiz Ibrahim Effendi, was sentenced to 1000 years of imprisonment because he distributed
booklets saying that morals are in Islamic doctrines and that according to religion women should be covered.\textsuperscript{34} Obviously this punishment was totally disproportiona\textsuperscript{35} nd it reflected the intention of the regime to repress any manifestation of religion that might endanger or challenge its rule. In two other documented cases several years later individuals who advocated a return to religious principles and against the reforms, without the use of violence, were immediately arrested by the police.\textsuperscript{35} In another incident in 1930, a flag full of verses against the republic and Atatürk's RPP that was unfurled on top of a building in the city of Adana led to the imprisonment of 30 people by the police.\textsuperscript{36} The state did not tolerate any expression of opposition or advocacy of religious content and acted against them in the harshest way.

Another type of peaceful demonstration of dissent came in the form of collective action, which can be seen as a very spontaneous and unorganized type of civil society activity. The most well known example was in response to the legislation of the hat reform in November 1925. Surprisingly, the population was less concerned about the established role of religion in the state than restrictions on religious everyday life practices. The \textit{fez} was a very basic symbol of Muslim culture whereas the modern European hat had been perceived as a non-Muslim custom. In response to this legislation spontaneous demonstrations took place with men wearing their hats in protest against the new legislation. Such protests were reported to have taken place in the cities of Sivas, Keyseri, Erzurum, Rize, Maras and Giresun. In all these places the protests were repressed in the most ruthless way. The account of the events in \textit{Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia} portrays a very violent state response against the protest. In Sivas the leader of the protest, Imamzade Mehmet Effendi was sentenced to death and others were imprisoned.\textsuperscript{37} In Erzurum 13 protesters were sentenced to death\textsuperscript{38} and in Rize 8 protesters were sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{39} It is noteworthy that \textit{Cumhuriyet} was the regime's mouthpiece and thus it most likely did not report the full scale of violent state actions against religious protesters. In order to fight effectively against what was seen as

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia}, 6.1.1924.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Cumhuriyet}, 12 November 1929 and 23 September 1930.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Cumhuriyet}, 17 October 1930.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia}, 20 November 1925.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia}, 22 November 1925.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Cumhuriyet Encyclopedia}, 25 November 1925.
challenges to the Kemalist revolution the state established Military Courts of Liberation (also called Independence Tribunals) that followed state orders and did not show much respect for basic human rights. According to Zürcher, the number of people who were imprisoned by these courts reached 7500 and the number of those who were executed reached 660 (Zürcher 2005, 204). Restrictions on freedom of expression in the media were another example of state repression against dissenting views. In addition to closing down of opposition and free media in 1925, the state closed several newspapers in Sivas and Bursa in 1929 because they expressed opposition to language reform. This was yet another demonstration of state actions against civil society activity in order to prevent the possible emergence of significant opposition to the regime.

While most of the opposition was peaceful, the reforms also generated some violent incidents against state authorities. Three of them had particular importance. The first was a revolt which started in the territory of Kurdistan on 13 February 1925. This revolt was organized and headed by Sheikh Said, a Kurdish member of the Nakshibendi order. While one of the reasons for it was the repression of Kurdish identity by the state, most scholars agree that the primary motivation for this revolt was religious - the restoration of the Caliphate and Sharia laws in the Republic. Moreover, the peasants who supported the revolt did so solely on religious terms (Ahmad 1991, 7; Kadioğlu 1996, 187; Akşin 2007, 201; Zürcher 2005, 202). This revolt lasted for 3 months until was defeated in May 1925, after the capture and execution in April of Sheikh Said and 46 other leading rebels. But it gave the government a persuasive excuse to take authoritarian and repressive measures against society in general. During the struggle against the rebels, the state passed a Law for the Maintenance of Order which granted it dictatorial powers. Acting in accordance with the powers granted to it by this law, the state established Independence Tribunals, closed down all free media, outlawed the Sufi orders and their lodges and forced them to go underground. In addition, the state shut down the very short-lived (November 1924—June 1925) Progressive Republican Party (PRP), which was a first attempt in opening the political scene to opposition views. The state prosecutor argued the PRP supported the rebellion and used religion for political purposes (Ahmad 1991; Zürcher 1991). Among these measures, the prohibition of the

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40 Cumhuriyet, 7 January 1929.
activity of the dervish orders radicalized their followers, who kept practicing underground, and was responsible for the eruption of the Menemen incident in 1930 (below).

The second violent incident was a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in Izmir in 1926, which was again based on opposition to secularizing reforms. The plotters were headed by Ziya Hurshid, a former member of the GNA who opposed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. They planned to hide a bomb in Atatürk's car during organized planned visit to the city of Izmir. This plot was uncovered by the police and the plotters were trialed and executed by the Independence Tribunal in Izmir. This incident unleashed another wave of state repression, with massive arrests and trials, including of former military generals, members of the Young Turks movement and even personal friends of Atatürk who became his political opponents. This wave of repression practically eliminated all types of possible opposition to the regime – military, religious and political (Lewis, 2000, 222).

After a relatively stable and quiet period between 1927 and 1930, except for some small scale sporadic incidents, the Kemalist elite confronted the boldest symbolic attack on its authority in 1930 in the city of Menemen. On December 23, 1930 Dervish Mehmet, a Sheikh from the Nakshibendi order, and his followers rebelled against the Republic. They called for the restoration of the Caliphate and the Sharia and waved a green flag (the color of Islam) which was taken from a nearby mosque. The incident escalated quickly:

Reserve Officer Fehmi Kubilay, on arriving at the scene, tried to intervene but was shot dead by reactionaries who cut off his head, stuck in on a pole and displayed it to the crowd. Two watch men were also killed. Repression followed and martial law was declared. A military court was established, which condemned twenty eight people to death (Akşin 2007, 210).

According to a report in Cumhuriyet the numbers of people arrested in the event reached 200 and those who were sentenced to death reached 37.\textsuperscript{41} Determined to demonstrate its strong hand and authority, following the event the state also closed down the mosque

\textsuperscript{41} Cumhuriyet, 3 January 1931 and 30 January 1931.
from which the riots had started, and built a museum for the reforms. In addition, a republican monument was erected in the memory of Kubilay in the center of Menemen.\footnote{Cumhuriyet, 8 March 1931 and 11 March 1931.} Immediately after the incident the state closed down yet again a new opposition party, the Free Republican Party (FRP) which was inaugurated only three months earlier, in August 1930. This was the second and last short experiment in democratic practices throughout the single party period. The excuse for the unlimited suspension of any political opposition was the alleged link that the Kemalist elite said existed between opening the political arena to opposition parties and subsequent political abuse of religion, first in 1925 and then again in 1930. The conclusion of the state was that "the multi-party system could not work until the revolution was better established" (Akşin 2007, 210).

The event itself was minor but it traumatized the Kemalist elite. It not only challenged and embarrassed the state, but it also confirmed the opposition of the masses toward state efforts to move the country forward and the bitter realization that secular reforms did not take root in society (Kadioğlu, 1996, 187). The bitter feelings among the elite were expressed well in the following passage by Yakub Kadri, a Kemalist author and diplomat:

It's as though nothing has happened all these years, as though…the idea of any of our radical reforms has altered anything in this country…who were the passive, silent observers of this tragedy? Citizens of this secular, contemporary republic of Turkey. That is the true Calamity (Ahmad 1991, 8).

Yet, instead of sober reassessment of the ramifications of its antireligious policies, the state decided to impose an even more militant version of secularism which became the official policy of the 1930s. For this reason, the Menemen incident was an important milestone in the evolution of state policies towards Islam and the possible uncivil reactions to it.

During the 1930s the state took more coercive efforts to redesign an artificial Turkish type of Islam. It was done several ways. The state introduced in 1932 a
translated version of the Koran and enforced the conduct of prayers in Turkish.\textsuperscript{43} This of course generated spontaneous as well as organized opposition which was repressed harshly by the state. Lay people and \textit{Imams} (Islamic clerics) who insisted on conducting the prayer in Arabic were arrested throughout the country.\textsuperscript{44} The Ministry of Internal Affairs outlawed the use of any epithet with a religious connotation although titles like \textit{hoca}, \textit{hafiz} and \textit{molla} were commonly used in everyday language. The state also prohibited the use of religious clothing outside of mosques.\textsuperscript{45} The security apparatus hardened its hands on dervish orders that continued their worship practices underground. This direct attack strategy on the foundations of Islamic identification and practices not only failed in achieving the marginalization of Islam, but facilitated the use of religion for political mobilization by opposition groups and further alienated the state elite from its subordinate masses (Zürcher, 2005, 225).

\textit{End of era – Atatürk's death and the transition to multiparty system}

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had been the leader of the nationalist movement since its foundation and the engine behind the radical social and cultural transformation that the Kemalist state enforced on Turkish society. With his passing away on November 10, 1938, the reform era came to an end. A year before his death, in 1937, the RPP inserted into the constitution the six principles of Kemalism - republicanism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism and statism - that guided Atatürk's reform project. This act celebrated Atatürk's political legacy and upgraded the Kemalist principles to constitutional status, establishing them as the ideological base of the Turkish political system (Kili 1980).

In the remaining years before the opening of the political arena to the participation of additional parties in 1945, the Kemalist elite did not launch any new significant reforms with regard to religion. Rather, it tried to consolidate earlier reforms and strengthen its rule over the country. The Kemalist alliance that was formed during the war of independence backed the Presidency of İsmet İnönü who became the second

\textsuperscript{43} Cumhuriyet 21 January 1932, 31 January 1932, 4 February 1932.
\textsuperscript{44} Cumhuriyet reported incidents that included the arrest of people in Bursa (6 February 1933, 8 February 1933, 12 February 1933), Biga (16 February 1933), Corum (31 March 1933), Amasya (29 May 1933).
\textsuperscript{45} These prohibitions came in the form of manifestos by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Cumhuriyet, 27 November 1934.
president of Turkey and chairman of the RPP after Atatürk’s death. It is significant that the military was instrumental in securing the candidacy of İnönü. It was yet another manifestation of its political power and tendency to intermingle with the political realm. Close friends and advisors of the late Atatürk did not have much appreciation for İnönü and they sought to appoint someone else to the presidency. Fevzi Çakmak, the Chief of Staff, openly expressed the military's position that İnönü should be the next president, making the army's position the primary determinant of the highest political position in Turkey (Akşin 2007, 233).

İnönü's Presidency was interrupted shortly after he took office by the breakout of World War II in 1939. Throughout the war, even though Turkey maintained neutrality, the Turkish state and population were more concerned about external threats and economic burdens than about internal politics. Very few religion-state incidents took place during this period. Shortly after the termination of the war, in September 1945, the Turkish Cabinet approved the establishment of the National Development Party (NDP), which was headed by Nuri Demirdağ, and with this ended the one-party regime. Three months later, in January 1946, the Democratic Party, which replaced the RPP in government following the 1950 election, was officially established.

The dramatic decision to democratize the Turkish political system was influenced by several personal, organizational, socioeconomic and external factors. On the personal level, Akşin emphasized the relative plural and democratic attitude of İnönü and his intention to make the political system more inclusive immediately after he became head of state (Akşin 2007, 234). Regarding organizational influence, Penner-Angrist emphasized changes in the political discourse in Turkey that facilitated the willingness of the RPP to tolerate political opposition to its rule. In particular, Penner-Angrist suggests that during the presidency of İnönü the RPP improved its ability to mobilize the masses by increasing its activity and penetration rate in Turkish society, compared with earlier decades. Also, the depolarization of the political discourse, with a guarantee given by all new parties that they will limit their political agendas within the ideological boundaries set by the principles of Kemalism, meant that new opposition

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46 Cumhuriyet, 5 September 1945.
47 Cumhuriyet 8 January 1946.
parties did not really challenge the foundations of the Kemalist project (Penner-Angrist 2005). In some respects this negotiation on the terms of opening the political arena was similar to the practice of pactng as a method for departing from authoritarian rule, which was common among Latin American and Southern European countries (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). A third factor was related to inter-elite conflict. According to Waldner, conflict among Turkish elites, especially between state elites and the business sector, around the growing grip of the state over the economy and its illiberal tendencies, had diminished the business sector’s support for the state and required the ruling Kemalist elite to seek broad political base among the general population (Waldner, 1999, 56-59).

Additionally, international pressures obviously played a role in compelling İnönü to pluralize and democratize the political arena. By the end of Second World War Turkey feared the growing power of the USSR on its Eastern border and desired to join both the UN and NATO, as well as to receive very much needed economic and technological aid from the United States in order to protect itself from the Soviet threat. The United States conditioned its support in Turkey’s willingness to adopt a more democratic and plural political system. This American demand persuaded İnönü to open the system to multiparty participation (Zürcher 2005, 243-245).

The formation and presence of political opposition required tactical changes by the RPP in an effort to maintain its control over governmental power. In response, the RPP introduced populist reforms, especially in the realm of religious recognition as well as used political maneuvering which combined legal as well as unlawful actions.

More specifically, the RPP understood that it must gain popularity among the general public, and thus became the first party to systematically manipulate religion for political purposes in the Kemalist era. Between the years 1947 and 1950 the RPP engaged in a significant attitudinal change toward religion, primarily, but not only, in education. In January 1947 the RPP congress decided that some special/personal education of religion outside the public school system would be permitted.48 A couple of weeks later the Ministry of National Education announced that parents were free to teach

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48 Cumhuriyet, 28 January 1947.
their children about religion and religious values outside the classroom.\textsuperscript{49} In July of that same year the Ministry of National Education permitted the opening of courses and seminars on religion.\textsuperscript{50} Another surprising policy was allowing, for the first time, the reading of Koran verses by a religious scholar, in a mosque, on the commemoration day for Atatürk.\textsuperscript{51}

Between 1948 and 1950 the flow of pro-religious policies became stronger. In February 1948 the RPP congress decided to allow Koran courses as part of the public schooling system in elementary schools.\textsuperscript{52} In May 1948 the RPP Assembly decided that Imam Hatip religious schools would be reopened and in January 1949 the Ministry of Education exercised this decision.\textsuperscript{53} Further, in June a law was passed that allowed the opening of a faculty of theology,\textsuperscript{54} and in February 1950 the Cabinet decided to reopen historical tombs throughout the state, primarily those of Ottoman Sultans Yavuz and Fatih.\textsuperscript{55} In this respect, one ardent follower of Atatürk's philosophy was correct to note that: "of course, after the death of Atatürk, Kemalism has witnessed some erosion."\textsuperscript{56} These policies, however, were insufficient for recruiting the political support of those whose basic cultural and religious identification had been repressed by the RPP for such a long time.

The RPP also tried to block the growing power of the opposition by using political maneuvering tactics. The party announced that general elections which were scheduled to take place in July 1947 would take place one year earlier, in July 1946, only six months after the establishment of the DP in order to lower the latter's chances to gain power and build an effective political organization before the election. This act was met with considerable criticism by the opposition, but the DP decided to compete in the election and won 62 out of 465 seats in the GNA. After the elections it became clear that the ruling party manipulated the votes and was involved in large scale irregularities of vote counting. Celal Bayar, one of DP's leaders argued in the assembly following the

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Cumhuriyet}, 8 February 1947.
\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Cumhuriyet}, 3 July 1947.
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Cumhuriyet}, 8 November 1947.
\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Milliyet}, 18 February 1948.
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Milliyet}, 21 May 1948, and 16 January 1949.
\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Milliyet}, 5 June 1949.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Milliyet}, 18 February 1950.
\textsuperscript{56} Professor Alparslan Isikli, member of the management board of ADD, the Association of Atatürk's Thinking, an interview on 13.5.2009.
publication of the election results that based on the party's investigation the DP was entitled to 279 seats in the GNA (Zürcher 2005, 248). These tactics kept the RPP in power for three more years but were unable to impede the growing popularity of the opposition. Finally, in the next elections, which took place on May 14th 1950, the DP won the election and replaced the RPP in power after three decades during which the former was the sole political power in Turkey. This transformation marked the beginning of a democratic phase in Turkish politics which considerably changed the dynamics of interaction between the (unelected) Kemalist alliance, the (elected) government and religious factions in society.

Conclusions
This chapter investigated state policies towards religion during the first, non-democratic phase of the Turkish Republic and the subsequent evolving patterns of the state-religion relationship during this time. The above account demonstrates nicely several relevant points regarding the applicability and analytical rigor of the Bounded Integration Model.

First, the Turkish experience supports the assumption about the continuity between pre-state and state attitudes towards religion and the transformation of pre-state agendas into state policies after the state is established. The Kemalist state had made considerable efforts to enforce an assertive type of secularism on Turkish society. The strong ambition to uproot religion from Turkish life as part of a comprehensive civilizing transformation was so central in Kemalist ideology that it justified extreme measures. In the absence of popular support for this ambitious project the Kemalist elite was willing to give up democratic politics and introduce them only when the goals of the revolution would have been completely achieved, something that have never actually taken place.

This experience reflects the problematic one-size-fit-all prescription of modernization theory, which the Kemalist elite fully adopted and tried to implement, while refraining from exercising democratic practices and respect for basic civil rights. In order to achieve cultural and social modernization and secularization the state was willing to enforce its policies on society regardless the low level of support for this coerced transformation among the population. The Turkish experience ultimately
contradicts modernization theory because secularization never came, but the logic of modernization could have justified the undemocratic nature of the secularizing reforms until Turkish society was “ready” for political democracy. It does demonstrate how difficult it is to become truly democratic when authoritarian policies empower the military and elite the way they did in Turkey.

Second, in the absence of popular support the Kemalist elite needed an alternative political alliance to backup its radical policies. The alliance that emerged included the Kemalist political party, the RPP, and other none civic state institutions, primary among which were the armed forces, the bureaucracy and the recruited media. During the one party rule this alliance provided a solid political support for the Kemalist project. Yet, since it was not required to defend its worldview in the public arena, this alliance developed an illiberal, intolerant and undemocratic approach towards politics. This shared worldview maintained the Kemalist alliance intact, preserved its central role in Turkish politics, albeit without electoral support, and has had considerable negative impact on the way politics has evolved in Turkey in recent decades.

Third, the modernizing policies of the Turkish state were unable to penetrate the vast periphery of Turkish society. In this respect, most of the country remained loyal to its traditional practices and ways of thinking. As long as modernization was selective and partial these two Turkey's (modernizing state and traditional society) hardly interacted. In recent decades, however, the modernizing project reached almost every part of the country and consequently facilitated a more intense urban based interaction between the secular and religious societies. In opposition to the prediction of modernization theory, rural urban immigration was not complemented by increased secularization. In essence, the opposite has happened. Immigrants to the cities brought religion with them, preserved its importance as means of collective identity and social organization, and made the big cities of Turkey, an exemplar of modernization, a new arena of secular-religious confrontation. This evolving pattern has been responsible for the great polarization in contemporary Turkish politics and society.

Finally, the Turkish experience reveals the crucial difference between undemocratic and democratic political systems when the role of dominant religion is considered. As long as the Kemalist elite had ruled the country without any political
opposition it felt free to act against religion without being required to make any concessions to religion in return for political support. Immediately after the political climate has changed the ruling elite was forced to reconsider its policies in relation to religion and tried to appeal to the general public by presenting a new and more lenient approach towards religion. This demonstrates the difference between undemocratic treatment of religion, that is decided upon arbitrarily and for opportunistic political reasons, instead of being a reflection of public preferences, as should be the case in democratic societies. It also reveals that when religion is so deeply embedded, decades of constant repression fail in uprooting it from the society. If religion cannot be dismissed, modernization projects should acknowledge and integrate it along the process, and in return enjoy the support of its followers, instead of trying to repress it. In that way religious publics will become part of civil society and bring the state-religion interaction above the minimum bound of recognition and into the realm of constructive interaction.
Chapter 5: Democratic Challenges to Kemalist Hegemony 1950-2007

The current chapter explores the evolution of the relationship between the state and religion in Turkey under democratic settings, between the years 1950 and 2007. As I will demonstrate in the following the opening of the political arena to plural participation caused a considerable change in the nature of the religion-state interaction in Turkey in comparison to earlier decades. Indeed, this change is regarded by some a more significant milestone in Turkish politics than the establishment of the Republic in 1923. For the first time the general public was given sovereignty and the ability to express its political preferences, whereas the establishment of the Republic transferred political power from one elite group to another.57

The investigation of this period highlights the relative advantages of the dynamic and open-end perspective of the Bounded Integration Model. Transition to democratic governance modified the reciprocal relationship between elected governments and religion-based civil society actors. First and foremost, it pushed political parties to recruit support from the electorate by manipulating religion in politics in various ways depending on their prospective electoral base and ideological standpoint. Second, transition to democratic governance put some restraints on the arbitrary powers of unelected bureaucratic institutions and facilitated the emergence of religiously based civic activity that, in turn, demanded further recognition of religion in the state. On the other hand, the debate about secularism deepened the societal cleavage among elected governments, religious actors and the Kemalist establishment, with the latter blocking democratic challenges to the secular political order. Even though throughout this period religious actors contested Kemalist hegemony with considerable success *de facto*, they failed in translating this success into institutional or legal changes *de jure*.

In addition to democratic transition, Turkey's rapid modernization since the 1950s and particularly the 1980s onwards, affected Turkish politics in general and the state-religion relationship in particular. As I already mentioned above in Chapter Four modernization in Turkey under the one-party rule had been limited and partial. During subsequent decades, however, Turkey has experienced rapid modernization which

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57 Professor Attila Yayla, founder of The Association of Liberal Thinking, an interview on 12 May 2009.
included mass immigration from rural settlements to urban centers. Internal immigration accelerated during the 1980s and was responsible for more intense encounters between the Kemalist urban and secular center and the traditional, rural and more religious periphery. As figure 5.1 (below) demonstrates the proportion of the urban population increased from 18.5% in 1950 and 28.2% in 1965 to 40.6% in 1980 and 59% in 1990. In Istanbul alone, the population grew from 2.77 million inhabitants in 1980 to 6.75 million inhabitants in 1990, most of whom newcomers from rural regions who settled in shantytowns around the city (Shmuelevitz, 1996, 163).

Diffusion of modernization to the entire population provided religious actors better exposure to politics and improved their mobilizing capacities. They have learnt how to take advantage of modern instruments such as the media and the economy in recruiting popular support and formed numerous civic groups and associations that distributed pro-religious ideas at the grassroots level. Consequently, there emerged a capable conservative counter-hegemonic leadership that introduced new challenges to the Kemalist establishment's worldview and hegemonic control.

**Figure 5.1 – Population growth in Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Urban Area (10001+)</th>
<th>Rural Area</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Ankara</th>
<th>Izmir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18,790,174</td>
<td>3,475,046 (18.5%)</td>
<td>15,315,128 (81.5%)</td>
<td>860,558</td>
<td>226,712</td>
<td>198,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20,947,188</td>
<td>3,894,708 (18.6%)</td>
<td>17,052,480 (81.4%)</td>
<td>983,041</td>
<td>288,536</td>
<td>227,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31,391,421</td>
<td>8,859,417 (28.2%)</td>
<td>22,532,004 (71.8%)</td>
<td>1,742,978</td>
<td>905,660</td>
<td>411,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>44,736,957</td>
<td>18,167,495 (40.6%)</td>
<td>26,569,462 (59.4%)</td>
<td>2,772,708</td>
<td>1,877,755</td>
<td>757,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>50,664,458</td>
<td>25,889,750 (51.1%)</td>
<td>24,774,708 (48.9%)</td>
<td>5,475,982</td>
<td>2,235,035</td>
<td>1,489,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>56,473,035</td>
<td>33,326,351 (59.0%)</td>
<td>23,146,684 (40.9%)</td>
<td>6,748,435</td>
<td>2,553,209</td>
<td>1,762,849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religious challenges, however, did not produce linear responses. As long as religious demands were not perceived as risking Kemalist hegemony, the Kemalist responded with restraint or tried to co-opt the religious sectors in a manipulative fashion. However, this approach unintentionally contributed to the empowerment of religion beyond Kemalists’ expectations and put more pressure on it to transform and pluralize. In contrast, whenever religious demands posed serious threat to the Kemalist establishment’s grip on power, the latter launched undemocratic responses in the form of military interventions or restrictive judicial decisions.

In time religion has increased its role in Turkish public affairs. As is demonstrated in Figure 5.2 (below), I detected 919 cases of media reports on religion related events between 1923 and 2007. These events were divided to four periods or phases (an elaborate explanation to this division is provided below). The average number of reported religious events in every period demonstrates significant increase in the centrality of religion in Turkey’s public sphere between 1923 and 2007. In the non-democratic era, between 1923 and 1950, there are 145 events, an average of 5.37 events per year. In the first democratic phase, between 1951 and 1980, there are 361 events, an average of 11.06 events per year. In the second democratic phase, between 1981 and 1997, there are 233 events, an average of 13.7 events per year. Finally, in the recent decade, between 1998 and 2007, there are 206 events, an average of 20.6 events per year. Increased coverage of religious issues in mainstream media has been accompanied by the development of a distinct Muslim consuming culture and fashion (Navaro-Yashin 2002), a vibrant Muslim business sector and religious unions (Yavuz 2006), dominant religiously affiliated political parties and comprehensive changes in the strategy of engagement of religious actors with the Kemalist state (Turam 2007).

Nevertheless, as the Bounded Integration Model suggests, path dependency played a crucial role in limiting the boundaries of the political discourse and the ability

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58 All events were searched and found in two daily newspapers, depending on the period of time. Between 1923 and 1948 I used Cumhuriyet, the only available daily newspaper throughout this period. However, Cumhuriyet has a clear Kemalist orientation. Thus I preferred to avoid using it after the media market was open to additional daily outlets. From 1948 onwards I used Milliyet, a relatively mainstream daily newspaper which was active throughout the period. The "events" I registered include every event with religious connotation in one of six categories: 1) political; 2) institutional; 3) legal; 4) symbolic; 5) economic; and 6) mass mobilization, and initiated by one of five actors: 1) government; 2) parliament (political parties); 3) religious groups; 4) the military; 5) society.
of the state's apparatus to accept a far reaching modification in the formal secular structure of the state. The Kemalist foundations of Turkey impose strict ideological restraints as well as biased distribution of power that is very hard to break or modify. Even though religion has become significantly stronger in the society and in politics throughout Turkey's democratic stage this empowerment is not reflected in the institutional and constitutional arrangements of the country.

This dynamic interaction and its perplexing outcome cannot be adequately explained by traditional theories of religion and state. The strong and positive correlation between modernization and the centrality of religion in Turkey stands in clear contradiction to the postulation of modernization theory that religion will fade away as modernization progresses. It thus requires students of religion and politics to abandon the over deterministic assumptions of modernization theory and instead concentrate on the new spaces that modernization opens for religion in society and politics. Also, the dynamism that characterizes the state-religion relationship in Turkey cannot be adequately explained by static theories of civil society which assume constant confrontation and a zero-sum-game interaction between the civic and political spheres. Changing behaviors and patterns of engagement by both the state and religious actors should be understood as part of an ongoing reciprocal constitutive process. New strategies of engagement from below and from above alter the dynamics of the interaction between the state and religious publics and the distribution of power among social and political actors. This in turn has an effect on the level of pluralism and openness in society which is directly correlated to the stability and quality of democratic governance.

In Turkey, the rich history of the state-religion relationship makes any attempt to employ static argumentations misleading and over-simplistic. On the other hand, without dividing the history of the state-religion relationship into distinct phases one can easily lose track of the analytical argumentation and fall into an idiosyncratic description of this relationship. Thus, in order to make the analysis more constructive I suggest that the religion-state relationship during Turkey's democratic period should be divided into three phases: 1) the early democratic period (1950-1980), 2) illiberal religious empowerment (1981-1997); 3) liberal religious empowerment (1998-2007), which
correspond to changes in the level of modernization, state policies toward religion, and patterns of engagement of state authorities and religious actors with each other.

**Figure 5.2 Average numbers of religious events per year**

The early democratic period (1950-1980) begins immediately following the opening of the political arena to competition. During this period the state relaxed restrictions on religion and exercised accelerate yet still partial modernization. Consecutive governments acknowledged the cultural role of religion and since 1970 approved the formation and participation in politics of parties with explicit religious affiliation and agenda. On the other hand, throughout this phase the state maintained bureaucratic supervision over religion and resisted any religious defiance to the Kemalist underpinnings of the regime. The general public was mainly concerned with recurrent economic crises and daily hardships and religion was given only secondary political concern. Although the relationship between elected governments and religious groups partially met the expectations of both sides the Kemalist establishment did not hesitate to intervene in politics in defense of the secular regime. Toward the end of this period the Turkish society deteriorated into rampant violence and political instability, though not
primarily due to religious behavior. It ended with the most significant military intervention in Turkish politics, in September 1980.

Turkey's second democratic phase, or illiberal religious empowerment (1981-1997) signified an advancement in the level of modernization and state endorsement of religion from above as a conservative check against radical politics, particularly by extreme left wing factions. State acceptance of religion as a conservative force in society and as social control mechanism extended the boundaries of public religious expressions, and made religion a more pivotal social and political force. Unfortunately, despite this positive trend both factions (Kemalists and Islamists) failed to develop a more pluralistic agenda that acknowledges the legitimacy of the other camp and saw the struggle between the secular and Islamist alternatives in black-white colors. Instead of respecting a 'thin consensus' both factions sought to impose their authoritarian worldview in society. Under these circumstances the Kemalist establishment feared, and justifiably so, that losing political power might be too costly and was determined to eliminate any threat to its supremacy. This period culminated with the ascendance to political power of the religious Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and a subsequent military intervention, known in Turkey as the 28 February process in 1997, that banned this party and its leaders from politics and reinstalled a strictly secular order.

The third, most recent phase in Turkish democracy, liberal religious empowerment, (1998-2007) witnessed the ascendance to political power of a new reformist religious party - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party - AKP) that won two consecutive national elections in 2002 and 2007 and by August 2007 took control over most governmental strongholds - the Executive and Legislative branches and the Presidency. During this decade the AKP initiated, with the active guidance and support of civil society actors, a deep behavioral and terminological change that altered the nature of the engagement between religious actors and the state. AKP coalesced with other anti-Kemalist groups in society and posed unprecedented challenges to the Kemalist establishment by borrowing a western-liberal discourse, embracing a pluralistic vision for Turkish society and politics and demanding more religious freedom in its name. As I argue in more details below, AKP's political success should be attributed to the party's ability to build broad power bases in civil society,
including a myriad of youth groups, organizations and associations, both religious and secular, which supports the party's political claims. Yet, once again, the political preferences of the Turkish electorate, as they were reflected by the electoral turnout in 2002 and 2007, have not been translated to formal changes in state policies or to reconfiguration of the role of religion in Turkish politics. Restrained by almost century-old non-pluralistic political arrangements the relationship between the Kemalist state and religious actors remains highly polarized and is still governed by undemocratic limitations on the boundaries of the political discourse. This reality deepens the gap between the actual social and political leverage of religion in Turkish politics and its reflection in the formal political structure and impedes the consolidation of a plural political system in which every social and ideological group has the right to express itself in public and influence political processes and outcomes.

**Early democratic Period 1950-1980**

In the following section I explore the state-religion interaction in the first three decades following the establishment of competitive elections in Turkey. While this is a relatively long and dynamic era in regard changes in the state-religion relationship I decided to treat it as one unified period for several reasons. First, during most of this period the representation of religious preferences was done by proxy, by popular parties that represented religious causes mainly for political recruitment purposes. This situation changed in 1970 with the establishment of religiously based parties, but soon thereafter Turkish society destabilized and the latter did not have the opportunity to realize its full electoral potential. In correspondence, until 1980 the political and social power of religious actors, including parties, was relatively small. Finally, throughout this period the Kemalist establishment maintained more or less the same restrictive policy vis-à-vis religion, a pattern that changed only after the 1980 coup. Nevertheless, in order to clarify the picture as much as possible, I will discuss every decade in this period separately.

**The first democratic decade and the 1960 coup**

During the first democratic decade the strong state legacy remained influential in Turkey and the number and volume of activity of civil society organizations, both religious and
secular, was minimal. Hence, most of the debate about the role of religion in the state took place between the elected government and the Kemalist establishment (Toprak 1996; Heper 1991). RPP's hegemonic rule in Turkish politics ended in 1950 with the transfer of government to the hands of Democrat Partisi (Democratic Party – DP), which produced significant distrust and animosity between the two parties. The Kemalist opposition and its bureaucratic allies believed that the DP was doing all it could to marginalize the RPP and reverse the achievements of the Kemalist project. Similarly, the DP feared that the RPP was doing everything in its power to delegitimize its rule and replace it by undemocratic means (Karpat 1972, 355; Harris 1970). However, despite mutual criticism the new ruling party did not develop distinct policies in most areas and remained generally loyal to Kemalist principles. This was rather expected given that the DP's two superior leaders, President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, served for many years as deputies for RPP before they split from the latter and formed the DP.

The DP's two immediate concerns were improving the national economy and widening its political base of support. In the economic realm there were positive signs of economic growth in the first five years of DP rule. Turkey strengthened its economic relationship with Western countries and the government allocated significant resources to industry and agriculture that helped in modernizing these sectors. But the party's leadership lacked formal economic knowledge and did not know how to prevent the collapse in 1955 and the economic crisis that followed. In part, the economy deteriorated because of massive governmental investments in different places for immediate political gains but without economic reasoning (Simpson 1965, 147). Another reason was a change of policy from initial emphasis on liberalism and private enterprise to a more statist-centralist policy toward the end of the 1950s, in resemblance with the policies of the former ruling party. This relatively short lived economic prosperity was insufficient to secure sustainable growth. Structural modernization, especially literacy and urbanization, remained limited and did not reach many parts of Turkey's vast territory. Narrow modernization was also responsible for the relatively low mobilizing capacities of the religious segments in society. The political role of religion remained relatively
marginal and did not reflect the true weight of religion in the lives of the Turkish populace.

The DP was also concerned about its electoral base of support which was substantially different than that of the RPP, and composed of farmers and peasants from the Anatolian periphery who were, on average, more religious and traditional than the urban masses. The party realized that in the countryside, where Kemalist reforms did not penetrate, religion remained a very strong social and political force. In fact, "The more remote a village from the capital or from any large urban center, the more likely were its inhabitants to be hardly aware of the secularization laws" (Landau 2004, 133). Thus, in order to win and secure the support of the rural population the government lifted some restrictions on private religious observance. Importantly, however, while the DP acknowledged the cultural importance of religion to the masses, the resurgence of religion was not perceived by the party as an ideological goal but rather was understood as an efficient recruitment tool (Reed 1954, 271; Cizre 1996, 237). At the same time, the government was well aware of its delicate relationship with the Kemalist establishment and genuinely committed to the principles of Kemalism. The policies of the DP government towards religion throughout the 1950s reflected an ongoing attempt to balance and maneuver between two opposite poles – winning the support of religious Turks by acknowledging the role of religion while adhering to the prescription of Kemalist ideology (Margulies and Yildizoğlu 1988, 13-14; Toprak 1981, 75).

The DP tolerated religious expressions that until then were prohibited and eased the pressure on private observance of religion. An immediate reform taken by the new government was lifting the ban on calling the Ezan (call for prayer) in Arabic.\(^59\) Three months later the Cabinet approved compulsory religious courses in elementary schools.\(^60\) Parents who did not want their children to participate in those lessons had to request exemption in advance. This new policy contradicted earlier policy that prohibited religious content in the public education system. However, to balance the pro-religious change, the task of determining the content of religious courses in the public schools was not left in the hands of the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) but became the

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\(^59\) *Milliyet*, 17 June 1950.
\(^60\) *Milliyet*, 4 October 1950.
responsibility of the Ministry of Education, which was controlled by ardent Kemalists. This example illustrates how the DP maintained a balance between appealing to its electorate and remaining loyal to Kemalism. Other pro-religious policies included the insertion of Koran readings into the state radio program and informal tolerance of religious garb in public. Also, the state expanded the Imam ve Hatip Okullari (religious schools for preachers and prayer-leaders) system by the opening of fifteen new schools. The number of students attending Imam Hatip schools had risen from 876 in 1951 to 3,377 in 1960. Finally, the state launched a training program of Imams (prayer-leaders) to 1000 Turkish villages (Reed 1954, 274; Weiker 1981, 109).

While the populace was satisfied with the pro-religion reforms some populist suggestions by DP deputies disturbed the delicate balance between religion and Kemalist principles and generated fierce criticism. In May 1951 several DP deputies from Konya (the most religious city in Turkey) proposed a bill that reversed many of Atatürk's reforms including permission to wear fez, compulsory head cover for women, the abolishment of sculptures (that are forbidden according to Islam), and most importantly, the return to Arabic alphabet and reestablishment of Sharia laws. This initiative destabilized the equilibrium between the pro-religious actors and the Kemalist establishment and produced criticism in the media, the parliament and among parts of the general public. The turmoil came to an end only after the Konya deputies rejected the proposed bill and organized a meeting in which they expressed their loyalty to Atatürk and adherence to his reforms. On another occasion, in 1957, DP deputies proposed a bill to pardon an Imam who criticized the RPP for being antireligious and made propaganda in favor of the DP. This proposition was opposed by the RPP and its leader, former president İnönü, accused the DP in manipulating religion for politics. Facing such pressures the assembly was forced to reject the proposed bill and the Imam remained in jail.

In other respects, though, the DP government remained loyal to Kemalism in that it maintained strict segregation between religion and the public and political spheres

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61 Milliyet, 30 September 1950.
62 Milliyet, 13 May 1951.
63 Milliyet, 15 May 1951.
64 Milliyet, 8-11 June 1957.
and rejected any involvement of religion in politics. During the 1950s numerous raids were launched against the Tarikats (religious orders), especially the Ticani, Nurcu and Bektashi.65 The DP's leadership used secular rhetoric and supported the expulsion of party members who advocated a return to religious rule and the reestablishment of the Caliphate.66 Furthermore, the government was sanctioned the abolishment of the short lived Millet Partisi (the Nation Party), which was accused in manipulating religion for politics,67 and passed a law that prohibited criticism against Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology (Cizre 1996, 237) as well as a law that prohibited political parties that manipulated religion for politics.68

Following the breakout of the economic crisis in 1955 the DP lost the support of the business sector. Unlike in a single party rule, in a competitive multi-party system the government's ability to sustain its political power is dependent on popular support and broad legitimacy. In order to compensate for the loss of support of the business sector the government covertly sought to establish a political alliance with the religious sectors by softening its activities against the religious orders. This change of attitude increased the leverage of the orders in politics. The most popular order at the time, Nurcu, was headed by Saidi Nursi, an Anatolian Kurdish Sheikh. In 1959, feeling secure enough about his popularity and political power base, Sheikh Nursi put forward an explicit political demand upon the government. He sent a letter to DP deputies in which he required that the Hagia Sofia - an originally Byzantine Church in Istanbul that was turned into a Mosque after the city was conquered by the Ottomans, and was turned again into a museum by Atatürk - would become a Mosque again. In the letter, which was published in the media, Nursi argued that he had some 600,000 followers and students that worked in support of the DP.69 This was the first demonstration of a formal religious intervention in the democratic political game that fully utilized the power of mass support. Given the legal restrictions on religious interference in politics the

65 In Milliyet alone there were more than 20 reported cases of raids and arrests of orders' followers between 1952 and 1959. Given the harsh restrictions on the press during the second half of the 1950 the real number was probably much higher.
66 Speeches of PM Menderes (Milliyet, 17 January and 8 February 1953) and President Bayar (Milliyet, 8 July 1953, 9 June 1957) in support of secularism.
67 Milliyet, 28 January 1954.
68 Milliyet, 21 July 1953.
69 Milliyet, 25 December 1959.
response of the government was surprising. The government did not open an investigation against Nursi nor detained him for this obvious manipulation of religion for political gain. Instead, Nursi was invited to Ankara by DP deputies to refute the accusations set by the opposition against him,\textsuperscript{70} and Prime Minister Menderes openly defended Nursi and rejected the claims made by the opposition about his reactionary activities and political relationship with the DP.\textsuperscript{71}

Compared with the former regime's draconian restrictions on any religious expression the DP government was perceived, at least by the general public, more respectful of its citizens' cultural and religious practices. This policy had a positive impact on the behavior of religious actors. Throughout the 1950s there was no religious based violence from below and no attempts by religious groups to rebel or act unlawfully against the government. A few and scattered anti-secular events included assaults against Atatürk's statues, probably more because idolatry is contradictory to Islam and less because of Anti-Atatürkism,\textsuperscript{72} wearing religious garb in public,\textsuperscript{73} selling calendars in Arabic\textsuperscript{74} and establishing an underground school for teaching Arabic and Koran.\textsuperscript{75} Indeed,

Prime Minister Menderes can be credited with having prevented the splintering-off of radicalization of religious groups and with expanding the state's social legitimacy through its liberal stance vis-à-vis Islam (Karakas 2007, II)

Yet, despite the peaceful interaction between the government and the religious populace, the Kemalist establishment perceived the relaxation of Atatürk's secularizing reforms as a dangerous and reactionary trend. The Kemalist alliance - the RPP, the bureaucracy, the military, the academic system and the media - accused the government that being too soft with religion risked the undoing of Atatürk's modernizing project.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Milliyet}, 31 December 1959.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Milliyet}, 9 January 1960.
\textsuperscript{72} There are two reported case in \textit{Milliyet}, on 24 February 1951 and on 26 June 1952. Reed reports about "a number of statues" but does not provide a precise number (Reed 1954, 274).
\textsuperscript{73} This practice was tolerated by the government until 1954. In \textit{Milliyet} there is one report about a special operation taken by the police against people who violated the hat and clothing reform, on 18 May 1954.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Milliyet} reports on a single event, in Izmir, on 30 December 1953.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Milliyet}, 12 December 1954.
This coalition was assisted by what can loosely be termed Kemalist civil society. This sector resembles the harmonious western secular understanding of the traditional school of civil society and included particularly secular urban-based student associations and women associations that pressed the government to remain loyal to the principles of the Kemalist Revolution.

Mounting criticism in combination with deteriorating economic circumstances destabilized the DP government and pushed it into exercising antidemocratic policies, such as restrictions on the freedom of expression and association and limitations on political opposition. These only made the political atmosphere more unstable and provided justification for authoritarian intervention (Harris 1960). In April 1960 İnönü warned the government that:

> When conditions are complete, revolution becomes a legitimate right for the nation, for the citizen begins to think that no other institution or way exists to defend his rights" (Karpat 1972, 356).

This was an explicit warning that the Kemalist coalition was going to topple the government and bring Turkey back to what the Kemalist thought was the only path toward secular modernization. A month later, on 27 May 1960, the military intervened for the first time in Turkish democracy. The military's formal excuse for taking over politics was the dangerous path that the DP paved away from secularism. In this regard one of Turkey's senior political scientists argued that:

> …particularly during the 1950s, the politicians' utilization of religion for political ends became the most contentious issue. This was the single most important justification the military advanced when they intervened in 1960-1961 and later (Heper 1991, 49).

This pattern of events returned in different versions every decade throughout Turkey's democratic history. It reflects the bifurcated nature of the Turkish state, being composed of a formal elected government with limited powers and an all powerful Kemalist alliance that controls important state systems. The DP government succeeded
in reaching an accepted *modus Vivendi* between religion and politics, which offered toleration of private worship and at one the same time the enforcement of public and political secularism. The unruffled behavior of religious actors during this period demonstrates that they accepted this implicit understanding regarding the role of religion in the state. However, the Kemalist coalition did not accept this arrangement and imposed its non-pluralistic worldview on society in complete disregard of the will of the people. The military intervention violated another basic element of democracy according to which political decisions should be taken by elected politicians and not be subject to imposition by unelected actors.

*Social and political empowerment of religion 1961-1980*

The 1960 *Coup* marked a clear cut in Turkish democracy. It should be noted, however, that compared with other military interventions, in Latin American countries for instance, the Turkish military seized power for a relatively short term and exercised little violence against the populace. Immediately following the *coup* the armed forces appointed the former Chief of Staff General Cemal Gürsel as head of state, banned all political parties, imprisoned the DP leadership and founded the Committee of National Unity (CNU) - a composition of a majority of military officers and a minority of appointed civilians - to rule Turkey. At the same time the armed forces appointed a group of intellectuals to write a new constitution with improved checks and balances and better protection of civil rights that meant to overcome the deficiencies of the 1924 Constitution which enabled the authoritarian tendencies of the former government toward the end of its term.

Interestingly, the military did not impose absolute marginalization of religion in accordance with hardcore Kemalist principles. Instead, it chose to manipulate Islamic religion to a certain extent in order to gain legitimacy and prevent opposition to its rule by either Islamist or radical leftist groups (Cizre 1997, 239). The military policy embraced a combination of strict laicism together with respect to the cultural role of

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76 The DP leadership was later tried by a special court on a small Island in the Marmara Sea, in what is known as the Yassiada Trials. Many DP leaders were sentenced to long term imprisonment and the top leadership, including PM Menderes and President Bayar, were sentenced to death. While Bayar was excused due to advanced age, Menderes and two others (Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan) were executed.
religion in society. Immediately after the *coup* the CNU announced that it had no intention to intervene in religious beliefs. At the same time it stated that political parties and individuals will be punished severely if they manipulated religion in politics.⁷⁷ Likewise, when the generals felt threatened they did not hesitate to act decisively against what they perceived as religious provocations. For instance, in December 1960 the military exiled 55 *Sheiks* and *Aghas* (religious leaders) from Eastern to Western Turkey out of fear that they might use their popularity to confront the regime.⁷⁸

This twofold approach was also been maintained in the wording of the new constitution. For instance, Article 2 of the Constitution combined Kemalist and democratic principles with acknowledgement of human rights:

> The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.

Article 19 on "Freedom of Thought and Faith" followed the same dual treatment of religion. On the one hand, the Constitution granted freedom of worship and faith:⁷⁹

> Every individual is entitled to follow freely the dictates of his conscience, to choose his own religious faith and to have his own opinions. Forms of worship, and religious ceremonies and rites are free provided they are not in opposition to public order, or morals or to the laws enacted to uphold them.

As well as freedom from imposition of religion:

> No person shall be compelled to worship, or participate in religious ceremonies and rites, or to reveal his religious faith and belief. No person shall be reproached for his religious faith and belief. Religious education and teaching

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⁷⁸ *Milliyet*, 3 December 1960.
shall be subject to the individual's own will and volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians.

On the other hand, the constitution forbade any use of religion for political gains and granted the Constitutional Court the authority to close down associations and parties that violated this restriction:

No person should be allowed to exploit and abuse religion or religious feelings or things considered sacred by religion in any manner whatsoever for the purpose of political or personal benefit, or for gaining power, or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on religious dogmas. Those who violate this prohibition or those who induce others to do so shall be punishable under the pertinent laws. In the case of associations and political parties the former shall be permanently closed down by order of authorized courts and the latter by order of the Constitutional Court.

In whole, the 1961 Constitution was more plural and liberal than the one it replaced. It contained an elaborate chapter on human rights, reordered the structure of government and provided more checks on the arbitrary powers of the executive branch. This relative freedom facilitated the commencement of civil society. During the 1960s and 1970s Turkey witnessed an unprecedented growth in the number of political parties, interest groups, and civil associations (Toprak 1996, 91). This development opened new spaces for religion in Turkish society and politics and facilitated the foundation in 1969 of religiously based political parties. At the same time, the new constitution endowed the state the power to abolish any collective activity that is based on, or identified with religion. Of course, the line between cultural manifestations of religion and manipulation of religion for political gain is very blurred. This blurriness has been the reason for recurrent disputes between the Kemalist establishment and religious actors in years to come. The wording of the 1961 Constitution determined the nature of the interaction between state authorities and religious segments in society until it was replaced by the 1982 Constitution. During this period religious actors became more careful and cautious
about their public expressions but in chorus religion grew stronger as a political force and further eroded the secular principle of the republic (Landau 2004, 137).

The CNU transferred the government back to the hands of civil politicians following national elections in October 1961. Yet it did not pull its hands out of the political scene. The elections placed the RPP as the biggest party with 37% of the vote while the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party - JP), a newly formed party that captured the political slot of the banned DP, came second with 35%. Two smaller parties won 15% of the vote each. This turnout was a clear sign that a majority of the public did not want to see the Kemalist RPP in power. Nevertheless, the Military insisted that the RPP's leader İsmet İnönü became Prime Minister and consequently between the years 1961 and 1964 the RPP had led several shaky coalition governments. While in power the RPP reversed some of DP's pro-religion policies and hardened its hand on civil expressions of religion. Among other sanctions it resumed raids and criminal investigations against followers of religious orders and reactionary Sheikhs and halted the construction of new Imam ve Hatip schools despite growing demands by the public for this type of education. 80 The most restrictive policy the RPP came out with, however, was the imposition of a weekly state version sermon that all Imams were ordered to read during Cuma Namaz (friday prayer), which eliminated the Imams' autonomous authority to preach their followers. 81 These policies were by no means popular, and were responsible in large part to steady erosion in political support for the RPP until its sounding defeat in the 1965 elections.

The 1965 election brought the JP to power. Part of the party's electoral success was due to appealing policies on various issues such as the economy and religion and its broad electoral base. Another reason was the efficacy and political capabilities of its leader, Süleyman Demirel. In these respects the party resembled its predecessor, the DP, which leaned on a populist agenda and was headed by a charismatic leader. A third reason, unique to the JP, was its strategy of forming and operating a broad platform of grassroots activists who assisted the party in its political campaigns. In particular, the JP had built a sophisticate network of services to new immigrants from the countryside who concentrated in squatters and shantytowns in the vicinity of the large urban centers.

80 Milliyet, 26 August 1963.
81 Milliyet, 4 March 1964.
These services ranged from employment to marriage registration and were operated by local party activists. The party's political base was composed by the same segments in Turkish society that formerly supported the DP - peasants and urban laborers as well as a small commercial and industrial group - which together represented an alternative to the old elite (Sherwood 1967; Özler 2000, 44).

The JP imitated the DP's populist worldview and was by no means a fundamental religious party. It lacked a strong ideological core and instead developed a pragmatist and flexible political agenda. This was particularly true in regard the issue of religion. Party policies in this realm reflected its cognition of the power of religion in Turkish society as well as an attempt to appeal to its traditional electoral base. Indeed, as Sherwood argued: "The Justice Party's attitude toward religion cannot be separated from its public appeal to the peasantry" (1967, 58). True, part of this political appeal was achieved by public religious gestures that might have been understood as provocative. Most controversial was PM Demirel's institutionalization of regular participation in Cuma Namaz (Friday prayer) together with the top party echelon and his close advisers (Cizre 1996, 240). This, however, was unlikely an opportunistic political act because PM Demirel was a believer and observant of Islamic tradition long before he entered the Premier position. Likewise, before elections Demirel used to employ more religious rhetoric and made overt his connections with the leadership of the Nurcu order. Other pro-religious policies included the foundation of four new High Islamic Institutes (colleges) in 1966, and the important decision of the government to participate in a pan-Islamic conference in Morocco which was in clear contradiction to ongoing Kemalist efforts to isolate Turkish society from the rest of the Muslim world.

In reaction, however, the party was harshly criticized by the Kemalist alliance and 'Kemalist civil society.' For instance, shortly after the JP formed a government, a group of academics in faculties of law and political science submitted a petition which stated that secularism is the most important principle of the republic and criticized the allegedly anti-secular intentions of the new government. A similar petition was signed

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82 Milliyet, 13 February 1966.
83 Milliyet, 10 May 1968.
84 Milliyet, 29 January 1966.
by Kemalist oriented National Federation of Teachers Association. In addition to frequent yet acceptable critique by the parliamentarian opposition there have been many expressions of anti-religious sentiment by civil servants or figures who are supposed to be in consensus such as President Cevdet Sunay (another former Chief of Staff), incumbent Chief of General Staff Cemal Tural, President of the Court of Appeals İmran Öktem, and the Rector of Istanbul University. Their statements reflected once more the non-pluralistic perception of this group and its qualified respect to democratic principles.

The truth, however, was far from the allegations made by the Kemalist apparatus. In fact:

The peasants simply list[ed] mosques along with water, roads, educational opportunity for their children, and government support of agricultural prices as the things they expect from any government or party soliciting their votes (Sherwood 1967, 59).

By the end of the 1960s, mass immigration from the village to the city and the formation of new spaces for religion in society made circumstances opportune for two intertwined developments. In contradiction to the assumptions of modernization theory this immigration did not secularize the formerly rural population. Instead, the latter brought their cultural foundations to the urban centers and intensified the secular-religious divide in Turkey's big metropolis. In the social realm, the empowerment of religion generated more activities by Islamic civil society associations. Religious people came to realize the power of civic engagement in the public sphere and exploited it in various occasions. Examples of this trend, by both individuals and collectivities, included protests against burning of Koran books in neighborhoods of Istanbul, demonstration of religious students against the decision of Ankara University to expel

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90 *Milliyet*, 12 February 1968.
two of their colleagues because they refused to take off their headscarves,\textsuperscript{91} insistence of a religious advocate to show up to court sessions with her head covered,\textsuperscript{92} and the demand by a religiously affiliated trade union, \textit{Hak İş}, to get one hour of worship a day as part of its collective agreement.\textsuperscript{93} To this one should add the growing number of faith based civil society associations which mushroomed in the 1960, especially in the areas of philanthropy and education and reached, in 1968, an impressive number of 10,730 registered associations that comprised 28.4\% of all associations in Turkey. The activities and increasing popularity of religious orders despite their being formally illegal, especially the powerful \textit{Nurcu} and \textit{Nakşibendi}, also contributed to enhancing the place of religion in society. This entire social matrix benefitted from supportive coverage by religiously affiliated media, which included several newspapers and periodicals (Landau 1976, 8-9). All these activities represented a process of engagement with the Kemalist state "from below."

The other equally significant development was the foundation in 1970 of a political party, \textit{Milli Nizam Partisi} (National Order Party - NOP), that emphasized religious concerns at the core of its agenda. Although this party was abolished shortly thereafter, in May 1971, by the Constitutional Court, it "played a key role in the re-politicization of Islam by enlarging the channels of political representation" (Yildiz 2003, 187). NOP served as an archetype for a series of subsequent religious parties with the generic name \textit{Milli Görüş} (The Parties of National Outlook), which opened and were closed occasionally by the Constitutional Court but nevertheless demonstrated resilience and maintained the same manpower, religious rhetoric and electoral base of support. \textit{Figure 5.3} (below) demonstrates the genealogy of religious parties in Turkey.\textsuperscript{94}

While the activities of religious civil society represented a movement of resurgence of religion "from below," the formation of religious political parties aimed at transforming the cultural role of religion in Turkish society into a political one "from above," while benefitting from the broad social power base provided to them by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{Milliyet}, 16-30 April 1968.
\item \textsuperscript{92} \textit{Milliyet}, 16 April 19
\item \textsuperscript{93} \textit{Milliyet}, 22 October 1977.
\item \textsuperscript{94} I use the term religious parties even though legal restrictions do not allow these parties to present themselves as religious. Instead, they use ambiguous terms such as 'conservative' and 'traditional' but the main purpose of this terminology is to obscure their religious core.
\end{itemize}
religious civil society associations. To be sure, these two developments were closely intertwined. The strongest evidence of relations between cultural and political Islam are vibrant connections between religious orders and religious politicians. In fact, the NOP was formed with the approval and blessing of the influential Sheikh Kotku, leader of the Nakşibendi order. Since then Milli Görüş parties have always been dependent to some extent on the support of this order (Mardin, 2006, 15).

![Figure 5.3](image)

With the advent of religious political parties the engagement of religious actors with the secular state became more intensive. This was especially true after the Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party – NSP) succeeded in winning 11.8% of the vote in the 1973 elections and thereby became a minor partner in the RPP government. The RPP was willing to accept the NSP in the coalition due to cold political calculations - without the support of the NSP the RPP would not have been able to recapture the
government. Also, the animosity between the JP and RPP made the interaction with a new and unfamiliar party easier. Nevertheless, this partnership provided the religious camp real political leverage for the first time in Turkish history. *Milli Görüş*'s founder and long time leader Necmettin Erbakan became deputy Prime Minister and other party members were put in charge of seven portfolios in the Cabinet, including the important ministries of state, justice, interior and commerce (Landau 1976, 31-34). Even more important was the fact that Kemal Atatürk's original political platform, the RPP, was willing to join in coalition with a religious faction, by this providing the NSP, its followers and its ideology further legitimacy in Turkish politics.

Remembering the ill fate of its predecessor the NOP, the NSP detached itself from any linkage to the banned party. Also, in order to protect itself from being dissolved by the Constitutional Court, the party refrained from basing itself unequivocally on Islam. Nevertheless, the party was Islamist in all but title. This assessment is grounded in various written documents and public speeches made by party leaders. The NSP election program proclaimed that Turkey must remain loyal to its glorious heritage (i.e. Islamic heritage) instead of imitating other civilizations. It distinguished itself from both capitalism and socialism as materialist and amoral ideologies as oppose to the party's strong moral (i.e. Islamic) foundations. Finally, it stated that secularism should be interpreted in a way that is not hostile to religion, and that the state should protect the right of individuals to observe their religion and allocate significant resources to education of (Islamic) morals (Landau 1976, 13-15). This was roughly the content of subsequent religious parties until the foundation of *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party – JDP or AKP) in 2001, which marked a significant ideological as well as behavioral transformation (Yilmaz 2003; Dağı 2008; 2008a 110-116; Tepe 2008; Atacan 2006).

The NSP quickly realized that its ability to influence national politics and challenge Kemalist perceptions was largely dependent on its participation in government. Accordingly, the party had taken part in every coalition government between 1973 and 1980, joining either the RPP on the left or the JP on the right. The participation of a religious party in government caused an immediate and significant change in the public role of religion. Religious demands were put forward explicitly and
partnership with mainstream parties provided them legitimacy and strong political backup. Three weeks after the elections Erbakan announced that the government will build 84 new Imam Hatip schools in the coming educational year.\(^95\) The NSP appointed Minister of State, Suleiman Arif Emre, announced that the public TV and radio broadcasts will devote more time to religion and morals,\(^96\) and the Ministry of Tourism produced and distributed an Islamic map of Turkey with religious destinations.\(^97\) The NSP also emphasized religious sentiments in behavior and Rhetoric. For example, Deputy PM Erbakan made his first visit in office to Saudi Arabia, by this expressing Turkey's natural ties with the Islamic Arab world,\(^98\) the NSP pushed the JP led government to become a full member in the Islamic League of Nations,\(^99\) and the party had led an assertive campaign of enforcing Islamic values in society that included restrictions on alcohol consumption and more severe punishments against obscenity and pornography (Landau 1976, 40-42).\(^100\) The ability of the NSP to achieve many of its political demands is rooted in the political structure and distribution of power in Turkish politics during the 1970s. Essentially, the NSP occupied the role of balancer to which each of the two big parties (JP, RPP) was willing to make far reaching concessions in order to win its support. In this respect the situation of the NSP in the 1970s was similar to that of the Haredi parties in Israel after 1977, on which I elaborate in Chapter Eight.

Furthermore, the NSP leadership exploited its temporary position in government to strengthen its future political powerbase by placing party followers in the administration, as well as through indoctrination and education. The party dismissed many senior civil servants from ministries under its control and appointed party supporters in their place. This was accompanied by demands to expand the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) by 25,000 new positions, the appointment of 5,000 new Imams in less than a year, and the massive construction of new Mosques throughout the country\(^101\) (Landau 1976, 43). Likewise, the party understood that students of

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95 Milliyet, 17 February 1974.
96 Milliyet, 2 April 1974; 21 February 1976.
97 Milliyet, 24 May 1974.
98 Milliyet, 4 May 1974.
99 Milliyet, 11 April 1976.
101 Milliyet, 26 August 1976. The government authorized a bill to allocate 82 million Turkish Lira for the construction of mosques.
religious schools and Koran courses were more likely to become party followers in the future. Hence, the party's leadership publicly encouraged the populace to participate in religious education and assured that the state allocates more resources toward this goal. For instance, on one occasion, in June 1975 Erbakan stated that:

This society would be moral only with imams and hatips. People should lead their children to take education in Imam-Hatip schools and afterwards they can become engineers or architects.\(^{102}\)

In an even more provocative expression just before the 1977 elections Erbakan promised the enthusiastic crowd that: "We will transfer all schools to Imam Hatip schools after June 5\(^{th}\)" (the scheduled election date – AR).\(^{103}\)

These measures fortified the religious camp they, but also raised anxiety and fear among Kemalists that Turkey is going to fall into extremist hands that might reverse all the Kemalist achievements. This deterministic perception pushed Kemalists into blocking the rising power of religious actors by various tactics. The most popular type of action against the NSP was legal. Erbakan was accused by the State Prosecutor of manipulating religion in politics as well as for violating the constitutional principle of secularism and the law of political parties.\(^{104}\) Similarly, the President used his veto power to block religious legislation,\(^{105}\) the GNA rejected bills which equated the status of Imam-Hatip graduates with that of graduates from public high schools, and religious functionaries in the media and the bureaucracy were accused and imprisoned for alleged anti secular activities.\(^{106}\) Intolerance toward religious political activity included violence, particularly the bombing in 1970 of the NOP's local branch in Eskişehir.\(^{107}\) Yet, despite

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\(^{102}\) Milliyet, 15 June 1975.  
\(^{103}\) Milliyet, 23 May 1977.  
\(^{104}\) Milliyet, 1 October 1975 and 22 February 1978.  
\(^{105}\) In December 1976 President Korutürk vetoed a bill that allowed graduates of Imam-Hatips to enter military schools, Milliyet, 26 December 1976. Similarly, the President appealed to the Constitutional Court to cancel a legal amendment that would have dropped the charges against Erbakan (Milliyet, 30 March 1978).  
\(^{106}\) For example, an inquiry committee of the Senate found the former deputy chairman of Diyanet (Directorate of religious affairs) guilty of supporting Nurculuk people, (Milliyet, 25 February 1975) and the general editor of a daily newspaper was sentenced to 13 months in prison for anti secular propaganda (Milliyet, 8 October 1977).  
\(^{107}\) Milliyet, 30 December 1970.
repressive and anti religious Kemalist activities, religious actors preferred to concentrate their behavior in the political realm and refrained from exercising violent and anti democratic measures in return. Until the late 1970 there are no records of violence or extra-legal challenges against the regime by religious groups. This reality fits well with the assertion of the *Bounded Integration Model*. It demonstrates that extending the boundaries of civil society above a minimum bound of acceptance and accommodating social groups, religious or others, into a more pluralist system might lead to a more democratic and peaceful society and concentrate efforts to defend group's interests from within the system instead of resorting to fringe activities.

*Radicalism, Political instability and the 1980's Coup*

The political behavior of religious actors in Turkey cannot be adequately analyzed in isolation from more general social and political trends. Starting in the 1960s, rapid modernization and the influence of the Cold War brought political radicalism and instability to Turkish politics. This period witnessed the emergence of radical left-wing movements that advocated Maoist and Marxist ideas and competed with rightwing and religious factions on the support of the growing *gecekondu* (immigrant proletariat in urban centers) segment of society. This competition radicalized all sides, deteriorated quickly to large scale violence and brought Turkey by the end of the 1970s to a verge of civil war. Only within this context one can understand the relative radicalization in rhetoric and behavior of religious actors during this period, because it stands in contradiction to religious actors’ gradual moderation following their accommodation into politics.

The main leftwing political platforms were *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (the Workers Party of Turkey) which was formed in 1961 and *Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi* (United Communist Party of Turkey) which was banned from politics for a long time then but still enjoyed the support of a small group of ardent followers. Leftist ideas became popular among labor unions and were also been adopted by intellectuals, academicians and students, who contributed to their spreading through public debates and publications in leftwing journals, the first and most influential journal being *Yön* (Direction) (Zürcher 2005, 297-298). Later on, a group of extreme leftist intellectuals
formed the *Milli Democratic Devrim* (The National Democratic Revolution - NDR) group that came in 1968 to conclusion that legal political activity was insufficient and that only violent struggle could bring revolutionary change to Turkey. Consequently, the NDR instigated urban guerilla warfare throughout Turkey, intending to destabilize Turkish society and eventually alter its political order.

The primary rightwing platform was the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (the Party of Nationalist Action – MHP). This party was headed by the racist and nationalistic Colonel Alparslan Turkeş, whose militant ideas led to his expulsion from the military in the 1960 coup. The MHP advocated anti-communist and radical nationalistic agenda. It formed an extreme youth group, *Bozkurtlar* (Grey Wolves) that engaged in paramilitary training, terrorized the streets and assaulted leftist politicians, publicists and students.

Each political faction had been involved in two simultaneous struggles, one against the political center and state institutions and the other against its ideological rivals. Beginning in 1968, radicalization on both ends of the political spectrum deteriorated into political violence and recurrent clashes between radical factions and state security forces. Violence was first initiated by leftist groups and then, in reaction, by rightist groups. The leftwing and rightwing factions shifted their political weight from parliamentarian politics to 'street politics' and the government became paralyzed and too weak to bring violence down and seize control over the country.

The religious NOP which was formed in 1970 was ideologically closer to the political right and occasionally joined it in specific social or political campaigns, especially after Turkeş abandoned his initial Kemalist agenda in favor of emphasizing the role of Islam in Turkish identity (Zürcher 2005, 300; Tepe 2008). It is noteworthy, however that religious groups had been less involved in physical violence compared with both leftwing and rightwing movements (Landau 2004, 160). The relative religious moderation during the 1970s despite the general radicalization of Turkish society can be explained only when bringing into account that during this period religion was accommodated into state politics and thus its agents were more inclined to participate in legal political channels instead of resorting to violent and extra-legal measures. Furthermore, as I have already demonstrated, the NOP's balancing position in the political arena endowed it with unprecedented achievements regarding the public role of
religion and the allocation of state resources to religious purposes. Under such circumstances the radicalization and alteration of the political structure were not seen by religious actors as a desired goal.

The political stalemate stimulated the military to intervene in politics for the second time since the foundation of Turkish democracy. On 12 March 1971 the Armed Forces forwarded an ultimatum to PM Demirel which stated that if civil politicians failed to build a strong and capable government and bring stability to the country the Armed Forces would fulfill their constitutional obligation and seize the government. Immediately thereafter PM Demirel resigned and the Generals appointed a technocratic government. Several parties including the religious NOP\textsuperscript{108} were eliminated by the Constitutional Court and the Armed Forces cracked down on every radical opposition, including the religious orders. The Armed Forces ruled Turkey indirectly until 1974. During this period they amended the 1961 Constitution and made it more restrictive while expanding the powers of the military-controlled National Security Council. Government was transferred back to civil politicians in January 1974 but the polarization and levels of violence did not decrease. At the same time, Turkey’s invasion to, and occupation of, Northern Cyprus generated considerable international criticism against her. Towards the end of the 1970s violence became rampant with daily street fights and more than 1,000 political assassinations per year. The period between 1978 and 1980 saw a daily average of 20 casualties and a total of 5,241 victims of terrorism in two years (Akşin 2007, 279).

Toward the end of the 1970s religious political activity was characterized by two contradicting trends. On the one hand, religion was integrated into politics more than ever before and played only secondary role in the escalation of Turkey to radicalism and violence. This made some respectable political analysts mistakenly argue in 1980 that "it would seem that Turkey’s 'Islamic revival' has already reached its peak and is in decline" (Ahmad 1981, 10; see also Kili 1980; Weiker 1981). At one and the same time the general atmosphere in Turkish society and, no less important, the empowering impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, pushed religious actors to extremism and led to a series of events that challenged the state and hastened military takeover in 1980.

\textsuperscript{108} Milliyet, 22 May 1971.
The first event took place in the city of Kahramanmaraş in December 1978, when Sunnis (the majority religion) attacked Alevi (heterodox Shia minority sect) supporters of RPP, crying anti-left and anti-secularist cries and in favor of an Islamic country, and caused the death of over 100 people.\textsuperscript{109} The events had gone out of control to such a degree that they required the execution of martial law in the city to bring violent events to an end.\textsuperscript{110} Shortly thereafter a series of assassinations of secularist figures began with the murder of Abdi İpekçi, the editor of the daily \textit{Milliyet} and the most reputable journalist in Turkey in February 1979.\textsuperscript{111} This was followed by the killings of other Kemalist intellectuals such as Cavit Orhan Tü tengil and Ümit Kaftancıoğlu, which were all attributed to religious militants. In addition to physical violence the rhetoric of the religious leadership became more revolutionary and provocative. In a religious rally in the conservative city of Konya anti-secular banners were carried by protesters and slogans in Arabic advocated the return to theocracy and \textit{Sharia} law. The entire NSP leadership attended the rally and headed the marching protesters.\textsuperscript{112}

The riots in Konya and the revolution in Iran were used as justifications for another military \textit{coup}. On 12 September 1980, three days after the Konya event, the military took over civil politics for the third time in twenty years, and began the longest period of military rule in Turkish history. Interestingly, despite the relative moderation of religious actors compared to leftist and rightist factions, the Armed Forces' formal reasoning for the \textit{coup} was the need to contain the threat of religious fundamentalism (Zürcher 2005; Ahmad 1981). Chief of Staff General Kenan Evren was nominated President and the military ruled the country between 1980 and 1983. In retrospective, the price of 'bringing an end to anarchy' was extremely high and included mass violation of human rights:

Some of the figures are staggering: 650,000 persons were detained, 230,000 were tried, 517 received a death sentence, and forty-nine were executed. 171

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{109} As a minority religious group the Alevi have always been in favor of Kemalist secularism as defense against the formation of a Sunni theocracy that might infringe their rights. They traditionally oppose the allocation of state resources to religious education and have been in support of left wing political platforms.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Milliyet}, 24-27 December 1978.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Milliyet} 2 February 1979.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Milliyet} 7 September 1980.
\end{flushleft}
people died as the result of torture. About 30,000 people lost their jobs because they were considered 'unreliable', and 30,000 fled the country. Journalists were condemned to a total of 3,315 years in prison (Akşin 2006, 282-283).

The military banned all political parties in 1981 and approved a new constitution in 1982. The new constitution was authored by the military and approved by referendum in October 1982, but no propaganda in opposition to it or objecting parts of it were approved. This constitution reconfirmed the nationalistic tendencies of the Kemalist establishment and reversed the civic and liberal orientation of the 1961 Constitution. The military restricted organs of civil society such as trade unions, professional guilds, religious associations and the like and sought to consolidate centralistic control at the expense of autonomous associational activity (Yeşilada, 1988, 352-354).

The Constitution, however, contains some deliberate ambiguity on the issue of secularism. The character of the Turkish Republic, including the principle of secularism, is secured in Article 1 without possible amendment in the future (Article 4). Notwithstanding, in the preamble the Constitution prohibits any worldview that deviates from "Turkish historical and moral values." This wording contradicts Atatürk's reliance on rationality and science, and opened a room for integration of religious values into state policies (Heper 1991, 49). Also, the Constitution mandates the instruction of religious culture and moral education in the curricula of primary and secondary schools (Article 24). As I will demonstrate in more details below, the new constitutional approach regarding religion was only one manifestation of a more comprehensive change towards religion from above during the 1980s. In that the 1980's coup was a milestone or turning point between eras in regard the interaction between the state and religion, with long-term and partially unexpected outcomes.


As noted above, the 1980 military coup signified a turning point in state policies toward religion and consequently affected the interaction among the state, the Kemalist establishment and religious groups. If until 1980 efforts to integrate religion were carried forward mainly from 'below,' the period which started after the coup was marked by intentional empowerment of religion 'from above'. Ideologically, the military leaned towards the conservative right and perceived the left as the gravest threat against the unity and stability of the Turkish state. Accordingly, during the post-coup era the military and subsequent governments sought to give more power and recognition to religion as a check against the left. This policy resulted in an unprecedented expansion of political Islam and culminated in the foundation of a coalition government in 1996 that was headed by the religious Refah Partisi (Welfare Party - WP).

As in earlier decades, the pace of modernization in Turkish society had an impact on the state-religion interaction. In Particular, the governments in the 1980s, led by the charismatic Turgut Özal, were successful in bringing unprecedented levels of development that penetrated to all segments of Turkish society. Modernization also altered the religious actor's strategies of engagement with the state. Yet, while exploiting the material advantages of modernization, religious actors failed to adopt a pluralist worldview and avoid clashes with the Kemalist establishment. Instead, the successful outcome of the Iranian Revolution and the rapid, facilitated from above religious empowerment, pushed the religious leadership into adopting a militant and illiberal goal - to replace the Kemalist hegemony with an Islamic one. Michael Walzer explains such radicalization towards totalistic political ambitions as a stage in the emergence of politics of identity, in which once a long time repressed group is able to occupy a political space, it might be tempted to present excessive demands upon the political system that might, in turn, cause political cleavage and instability (Walzer 1996).

During this period, both the Kemalist and Islamist factions conceived the ideological disagreements between them as a zero-sum-game interaction with clear losers and winners, instead of finding a common ground or accepting the principles of the 'thin consensus' that allows peaceful coexistence and provides tools to resolve ideational disputes. In the terminology of the Bounded Integration Model, during this period religious actors endeavored to extend their integration beyond the upper bound of
constructive integration, and practically to alter the system all together. Under such circumstances the Kemalist establishment was pushed into utilizing its surplus coercive capabilities to maintain its hegemonic status. In the absence of efficient pluralistic mechanisms to resolve inter group disputes, this phase, just like the preceding one, ended in 1997 with military intervention and the reinstallation of a strict secular order.

**Policies from above – Türk Islam Sentezi**

The primary motivation of the generals in conducting the 1980 coup was to prevent an organized coup by junior officers with socialist tendencies (Zürcher 2005, Akşin 2006). Therefore, in the aftermath of the coup, the generals sought an ideological counterforce to leftist ideologies that will appeal to the populace and at the same time provide the state with an effective social control mechanism. They found what they were looking for in Türk Islam Sentezi (Turkish Islamic Synthesis – TIS), an ideology that was first been developed in the 1960s by the Aydınlar Oçağı (The Hearth of Intellectuals), an intellectual group of traditional-nationalists who sought to remerge the Turkic pre-Islamic past and cultural Islam and use them as a core element in the Turkish social order. The components of this ideology included a union between religion and state, society built on the foundations of Islam, coalition between military and government, and rule of religious law. Additionally, this ideology identified groups of enemies that must be controlled or eliminated by the state including atheists, communists, materialists, separatists, Western humanists, minority religions, and progressive intellectuals (Yeşilada, 1988, 365; Akin and Karasapan 1988, 18). The Adoption of TIS by pivotal partners in the Kemalist alliance was in stark deviation from the original teachings of Atatürk and his vision of republican Turkey. In this regard, one scholar rightly noted that: "Indeed, under the laws which the secular governments propagated during the 1980s, Atatürk himself would no doubt have been arrested for insulting the Prophet and hurting the feelings of the religious population" (Lapidot 1996, 68). The adoption of TIS by the military had generated tensions within the Kemalist alliance. In particular, the generals, who perceived themselves guardians of the republic and of Kemalist ideology, were accused by Kemalist intellectuals of betraying the legacy of Mustafa Kemal. Alparslan İskli, Deputy President of the Atatürk Thought Association
(ADD) told me how Kemalist intellectuals perceived the Generals' policy following the 1980's Coup:

The Generals who issued the 12 September Coup did some negative things against Turkey but represented themselves as Kemalists. They implemented a policy that was exactly against, in contradiction to Kemalist purposes, but they represented themselves as Kemalists.\footnote{Interview with Alparslan Isikli, Atatürk Thought Association, 13 May 2009.}

In accordance with principles of TIS the military modified Turkey's tendency to isolate itself from the rest of the Islamic world. Under its rule Turkey became an active member in the community of Islamic nations, hosted Islamic conferences,\footnote{In October 1981 the conference of Islamic Countries' International Development took place in Istanbul, \textit{Milliyet}, 24 October 1981.} participated in a peace commission of Islamic countries to settle the Iran-Iraq war,\footnote{\textit{Milliyet} 8 March 1982.} and expressed its solidarity with Islamic countries.\footnote{\textit{Milliyet} 22 May 1982. Also, in 1984, President Evren, the ex Chief of Staff participated in an Islamic conference in Morocco.} In the domestic arena the government introduced compulsory religious courses in public education, facilitated the construction of numerous Mosques and theology colleges, published a book on Atatürk's attitude toward Islamic religion, and expanded the authorities of \textit{Diyanet} (The Directorate of Religious Affairs). To be sure, these measures were not meant to 'set religion free' and fully integrate it into the Turkish public sphere. Rather, the military's aim was to exploit religious identity and mold it with national feelings as a common denominator for social identity and public order. At least in formality the military quested to preserve political secularism, but the relative resurgence of religion soon confronted the Kemalist elite with new challenges.

The military rule ended with the approval of the 1982 Constitution and national elections in 1983. The military took three important measures in an attempt to stabilize the political scene before transferring government back to civil politicians. First, the constitution ordered an entry threshold of 10\% for parties that competed for seats in the GNA. The rational of this was to make it impossible for relatively small political interest groups to enter the GNA, and essentially to prevent leftist, Kurdish and religious parties
from achieving parliamentarian representation. Second, the military prohibited the participation of old (i.e. pre 1980) politicians and parties in the 1983 elections in order to prevent fast return to the populism and radicalization that characterized the pre 1980 political system. Third, the military imposed the creation of large electoral bloc by approving only three new political. The formation of two, Halkı Partisi (the Populist Party) and Miliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (the Nationalist Democracy Party) was encouraged by the military while the third one, Anavatan Partisi (the Motherland party – ANAP) was formed independently by Turgut Özal and a group of relatively anonymous figures.

To the surprise of many ANAP obtained 45% of the vote which gave it a majority of seats in the GNA and the ability to form a single party government. The reasons for ANAP's popularity were first and foremost the charismatic appeal of its leader Turgut Özal, its proven economic skills as the minister in charge of financial reconstruction under the military government, and his political cleverness and good relationship with the military's high command. Also important, ANAP presented the most traditional agenda which many Turks found appealing and TIS was further endorsed by its government. Özal himself was an observant Moslem, a former candidate for parliament of the religious NSP, and maintained overt connections with the Nakşibendi religious order, of which his brother was a leading activist.

Özal became the most prominent politician in Turkey until his death in 1993. He served as Prime Minister between 1983 and 1989 and President between 1989 and 1993. His political agenda rested on four somewhat contradicting pillars – conservative Islam, nationalism, economic liberalism and social democracy. In practice, this agenda meant:

A social structure that will still be dependent upon moral-religious (Sunni) values of the past, while simultaneously proposing dramatic changes to the economy and prosperity of the country" (Kalaycioğlu 2002, 46).

During Özal's leadership modernization in Turkey reached new levels, with massive industrialization and urbanization throughout the country. The business sector applauded Özal's economic measures and a new group of Anatolian businessmen, commonly known as the 'Anatolian Bourgeoisie' or 'Anatolian Tigers,' had emerged.
This group was composed of business people from district cities in Anatolia such as Keysari, Konya and Gaziantep, that despite their growing prosperity and influence on Turkish economy respected and preserved the religious culture and traditional way of life (Karakas 2007, 20).

Özal skillfully exploited his personal affinity to Islamic religion for political gain. For instance, he used to publicize his *Hag* (pilgrimage) trips to Saudi Arabia for which he was accused by his opponents in manipulating religion for politics. His government granted religious orders a semi-legal status and in return gained their support. It also approved the construction of a Mosque in the GNA, an act with a very important symbolic meaning. Uğur Mumcu, an investigative journalist, revealed secret ties between domestic and foreign religious associations which involved the donation of large amounts of money by Saudi-based organizations to religious purposes in Turkey with the blessing of the Turkish government. In fact, the Mosque in the Parliament and the Arabic program in Middle East Technical University in Ankara (METU) were both funded by the Saudis. These connections, which were named the *Rabita Affair* (after the name of the Saudi association that donated the money) revealed the mingling of Saudi money with Turkish politics and also exposed the hidden relations between the Saudi donors, PM Özal and his family (Lapidot, 1997; Akin and Karasapan 1988a, 15).

Religious activities 'from below'

In accord with the dynamic perspective of the *Bounded Integration Model* the utilization of religious identity 'from above' resulted in growing volume of religious activities 'from below'. The pro-religious measures that were taken by the military and later by Özal's governments resulted in an unprecedented popularity and presence of Islamic religion. As Margulies and Yıldızoğlu noted in 1988:

No one who spends even a few days in Turkey can fail to notice the larger crowd in mosques, the greater number of people wearing religious dress, the atmosphere during the holy month of Ramadan. The activities of the religious

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orders, particularly the Süleymanći and the Nakşibendi, cover a whole range of areas (Margulies and Yildizoğlu 1988, 17).

The tarikats' (religious orders) impact on the revival of religion grew bigger as the orders exploited modern techniques of recruitment in appealing to a larger audience. The orders provided social services such as dormitories and Koran courses to incapable and poor students, established a popular TV channel, and published numerous books and the widely circulated daily newspapers Zaman and Milli Gazette. These measures were complemented by more traditional activities such as gatherings in Mosques, house visits and discussion groups. The more their activity became autonomous and widespread, the more their political power and ability to lobby the government increased (Ayata, 1996, 49-50). In particular, the 1980s saw the ascendance to power of the Gülen Movement, an Islamic order led by Fethullah Gülen, a student of the late Saidi Nursi, the former head of the Nurculuk order. Since the 1980s the Gülen movement became the most powerful Islamic order with a network of schools, Koran courses and various social services that spreads far beyond the borders of Turkey and includes branches in the Balkans, Central Asian Republics, Middle Eastern countries and in centers of Turkish immigrants in the EU, such as Germany. This network provided the order with large cliental and advanced its influence in Turkish society (Yavuz and Esposito 2003, Turam 2007). Though there is no decisive evidence in support, it is commonly argued that Abdulla Gül, the current President of Turkey and former PM for AKP maintains close relationship with Fethullah Gülen and is very much affected by his teachings.

Another trend 'from below' was the reconstruction of a solid religious political division. By the end of the 1980s the resurgence of religion brought the 'holy-alliance', a religious faction within ANAP, to adopt a more radical pro-religious agenda that did not fit anymore with the centrist-pragmatist line of the party. Consequently, this group withdrew their support from ANAP and joined the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party – WP), the contemporary representation of the National Outlook parties. The WP was founded in July 1983 as a substitute to the dissolved NSP and in 1987 Necmettin Erbakan, who

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119 The Gülen movement has received much scholarly attention, including numerous articles and conferences on the theme. To date, the two most comprehensive studies of the movement and its leader are Yavuz and Esposito (Eds.) 2003, and Turam 2007.
was equated from charges of anti-secular activities, was allowed back into politics and regained his position as leader of the religious political party.

The WP embodied a new type of religious political representation that distinguished it from both the secular parties and former religious parties. First, instead of being formed as a regular political party that is run by a small elitist group the WP was primarily a social movement that concentrated on grassroots activity which was translated to the national political level, more than on elite politics. The party expanded its political powerbase by developing and training a sophisticated network of local activists who had good familiarity with their potential electorate and were responsible for the initiation of diverse social activities that won the sympathy of the street, such as paying visits to mourning families or assisting poor families with food and money (White 2002; Yavuz 1997; Ayata 1996).

Second, the party offered an innovative political agenda, one that combined traditional communitarian values with economic development and technological progress and was flexible enough to attract people from different regions and socioeconomic strata. Public support in the party came from four segments in the Turkish society: Islamic intellectuals, Sunni Kurds, Squatter town dwellers, and members of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie. For each of these groups the party tailored a distinct political agenda with fine tuned emphases. To Kurds it emphasized the common Islamic identity whereas to the Anatolian bourgeoisie it presented itself as a social democratic party. This flexibility, together with the relative autonomy of local branches to design their own policies in accordance with the specificities of their communities provided the party with much electoral appeal (Yavuz 1997, 79-80).

Third, the WP exploited the resentment of the general populace about the negative effects of modernization and Turkey's integration into world markets, especially the growing gap between the haves and have-nots (Toprak 1999, 4). The WP's leadership took advantage of this resentment in challenging the urban, modern, Kemalist population with an alternative, peripheral identity. The party posited Beyaz Türkler (white Turks) vs. Siyah Türkler (Black Turks) with the latter term referring to all sideline Turks who were abandoned by the Kemalist state since its foundation. This polarized description of society served as a very powerful recruitment tool to those who
felt alienated by the Turkish state for cultural and economic reasons (Sumer, 2003; Demiralp 2009). In fact, the purpose of the WP leadership was to counterchallenge the Kemalist coalition with an alternative paradigm or social vision led by its emerging counter-elite. This religious counter-elite rested on the growing volume of civil society organizations that challenged the secular state 'from below' and was backed by three key social players – women, engineers and Islamic intellectuals. Educated Islamist women were an important component in the rhetoric of the new elite. Their modern lifestyle, graduate education and developed careers and at the same time their adherence to a traditional, religious based worldview, served in falsifying the Kemalist perception that there is an embedded inequality towards women in traditional Islamic culture. Also, Islamist leaders with engineering degrees, such as Erbakan himself, were important in proving that Islamist worldviews did not stand in opposition to modernity and technological progress. Finally, the religious elite benefitted from the intellectual backup of Islamist thinkers such as Ali Bulaç, Ismet Özal, Abdurrahman Dilipak and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, who developed non apologetic arguments and sophisticate criticism of Turkey's nonselective adoption of Western culture (Göle 1997).

The revival of religion, both socially and politically, in simultaneity with the adoption and utilization by religious actors of modern tools, challenges the assumptions of modernization theorists who conceive religion and modern life as two irreconcilable things. As the Turkish case illustrates, the spread of modernization into all parts of Turkey has been used by religious actors to recruit more audience and gain better impact in society and politics. In fact, the Turkish case suggests that, contrary to modernization theory's arguments, modernization was a key factor in the reappearance of religion in Turkey since the 1980s onwards. Therefore, the resurgence of religion and its new methods of engagement with the state should be understood as a modern phenomenon and a consequence of modernization rather than as antithetical to it.

The WP demonstrated an impressive growth in electoral support over a relatively short time span. The first election in which the party participated, in 1987, it gained 7.2% of the total vote which was lower than the 10% threshold and did not grant it seats in parliament. In the 1991 election the WP ran in alliance with the ultra-nationalist
MHP, in order to secure representation in the GNA, and won 16.2% of the vote which was translated to 62 seats in the GNA. But the WP-MHP alliance was not invited into the coalition. In the local elections of 1994 the party made a considerable progress, winning 19.7% of the total vote and mayoral positions in 29 large cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, which were considered until then bedrocks of secularism and Kemalism in Turkey. In the national election in December 1995 the WP ran on its own and won a convincing victory with 21.4% of the total vote, which made her the biggest party in the GNA, with 158 seats. On 28 June 1996, after half a year of recurring attempts to stabilize a coalition government between the center-right parties ANAP and Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party - TPP) without the WP, Erbakan succeeded in constructing a coalition government with the TPP under his leadership and became the first overtly Islamist figure to hold this position in Republican Turkey.

A religious party leading the executive branch was portrayed by some political analysts as the final stage in the consolidation of Turkish democracy and ultimate acceptance of pluralist principles by all its members. In retrospective, however, this assumption was proven optimistic and premature. Rapid changes in the distribution of political power in favor of the religious camp intimidated the Kemalist elite and pushed it to act against the emerging political challenge. To the disappointment of Erbakan, his party members and their many followers, before too long the WP government was dissolved as a result of military pressures in a process that started on 28 February 1997, only eight months after the government was established, and ended with the resignation of Erbakan on 17 June of the same year. There were several reasons for this short lived experiment in Turkish politics, all of which related to lack of tolerance and pluralism on both the Kemalist and religious camps.

To begin with, after a few years in the 1980s the military and its Kemalist partners realized that their initial intention to empower religion through TIS but keep it 'civilized' and under state control had gone out of hand. Consequently, TIS ideology was abandoned and the Kemalist coalition took all efforts to contain the expansion of Islamic sentiments in the country. The legal system and security forces resumed their assaults against the religious orders. Beginning in 1986 the government arrested followers of religious orders and produced critical reports about their activities and decisive
statements by military and legal figures about the Republic's commitment to secularism.\textsuperscript{120} The TAF's higher command introduced a procedure that every six months the military discharges officers who were accused in involvement in reactionary religious activity. In addition, the heated debate over head covers in public spaces and especially in the education system resumed, with a terminal decision by the Constitutional Court to invalidate a GNA law that allowed wearing head covers in universities. The Court declared that wearing head scarves contradicted the constitutional principle of secularism, while ignoring the fact that such interpretation was in clear violation of basic human rights. Like the hat reform more than 60 years earlier, this issue generated significant resentment that was manifested in mass civic reactions in the form of rallies, appeals, demonstrations etc.\textsuperscript{121} All these antireligious actions reflected the anxiety of the Kemalist elite about the resurgence of religion and the emergence of counter-elite that challenged the Kemalist hegemonic control.

The WP did not embrace a pluralist worldview either. While the party was very effective in exploiting modern means for mass support, it failed to adopt some substantive elements of democracy and by this exceeded the upper limit of religious integration portrayed by the \textit{Bounded Integration Model}. The party's leadership demonstrated intolerance towards other identities and worldviews and dismissed progressive values such as gender equality and toleration of religious diversity. This approach was in dispute with the values of the Kemalist revolution and democracy and exacerbated the tension between the two camps. While embracing procedural or electoral democracy as 'the only game in town' the WP did not embrace what Fareed Zakaria calls the legacy of liberal constitutionalism (Zakaria 1997). Besides a few leading liberal figures in the party, such as Bahri Zengin, Ali Bulaç and Abdullah Gül, the mainstream leadership of the party was strict and conservative. Ironically, the intolerance demonstrated by the WP leadership was an outcome of its longtime interaction with the Kemalist state. As Hakan Yavuz describes:
Having been socialized by the rather authoritarian Kemalist tradition, the conservative core leadership of the party, which includes Necmettin Erbakan, Oğuzhan Aşılturk and Şevket Kazan, reacted negatively to this openness and insisted on the subordination of cultural and political cleavages in Turkish society to a single ideology, state-centric Islam. Clearly there are several ambiguous trends within the WP and the current leadership represents the least democratic characteristics (Yavuz 1997, 76) (emphasis added).

Undemocratic tendencies were reflected in rhetoric and behavior before the WP won the 1995 election, especially by Erbakan himself. He used to participate and lead protests that contained radical content, violent expressions, and in contradiction to formal state policies. For instance, Erbakan participated in a violent protest against the ban of headscarves in which radicals shouted in favor of Sharia and Jihad and clashed with the armed forces. In the event several people were arrested.\footnote{Milliyet, 17 January 1987.} In another protest, this time against Israel, Erbakan gave a speech in front of 25,000 people who acted violently, burned Israeli flags, and demanded that Turkey cut all its relationship with Israel, a statement that contradicted Ankara's policy.\footnote{Milliyet, 21 March 1988.} On another occasion Erbakan provoked the secularists and intensified hostility by promising to build a Mosque in the middle of Taksim Square, the central square of Istanbul and a symbol of the Kemalist revolution.\footnote{Milliyet, 9 January 1995.} Other statements, while in themselves not antidemocratic, provoked the Kemalist establishment and raised its level of anxiety. For illustration, a WP deputy argued that "the official regime in Turkey is Kemalist secular dictatorship,"\footnote{Milliyet, 24 February 1994.} while other WP deputies suggested that the armed forces' restriction of worship in its ranks be declared hostile to Islamic religion,\footnote{Milliyet, 27 March 1996.} statements that were undoubtedly perceived by the Kemalist establishment as a direct attack on its values and legitimacy.

The WP's intolerant worldview diffused among its followers. The religious leadership was responsible, no less than the state, for polarizing society between...
advocates of religion and secularism and contributed to fanatical behavior by religious activists. Jenny White's account of an interview with a WP activist is very telling in this regard:

Perhaps I was the first to bring it up, when I tried to explain why Welfare scared many secularist Turks, that people thought that Welfare wanted Sharia law, not democracy. Much to my surprise, instead of taking the opportunity to demur, Halil fired into a heated defense of Sharia. "We have to follow Allah's design." Referring to our previous conversation, I asked him whether Allah's design was democracy. He was momentarily flustered but soon caught up again in sloganlike exclamations about the requirement to follow Allah's will. His voice was hard and almost spitting, his eyes steely, his back arched as if daring me to disagree (White 2002, 12).

Before long non-pluralistic sentiments spread widely. Relatively soft instances of intolerance included decisions taken by directors of religious schools that students who did not fast in Ramadan would not be eligible for scholarships, or would fail a Koran course, threats on the life of judges who conducted court cases against religious activists, and physical violence in university facilities by members of a religious sect against students who did not fast during the month of Ramadan. Much more serious were the deadly attacks against intellectuals and political figures with differing points of view and against religious minorities. Religious extremists were responsible for the assassination of journalist Bahriye Uçok, a member of the Social Democratic People Party (SDPP) and passionate supporter of secularism in October 1990, journalists Turan Dursun and Çetin Emec in 1990, and leading investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu in January 1993. In other events religious activists bombed the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul twice, first in 1986 and again in 1992, causing casualties and damage in both times. Later, in June 1995, religious extremists assaulted the head of the Jewish

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129 Milliyet, 1 March 1995.
congregation in Ankara and injured him seriously. Violence was also been directed towards Alevi who were traditionally in support of secularism. In July 1993, a notorious attack by a raging Sunni crowd took place on a hotel in which Alevi people convened, in the city of Sivas. The furious rioters set the hotel on fire and caused the death of 39 Alevi intellectuals and artists. In another serious event Alevi people were fired at by gunmen in Istanbul, two of them were killed and 16 injured. These events and others were related to new fanatical Islamic groups such as Hizballah, Islamic Jihad, Hizb-ut-Tahrir and others, which were founded in Turkey in the late 1980s. Despite their relatively marginal resources, popularity and scale of activity (Lapidot 1996), these organizations had definitely contributed to extremism and to the anxiety of state authorities about the possible consequences of the rising power of militant Islam in Turkey.

The rates of distrust and hostility between the two camps increased further following the formation of the Refahyol coalition government in June 1996 with the contribution of both factions. The religious leadership saw itself committed to revolutionize Turkey's domestic and international conduct and got engaged in a series of actions that elevated fears among the general public that the government was going to abuse the democratic process and install in Turkey a theocratic regime, similar to that of Iran.

Numerous incidents supported the Kemalist anxiety. Here I will present the most significant ones. Two weeks after the formation of the new government Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the contemporary strongest politician in Turkey and the then influential WP mayor of Istanbul argued in an interview that democracy is not an end in itself but only a means; İsmail Kahraman, the new Minister of Culture promised to build a Mosque in Taksim Square in a 'short while'; Şevket Kazan, the new Minister of Justice, proposed a bill that provided preferential conditions to criminals who memorized the Koran,

\[\text{132} \text{ Milliyet, 8 June 1995.} \]
\[\text{133} \text{ Milliyet, 3 July 1993.} \]
\[\text{134} \text{ Milliyet, 13 March 1995.} \]
\[\text{135} \text{ This nickname was given to Erbakan's government because it was formed by the WP (Refah Partisi) and the TPP (Doğru yol Partisi).} \]
\[\text{136} \text{ Milliyet, 14 July 1996.} \]
\[\text{137} \text{ Milliyet, 15 July 1996.} \]
\[\text{138} \text{ Milliyet, 20 August 1996.} \]
Lütfü Esengün, Minister of State, announced that a major part of the education budget will be allocated to Imam Hatip schools;\textsuperscript{139} and the Minister of Education proposed that graduates from the Al-Azhar Islamic Institute in Egypt will be able to work as teachers in Turkey's education system.\textsuperscript{140} Erbakan's political performance was also a source of uncertainty and fear to secularists and especially to the TAF. The new PM strengthened Turkey's relationship with Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia, at the expense of Turkey's relations with the west. In addition, he advanced personal relationships with leaders of religious orders despite the fact that their activity was formally illegal. In a most provocative act Erbakan arranged a special meal for Sheikhs of religious orders to celebrate the breaking of Ramadan fast.\textsuperscript{141}

The responses of the secular camp to Islamic empowerment and provocation reflected growing hysteria. In a press conference at the beginning of the Year of Justice, the President of the Court of Appeals warned that: "Turkey wishes to be administered by a mentality that manipulates religion in politics";\textsuperscript{142} The National Security Council released statements about the growing influence of religious sects and their evil intentions,\textsuperscript{143} and bills with religious content were vetoed by the council and by the Constitutional Court.\textsuperscript{144}

The intense atmosphere only needed a spark to explode. This came at the Night of Jerusalem in Sincan, a suburb of Ankara. The event was organized by Sincan's Mayor with the participation of the Iranian Ambassador. Throughout it religious extremists shouted "we will force the Sharia on secularists."\textsuperscript{145} This was the straw that broke the Kemalist back. On 4 February 1997 the TAF advanced rows of tanks into Sincan's main boulevard in demonstration of resolve. Three weeks later, on 28 February, the NSC ordered the government to implement a list of 18 directives and fix government deficiencies in various areas. After three months political stalemate between the government and the TAF Erbakan's government was compelled to resign and the State Prosecutor appealed to the Constitutional Court, requesting it to abolish the WP. The

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Milliyet}, 24 August 1996.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Milliyet}, 21 September 1996.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Milliyet}, 20 January 1997.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Milliyet}, 7 September 1996.
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Milliyet}, 17 January 1997.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Milliyet}, 31 January 1997.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Milliyet}, 3 February 1997.
party was abolished permanently by the Constitutional Court in January 1998 and Erbakan was suspended from political activity for five years. A new center-right government was formed by ANAP's leader Mesut Yılmaz, and was kept in place until the 1999 election, following which a secular coalition was established. Nevertheless the military and the bureaucracy became the true rulers and policy makers in Turkey until 2002 (Cizre and Çinar 2002, 319-322).

To conclude, the first few years following the 1980's coup were characterized by pro-religion policies from above and exploitation of these policies and the consequences of rapid modernization by religious actors from below, in a manner that was not in line with democratic principles. The two most important religious players during that period were the religious orders with their social services and growing political influence and the emergence of a popular religious party, the WP, with a solid infrastructure in civil society. A process that seemed at first as an important step towards the consolidation in Turkey of pluralist democracy ended with yet another undemocratic interference by the armed forces which reinforced once again the hegemonic worldview of the Kemalist coalition and brought back into place non-pluralistic policies.

Arguably, both the Kemalists and religious actors were responsible for the evolving tension between the two camps, and its consequential outcome. Instead of adopting a more pluralist vision for Turkish society and politics both sides sought to impose their worldviews in their entirety and expressed intolerance towards the ability of differing worldviews to peacefully coexist in the public sphere. In essence, both camps continued to view the relationship between them as a zero-sum-game, and failed to agree on the fundamentals of a 'thin consensus' that will enable both the ability to express and defend their worldviews and interests in the public sphere in a peaceful manner and without imposition. Under mounting threats on the fundamentals of Kemalism the military had a strong incentive to use all possible measures in protecting its preferable status in the state. This period supports the assumption of the Bounded Integration Model that unlimited integration might not produce positive results for democracy. The WP inspiration to replace one hegemonic world view with another was not better that the Kemalist intention to preserve their long time hegemonic status,
deepened the cleavage between the two camps and resulted in an obviously nondemocratic result.

**Third phase – liberal religious empowerment 1997-2007**

The most recent phase in Turkish democracy represents a significant alteration in the religious sector's strategies of engagement with the Kemalist establishment. The main agent of this change is a new reformist party with religious roots - the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party – AKP). Formed in 2001, AKP demonstrated its dominance in Turkish politics by winning two consecutive national elections with 34.2% of the vote in 2002 and an impressive 46.6% of the vote in 2007. AKP's electoral popularity can be attributed to several factors. The party adopted a new liberal terminology which emphasizes pluralism and human rights, moderated the tone of religious claims towards the state and avoided direct confrontation with the Kemalist establishment, performed very well in various fields of policy including the economy, promoted accession to the EU as a catalyst for democratic reforms, and, most importantly, formed broad alliances with other social actors in Turkish society that conceived the religiously based AKP as the most effective counter-hegemonic instrument in bringing political change and expanding the boundaries of the political discourse in Turkey.

AKP's new forms of dealings with the Kemalist state ended the zero-sum-game perception that characterized former interactions between Kemalists and Islamists. The party founded new channels of engagement that enable the establishment of a 'thin' or 'partial' consensus in society. Moderation on both sides facilitated new interpretations of both religious doctrines and the philosophy of Atatürk in ways that made them more compatible and less hostile to each other (Turam 2007). However, while the new dynamics between the Kemalist establishment and religious factions have opened spaces for a more constructive interaction between the rivaling camps, as of yet this has not been accompanied by a transformation of institutional or constitutional arrangements in Turkey.

In the remainder of this chapter I discuss the factors and processes that brought AKP to political dominance, the patterns of interactions which were established between
the main political actors under AKP rule and the prospects for institutional and constitutional changes in the role of religion in the future. I wish to argue that while new forms of engagement between religion and the state might have brought considerable informal changes in the distribution of political power, at the same time old institutions and constitutional arrangements, that are guarded by the Kemalist alliance, block any possibility to translate the preferences of the electorate regarding the role of Islam in the state into formal structures, laws or institutions. As long as these circumstances persist they will inhibit the consolidation of a pluralist democratic regime in the Turkish Republic.

**Division in Religious Representation 1997-2001**

The first sign that certain features of interactions between Kemalists and Islamists were about to change was the emergence of a deep cleavage within the Islamist camp, out of which two distinct Islamist parties were founded. While one camp maintained its traditional fundamentalist ideology the other presented a new vision for the state-religion relationship that eased the tension between the Kemalist state and Islamic actors and enabled new spaces of interaction and coexistence between them.

Following the dissolution of WP in 1998 the Turkish political system remained paralyzed. The TAF intervened in politics for the fourth time in 40 years but did not want to hold direct political power. At the same time, the existing political parties did not offer any clear vision to solving Turkey's political problems. The general public was left in confusion after realizing that the 'religious option' which seemed until then the primary alternative to Kemalist authoritarianism did not present a more pluralistic agenda. Indeed,

Since February 28, 1997, Turkish political parties have retreated from a constituency-serving position to a state-supporting one. …The nationalist MHP and the Islamist parties have failed to formulate a solid political bedrock from which to constructively oppose the moral consensus laid down by the 28 February process (Cizre and Çinar 2003, 317).
The conservative religious elite did not wait long before it established *Fazilet Partisi* (Virtue Party – VP) in 1998 as substitute to WP. VP made serious efforts to avoid the militant rhetoric of the WP and secure itself from the same verdict, but by no means changed its fundamental worldview. Although Erbakan remained the party's leader behind the scenes he appointed the conservative Recai Kutan as the formal leader of VP. The party's lack of vision, its continued adherence to radical ideas, and its non-transparent internal structure caused a division among the ranks of the party between Traditionalists and Reformists (Mecham 2004). The first camp, the Traditionalists, has seen itself as a contemporary manifestation of *milli görüş* parties. It was composed by the same milieu and advocated the same ideas that had been expressed by former manifestations of *milli görüş* parties - NSP and WP - although its rhetorical tone changed and some of its ideas were disguised in democratic terminology. The other camp, the Reformists, included a group of leading figures from within the ranks of VP such as Bülent Arınç, Abdullah Gül and Cemil Çiçek, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This group challenged the traditional leadership and pushed the party towards more liberal and pluralistic ideas as well as to a more democratic and transparent internal party structure. After VP was dissolved by the constitutional court in 2001 for expressing anti-secular ideas, the clash between the two camps culminated in breaking the party into two. The traditionalist camp founded another radical Islamist party *Saadet Partisi* (Prosperity Party – SP), whereas the reformist camp formed the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party – AKP).

Following its foundation AKP faced two immediate challenges. First, it had only a short time, one year, to develop an effective political infrastructure before the next national elections. Second, its charismatic leader Erdoğan was banned from politics and sentenced to prison by the Constitutional Court after reading a provocative song with Islamic connotations in a public speech, and thus was prohibited from presenting his candidacy to the GNA. The first challenge was dealt in three ways. First, AKP used the same methods of recruitment and campaigning as the former WP and exploited its good relationship with the *Gülen* movement, which was not in favor of radical Islamism and thus did not use its influence in the past to assist religious parties in elections. Strong ties with the movement guaranteed the latter support to the party, and indeed, the election of
2002 was the first occasion in which a majority of Gülen followers voted for an Islamic party (Turam 2007, 136). Second, the party formed political alliances with groups in society that despite holding very different worldviews believed that AKP will be an effective opposition to Kemalism. In particular, AKP recruited the support of liberal intellectuals and the Kurdish population. This issue will be discussed below in more details, but the broad base of social support surely compensated for the relative short time for preparations. Third, the party opened its ranks to deputies from other center-right and right parties. In addition to a core group from the dissolved VP the new party included experienced politicians from parties such as MHP and ANAP. Regarding the legal situation of Erdoğan the party decided that the latter would lead the party's campaign albeit without any formal position, while Gül would serve as the formal leader of the party. This arrangement was based on the (accurate) expectation that after winning the election Erdoğan's legal situation will be solved and he will be able to head the party in formality.

**Forming broad coalitions**

AKP's main source of political strength was its ability to form broad coalitions among people and groups in civil society with different backgrounds and worldviews. As I explained above, the traditional milli görüş parties held hegemonic and strict worldviews and did not embrace the right of divergent groups in society to express their ideas in the public sphere. Yet, while most people in Turkey identify with Islamic tradition, modernity and exposure to democratic values lead many of them to oppose the authoritarian nature of the religious parties. Consequently, only hardcore Islamists gave their voice to milli görüş parties, while mainstream conservatives preferred to vote for center-right parties such as DP, JP and ANAP. This made the potential electorate of former religious parties relatively limited. Also, former religious parties suffered the electoral consequences of a sturdy competition between the powerful Nakşibendi and Nurculuk orders. As long as the the leadership of milli görüş was affiliated with the former, followers of the latter refrained from giving their voice to religious parties (Yeşilada 2002, 67).
Figure 5.4 - Election Turnout of Religious Parties in Turkish National Elections

As is demonstrated in figure 5.4 above, the most popular turnout of a milli görüş party was in the 1995 election when WP won 21.4% of the total vote. Before and after 1995 religious parties achieved significantly lower results. In contradiction, AKP won 34.43% and 46.58% of the total vote in the 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively. These turnouts were much higher than those given to former religious parties and reflected, more than anything else, the joining together of AKP with social and political actors that extended the boundaries of the religious population, particularly with the liberals and the Kurds.

In Turkish society there has always been a vibrant liberal intellectual movement whose roots trace back to the Young Ottoman movement in the 19th Century. This movement opposes any type of political authoritarianism and hence did not side in the past with either Kemalists or Islamists. After the 1960 coup this group named itself Ikinci Cumhuriyetçiler (Second Republicans). Its members claimed that Kemalism (the first republic) completed its ideological role after the consolidation of the republic and that Turkey should now develop more open and pluralistic society and politics. Attempts to form a political party that was based on liberal agenda did not fare well and individuals
belonging to this group voted as a default for center-left parties. After the 1997 military intervention the liberals came to realize that the disproportional power of the military in politics and its enforcement of secularism are the main impediment to democratization, much more so than the presence of Islamic contents in politics. Thus, they sought to coalesce with a political faction that might advance liberal discourse and be an effective opposition against the power and illiberal tendencies of the Kemalist establishment. The only existing such political force in Turkey in the beginning of the 21st Century was AKP.

On its side, AKP understood the electoral potential of utilizing a liberal terminology in the domestic arena as well as the sympathy it might recruit among Western countries for doing so. The merging needs of both sides pushed the liberals and AKP to form a political alliance which was responsible to the adoption by AKP of liberal human-rights oriented language. Instead of advocating the abolishment of secularism the party now states that it endeavors to interpret secularism in a way that protects one's right to express her religiosity in the public sphere. Instead of the old secularism-fundamentalism schism that the Kemalist establishment marketed successfully for decades, the AKP skillfully altered the dispute to one between secularism and democracy, with AKP being the leader of the democratic camp. Ironically, a religious party that labels itself conservative became the most liberal faction in Turkish politics. This terminological shift brought leading secular liberal thinkers such as Professor Attila Yayla, founder and chairman of the Liberal Düşünce Topluluğu (Association of Liberal Thinking),146 and Professor Ihsan Dağı of Middle East Technical University (METU) to support the party. AKP also attracted the support of many liberal oriented civil society associations such as Genç Siviller (Young Civilians - YC)147, Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (Foundation for Political, Economical and social Research – SETA),148 and Başkent Kadın Platformu (Capital City Women's Platform - BKP)149 whose leading activists I interviewed for this research, as well as many others.

146 More information about this think tank can be found in its official website at: http://liberal-dt.org.tr/?lang=en
147 The organization's official website can be found at: http://www.gencsiviller.net/cat.php?categories_id=30
148 The organization's official website can be found at: www.setav.org
149 The organization's official website can be found at: http://www.baskentkadina.org/
While these groups maintain political independence and do not formally identify with any party, there is a complex intermingling between people from these organizations and party figures. For example, Fatma Bostan Unsal, a director of BKP was a founding member of AKP and her husband, Faruk Onsal, served as a deputy for the party in the GNA. Likewise, Zeynep Dagi, Professor Ihsan Dagi's wife, is a member of parliament for AKP, while her political advisor, Dr. Nezir Akyeşinman, is the director of YC. This rich and intimate network of connections between the AKP and civil society actors suggests that the party and its civil supporters are far from being isolated. Moreover, many party deputies in the GNA are not at all religious traditionalists, but rather secular people with liberal modern orientations. The fact that AKP integrated these people into its ranks in various positions reflects the party's genuine ambition and commitment to outreach to various segments in society and expand its electoral potential.

A religious-liberal alliance also challenges the Kemalist establishment that previously posited modern vs. traditional and secular vs. fundamentalist. Kemalists are having hard time digesting the fact that people who identify with their modern rational principles and live the same way of life support AKP. As professor Yayla told me:

> It is very easy for the Kemalists to accuse conservative religious people as being people whose ideas belong to old age, stupid people. But it is not so easy with us. Because when I make a speech I make reference to John Locke, to David Hume, not to Koran. That makes them very angry. They can't fight back…They were not able to understand us. We are taking alcohol, we have girlfriends, we live modern life etc., but we defend these bloody conservative people.\(^{150}\)

The liberal stream was also instrumental in changing the title of AKP in accord with acceptable western terminology from 'conservative party' to 'conservative democratic party,' a change that was officially announced by Erdoğan in a speech at Harvard University in January 2004.\(^{151}\)

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\(^{150}\) Professor Attila Yayla, founder of The Association of Liberal Thinking, an interview on 12.5.2009.

\(^{151}\) Milliyet, 1 February 2004.
Notwithstanding the advantages of the liberal-religious alliance, it is noteworthy that party members with true liberal worldview are not the average supporters of AKP. Among this group are people with advanced education, often earned in western countries, substantive experience with the western way of life, or people with graduate degrees from top tier Turkish universities such as Boğazici, METU and Bilkent. In this regard the liberal faction in AKP is elitist and does not reflect an authentic development from below, among grassroots activists. Conversely, the average supporter of AKP does not necessarily support pluralist and liberal agenda, and still holds traditional and relatively illiberal views. The party's leadership is smart enough to utilize the liberal language selectively. While liberal discourse is more effective in 'high politics' give-and-take domestically and abroad, the party leaders strategically employ a more traditional language in mass organized events and in daily interactions with their electorate. There is certainly an opportunistic part to AKP's utilization of the liberal discourse but liberals who support the party believe that a continuous use of such language will eventually change the user (Dagi 2006). Consider for example the response of a former AKP deputy when I asked him how he could explain the contradiction between the liberal discourse and religious foundations:

> There is no contradiction. It is a kind of opportunism but when you use liberal discourse as an instrument you also change. You cannot stop yourself from changing because you use this as an instrument.\(^{152}\)

Although some in the Kemalist camp accuse the AKP of conducting *takkiye* (dissimulation or hypocrite behavior) the new liberal language threatens the Kemalist elite less compared to absolute religious demands like those expressed by Erbakan in the past and thus certainly alleviates the levels of animosity and facilitates mutual tolerance between the two camps.

Another important ally of AKP is the Kurdish population in Eastern Turkey. Kurds were suppressed by the Kemalist establishment since the foundation of the republic and were prohibited from expressing their distinct national identity. State

\(^{152}\) Interview with Faruk Unsal, 14 May 2009.
suppression generated opposition among the Kurds since the early days of the Republic, starting with the Sheikh Sait Rebellion in 1925 which I discussed in details in Chapter Three. In 1978 a group of extreme Kurdish nationalists with Marxist ideology formed the Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers Party – PKK) and engaged in fighting against the Turkish state for national self determination. The Kurdish struggle involved terrorist attacks against state and civil targets across Turkey and stimulated the TAF to repress the upsurge by harsh military means. Mutual violence took the lives of tens of thousands people (estimated 30,000 casualties) on both sides and involved restrictions from above on Kurdish culture, language, and national identity. The capture of the PKK's notorious leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999 lessened the intensity of violence but the 'Kurdish problem' in Turkey is still far from solution (Doğu 2000; Saracoğlu 2009).

In the past religious parties did not pay special attention to Kurdish claims. Erbakan did argue that Kurds and Turks are united by Islamic bonds, but former religious parties did not wish to upset their Turkish electorate and thus never acknowledged Kurdish collective rights or treated them as distinctive people. Moreover, although the Kurdish population votes in significant numbers to religious parties the latter did not include Kurdish figures in its ranks. In contrast, AKP's approach to Kurdish nationalism is partially accommodative. The party nominated Kurdish deputies and reforms that were taken for meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and entering the EU eased restrictions on the Kurdish population. Consequently, the AKP won a majority of votes in Kurdish cities and especially in Diyarbakir, the Kurdish capital of Eastern Anatolia. While avoiding a substantive reform on the Kurdish issue, particularly due to strident Kemalist resistance and nationalist sentiment among many of its followers, AKP is the only party that does not deny the problem, and tries, as it manages, to better the situation of the Kurds in Turkey without provoking the Kemalist state too much. For instance, AKP approved a state-funded television channel for the Kurds and allowed the latter to resume the use of Kurdish names. It will be a mistake, however, to naively perceive AKP's relationship with the Kurdish population as one motivated by ideals.

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153 During the final edits of this dissertation, in December 2009, the Constitutional Court in Turkey ruled out the Kurdish party in the GNA and sparked Kurdish riots in the South-Eastern parts of country in yet another manifestation of the Kemalist fear from Kurdish claims for self determination.

only. According to former AKP deputy Faruk Unsal this is not more than the instrumentalization of the issue by both sides, or, to borrow Unsal's expression: "a marriage of interest."\textsuperscript{155} AKP maintains its alliance with the Kurds for political gains. Similarly, the Kurds realize that cooperation with AKP might benefit them more than support to the radical PKK. Nevertheless, the significant point is that the demands and terminology of AKP allies, liberal and Kurds, are being expressed in public, penetrate into the public discourse and resonate in Turkish society.

\textit{Changing language, avoiding confrontation, facilitating 'thin consensus'}

The establishment of a 'thin consensus' in society and politics requires mutual tolerance of all major participants in society as well as an agreement on accepted forms of dispute resolution. Interactions between Kemalists and Islamists in the past did not meet these requirements. Instead, each side questioned or opposed the legitimacy of the other. This dynamics generated politics of 'winners take all'. In such type of political interaction efforts are made to eliminate political opponents instead of accepting and collaborating with them. Being aware of its relative inferiority in comparison to the TAF when it comes to imposing one's political will, the AKP endeavored to alter this dynamics in a way that will secure the party from abolishment and at the same time will lay the foundations for at least minimal cooperation with the Kemalist establishment in common political interests, such as economic growth and political stability. Former religious parties have always based their political popularity on rhetorical clashes with the Kemalist establishment and on challenging the foundations of the Kemalist project and secularism. This style of engagement invited aggressive repression and did not ease cooperation between the factions. Alternatively, AKP adopted a non confrontational language and refrains from criticizing the core elements of the Kemalist ideology. This strategy serves three purposes. First, it secures AKP from the same fate of former religious parties, namely – termination by the secular establishment. Second, it alleviates distrust and anxiety and enables partial cooperation between religious actors and the state. Third, instead of viewing Kemalism and religion in dichotomy it suggests a third

\textsuperscript{155} Interview with Faruk Unsal, 14 May 2009.
option that convinces many Turks to vote for a conservative party while not abandoning their Kemalist convictions. Erdoğan's own words illustrate this approach nicely:

We are against the employment of discourses and organizational approaches that create divisions of Us and Them and make one specific fact – ideology, political identity, ethnic element, or religious thought – the center of the polity, thereby antagonizing all other choices…While attaching importance to religion as a social value, we do not think it right to conduct politics through religion, to attempt to transform government ideologically by using religion, or to resort to organizational activities based on religious symbols. To make religion an instrument of politics and to adopt exclusive approaches to politics in the name of religion harms not only political pluralism but also religion itself.156

Erdoğan's words reflect a deep change in the public image of religious parties according to which religion's role in the state is not viewed as the center of politics and not even the most important issue. It is one of various issues that the government needs to discuss and form policies for, but not a prism through which every political concern should be viewed and treated. In this view Sharia is not only not a panacea to all societal ills, but not even desired as a formal element in the political order. In contrast to MSP and WP that emphasized Sharia for political purposes AKP and its supporters in civil society do not support the implementation of Sharia laws in Turkey. Professor Hakan Yavuz, a notable student of religion in Turkey told me recently that "no one wants Sharia law in Turkey."157 Similarly, Dr. Ibrahim Kalin, the head of SETA, told me that recurrent polls clearly show that the people of Turkey do not favor the reinstallation of Sharia laws. Cognizant to the lack of popular support for Sharia and its explosive potential vs. the Kemalist establishment the party completely abandoned the concept and refrains from using it.

Further, as Sultan Tepe skillfully demonstrates, one of the party's electoral advantages is its ability to 'secularize' issues which until then were considered sacred in the Turkish public sphere, while keeping Islam in the background (Tepe 2006, 109;

156 The Speech was given by Erdoğan at the American Enterprise Institute, on 29 January 2004 (in Yavuz 2006).
Even political debates with religious core are presented as questions of human-rights and individual welfare. For example, the loaded issue of headscarves in educational facilities is presented by the party as a matter of conscience and free choice and not as religious duty. In that regard, Erdoğan noted that a woman should be free to wear a headscarf exactly as she should be free to wear a mini skirt (Liel 2003, 35). Such a moderate liberal approach could never have been expressed by religious leaders in the past. In the same manner, equal access of graduates of Imam-Hatip schools to universities or the public service is treated as a question of equality of chance and freedom of occupation rather than as a religious issue.

In addition, to reduce animosity and open channels of collaboration with Kemalists the party embraces both Kemal Atatürk (the figure) and Kemalism (the ideology) as common Turkish values. Since the foundation of the party its formal gatherings routinely host pictures of Atatürk and people stand to commemorate his legacy. These gestures were unthinkable by former religious and while they do not convince all Kemalists in their sincerity they gain the sympathy of the general public and help in promoting AKP to its dominant position in Turkish politics. Indeed, the secularization of religious issues deviates from the path of former religious parties in Turkey to a degree that makes AKP comparable to Christian Democratic Parties in Europe that are religious by title but nevertheless center around secular issues and policies. As William Hale argues:

Even if the leaders of the JDP [AKP] reject the "Muslim Democrat" label, there are intriguing similarities between their party and the Christian democrat parties of Western Europe in terms of policies, especially on moral, cultural, and educational issues; international attitudes; and support structures (Hale 2006, 83).

*Popular policies, convincing performance: Fixing the economy and joining Europe*

As oppose to the WP, following its 2002 electoral victory AKP did not put emphasis on radical policies in issues related to religion. Instead, the party chose to concentrate on two subjects that were in consensus in Turkey - economic reconstruction and Turkey's accession to the European Union. By this doing the AKP attempted to gain the trust of
the secular establishment and the business sector, preserve its national popularity, and use these tools as instruments in altering the distribution of political power in Turkish politics. On both issues AKP has been relatively successful. Just like the Cold War that compelled the Turkish state to democratize and the Iranian Revolution that served as a catalyst for the coup in 1980, in the beginning of the 21st Century another foreign factor, the prospects for joining the European Union impacted Turkish domestic politics. It is true that reforms and advocacy in favor of accession started before AKP entered into Turkish politics. Joining the EU was a longtime desire of Turkey and 'on the table' for many years. In July 2002 Turkey undertook a broad series of reforms to adjust to European standards in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria in the economic, political and legal realms. These reforms included the isolation of the military from politics, attempts to solve the Kurdish and the Cyprus issues, fighting corruption, improving the economy and making politics more transparent and pluralistic.

AKP, however, utilized the aspirations of the Turkish people to join the EU as a tool to improve the human rights situation in the country and weaken the TAF's influence on politics. The party became the most enthusiastic supporter of accession to the EU and its government approved large scale reforms in all realms to promote accession to the Union. AKP's pro-EU policy confronted the secular establishment with a serious dilemma and pushed it 'to the corner'. On the one hand the Kemalists support Turkey's accession to the EU as a reaffirmation of Turkey's legitimate membership in the "West". Also, the Kemalist establishment understands that joining the EU is a significant generator of growth for the Turkish economy, the Turkish electorate supports Turkey's accession and finally, the business elite recognizes the advantages of this process. On the other hand, the secular establishment is suspicious that the entire process is meant to disguise the Islamists' true intentions - to weaken the secular establishment by using EU reforms in order to alleviate the TAF's power and be able to push Turkey into becoming an Islamic theocracy. Eventually, the RPP and the armed forces, out of fear of losing their hegemonic power, expressed their opposition to joining the union. This enabled AKP to capitalize on another axis – globalization and progress advocated by its government vs. domestic nationalism and isolationism advocated by the Kemalist establishment. This also turned the business sector and the important industrialist unions
MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD in favor of AKP's pro EU regulations and away from supporting the TAF and the RPP (Öniş 2006, 214). Since 2005 the EU accession process has been stalled but mainly because of internal European disagreements about Turkey's accession. Despite mounting criticism about the EU process, especially from the rightist MHP, AKP and the general public in Turkey still support the process and desire its ultimate outcome.

On the economic front the party demonstrated impressive performance as well. Despite fears among many that it will act in a populist manner to appease its electorate the party exercised disciplined economic policies in cooperation with the IMF and without breaking budgetary constraints. This enabled the government to bring inflation down to a low record in three decades and achieve an impressive growth rate of 12% in 2004 (Öniş 2006, 215). Likewise, the government allocated significant resources to infrastructure both in urban centers and rural areas, and elevated the standard of living in the country. The most significant change took place in Istanbul, where the government initiated large scale projects of renovation, building new roads, and new public transportation vehicles such as modern subway and tram lines. The business sector applauded AKP's convincing economic performance and consolidated the latter political base of support, while further isolating and weakening the Kemalist establishment.

*New realities, old politics*

AKP's new strategies of engagement with the secular state and its notable success in various fields of policy altered the dynamics of interaction between Kemalists and Islamic actors in Turkey and the political division of power in the country. In particular, for the first time in Turkish history it made the democratic-Islamic camp a leading political force at the expanse of the fading old Kemalist establishment. Assessments regarding the ramifications of this process are in dispute. Berna Turam, for instance, sees AKP's term in office as a positive experience that mitigated tensions between the two camps and opened new spaces for mutual tolerance and more constructive engagement in the future (Turam 2007). In opposition, Zeyno Baran asserts that the AKP government only deepened cleavages and distrust between the "two Turkeys" and made Turkish democracy all the more fragile (Baran 2008).
My conviction is that the present situation in Turkey should be viewed in a more nuanced manner. It is without doubt that AKP won the support of the Turkish populace. This is clearly reflected by its sweeping electoral victories in 2002 and 2007. Also, the party skillfully altered the contours of the debate with the Kemalist establishment from secular-religious traditional-modern divisions to secular-democratic plural-hegemonic ones. In this new terminological environment AKP does not challenge the basic elements of Kemalism but rather offers a new interpretation to them, with the assistance of a myriad of liberal civil society organizations as well as sophisticated infrastructure of grassroots activists. This new strategy has been successful in maintaining political stability in Turkey as long as it did not challenge the very basic nature of the Kemalist state and its core legal and institutional arrangements. Nevertheless, the Kemalist establishment remains resilient against any attempt by AKP to formally alter the political arrangements that preserve the former’s hegemonic worldview and status in the state.

At present, then, there is a considerable discrepancy between AKP’s broad political support and its inability to carry forward reforms in accordance with its supporters’ preferences. The party has not been able to translate these preferences into redesigning Turkey's political structure including the role of religion in it. Although religious actors did everything in their power to avoid confrontation and appease the Kemalist establishment, the latter remained in opposition to any formal acknowledgement by the state of religious concerns beyond what was included in the 1982 Constitution. Turkey's political reality was resonated in the 2007 Freedom House special report on the state, which starts by stating that: "Turkey presents an ever shifting dichotomy between democratic progress and resistance to reform" (Freedom House 2007, 1).¹⁵⁸

Today in Turkey there is more informal integration and toleration of religion in everyday life. Yet, Turkey's restrictive political order disregards the preferences of the majority of the Turkish public, excludes it legally from the political game, and thus thwarts the development in Turkey of a meaningful pluralistic democracy. While the main religious actors came to acknowledge the advantages of pluralistic democracy and

thus are willing to adhere to the principles of a 'thin consensus' the Kemalist camp did not yet take the same path and is blocking any attempt to further democratize the Turkish political system. More so, when measuring Turkey's democratic performance it becomes apparent that the present situation violates several basic requirements of democracy. First, it restricts the right to form and join organizations only to those who accept the tenets of Kemalist ideology. Second, it restricts the eligibility of religious people for public office. Third, governmental institutions are not responsive in that that they do not fully reflect the preferences of the electorate to see more religion in the public sphere - a prime example would be the head cover issue. Fourth, Turkey's political system violates the principle of 'institutional uncertainty' because the outcome of the democratic process must stay within the limits of the Kemalist principles. And finally, state policies are not made solely by elected representatives (politicians) but are controlled and manipulated by unelected actors, especially the military and the court system.

While the Kemalist project failed to secularize society from above and transform its moral values, its agents succeeded in blocking any modification in the core elements of the political order, especially secularism, statism and nationalism. Moreover, whenever the Kemalist establishment fears that such changes might take shape, it does not hesitate to undemocratically interfere in the political process, even though any interference by its agents further decreases its popularity, by this making Kemalist actions more antidemocratic and less representative of the general public's will.

The period covered by this research ends in August 2007 with the election for Presidency of Abdullah Gül. The election process was another embodiment of the problematic approach of the Kemalist establishment and manifested once again the dominance of religion in Turkish politics as well as the restrictive and exclusivist nature of Turkish democracy and the Kemalist unwillingness to integrate religious actors into the political system.

Towards the end of President Necdet Sezer's term in office AKP announced that its candidate for presidency will be the moderate and pragmatist Deputy PM Abdullah Gül. Selecting Gül and not one of the other two leaders of the party - Speaker of the GNA Bülent Arınç or PM Tayyip Erdoğan – was, at least in part, an attempt to appease
the secular public and alleviate tension and polarization in Turkish society. Nevertheless, the secular apparatus opposed any candidate with religious roots whose wife wears a headscarf. As expected, this announcement sparked a massive wave of protest throughout Turkey by the Kemalist establishment and its remaining supporters in society. Marches and rallies were organized in all major urban centers including Izmir, Ankara, Istanbul Antalya and Mersin. Under other circumstances this could have been interpreted as an impressive act of civic involvement. Nevertheless, the incentive of the rallying secularists was not the development of a more inclusive political sphere or further democratic reforms but rather maintaining the old status quo and the marginalization of religion from the public sphere. Instead of mitigating fears and distrust the secularists' mass actions only polarized the society more and made the possibility that all factions agree on a basic outline of a 'thin consensus' and respect each other's right to be active in the public sphere ever more remote. Despite the ultimate election of Gül as President the election campaign, on which I elaborate below, exposed once more the problematic and restrictive nature of Turkish democracy.

In the midst of pro-secularist protests the military intervened in politics once again. Since the 2002 election the military became more active in the media through occasional speeches by military generals on civil and political themes. The military perceives itself as a political actor and utilizes the media as an instrument to deliver its ideas to the general public, even though this is a clear violation of the typical role of armed forces in democratic regimes. There are many illustrations of this phenomenon. In January 2004 General Tolon claimed that there are many people in the government who wish the reinstallation of Sharia laws in Turkey. Likewise, general Erüygür argued in August 2004 that malicious people find refuge in the democratic regime and continue their activities against the Republic. Similar political statements were made by Chiefs of Staff generals Basbuğ and Büyükanıt. In the same fashion, two weeks before AKP announced Gül's candidacy for presidency Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt gave a public comment which said the following:

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Recently, the main issue emerging in connection with presidential elections has focused the debate over secularism. This is viewed with concern by the Turkish Armed forces.\textsuperscript{163}

This comment was a promo for a more aggressive interference by the TAF and the Constitutional Court down the road, following AKP's insistence to bring Gül's candidacy to vote in the GNA. Because AKP enjoyed solid majority in Parliament it was able to approve Gül's nomination. However, both the Constitutional Court and the TAF overruled his election. The Constitutional Court ruled that there was no sufficient quorum to take the vote and after the first round, on April 27, close to midnight, the military published a short memo on its website, which said the following:

> It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a side in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces are against those debates… and will display its position and attitudes when it becomes necessary. No one should doubt that.\textsuperscript{164}

This memo, which was later nicknamed the \textit{e-coup}, left no room for speculation. The military signaled very clearly that it would intervene in the election process if Gül is elected President. Similar to 1997 the military did not take control over civil politics but its aggressive interference confiscated every practical power from the elected politicians. Under these circumstances Gül removed his candidacy and AKP announced that national elections will be rescheduled to July 2007, instead of November 2007.

The TAF's intervention in the political process generated rage and frustration in the general public as well as among intellectuals and media circles. Bülent Keneş, a well known columnist for \textit{Today's Zaman} was representative of the public's feelings:

\textsuperscript{163} Quoted in Ceyhan Bülent and Fatih Vural, "Intellectuals Condemn Military Memorandum on 2\textsuperscript{nd} Anniversary," \textit{Today's Zaman}, 27 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{164} Quoted in Ceyhan Bülent and Fatih Vural, "Intellectuals Condemn Military Memorandum on 2\textsuperscript{nd} Anniversary," \textit{Today's Zaman}, 27 April 2009.
By taking an unexpected step toward midnight on Friday that could never be encountered in any contemporary democracy the General Staff has not only intervened in, and thereby insulted, the democratic politics, but has also insulted the Turkish people's dignity, honor, mind and will by making this statement. … Those people [Turkish citizens] have never forgiven and will never forgive those using against them the threatening and dissuading power of the arms provided by their taxes and self-sacrifices. Those who consider themselves as the only owner of this country, state and nation, and who see everyone else besides themselves as a threat, should now realize that they are becoming a minority and becoming marginalized.  

Acknowledging the unprecedented anti-military sentiment PM Erdoğan confronted the TAF with a counter response, saying that the armed forces are civil servants and as such should refrain from involving themselves in political issues. The courageous reaction of AKP was a significant turning point in civil-military relationship because it accentuated the dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism and reaffirmed AKP's status as the leader of the democratic camp. As a result, AKP gained the support of all the Turks who were reluctant to accept undemocratic military intervention in politics, and came out of the July 2007 election victorious with of 46.6% of the total vote, meaning that every second Turk voted for the AKP, whereas the Kemalist party RPP won slightly more than 20% of the vote. In the aftermath of the election Gül was nominated again for presidency and on 26 August 2007 he became the first religious President of Turkey. In a very symbolic act, the Chiefs of Joint Staff did not participate in Gül's inauguration ceremony.

This recent example suggests once again that the Kemalist establishment does not hesitate to violate democratic principles for the sake of preserving its dominant status in the Turkish state even though these antidemocratic actions damage its popular image and reduce support for it in the Turkish society. On the other hand, the growing power of pro democratic forces in Turkey, both religious and secular, translates itself to direct confrontations vis-à-vis the old establishment and more demands to pluralize the

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165 Kenes Bulent, "No need for 'Midnight Express' anymore, we have a midnight memorandum," Today's Zaman, 30 April 2007.
166 Interview with Dr. Nezir Akyeşinman, 14 May 2009.
system. As of yet, though, the Kemalists were powerful enough to block significant changes in the formal institutional and constitutional arrangement in Turkey, but their backing up in the election of President Gül might reflect a first step in a new direction.

**Conclusions**

This chapter covered a very long and dynamic period in Turkish history. Along this era Turkish politics experienced up and downs and was subject to instability and undemocratic interventions. Nevertheless, in regard religion it is safe to argue in retrospective that the secularization project of Atatürk failed in at least two respects. First of all, societal secularization in Turkey failed. Despite the Kemalists efforts to alter the values of the Turkish society to modern, rational and scientific ones the average Turk remained traditional and religious and rejected attempts to detach it from her cultural and religious foundations. Throughout this period Turkish society gradually, but steadily, increased the consumption of religious services, built more Mosques, expanded religious education and developed distinct Muslim culture and fashion. In addition, the religious orders, the local Mosque and the religious associations continued to serve as important social institutions by which people identified themselves, as well as powerful recruitment tools in politics. Finally, Social secularization failed politically because more and more people have chosen to give their vote, first to secular parties who eased restrictions on religion, such as the DP JP and ANAP and later to explicit religious parties like NSP, WP and AKP.

In addition, secularization colossally failed on the democratic level. Despite the assumptions of the modernization theory and the secularization thesis, imposed secularization from above did not advance the consolidation of a stable democratic system in Turkey. In contrast, ongoing attempts to impose secularism in society acted against the will of the people and were responsible in large part to the formation of an exclusionary political system and recurrent undemocratic military interventions. In order to defend its hegemonic worldview the Kemlist establishment blocked any attempt to put forward religious claims, as well as claims by other groups in society such as the Kurds and the liberals, by this restricting the boundaries of the political discourse and
thwarting any possibility to establish a 'thin consensus' in politics, under which every group and worldview can coexist peacefully in the public sphere.

Furthermore, the penetration of religion into politics was gradual but linear. The first two decades following the establishment of a pluralist democracy made religion and religious concerns a strong recruitment tool but without direct representation by religious parties. Direct religious representation had started in 1970 but only in the 21st Century there evolved a religiously affiliated party, AKP, which deviated from the traditional Islamist-Kemalist dichotomies and was able to change the political discourse and form broad alliances in the society. Yet, as of today, the actual political distribution of power in Turkish society is not yet reflected in Turkey's political order. The Kemalist establishment still relies on anachronistic power structures and political arrangement and is not willing to give up its hegemonic role and allow a true pluralistic political arena. Ironically, the more the Kemalist establishment intervenes in politics undemocratically the more it loses public support. It is predicted that at some point the difference between Kemalist hold on power and support for it in society will grow bigger beyond an Archimedean point, which might compel the Kemalists to give up their hegemonic status and allow other groups, religious, ethnic, ideological and others the right to express their worldviews and demand the implementation of their preferences in the public and political sphere.
Chapter 6: Zionism and Religion Pre-Independence

The treatment of religion in the State of Israel evolved in a very different way than the strictly imposed secularism that characterizes Turkish politics. It also had a distinct impact on the evolution and stability of the democratic regime and thus makes the comparison between the Turkish and Israeli cases in regard the state-religion relationship very telling.

In many respects the Zionist movement and later the State of Israel deviated from the secularist prescription which was offered, at times imposed, to post colonial societies by the western powers. Instead of adhering to commonly prescribed arrangements and coercing a secular political sphere Israel chose to develop a unique model that formally recognizes the Jewish religion in the polity by means of religious institutions, autonomous religious powers, allocation of resources for religious purposes and specific laws and regulations with religious content. This original model of religious integration into state affairs has had, over all, a positive impact on the stability and quality of Israel's democratic system. It was instrumental in mitigating tensions between secular and religious actors as well as in relegating most of the religious-secular disputes to the parliamentarian, non-violent and legal realms. The recognition of religion and religious actors in the public sphere following Israel's proclamation of independence facilitated broad acceptance of the principles of a thin consensus by both the state and the religious sectors and enabled the latter to participate in civil society and in return to support and respect the democratic order. These circumstances stand in stark contradiction to the imposed secularist agenda from above that characterized the Turkish Republic following the establishment of the state.

In accord with the proposition of the Bounded Integration Model, the foundations of the state-religion relationship in Israel originated from social and political arrangements that were shaped in the pre-state period. Therefore, it is essential to investigate the emerging relationship between the leadership of the Zionist movement and the religious factions in the Jewish nation, which preceded the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 in many decades, taking place first in diaspora and later in the Jewish community in Palestine.
In similarity to the Turkish experience, pre-state considerations influenced the treatment of religion following the establishment of the state. Yet, in stark disparity than Turkey, the social, structural and cultural attributes that characterized the Jewish nation at the time of the emergence of the Zionist movement stimulated the integration of religion into the ideology and institutions of the movement, then into the political framework of the Yishuv (The Jewish community in Palestine) and eventually into the legal and institutional configuration of the newborn country. Of particular importance were the following factors: First, Jewish religion lacked political influence. While religion was the most important instrument of social order among the Jewish communities in Europe until the beginning of the 19th Century its centrality was not reflected in a significant political establishment and thus did not pose a threat to or challenged the authority of the emerging secular Zionist leadership. Second, in contrast with Turkey, whose population inhabited the national territory prior to independence, the primary goal of the Zionist movement was to stimulate Jews to immigrate to Palestine and populate its land. In this respect Jewish religion served as a common identity and the most effective recruitment tool of Jews from different states of origin, languages and value systems. Third, while the Zionist movement was essentially secular it did not dismiss or undermine the inseparable fusion between the religious component of the Jewish identity and its other ingredients, national, linguistic, cultural and ethnic (Rubinstein 1967, Weissbrod 1983). Consider, for instance the following words by Ahad Haam (Asher Ginsberg), a prominent Zionist leader and thinker:

Judaism is fundamentally national, and all the efforts of the "Reformers" to separate the Jewish religion from its national element have had no result except to ruin both the nationalism and the religion. Clearly, then, if you want to build and not to destroy, you must teach religion on the basis of nationalism, with which it is inseparably intertwined (Hertzberg, 1969, 262).

Indeed, several attempts in the past to divorce Judaism from its religious component all failed to come up with an alternative yet appealing conception of Jewish identity, and risked rendering the entire identity less coherent.
These underlying conditions and the ability of the Zionist leadership to accurately acknowledge their political significance to the success of the Zionist project dictated the manner by which the leadership of the Zionist movement treated the Jewish religion, and facilitated the multidimensional integration of the latter into the Zionist institutional structure and national ideology. In addition, these factors shaped the nature of the interaction between the Zionist leadership and religious factions in the Jewish nation and set the foundations for their later integration into state affairs following the establishment of the state.

This account highlights the roots of the difference in the treatment of religion between Israel and Turkey. As I elaborated above in Chapters Three and Four, the Kemalist movement wished to dismiss the central role of Islam in the life of the Turkish populace because, according to its narrow western conception, religion and modernization were in irreconcilable contradiction. Subsequently, it forced secularism from above, confronted significant resistance, and eventually failed to achieve its desired goal, secular society, while inflicting a very high price on the Turkish population. In contrast, the Zionist movement took the significance of the Jewish religion in the life of the Jewish nation into careful consideration, was willing to integrate it into the national ideology and institutional framework, and consequentially achieved most of its political goals, a modern democratic state, while maintaining better democratic stability at lower social costs.

**The 'Jewish Problem' and the emergence of the Zionist movement**

The modern phase of Jewish nationalism began in Europe in the 19th Century with the emergence of the Zionist movement. However, Zionism by no means created a new collective identity from scratch. Jewish nationalism is rooted in history and traditions which go back several millennia in time. The Jewish collective identity is definitely one of the most, if not the most, ancient ethno-national identities. Its origins can be traced back to the biblical era, to the covenant between God and Abraham, the father founder of Judaism. Historians and students of nationalism regard the Jewish nation as an archetype of modern nationalism and the bible as the founding textbook of European nationalism (Hastings 1997; Smith 2000; Ben-Israel 2000).
The history of Judaism is too long and detailed to cover adequately here, but it is evident that throughout it the Jewish people kept firm connection with the land of Israel, either physical or spiritual or both, depending on historical circumstances. According to the Jewish belief, three generations after establishing the covenant between Abraham and God and settling in the land of Israel the Israelites were forced to immigrate to Egypt due to long famine that plagued the land. The Jews escaped from Egypt after 400 years of national slavery in the famous biblical story of Exodus and following two generations of nomadic existence in the Sinai desert conquered the land of Israel from its Canaanite inhabitants. This resulted in six centuries of Jewish political independence in the land of Israel that reached a peak under the prosperous Kingdoms of David and Solomon. In 538 B.C.E. the land was conquered by the Babylonians who exiled the Jews from it. Since then, for more than two millennia the center of Jewish existence had been in diaspora, despite brief historical moments of Jewish independence during the Maccabian Revolt and Hasmonean Kingdom, which ended with the second exile of Jews from the land, in 70 A.D., this time by the Roman Emperor Titus. Jews spread throughout the world, existed in poverty and suffered discrimination and persecution in both Christian and Muslim countries (though significantly less in the latter). Throughout this long history there always remained a small minority of Jews in the land of Israel, in the cities of Hebron, Zefad, Tiberius and Jerusalem, who identified themselves in purely religious terms and stayed there to work the holy land (Reich 2005).

In Judaism there is an inseparable Gordian connection between the religion and the nation. Judaism is both a religious and national marker of collective as well as individual identity. This connection lies at the heart of the Jewish nation and was instrumental in shaping the relationship between the Jewish religion and the Zionist movement. However, notwithstanding the linkage between Zionism and the Jewish religion, the revolutionary nature of the Zionist ideology put it in constant dispute with the religious-based traditional leaderships in the Jewish nation. The main source of disagreement between the two camps seemed to be the proactive ideology of Zionism which stood in obvious contradiction to the Orthodox passive waiting for messianic

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167 I use the prular (leaderships) to emphasize that while in diaspora every local Jewish population gathered around its particular leadership. During this time an effective, legitimate national leadership was absent.
redemption, which is the reason why throughout its existence in diaspora the Jewish people maintained their spiritual longing to Zion (one of the biblical names of Jerusalem) but took no active measures to hasten and bring about the realization of their national aspirations (Rubinstein 1984). Moreover, Orthodox Judaism perceives any activity that enhances the rebuilding of a Jewish polity in the ancient land of Israel as an act of heresy and violation of God's will and thus opposed the provocative and blasphemous establishment of a secular Zionist movement (Salmon 1990, 314; Vital 1999; Ravitzky 1993).

The emergence of Zionism was a consequence of two opposite yet related trends, persecution and integration, that took place simultaneously in Eastern and Western Europe and were both an outcome of growing nationalistic sentiments in the countries in which the Jews resided. In Eastern Europe – Romania, Ukraine, Tsarist Russia and the Baltic States – ethnic nationalism was accompanied by large scale anti-Semitism, discrimination and pogroms against local Jewish communities, which were implicitly encouraged by the local governments. Unbearable life conditions stimulated Eastern European Jews to find refuge in other places. While many fled to the new countries of the West, mainly to the United States, others endeavored to find a permanent political solution to the Jewish people that will secure them from hardships and guarantee their survival (Reich 2005, 14-15; Shapira 1995)

At the same time, the Jews of Western Europe faced an unprecedented level of integration and assimilation that confronted them with a new set of dilemmas. Emancipation in Europe allowed the Jews, who until then were segregated and thus found it easy to preserve their distinct culture, to work in the public service, occupy new professions, and enter the public education system and the universities. These measures bettered the material life of the Jews but at the same time forced them to think of ways to preserve their identity and avoid cultural assimilation. The new equal status which was granted to Jews in Western European societies brought with it various daily problems. Participation in public education and employment in the public sector required the violation of the Sabbath. Likewise, socializing with friends from school in eating places required giving up on kosher dietary laws. Therefore, the second manifestation of the 'Jewish problem' was how to make sure that the Jewish distinctive
culture does not disappear as a consequence of integration of Jews in their countries of residence (Avinery 1984; Reinharz 2000).

Nevertheless, the legal and material assimilation could not overcome the problem of distinct identity. Growing national sentiments in both Eastern and Western Europe created an old-new problem of inclusiveness for the Jews. While former social categorization in European societies was based on religion and thus excluded Jews for not being Christians, new social categorization relied on national heritage and ancestral roots, which still excluded the Jews who could not identify with the Gaelic origins of French people or the nomadic origins of German and Anglo-Saxon tribes.

The contemporary problems facing the European Jewry during the 19th Century served as a catalyst to the emergence of a new national movement with two main objectives. The first objective was pragmatic - to find a refuge place for Jews who suffered persecution in their countries of residence. The second objective was more idealistic - the realization of Jewish national aspirations by building an ideal, independently governed Jewish society, preferably in the land of their ancestors. Zionist ideas began spreading in the second half of the 19th Century with two major publications, Moses Hess's *Rome and Jerusalem* (1862) and Leo Pinsker's *Auto-emancipation* (1882). Both books discussed the 'Jewish Problem' and asserted that Jews will never be fully integrated in their countries of residence and thus should seek to reestablish an independent Jewish polity.

The novel ideas which were expressed in these books hastened the formation of *Chibat Zion* (Affection for Zion), a proto-Zionist organization of pioneers with traditional orientation, almost exclusively from Eastern Europe – Romania, Galicia and Poland – who immigrated to Palestine in the 1870s and 1880s to settle and cultivate the land of Israel. The primary motivation of *Chibat Zion* in immigrating to Palestine was religious, and the movement was headed by religious figures such as Rabbis Pines, Kalisher, Alkalai, Moheliver and Raines. Accordingly, the pioneers quested to build in the land of Israel a religious observing community and concerned themselves with religious themes such as cultivating the land during the Jewish sabbatical year *Shnat Shmita* (every seventh year), protesting against the establishment of secular schools in Jaffa, and forcing the observance of religious rituals among the secular pioneers such as
the Bnei Moshe movement who was headed by Ahad Ha’am and the Biluim who settled in Gedera. In the latter case, for instance, rabbis Pines and Moheliver demanded that the secular pioneers and those who decided to cultivate the land during sabbatical be expelled from Palestine because they violated a religious commandment and contaminated the sanctity of the holy land (Salmon 1990, 20, 112-139).

Chibat Zion, however, could not have been considered an institutionalized national movement. The narrow stream of Jewish people from Europe to Palestine lacked sufficient infrastructure and resources, was dependent to a large extent on donations from Jewish philanthropies such as Baron Montefiore and Baron Rothschild and did not have a clear political vision. Only later in the 1890s Theodore Herzl's emerging leadership became the driving force behind the inauguration of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the convention of the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, which became the main institutions of the Zionist movement.

Jehuda Reinharz and David Vital make a distinction between proto Zionism and historical Zionism. According to them, the difference between the two phenomena relates to their modernist orientation. While proto-Zionism was traditional and religious, the movement that emerged in the 1890s was modernist (Reiharz 1993, 60-61; Vital 1998, 207). In this respect, the formation of the WZO signified an ideological shift among the leadership of the Zionist movement. In contrast to proto Zionists who conceived the immigration to Palestine a religious obligation, the emerging leadership of political Zionism – Herzl, Nordau, Pinsker, Hess, and Lilienblum – were all liberal-secular Jews, mostly from western Europe, who interpreted the Jewish collective identity in ethnic-national terms rather than in religious-spiritual terms. They were all products of emancipation and the enlightenment and saw the Jewish traditions, ceremonies and special attachment to the land of Israel as ingredients of an ethnic Jewish identity. Further, the founders of political Zionism desired the construction in Palestine of a free, plural and secular society, with no clerical influence in social and political matters. The best manifestation of this vision appears in Herzl's two classic publications Judenstaat (the Jewish State) in 1896 and Altneuland (Old New Land) in 1902. One famous quote from Judenstaat that reflects Herzl liberal secular vision of the future Jewish state is that in the state of the Jews Rabbis will be restricted to their synagogues and military officers
to their barracks (Herzl 1896). Similar liberal expressions can be found in the published works of Max Nordau, Herzl's second in command (Mosse 1992, Baldwin 1980).

Religion and Zionism – the formative years

The Zionist movement developed a convoluted relationship with the religious component of Judaism and with religious factions in the Jewish nation from the very early stage. This complexity was embedded in the conflicting motives of the movement. On the one hand, the Zionist leadership endeavored to spread secular and liberal values among the Jewish communities in Europe and establish these ideas as an ideological platform for the future Jewish polity. On the other hand, the movement needed the broadest possible support among the scattered Jewish populaces in the realization of its ambitious enterprise, and thus tried to avoid factionalism within the organization as much as possible and to recruit groups with diverse political visions, including religious ones, to the WZO. These contradictory motives led the Zionist leadership from the outset to seek a modus Vivendi with religion rather than exclude it altogether, as was the case in the early years of the Turkish Republic.

The religious Jewish world divided in response to the formation of an institutionalized Zionist movement between those who supported the Zionist movement and participated in its institutions and those who boycotted it and opposed its heretical actions. The traditional leadership of Chibat Zion joined the WZO and in 1902 formed in it a religious-Zionist stream, Mizrahi. Mizrahi's vision was to utilize the Zionist institutional platform in promoting a vibrant observing community in Palestine. Conversely, ultraorthodox Haredi (fearful) communities, especially in Germany, Galicia and Hungary, opposed the establishment of a World Zionist Organization, rejected its secularist tendencies, and perceived it as an instrument for convincing Jewish peoples to give up their religion (Salmon 1990).

Before long the WZO became an arena of heated discussions between secular and religious delegates which shaped the character of the Zionist movement in a significant way. In particular, the two most celebrated disputes in the WZO in the first decade of the 20th Century - the centrality of the land of Israel and the cultural prerogatives of the movement - were both closely affiliated with religion. These disputes
consolidated the distribution of political power between secularists, religious pro-Zionists and religious anti-Zionists, which set the foundations for the secular-religious divisions in Israeli politics following the establishment of the state. In addition, they emphasized the essentially religious attachment of the Jewish people to the land of Israel and the pivotal role that the biblical territory occupies in Zionist ideology.

In regards the territorial question, there existed a principal disagreement between two standpoints. One camp sought an immediate and pragmatic solution to the misery of European Jewry, especially after yet another wave of bloody Pogroms in Russia and Ukraine in 1903 and mass expulsion of Jews from Romania, which made it crystal clear that the lives of Jews in Eastern Europe were at stake. Yet, at that time Palestine could not serve as an immediate refuge place for a large number of Jews because of Ottoman opposition to mass immigration of Jews to Palestine (Mandel 1974). These circumstances pushed the Zionist leadership to seek alternative destinations for a Jewish polity. The movement considered several places such as Argentina, Cyprus, Mesopotamia (Syria Iraq border), El-Arish (Egypt) and Uganda. Some of its leaders, including Herzl, supported these solutions, especially that of Uganda.

Quite the opposite, the other camp insisted on the special attachment of Jews to the ancient land of their ancestors and stated that Palestine should be the only possible territorial solution. Dominant among this camp were the Russian delegation and parts of Chibat Zion (Goldstein 1986). Uganda, which was offered as an available territorial substitute by the British government was put to vote in the Seventh Zionist Congress (1903) and after a fierce discussion was voted against. This outcome emphasized the Zionist movement's worldview according to which a Jewish polity must be reestablished in the biblical land of Israel and nowhere else. Although some religious delegates from Mizrahi, such as Rabbi Raines, voted in favor of Uganda and justified it on the ground of providing immediate refuge to Jewish souls (Almog 1996, 46), a majority of religious delegates favored the Palestine option. The outcome of the Uganda affair positioned the land of Israel in the center of Zionist ideology and distinguished it from two other Jewish movements: (1) **Territorialists** who sought a territorial solution but not necessarily in Palestine and; (2) **Autonomists** who opposed the idea of an independent Jewish polity, in Palestine or elsewhere, and instead endeavored the establishment of
autonomous self regulated communities for Jews in their countries of residence. Both alternatives faded away whereas the firm commitment of mainstream Zionism to the land of Israel became the dominant worldview in the Jewish nation (Almog 1996).

The second dispute, which caused a division in the ranks of the Mizrahi, concerned the authority of the Zionist institutions to direct cultural and educational projects among the Jewish populations in Europe. As I already mentioned, in 1902 Rabbi Raines founded Mizrahi as a religious division in the WZO. The philosophy of Mizrahi held that Judaism and Zionism are inherently and mutually dependent on each other. There could be no Zionism without linking it to Jewish religion. Similarly, the Orthodoxy could remain relevant only if it dealt with the full range of contemporary issues that confronted the Jewish nation (Reinharz 1993). However, these ideas were not shared by a majority of delegates in the Zionist institutions, who supported a liberal religious-free Jewish polity and aspired to indoctrinate the nation in accordance.

During the first decade of the 20th Century the main goal of Mizrahi was to restrict the activities of the Zionist movement to 'pure' Zionism or political Zionism, and keep it out of cultural and educational indoctrination, which it perceived as a threat to the traditional system of orthodox education. Essentially, Mizrahi feared that the Zionist movement will exploit such extended prerogatives by introducing modern and anti-religious content among the Jewish people. In contrast, the dominant Russian branch in the WZO under the leadership of radical activist Leo Motzkyn insisted that Zionist activities should incorporate educational programs as a tool to spread its ideas (even though there was no agreement on what these were) throughout the Jewish communities as well as engage in training and educational programs for the pioneers in Palestine.

After a decade during which Mizrahi was able to postpone a decisive decision by the Zionist institutions in the realm of culture, in the Tenth Zionist Congress (1911) the secularists won the upper hand and succeeded in passing a decision that approved the authority of the Zionist institutions to supervise cultural programs. Yet, being aware of the sensitivity of the subject matter the Zionist Congress tried to steer mid way between respecting religious and cultural autonomy and establishing the authority of the Zionist movement to supervise cultural indoctrination. The decision established the authority of the executive committee of the Zionist Congress to lead cultural activities, but these
were confined to Palestine and the Orient whereas the autonomous status of the European communities in cultural matters was respected. Also, in order to appease the religious factions, Article 2 of the decision stated that:

The Tenth Zionist Congress declares its intention that nothing which is contrary to the Jewish religion should be undertaken by any institutions for cultural activity created by the Zionist organizations (Reinharz 1993, 68).

Despite the above reservation, the resolution was perceived by many religious delegates as a sounding defeat and subsequently divided the religious bloc in the WZO into two rivaling factions, a division that consolidated the structure of religious parties in the State of Israel later on. One faction, headed by the leadership of Mizrahi, decided reluctantly to accept this resolution and remain in the WZO in order to influence the Zionist movement from within. After forming an autonomous political stream within the WZO this group was able to solicit the approval of an autonomous religious educational branch within the Zionist movement. In contrast, the other faction perceived the resolution as the beginning of a Kulturkampf (cultural struggle) between Judaism and Zionism, a perception that led it to withdraw from the Zionist movement and join ultraorthodox Jewish groups who opposed Zionism from the outset in forming a competing global anti-Zionist organization – Agudat Israel (The Union of Israel). Agudat Israel intended to form an ultraorthodox organization that would unite the entire nation and provide a faithful institutional alternative to the secular Zionist movement. Interestingly, in its efforts to achieve this goal Agudat Israel imitated much of the institutional infrastructure and modus operandi of the Zionist movement and essentially maintained a balance between imitation and rejection of Zionism (Bacon 1999).

The cultural dispute in the WZO at the beginning of the 20th Century shaped the agenda of the Zionist movement, established the subsequent nature of the state-religion relationship in the State of Israel, and consolidated the distribution of power and ideological differences among religious factions in the Jewish nation. Until today, the contemporary manifestations of Mizrahi and Agudat Israel (Mafdal and Yahadut Hatorah respectively), together with the more recent Shas party, represent the dominant religious streams in Israeli politics and to a large extent still advocate the same views
they held a century ago.

*The emergence of a Jewish political platform*

The Zionist movement mobilized to five waves of immigration (*or Aliya, 'ascendance*) to the land of Israel before the outbreak of World War II. The first wave started with *Chibat Zion* in the early 1880s and the fifth one started in 1932 and continued until 1939.\(^{168}\) The first three waves immigrated mainly out of idealistic reasons, while the last two came to Palestine for economic and security reasons as well (Shapiro 1984, 20-23). Most of the *Yishuv* (the Jewish community in Palestine) leaders were members of the Zionist movement and arrived in Palestine in the second wave of *aliya* from Eastern Europe, between 1904 and 1914. In opposition to the founders of political Zionism who came from Western Europe with a liberal bourgeoisie worldview, the Eastern European leaders who emerged in the Second *aliya* supported Marxist-socialistic ideas. Also in contrast with the founders of Zionism who concentrated their activities in the diaspora, the leadership of the *Yishuv* emerged in the Jewish community in Palestine, among its constituencies, and enjoyed high levels of legitimacy amongst the domestic population (Rubin 2009, 269). This group composed the leaders who later occupied the highest positions in Israeli politics and included, among others, first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Second President Yitzchak Ben-Zvi, Third Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and first Minister of Education David Remez. It also included influential intellectual and cultural figures such as publicists Berl Katzenelson, Yosef Haim Brenner, and Aharon David Gordon, and Israel's national poet Haim Nachman Bialik. The ascendance of the *Yishuv* leaders to political power signified a transformation of weight from the diaspora to Palestine as well as an ideational conversion in the Zionist movement from liberal to socialist worldviews.

**Until the 1920s the dominant ideology among the Zionist leadership was liberal. The liberal stream was headed by Haim Weizman, a British Jew and reputable scientist who served as the Chairman of the WZO and later as the first President of Israel. The main powerbases of the liberal stream were the Zionist institutions in diaspora and the**

\(^{168}\) Even though *Chibat Zion* preceded the formation of the Zionist institutions it is regarded the first wave of immigration to the land of Israel that was motivated by Zionist ideas.
sway of its leaders in European politics. Of particular importance were Weizmann's crucial influence on the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 that acknowledged the right of the Jewish people to a national home in Palestine, the recognition of the WZO as the formal representative of the Jews in the wording of the British mandate on Palestine in 1920, and constituting a broadly accepted constitution among different groups in the Zionist movement in 1929, which became the basis to Israel's relatively inclusive political system (Migdal 1988). Just like Herzl before him, Weizmann believed that the achievement of Zionist aspirations was dependent on international recognition and collaboration. Thus, he opposed unauthorized immigration of Jews to Palestine. Also, Weizmann invested many efforts in finding common grounds for collaboration among all factions in the Jewish nation, instead of one stream dominating the others.

In the 1930s labor Zionists increased their weight in the WZO and acquired dominant position in the Jewish Agency. In 1935 Ben Gurion became the Chairman of the Agency's Executive Committee and was recognized by the British authorities as the official representative of the Yishuv. This turnover represented comprehensive generational, territorial and ideological shifts in the Zionist movement. It transferred political power from the founders of Zionism in Diaspora to relatively young men with socialistic ideas who established themselves in Palestine. In contrast to Weizmann's approach, labor Zionists advocated mass illegal entry of Jews to Palestine and the erection of new Jewish settlements regardless of international criticism. It endeavored to gain autonomy from the international Zionist organizations in its management of the Yishuv and sought to indoctrinate the Jewish community in Palestine with socialistic ideas at the expense of other worldviews.

In contrast to early Zionists, the labor Zionist leadership emerged in Palestine, enjoyed the support of the local Jewish community, and managed the daily life of the Yishuv through the executive Vaad Leumi (national council) on behalf of Asefat Hanivharim (Convention of Delegates), which was an elected Parliament. Elections to Asefat Hanivharim took place four times, in 1920, 1925, 1931 and 1944. The entire political institutional of the Yishuv was called Knesset Israel and membership in it was voluntary to the Jewish inhabitants in Palestine. Figure 6.1 below illustrates the structure of Jewish political institutions in diaspora and the Yishuv.
In time labor Zionism consolidated its dominance in the Yishuv by exploiting and soliciting more autonomous authorities from the British Government. Labor Zionism extended its authority and responsibility to new areas such as housing, employment, health and education and enjoyed an unparalleled degree of independence compared with other local governments under British rule (Migdal 1988, 157). It established local labor associations such as Achdut Haavoda (Union of Labor) in 1919 from which emerged Mapai – Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel (the party of proletarians of the land of Israel) that ruled Israel for three consecutive decades, and Histadrut Haovdim Haklalit (General Organization of Laborers) in 1920, which remained the dominant labor union in Israel until today.

Figure 6.1
The structure of Jewish Institutions

Zionist Institutions in the Yishuv

- **Knesset Israel** (1920)
  - Recognized by the Mandate as a Religious Community in 1926
  - Headed formally by the Chief Rabbinate
  - Voluntary Association of the Entire Jewish Community

- **Asefat Hanivharim** (1920)
  - (Convention of Delegates)
  - Recognized by the Mandate in 1928
  - Legislative Branch

- **Vaad Leumi** (1920)
  - (National Council)
  - Recognized by the Mandate in 1928
  - Executive Branch

- **Ha’Vaad Ha’Paclel** (Acting Council)
  - Recognized by the Mandate in 1928

Zionist Institutions in Diaspora

- **World Zionist Organization** (1897)

- **Jewish Agency** (1923)
  - Recognized by the Mandate in 1921, Established by Decision of the WZO in 1923, became active in 1929.

- **The Jewish Agency's Executive Management** (1929)
  - Dealt with general issues of national import such as funding, immigration, settlement and security

Labor Zionism exploited its control over material resources and offered various social...
services to the working class which ranged from absorption of new immigrants to an independent proletariat educational stream. The expansion of Labor Zionism to social realms was imitated by other political factions in the Yishuv, including both Mizrahi and Agudat Israel. Each political stream formed a political party, established complementary social institutions and provided civil services in exchange for political support. The peaceful competition and intermingling among the different political factions in the Yishuv facilitated a vibrant civil society in the Jewish community in Palestine that mediated between the political system, the British authorities and the Jewish population. The characteristics of this social and political environment – active civil society, lack of sovereignty and coercive capabilities, and impressive and extensive performance of political parties – enhanced the absorption of democratic values and became the cornerstone of the Israeli political system post independence (Rubin 2009, 273).

Religious Structure and Religious Authority

The Bounded Integration Model proposes that the status and centrality of religion in the old political order has an impact on the ability and willingness of the national movement to integrate religion into the emerging order. The Israeli case supports this proposition in a nice way. In particular, the lack of central authority and clear hierarchy in Jewish doctrine and the absence of established religious institutions prior to 1948 enabled the leadership of the Zionist movement to integrate religion into the political structure without fearing the latter's potential to seriously challenge the legitimacy and authority of the secular Zionist establishment. (Friedman 1984).

The structural features of Judaism stem from religious doctrine but were also significantly shaped by historical circumstances. Doctrinally, Judaism is similar to Islam in that it lacks clear hierarchy like that found in Catholicism. Every rabbi (religious scholar) is equal in terms of authority and the ability to produce Halachot (abiding regulations for his community). Historically, the anarchical nature of Judaism was accompanied by the absence of an independent Jewish polity for more than two millennia. Jewish communities in diaspora were subject to non-Jewish local governments that regulated their civil life whereas the rabbis regulated the cultural and religious dimensions. The Jewish communities in Europe were organized in Hasidic
courts, sometimes containing as many as 100,000 followers. Each Hasidic court is named after its religious leader or the latter place of origin. Among the leading courts are Lubavitch-Chabad (Shneorson), Rozyn, Baelz, Gurr (Gerer), Satmer, and Sadagora. The courts compete with each other on followers, prestige and influence and in time have experienced significant changes in structure and distribution of power as a result of generational shifts, personal feuds or internal splits. This reality leads to contradicting Halachot, recurrent power struggles and inability to reach a consensus on basic issues of relevance to the entire Jewish people.

The Hasidic courts divided on the issue of Eretz Yisrael (The land of Israel) between the Hasidic courts in Romania, Russia and Poland which viewed immigration to Palestine with sympathy, and the Galician and Hungarian Hasidic courts which vociferously opposed any proactive action in relation to the land of Israel (Salmon 2006, 194-206). To this one should add power struggles in the old Yishuv (the pre-Zionist orthodox population in Palestine) as well as its intricate relationship with the Zionist movement and ultraorthodox leaders in diaspora. These cleavages made it impossible to organize a unified ultraorthodox front vis-à-vis the Zionist movement. Furthermore the two main religious political factions, the pro-Zionist Mizrahi and the anti-Zionist Agudat Israel, were far from unitary and suffered recurrent splits and internal power struggles.

At the same time, the Jewish religious establishment in Palestine lacked institutional capacity and real political power. The formal Jewish representative to the government in the Ottoman rule, Hacham Bashi, served as a Chief Rabbi in Istanbul, speaker of the Jewish Millet (autonomous religious community) and as mediator between the authorities and the Jewish community. This position was made official in 1835 and had been maintained until the disintegration of the empire in 1920. The Ottoman administration also appointed local Hacham Bashis to represent and oversee Jewish communities in the provinces of the empire. In 1841 a Hacham Bashi was appointed in Jerusalem. This position combined both secular and religious duties but was mainly ceremonial and lacked substantial political authority (Levi 1993, 38-56).

In 1920 the British Empire was appointed by the League of Nations to administer a protectorate in Palestine. The British authorities adopted the religious-based Millet system of social categorization. Accordingly, the Chief Rabbinate (CR), which was
established in 1921 (elaboration below), was the first Jewish institution to be recognized by the British administration. It took until 1928 before the British administration recognized the other institutions of Knesset Israel - Asefat Hanivharim and Vaad Leumi. The CR included two Chief Rabbis, one Ashkenazi (Jews of European origins) and the other Spharadi (Asian and North African Jews). The two rabbis headed a Rabbinic Council whose members were elected by a special committee of Asefat Hanivharim. The method of election to the CR changed several times since then but the structure of the institution was transferred as is to the State of Israel and remains intact until today.

The foundation of the CR as an institution of Knesset Israel was originally advanced by Mizrahi that sought to establish a supreme religious authority for the Yishuv (Don-Yehiya 1984, 161). The first Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi was Avraham Yitzhak Hacohen Kook (Rav Kook) (1865-1935), an extremely charismatic person with distinct theological interpretation of secular Zionism and its contribution to Jewish redemption, which have served as the ideological cornerstone of religious-Zionism until today. The aspirations of Mizrahi and Chief Rabbi Kook regarding the role of the CR in the life of the nation were very high. Rav Kook endeavored to consolidate the CR as a guiding spiritual authority to the entire Jewish nation (Friedman 1972, 120). However, the CR lacked formal authority and sufficient administrative capabilities and had very limited resources at its disposal. These serious limitations hampered the Rabbinate's ability to exercise significant political role in the Yishuv. In addition, the Yishuv's population did not desire religious involvement in public life and thus tried to minimize the role and authority of the CR in Knesset Israel. Finally, the authority of the CR in issues of marriage and divorce was only effective with individuals who chose to participate in Knesset Israel, rather than compulsory.

In practice, since the beginning of the British Mandate the Yishuv was managed by the secular organs of Knesset Israel and the Executive Council of the Jewish Agency. This arrangement was made formal in 1926, after the British authorities recognized Knesset Israel as an autonomous Jewish community. Thereafter, the community's leadership was asked to submit a preliminary draft of Hukat Ha'Kehilot (Communal

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169 The Spharadi Chief Rabbi replaced the Ottoman position of Hacham Bashi. It is also known as Ha'rishon le'Zion (the first of Zion)
170 I elaborate on the teachings of Rav Kook in more details in Chapter Eight.
Constitution) to the authorities, which specified what authorities will be granted to each institution in the *Yishuv*. This draft did not mention the CR in a single word, a clue to the leadership's low esteem of this institution. While the religious based principles of the *Millet* system made the British authorities officially recognize the CR as the leading institution of the *Yishuv* (Friedman 1972, 123), the latter's legal authority was restricted to matters of personal status and its official position carried little more than ceremonial value (Eliash 1985, 34).

Menachem Friedman, a leading student of the state-religion relationship in Israel argues that the CR has been confronted since its foundation by a constant existential dilemma. This institution aspires to play a role in the life of the entire nation, secular as well as religious, but fails on both fronts. In its relationship with the secular majority the CR desires to be widely acknowledged as a spiritual authority but makes all effort to isolate itself from this public, fearing that intermingling with secular people and ideas might subject the CR to negative influence. The CR also deals with serious challenges from the ultraorthodox populace and its leadership. Starting in the 1930s important Hasidic courts escaped the horrors of Europe and immigrated to Palestine. This brought to Palestine a collection of reputable religious scholars with surplus religious authority in comparison to the Chief Rabbis. Consequently, not only the ultraorthodox population does not follow the decisions of the CR but the CR itself is aware of its relative religious inferiority and therefore refrains from taking decisions in sensitive religious themes. Finally, leading rabbis refuse to acquire membership in the CR Council because of power struggles within the ultraorthodox world and the reluctance of its leaders to take part in a formal organ of the secular state. All these factors make the CR a hardly relevant institution to substantial parts in the Jewish nation, particularly in Israel (Friedman 1972).

The ultraorthodox establishment further eroded the authority of the CR by founding a competing institution - *Moetzet Gedoley HaTora* (The Council of Torah Sages – MGH). MGH is an informal religious institution that enjoys significant clout among the ultraorthodox population due to its members' spiritual and theological authority. In contrast to the CR this institution is isolated from the secular public and its members are not subject to elections. Membership in MGH is offered to new members.
by incumbents in the council. Also, there has been (and still is) a qualitative difference between MGH and the CR in terms of authority. The CR, as a formal institution in the Yishuv, was part of the civil service and thus restricted from involving in political issues. Also, the political leadership of Mizrahi set its own limits to the authority and involvement of the CR in political matters by relegating it to the spiritual realm (Schwartz 1999, 48-52). Conversely, MGH is not restricted by any other group or institution and exercises full authority over spiritual as well as earthly political matters. MGH appoints the candidates of Agudat Israel to the elections and have the final word in every political issue with relevance to the ultraorthodox populace (Don-Yehiye, 1984).

To conclude this point, the disintegrated structure of the religious camp during the pre-state era together with the absence of hierarchy and a central clerical authority and the limited functions granted to the CR, the sole formal religious institution in the Yishuv, left the religious establishment politically weak and prevented it from offering a real unified political competition to the secular leadership of the Zionist movement.

**Pre-state arrangements – the Status Quo**

The dynamic interaction between the secular establishment and the religious factions in the Yishuv during the most recent period prior to the establishment of the State of Israel reveals the circumstances that led to official recognition of Jewish religion in the public and political spheres following Israel's proclamation of independence. In particular, the need to form broad coalitions both within the Yishuv and vis-à-vis international pressures motivated the secular establishment and the religious factions to reach a compromise regarding the role of religion which was later translated to the institutional structure of the newborn state.

The 1930s and 1940s were a very intensive period in the life of the Jewish community in Palestine. During this period the institutions of the Yishuv and the Executive Council of the Jewish Agency (ECJA) consolidated their political authority were occupied, in addition to the management of daily life, with security threats by neighboring Arab communities that intensified in response to increasing immigration of Jews to the land and the emergence of political propositions to divide the territory and
grant political sovereignty to the Jewish community.

During that time *Mizrahi* served as a minor partner in the Jewish representative institutions. It "followed the footsteps of secular Zionism and endeavored to find positive aspects to it, but did not attempt to guide the Zionist enterprise in a particular direction" (Harkabi 1988, 146). In 1922 a splinter group from *Mizrahi* which was attracted by the socialistic ideas of labor Zionism formed a new pro-Zionist religious faction. Before too long this group, *Hapoel Hamizrahi* (the Mizrahi worker), outnumbered *Mizrahi* and became the largest religious-Zionist political faction in the *Yishuv*. The partially similar political worldviews of *Hapoel Hamizrahi* and *Mapai* facilitated collaboration between the two parties in the political and institutional realms, including participation in *Mapai*’s labor unions and settlement projects (Salmon 1990, 340-350).

The situation of *Agudat Israel* was more complicated. On the one hand the party refused to participate in a secular political system or promote the establishment of a secular Jewish polity. This is why the ultraorthodox public boycotted the elections in the *Yishuv* and did not take active part in its institutions until 1947, with the exception of the first election to *Asefat Hanivharim*, in 1920 in which it participated. On the other hand, the ultraorthodox establishment was badly affected by the events in Europe between the World Wars and ever more by the Holocaust, and could not stay blind to the grave situation of European Jewry and the prospects of saving them by creating an independent Jewish state. Also, the ultraorthodox establishment needed to cope with the loss of many important rabbis following the complete extermination of some ultraorthodox communities by the Nazi regime. *Agudat Israel* sought ways to secure the survival of ultraorthodox Jewry and since immigration certificates, funding for absorption and other civil activities were under labor Zionist control, the only way to achieve these goals was by cooperating with the institutions of the *Yishuv*. To complicate the situation further, the warming relationship between *Agudat Israel* and the *Yishuv* generated disputes within the ultraorthodox population. In 1935 a group of militant ultraorthodox separated from *Agudat Israel* and formed a militant group –

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171 The Mizrahi and Hapoel Hamizrahi have always participated together in coalitions and shared, with slight differences, the same agenda. In 1956 the two groups reunited and became the *Mafdal – Miflaga Datit Leumit* (National Religious Party – NRP). In the following I will refer to both as *Mizrahi*. 190
Neturei Karta (in Aramaic: Guardians of the City) – which opposed any collaboration with or recognition of the secular establishment and was involved in recurrent violent clashes with the secular public over religious issues (Friedman 1984, 69-70).

During these years Mizrahi played a key mediating role between the Zionist leadership, the CR and Agudat Israel. The leaders of Mizrahi mediated an important agreement on public funding for religious services in 1936, arranged immigration certificates for ultraorthodox Holocaust survivors and embraced the relationship between the CR and Agudat Israel. Working inside the institutional framework of the Yishuv as a bridge between the secular and ultraorthodox establishments positioned Mizrahi in a strategic political intersection. Every comprehensive agreement in the Yishuv era was coordinated by this party and consequentially the secular establishment came to value the political partnership with Mizrahi. This was especially true regarding the warm and trustworthy relationship that developed between Mapai's Ben-Gurion and the Mizrahi leader Rabbi Fishman-Maymon and facilitated the establishment of a political alliance between Mizrahi and Mapai, known as Habrit Hahistorit (the historical alliance) that lasted between 1935 and 1977 and was the strongest axis in Israeli politics until the 1970s (Sandler 1996).

The secular establishment also recognized the importance of maintaining some form of relationship with the ultraorthodox population. On the pragmatic level the secular leadership understood the importance of unifying the Jewish community in Palestine in preparation for future challenges. It thus was willing to go a long way in meeting the demands of the ultraorthodox. Partnership with the ultraorthodox population was also important on the diplomatic level. In 1937 the Peel Commission on Palestine recommended the partition of the land between Arabs and Jews as a first step toward an independent Jewish entity in Palestine. Before the Committee published its decision the ultraorthodox leadership initiated some diplomatic countermeasures in order to cancel the partition plan, including meetings with high ranked British officials (Friedman 1999, 451). This behavior alerted the Zionist establishment that ultraorthodox opposition might put the entire Zionist project at risk. Specifically, the Zionist leadership feared that Agudat Israel will use its contacts and influence abroad and in Palestine to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state and realized that the best way to prevent this danger was
to concede with this group.

However, not only pragmatic motivations guided the Zionist attempts to seek common grounds with *Agudat Israel*. As I already mentioned, unlike in Turkey, the leadership of the *Yishuv* acknowledged the centrality of the religion in the collective national identity and therefore assumed that some of the *Haredi* requirements should anyway be respected in a future Jewish state (Zameret 2002, 197-203). Things like declaring Shabbat the official day of rest and regulating marriage and divorce according to Jewish laws were accepted by many secular Jews including the dominant stream in *Mapai*. This ideological worldview was especially advocated by Ben-Gurion who stated on several occasions that he would have promoted these arrangements regardless religious participation in politics, because "this is the right thing to do" (Eilam 2000, 73-74).

The pressing need to find solution to the situation of Jewish survivors in Europe, a majority of whom were ultraorthodox, warmed the relationship between *Agudat Israel* and the Zionist establishment. During the 1940s *Agudat Israel* changed its position regarding the establishment of a Jewish state from complete denial to implicit toleration (Friedman 1999, 453). Being unable to find a solution to the dilemma of cooperating with the Zionists while opposing a secular state, the *Agudat Israel* leadership avoided a clear policy on the issue but the emerging circumstances soon compelled it to take side.

In 1946 the British returned the Mandate on Palestine to the United Nations. Thereafter the UN appointed UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) a committee of 11 state members, to provide the UN recommendations to a permanent political solution in Palestine. UNSCOP came up with two alternatives - a two-state solution or one federative bi-national state. Shortly before the arrival of UNSCOP to Palestine in 1947 the Jewish Agency and *Agudat Israel* engaged in an intensive series of discussions in order to secure *Agudat Israel’s* support in the two-state solution. In return, *Agudat Israel* required that the ECJA will guarantee that some religious principles will be respected in the new Jewish state. *Agudat Israel* insisted on four such issues: 1) religious monopoly in matters of marital status, 2) kosher food in public facilities, 3) the sanctity of the Shabbat, and 4) an autonomous religious education system.
On 19 June 1947 the ECJA sent a letter in reply to *Agudat Israel* in which it complied with the orthodox demands. Having been signed by Ben-Gurion, Rabbi Fishman of *Mizrahi* and Yitzhak Grinbaum of the General Zionist faction, the letter reflected a wide agreement among the Zionist establishment. The nuanced language of the letter, commonly referred to the *Status Quo Letter*, particularly its effort to balance among democratic values, religious demands, state sovereignty and international pressures is very telling. After quoting the letter I will provide an analysis of its content:

…As the Chairman of the Executive informed you, Neither the Executive management of the Agency nor any other institution in the Yishuv are authorized to determine in advance the Constitution of the future Jewish state. The establishment of the State requires the approval of the UN and it will not be given unless freedom of conscience is guaranteed to every citizen, and it be made clear that there is no intention to establish a theocracy. In the Jewish state there will also be non-Jewish citizens, Christians and Muslims, and it is obvious that the state will have to secure complete equality to all citizens and avoid coercion or discrimination on religious issues or others.

We heard willingly that you accept that no institution is authorized to determine the constitution of the state in advance and that the state will be free on certain issues to decide on its regime in accordance with its citizens’ preferences.

Notwithstanding, the Executive appreciates your demands, and knows that these things concern not only the members of *Agudat Israel* alone, but many others in the Jewish nation who care for Jewish religion…

The Agency's Executive Council authorized the undersigned to respond to your demands as follows:

A. **Saturday**. It is obvious that the legal day of rest in the Jewish state will be Saturday, without violating the right of people of other religions to choose their days of rest.

B. **Kosher**. All measures will be taken to guarantee that kosher food will be served in every public kitchen that is aimed to serve Jews.

C. **Marital issues**. All members of the Executive acknowledge the seriousness of the problem, and all measures will be taken by the Agency's organs to
satisfy the concern of the guardians of religion and avoid the division of Beit Israel.

D. **Education.** Full autonomy will be guaranteed to every educational stream, and there will be no violation by the authorities of religious recognition and religious conscience of any part in Israel. The state will decide on a minimum mandatory curriculum, Hebrew language, history, the sciences etc., and will supervise the fulfillment of it, without restricting complete religious freedom and the authority of every education stream to manage its educational system as it sees fit (Friedman 1988, 66-67; Translated by the author).

The status quo letter prescribed the role of Jewish religion in the future Jewish polity and was institutionalized following the foundation of the state. This document is a masterpiece of balance between accommodating religious needs and securing pluralism, between granting a preferred status to Jewish religion while guaranteeing the rights of non Jews, and in being sensitive to the collective demands of one segment of the population without compromising the sovereignty of the people and the primacy of democracy. More than its content, however, the document reflects the cognition of the national movement to the centrality of religion in the life of the nation and its willingness to deviate from the prominent secularist prescription and integrate religion officially into the political order, an acknowledgement that was absent in the Turkish case. The ability of the Zionist leadership to offer such a far reaching compromise depended to a large extent on the unique historical, structural and ideological circumstances of the Jewish nation in the decades that preceded the formation of the state. In similarity to the Turkish case, these pre-state arrangements created resilient path dependent institutional arrangements that have shaped the nature of the state-religion relationship until today and proved very hard to transform (I elaborate on these arrangements in the next chapter).

Despite a disagreement among scholars and politicians regarding the relative weight of the Status Quo letter on policy design in matters of religion and state, it is

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172 Some argue that this letter was the outcome of a long bargaining process between the secular Zionist establishment and the leadership of *Agudat Israel* and reflected their ultimate understandings regarding the
unquestionable that there is a significant value to the fact that the Zionist leadership issued a formal document that acknowledged the special role of Jewish religion in the future state and declared its intention to integrate religion and religious actors into the emerging political system and facilitate cooperation between the two camps in the political arena. It is also beyond doubt that the letter achieved its goal. It appealed Agudat Israel and enabled its integration in the contemporary institutions of the Yishuv. Agudat Israel refrained from testifying in UNSCOP against the two-state solution and the idea of an independent Jewish state and took an active part in preparing the Yishuv to the War of Independence and to statehood. More so, Becoming part of the political establishment smoothed secular-religious cooperation and facilitated the ultraorthodox acceptance of otherwise unthinkable political outcomes, like the wording of the Declaration of Independence that did not contain any reference to God or to Jewish religion. While this created a petite political crisis immediately prior to the actual declaration on 14 May 1948, the secular leaders quickly appeased the religious factions by agreeing to add the expression Tzur Israel (Rock of Israel), an implied reference to God, to the Declaration. But other than that Jewish religion or the Torah are not mentioned in the document. The lenient approach of the religious factions in this matter is all the more surprising given that only a year earlier the ultraorthodox leadership did not accept less than a Torah based Constitution in exchange for its support in a Jewish state.

Conclusions

This chapter explored the multifaceted relationship between the Zionist movement and the religious factions in the Jewish nation during the pre-state period that transformed from mutual rejection to endorsement and cooptation. While the Zionist movement was revolutionary in offering a modern collective identity which distinguished it from passive orthodox perceptions, a combination of political pragmatism and ideological role of the Jewish religion in the future state (Rubinstein 1967, 113; Livni 2002, 104; Paz-Pines, 2002, 163-166; Eilam 2000, 66). According to this approach the status quo letter is a founding document that represents a turning point in the state-religion relationship. In contrast, others contend that this letter was not at all central or innovative but rather refrained from making any obligations and did little more than restating the arrangements which were already in effect in the Yishuv and that long term political circumstances before and after Israel's proclamation of independence had shaped the nature of the state-religion relationship rather than this single letter (Friedman 1988, 65; Don-Yehiye 1997, 32-36).
considerations compelled it to seek the integration of Jewish religion and religious actors into the national institutions. In stark disparity to the Turkish case the Zionist leaders understood the importance of religion as a common marker of collective identity and effective instrument to mass recruitment and acknowledged that Jewish history, identity and belief are all fused together in an inseparable connection that should be reflected in some way in a Jewish polity for purposes of political legitimacy, but also for the purpose of creating an authentic and commonly shared collective identity.

Consequently, the Zionist leadership made sincere efforts to maintain a positive relationship with the religious factions in the Jewish nation, and paid significant political prices to integrate them into the national project. This effort succeeded fully with Mizrahi that remained an important member in the Zionist institutions throughout the pre-state era as well as following the establishment of the state, whereas the status quo letter guaranteed Agudat Israel's support in the national project shortly prior to the foundation of the state. As I show in the next chapter, the mutual recognition and collaboration between the national movement and the religious factions benefitted all parties and shaped the formation of state institutions and the evolution of the state-religion relationship following the foundation of the state in very significant, majorly positive, ways.
Chapter 7: An Era of Constructive Collaboration 1948-1967

This chapter explores the relationship that emerged between the state and religion in Israel between Israel's proclamation of independence in 1948 and the Six Day War of 1967 and the motivations that led the secular leadership of the newborn polity to accommodate religion and religious groups into the institutional and political structures of the state. The main argument of this chapter is that, in striking difference than the Turkish case, mutual interdependence between the ruling secular establishment and the religious populace on the one hand, and deep ideological disagreement between them about the desired character of the state and society on the other hand, generated a complex and dynamic interaction that consisted ongoing partnership of religious parties in government coalitions and, at the same time, recurrent political crises over religious issues. Nevertheless, the overall outcome of this contentious interaction had been positive. Both sides were compelled to accept uneasy compromises that facilitated a stable political system and the development of a pluralistic political arena of negotiation, at least in regard the Jewish religion, instead of intolerance and attempts to enforce one ideology or worldview at the expense of others. Instead of treating religion as an illegitimate threat, like was the case in Turkey, the state of Israel took active measures to create formal space for religion in the public and political spheres. By this doing the ruling elite succeeded in recruiting the religious populace, leadership and masses, and benefitted from the stabilizing and legitimizing impact of religion in the political system.

In addition, the establishment of, and the recognition given by the state to, religious institutions such as the Rabbinical Courts, the Chief Rabbinate (CR) and the Ministry of Religions, provided the religious actors a strong incentive to collaborate with the state in return to allocation of economic resources and other forms of patronage and cooptation. These arrangements fulfilled two goals. They were both a marker of official collective identification with Judaism and at the same time a major source of employment, funding and bureaucratic potency for the religious populace.

173 Due to significant changes following the war the period after 1967 deserves a separate chapter. It will be discussed in details in Chapter Eight.
174 It is noteworthy that not all the cleavages in society enjoyed the same pluralistic and tolerant approach. The most problematic was government treatment of the Arab population in Israel that because of security excuses was governed by a military administration between 1948 and 1966.
The last section of this chapter will highlight the potential of Judaism to develop radical interpretations of the religion and the negative consequences that might arise when religious groups are isolated or voluntary isolate themselves from the state. Aggregate data on the political behavior of religious groups during this period reveals striking differences between the behavior of a majority in the religious public that chose to recognize the state and participate in its political and institutional structures and a radical anti-Zionist minority, Ha'eda Ha'haredit (the fearful sect) that proscribed itself from the secular system and actively defied the rules of the political game. While the former concentrated their efforts in promoting religious interests through formal legal political activity, the latter took more extreme measures to fulfill their goals, including violence and other uncivil forms of expression. This difference illustrates nicely that the Jewish religion, just like any other religion, occupies fundamentalist ideational ingredients and supports the assumption that inclusive policies within a bounded range can be successful in mitigating potential radicalism in collective social behavior. This is also very different from Turkey, where the policies of the state generated religious extremism that otherwise would not have emerged. Finally, it manifests the value in conceptualizing the state-religion interaction as a bounded integration. This is because unlimited integration of religious elements which might have satisfied the most radical sections in the religious population would have meant a serious undermining of democratic principles and the infringement of rights of other publics in the state.

The relative success of the Israeli experience in accommodating Jewish religion into Israel's democratic political system following the foundation of the state challenges common suppositions regarding the appropriate role of religion in modern democratic societies. As such, the Israeli experience of religious integration requires more scholarly attention as a possible role-model of the state-religion relationship for non-western traditional societies in transition to democratic rule, as well as for newborn states that strive to design the core principles of their political system.

*What role for religion in Statehood?*

The state of Israel was founded in the territory of mandatory Palestine on 14 May 1948, in the midst of a civil war between Jews and Palestinians. Large scale violence between
Jews and Arabs in Palestine began following UN resolution UNGAR 181 (on 29 November 1947) which ordered the partition of mandatory Palestine to two nation states, Arab and Jewish. Inter communal violence turned into interstate war between Israel and neighboring Arab countries immediately after Israel proclaimed independence in May of the following year.

In terms of political regime, Israel was established as a democratic state that guaranteed equal civil and political rights and freedoms, including the freedom of religion, to all its inhabitants. Israel's Proclamation of Independence declares that the state:

…will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.\(^\text{175}\)

The legal status of Israel's Declaration of Independence is long debated among legal scholars, judges and lawmakers in Israel. While it is commonly accepted that the declaration is legally inferior to regular legislation it has been acknowledged by the High Court of Justice (HCJ) as a founding document and a source of legal interpretation.\(^\text{176}\) The declaration ensures unqualified freedom of religion in similarity with other Western constitutions but says nothing about formal role to, or recognition of, Jewish religion in the newly established state. The wording of the declaration expresses a standard liberal approach toward religion and is far from reflecting the true complexity of the state-religion relationship in Israel and the multifaceted recognition of religion in the state.

Since 1948, there have been no breaks or undemocratic interventions in the political system of Israel. The Israeli democracy has been preserved despite serious

\(^{175}\) The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Official Gazette: Number 1; Tel Aviv, 5 Iyar 5708, 14 May 1948, Page 1.

\(^{176}\) See, for instance, HCJ 450/70 Rogozynski vs. The State of Israel, ILR 26 p. 135; HCG 958/87 Poraz vs. the Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Yaffo, ILR 42:2, p. 309.
challenges that Israel has faced throughout its short life, such as external threats, recurrent violent conflicts with neighboring states, economic recessions and rapid absorption of mass immigration, which changed the demography and social fabric of the young state. Given these extraordinary circumstances the relative success of the Israeli democracy - even when considering its qualified nature and substantive shortcomings, primarily the long term occupation of Palestinian territory and population and the discriminatory and ethnocentric policies towards its Arab citizens (Peled 1992; Smooha 2002) - needs explanation.

Many studies emphasize the strong social cohesion and collectivist ethos of the Israeli society during the early years of independence, among its Jewish majority, as a primary explanation to its political stability. Given the high diversity of Israel's Jewish society in 1948 - including newcomers and longtime residents, city dwellers and inhabitants of rural settlements, secular traditional and orthodox, educated and uneducated, rich and poor, of European and Asian-African origins - high level of social cohesion was not at all obvious. According to these studies social cohesion was partly maintained in response to ongoing external and internal security concerns and the continuing appeal of the Zionist ethos and its founding leaders (Barzilai 1999, Ezrahi 1998, Shapiro 1985). Another reason that produced vast research recently attributes the unity of the Jews in Israel to the collective trauma of the Holocaust (Zertal 2002; Segev 1991; Burg 2007; Yablonka 2001).

Notwithstanding the above mentioned reasons, however, it is impossible to understand Israel's social solidarity, which was so instrumental to its democratic stability, without considering the impact of state policies on religion and the evolving interaction between the state and the religious publics between 1948 and 1967.

Following Israel's proclamation of independence the government of the newborn state chose to deviate from the common secularist prescription, expanded existing arrangements with religious groups that had been agreed upon in the pre-state era and complemented them with new arrangements that adjusted the role of religion to fit a sovereign reality. The mainstream leadership of Mapai - and above all David Ben-Gurion, who had a very complex relationship with the religious components in the Jewish nation (Zameret 2002, 199-222) - acknowledged the spiritual value of religion.
for the masses, its central weight in the Jewish national identity and the political benefits that might arise from political alliance with the religious factions. The latter were, from their perspective, committed to Jewish state-building, but in return required broad recognition of Jewish religion in the state. The outcome of this mutual dependence was the adoption by the state of existing Yishuv-religion arrangements in addition to new post-independence understandings between the state and religious groups.

It is noteworthy that the decision to grant Jewish religion official status and authority was not shared by the entire political leadership. In fact, the secular-Zionist camp was divided on the issue of religious integration and its executive leadership confronted substantial pockets of resistance on this matter. Those who opposed religious accommodation argued that transition to statehood requires substantial revision in the relationship with the religious factions because prior to statehood the Yishuv's executive leadership had to compromise with the religious parties in order to gain their political support and participation in the institutions of the Yishuv, whereas the state was now sovereign to enforce its will on every collectivity in society (Don Yehiya 1997, 32).

More specifically, there had been three groups that opposed, or were very reluctant to accept, an official recognition of religion in Israel's political and public spheres. The first group included radical secularist leaders with key positions in Mapai such as Pinhas Lavon, Golda Meir, Bebe Idelson and Ami Asaf and, to a lesser extent, Moshe Sharett, Mapai's second in command. Not surprisingly, Idelson and Meir, the two most vocal opponents to religious accommodation were women who opposed the gender inequality inherent in the Jewish religion and especially the idea of granting religious courts monopolistic authority over issues of marital status (Zameret 2002, 178-188).

A second type of opposition came from inside the labor-Zionist camp but outside Mapai, from Mapam (United Workers Party), a socialist party that opposed the accommodative line of Mapai because of ideological reasons, namely the deep resentment of socialism to anything related to religion (Tzur, 2002).

A third group included Zionist circles in United States. Although Zionists in America were not part of the Yishuv they exerted considerable influence over Zionist politics because of their size, disproportional influence on American domestic politics and their financial support to the newborn state (Z. Segev, 2007; 2007a). The American
Zionist Jewry, led by charismatic rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, endeavored to imitate in Israel the American model of separation between Church and State. Accordingly, a few months before the inception of Israel Silver stated before representatives of the Jewish Agency that the new state will exercise complete separation between religion and state. This statement generated harsh responses by the religious parties in the Yishuv and eventually forced Ben-Gurion to respond that no such decision about the future role of religion in Israel was yet taken.\footnote{Ha'tzofe, 8 December 1947.}

In spite of the abovementioned opposition, following independence the political leadership of Israel took a series of measures that recognized the role of the Jewish religion in the structure and institutions of the newborn state. Furthermore, as Liebman and Don-Yehiya display, Mapai transformed its attitude to the Jewish religion from confrontation during the Yishuv era to selective reinterpretation of religious content in accordance with a new designed narrative of Jewish national identity. Indeed, on the symbolic level the Jewish national identity had gone significant revision. Instead of trying to get rid of the religious component the secular leadership exploited religious symbols and historical events but loaded them with modern national meanings. Manipulation of symbols and historical facts with religious origins from above in a manner that highlighted their national and ethnic ingredients at the expense of their religious importance facilitated the construction in Israel of a new civil religion (Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 1984).

There is a broad agreement among scholars that the significant inclusion of religion was a rational and calculated decision taken by the secular leadership (Shapiro 1998, 669, T. Segev 1986; Woods 2008).\footnote{For a different approach according to which the integration of religion in Israel was an unplanned circumstantial outcome which had materialized during the state-building process see Friedman 1988.} State policies on religion proved instrumental to the stability of Israeli democracy. Multidimensional accommodation of Jewish religion in the state compelled almost the entire religious population to accept the political principles of the regime and convinced them to challenge the character of the state only within accepted political boundaries. In this the Israeli case challenges the common perception of the secularization thesis according to which modern democracy is contingent upon societal and political secularization. In opposition to the postulation of
the secularization thesis, acceptance of religious presence in all realms of public life not only did not inhibit the establishment in Israel of a stable democratic regime but rather promoted it by recruiting considerable parts in society, that otherwise would not have participated in a state so foreign to their worldview and value system, to become active participants in the democratic game. This relatively original approach towards religion facilitated the creation of, and consensual respect to, the principles of a 'thin consensus', and channeled normative and ideological battles on religious issues to the political and legal realms. It is therefore essential to describe the complex and multifaceted nature of religious accommodation in Israel, and analyze what impact it had on the behavior of religious actors in the state, the character of the relationship that evolved between the state and religious groups, and how it shaped Israeli democracy between 1948 and 1967.

**Forms of inclusion**

The transformation of the Jewish community in Palestine from a colonized society to an independent state required new policies and legislation to complement or replace pre-state arrangements on various issues, including the role and authority of religion. Some scholars label the relationship that evolved between religion and the state in Israel as a specific type of Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969; Sandler 1996; Don Yehiya 1997, 18-30; Cohen and Susser 2003, 32-50). While similarities do exist, there are at least three critical differences between Lijphart's consociational model and the situation in Israel. The first difference relates to Lijphart's supposition that consociational arrangements have more chances to hold in demographically and culturally stable societies. This supposition stands in contradiction to the dynamic character of Israeli society and the evolving nature of the state-religion relationship in the state, an issue that I am going to discuss in more details in Chapter Eight.

The second difference relates to the impact of consociational arrangements on the entire society. Lijphart emphasizes the creation of autonomous spaces for distinct sub-cultural groups in which they can protect their culture, education, language etc., and at the same time maintain minimum connections with other subcultures. In Lijphart's words:
It may be desirable to keep transactions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society – or, similarly, among different nationalities in a multinational state – to a minimum (Lijphart 1969, 220-221)

This dimension exists in Israel. The religious populace in Israel enjoys considerable autonomy in different realms, from places of residence, to education, to welfare associations. There is, however, another dimension that does not get much echo in Lijphart's theory but is substantive in Israel. The religious community in Israel does not limit its political demands to the protection of its own culture and interests. Rather, it tries to impose its worldview on the entire Jewish society which consist a secular majority. This paternalistic approach is rooted in the Jewish belief that *kol Israel arevim ze la'ze* (Jewish people are mutually responsible to each other) which motivates the religious minority in Israel to enforce a Jewish character on the entire Israeli public sphere (Vasserman 2002, 287-301).

Finally, consociational arrangements in Israel are partial and regulate only certain societal cleavages. While the religious cleavage is definitely regulated by arrangements with consociational elements other cleavages, primarily the Arab-Jewish one, are not treated in the same accommodative manner. In this they deviate from Lijphart's 'grand coalition' or cartel of elites' schemes (Lijphart 1969). Hence, even though the Israeli case contains some consociational motives the state-religion interaction in Israel is not a straightforward manifestation of consociational democracy.179

Arrangements between the state and religious groups in regard the roles and authorities of Jewish religion in Israel can be grouped to three distinct dimensions 1) Symbolic; 2) Political; 3) Institutional:

*Symbolic inclusion* – Benedict Anderson argued in his canonical *Imagined Communities* that manipulation of symbols is an integral part of nation-building. This is because symbols create identification and connection (real or invented) between the

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179 The value in distinguishing Lijphart's consociational theory from the character of the state-religion relationship in Israel is in checking the tendency to measure complex social phenomena through an already developed theoretical prism, even when the latter does not fit the researched phenomenon, something that might lead to inaccurate interpretations or the implementation of inappropriate prescriptions.
nation and its heritage (Anderson 1991, Ch. 10). As I elaborated in Chapter Six the State of Israel understood well the centrality of religion in the Jewish national identity. Indeed, as Liebman and Don-Yehiya rightly note:

In view of the central role of Jewish religion in the national history and culture of the Jewish people, there is hardly a single Jewish symbol which is not loaded with religious meaning (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983, 57).

Hence since its inception the state of Israel utilized various state symbols with religious meaning. The Israeli flag resembles the structure and colors of a *Talith* (prayer shawl) and contains the Star of David, an ancient Jewish symbol. The formal emblem of the state, the *Menorah*, bear a resemblance to the one used for rituals in the Temple.\(^{180}\) Official holydays in the state of Israel follow the Jewish calendar, and the weekly day of rest is Shabbat.\(^{181}\) The lunar based Jewish date appears on every state document in addition to the Gregorian date\(^{182}\) and only kosher food is served and allowed in public facilities.

*Political inclusion* – unlike in Turkey, Israeli laws permit religious groups to operate in national and local politics and exploit their political leverage in shaping political processes and outcomes. Furthermore, with the exception of rare short-lived political circumstances - such as the period between 1959 and 1961 during which the *Mafdal* departed from the government following the "who is a Jew?" crisis, or the final stages of the second Rabin Government in 1994-1995 - religious parties have participated regularly in Israeli governments. In this regard a senior religious MK stated recently that a government in Israel cannot be established without religious parties participating in it.\(^{183}\) Religious parties are regularly approved by the National Election

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\(^{180}\) The flag of the State of Israel was announced by the Temporary State Council, on 28 October 1948. The Menorah as the Symbol of the State of Israel was announced by the Temporary State Council, on 10 February 1949.

\(^{181}\) This was legislated immediately after the Proclamation of Independence in Article 18A. of The Order on Governance and Legal Procedures Act - 1948.

\(^{182}\) Adding the Jewish date was regulated in secondary legislation until it passed as a Law of Knesset in the Using of Hebrew Date Act - 1998.

\(^{183}\) A lecture by MK Zevulun Orlev of *Ha'Bait HaYe'hudi-Mafdal Party* (the Jewish House – Mafdal, the party that replaced Mafdal), Panel on Education, Religion and Politics in Israel, Bar Ilan University, Israel, 29 January 2009.
Committee even though some of them, such as *Agudat Israel* and *Shas*, advocate non-Zionist ideology. Also, their internal structure is headed *de-facto* by Rabbis rather than by elected politicians, thus making these parties undemocratic.

Moreover, secular political leaders are well aware of who really determines the political line of the religious parties. Subsequently, meetings between the incumbent Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers and leading Rabbis in which political conflicts are solved became very common since the very early days of the State of Israel. For instance, on 3 January 1950 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion held a meeting with heads of *Yeshivot* to discuss the exemption of *Yeshiva* students from military service.\(^{184}\) Similarly, on 24 September 1952 Ben-Gurion paid a visit to the *Hazon Ish* (Rabbi Avraham Kerlitz) in an attempt to reach a compromise about the recruitment of religious women to the IDF despite the fact that the Rabbi did not hold any formal position in the political religious establishment.\(^{185}\) This pattern has continued in recent decades. Indeed, a head covered secular Prime Minister paying a visit to influential Rabbis before substantive political decisions are made became a common reality in Israeli politics.

The religious parties in Israel promote two types of political motives. The first is to take care of their publics by achieving selective sectarian benefits. The other is theocratic and aims to preserve the Jewish nature of the state and the public sphere (Oren 1973). Both types have been subject to political struggles that often resulted in significant gains to the religious parties. Achievements on the sectarian realm include allocation of resources to religious services such as synagogues and *Mikvaot* (rituals baths), exemption of religious men and women from military service, construction of specific housing projects for religious communities, shutting down transportation in religious neighborhoods in holydays, and the allocation of state resources to the different religious education systems. Achievements on the theocratic realm include the observance of Shabbat and kosher food, religious monopoly over marriage, divorce and burial; objection to liberal ceremonies such as homo-lesbian pride parades; continuing state disregard of the non-orthodox (reform and conservative) streams in Judaism and Orthodox control over the definition of *Mihu Yehudi* (who is a Jew?). Both types create

\(^{184}\) *Yediot Ahronot*, 3 January 1950.

\(^{185}\) *Yediot Ahronot*, 24 September 1952.
tension and friction between the secular and religious populations in Israel, albeit in different ways. Theocratic demands force secular people to follow practices and ceremonies they do not really believe in and by this infringe their liberty to live their life as they choose. Likewise, sectarian concessions create exclusive benefits for a specific group in society, thus violate the principle of equality. Especially frustrating to the general public are the allocation of disproportional resources for religious needs, and the mass exemption of religious teenagers from military service, a very demanding civic duty in a state like Israel.

**Institutional inclusion** – This dimension refers to the establishment of authoritative state-recognized institutions with religious character that operate under the aegis of *Halakha*, such as religious courts, religious schools, specific religious services etc. Many such institutions were established in Israel immediately following the foundation of the state in 1948. The Ministry of Religions was established in the first government and deals mainly, though not exclusively, with the provision of ritual services to observing Jews. The CR became a formal state institution in charge of supervision of kosher regulations, appointment of *Dayanim* (religious judges) and municipal Rabbis, and consulting the state and the public about questions of religious concern. In addition, one of the Chief Rabbis serves as the President of the Supreme Rabbinical Court.  

Pro-Zionist as well as non-Zionist religious groups run their own autonomous state-funded education systems. Each of them provides all levels of education, from elementary school to higher *Yeshiva* (colleges of religious education) and has nearly complete autonomy to decide on the curriculum in its schools. Additionally, Israel adopted the pre-state Ottoman *Millet* system that grants every religious community autonomy to decide on matters of personal status for its community members. Accordingly, Israel established in 1953 a system of Rabbinical Courts and entrusted in them monopolistic authority over marriage and divorce of Jewish individuals, including coercive powers to enforce their decisions, such as confiscation of

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186 The authorities of the Chief Rabbinate are specified in *The Chief Rabbinate Act – 1980* which revised and replaced previous laws on this matter.

187 See *State Education Act – 1953* articles 1, 13-16.

188 For full description of religious education in Israel, its curricular autonomy and the problems it raises see Maoz 2007.
property and detention in prison.\textsuperscript{189} In general, religious institutions benefitted from transition to statehood and in most cases have been granted more authority and autonomy post-independence.

Furthermore, while the recognition of religion in the state was largely based on pre-state agreements, some religious concerns became relevant only after independence that required institutional accommodation. This was especially true regarding religious needs in the realm of national security, that until than were under British responsibility. In particular, the state designed new policies regarding military service of orthodox people, the role of religion in the IDF,\textsuperscript{190} and military operations and training during Shabbat.\textsuperscript{191} Likewise, longtime non-sovereign existence confronted the Jewish religion with many challenges of modern statehood that the Jewish Halakha was not well equipped to answer (Eilam 2000). Consequently, some institutional arrangements between the state and religion had been established gradually without clear doctrinal guidance. Provision of essential services such as hospitals, electricity, transportation, policing and entertainment on Shabbat had no preceding experience. Many times, state policies on these questions were shaped by political struggles, contemporary political circumstances and compromises, rather than in accordance to clear doctrinal or ideological principles.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the state funds all these institutions in a manner that facilitates their activities. Of course, there is no complete overlap between allowing an activity or institution and providing it with sufficient means to operate. The state of Israel not only acknowledges Jewish religious institutions but also provides them with considerable funds to operate and increase in size. Funds come from various legal sources and ministries, including the National Social Insurance Institution, and the Ministries of Education, Interior Affairs, Housing, Welfare, Religions and Finance. Specific channels for allocation of funds to religious purposes depend on contemporary

\textsuperscript{190} The IDF has a Chief Rabbi who also participates in the meeting of the Chief Rabbinate Council. In addition, there is a military Rabbi and Kosher supervisors in every military unit in the IDF.
\textsuperscript{191} For example, in September 1948 two observing soldiers were sent to military prison after refusing to cook for their squad in Shabbat. This punishment was cancelled following a political crisis and criticism by religious ministers. Yediot Ahronot, 9 September 1948.
coalition agreements. Such allocation of resources to actors in civil society is common in other democratic countries and reinforces the assumption that religious groups can, and should be considered, as part and parcel of civil society.

**Religious responses**

It was exactly the integration of religious content and groups into state affairs that mitigated tensions between the secular state and its religious populations, motivated the religious camp to identify with the state, and necessitated all parties to solve their disagreements through legal political channels. The integrative policies towards religion that Israel adopted stand in clear contradiction to the policy prescription of the secularization thesis, which sees religious interference in politics as a barrier in the way of democratization and modernization. Indeed, if one accepts the assumptions of the secularization thesis then Israel's integration of religion into state affairs, granting the latter official role and authority, and accepting its involvement in the political system, might have lowered the prospects to achieve a stable democratic regime. Alternatively, secularists would have argued that in order to maximize its chances to consolidate a democratic regime Israel should have chosen a complete opposite policy and marginalize religion from state affairs at all levels.

In reality, though, the assumptions of the secularization thesis did not hold true in the Israeli case. The complex multilevel integration of religion in the State of Israel placed its Jewish religious population in a very delicate and challenging situation. On the one hand an inherent contradiction exists between religious passivism and the Zionist proactive ideology that led the nation to political independence. Also, as Ravitzky, Friedman and others argue, the foundation of the state confronted its religious citizens with an unsolvable dilemma. While they found it very difficult, if not impossible, to accept a secular Jewish state that is not run by Halakhic laws, Halakhic literature was incapable to provide them adequate answers to problems of sovereign existence or how to work out the permanent tension that exists between Halakhic instructions and democratic decisions. On the other hand an independent Jewish state was perceived as a substantial accomplishment after many generations in exile. Jewish Independence was hard to explain without considering it, even among mainstream
ultraorthodox, as an act of divine intervention, as well as a remedy to a real national need given the horrible consequences of the Holocaust (Ravitzky 1993, 2005; Friedman 1990; Eilam 2000). While each religious camp offered distinct meaning and theological importance to the events that led to the creation of the state, the majority of the religious population in Israel came to recognize it and participate in it.

Three Religious Camps
The absence of hierarchy in the rabbinical establishment led to more than one response among religious peoples to the foundation of Israel, and development of more than one practice in daily interaction between religious groups and the state. While the religious-secular cleavage includes some general issues that concern every religious group in Israel, a distinction should be made between three main clusters or opinions that emerged after the inception of the state: 1) pro-Zionists, 2) Non-Zionists, and 3) anti-Zionists.

Pro-Zionists – in 1948 the pro-Zionist camp included the Mizrahi and Hapoel-Hamizrahi parties that joined together in 1956 to create the Miflaga Datit Leumit – Mafdal (National Religious Party – NRP). These parties cooperated with the state in all realms, from participation in coalition governments, to serving in the military, to being part of the national education system (under separate and autonomous division). Collaboration with the secular state accompanied a modern worldview and an ongoing effort to reconcile between earthly life and religious observance. Rabbinical authority was limited in the pro-Zionist camp during this period to the realm of education. Some religious-Zionist communities did not even have a rabbi. The pro-Zionist religious elite included political figures such as Rabbi Yehuda Leib Fishman-Maymon, Meir Berlin, Zerah Verheftig, Yosef Burg, and Moshe Shapiro, and the leadership of the Ha’Kibbutz Ha’Dati movement (the religious kibbutzim movement), which combines labor-Zionist values with a religious way of life.

The religious-Zionist elite saw itself a minor partner in the fulfillment of the Zionist project and did not challenge the secular leadership of the state on secular matters. This is why Mapai favored collaboration with Mafdal over other, more militant, religious parties. Indeed, in the view of Mapai: "the NRP [national religious party –
Mafdal) was a vehicle for mobilizing support among religious voters for a Mapai-dominated government” (Sandler 1996, 137). Rabbi Yuval Sharlo argues that continuous attempts to reconcile between the religious and statist-modern poles led this group to pragmatism and tolerant approach but also to religious mediocrity and selective observance of Mitzvot (religious acts) (Sharlo 2007, 336). Conversely, Yitzhak Conforti argues that during the 1950s and 1960s this camp had been much more diverse, pluralistic and open to different interpretations of the complex relationships among state, religion and nation, than it is nowadays.\(^{192}\)

Non-Zionists – This camp includes Agudat Israel party and the smaller Poalei Agudat Israel (Workers of Israel Unity - PAGI) party. Agudat Israel started its life in 1912 as an institutionalized opposition to Zionism that advocated an anti-Zionist approach. Starting in the late 1930s, however, the Aguda tightened its connections with secular Zionism and gave up its anti-Zionist fervor entirely before the foundation of the state. This attitudinal change can be partly explained as a result of its achievements in the realm of recognition of religion in the state, which are nicely reflected in the Status Quo letter of 1947 and partly due to Agudat Israel's acknowledgement of the unique circumstances that necessitated its support in the establishment of a Jewish state.\(^{193}\) This new approach was headed by the influential Gurr (Gerer) Hasidic court that emigrated from Europe in the 1930s and 1940s and became the biggest Hasidic court in Israel. After Israel proclaimed its independence Agudat Israel participated in the Temporary National Council which was the temporary government of the state. In 1949 it joined forces with the other religious parties and ran in a United Religious Front (URF) to the Knesset. After the elections it became a member of government. Clashes among different factions in this camp led to their secession from government in 1952 over disagreements on national service (military or civil) of ultraorthodox women.

Between 1952 and 1967 Agudat Israel was a regular participant in national elections but had stayed out of government. Its representatives were mostly concerned with sectarian interests but were relatively flexible and pragmatic when secular issues

\(^{192}\) An interview with Dr. Yitzchak Conforti, Professor of Jewish Studies at Bar-Ilan University, 10 August 2008.
\(^{193}\) See chapter six of the dissertation for a more elaborate account of the circumstances that brought the executive of the Jewish agency to send this letter to the leaders of Agudat Israel in July 1947.
were concerned. The small PAGI party was more lenient and cooperative towards the state but on the other hand subordinated itself to some extent to Agudat Israel's MGH (Council of Torah Sages) rabbinical establishment. PAGI's need to maneuver between these two contradicting poles resulted in occasional zigzagging between opposition (1952-1960) and coalition throughout the period.

Anti-Zionists – This was by far the smallest sect in the religious camp in 1948, but at the same time the one most resistant to the state. It includes the Neturei Karta group that seceded from Agudat Israel in 1935 when the latter became more sympathetic of the Zionist movement and strengthened its ties with it. In effect, Neturei Karta took the pre-state anti-Zionist position previously held by Agudat Israel and advocated a line of complete negation of any Zionist initiative, including in particular the establishment of an independent Jewish state, which they perceive as blasphemy. Its members do not communicate in Hebrew language, refuse to carry Israeli identity cards and abstain from any active involvement in state institutions (Beit-Hallahmi, 1992). In 1948 the group was based in the Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem and led by the militant Rabbi Amram Bleu.

While Neturei Karta is the most militant anti-Zionist faction it by no means constitutes a majority in this camp. Additional anti-Zionists factions include major parts of the Eda Haredit (the Haredi sect) and especially the followers of the Satmar Hasidic court whose leader, the late rabbi Yoelish (Joel) Teitelbaum (1888-1979) is known as the most important anti-Zionist intellectual thinker (Kaplan 2004). The Satmar court is one of the biggest in the world and its followers are divided between the United States and Israel. In Israel they reside mainly in Jerusalem and the city of Bnei Brak. Other anti-Zionist groups include the followers of the Soloveichick family from Brisk and the Hazon Ish group which is led by the Kanajevski family of Rabbis (Friedman 1975, 94).

The nonpartisan attitude of anti-Zionists liberates them from any obligation to the state, its institutions, and hence from adherence to the results of the political process. Therefore, in contrast to pro-Zionists and non-Zionists, who by virtue of their participation in politics accept the rules of the political game, the anti-Zionist factions took on occasions illegal actions which included violence and disturbance of public order in order to defend what they perceived as essential religious issues.
Participation in politics

The pro-Zionist and non-Zionist religious factions both accepted the idea of a Jewish state even though they differed on the interpretation of its meaning. The pro-Zionists interpreted the establishment of the state as Reshit Tzmihat Geulatenu (the beginning of redemption) and gave it sacred meaning, as being part of a divine plan. This theological line of thinking was translated to deep commitment to serve the state in all realms. At the same time, this camp lacked the theological depth and capacity to offer a comprehensive Halakhic guideline to modern-sovereign existence (Ravitzky 2005; Eilam 2000, 30-44). This reality compelled the religious-Zionists to accept compromises on the status of religious norms in different realms of public and individual life.

Conversely, the non-Zionist factions underestimated the theological importance of the establishment of the state. According to their theological reasoning the establishment by Jews of a secular political entity cannot bring redemption to the Jewish people without running it in accordance to Halakhic norms. This vision was not feasible in a reality of a secular majority inspired by Zionist ideas. Therefore, Agudat Israel's principled attitude was to treat the state similarly as other non-Jewish regimes and interact with it on the basis on interests and needs. "Consequently, a free-riding modality has emerged in the relationship between the state and the Haredim." (Kook, Harris and Doron 1998, 2).

These very differing approaches about the sacral meaning of the state did not stand in the way of uniting the two factions into one political bloc, Hazit Datit Leumit (United Religious Front-URF) which included all four religious parties – right wing pro-Zionist Mizrahi, left wing pro-Zionist Hapoel HaMizrahi; right wing non-Zionist Agudat Israel; and left wing non-Zionist Poalei Agudat Israel (PAGI) – which ran a joint electoral campaign in the first national elections in January 1949.

The URF won 14 percent of the vote in 1949 which translated to 16 (out of 120) seats in the Knesset, and joined the first Mapai-dominated government with three cabinet ministers. The religious parties participated in government as a united faction only until 1952, after which the Haredi parties left the government and divorced from the URF due to disagreements with the pro-Zionist factions and Mapai about
conscription of ultraorthodox women to military or civilian service. The *Agudat Israel* faction continued to participate in national and municipal elections and to recognize the legitimacy of the state but did not join the executive branch again until after 1977. The smaller *PAGI* stayed in opposition between 1952 and 1960 and then resumed its membership in government.

The URF did not last long. Nevertheless, this initial religious coordination and joint participation with secular Zionist parties in the legislative and executive branches of the newborn state served as an important milestone in the relationship between the state and its religious populace. The participation of all religious parties in government, including the non-Zionist Haredi ones, provided the state with a stamp of legitimacy by the rabbinical establishment, which was much needed for domestic cohesion as well as for international legitimacy.

Political collaboration between pro-Zionist and non-Zionist Haredi parties with such differing theological perspectives is far from obvious. Indeed, the possibility of such a unity between non-Zionist ultraorthodox Haredi Parties and modern religious-nationalist parties under the same political umbrella today, is practically impossible. ¹⁹⁴ Part of the reason for collaboration among the religious parties was undoubtedly the unusual circumstances following the establishment of the state that included enormous internal and external challenges which united the entire nation. Yet, while circumstances may provide explanation as to why almost all religious factions decided to participate in the political system, they cannot explain their decision to run together in election and join the government as a unified bloc. This behavior can be explained only as a positive response to integrative state policies that gave religious factions incentive not only to join politics separately, but rather as a united front that might give religious concerns more political leverage. Formal integration of religion brought a sheer majority among the religious population, including its political and rabbinical elites, to accept the rules of the political game set by the secular leadership. Subsequently, religious people accepted participation in democratic politics and in government as a means to materialize their collective goals, and by this contributed to the pluralization of the Israeli political arena.

¹⁹⁴ An interview with rabbi Yaacov Ariel, Chief Rabbi of Ramat Gan, and one of the leading religious-nationalist rabbinical figures, on 20 November 2008.
As I detail below, the participation of religious groups in the democratic game exposed them to the benefits of political power as well as made them more committed to the results of the political process. Succinctly put, religious participation promoted pluralist democracy in Israel. This outcome supports the theoretical supposition of the *Bounded Integration Model* that the inclusion of religion in the public and political spheres in traditional societies in accord with minimal democratic conditions encourages religious collectivities to take part in democratic politics. Integration invites religious groups to become part of civil society and motivate them to channel their collective demands into legal and parliamentarian realms by peaceful means.

As is demonstrated in Figure 7.2 (below) throughout this period the religious parties participated in parliamentarian politics. They have won roughly the same total number of seats, between a low of 15 seats in 1951 to a high of 18 seats in 1959 and 1961. Also noteworthy, the relatively tolerant pro-Zionist parties gradually strengthened their political support from 10 to 12 seats whereas the non-Zionist camp remained stable with 6 an average of seats. This electoral shift in favor of *Mafdal* can be explained by the clear dominance of the pro-Zionist religious parties in state institutions and their connections with the secular establishment, which were translated to patronage in return for votes (Sandler 1996, 137). It can also be explained by the massive flow of immigrants from Middle Eastern countries shortly following the establishment of the state, who held traditional values but at the same time had no affinity to the Haredi establishment. They thus found in the religious pro-Zionist parties a more suitable political home. The latter point draws an interesting parallel with the Turkish case, in which there was a massive rural-urban flow of immigrants. While the newcomers to Israel had a non-secular political outlet they could affiliate with, the Turkish immigrants to the cities had none, and thus they were forced, as default, to support secular parties that promoted religious ideas by proxy.

Religious parties also participated regularly in *Mapai*-dominated governments. Between 1948 and 1967 there had been at least one religious party in government, with the exception of two years between 1958 and 1960. *Mapai* and Ben-Gurion preferred religious membership in the government instead of compromising with rivaling left wing *Mapam* party, the extreme right wing revisionist *Herut* party, or the left wing communist
Maki party. Ben-Gurion found it strategically convenient to make some concessions about religious demands and in return benefit the religious parties' passive support in secular matters such as security, diplomacy and the economy (Shapiro 1998; Sandler 1996).

**Figure 7.2 - Distribution of Seats of Religious Parties in the Knesset 1948-1967**

![Distribution of Seats of Religious Parties in the Knesset 1948-1967](image)


In similarity to what happened in Turkey, the relationship between the state and religion was shaped during the formative years following the inception of the state. Concessions in the realm of religion created a complex set of institutions and arrangements with long term impact on the nature of Israel's political and legal systems. A significant achievement of the religious parties was an unlimited delay in the approval of a constitution. Despite the initial intention to approve a constitution immediately after independence, debates about the nature of this constitution, especially regarding the constitutional protection of religion on the one hand and liberal human rights on the other hand, generated disputes between religious and secular factions. The religious parties demanded that Jewish religion will enjoy constitutional protection in the state as
a condition to their participation in government. In contrast, drafts for a constitution that were suggested by the secular establishment emphasized liberal rights and freedom and did not give religion a preferential constitutional status. This disagreement threatened the alliance between the religious parties and Mapai. At the end, the mutual interdependence of both sides channeled them toward a compromise. The religious parties gave up their demand for a constitutional protection of religion and in return prevented the authorization of a constitution for Israel (Kook, Harris and Doron 1998, 6). This agreement involved significant costs to both sides but at the same time maintained their collaboration. The secular side had to abandon the idea of a liberal constitution which appears in the proclamation of independence and was advocated by most of the secular parties. At present (January 2010) Israel still lacks an official constitution and even though the Knesset approved a series of Basic Laws that protect some basic civil rights, their legal status is not entirely determined and are they far from providing a full constitutional framework to the state or protection to its citizens. The religious factions gave up on constitutional defense of Jewish religion that would have strengthened its legal and normative status in the state. On the other hand, this compromise eased the tension between the factions and enabled their joint participation in government.

Other significant religious achievements include the approval of the Rabbinical Courts Act (Marriage and Divorce) 1953 which provided the Rabbinical Courts monopolistic authority over marriage and divorce of Jewish citizens in Israel; establishment of a separate religious division in the ministry of education for the pro-Zionist stream; establishment of a recognized autonomous religious stream for Agudat Israel in 1952; de facto exemption of religious men and women from military service; observance of Shabbat and kosher regulations in public facilities; establishment of a CR Council, Municipal Rabbinates, and a Chief Rabbinate in the IDF, and; shutdown of public transportation on Shabbat.

196 Yediot Ahronot, 31 August 1948.
197 Yediot Ahronot, 3 February 1949.
198 An important step in this direction has been taken with the legislation of two Basic Laws in 1992 – Basic Law Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law Freedom of Occupation, which were interpreted by the High Court of Justice as having constitutional supra-legal status. I will elaborate this in Chapter 8.
Despite these considerable achievements whenever disagreements arose regarding the public status of religion or sectarian benefits to religious groups the religious parties did not hesitate to respond in a very decisive manner and to skillfully utilize various political tools to attain their political demands. In matters perceived by the religious parties salient to the Jewish nature of the state and society they instigates political crises, boycotted the government and even lead the entire political system to new elections.

As Table 7.3 (below) demonstrates, during this period religion-state issues were very politically contentious. Disagreements within the government on religious themes caused some 30 political crises in the coalition during a period of less than 20 years and were responsible to the disintegration of several coalition governments. In contrast, secular issues were given only secondary consideration by the religious parties and generated minor political crises in only two instances (in 1949 and 1967).

Moreover, in disparity to more recent decades, the sanctity of the land of Israel was not given high priority in the agenda of religious parties. Remarkably, I found no record of public expressions by religious politicians on territorial issues or the divine value of the land during the relevant period, even though the Israeli government had taken tough decisions on territorial issues during this period, such as giving up sovereignty in all of Jerusalem as part of the Armistice Agreement (1949) and withdrawing from the Sinai Peninsula after the Kadesh Operation (1956). This is because the religious parties understood their primary responsibility in Israeli politics as protecting the status of religion in the state (theocratic-general) and advancing the distinct interests of different religious populations (sectarian-specific) and did not intend to lead the political line in secular issues.

On the other hand, Table 7.3 reveals that the religious delegates in government were not successful on every issue. While some religious demands were fully answered, others were entirely rejected. Nevertheless, in most cases an agreement was achieved either by compromise or following a clear political defeat or victory of either the secular or religious camp. Only in four cases bargaining failed and resulted in the disintegration of government or new elections (1950, 1951, 1958-1960, 1961).

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199 I explored the news on all relevant dates in the daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot.
The more prominent the issue was perceived by the religious parties, the further they had gone to defend it. The most contentious issues in this respect were the crisis over the education of Jewish immigrants in 1951 which led to new elections and the definition of 'who is a Jew?' which generated a three year crisis and the only phase during which no religious party participated in government. This is because the definition by which individuals are to be considered part of the Jewish nation defines the boundaries of the nation and as long as orthodox definitions govern this realm the orthodox religious establishment practically controls the boundaries of the nation. Giving up on this control would have undermined the power of the orthodox establishment in the state and open the way to conservative, reform or secular groups to become active participants in shaping the character of the nation. This is why the religious parties proved very persistent on this issue. Eventually Mafdal enforced its political will and regained control over the registration of Jewish identity in 1961 (Eilam 2000; Woods 2008; Don Yehiya 2002). Additional issues of prominence to religious parties include the observance of Shabbat, marriage, military service, kosher regulations and allocation of resources to religious educational facilities.

Yet, the most significant point about the dynamic interaction between the secular establishment and the religious parties is that the entire process of debate, struggle, and agreement about religious issues had taken place within the political arena and only by acceptable, namely – legal and peaceful – forms of action. Throughout this period there were no incidents of illegal or violent activity by followers of non-Zionist and pro-Zionist parties. Providing the religious segment a meaningful space in the political arena to defend and fight for the promotion of its worldview and interests made other forms of political behavior unnecessary.

Furthermore, participation of religious actors in politics checked the primacy of religious doctrines (Daat Torah) and subjected them to rational political calculations. While the rabbinical establishment presented an uncompromising line of conduct over religious issues, the religious political leadership demonstrated political wit and many times preferred compromises that guaranteed significant religious achievements than a totalistic standpoint that might have risked them.
**Table 7.3 - Crises on Religious Issues in Government 1948-1967**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Religious Actions</th>
<th>Political Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1948 Authority of rabbinic courts</td>
<td>Religious minister resigns</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1948 Soldiers punished for observing Shabbat</td>
<td>Religious minister resigns</td>
<td>Demand accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Punishment cancelled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>1949 Import of non-Kosher meat</td>
<td>Boycott on government</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1949 Riots in Jerusalem – Observance of Shabbat</td>
<td>Threats to resign</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>1949 Secular issue – tax revision</td>
<td>Boycott on government</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>1949 Mandatory education</td>
<td>Threats to resign</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>1950 Education of immigrants</td>
<td>Threaten to resign</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>1950 Various - religious services, import of non-Kosher meat, religion in the IDF, status of CR and Shabbat</td>
<td>Religious minister resigns</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>1950 Import of non-Kosher meat</td>
<td>Resignation from govt.</td>
<td>Govt. falls, new govt. appointed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1951 Education of immigrants Equality of Women Act</td>
<td>Resignation from govt.</td>
<td>Govt. falls; elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>1951 Import of non-Kosher meat</td>
<td>Popular protests</td>
<td>Demand rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>1952 Religious education and recruitment of religious women</td>
<td>Popular protests, Haredi ministers resign</td>
<td>No formal change in policy; no enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>1953 Religious education</td>
<td>threats to resign</td>
<td>Demand accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>1953 Raising and selling pork meat</td>
<td>Public protests, threats to resign, proposed legislation</td>
<td>Demand rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>1953 Religious Education</td>
<td>Boycott on government</td>
<td>Demand accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>1953 Recruitment of religious women</td>
<td>Threats to vote against govt.</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>1954 Recruitment of religious women, Dayanim (religious Judges) oath of loyalty to state</td>
<td>Boycott on government</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>1956 Exhibition on Shabbat</td>
<td>Threats to vote against govt., popular protests.</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>1957 Breach of coalition agreement on religious education and Shabbat</td>
<td>Threats to resign, meetings with PM</td>
<td>Demand accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>1958 Operation of mixed-sexes swimming pool on Shabbat</td>
<td>Popular protests</td>
<td>Demand rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>1958 Postmortem autopsy; violation of graves</td>
<td>Protests, demands to revise legislation</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>1959-1962 Elections to the Chief Rabbinate</td>
<td>Threats to resign, demand to postpone elections</td>
<td>Elections postponed, Eventual compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>1960 PM gives secular interpretation to religious text</td>
<td>Threat to vote against govt.</td>
<td>PM publishes public clarification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>1961 Coalition negotiations</td>
<td>New demands raised</td>
<td>Negotiations fail; new elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>1961 Soccer game on Shabbat</td>
<td>Demands to sanction the soccer association</td>
<td>Demand rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>1961 PM visited a Buddhist shrine in Burma</td>
<td>Religious ministers boycott PM reception</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>1962 Public television broadcast</td>
<td>Threat to vote against govt.</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>1963 Various – Shabbat, education, Chief Rabbinate</td>
<td>Threats to resign</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>1964 Kosher food onboard Israeli vessels</td>
<td>Threats to resign</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>1965-1966 Shabbat legislation, port operates on Shabbat, military service, elections</td>
<td>Threats, negotiations</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>1967 Secular issue – appreciation of salaries</td>
<td>Threats to resign</td>
<td>Compromise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Yediot Ahronot* daily newspaper January 1948 - June 1967
Two examples suffice to illustrate this point. The first is a debate that took place in 1951 among political leaders, the Chief Rabbis and the Agudat Israel's MGH (Council of Torah Sages) regarding the appropriate response to the proposal of Hours of Work and Rest Act - 1951. This Act meant to guarantee Shabbat as the weekly day of rest but emphasized its social rather than its religious value. In addition, the proposed act provided the secular state authority to issue working permits on Shabbat if need arises. Asher Cohen's account of this debate divulges the difference between the militant standpoint of Chief Rabbi Herzog and the Torah sages against the pragmatic standpoint of MKs (members of Knesset) Shapiro and Verheftig. While the former held that the approval of this law must be prevented, the latter sought to approve it and guarantee the legal protection of Shabbat, believing that under the circumstances it was the best possible political outcome. The final decision on this matter also reflected the tension between religious doctrine and political wisdom – while the law could not be supported on Halakhic terms it made no political sense to withdraw from government at that point. Hence, while all religious parties harshly criticized the new law none left the government following its approval (Cohen 2002).

The second example relates to conscription of orthodox women to military service. In 1953, following a long political crisis and recurrent popular protests on the issue the Hazon Ish (rabbi Kerlitz) - the most important religious authority of his time - ordered religious MKs Shapiro and Verheftig to vote against a proposed bill that authorized the conscription as being against Daat Torah. Despite this explicit order the two MKs supported the law, even though they were subsequently criticized for it by the rabbi.200

These two examples demonstrate how religious politicians perceived themselves not only as a political branch of the rabbinical establishment but rather as authentic representatives of a population which granted them at least partial autonomy to maneuver in the political arena in order to represent the religious populace's preferences in the best possible way.

Finally, this research treats political parties as manifestations of civil society and thus their activities should be considered part of the civil doings of the religious publics.

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200 Yediot Ahronot, 20 August 1953.
in Israel. Other forms of religious civil society, however, were also instrumental in the process of religious interaction with and integration in the state. While a major part of the public religious activity was conducted by political leaders in the *Knesset* and in government, the religious parties, especially *Mafdal*, have been very successful in establishing diverse civic associations that promoted and distributed religious ideas in society, and provided the religious political leadership stable popular backup.

As I already mentioned earlier in Chapter Six, political parties were the skeleton of civil society during the *Yishuv* era. They expanded by establishing affiliated associations and by providing diverse social services (Halpern and Reinhartz 2000; Rubin 2009). Religious parties were not exceptional in this regard. Religious associations which were founded by the religious parties continued their activities post independence. These included the religious Kibbutz movement, the *Bnei Akiva* and *Ezra* youth groups, various women clubs and *Yeshivot* of all sorts. Noteworthy, these associations had been occasionally involved in popular protests on religious issues, but there is no evidence that these actions were accompanied by violence or by challenging the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state.

Civil society associations served as platforms for grassroots activity at the mass level, and provided the link between the political elite and their followers. Subsequently, culture of tolerance diffused to the general religious population and made it more pluralistic and open to diverse ways of life. The results of a survey conducted among religious teenagers in 1964 demonstrate that a clear majority among them subscribed to democratic values: 95 percent of the respondents supported mixed sex education and two thirds thought that a religious government has to fund secular education as well as permit transportation on Shabbat. These results also support the supposition that exposure to democratic values through participation in the system change the participants in way of making them more receptive to deviating opinions and worldviews.

Finally, institutional integration had a positive impact on the overall integration of religion in the state for several reasons. First, religious state institutions which were

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201 For a detailed account on the intellectual foundations of Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Dati, their interrelationship with the rest of Israeli society and the orthodox population in Israel, see Fishman 1983.

202 *Yediot Ahronot*, 3 December 1964.
granted with real authority reflected the state acknowledgement of their spiritual value for the collective. The establishment of a religious education system and a system of rabbinic courts consolidated the formal status of religion and provided religious people more reasons to identify with the state. Second, state institutions are fertile ground for cooptation and distribution of resources and, in turn, provide the co-opted groups strong motivation to cooperate with the state. Third, the addition of religious institutions to the public sector implies certain duties and limitations which assist in restricting militant or anti-state expressions among religious people, requires them to maintain constructive relationship with the general society and to cooperate with other state institutions. The result is a broad *de facto* recognition and legitimization of the state among religious institutions which affects popular religious support in the state.

Furthermore, religious institutions provided jobs for tens of thousands of religious people. The biggest employer in this regard is the Ministry of Education that employs thousands religious teachers (Schiffer 1998). Even though the pro-Zionist religious education system is supervised by a separate division in the Ministry, it is still required to provide general education in profane themes such as biology, math, geography etc. in addition to Torah studies. Also, its teachers receive their salaries directly from the state. Economic dependency creates complicity and loyalty and being part of the national education system necessitates a shared core curriculum in secular and Zionist-religious schools which lessens, at least partially, the gap in knowledge and values that exists between the two populations. Other significant sources of funding and cooptation include the Ministry of Religions, the municipal rabbinates, the municipal religious councils and the religious courts which are responsible to the provision of religious services and in return supply a source of income and status to thousands religious men.

Among the religious institutions the Chief Rabbinate (CR) has been the most important institution in regards its impact on religion state relationship until 1967. Despite its theological inferiority vis-à-vis' Haredi rabbis and its insufficient interaction with the secular public the CR has been instrumental in establishing constructive relationship between the religious and secular camps. The first Chief Rabbi Herzog

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203 See more on this in chapter Six.
(1888-1959) was a leader of rare qualities and religious prestige. Throughout his incumbency rabbi Herzog succeeded in uniting modern orthodox and Haredi groups under his authority, and many Hasidic leaders subjected their followers to Rabbi Herzog's religious decisions. In combination, Rabbi Herzog perceived the establishment of the state an act of divine intervention and advocated a pro-statist attitude. Whenever possible, Rabbi Herzog made rabbinic decisions that took into consideration the special needs of the state. Such decisions included permission to conduct general conscription on the eve of independence which fell on Shabbat, permission to manufacture ice on Shabbat, lenient approach to kosher approval of imported meat and to conscription of orthodox women, and conditional approval of post-mortem autopsy for medical studies and research. In this doing, Rabbi Herzog promoted the legitimization of the state among the religious population and endeavored to find a golden bridge between the needs of the state and religious regulations.

At the same time, the CR exerted real power and acted to some extent as a representative religious institution, even when its decisions ran counter to state policies. Examples include the decision of the CR to prohibit the removal of 2500 body remains from land which was designated to house the new government campus in Jerusalem, its decision to abstain from the commemoration ceremony of the first President because it was secular in nature and took place on the Gregorian date of death, in its opposition to the Hours of Work and Rest Act – 1951 and the Equality of Rights to Women Act – 1951 (Cohen 1998), its overt opposition to nominate Rabbi Toledano as Minister of Religions, and insistence on preserving the monopolistic authority of the CR over Kosher certificate and nomination of Dayanim (religious Judges).

Being part of the state structure and at the same time presenting a firm and independent attitude towards religious issues, positioned the CR as an essential mediating link between the religious establishment and the state. This position assisted

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204 Yediot Ahronot, 14 May 1948.
205 Yediot Ahronot, 19 July 1951.
206 Yediot Ahronot, 1 March 1954; 8 April 1954.
207 Yediot Ahronot, 22 November 1951.
208 Yediot Ahronot, 1 July 1953.
209 Yediot Ahronot, 12 October 1958.
210 Yediot Ahronot, 17 November 1958.
211 Yediot Ahronot, 19 June 1959.
in mitigating the tension between the secular state and the religious establishment and promoted peaceful coexistence of the two camps.

To be sure, the CR was subject to intrigues and power struggles among the different religious factions. Elections to the CR council were loaded with emotions and a source of quarrel between the different religious factions. During this period the pro-religious Mafdal exerted more influence over the CR and hence was justifiably accused by the Haredi establishment of not representing the entire religious population in an equal manner. In 1958 Haredi rabbis abstained from the inauguration ceremony of the new CR building in protest against their underrepresentation in the institution\textsuperscript{212} and in 1963 they announced their intention to found a Haredi Rabbinate that would compete with the CR. Despite intra-religious struggles, however, in 1966 the CR consolidated its status as the sole official Rabbinate following an agreement between Mafdal and Agudat Israel according to which Agudat Israel's representatives will join the Rabbinate and will support it from the inside.\textsuperscript{213} This agreement terminated forty years of competition between the two factions and concentrated both non-Zionists and Pro-Zionists under the institutional umbrella of the CR, by this amplifying the power and legitimacy of this institution among the general religious public as well as vis-à-vis the state.

Religious anti-Zionism and the state: voluntary exclusion - extreme interaction

The final section of this chapter discusses the relationship that evolved between the state and its religious anti-Zionist minority. One should not assume that religious moderation was a given. The behavior of the anti-Zionist religious minority demonstrates a potential for religious fanaticism/extremism in Judaism that is similar to the Turkish case, and the new state sought to diffuse this by integrating the more moderate majority into its ranks. To be sure, unlimited accommodation of religious doctrine into state laws and institutions might have convinced this sector to collaborate with the state as well. However, the external costs of going too far in religious integration in terms of violating the principles of democracy and infringing the rights of the general public did not justify such extensive accommodation. This point reinforces the Bounded Integration Model's

\textsuperscript{212} Yediot Ahronot, 7 May 1958.
\textsuperscript{213} Yediot Ahronot, 16 June 1966.
conceptualization of religious integration as a bounded range, below and above which the overall costs of inclusion are higher than its benefits.

The moderating effect of religious accommodation had fallen short from reaching the entire religious population. Long before the establishment of the state two fundamentalist ultraorthodox groups, *Ha'eda Ha'haredit* and its most militant splinter group *Neturei Karta* opposed the warming relationship between *Agudat Israel* and the Zionist establishment and positioned themselves as the true defenders of Jewish religion against the threats of secular nationalism and Zionist proactive politics which ran counter to God's will.

These groups did not acknowledge the representative institutions of the *Yishuv* and took every effort to work against the Zionist plan to establish in Israel a Jewish political entity. Following the establishment of the state *Neturei Karta* and parts of *Ha'Eda Ha'Haredit* had taken various actions to weaken the legitimacy of the state. These included meetings with foreign figures like representatives of the Vatican, violent protests against state authorities, refusal to pay state and municipal taxes, and boycott of national and municipal elections. In addition, the *Neturei Karta* group led several militant struggles against the state in issues like the observance of Shabbat, kosher meat and post-mortem autopsy. While these issues were also defended by the religious parties in the *Knesset*, the differences between the two campaigns are striking - religious parties used legitimate political techniques to compel the secular establishment to satisfy their religious demands, whereas the anti-Zionists sparked riots in Jerusalem and other cities and made use of violence and other terrorizing techniques against ordinary civilians and police forces.

*Table 7.4* logs the most serious violent incidents among anti-Zionist factions, state authorities and the rest of society. The most serious events during this period included an attempt by a radical anti-Zionist underground to set the *Knesset* on fire (1951); letters sent to the speaker of the *Knesset* and Minister Levin of *Agudat Israel*,

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214 *Yediot Ahronot*, 5 August 1949.
215 *Yediot Ahronot*, 14 August 1949.
216 *Yediot Ahronot*, 11 October 1949.
217 *Yediot Ahronot*, 14 November 1949.
threatening them with death for violating the sanctity of the Torah (1950; 1951); setting non-kosher butcheries on fire (1953) and recurrent assaults against Christian priests who were accused in missionary activities. In addition, throughout the period fundamentalist anti-Zionist factions initiated violent mass riots in protest against the violation of Shabbat, post-mortem autopsy and non-Kosher butcheries. These protests lasted many weeks, sometimes stretching to months, and included roadblocks and stoning, sabotaging public and private property and clashes with the police (1954; 1957; 1958; 1963; 1967). Other rarer activities included kidnapping of children from youth hostel to provide them religious indoctrination, threats and violence against intersex activities of other groups, and assaults against secular and religious individuals who did not follow an ultraorthodox way of life.

These riots not only violated the law but also exacerbated tension and hostility among anti-Zionists, state authorities and the secular public. Occasionally the state and society reacted to anti-Zionist provocations with counter force. These clashes claimed the life of one person and caused hundreds of wounded people, both Haredi and the policemen. In addition, hundreds of people got arrested and public and private property was damaged. The costly results of these riots deepened the religious-secular cleavage and by no means promoted pluralism or mutual inter-communal respect.

Furthermore, fundamentalist anti-Zionists disapprove of and fight against every deviation from what they perceive as the sole accurate interpretation of Halakha. This is why zealous activities had not been directed solely against the state and secular society but also against religious groups that acknowledged the state or maintained some form of collaboration with its institutions (Friedman 1975). For instance, the zealots attacked rabbis that acknowledged the state or approved Hebrew courses in their colleges. Violent activities also took place between Anti-Zionist and non-Zionist Hasidic courts, especially regarding participation in elections.
Table 7.4 – Incidents of Illegal Anti-Zionist Behavior on Religious Issues 1948-1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity and Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1949</td>
<td>Recurrent violent incidents with police forces about observance of Shabbat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8.1949</td>
<td>Meetings with Vatican representatives and officials of foreign governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.8.1949</td>
<td>Application to immigrate to Jordanian Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.10.1949</td>
<td>Neturei Karta declare that will not participate in elections and will not pay taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.10.1949</td>
<td>Stones thrown at secular people without head covers. The police arrest several protesters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.4.1950</td>
<td>Construction of roadblocks and violent clashes with the police about observance of Shabbat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.6.1950</td>
<td>Letter threatening a religious minister with death was sent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5.1951</td>
<td>Attempt to set the Knesset on fire. Police uncovers an underground group Kananei Brit Ha'Shabbat (alliance of Shabbat protectors). Weapons and hand grenades are found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6.1951</td>
<td>Threat letter sent to the Speaker of the Knesset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.4.1952</td>
<td>Violent Shabbat riots. Several Haredis arrested. Calls to defend Shabbat at the price of imprisonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3.1953</td>
<td>Two butcheries selling pork meat were set on fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5.1953</td>
<td>Threat letters to butchery and restaurant in Jerusalem for selling pork meat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.6.1953</td>
<td>Violent Shabbat riots including sabotaging cars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.12.1953</td>
<td>Violent riots against conscription of Yeshiva students to the IDF. Many wounded and arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.1.1954</td>
<td>Teenager assaulted badly for smoking on Shabbat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.6.1954</td>
<td>Mass assault of Yeshiva students on a youngster who returned from medical examination by car after the beginning of Shabbat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.10.1954</td>
<td>Neturei Karta leader, Amram Bleu, accused of violation of public order during Shabbat riots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.12.1954</td>
<td>Violent Haredi interruption to religious-nationalist activity because of intersex intermingling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>Recurrent violence andstoning of a women club in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.1955</td>
<td>Application to immigrate to Jordanian Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.6.1995</td>
<td>Haredi man assaulted badly in synagogue for allegations that he might vote in national elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.6.1955</td>
<td>Violent clashes between Satmar group who boycott elections and Baelz group who participate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8.1956</td>
<td>Police forces take off road blocks put by Neturei Karta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9.1956</td>
<td>Haredi man is killed during violent Shabbat riots in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7.1957</td>
<td>Violent Shabbat riots in Netanya, including road blocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9.1957</td>
<td>Violent Shabbat riots in Tel Aviv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6.1958</td>
<td>Violent riots against mixed sex swimming pool that operates on Shabbat. Dozens arrestees and wounded. Organized buses bring Haredi protesters from all around the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.1958</td>
<td>Violent riots, stoning police forces, following presidential amnesty to Rabbi Bleu and followers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.1959</td>
<td>Violent clashes between Agudat Israel and Neturei Karta followers on participation in election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8.1960</td>
<td>Rabbi Bleu and follower arrested after sabotaging commercials of new movie on Queen of Sheba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1.1961</td>
<td>Riots against Haredi Rabbi Kloizenburg following the latter decision to allow Hebrew courses at his Yeshiva. Several Neturei Karta people are wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.8.1961</td>
<td>Children abducted from a youth hostel by Haredi People. Children returned after several days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.10.61</td>
<td>Violent riots against a non-Kosher butchery require police intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3.1962</td>
<td>Police intention to send a body of Haredi man to post-mortem autopsy generates violent riots. Over 30 wounded and arrestees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.1962</td>
<td>Police arrests protesters against non-kosher butchery in the city of Herzliya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1963</td>
<td>Violent riots against Christian missionary activity in Jerusalem. 7 Haredi arrestees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.1963</td>
<td>Violent riots in Bnei Brak against post-mortem autopsy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-12.1963</td>
<td>Recent violent protests against transportation on Shabbat. Dozens wounded and arrested; vehicles sabotaged; police forces, tourists and civilians stoned, ministry of education damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.6.1964</td>
<td>Religious underground uprooted signs of reform synagogues and left threat letters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.8.1965</td>
<td>Violent riots against the Messianic Jews sect. Their leader is forced to escape sect members assaulted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.1.1966</td>
<td>Violent riots in Ashdod against operation of port on Shabbat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.1966</td>
<td>Ha'noar Ha'oved ve Ha'Lomed (the working and studying youth) Bnei Brak branch is stoned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.4.1966</td>
<td>Violent Shabbat riots. Many arrestees and wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.7.1966</td>
<td>Woman attacked in Jerusalem and her house ruined for allegations of immodest lifestyle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Anti-Zionist activities engendered complex responses by religious non-Zionists and pro-Zionists groups. On the one the religious parties and the Chief Rabbis could not have dismissed the actions of the zealots when their primary intention was to defend a Halakhic way of life. Hence, they backed these groups in the Knesset and in government and prevented state sanctions against them following provocative events. On the other hand, religious leaders condemned anti-Zionist activity against the state. At times they even installed institutional and religious sanctions against it. For instance, in 1949 several rabbis asked the CR to cancel the authority of the court of Ha'Eda Haredit; in 1953-1954 Agudat Israel and Chief Rabbi Herzog criticized Neturei Karta's interaction with foreign bodies that aimed to delegitimize the state in the international arena; and in 1958 Chief Rabbi Nissim and former Mizrahi leader Rabbi Maymon called to boycott the Satmar Hasidic Court in response to the latter anti-Zionist doings. Therefore, anti-Zionist activity not only deepened the secular-religious divide but also divided the religious populace to hostile camps.

In sum, anti-Zionist activity against the state was the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, it had a negative impact on the relationship among the religious populace, state authorities and the general society. While this activity was carried out by a relatively small minority, its militant approach did not pay respect to state laws, deviating interpretations of Halakhic instructions within society, or the preferences of the general public, and charged high cost in terms of the nature of the relationship between religious groups and the appreciation toward the Jewish religion in society. This account suggests that complete marginalization of religious groups from the state and the public sphere, exactly what took place in Turkey following the establishment of the republic, might have pushed large proportion of the religious population in Israel to the same militant line of opposition to the state, the destabilization of political system and more illegal and extreme forms of religious behavior.

219 Yediot Ahronot 15 December 1949.
220 Yediot Ahronot, 30 July 1953.
221 Yediot Ahronot, 23 June 1958.
Conclusions

The account of the state-religion relationship in Israel between 1948 and 1967 reveals a multifaceted integration of Jewish religion and religious groups into the political and public spheres of the newborn state. The state of Israel utilized religious symbols, allowed religious political activity, including participation of religious parties and individuals in all branches of government, accommodated the special needs of observing Jews in public facilities and established formal state institutions which operate in accord with Jewish laws. The religious camp also benefited in preserving a Jewish character in the public sphere, such as observance of Shabbat and Halakhic laws in matters of personal status.

Notwithstanding the problems that such deep integration introduced, particularly far reaching compromises by the secular majority that was compelled to accept some violation of its liberal rights, the integration of religion proved a stabilizing and legitimizing force in Israeli politics. A majority of the religious population in the state embraced the legitimacy of the state, participated in its institutions, and operated to advance their worldview and special interests almost exclusively within the confines of the law. The role of religion in the state remained a very contentious issue throughout the period but disagreements were solved almost exclusively in the political realm. The small ultraorthodox anti-Zionist minority that chose not to collaborate with the state was a source of social instability and extreme behavior, but it did not succeed in persuading the entire religious population to follow its steps and shatter ties with the state. The striking disparity between the behavior of the majority that accepted the state and the minority that opposed it reveals in a nice way the mitigating effect of religious inclusion and its impact on religious behavior.

Religious integration undoubtedly had a positive impact on Israel's political stability. Throughout the period there had been no breaks or changes in the democratic regime, despite it being a very dynamic and challenging era. This was achieved in spite of, probably because of, state policies that ran counter to the speculations and prescriptions of the secularization thesis. This policy provided strong incentives to religious parties to participate in society and in politics without infringing the rights of other collectivities. While some compromises were required by the secular majority,
they were lightweight in comparison with the positive effects of the integration of religion in the state.

Finally, this account also serves as an important reminder that democracy should not be regarded an ideal type of political governance but rather a realm in which balanced and mutually beneficial compromises are achieved for the entire society. In this respect religious integration in Israel between 1938 and 1967 succeeded to provide political stability, a pluralist realm of debate and broad respect for democratic rules.
Chapter 8 – Democratic Containment of Religious Challenges 1967-2007

As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, the integration of religion in Israel during the first two decades post independence proved successful. Religion was given significant role in public and political life and in return religious groups collaborated with the institutions of the state, espoused acceptable (i.e. legal and peaceful) channels of political expression and embraced the principles and values of democratic rule and the thin consensus.222

But recognizing that in transitional circumstances a minimum degree of religious integration might be beneficial to democracy is insufficient. As I argued in Chapter Two there is inherent contradiction between the absolutist worldview of religious doctrines and the compromising attitude which governs democratic systems. Despite the crucial importance of the initial institutional design of the state and the level of religious integration in the state the character of the interaction between the state and religious agents is subject to contemporary and circumstantial changes. Some situations can very well lead to extreme or intolerant interpretations of religious doctrines and confront the democratic system with new challenges. If left unchecked religious groups might try to impose their agenda and the presence of religious content in the public sphere at the expense of democratic norms and practices.

The Bounded Integration Model asserts that religious actors, just like any other manifestation of collective identity, should be accommodated in the state only as long as they embrace the conditions of democracy, otherwise the overall cost of excessive integration - democratic instability and violation of rights of other publics in the society - might become higher than its benefits. The state should respond to the emergence of such challenges and take measures to restrain the wrongful doings of religious actors and keep their activities within the bounds of democratic principles.

In this respect, the ability of the state to contain such challenges depends to a large extent on the initial degree of religious recognition and inclusiveness. The Bounded Integration Model proposes that democratic states that exercise inclusive

222 For elaboration, see chapter Seven of this dissertation.
policies vis-à-vis religious groups in society within the bounds of democratic principles are likely to succeed better in isolating extremist and excessive demands, in channeling new demands to the realm of democratic deliberation and in containing challenges against its democratic regime compared with states that exercise strict marginalization of religion and by this doing narrow the boundaries of civil society and breeds extremism. While the Turkish case represents the latter case (i.e. restrictive policy) the Israeli case, on which I elaborate below, represents the latter case (i.e. inclusive policy).

Post-1967 Israel illustrates the importance of understanding the state-religion relationship as a dynamic bounded range that is influenced by external events and general trends in society such as demographic changes; alteration in the distribution of political power or in electoral designs; wars and peace; economic conditions and level of modernization, which might modify state policies towards religion as well as alter the political agenda and behavior of religious groups vis-à-vis the state and society. This period in Israel also exposes the relatively improved ability of inclusive state policies in democratic settings to contain challenges to democracy that might arise as a consequence of such societal changes and protect the fundamentals of the democratic regime against religious behavior that exceeds the democratic bound.

More particularly, during the 1960s and 1970s the Israeli political system experienced major changes, above all two major wars and reshuffling in the distribution of political power that influenced the state-religion interaction in a direct and considerable manner. The first resulting trend was the radicalization and changing interaction of parts in the religious-Zionist camp with the state. The Six Day War victory created an ideational shift among parts in the religious-Zionist population by way of amplifying the sanctity of Eretz Israel (the land of Israel) while undermining other values such as the rule of law and the sanctity and legitimate authority of the Jewish state. This perception has gained popularity among parts of the religious-Zionist public, especially affiliates of Merkaz Harav Kook (Rav Kook Center) Yeshiva, led to the foundation of the settlement enterprise in the Occupied Territories (OT) and facilitated militant behavior against Palestinian inhabitants in the OT as well as against state authorities. This militancy was tolerated at very early stages, part implicitly part explicitly, by the government, state institutions and right wing political factions in the
Knesset which gave it a legitimate fervor, despite the fact that the support in the settlement enterprise was mainly for secular considerations (political calculus, security concerns and secular-type nationalism) and did not converge with the messianic agenda of the settlers. Along that process the settler movement has altered its political behavior from concentration on religious issues and deliberation in the parliamentarian arena to extra-parliamentarian mass mobilization activities with emphasis on security issues, often involving illegal actions, which consequentially decreased the weight of this camp in Israeli politics.

This account reinforces the assumption that Judaism has the same potential to radicalize as other religions, and therefore that more importance should be given to how the state-religion interaction breeds or mitigate radical behavior instead of concentration on specific religious doctrines. The inclusive policy of Israel in regard the Jewish religion facilitated its relative success to contain the radical challenges. Despite mounting attacks on the legitimacy of the state that reached a zenith point in the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, most of the religious-Zionist public maintained lawful and collaborative behavior with the state - a manifestation of the state ability to contain the radical potential of this movement. The state was able to execute peace agreements with Egypt and the Palestinians and the democratic regime was not interrupted throughout this period.

The second modification in the state-religion relationship was a product of a reshuffle in the political distribution of power. The 1973 Yom Kippur War hastened the decline of Mapai's hegemony and facilitated the electoral victory of the rightwing Likud party in the elections of 1977, after which the political system transformed from a hegemonic one-party structure to a bipolar political stalemate between the right and left blocs, which worked against the stability of the system. Importantly, in all the elections after 1977 each of the two political blocs needed the support of at least one religious faction to form a sustainable coalition government. These political circumstances endowed the religious parties, especially the Haredi ones, a balancing position in the political system and, subsequently, disproportionate political leverage. The redesign of the electoral system in the 1990 in order to check political blackmailing and provide the
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system more stability only worsened the situation by way of fragmenting the political arena and increasing the blackmailing capabilities of sectarian parties.

The third change relates to the increased involvement of Haredi parties in politics and is a consequence of the political stalemate. Between 1948 and 1977 the Haredi party Agudat Israel participated in politics but did not join government. By the 1970s, however, the modernization of Israeli society and the motivation of the Haredi establishment to maintain a structure of 'society of scholars' in their public required considerable state benefits, especially for educational facilities, continued exemption from military service and subsidies in housing and other social services. The attainment of the Haredi needs pushed them to increased political activity and involvement in government. The political stalemate post 1977 positioned the Haredi parties in an optimal situation, in which no government could have been constructed without them. This allowed the Haredi parties to put forward unwarranted sectarian demands on the state, often at the expense of the rest of the society. The leverage of the Haredi parties in politics during the 1980s increased substantially following the emergence and ascendance to power of the Mizrahi Haredi Shas party, which recruited electoral support from non Haredi population, increased the weight of religious parties in the Knesset (see figure 8.1 below), have taken important cabinet ministries under its responsibility and utilized them in providing benefits to its electorate.

Nevertheless, the Haredi political activity, despite its opportunistic and abusive nature, remains in the confines of the democratic regime and does not threaten democratic stability. This is especially true in the case of Shas, whose recruitment techniques and socio-religious worldview are very similar to those of popular Islamic parties but nevertheless never embraced or facilitated anti democratic behavior. Part of this can be explained by the fact that the Haredi parties depend on the democratic regime for the attainment of their needs. No less important, however, the inclusive nature of Israeli democracy in religious issues reinforces the identification of religious populations with the Jewish state and makes it more beneficial for them to work from within the system other than challenge its foundations. While the Haredi political activity might have a negative effect on the quality of the democratic regime Israel, in the foreseeable future it does not risk the sustainability of the system.
Seemingly paradoxical, the Haredi occupation of a central role in the Israeli government in replacement of Mafdal did not result in the empowerment or even preservation of the public role of religion. Instead, sectarian interests came to the fore while religion, the glue that united religious groups in the past, has been degraded to secondary political importance. Things like violation of Shabbat or Kosher food, which in earlier decades disintegrated the government and forced new elections became practically non-issues in Israeli politics. At the same time, the ability of the religious parties to cooperate on religious issues diminished and the prospects for such collaboration in the present are very slim. On closer examination, however, this trend fits nicely with the respective agendas of Mafdal and the Haredi parties. After 1977 Mafdal’s sacred perception of the state as and its advocacy for theocratic demands were replaced by the opportunistic and sectarian view of the Haredi establishment that concentrates on the needs of its constituents and shows relatively little interest in the
public sphere. In result, religion diminished in importance as a political issue and its presence in the public sphere has been degraded.

Despite all these challenges, the democratic system in Israel proved successful in isolating radicalism and in maintaining democratic stability. Israel is considered a free democratic state in acceptable measures such as Freedom House,\(^{223}\) in which Israel scored 1 in political rights and 2 in civil liberties throughout the last decade, exactly like the old time EU member Greece, and the Polity IV Project 2007 state report in which Israel scored the highest possible grade, 10, in both polity and democracy.\(^{224}\) In addition, throughout Israel's dynamic post 1967 history there have been no breaks in the democratic system and no undemocratic intervention in the political process like the ones found in Turkey every decade and a large majority among the Jewish population accepts democracy as the best political system of governance.\(^{225}\) The relative democratic success of Israel is rooted in the inclusive state policies toward the Jewish religion that prevented the sliding of more substantial publics into direct confrontation with the state and mass violation of democratic principles. Data from Israel constantly confirms that the general public desires official recognition of religion in the state and the preservation of a Jewish public sphere despite the fact that most of it does not define itself as orthodox. Moreover, most of the Jewish population in Israel states that it has personal affinity to the Jewish religion and performs some of the Jewish rituals (Levi, Levinson and Kats 1993; 2002). By facilitating the fulfillment of the preferences of the population in regard the public presence of the Jewish religion the state of Israel increased the motives of the Jewish populace to identify with the state and remain committed to its democratic regime. This decreased the mobilization capabilities of radical groups in Israel society. Indeed, as will be illustrated below, the radical factions within the religious population were unable, despite mounting challenges against the state, to recruit popular support or change the course of state policies.

\(^{223}\) On a scale of 1 to 7, 1 means the freest score whereas 7 the least free. More details on the index can be found at [http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2009&country=7630](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2009&country=7630)


\(^{225}\) In the Israel Democracy Index 2003 77% of the Israeli population stated that Israel is the best type of government and 81% supported democratic values. In 2004 and 2005 the results were similar with 85% and 80% (respectively) for the first statement and 84% and 80% (respectively) for the second. The entire report can be found at: [http://www.idi.org.il/PublicationsCatalog/Documents/BOOK_7035/61.pdf](http://www.idi.org.il/PublicationsCatalog/Documents/BOOK_7035/61.pdf)
Another ingredient, in view of the political stalemate that emerged in the late 1970s and the inability of the legislative and executive branches to contain excessive religious demands is the decisive response of the judicial branch, particularly the High Court of Justice (HCJ) against religious claims that violated the principles of democracy and exceeded beyond the upper limit of the bounded integration. The combination of democratic inclusion of religion and the efficacy of the state in checking deviant behavior prevented political instability, alleviated serious challenges to Israeli democracy and facilitated a more democratic outcome than in Turkey.

The rest of this chapter is organized in the following order. I will start with a very brief note about the main religious camps in Israel after 1967 and their respective parties (on which I will elaborate later). Afterwards I will discuss, in separate sections, the radicalization of the religious-Zionist camp and the increased leverage of the Haredi parties in Israeli politics and will demonstrate how the inclusive nature of the state in Israel in regards the Jewish religion has been relatively effective in containing excessive religious demands and protecting the democratic regime.

**Religious camps in Israel**

*Figure 8.2* (below) presents the genealogy of religious Parties in Israel. We can identify three distinct dominant clusters of religious groups in Israel between 1967 and 2007, two of which remained active from earlier decades, while the third is a more recent phenomenon. The first is the religious-Zionist camp with its representative political party Mafdal and various splinter groups. The second includes the non-Zionist Haredi Agudat Israel and the non participating anti-Zionist Haredi factions. The third group, Shas, represents the growing power of Mizrahi ultraorthodox in Israeli society.\(^\text{226}\) Being established in 1982, Shas soon became the biggest and arguably most influential religious party in Israeli politics. While Shas's unique attributes will be emphasized it is essentially a Haredi party, and thus will be analyzed as part of the Haredi camp. Offshoot religious associations and parties such as Tami, Meimad, Morasha, Tkuma, and

\(^{226}\) For a complete account on the emergence of the religious-Zionist and ultraorthodox political parties before 1967 see Chapter Seven. For an account of contemporary religious parties in Israel see Neuberger 2006.
Degel Hatorah emerged as well, but they left a relatively minor mark on the role of religion in the state or the dynamics of the state-religion relationship.

The radicalization of religious-Zionism

The religious-Zionist camp has undoubtedly gone through the most significant transformation after 1967 compared with any other group in Israel. From a minor partner and unreserved supporter of the secular establishment it became the most radical challenger of government policies. More so, parts of this sector modified their political behavior from parliamentarian activity, adherence to democratic procedures and collaboration with the state to extra-parliamentarian, often illegal, activity through non-state associations and social mobilization. How can this shift be explained?

In answering this question I will divide the discussion to four historical periods, and detail the ideational and structural changes that influenced a change of behavior in this camp and how state responses and the contemporary distribution of political power shaped the relationship between the state and this sector. The first section, pre 1967,
discusses internal trends in the religious Zionist population that did not translate into explicit political action but nevertheless are essential to understanding later developments. The second period, 1967-1977, details the emergence of a social movement with a redemptionist agenda and its early interactions with the state. This period is characterized by major security events and an indecisive state policy about the future of the OT which was mistakenly interpreted by the settlers as support in their agenda. The third period, post 1977 illustrates the mutual interdependence between the settlers and the governments (both left and right coalitions) that on occasions supported the settlement enterprise for political, national and security considerations, but opposed the agenda that guided the movement. This period is characterized by unstable relationship between the government and the settlers, ranging from mutual interest to direct confrontation, and highlights the impact of political distribution of power on the relative leverage of religious groups. After 1992 these trends exacerbated. The state and society's broad acceptance of the two-state principle for peace with the Palestinians radicalized the settlers further, including disobedience, hard violence against state authorities and the Palestinians, and peaking with the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in 1995. Nevertheless, throughout this period the democratic regime succeeded in containing the challenges raised upon it. Most of the religious-Zionist public remained loyal to the state and respectful to the rule of law and avoided illegal activity or clashes with state authorities. The political leverage of the radical segments decreased significantly and they failed to intercept the official policies of the state in regard the peace process, including evacuation of settlements and transfer of lands to Palestinian responsibility. The democratic regime was never interrupted and the state authorities took resilient measures to isolate and marginalize deviant activities that violated the limits of bounded integration.

*Origins – before 1967*

During the 1960s, a crisis of identity exposed the old pragmatic leadership of *Mafdal* to growing criticism by the young generation on cultural and educational grounds. Culturally, the efforts of religious-Zionist to participate in Israel's modern secular society and at one and the same time preserve their orthodox way of life resulted in
selective observation of Mitzvot (religious rules) and passive approval of Mapai's secular leadership. This was coupled by the difficulties associated with living in mixed (secular-religious) urban populations and growing consumerism and materialism that characterized the surrounding secular society and diffused into the religious-Zionist population. On the educational level, religious and Talmudic education under the aegis of the public education system suffered from what Rabbi Yuval Sharlo calls "religious mediocrity"\(^{227}\): insufficient Torah studies and low level of knowledge and observance by teachers in the system (Sharlo 2007, 336; Friedman 1982).

These trends amplified the power of certain religious-Zionist institutions while weakening others. In the educational realm, Yeshivot Tichoniyot (high-school yeshivas) boarding schools for boys and Ulpana schools for girls were founded in an effort to restore religious knowledge, observance and dedication among the young generation. These institutions soon became much more than educating institutions. They facilitated strong social and intellectual networks among their students in which political ideas were developed and challenged, and social ties emerged (Don Yehiya 1987, 231; Friedman 1982; Newman 2005).

Equally important was the ascendance of Yeshivat Merkaz Harav Kook (Rav Kook Yeshiva Center) to prominent status among religious-Zionists.\(^{228}\) The Yeshiva was established in 1923 by Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen Kook (Rav Kook), the first Chief Rabbi of Mandatory Palestine until his death in 1935.\(^{229}\) Between 1935 and the mid 1950s the Yeshiva had been a relatively small and insignificant institution of higher religious learning compared with the leading Haredi yeshivas. In 1952 Rav Kook's son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, became the head of the yeshiva. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda followed his father's theological worldview which perceived the secular Zionist movement and the creation of the state of Israel as integral components in a divine plan of redemption. The IDF and the pioneers were, according to Rav Kook, manifestations of holiness whose deeds brought Messianic times closer. In addition, Rav Kook emphasized the religious centrality of the land of Israel and the holy trinity that exists among the Jewish Torah,

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\(^{227}\) Interview with Rabbi Yuval Sharlo, 19 October 2008

\(^{228}\) Historical facts on the institution are taken from the Markaz Harav website at: [http://www.mercazharav.org.il](http://www.mercazharav.org.il).

\(^{229}\) Elaboration on Rav Kook's incumbency as Chief Rabbi of Palestine can be found in Chapter Six.
the Jewish nation and the Jewish land – *Torat Yisrael le-Am Yisrael Be-Eretz Yisrael* (the Torah of Israel to the people of Israel in the land of Israel), a philosophy that contradicted sharply with the Haredi theological perspective which opposed the proactive ideology of secular Zionism and underestimated the religious value of a secular Jewish state. Likewise, Rav Kook's teaching contradicted with important ingredients of the mainstream religious-Zionist worldview. While *Mizrahi* based its worldview on two legs, *Torah Ve'Avoda* (the earthly and the divine), for Rav Kook every part of reality was manifestation of divinity. In this respect Rav Kook's school is closer to Haredi perspectives than to the *Mizrahi* movement (Sharlo 2007, 337-339; Kehat 2002).  

Noteworthy, despite the similar doctrine of Rav Kook and his son, the two differ in some important ways. The son put more emphasis on vanguard activity, emphasized much more the sanctity of the land of Israel and drew a clear outline of the redemption process whereas the father was more ambiguous about the sequence and shape of redemption. These differences made the son's teachings a powerful ideological base for assertive political activity in the future (Don Yehiya 1987, 225-228).

The ideological crisis among the religious-Zionist population caused a remarkable elevation in the status and popularity of *Merkaz Harav* Yeshiva. The authority and appeal of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda and other charismatic rabbinic figures, such as Avraham Shapiro, Shaul Israeli, Moshe Zvi Nerya and Chaim Druckman, attracted many religious-Zionist youngsters who sought a new religious perspective. *Merkaz Harav* Yeshiva offered its enthusiastic students new theological horizons, original interpretations of present events and strong emphasis on national redemption. In the 1960s *Markaz Harav* became a leading center of religious Zionist learning. Between 1960 and 1964 it doubled the number of its students from 100 to 200. Its religious perspective diffused into the entire religious-Zionist educational stream. Bachelors of *Merkaz Harav* became teachers and heads of yeshivas and indoctrinated the Yeshiva perspective among young students in the religious division of the public education.

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230 This is why Kook's followers are commonly referred to as – *Hardal* (*Haredi Leumi* – National Ultraorthodox).

231 Rabbi Zvi Yehuda's charisma and coherent teaching were very appealing. Nevertheless, other rabbis had reservations about the non-compromising and intolerant style of his leadership. For instance, Rabbi Yehuda Amital, an important teacher and educator in the religious Zionist camp, criticized Rabbi Zvi Yehuda's monopolistic control over Gush Emunim, which led to Rabbi Amittal's separation from the movement (Reichner 2008, 139).
system. The above mentioned trends also had an impact on the religious-Zionist political sphere. While in the early 1960s Rabbi Zvi Yehuda did not show any interest in earthly political matters, and ordered complete dedication to Torah studies - in 1963 he even publicly prohibited his students from participating in elections or getting involved in politics - Merkaz Harav's agenda led the young students in an opposite direction, of more involvement in national politics.

At the same time, the young generation of Mafdal rebelled against the party's old guard, challenging its political pragmatism and submission to Mapai. In 1963 young religious-Zionist activists headed by Zevulun Hammer established the Tzeirey Ha'Mafdal (the Mafdal Young Faction) in the party. They accused the old leadership in concentrating solely on religious themes instead of offering a more comprehensive national agenda, one that provides an alternative vision to that of the secular headship in profane issues such as economy, security and foreign policy. The theological sophistication of Merkaz Harav in combination with the political enthusiasm of the Young Faction begged a significant shift in the relationship of religious-Zionism with the state, the secular establishment and the rest of Israeli society. This process only needed an external stimulation which came in 1967.

Messianic redemption - 1967-1977

On the eve of Independence Day in May 1967 Rabbi Zvi Yehuda gave a sermon in which he mourned the fact that Israel was not in control over the entire biblical heartland of Eretz Yisrael:

19 years ago, on that famous night, upon the acceptance of the positive decision of the United Nations on the foundation of the State of Israel, when the entire nation flooded the streets to celebrate its joy, I could not go out and join the celebrations. I sat alone and silent because I felt a heavy burden. During those first hours I could not accept God's awful message which appears in the prophecy in Tre-Asar (Twelve) – My land shall be divided. Where is our Hebron – do we forget it?! And where is our Skhem (Nablus) - do we forget it?! And where is our Jericho - do we forget it?! And where is our Transjordan?! Where is every piece of land, each and

\[232\] Yediot Ahronot, 11 February 1963.
every part of God's land? Is it in our right to give up even a millimeter of it? Has Ve'Khalila Ve'Shalom! (God forbids). (Translated from Hebrew by the author)

Three weeks later, on 5 June 1967, Israel initiated a successful preemptive attack against neighboring Arab countries. In six days the IDF destroyed the air forces of Syria, Jordan and Egypt, gained military superiority in all three fronts, and occupied large territories from its neighbors, including the West Bank and Eastern Jerusalem from Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and parts of the Golan Heights from Syria.

The military outcome of the war, especially the occupation of Jerusalem, was not related to or influenced by religious motives but rather by security considerations (M. Oren 2004). Nevertheless, the liberation of the holy places which were mentioned in Rabbi Kook's prophetic sermon strengthened the rabbi’s leadership and spiritual status. Not less important, it reinforced a misleading perception of congruence between the interests and actions of the state during the war and the ultimate plan of redemption.

The enormous consequences of the 1967 military victory made it the most significant turning point in the history of modern Israel. The occupation/liberation of the holy places denoted the beginning of a deep transformation in Israeli society as well as in the interaction between the state and its religious population. In particular, it confronted both the state and the religious establishment with new dilemmas about the proper treatment of the liberated places, the manner by which they alter the status of Israel in the Middle Eastern domain and the theological meaning of the Jewish state, and ignited a rapid and comprehensive messianic radicalization among parts of the religious-Zionist public (Sprinzak 1998; Hertzberg 1986; T. Segev 2005, M. Oren 2004, Rubinstein, 1984).

An immediate tension following the war between the state and militant religious Zionists regarded prayers on Temple Mount. The Israeli government gave primacy to diplomatic and security considerations and decided that, in order to avoid international

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233 The Hebrew version can be found at http://www.mercazharav.org.il/?pg=11
234 Selection of terminology with regard to the West Bank is politically sensitive in Israeli and Jewish politics as it is dependent to a large extent on one's political worldview. People holding a rightist agenda or religious people see the results of the Six Day War as an act of territorial liberation. In contrast, those holding a leftist world view emphasize the legal status of this land as an occupied territory according to international laws. Throughout this chapter I will utilize both adjectives interchangeably, depending on the context and political perspective that I specifically describe.
pressure and Muslim protests, Jews shall be denied prayer on the mountain, but only next to the Western Wall, a remnant of the Temple's surrounding barricade. Yet, some rabbinical figures, particularly the IDF Chief Rabbi Goren, perceived it humiliating to settle on a surrounding wall when the entire place is liberated and under Jewish rule. This disagreement engendered tensions between the secular government and religious actors that did not come out in earlier decades and later on stimulated extreme attempts to reestablish Jewish sovereignty in the holy place (Shragai 1995, 28-38; Inbari 2007).

Following the 1967 military victory religious-Zionist attitudes have become more messianic and land oriented. The occupation of historic Jewish territories was perceived by followers of Rabbi Kook no less than a deliberate act of God, the beginning of messianic redemption and a manifestation of the non-separable triangle among the Jewish People, the Torah, and the Land of Israel (Tirosh et. al. 1974). Noteworthy, this triangle does not include Jewish sovereignty. To followers of Rabbi Kook the linkage between people and land is not necessarily dependent on the existence of a Jewish state. The state is merely an instrument of redemption lacking intrinsic value. It is justifiable only as long as it serves the liberation of the land and cooperates with God's plan of redemption. Conversely, if the state does not follow the path of redemption (i.e. give up territory or avoid further occupations), it lose its sacred value and should not be adhered to. This theological perspective tore the religious Zionist population between two contradicting poles – redemption and sovereignty (Taub 2007; Newman 2005, 199). As I will demonstrate below, while a minority in the religious Zionist camp radicalized and chose the redemptionist path that implies tension, at times contradiction, with state laws, most of the religious Zionist population refrained from unlawful activities and remained committed to the Jewish democratic state.

The postwar terminology of Merkaz Harav followers in regard the state of Israel has changed from civic-nationalistic to a more religious-messianic one, abandoning the use of the modern term Medinat Israel (The state of Israel) and instead readopting the biblical term Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) (Bartal 2001). The holiness of the land was linked to the commitment of the Jewish people to God who promised the land to them, even though, ironically, some parts of the Occupied Territories (OT), such as the Golan Heights or the Gaza Strip, were probably never part of biblical Eretz Yisrael.
Even worse, the redemption project was interpreted by radical Rabbis as justifying, even mandating, practices that otherwise would not have been considered legitimate such as violence against Palestinian inhabitants in the OT and systematic infringement of state laws. The settlers believed that they were following a superior moral standard (that of redemption) even if at times this standard involved clear violation of basic moral values and legal norms. In time, the occupation of the land became superior to any other mitzvah (religious obligation) and narrowed the entire corpus of Jewish morals to one debatable commitment (U. Tal 1987; Lustick 1987).

The most provocative and challenging activity, and the one having the most salient political consequences, was the settlement enterprise in the OT. Shortly after the 1967 War religious-Zionist teams under the leadership of Rabbi Kook’s students Hanan Porat and Moshe Levinger settled in occupied lands in Gush Etzyon, Hebron and the Old City of Jerusalem. Between the Six Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur War in 1973 the settlers founded 18 settlements, a wave that increased significantly after 1977. The early settlements were all erected with the implicit support of the government, a nice illustration to the mutual nature of the state-religion relationship and the manner by which state behavior from above might bring about unintended responses from below. Several Mapai leaders, including Ministers Yigal Alon and Israel Galilee, understood these new settlement projects as the continuation and contemporary manifestation of Zionist ideology. Applauding the pioneering activity of the settlers they failed to grasp the divine motivation behind it or the far reaching ramifications it entailed. Others, like Pinchas Sapir and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, were more reluctant and skeptical about settlement initiatives but could not resist the passion and energy of the young settlers (Gazit 1999; Zertal and Eldar 2004, 25-28). The only person who recognized the dangers inherent in such a policy was David Ben-Gurion. The retired leader warned Mapai’s leadership that Israel should not deepen its hold in the OT but return them in exchange for peace with the Arab world in the earliest possible occasion. But he was alone and failed to convince his former disciples who now held political power in their hands (Hertzberg 2003, x-xi).

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235 Yediot Ahronot, 26 September 1967.
236 Yediot Ahronot, 17 April 1968.
237 Yediot Ahronot, 27 May 1968.
The government was not alone in this approach. The settlements were also backed by the IDF's higher command who believed that Israeli control over the mountainous shoulders of the West Bank increases its security (Gazith 1999). Even though this security consideration had nothing to do with the redemptionist vision of the settlers, it was perceived by the latter as an important stamp of legitimacy. Until 1979 the IDF security rational was respected by the High Court of Justice (HCJ), despite the Court's growing criticism about the illegality involved in settling on Palestinian owned lands (Negbi 1981). The inter-institutional backup to the settlement enterprise convinced the settlers that the entire administration supports their line of action and hence, that there is no contradiction between state sovereignty and the promotion of redemption. It made them believe, falsely, that they actually implement the will of the government which cannot support them publicly because of diplomatic considerations. Such interpretation of state indecisiveness was far from the truth but it nevertheless facilitated what Ehud Sprinzak terms *politicocultural illegalism* - basic disrespect for state laws and institutions and a worldview that justifies certain illegal actions when they accord with divine imperatives (Sprinzak 1986, 121) - and the aggrandizement of the settlement enterprise.

*Mafdal*, the political platform of religious-Zionism, was also influenced by the new territorial reality. Moderate figures like Yossef Burg, Moshe Unna and Moshe Shapiro were confronted by the Young Faction which demanded the disintegration of the historical alliance with *Mapai*. In January 1968 MPs Unna and Shapiro still supported negotiation on the future of the OT in Cabinet, but this time their pragmatist approach was not in consensus. The outcome of the war served in crystallizing the political positions of the young religious-Zionist generation in a more tangible manner, by the insistence on the territorial integrity of *Eretz-Yisrael* (Don Yehiya 1987, 23; Newman 2005, 203-204). The Young Faction increased its attacks on the old leadership and at the same time succeeded in gaining significant representation in the party's institutions. In February 1968 it appealed to the Grand Rabbinical Court against the

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239 *Yedioth Ahronot*, 3 January 1968.
party's institutions, and in May the same year it announced the foundation of a political faction - *Gush Le'Shinui Ha'Tnuah* (a bloc to modify the movement) - within *Mafdal*.\(^{240}\) These two consecutive events signaled the outbreak of rebellion and generational shift within the religious Zionist party.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War accelerated alterations in the distribution of power in the political structure as well as furthered the militancy of the settler movement. On October 6, 1973 Israel was caught by surprise by the Egyptian and Syrian armies. In three weeks fighting Israel succeeded in blocking the combined attack and gained military advantage in both fronts, but the cost of the war was extremely high. Israel lost approximately one third of its armored and aerial forces, and suffered over 2,600 casualties and over 7,200 injured soldiers. Israeli society lost its self confidence (some would say hubris) and unbreakable trust in the power of the IDF and the capabilities of *Mapai*’s political leadership (I. Tal 1996, 184-191). The results of the Yom Kippur War contradicted painfully with the glorious victory of 1967. At the same time, adding to the feeling of despair, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) gained considerable international recognition and international criticisms against the State of Israel and the discriminatory nature of the Zionist project became louder and more explicit.\(^{241}\)

These events furthered the tension among the settlers, the state and the rest of society and put them on a collision track. While the 1973 War disillusioned the state and most of the Israeli public from the euphoria of 1967 and illustrated the limitations of military power, Rav Kook's followers perceived the grave international and domestic circumstances, or what Rabbi Kook called *Sibukhim* (complications), a direct product of not following God's plan of redemption. In their understanding, the only way to fix contemporary malfunctions down the road of redemption was to commit more forcefully to the settlement of the land. Such theological perspective entailed practical action. In 1974, a group of Rabbi Kook's followers established *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful). The Bloc was originally established as a faction within *Mafdal* yet the political arena restrained the ability of *Gush Emunim* to advocate and carry forward an absolutist

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\(^{240}\) *Yediot Ahronot*, 5 February 1968; 5 June 1968.

\(^{241}\) The most important reflections of this double edged trend were *UNGA* Resolution 3237 which approved a PLO observant delegation to the UN (accepted 22 November 1974) and Resolution 3379 which equated Zionism with Racism (accepted 10 November 1975).
agenda. Indeed, "to participate in politics on these terms, implicitly or explicitly, accept major restrictions on claims and forms of action" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1997, 165). Party politics requires intraparty as well as interparty compromises, and obedience to state laws and to the rules of the political game which would have weakened the ability of Gush Emunim to accomplish its ultimate religious goals. Thus, the Bloc separated from Mafdal and was reestablished as an extra-parliamentarian organization. The new movement maintained open channels with the political establishment but by releasing itself from the chains of the formal political game freed itself from compliance to state rules and democratic principles.\textsuperscript{242}

Soon thereafter Gush Emunim got into direct confrontation with the incumbent Rabin-led Mapai government (1974-1977), which was not willing to accept deviant and nondemocratic activities in contradiction with the policies of the elected government. In 1975 Gush Emunim initiated a settlement campaign in the OT, aiming to settle Jews throughout the land in fulfillment of God's will, and believing that dense Jewish population in the OT will make future separation of this land from Israel proper practically impossible. The Rabin government accepted the foundation of scattered settlements with strategic value, especially along the Jordan valley, but opposed Jewish residence in densely populated Arab-owned lands. It thus resisted recurrent attempts of Gush Emunim's Elon Moreh Group to settle in different spots in Samaria (northern West Bank) despite the settlers' motivation and persistence (Gazit 1999, 233; Hertzberg 1986, 90). Between 1974 and 1976 only six new settlements were established, the total number of settlers in the West Bank reached 3200\textsuperscript{243} and the entire settlement project remained small and relatively insignificant until 1977.

The objection of the Rabin government to the settlements led Mafdal, now headed by a more militant leadership, to disintegrate the government and call for new elections, by this untying its historical alliance with Mapai. On 10 December 1976 three

\textsuperscript{242} According to Newman Gush Emunim had four \textit{modus operandi}: 1) protest movement; 2) political movement; 3) settlement movement and; 4) a movement of socio-ideological socialization (Newman 2005, 200). Although I do not strictly follow these categories, the following discussion explores \textit{Gush Emunim} practice in each of these dimensions.

\textsuperscript{243} Source: Peace Now 2009 Report on the number of settlers in the West Bank at \url{www.peacenow.org.il}. The most important settlement founded during this period is Ofra, which until today contains the settler movement's aristocracy.
F-16 jet fighters arrived in Israel as part of the American arms aid to Israel. Their arrival after the entrance of Shabbat provided Mafdal optimal ammunition to disintegrate its partnership with Mapai. Mafdal's ministers abstained in a non-confidence vote, were fired by PM Rabin, and imposed national elections in 1977.

1977-1992 political stalemate and gradual divorce

The 1977 election's turnout was remarkable. Mapai lost political hegemony for the first time in Israeli history and surrendered power in the hands of Likud party. This was the height of a gradual process that begun in 1967 and accelerated after 1973. The harsh consequences of the Yom Kippur War, in combination with dire economic situation, the mediocre performance of Rabin's government, maltreatment of specific segments in society, and visible frictions among Mapai's leaders shifted the support of the Israeli electorate from socialist Mapai to rightwing Likud (Unity) party. Likud's leader Menachem Begin built a rightwing coalition of 61 seats with both Mafdal (12 seats) and Agudat Israel (4 seats). The participation of both religious factions was necessary for the construction of a rightwing government and the willingness of Likud's leader to make political concessions in order to buy their collaboration and political loyalty was in accordance.

Mafdal's emerging militant leadership reasoned that a rightwing government will be more sympathetic to the settler movement and their assessment was not shattered. Begin gave the religious parties a feeling that their agenda is in consensus in Israeli society. Although Begin did not lead a religious life he often used religious terminology such as "bless be the Lord" or "with the help of the Lord, and adopted the religious term Eretz Yisrael instead of the modern secular term Medinat Yisrael (Friedman 1994, 190). Also, immediately following the elections Begin visited the Elon Moreh Group's Kadum settlement in the West Bank and announced that "we will have many more Elon Moreh." On another occasion he corrected a CBS reporter: "What occupied territories? These [The West Bank –AR] are liberated territories" (Shafat 1995, 298). According to Gazit:

244 A few months later Dash party joined the coalition, by this expanding it to 76 members of Knesset.
The message was clear – the Likud holds a very different opinion regarding the establishment of new settlements in Samaria. The Mapai Settlement policy has come to an end (Gazit 1999, 241) (translated from Hebrew by author).

Begin's approach was not exhausted by words. As Figure 8.3 (below) demonstrates, under Likud's rule between 1977 and 1984 the government recognized 77 new settlements in the West Bank\(^{245}\) with the total number of settlers multiplying by eleven, from 3200 settlers in 1976 to 36,900 in 1984.\(^{246}\) To this one should add 18 settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and 12 in Gaza Strip, totaling several thousand settlers. The settler movement also benefitted greatly from the active support and patronage of Ariel Sharon, Begin's Minister of Agriculture (1977-1981) and Defense (1981-1983), who personally advanced settlement initiatives throughout the OT. It was for good reasons that Sharon was commonly referred to by the settlers as "the Patron" or "the father of the settlements" (Shafat 1995, 311-312). No less important, Begin agreed to Mafdal's demand to get a hold of the Ministry of Education, which put the entire public education system in the hands of a religious party for the first time in Israeli history, and became a standard demand of Mafdal in later coalition negotiations with Likud.

Figure 8.3 – Number of Settlers in the West Bank 1967-2006

\(^{246}\) Source: www.peacenow.org
The starting point in the relationship between the settlers and the Begin government appeared very positive. Both sides advocated perpetual Israeli hold over the OT, albeit based on very different rationales – Begin was an advocate of Eastern European type romantic nationalism complemented by security considerations whereas the settlers advocated occupation of the land as part of redemption – and cooperated in realizing that goal (Taub 2006). As long as the policies of the state and the objectives of the settler movement converged, no tensions arose between the state establishment and the settlers and the latter were able to carry forward their political intentions without considerable opposition or constraints. Nevertheless, the insolvable dispute between sovereignty and redemption remained constantly in the background, and before too long became overt. It came out to the fore within a year after the inauguration of the Begin government following two separate yet related events – the Camp David Agreement and the Elon Moreh Case. The former event emphasized the differing perspectives and considerations of the government and the settler movement in regard the status of occupied land whereas the latter signaled the beginning of a long time dispute between the judiciary and the settler movement and the important role played by the Court in containing the settlers’ excessive and undemocratic actions.

The Camp David Agreement was signed by Israel, Egypt and the United States on 17 September 1978 and commenced the Arab Israel peace process. It included two sections: The first drew an outline for Egypt-Israel peace agreement that adopted the principle of land for peace. Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and dismantle military bases and civil settlements in that territory in exchange for peace and normalization between the two countries. The second section recognized the national rights of the Palestinians and accepted the idea of Palestinian self rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Both sections were perceived by the settlers as threatening the entire redemption project and made the agreement a critical juncture in the relationship of the settler movement and the state. The Begin government, despite it being a right wing government, gave primacy to security and diplomatic considerations whereas the settlers cared for the messianic aspect and could not compromise it for profane considerations. Indeed, "On that day when Menachem Begin signed the famous accords with Egypt, he gave a kiss of death to the unity of the right" (Sprinzak 1989, 172).
The second event took place a year later, on 22 October 1979, in a decision by the High Court of Justice (HCJ) to dismantle a settlement in Rugeib near Skhem (Nablus) in the West Bank, which was constructed by Gush Emunim's Elon Moreh group on private Palestinian land, in obvious violation of Palestinian property rights. The weight of this precedence cannot be overestimated. That was the first occasion in which the HCJ rejected the IDF's arguments about the strategic value of a settlement and preferred to defend Palestinian rights, by this signaling that it is resolve to enforce Israeli and international laws in the occupied land.  

The HCJ ruling in the Elon Moreh Case shocked and shaken the settler movement in two respects. First, the decision to prefer sovereignty, human rights and the rule of law over settlements positioned the Court as the state branch most resistant to the settlement movement and spawned a long lasting dispute between the Israeli judiciary and the settlers. Religious Zionist Rabbis repeated this approach during interviews I conducted with them, making statements such as: "the HCJ is one of the institutions which threatens the partnership between the religious population and the State of Israel the most," 248 or "the HCJ does not fulfill its responsibility to preserve Israel as a Jewish-democratic state." 249 Second, to the settlers' disappointment, instead of taking legal actions to bypass the Court's decision, the Begin government adhered to it and ordered the dismantling of the settlement. This policy sent a clear sign that government support in the settlements is not without limits and should always be subjected to the principle of state sovereignty. In a moment of truth the state preferred the rule of law over messianic interests (Gazit 1999, 239-244; Negbi 1981, 69-74).

The combined impact of the Camp David Agreement and the Elon Moreh verdict shattered the euphoria of Gush Emunim and pushed it to more militant behavior. Nevertheless, the settlers' multidimensional response, in the political, institutional and social mobilization realms, only divided the religious Zionist camp, decreased its
parliamentarian weight and further isolated it from the Israeli society. Despite their militancy, most likely because of it, Merkaz Harav, Gush Emunim and the settler movement have always represented a minor part of the Israeli society and even a minority of the religious Zionist population in Israel. Most religious Zionists, comprising approximately 12% of the Israeli population, 800,000 people, live within the 1967 Green Line borders and do not participate in protests and extreme reactions, most of them even deny such behavior (Tabory and Sasson 2007). Likewise, their life is not headed by the same fundamentalist perspective that characterizes the members of Gush Emunim, and their allegiance to the state is secured (Cohen 2005). This outcome is in disparity than the Turkish case and is correlated to the different levels of religious integration in the two countries. The inclusive nature of the Israeli state regarding religion and the presence of the Jewish religion in its public and institutional realms isolated religious radicalism, narrowed significantly its ability to influence the regime or recruit significant parts in the Israeli society and provided the general population as well as the religious-Zionist sector sufficient sources of identification with the state, whereas Turkey's imposition of strict secularism on the population, at least in the early years of the republic, pushed significant parts in the society to support the religious cause.

I shall now turn to explore the changes that have taken place in the political, institutional and social mobilization realms among the settlers and their influence on the evolution of the state-religion relationship.

Politics – the movement sought to recruit support for its agenda in government through lobbying and by stimulating its patrons and representatives in it, Ariel Sharon and the ministers of Mafdal. The secretariat of Gush Emunim held numerous meetings with cabinet ministers, trying to convince them in the strategic and national value of the settlements (Shafat 1995, 338-339). However, these attempts provided insignificant achievements. They did not prevent Sharon from supervising the retreat from Sinai in his capacity as Minister of Defense or the decision of Mafdal to remain in government following Camp David.

Another failed political effort was the division of the religious Zionist electorate among several parties, based solely on their commitment to the Greater Israel worldview. Gush Emunim believed that distribution of votes among several parties will
benefit the causes of the movement in the political arena (Pedahzur 2000, 102). Three such political platforms were established in the 1980s (in later periods additional splits took place within the religious right. see Figure 8.2 above):

250 Techiya (1981-1992) - a mixed secular-religious party with an ultra rightwing worldview;

251 Matsad, which later became Morasha (1983-1988), a hawkish offspring of Mafdal; and Kach (1971-1988) - the most extremist religious political faction in Israeli politics. The splitting of the religious-Zionist public among several parties only decreased its parliamentarian weight. Figure 8.1 (above) nicely demonstrates Mafdal's sharp electoral decline from 12 seats in 1977, to 6 in 1981 to merely 4 in 1984. The most important religious party in Israeli politics during the first three decades gave up its place to the Haredi parties and was relegated to the position of an insignificant political faction. Mafdal's electoral decline decreased the ability of the religious Zionist public to influence state policies in the parliamentarian arena, and pushed parts of it to alternative forms of political activity (Friedman 1982). The party's constant sliding to the right-end of the political spectrum resulted in that it lost the support of traditional Jews who sought to be represented

250 In 1988 two additional rightwing parties, Tzomet (Intersection) and Moledet (Motherland) participated for the first time in national elections, each of which gaining a portion of their vote from the religious Zionist camp. There are not discussed in the body of the research they were both predominantly secular, and headed by two secular charismatic figures, former Generals Rehavam Zeevi (Moledet), who was assassinated while serving as a cabinet minister in 2001 and Former Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan (Tzomet). For an elaborate discussion on the parties of the radical right in Israel, religious and secular, see Pedahzur 2000.

251 The party was established in response to the Camp David Agreement and consequential government intention to retreat from Sinai and headed the protest movement against the evacuation. Its leadership included secular leaders such as Yuval Neeman and Geula Cohen as well as notable religious-Zionists, Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, Hanan Porat, Benni Katsover and Gershon Shafat. The party reached its peak electoral success in 1984, winning five seats in the Knesset and was disintegrated after failing to win seats the Knesset in the 1992 elections.

252 Morasha members left the mother party in reaction to the latter moderate response and decision to remain in government following the Israeli retreat from Sinai. The party participated in the 1984 elections and won 2 seats, but its representatives in Knesset reemerged with Mafdal in 1986.

253 Kach was established in 1971 but came to the fore only after the Camp David Accords. Its founder and leader was fanatic Rabbi Meir Kahane, a Jewish immigrant from Brooklyn whose followers engaged in brutal harassment of Palestinian inhabitants, recurrent acts of violence and hooliganism (Sprinzak 1991). The radicalization of the right following the retreat from Sinai entered Kahane as the Knesset but in 1988 the party was disqualified from running in elections (Pedahzur 2000, 104). Kahane was killed in New Work in 1990 by an Arab Assassin. The party splintered after Kahane's death. One branch preserved as an illegal association by his son, Binyamin Zeev Kahane, until latter death with his wife in a terror attack in 2000 and the other is still active on the fringes of the Israeli extreme right. For good coverage of Kach and its leader Rabbi Meir Kahane see Sprinzak 1991 and Margui and Simonnot 1987.

254 Another offspring of Mafdal, Tami, participated in the 1981 and 1984 winning 3 seats and 1 seat respectively. This split, however, was not rooted in disagreements about the settlement movement but rather on a cleavage in Mafdal between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi sects.
by a moderate party, and thus turned their support in the 1980s to Tami (a moderate mizrahi offspring of Mafdal), Shas and Likud. Importantly, Mafdal's decline is not merely a consequence of radicalization among its potential electorate. Rather, it has been closely correlated to the party's failure to present a clear stand on important civic and religious-state issues during the last two decades. While emphasizing the cause of Greater Israel Mafdal abandoned the arena on all other state-religion issues. Her voice was not heard on issues such as conversion, Shmita, conscription of Yeshiva students, civic marriage, the role of Basic Laws and the status of the Supreme Court. Its silence on these sensitive matters gave the impression that Mafdal simply turned irrelevant in Israeli politics and led its traditional electorate to seek new political platforms (Cohen and Susser, 2003, 126-137).

Furthermore, the state did not hesitate to disqualify extreme manifestations of religious messianic behavior and draw the democratic regime's limit of tolerance towards deviations from the bounded integration, as was manifested nicely in the case of Kach. After winning one seat in Knesset in 1984 the party was disqualified by the Central Election Committee from running in the 1988 elections. This precedent decision was based on Kach's apparent racism and anti-democratic agenda (Margiul and Simonot 1987). When the regime was confronted by an excessive manifestation of religious radicalism that contradicted basic democratic elements it justifiably ruled out the party, delegitimized it, and placed it in the fringes of the political discourse. For sure, the ability of the electorate to identify with other legitimate political outlets that advocated less extreme agenda, due to the inclusive nature of the Israeli state, prevented the growing extra-parliamentarian popularity of this movement and secured its marginality in Israeli society.

Institutionalization - the settlers recognized that an effective political campaign requires a formal institutional network to coordinate its actions. Hence Gush Emunim's leadership established Moetzet Yesha (Yesha Council), a formal body composed of heads of local councils in the West Bank and Gaza, and Amana, an organizational arm of Moetzet Yesha which was responsible for the coordination and management of settlement initiatives. The third institution is Moetzet Rabbanei Yesha (the Council of

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255 Meeting with MK rabbi Michael Malcior, 21 July 2008.
West Bank and Gaza Rabbis), an informal council of religious-Zionist Rabbis who provide the political leadership Halakhic guidance and a religious stamp of legitimacy. The council included the late Chief Rabbis Mordechai Eliyahu and Avraham Shapiro as well as many other disciples of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda. While the council has no formal role in the decision making process of the lay leadership, no substantial decision is taken without the former's approval. This reflects a gradual transformation of power from the political leadership to the rabbis, a process that restricted the ability of the elected leadership to represent the religious-Zionist camp vis-à-vis the state and further decreased the effectiveness of formal channels of political behavior (Sharlo 2007, Bick 2007; Cohen and Harel 2004).

"Social mobilization" - the most significant transformation of the settler movement was in the realm of social mobilization, particularly in increased radical and illegal forms of behavior. Despite the radicalization of parts in this public, however, the movement failed to achieve significant support from the general public and even in their own camp. The circumstances after 1979 confronted the settler movement with tremendous challenges. On the one hand, its attempts to influence political decisions failed. The movement failed in preventing the state from signing international agreements and retreat from occupied land. Also, to the religious Zionist disappointment most of the Israeli populace supported the peace initiative with Egypt and was not convinced by the movement's actions and arguments. Surveys about the peace with Egypt revealed in January 1980 that 74% of the Jewish population had trust in the Egyptian intentions, and 76% believed that peace with Egypt will improve the security situation of Israel.256 As one of the leaders of Gush Emunim confessed:

We realized that we cannot mobilize them to join popular protest activities against government policy. The religious-Zionist public remained lonely in its fight against the retreat from Sinai and opening the door to the establishment of a Palestinian State which was agreed upon in Camp David (Shafat 1995, 356-357) (Translated from Hebrew by the author).

256 Source: The Israeli Democracy Institute (IDI) at: http://www idi org il/breakingnews/pages/breaking_the_news_100 aspx
The distress of the settler movement sparked a wave of violence against state authorities as well as against Palestinians in the OT. As Gal-or's thesis demonstrates, the settlers illegal actions during that period had strong links to, and derived their justification from, the ethos and philosophy of the pre-state undergrounds and well as from the encouragement of rabbinical authorities and reflected a deeply entrenched belief among them that exceptional circumstances justify exceptional measures in reaction (Gal-Or 1986). This attitude led the settlers to clash with state authorities during the retreat from Sinai in 1981-1982. The settlers' motivation to do so was twofold. First, they believed that resolve action might still convince God to change the fate of the Sinai settlements and save them from termination. Second, the settlers hoped that a very costly retreat will deter the state from executing similar evacuations in the future (Aran 1985). Nevertheless, the state was resolved to accomplish its obligations and maintain the peace with Egypt. The withdrawal turned fast into a bitter struggle between two decisive opponents:

If serious bloodshed did not take place, everything else did. Fierce struggles between soldiers and desperate settlers were conducted...The Israeli public witnessed the longest and most intense period of civil disobedience and organized extralegalism in the history of the state (Sprinzak 1989, 177).

The settlers did their best to scar the Israeli collective memory with a national trauma that would not be forgotten for a long time and make it harder for the government to perform such retreats in the future (Wolfsfeld 1984, 378). In retrospective, however, the clashes in the Sinai did not prevent future agreements and evacuations of territory such as the Oslo Accords and the Disengagement from Gaza in subsequent decades.

Furthermore, the radicalizing rhetoric of the movement facilitated the emergence of extreme cells with concrete illegal goals. In 1979 the Israeli police arrested Yoel Lerner, a disciple of Rabbi Kahane for heading Gal (acronym for – Geulah Le-Yisrael – redemption for Israel), an underground group that planned various violent actions including sabotaging the Masques on Temple Mount, in hope that the subsequent catastrophe might lead to the foundation in Israel of a Halakhic state. Despite no
documents to support, Lerner insisted that Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook gave his personal blessing to Gal’s plans (Shragai 1995, 85-90). Shortly after serving two years in prison Lerner was arrested again, this time for founding the Hasmonaim youth group which plotted to bomb the Dome of the Rock (Shragai 1995, 91-95). The Jewish Underground presented a more serious organization. The underground was founded in 1980 by Yehuda Etzyon, Menachem Livni and Yeshua Ben-Shoshan. Its founders’ main goal was to explode the Dome of the Rock and hasten the process of redemption. The underground prepared a detailed plan which included stilling explosives and other weapons from the IDF, repeated practices and careful collection of relevant intelligence. The plan was not activated for various circumstantial reasons, but in the meantime the group’s members were involved in deadly attacks on Palestinian targets.

The Underground was uncovered by security services on 26 April 1984, moments before exploding five Palestinian school buses in East Jerusalem. Violence was not restricted to Palestinians but was also exercised toward Israeli citizens with dissenting political views. In February 1983, extremist Yonah Abrushmi threw a hand grenade into a crowd of protesting peace activists, killing Emile Greenzweig and wounding several others (Sprinzak 1995, 88). These events were complemented by daily violence towards the Palestinian population in the OT and regular harassment of peace activists in (Jones 1999; Zertal and Eldar 2004).

Nevertheless, these actions failed to prevent the execution of state policies like the retreat from Sinai or the dismantling of the illegal Elon Moreh settlement or to destabilize the Israeli society and extreme Jewish plots were contained relatively effectively by the security services. More importantly, the radical behavior did not win

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257 For a 1998 interview with Yoel Lerner see Juergensmeyer 2003, pp 46-50. In the interview Lerner praises Rabin’s assassin Yigal Amir, advocates a Halakhic state and repeats the need to rebuild the Jewish Temple on Temple Mount.

258 These included assassination attempts of the Palestinian Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah in June 1980, which left the Mayors severely wounded, a fatal attack on the Islamic College in Hebron in July 1983 that left three dead students, as well as other less harmful events. The members of this organization were all Gush Emunim members and former combat officers in the IDF. Yehuda Etzyon was a member of Gush Emunim’s secretariat, Menachem Livni a Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF, and Yeshua Ben-Shoshan a rabbi and favored student of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda. The Underground presented its plan to explode the Dome of the Rock to dozens of Rabbis including Zvi Yehuda Kook, Moshe Levinger, Moshe Segal, Shlomo Aviner, Eliezer Waldman, Tzvi Tau, and Dov Lior. While most rabbis were reluctant to approve the radical plan, a minority supported it, some did not condemn it and none found it necessary to report this organization to the authorities (Shragai 1995, 109; Gal-or 1986; Aran 1985).
the support of the general public. On the contrary, after a decade of radicalization, in the 1992 elections the public voted for moderate parties facilitated the creation of a left bloc government under Rabin and furthered the settlers from their objectives.

The post 1992 period only exacerbated earlier trends. During it the governments (both left and right coalitions) accepted the principle of land for peace and the two-state solution and took more active measures to promote the peace process with the Palestinians, including transfer of lands to Palestinian responsibility. This deepened the rift between the state and the settler movement and generated unprecedented extreme responses, but these failed to change the course of the peace process in a significant way and did not win the sympathy of large parts of the general public as well as among a majority of the religious Zionist populace. Israeli democracy proved its strength and even the most extreme events, the assassination of PM Rabin in 1995 and the disengagement from Gaza in 2005, failed to destabilize the political system or modify its democratic foundations. While proving once more the dangerous potential of extreme interpretations of Judaism this period also manifested the strength of Israeli democracy and the advantages of its inclusive approach towards religion.

The following will illustrate this point. In 1992 Israeli society elected Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister. Rabin's Government accelerated the Israel-Palestinian peace process and in 1993 announced the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with the Palestinians which formally commenced the Oslo process. Radical responses came almost instantly. On 25 February 1994 medical Doctor Baruch Goldstein, a Kahane student, massacred 29 praying Palestinians in the Patriarch Tomb in Hebron. Goldstein's murderous actions were planned carefully and were guided by conviction that they will stop the implementation of the Oslo Accords. However, after a short setback in the peace negotiations the talks resumed and the process continued with the implementation of the second stage in the process (Sprinzak 1995, 101-103).

The next radical act, the murder of PM Rabin, was less isolated and the state arguably failed in preventing extreme behavior that clearly surpassed the bounds of acceptable democratic expressions. The settlers launched, with the active support of Likud leaders, which was given for political motives, an aggressive campaign against the Rabin government as well as personal incitement against Prime Minister Rabin and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Peres. *Pictures 8.4* (below) demonstrate the level of incitement before the killing. In two of them, Rabin is associated with Hitler and Arafat, bitter enemies of the Jewish nation. In the third there is a sniper target on Rabin's head and the ward *Boged* (traitor). The message was straight forward – Rabin is a threat and enemy and should be treated in accordance. At the same time, a theological discourse emerged among radical rabbis that defined Rabin as *Moser* and *Rodef*.\(^{259}\) This interpretation gave a religious stamp of legitimacy to people who might try to stop Rabin from risking Jewish lives by giving in Jewish territories to the gentiles. Importantly, it:

> Was not an isolated expression of a few extremist individuals who came to the conclusion that the two Halakhic concepts of *moser* and *rodef* had to be invoked. It was, instead, a reflection of intense scholarly discussion conducted in many extremist Yeshivas and religious circles (Sprinzak 1999, 255).

The incitement and Halakhic legitimization motivated law student Yigal Amir to assassinate the Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995.

*Pictures 8.4 – Incitement against Rabin before the murder*

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\(^{259}\) *Moser* is a person who hands over Jews or Jewish property to foreign authorities. *Rodef* is a person who risks other person's life. In both cases the Halakha allows the killing of such a person.
While Amir and Goldstein were the most extreme manifestations of disrespect to democratic principles and state laws, others were also involved in active opposition to the Oslo process which included mass civil disobedience, interference to public order and violent clashes with state authorities. Much of the activity was coordinated by ad hoc associations, a trend that signaled a temporary decline in the authority of Yesha Council as the representative institution of the settlers.\textsuperscript{260} Nevertheless, the murder and contentious activities did not undermine the ability of the government to exercise its plans or gained the support of the general public. Moreover, the rightwing Netanyahu government which came to power in 1996 continued the implementation of the Oslo plan by signing the Hebron (1997) and Wye (1998) Agreements and transferring large lands to Palestinian rule.

The most recent round of clashes between the settlers and the state emerged in response to the disengagement from Gaza during the second Sharon Government. The core of the plan was a unilateral civil and military withdrawal from OT in the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria.\textsuperscript{261} Sharon failed in recruiting support for the plan among Likud members, but on 24 October 2004 succeeded to approve it in the Knesset. The right in Israel regarded Sharon's political conduct undemocratic and demanded a referendum to determine the fate of the plan (Don Yehiye 2005). A referendum bill was brought to the Knesset but voted against on 28 March 2005. Afterwards the Plan passed all possible democratic procedures, gained significant public support\textsuperscript{262} and was executed in August 2005.

The plan exposed once more the problematic relationship of the settler movement with the state of Israel and the democratic regime. Nevertheless, it also exposed the serious disagreement that emerged in this camp following the murder of Rabin regarding the desired relationship of this public with the state and the rest of the

\textsuperscript{260} An instance of such opposition organization is Zu Artzeno! (This is our Land), which was headed by Benny Elon and Moshe Feiglin, well known rightwing political figures. In the height of the Oslo process the movement mobilized its supporters into acts of civil disobedience, mass protests, and road blocks. It declined after the assassination of Rabin but was reactivated before the disengagement from Gaza. Other protest organizations included Women in Green, Gamla shall not Fall Again, Professors for Strong Israel, Chai Vekayam (Alive and Existing), Matte Maamatz (Headquarters for Efforts) and the Maccabean (Haklai, 2003, 798).

\textsuperscript{261} A complete version of Sharon's Disengagement Plan can be found at the Knesset website: \url{http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon_eng.htm}

\textsuperscript{262} According to a survey that took place on 14 May 2004 71% of the public supported the evacuation from Gaza while 24% opposed it, Yediot Achronot, 14 May 2004.
society, and the limits of political protest, and the deradicalization of significant parts in it (Inbari 2009; Sprinzak 1999; Don Yehiye 2005). The disengagement instigated profound debates among rabbinic authorities. Some leading rabbis, such as Shlomo Aviner, Tzvi Tau, Yoel Bin-Nun and Yehuda Amital emphasized that obedience to an elected Jewish government is a religious commitment (Dina Demalchuta Dina), whereas the more militant ones like Dov Lior, Shalom Dov Wolpa and Eliezer Melamed called Israeli soldiers to disobey military orders to evacuate settlers and even defect from their units. Most disturbing was a unite call by two former Chief Rabbis and incumbent heads of Merkaz Harav Yeshiva, Avraham Shapira and Mordechai Eliyahu, to resist the dismantling of Jews from their homes in every possible way, including disobedience.

On the ground Yesha Council reoccupied its central role by launching a popular campaign, hoping that it might create public pressure on decision makers to cancel the disengagement. The campaign included slogans in support of the settlers, orange flags and stripes, popular protests and other, mostly legal, means of expression. Other efforts included lobbying members of Knesset and government to oppose the plan, popular demonstrations, public conferences, and appeals to the HCJ, but also road blocks, interference with the preparation of the IDF to the evacuation and clashing with soldiers before and during the execution of the plan. Although illegal behavior was conducted by a minority of the protesters, no major violence took place and the entire process was accomplished in a peaceful manner. More so, it was regarded by many as manifestation to the de-radicalization of the settlers and its exploit of civil democratic protest. True, the disengagement also generated a few violent responses like the Eliran Golan underground and Eden Nathan Zada's and Asher Vizgen's killing of Palestinian

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265 Yediot Ahronot, 3 April 2005.
266 Maariv, 7 April 2005.
267 HCJ 1661/05 Municipal Council Hof Azza and others vs. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and others (not published)
269 On 4 March 2004 the police uncovered a contemporary version of the Jewish Underground in Haifa. This organization, headed by Eliran Golan, was responsible for planting explosives in Mosques and under cars of Arab members of Knesset. Ynet, 4-5 and 11 March 2004. Golan committed suicide while in detention in December 2005.
Citizens. However, Golan, Zada and Vizgen acted independently, no links were found between them and the religious-Zionist Rabbinic or political establishment and their actions were not supported among the settlers. The disengagement was executed as planned and without casualties. Even though little violence did emerge between the settlers and the state, it remained the exception to otherwise a peaceful retreat. Also importantly, there was a very small number of cases of disobedience among IDF soldiers, approximated at 130 (Inbari 2007a, 700), and even cases of residents of Gaza who participated in the evacuation of their own settlements and families. It can be summed that the majority of the religious Zionist population, including the evacuated settlers, cooperated with the decisions of the democratic regime and refrained from large scale extremist behavior, despite their deep discrepancy with the policies of the government.

Following the disengagement, rabbis, intellectuals and politicians have engaged in a profound and critical debate about the multifaceted consequences of the evacuation from Gaza. In particular, they endeavored to interpret how it reshaped the relationship of this camp with the secular state. The public parts of this process expose the bystander to the spectrum of contemporary ideas in religious Zionism. While some hard liners advocate detachment between the settlers sector and the rest of Israeli society, and gathering in a united front with the Haredi sector for the formation of a theocratic state in Israel, they are a tiny minority. Most of the important rabbis choose to re-emphasize the sanctity of the state and the need to make all effort to reattach religious

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270 On 4 August 2005, a religious soldier Eden Nathan Zada opened fire in a bus in the Arab city Shfaram, killing 4 passengers and wounding 9. Zada himself was lynched to death by the raging crowd. Investigation revealed that he was a member of Tapuach settlement in Samaria and of Kach movement. He told his relatives he is going to thwart the execution of the disengagement from Gaza - exactly the same line of thinking that guided Dr. Baruch Goldstein a decade earlier (Levi and Ehrlich 2005, 13), Ynet, 4 August 2005. Two weeks later, on August 17 2005, in the midst of the evacuation, Asher Vizgen from the Settlement Shvat Rachel opened fire and killed four Palestinians. Vizgen argued in trial that his actions intended to stop the retreat from Gaza. He was sentenced to four lifetimes in prison and a year later committed suicide in Jail.

271 A sign that radical cells are still persistent in their opposition to the execution of a compromise with the Palestinians is the escalation in the behavior of groups of youngsters called the hilltops youth. Recent evacuations of settlers from unauthorized outposts in the West bank did not resemble the relative peaceful disengagement from Gaza. The evacuation of Amona, a single unauthorized outpost of 30 families in the West Bank in February 2006 resulted in hundreds wounded settlers and policemen and dozens arrests. Nevertheless, these groups do not enjoy the support of the general public and failed to prevent the execution of state policies. Yediot Ahronot, 1 February 2006.

Zionists with the rest of Israeli society. This debate is far from over and its conclusions will surely influence the relationship between the religious Zionist sector and the state (Barth and Barth 2007; Cohen 2005; Inbari 2007a; Tabory and Sasson 2007; Shavit 2005).

Finally, as Cohen (2005) and Tabori and Sasson (2007) demonstrated in the aftermath of the disengagement plan, the religious-Zionist community is diverse, composes a variety of backgrounds and opinions and therefore oversimplifying it by equating its political preferences with those of the most militant line in this sector is misleading. Gush Emunim and Merkaz Harav represent the most activist line of thinking among religious Zionists, but their actual proportion in this camp is relatively small. The number of those who participated in active protest against the disengagement reached around 20,000 whereas the total number of religious Zionists in Israeli society approximates 800,000. Also, these scholars emphasize that there is a profound difference in behavior and opinion between the religious-Zionist settlers who live in the West Bank, number approximately 200,000 and display, quite naturally given that they are the ones subject to evacuation, a more hawkish attitude against evacuation of settlements and the rest of the religious Zionist public who constitutes a two-thirds majority, demonstrates a more submissive approach to state policies and in any event refuses to engage the state with illegal activities. Moreover, Inbari adds that the activist line of Merkaz Harav "does not reflect the positions of the entire settlement movement" either (Inbari 2007a, 700). This suggests that the radical elements in religious Zionism were not able to mobilize a large number of followers in the fulfillment of their redemptionist agenda. The entire society but also a majority of the religious-Zionist population, and even parts of the settlers remained committed to the state and did not support radical activities against it. Without significant support the militant faction has not been able to influence the course of events or alter the democratic regime in Israel.

To conclude, a great ideological and political transformation swept through the religious Zionist sector after 1967. Religious-Zionist ideology and behavior turned messianic and militant and gave primacy to territorial considerations at the expense of other religion-state issues. Throughout time Israeli society and the settlement movement grew apart from each other. While parts of the settler movement radicalized and
confronted the regime with mounting pressures, including extreme violence, the state has been nevertheless successful in containing these activities. Instead of recruiting public support, radical behavior only deepened the isolation of the settler movement in the social and political realms and prevented it from realizing its goals. The state proved able in executing its policies in the OT despite fierce opposition and the democratic regime was not affected. Recent evidence indicates that serious reevaluation is taking place in religious Zionism but it is too early to predict its impact on the agenda of this diverse camp and on the nature of its interaction with the state.

The Haredim – political balancers and democratic freeriders
Another significant change in the state-religion relationship in Israel during recent decades was the evolving interaction between the state and the non-Zionist Haredi population. After 1977 the Haredi population increased its involvement in Israeli politics in a manner that deepened the mutual interconnectedness between the political system and this previously remote sector and exposed the Israeli democratic system to Haredi excessive sectarian demands. However, while exploiting politics in a cynical and opportunistic fashion the Haredi political establishment has always acted within the realms of democratic practices and did not pose demands on the system that run counter to the basic principles of democracy. Therefore, despite the negative feelings that the Haredi behavior in politics arises among the Israel society and its contribution to exacerbating the religious-secular divide in Israeli society Haredi politics does not threaten democratic stability in Israel. Furthermore, whenever the Haredi parties exploited their political leverage to pass undemocratic laws in the legislative and the executive branches they have been checked efficiently by the High Court of Justice. I will start by presenting the fundamental characteristics of the two main Haredi factions, the Ashkenazi Agudat Israel and the Spharadi Shas, and then detail their evolving interaction with the state and the political system and its implications for Israeli democracy.

273 The 2000 Gutman report found that 82% of the Jewish population in Israel believes that the relationship between the secular and religious publics is negative. This was a rise of 10% compared with the 1993 Gutman report (Levi, Levinson and Katz 1993, 2002).
The Haredi Factions

The population that defines itself Haredi is a relatively small minority in Israeli society, comprising approximately 5% of the population, or 350,000 people (Levi, Levinson and Katz 2002). This population is divided across ethnic lines between the Ashkenazi Agudat Israel and the Mizrahi (or Spharadi) Shas. The Ashkenazi Haredi population is comprised of extreme anti-Zionist ultraorthodox and mainstream non-Zionist ultraorthodox factions (Neuberger 2006, 179-195). Until the entrance of Shas to the national political arena in 1984 the Ashkenazi Agudat Israel had been the only Haredi party in politics, running usually in a united front with the small Poalei Agudat Israel party. The mainstream ultraorthodox camp includes the Hassidic courts and Lithuanian yeshivas. The Lithuanian ideology is more strictly anti-Zionist whereas the Hassidic Courts, especially Chabad (Lubavitch) and Gurr (Gerer) have more sympathy to the state. Despite internal personal and ideological disputes this community remained relatively unified on the level of political representation, with Agudat Israel functioning as its main party platform. The only split in Agudat Israel took place in 1988, when the Lithuanian faction, headed by Rav Eliezer Shach, established the Degel Hatorah (Pennant of the Torah) party in response to the dominant weight of the Hassidic courts and apparent discrimination against the Lithuanian Yeshivas in Agudat Israel (Friedman 2007). However, this split was not maintained for long. In 1992 Agudat Israel and Degel Hatorah rejoined and formed the Yahadut HaTorah (United Torah Judaism - UTJ) front, which has remained united until today.

Agudat Israel increased its involvement in politics after 1977 in response to evolving structural, political and ideational circumstances. Structurally, the Haredi leadership wished to maintain its coherence and a structure of 'society of scholars' in which the men spend all their time in Torah studies and do not engage in profane occupations. Indeed, as Rabbi Yaacov Ariel, the Chief Rabbi of Ramat Gan told me:

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A detailed account about the anti-Zionist factions and the emergence of Agudat Israel in response to Zionist development and its level of participation in Israeli politics during the early decades can be found in Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation.
The greatest mitzvah in Judaism is Torah studies... Jewish education means Torah studies, every day and all day long. This is the Jewish heritage.\textsuperscript{275}

But exercising a mitzvah was not the only motive of the Haredi leadership. Only a 'society of scholars' social structure could have sustained rabbinical control over the population and prevent defection from the Haredi community to secular life. The maintenance of a society of scholars was contingent on the ability of the society to provide its youngsters material benefits on a par with those that can be found in the surrounding secular world, such as housing, cars, tuition fees, and subsidy for basic needs (Friedman 1991). However, the capability of a nonproductive society to produce comparable goods to those of a productive society is very limited. Also, the rapid demographic growth of the Haredi population\textsuperscript{276} made it almost impossible to fund its educational system. Finally, the maintenance of an isolated 'society of scholars' required that yeshiva students will be exempt from military service, not exposed to the secular way of life and remain in the Haredi community. All these considerations engendered pressing needs for substantial state funding which, in turn, required more Haredi involvement in politics (Friedman 1991; 1996).

Second, the political atmosphere after the 1977 turnover from Likud to Mapai became more sympathetic to Haredi participation. Begin was not able to build a rightwing coalition without Haredi participation and thus was willing to go a long way in appeasing the Haredi parties to ensure their participation in government. In accordance, after forming a coalition the Begin government removed all quotas on exemption of male Haredi students and Haredi women from military conscription. This decision reversed the 1953 policy of Mapai which drove Agudat Israel out of the government and left it in opposition for 25 years. In addition, Begin approved allocation of significant resources from several ministries such as housing, education and welfare directly to Haredi institutions.

\textsuperscript{275} Interview with Rabbi Yaacov Ariel, 4 December 2008.
\textsuperscript{276} From 3\% of the population in 1990 it almost doubled its proportion with 5\% in 2000 (Levi, Levinson and Katz 2002), and the growth of its education system exceeded significantly its growth rate by participation of non Haredi students in Haredi educational institutions (Schiffer 1998).
But, political considerations were not the only reason. The ascendance of Likud to power meant also a genuine change of attitude towards the needs and worldviews of the religious population. As Friedman asserts:

Begin was a prime minister whom the Haredim could appreciate. He spoke their language, rather than that of the native-born Israelis and the Zionist left… For the first time, Haredim felt at home in the corridors of government, and not like stepchildren or total strangers (Friedman 1994, 190).

Third, the aftermath of the 1973 war changed the ideational attitude of the Haredi parties towards the state of Israel and facilitated their participation in politics. The devastating outcome of the war convinced the ultraorthodox leadership that the Israeli population came to realize the fallacy of the Zionist project and the supremacy of the religious way of life and therefore that it is an opportune time to join the government and take advantage of state infrastructures to guide the Israeli society closer to religion and away from secular Zionist ideology (Liebman 1995).

After 1977 the Ashkenazi Haredi party became a regular member in government. Yet, its formal anti-Zionist stance prevented it from occupying full ministerial positions. Instead, its delegates occupied deputy-ministerial positions and chairmanships of parliamentarian committees. Throughout the years Agudat Israel (later UTJ) demanded particularly the chairmanship of the Knesset’s monetary committee which approves the national budget and can secure allocation of funding for sectarian ultraorthodox needs.

The second, arguably more influential, Haredi camp contains the Mizrahi Haredi population and is represented by Shas Party. The emergence of Shas – Hitahdut Sepharadim Olamit Shomrei Torah (Global Union of Torah Observant Spharadi Jews) and its ascendance to power in Israeli politics has been subject to extensive research (Ravitzky at el 2006; Lehmann and Siebzehner 2006; Peled et al 2001; Tepe 2008; Lupo 2004; Ben Refael and Leon 2006; Deshen 2006; Fisher 2004; Yuchtman-Yaar and
Shas is a relatively recent phenomenon in Israeli politics. Between 1948 and the early 1980s the Spharadi religious population in Israel did not have its own educational or political institutions. The traditional Spharadi population got educated in religious-Zionist institutions and voted to Mafdal whereas the more strict religious Spharadi people got educated in Ashkenazi Yeshivas and gave their vote to Agudat Israel. Despite the Spharadi distinct theological and cultural foundations, in a process that Jacob Lupo describes as the emergence of a Spharadi-Lithuanian ultra orthodoxy the Spharadi religious population subjected itself to Ashkenazi, primarily Lithuanian, theological worldview and habits (Lupo 2006).

In the early 1980s the Lithuanian Rav Shach gave his blessing to the creation of a Spharadi ultraorthodox party in a world that until then was dominated by Ashkenazi Rabbis and practiced considerable discrimination against Spharadi rabbis and yeshiva students. Rav Shach's approval and backup was a mixture of moral consideration and sober political calculus. He wished to eliminate anti-Mizrahi discrimination in the Haredi world but at the same time estimated that the new Mizrahi faction will remain under his wingspan and expand the political weight of the Lithuanian faction vis-à-vis' the Hassidic courts. This development led to the creation of Shas under the headship of charismatic Halakhic scholar, former Chief Spharadi Rabbi, Rav Ovadia Yosef.278

Shas was founded in 1982, participated in municipal elections in Jerusalem in 1983 and in national elections in 1984, in which it won 4 seats in the Knesset. Soon thereafter, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef broke free from Rav Shach's patronization and, consolidated its own religious authority and supported it by Moetzet Hakhmei Ha'Torah (Council of Torah Wises). Although the council imitates Agudat Israel's Council of Torah Sages, Shas's Council of Torah Wises is entirely dominated by Rabbi Yosef.

Shas represents distinct strategies of popular recruitment and engagement with the state than those practiced by the Ashkenazi parties. Since its foundation the party has challenged the distribution of power in Israeli politics and confronted the hegemonic

277 Shas is a very perplexing phenomenon in Israeli politics. However, a comprehensive account of the historical, cultural, theological and social foundations of Shas and the various ways by which it challenges the political and public spheres in Israel are beyond the scope of this research. Interested readers are referred to relevant literature, the most important of which are specified above in the body of the text.

278 For a complete account of the religious significance of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef and its ascendance to the position of the most influential religious figure in Israeli politics see: Lau 2005; Leon 2007; Aloush and Elituv 2004; Picard 2007.
status of Ashkenazi culture in the Israeli society. While Mafdal and UTJ recruit their electorate from well defined segments in society - modern orthodox and ultraorthodox respectively, Shas aims to represent a mixture of populations - Haredi, traditional and secular, as well as people from the periphery and of low socio-economic status. The common thread among all these sectors is their Spharadi origins. Estimations divide Shas's electorate to a core Haredi Mizrahi nucleus that comprises approximately 25-40% of Shas voters, 20-25% national religious Mizrahi voters, and 40-50% traditional and secular Mizrahi voters. While the core Haredi Mizrahi electorate is constant, the size of the other two groups is contingent upon strategies of recruitment and contemporary political configurations (Neuberger 2006, 193-194; Bick 2001, 58-59).

Shas also gives much political emphasis to secular issues such as welfare and education as platforms for indoctrination and recruitment of potential electorate at young age. In this Shas is dissimilar than other religious parties in Israel and resembles the electoral features of religious parties in the Muslim world, such as the FIS in Algeria, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Refah and AKP parties in Turkey, but also the recruitment methods of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian Authority (Ashour 2009; Tepe 2008; Mishal and Sela, 2000; Jaber 1997; Zisser 2000). Nevertheless, unlike most of the above Islamic examples, Shas concentrates its activities exclusively in the legal social sphere, and never since its foundation challenged the foundations of the democratic regime, turned into violence or was linked to illegal, radical or extreme cells. Given the radical potential of Judaism, as is demonstrated nicely by the activities of extreme anti-Zionist ultraorthodox and militant religious-Zionist groups, this reality is by no means obvious. Such discrepancy in the type of political activity despite the many similarities between Shas and Middle Eastern Islamic movements can be explained by the democratic inclusion of the Jewish religion in the Israeli regime, which alleviates tensions between the state and the religious populations and enables channels of participation and influence of this population within the bounds of the political process.

Shas's diverse electorate led to disagreement among scholars regarding the relative dominance of religious, ethnic and socio-economic components in the party's agenda. Peled argues that Shas is predominantly a socio-economic phenomenon that
uses integrative religious-social agenda to appeal to the peripheral Mizrahi segment of the population (Peled 2001) whereas Ravitzky et al emphasize that the core of Shas's worldview is religious and that welfare issues occupy only secondary importance, mainly as recruitment and mobilization tools (Ravitzky et al 2006). My conviction is that despite the party's explicit interest in social secular issues, portraying it merely as a manifestation of class representation is inaccurate. Evidence on the party demonstrates its Haredi religious core: the entire party leadership is Haredi and strictly follows the leadership of Rabbi Yosef; all its delegates in the Knesset are Haredi men; its educational platform is entirely religious; the skeleton of its electoral support is the Haredi Mizrahi sector and; its public rhetoric is largely religious. This is very different than the behavior of AKP in Turkey which, like Shas, manipulates social issues for political support but in disparity than Shas builds broad social coalitions and adopts a liberal language other than a strictly religious one. Thus, the most accurate description of Shas is probably the one offered by Lehmann and Siebzehner, according to which Shas manifests an amalgamation of ethnic and religious renewal (Lehmann and Siebzehner 2006, 2008).

Since its inception Shas has developed a distinct strategy of interaction with the state that endowed it considerable sectarian benefits but at the same time exposed it to serious social criticism in the Israeli public. Unlike the Ashkenazi ultraorthodox, Shas fully participates in Israeli politics, including occupying ministerial positions in government. This policy facilitated the allocation of considerable resources to Shas's educational and social platforms Maayan Hachinuch Ha'Torani (the Spring of Torah Education) and El Ha'maayan (To the Spring) and its occupation of a central role in religious-state issues through the ministries under its responsibility. The party traditionally demanded the Ministry of Interior Affairs that controls conversion and immigration and the Ministry of Religions that supervises, and allocates resources to, religious services. Other ministries that Shas was responsible for in the past include Welfare and Housing, which are relevant to distribution of state resources to its electorate (Cohen and Susser 2003, 119-126). The party's strategy of full engagement with the secular state as well as its emphasis on educational infrastructure as a source of
indoctrination are additional points of resemblance with the Islamic parties of Turkey (Sarfati 2008; Tepe 2008).

**Haredi parties in national politics**

The ultraorthodox establishment conceives political parties as an unwanted necessity but at the same time the only platform able to secure the special interests of the sector. When I interviewed the incumbent Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi, Rav Yonah Metzger, he noted that:

> *Miflaga [party] comes from the root Pilug [division, partition]. Pilug is a negative thing. Nevertheless, it is the only way to prevent the democratic regime from infringing the rights of certain sectors. On the other hand, the majority needs to protect the rights of the religious minority* (translated from Hebrew by author).

Such selection of words by an official religious authority is significant. On the one hand, Rav Metzger admits the potentially negative consequences of sectarian representation and the tension it might arise among other groups in society. On the other hand, he adopts a civil rights discourse that appreciates the ability of political power to secure individual and collective rights in a democratic regime, by this implicitly acknowledging the value of democracy. Regarding the latter point, even though Haredi ultraorthodox people do not endow democracy with intrinsic value they have learnt how to exploit it for their own purposes. As one Yeshiva scholar told me:

> As far as the Haredi public is concerned democracy stands in complete contradiction to Daat Torah [the word of the Torah – AR] which means that the wise elders should determine on public issues... Nevertheless the Haredi population decided to join the democratic system in a partial and conditional...

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279 Interview with Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi Yonah Metzger on 20 April 2009. A similar approach has been expressed by Rabbi Yaacov Ariel, chief rabbi of Ramat Gan municipality, in an interview on 4 December 2008. Interestingly, the two (Metzger and Yaacov) competed in 2003 on the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi position. While the religious Zionist camp supported Rav Ariel the Ultraorthodox leader Rav Elyashiv supported the candidacy of Rav Metzger who eventually got the high position. This is another indication of the declining political power of religious Zionism and increasing political power of ultra-orthodoxy.
way... There are economic interests but the main reason was to save our Jewish brothers from Shmad [assimilation].

Of course, the problem arising from this instrumentalist view of democracy is that those subscribing to it apply it selectively and only when democratic procedures and restraints on the power of the secular majority merge with their preferences. In contrast, when democratic values and respect for the principles of the thin consensus are not in the ultraorthodox interest, they dismiss it in ways that deepen the already existing secular-religious cleavage. While not threatening the democratic stability this conduct surely had some negative consequences on intergroup relationship in Israel and the quality of the democratic regime. I shall now demonstrate how this approach has been reflected in the conduct of the Haredi parties in Israeli politics after 1977.

In many respects, the role of the Haredi parties in Israeli politics evolved in response to changes in the interaction between the religious Zionists and the state and the reshuffling of political distribution of power in the national political arena. The exclusive emphasis of religious Zionist politics on territorial expansion and the settlement enterprise since the 1970s left a vacuum in Israeli politics into which the Haredim (Haredi in plural – AR) entered. As Figure 8.1 (above) demonstrates, Mafdal's sharp electoral decline after 1977 was complemented by an impressive growth in the electoral power of the Haredim. If in 1977 Mafdal had 12 seats in the Knesset in comparison to 5 Haredi seats, then in 2006 the electoral picture turned upside down with only 4 seats to Mafdal in comparison to 18 Haredi seats in the legislative.

The turning point in the political status of the ultraorthodox parties came hand in hand with the transformation of the Israeli political system from one party dominance to a left-right bipolar structure, with Mapai and later Avoda (Labor) leading the left bloc and Likud leading the right bloc. In contrast to the religious-Zionist nationalistic agenda that confined Mafdal to participation in rightwing coalitions the ultraorthodox parties are more flexible on secular issues, specifically the peace process and foreign policy (Yuchtman-Yaar and Hermann 2000). The Haredim were willing to approve and

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280 Interview, 19 November 2008
281 This system remained intact until 2005, when Sharon and Peres broke from their old parties and founded the centrist Kadima (ahead) party that shifted the system into a tri-polar structure.
support diplomatic moves in return for sectarian material benefits.\textsuperscript{282} They thus became potential partners in every political configuration, even though their preference is to rightwing governments which are often more sympathetic to ultraorthodox values and material needs. Also, most of the Haredi electorate especially that of \textit{Shas}, holds hawkish worldviews and supports more enthusiastically partnerships in rightwing governments. On the part of the secular parties, their strong incentive to prefer Haredi participation in government is that their participation provides a Jewish stamp of legitimacy to government policies and 'costs less,' money but not principles, in political terms.

Consequently, since 1977 at least one, usually both, ultraorthodox parties have served in government. \textit{Agudat Israel} (later \textit{UTJ}) participated in coalitions in 1977-1992 and 1996-2006, while staying in opposition only during the Rabin Government between 1992 and 1995. \textit{Shas} participated in all governments since its establishment until 2003, including the Rabin (1992-1995) and Barak (1999-2001) Governments, but left the first in 1993 following the signing of the Oslo Accords and the second before PM Barak convened with Arafat at Camp David in 2000. On the other hand, \textit{Shas} remained in opposition during the second Sharon government (2003-2006) due to Sharon's preference to recruit the militant secularist \textit{Shinui}, which won 15 seats in the Knesset in the 2003 elections, to the government instead of \textit{Shas} (I elaborate more on \textit{Shinui} below).\textsuperscript{283}

The almost permanent membership of ultraorthodox parties in government and their relative flexibility on diplomatic and security issues endowed them a balancing position in Israeli politics, meaning that in practice no government in Israel can be constructed without the support of at least one ultraorthodox party.\textsuperscript{284} It also meant that both blocs were willing to offer far reaching concessions to the Haredi parties, including allocation of significant material resources as well as selective exemption from civic duties in return for Haredi political support.

\textsuperscript{282} In the early 1990 Rav Ovadia Yosef issued a Halakha that a true peace allows transfer of parts of \textit{Eretz Israel} to foreign hands which made \textit{Shas} a convenient partner in the Rabin government.

\textsuperscript{283} Source: \url{www.knesset.gov.il}

\textsuperscript{284} MK Zevulun Orlev, lecture in Bar Ilan University, 27 January 2009.
Between 1977 and 2007 the Haredi parties skillfully exploited the deadlock in Israeli politics. Haredi blackmailing hit the highest point during the unity governments’ period between 1984-1992, in which each of the blocs attempted to break the political stalemate and build a narrow coalition with ultraorthodox support. In 1990 Shimon Peres tried to construct a narrow Labor-led government in replacement of the Likud-led unity government with the active assistance of the Haredi parties. In what was known as the *Stinky Manipulation* Shimon Peres succeeded in constructing such a government, but disagreements among Rav Shach of Degel HaTorah, Rav Yosef of Shas and Rav Shneorson of Agudat Israel about joining such government failed his attempt. The *Stinky Manipulation* exposed the high degree of political overreliance on Haredi votes and the emergent need for significant revision in the Israeli political structure (Diskin and Diskin 1995; Brichta 1998; Diamond and Sprinzak 1993; Hazan 1997).

The political saga of 1990 led the *Knesset* to approve two bills in an attempt to restore democratic stability (as oppose to political stability) and restraints future Haredi blackmailing. The first bill established direct election to the Prime Ministry, which changed the Israeli political system from a full parliamentary system to a semi-presidential one.\(^{285}\) The idea was to provide the Israeli Prime Minister more flexibility and popular legitimacy and by this moderate the ability of small parties to condition participation in government on outrageous demands (Diskin and Diskin 1995). The second bill enacted new regulation procedures on allocation of public funding to registered associations, which until then was conducted without clear criteria, and subjected it to principles of transparency and equality (De Hertoch 1999).\(^{286}\)

Both bills, however, failed to achieve their goals. The direct election reform that took effect in the 1996 elections only fragmented Israeli politics further. It enabled a strategic vote to the Prime Minister and a separate vote to parties that represented individual preferences more closely, by this decreasing the incentive to vote for big parties. Subsequently, the combined strength of *Likud* and *Avoda* decreased from 76 seats in the *Knesset* in the 1992 elections, to 66 in 1996, to only 45 in 1999, whereas *Shas* had grown from 6 seats in 1992, to 10 in 1996, to 17 in 1999! In addition, the

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\(^{285}\) *Basic Law: the Government* (law approved in 1992)

\(^{286}\) *Article 3A, Foundations of the Budget Act 1985* (amendment approved in 1992)
reform suffered from two significant structural shortcomings - it kept a low 1.5% threshold and conditioned the construction of government on a majority vote of confidence (61 MKs) – which rendered the direct election practically meaningless. Overall, the Knesset became weaker whereas single law-makers became much stronger (Hazan 1997, 344; Ottolenghi 2001). This reform was reversed in 2001 but its fragmenting impact remained intact since then.

The new supervision on the sources of the budget which aimed to check unregulated allocation of resources also failed. This was especially true in the case of the ultraorthodox parties. Unregulated funding continued to flow, particularly from the Ministries of Education and Religions, to unregulated and ambiguous purposes. Between 1992 and 1998 the allocation of state resources to religious purposes almost doubled, from 2.14 to 4.04 Billion NIS, while the number of funded associations expanded from 3000 to almost 5000. This fast growth was not supplemented by sufficient supervision (Lupo 2004, 36).

The political stalemate and the apparent malfunctions in the electoral system improved the ability of the Haredi parties to blackmail the state at the expense of other groups in Israeli society in terms of material benefits as well as exemption from otherwise universal civic duties. Selective material benefits include disproportional resources to all levels of education, from kindergarten to high Yeshivas; construction of designated neighborhoods, even cities (Kiryat Sefer Modiin Ilit and Elad), for ultraorthodox populations; tax exemption contingent on number of children; and progressive child subsidy that grows per child in linearity with the number of children. Exemption from civic duties includes universal exemption of yeshiva students and women from military or civilian service and exclusion of educational Haredi institutions from state supervision and core curricular duties (Schiffer 1998). To this one should add numerous Haredi appointments in the ministries under the responsibility of Haredi parties; nomination of Rabbinic Court judges; members of municipal Religious Councils; and appointments in the religious burial institution Hevra Kadisha that provide a source of living to thousands ultraorthodox people.

287 Noteworthy, the Arab population in Israel is also exempted from some civic duties, primarily military service, but for very different reasons.
Arguably the most disturbing preferential and selective treatment of the ultraorthodox population society is in the realms of military service and education. The meaning of military service in a state like Israel needs no further explanation. Serving in the IDF is regarded in Israeli society the ultimate sacrifice and an entry card to full participation in society. Thus, it is not surprising that universal exemption of ultraorthodox men from conscription is often conceived as parasitism (Kook, Harris and Doron 1998, 3). Education is sensitive for two reasons. First, the secular education system suffered constant budgetary cuts in recent decades while at the same time more money was allocated to ultraorthodox institutions. Second, subsidized ultraorthodox educational institutions are subject to either partial or no state supervision which enable them to violate the duty to teach the core curriculum of the Ministry of Education.

288 Arrangements regarding conscription of ultraorthodox men to the IDF began in 1948. 400 Yeshiva students were originally exempted from military service by PM Ben-Gurion following the establishment of the state. Ben-Gurion limited this exemption to exceptional students who invest all their time in Torah studies in order to restore the rich Torah scholarship that was terminated in the Holocaust. In 1968 the Cabinet appointed a committee of ministers to re-evaluate the exemption. This committee decided to continue the existing arrangement as long as the number of exemptions does not exceed 800 students per year. As I already noted, in 1977 PM Begin cancelled all limits on the number of exemptions. Immediately afterwards the number of exempted Yeshiva students skyrocketed from a total of 8,260 in 1977, to 16,000 in 1985, 30,174 in 1999 and 44,854 in 2006. In comparison, by the end of 2006 only 570 Haredi men served in the IDF as part of the Nachal Haredi - a special Haredi Unit (Mey-Ami 2007, 3-9). The Knesset failed to approve any reform on the issue despite numerous attempts to do so by incumbent MKs (HCJ 910/86, Yehuda Ressler vs. the Minister of Defense, ILR 42(2), 441, p. 448). In 1986 the Knesset formed the Hacohen Committee to reevaluate the existing arrangement, but its recommendation to limit the number of exemptions have been disregarded (Z. Tal 2005, 343). During the 1980s the HCJ refrained from taking a decision on the issue (HCJ 910/86, Yehuda Ressler vs. the Minister of Defense, ILR 42(2), 441; HCJ 448/81 Yehuda Ressler vs. the Minister of Defense ILR 36(1), 81), but in 1999 it harshly criticized the arrangement, cancelled it, left it intact temporarily for two years, and in the meantime returned it to the Knesset to come up with a revised and more egalitarian arrangement (HCJ 3267/97, Amnon Rubinstein vs. the Minister of Defense, ILR 52(5), 481). In response, the Knesset appointed the Tal Committee to revise a new exemption/conscription procedure. Its recommendations, which are beyond the scope of this work, were approved by the Knesset in 2002 (Postponing Service to Yeshiva Students Act - 2002) but have hardly been followed since then.

289 Discrimination in favor of the Haredi educational systems is apparent. The most thorough study done on this complicate and obscure subject found that in contrast to public schools that receive funding only from the Ministry of Education, Haredi schools receive additional funding from the Ministry of Religions as well as from the Jewish Agency and the municipal authorities (Schiffer 1998). In addition the sum Haredi budget for education represents more teachers, construction of new classes and hours per student compared with the public system (Schiffer 1998). Not surprisingly, many non-ultraorthodox parents, especially from among the low socio-economic classes, have chosen to send their children to Haredi institutions. This trend is reflected by the rapid growth in the proportion of Haredi students that significantly exceeds the Haredi growth rate. To illustrate this point, the weight of Haredi institutions in Jewish elementary schools nationwide increased from 7.6% in 1990, to 11.4% in 1995, to 19.4% in 2005 (Schiffer 1998, 9; Weissblai 2005, 2). Data presented to the government indicates that the rate of first
Nevertheless, all exemptions and benefits were achieved in due democratic process and without violating the basic principles of democracy. The Haredi parties proved very committed to their publics and very efficient in their political conduct but their political activity by no means threatens the stability of the democratic system. The rapidly growing proportion of this population might create a problem to Israeli society in terms of future popular support for democratic governance. After all, as former Minister of Education Professor Yael Tamir argues, the participation of the Haredi parties in the democratic system does not manifest their acceptance of its fundamentals. Rather, they participate in democracy only because this is the best path to achieve their contemporary needs (Tamir, 1998, 88). However, given their very small proportion in Israeli society, approximating at present 5%, this problem is not very bothering in the foreseeable future. Moreover, social trends beyond the scope of this study such as material modernization, growing entanglement with the secular society, the emergence of feminist ideas, growing internal criticism and increased exposure to mass media, especially the internet, might adjust the social and ideational characteristics of this group in ways that are beyond prediction and make it more receptive to democratic ideas (Kaplan 2007; Kaplan and Stadler 2009).

Also important, the recent countermeasures taken by the state and society against the Haredi opportunistic behavior demonstrates that the secular-Haredi political struggle can be contained within the democratic system, but also suggests that electoral reforms might improve the potency of the legislative and executive branches to check such opportunistic tendencies in the future. The main confrontation against Haredi dominance in the parliamentarian arena was made in the foundation of Shinui (Change), a militant secularist party which advocated an extreme anti-Haredi agenda and wished to create substitute balancing position to the Haredim. Shinui experienced a meteoric rise that reflected the wish of many in the secular public to contain ongoing Haredi abuses of Israeli democracy. Shinui competed in elections for the first time in 1999 and won 6 seats in the Knesset. In the following 2003 elections it achieved an impressive turnout of 15 seats and its parliamentarian weight motivated PM Sharon to recruit Shinui instead of grade students entering Haredi institutions in 2009 reached 27% in comparison to merely 8% in 1960 (Israel Today 30 November 2009).
From Marginalization to Bounded Integration

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Shas to his 2003 coalition. While in office Shinui succeeded in reversing many of the Haredi sectarian benefits, including the elimination of the Ministry of Religions and the progressive subsidy system and improved regulation over allocation of public resources to Haredi associations. Personal disputes and lack of agenda on other issues hastened the electoral collapse of Shinui in the 2006 elections, in which it failed to enter representatives to the Knesset, and restored the pivotal role of the Haredim in Israeli politics. Nevertheless, this attempt demonstrated that an efficient political organization can check or counterbalance the interests of the Haredi parties within the democratic system.

The Judiciary also played a central role in blocking excessive Haredi demands. The limited ability of the executive and legislative branches to deal with Haredi abuses of democratic politics left the arena of confrontation with the Haredi parties to the High Court of Justice. Consequently, since the late 1980s the HCJ became the main barrier against Haredi excessive claims. In 1988 the Court imposed women membership in municipal religious councils. In 1993 it approved the importation of pork meat to Israel based on freedom of occupation. In 1994 the Court subjected the Rabbinical Courts to its precedence, by this securing legal harmony in the Israeli judiciary, sanctioned the representation of non-orthodox Jewish streams in municipal religious councils, and acknowledged the right of women to pray in the Western Wall. In 1998-1999 the Court produced some of its most important resolutions on religion-state issues. During those years it declared the exemption of Yeshiva students

290 The Supreme Court in Israel holds two positions. In its capacity as a supreme court it hears appeals on decisions of lower courts. In its capacity as a High Court of Justice it is responsible for appeals against state organs. In its capacity as HCJ the court can also exercise judicial review over legislation. The increasing influence of the HCJ in Israeli society and politics has been subject to impressive volume of research. The primary reasons suggested for this increase are the political stalemate during the 1980s and 1990s; the appointment of activist Judge Aharon Barak as President of the Supreme Court; the legislation of Basic Law Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law Man’s Honor and Dignity in 1992, which were endowed constitutional status by the HCJ; the development of value based judgment at the expense of legal positivism; and the active exchange of the HCJ with the Israeli legal community (Woods 2008; Barzilai Yuchtman-Yaar and Segal 1994; Hirschl 2001; Gavison 1998; Mautner 1993).

291 Importantly, the HCJ became active on other politically loaded issues in Israeli politics such as the rights of non-Jewish citizens and the Palestinian inhabitants in the Occupied Territories, gender equality, rights of prisoners and detainees, corruption of public servants etc.

292 HCJ 153/87 Lea Shakedel vs. The Minister of Religions, ILR 42(2), 221.

293 HCJ 3872/93, Mitrael Vs. The Prime Minister, ILR 47(5), 485.

294 HCJ 1000/92, Hanna Bavli vs The Supreme Rabbinic Court, ILR 48(2), 221.


296 HCJ 257/89, Hoffman vs. the Supervisor of the Western Wall, 48(2), 265.
from military service unconstitutional, cancelled the allocation of state funding to Haredi youth groups that did not meet the eligibility conditions of the Ministry of Education and cancelled a decision of the Minister of Transportation to close a central traffic route in Jerusalem throughout the Shabbat. Another wave of important decisions took place in 2004-2006, during which the HCJ suspended municipal legislation in the city of Beit Shemesh that prohibited the selling of pork meat due to religious pressures, declared subsidies to Haredi schools that do not follow the state's core curriculum unlawful and void, recognized non-orthodox Jewish conversion which was completed abroad and authorized a homo-lesbian pride parade in Jerusalem despite fierce Haredi opposition.

Importantly, the efficiency of the HCJ in preventing some serious religious abuses in the democratic system portrayed it as an emblem of secular agenda and subjected it to religious criticism. The Israeli Democracy Index Project found that the secular-religious cleavage in Israel is viewed as deep and broad, with 76% of the respondents in 2003 and 74% in 2006 stating that the relationship between the religious and secular sectors are either not good or not good at all (Arian, Atmor and Hadar, 2006, 39). Most respondents viewed the HCJ as an active player in the secular-religious dispute, but there was a large discrepancy between the secular and religious perception of the court's activist stance, with 71% of the orthodox respondents as oppose to only 29% of the secular respondents stated that the HCJ intervenes too much in government decisions whereas only 10% orthodox as oppose to 50% secular respondents did not agree with this statement. At the same time, a significant part of the public perceived the

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297 HCJ 3267/97, Amnon Rubinstein vs. the Minister of Defense, ILR 52(5), 481.
298 HCJ 8569/96, Ha'Noar Ha'oved Ve'Ha'alomed vs. The Minister of Education, ILR 52(1), 597.
299 HCJ 5016/96 Horev vs. The Minister of Transportation, ILR 51(4), 1.
300 HCJ 953/01 Solodkin vs. The Municipality of Beit Shemesh, ILR 58(5), 595.
301 HCJ 10296/02 The Teachers Union vs. the Ministers of Finance and Education, ILR 59(3), 224.
303 HCJ 8988/06 Mushi Zahav vs. The Commander of the Jerusalem (Unpublished, given 27 December 2006).
304 In addition, during those years the Supreme Court has exercised a hard hand against Haredi leaders, mainly from Shas, who were accused in corruption. The most celebrated case in this regard was against the former head of Shas Rav Arie Deri, who was sentenced to three years in prison for allegations of bribery. See CA (criminal appeal), 3575/99 Arie Deri vs. The State of Israel, ILR 54(2), 721.
305 Ultraorthodox protest against the Supreme Court reached a zenith in 14 February 1999, with a huge demonstration of quarter million Haredi demonstrators in front of the Court in Jerusalem. For a critical analysis on the implications of this protest on Israeli democracy see Gordon 1999.
HCJ as the branch most protective of Israeli democracy, with almost 50% of the respondents agreeing with this statement, whereas the Knesset and government received only 13-15% support on that criterion (Arian, Atmor and Hadar, 2006, 38). Further, the Court is the second trusted state institution in Israel with 68% (the IDF came out first with 79 percent), whereas the Knesset is trusted only by 33% and political parties by a low of 22% (Arian, Philippov and Knafelman 2009, 59). These results can be seen as a vote of confidence in the Court and wide political support in the way it handles political issues, including the highly contentious religious-secular divide.

Finally, the replacement of religious Zionist parties with Ultraorthodox ones in government resulted in a somewhat perplexing phenomenon. The transition of political salience from moderate Mafdal to the ultraorthodox Haredi parties was complemented by significant erosion in the public role of religion. Throughout this period religious parties did not disintegrate the coalition over religious issues, even though violations of the Status Quo became a matter of routine. The Israeli society turned Shabbat into a shopping day (Ben-Porat and Feniger 2009), kosher regulations are violated throughout the country and more Israeli couples have been married in secular ceremony in Cyprus since 2003 than Cypriot couples. Themes that before 1967 would have caused the breakup of government became practically non issues in Israeli politics.

While this trend might seem surprising at first glance, it actually fits well with the theological worldview of these two camps. The religious-Zionist camp sees the state as manifestation of divinity and desires to transform the Israeli society and public sphere into more religious (Eilam 2000). Thus, as I demonstrated in Chapter Seven, the religious-Zionist establishment concentrated until 1977 on theocratic demands and in accord took a very assertive stand against any attempt to secularize the public sphere (Oren 1973). In contrast, the Haredi establishment does not credit the state of Israel much sacred value. For the ultraorthodox factions the secular state is no different than any other foreign ruler. Therefore, they concentrate on sectarian demands and show relatively little interest in the religiosity of the public sphere (Neuberger 1994; Kook, Harris and Doron 1998). Therefore ultraorthodox parties have taken good care of their publics in recent decades but at the same time did not make significant effort to secure the role of religion in the state.
Conclusions

The role of religion and religious actors in Israel was subject to deep and comprehensive transformation after 1967. This period demonstrates the dynamism the characterizes the state-religion relationship, the challenges to democracy that might arise from changing religious behavior and unchecked power of religious actors, and the improved efficacy of an inclusive democratic regimes to contain such challenges successfully and prevent them from recruiting a significant proportion of the population and from destabilizing the democratic order.

Various ideational and structural factors influenced the change in religious behavior post 1967 and it is practically impossible to value the relative weight of each. Nevertheless, it is clear that the consequences of the Six Day War amplified a messianic theological worldview and shifted the religious-Zionist public from political moderation and concentration on religious issues to one-dimensional emphasis on territorial expansion which led them to abandon the parliamentarian arena and engage in extra-parliamentarian legal and illegal social mobilization. At the same time, the establishment of a 'society of scholars' in the Haredi public and the political stalemate in the national arena motivated the Haredi leadership to increase its engagement with the state for the fulfillment of sectarian interests. Finally, the establishment of Shas in the 1980s, its electoral success and its willingness to participate fully in the political system increased the weight of Haredi preferences in Israeli politics. These trends instigated transformation of political power from religious Zionism to the Haredi parties coupled with the changing configuration of the Israeli political system from one-party hegemony to a bipolar stalemate which exposed Israeli politics to excessive religious demands.

Consequentially, since 1977 the state of Israel was confronted with increased challenges by its religious publics. Extreme cells within the religious Zionist camp, notably Merkaz Harav followers and the settler movement, made serious efforts to stop the state from executing its policies in the occupied territories, including extreme illegal and violent activity. Nevertheless, the state proved able to contain these challenges. The inclusive nature of the state regarding the Jewish religion preserved the allegiance of most of the religious Zionist public and intercepted the intentions of radicals to block the
execution of state policies or damage the democratic regime. While tolerating activities within the bounds of democratic integration the government and the judicial branch responded assertively to manifestations of disrespect to the rule of law or violations of the bounded integration.

Likewise, the increased activity of the ultraorthodox establishment in national politics coupled with a political stalemate between left right and a malfunctioning electoral system elevated the Haredi parties to a balancing position in the political arena and enabled them to put forward excessive sectarian demands. Yet, as much as these demands might irritate the general public and deepen the cleavage between the secular and religious sectors, they have all been exercised within the bounds of the democratic system, did not violate the basic principles of democracy, and when they did, they were checked by an independent and activist judiciary.

These findings reinforce the propositions of the Bounded Integration Model. Despite the radical and undemocratic potential that can be found in Judaism the initial recognition of the Jewish religion and the inclusive foundations of the state religion relationship enabled the state to effectively contain and isolate excessive demands for religious integration while maintaining democratic stability.
Chapter 9 - Religion in Democracies: Preliminary Conclusions

Contemporary trends deserve careful reassessment of the role of religion in democratic societies. This is especially true given the simultaneous transitions to democracy and resurgence of religion in societies with distinct historical and cultural features that have taken multiple paths towards modernity. Cultural and historical diversity broadens the conceived role of religion as a political tool and ingredient of identity in ways that extend well beyond the conceptual boundaries of Western thinking and practice. Under such circumstances, the continuing domination of Western experience and values over the proper integration of religion in democratic societies is more often than not inapplicable to democratizing countries with diverse backgrounds.

This study aimed to fill the theoretical gap that exists between the narrow yet dominant view of the secularization thesis regarding the prescribed role of religion in modern democratic states and the great diversity among societies that endeavor to democratize but at one and the same time seek to preserve a significant public role for religion. The very unique, arguably exceptional, development of European societies included steady decline in the role of religion as an organizing principle of society complemented by a process of separation between the religious and political realms, which stemmed from long lasting power struggles between the Papacy and secular monarchs. The philosophy of the enlightenment and overwhelming European dominance in world politics until the first half of the 20th Century have led to the imposition of distinct European values regarding the appropriate public role of religion on the rest of the world without making necessary adjustments contingent on specific contextual features. In many cases such imposition has been responsible for political friction, extreme behavior and violent repression, and thwarted the formation and sustainability of democratic governance. Indeed, when policy prescription regarding the role of religion is limited to only one extreme solution - secular dominance and relegation of religion - the typical result is hardly supportive of pluralist democracy.

The current study offers the Bounded Integration Model as an alternative analytical framework for evaluating the multifaceted ways by which the varying role given to religion and religious actors in democratic states might influence the stability
and quality of democratic regimes, and measures the applicability of this model in the Turkish and Israeli cases. In the following I will briefly summarize the findings of this research and emphasize the ways by which the Bounded Integration Model overcomes the shortcomings of existing theories of religion and state - the secularization thesis, the inclusion-moderation thesis and the twin tolerations - and provides a more dynamic, nuanced and generalizable theoretical viewpoint for understanding the complex interaction between the state and religion. Afterwards, I will raise some points of consideration regarding the general implications of this study and offer possible paths for related future research projects.

**Wither the Secularization Thesis - Enter the Bounded Integration Model**

The Lakatosian philosophy of scientific progress holds that the first step in the development of a new paradigm is the falsification of existing explanations of the researched phenomenon. Accordingly, the first step in the development of a new model for the state-religion relationship must be preceded by the falsification of existing theories, primarily the secularization thesis, as descriptive, prescriptive and predictive tools of analysis of the state-religion relationship. The current study accomplishes this task. In particular, it exposes the failure of the secularization thesis to provide a sufficient explanation for the dynamic dialog that took place between the state and religious actors in Turkey and Israel and account for changes in it over time. The Turkish state strictly followed the prescription of the secularization thesis. It bundled modernization with secularization and took significant measures to uproot Islamic religion from the public sphere. Nevertheless this policy proved unsuccessful in two respects. First, it failed to achieve social secularization and eliminate the attribute of religion as an ingredient of identity and efficient mobilizing tool. Despite 85 years of varying repression, Islam in Turkey has only grown stronger. At present the Islamic AK party acquires control over the Presidency, the Government and the Legislative branches, and popular identification with Islam has become trendier than ever. No less important, the Turkish secularizing project failed to bring about stable democratic governance. In fact, the opposite has happened. The imposed secularizing project necessitated recurrent military interventions in politics as well as systematic violation of
the civil rights and liberties of religious people. Finally, the deterministic and oversimplistic prediction of the secularization thesis falls short from explaining the dramatic changes in the nature of the interaction between the state and Islamic actors in the Turkish context and the perplexing growth in identification with religion as a consequence of rapid modernization. More specifically, it cannot account for the moderating effect that the participation of a religious party in politics in the early 1970s had on the behavior of religious actors. Likewise, it cannot explain the empowerment of religion in urban centers following rapid modernization in the 1970s and 1980s that, according to the premises of modernization theory, from which the secularization thesis is derived, should have brought about the decline of religion in society and in politics.

The secularization thesis equally falls short from explaining the dynamic nature of the state-religion relationship in the Israeli case. Israel represents a unique example of a post colonial state that chose to deviate from the common prescription regarding the appropriate role of religion in state affairs. Despite this serious deviation, most likely because of it, Israel succeeded in maintaining a stable democratic regime, at least in the procedural Dahlian sense, since its foundation in 1948. Moreover, in contrast with the prediction of the secularization thesis, state acknowledgement of religion and religious actors in Israeli politics has not been followed by an increase in religiousness but rather in decreasing levels of religious observance among the Jewish population (Ben-Porat and Feniger 2009; Levi Levinson and Katz 2002). Finally, the secularization thesis cannot explain the changes that occurred in the nature of the interaction between the state and its religious populations following the Six Day War in 1967, from constructive collaboration to self exclusion, extreme forms of behavior and disrespect to the preferences of other publics.

Other theories of religion and state cannot explain the state-religion relationship in Israel and Turkey either. In particular, the inclusion-moderation thesis is right in emphasizing that inclusion might bring, under certain circumstances, religious moderation in politics. But it does not draw a clear upper limit of religious-integration beyond which the costs of integration surpass its benefits. Thus it cannot explain why the state in Turkey in the 1990s and in Israel post 1967 restricted some excessive religious activities. Likewise, the twin tolerations theory is right in emphasizing that
religion should be given substantial autonomy in the society. But it has two serious shortcomings that make it insufficient as an analytical prism for the state-religion relationship. First, while accepting religious activity in the public and civic spheres it prohibits direct religious influence on the political scene. Also, the *twin toleration* is static in that it does not provide an explanation or mechanism for realignments in the state-religion relationship over time.

The wide-ranging failure of existing theories to provide a coherent explanation to the complex and dynamic state-religion relationship in Turkey and Israel begs the development of an alternative analytical tool. The *Bounded Integration Model* that I have developed and tested throughout this study overcomes the shortcomings mentioned above in a convincing fashion. In specific, the model offers a more nuanced and dynamic explanation to the interaction between the state and religion, it is more flexible and thus applicable to a wider variety of historical and cultural contexts, it provides a clear criteria for religious integration and it provides a plausible explanation to temporal alteration in the nature of the state-religion relationship in places where other theories fails to do so.

The departure point of the *Bounded Integration Model* is its emphasis on the need to investigate the historical origins of the role given to religion in the national society. In dissimilarity to other studies, the *Bounded Integration Model* asserts that it is insufficient to look for the determinants of the role of religion in newborn states beginning at the time of the formation of the state, or during the formative years that follow (Kuru 2007; Higley and Gunther 1992). Such an analysis is not deep enough and might miss fundamental factors and processes that are highly relevant to the observed outcome (Kitschelt 2003; Rubin 2009). Instead, the *Bounded Integration Model* suggests that the ideological role given to religion following the proclamation of independence is dependent on structural and ideational variables that predate the time of independence by decades, sometimes more.

The findings of the current study reinforce this assertion. In both Turkey and Israel the role given to religion following the foundation of the state was a product of gradual ideational and structural developments that have taken place in the two societies long before the foundation of the nation-state. In Turkey, the emergence of the Young
Turks movement and the subsequent Kemalist revolution in the beginning of the 20th Century were merely the very final phase in a very long process that begun during the Ottoman era with the reforms of Sultan Selim III at the end of the 18th Century. Likewise, the decisions taken by the independent state of Israel in 1948 to grant public recognition to the Jewish religion cannot be viewed in isolation from the debates and power struggles between secular and religious factions that took place since the birth of the Zionist movement in Europe in the mid 19th Century, and later in the Yishuv in mandatory Palestine.

The point that follows is that the ability of the dominant political elite to shape the character of the political order at the critical juncture of independence is not free of constraints. Conversely, the elite's worldview about the appropriate role of religion in the public and political spheres is a product of a longtime discourse and structural and ideational parameters that limit and define the spectrum of alternatives open for consideration by the elite (Kubik 2003; Kaufman 2001). The institutional and cultural stronghold of Islamic religion in the Ottoman Empire and the need to disentangle Turkey's burdening relationships with her former Islamic non-Turkish colonies made it almost necessary for the Kemalists to eliminate the Islamic religion and preempt it from seriously challenging westernizing project of the emerging regime. In similarity, the inability to disintegrate the ingredients of Judaism and marginalize its religious component from the overall national identity, as well as religion being the most efficient recruitment tool available to the Zionist movement, made the decision of the secular Zionist elite to include religious content in the ideology of the national project almost inevitable.

Notwithstanding the above, the model also asserts that the moment of transition from national movement to a sovereign state is critical in that that it consolidates patterns of state-religion interaction, with far reaching long term ramifications. This is because institutional and legal designs establish the role of religion and religious groups in society in a formal way, and create a resilient path dependent structure. Such institutions may remain intact long after they became unrepresentative of social preferences, and impede transitions towards a more representative regime. Good illustrations of this point are the restrictions conveyed on religion in the Turkish
Constitution that deny any role to religion in the state despite the fact that Islamic religion is the strongest identifier in Turkish politics for more than a decade or the serious contemporary difficulties that confront the status and social relevance of the Chief Rabbinate in Israel.

A third point of import suggested by the Bounded Integration Model and reinforced by the findings of this study is the need to abandon a static understanding of the state-religion relationship in favor of more attention to the dynamic aspect of this interaction, namely to temporal changes in its nature. In dissimilarity with the secularization thesis and the twin tolerations, the Bounded Integration Model views the interaction between the two forces, state and religion, as an ongoing, mutually constitutive process, in which both actors constantly shape and reshape each other. Such a view becomes tangible only if religious actors are perceived as potential partners in civil society and only if civil society as a whole is viewed as an inclusive and dynamic arena of confrontation and debate. Indeed, religion represents a worldview that contradicts with Western ideas in many ways. Therefore, the traditional school of civil society, which advocates a liberal-secular consensus at the core of civil society (Almond and Verba 1963; Fukuyama 1996), cannot integrate religious groups and ideas into the realm of civil society. Such exclusion might generate frustration and alienation and lead to extreme forms of behavior by the marginalized public, as was the case in Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s. On the other hand, when religious groups and values are granted a legitimate space in civil society, contingent on their mutual respect for the basic principles of democracy, the political outcome becomes more inclusive and, consequentially, more supportive of democratic governance. Such was the case in Israel after the proclamation of the state in 1948. The broad and multilayered recognition of Jewish religion in the public sphere led an overwhelming majority among the religious population to collaborate with the state and concentrate its political activities on the legal-parliamentarian arena.

Furthermore, this school of civil society contradicts sharply with the static Zero-sum-game perception of the traditional school, according to which the state and social actors are in constant conflict, the strengthening of one inevitably leads to the weakening of the other. As a substitute, this study reinforces an open-end perception of the
relationship between state and society (Migdal 2001). Under particular circumstances the outcome of the interaction might benefit and strengthen both sides. For illustration, the decision of the Kemalist state to tolerate a religiously based party in 1971 and the latter participation in government during the 1970s resulted in substantial material benefits to the Islamic population, which included the construction of new Mosques and Imam-Hatip schools as well as higher degree of state acceptance of religious manifestations in the public sphere. In turn, the religious segment of the population was the one least involved in extreme and violent activity against the regime compared with both leftwing and rightwing factions. Conversely, in other times the interaction can damage both sides. For example, the advocacy of a militant agenda by the settler movement in Israel following 1967 was responsible to a decline in its political leverage and ability to influence government policies and the subsequent deteriorating status of religion in the public sphere. despite the ability of the state to successfully contain radical challenges and maintain democratic stability radical activity undermined the quality of Israeli democracy and exposed its society to extreme types of behavior.

This leads me to the most fundamental assertion of the Bounded Integration Model which relates to the connection between levels of religious integration and the stability and quality of democratic governance. The findings of this study imply, in contrast to both the secularization and inclusion-moderation theses, that the impact of religious integration on democratic governance is neither deterministic nor linear. Instead, it changes in response to various exogenous and endogenous events and processes initiated by the religious populations, their surrounding environment, or by state organs. The cases of Turkey and Israel demonstrate how the state-religion interaction can turn dramatically from a constructive to destructive path. The radicalization of religious Zionism after 1967 is a relevant example. The Six Day War was an external event with enormous theological and secular consequences, the merger of which with internal currents among the religious Zionist public and ambiguous and indecisive state policies seriously distorted the formerly constructive interaction between religious-Zionism and the state. An illustration of an opposite trend, from clash to potential collaboration, is found in the ideological and terminological modification that have taken place in Turkey following the shift of religious representation from WP
(Refah) to AKP. This point is crucial because it refutes the dichotomous perception of the secularization thesis according to which the tension between religious content and democratic governance is inherent, static and unchangeable.

At the same time, the findings of this study do not support the linear perception of the inclusion-moderation thesis either. Alternatively, they imply that, while granting some public role to religion, within the bounds of basic democratic principles, might support the democratic regime, unlimited or excessive integration that violate democratic conditions might prove counterproductive. In such circumstances tolerance, respect for civil rights, limits on the use of governmental power and acceptance of cultural diversity - otherwise the comparative advantages of democratic regimes - become their weakness. Unchecked subjection to religious demands may produce strong incentives to religious groups to violate the principles of the thin consensus and disregard the basic right of other collectivities that their values and preferences be expressed and respected in politics. Such interaction inevitably leads to polarization and frustration and it is only a matter of time before it generates reactions by other social actors or state organs. Such a process took place after Refah came to power in Turkey in the 1990s. The party's threatening terminology and its apparent disrespect for the preferences of the secular public in Turkey generated assertive reactions by the secular segments in society, the judiciary and the media, and led eventually to military intervention following which the party and its leadership were disbanded from politics. Correspondingly, the growing Haredi abuse of Israeli politics after 1977 led to various reactions such as the short lived antireligious party Shinui which built its power on systematic delegitimization of the Haredi population, an unsuccessful attempt to change the structure of the political system by direct election of Prime Minister, and necessitated the active involvement of the Supreme Court to check excessive Haredi demands that violated the democratic rights of the rest of the public.

It follows that the relationship between the state and religious groups and the level of accommodation of the former in the latter should be understood as a bounded range, within the edges of which the interaction is likely to be constructive and supportive of democratic governance, whereas below and above these boundaries the relationship is likely to generate negative consequences and undermine the democratic
regime. The criterion for the bounds is one – respect for basic democratic principles. While religious manifestations within this bound should be tolerated, below the minimum might lead to political extremism and above the maximum requires assertive state response in order to fix the violation and protect the stability of the regime and the basic rights of all its members. Of course, this range should be sensitive to contextual diversity and change over time in response to demographic, cultural and social trends. Any attempt to design a parsimonious one-size-fit-all framework while disregarding contextual diversity and contemporary circumstances might eventually fall into the same determinism and over-simplistic view of existing theories. Nevertheless, understanding the nature of the state-religion interaction as a bounded integration within democratic limits, with constructive and destructive zones, offers an innovative and policy relevant perspective and facilitates an ongoing dialog within society regarding the optimal status of religious recognition. In this respect, the dynamic nature of the Bounded Integration Model makes it preferable to the twin tolerations. While the latter suggests a division of labor between the state and religious institutions it lacks a mechanism to explain realignments in the borderline between the two in response to social, structural, cultural or ideational changes, an explanation that the Bounded Integration Model is well equipped to provide.

Another relative advantage of the Bounded Integration Model that comes up in this study stems from the model's nondeterministic perception of modernization. In opposition to existing theories, the Bounded Integration Model does not draw a dichotomous line between modernization as a manifestation of progress, and religion as a manifestation of backwardness (Lipset 1959; Deutsch 1961), and does not stipulate a preordained correlation among level of modernization, social secularization, the nature of the state-religion relationship and degree of democratic governance. Alternately, the model perceives the contemporary resurgence of religion in politics as a possible outcome of modernization trends. This is because material modernization improves the ability of religious groups to employ high technologies and mass media means and facilitates more effective penetration to their potential electorate. In Turkey, the empowerment of the Refah and AKP parties since the early 1980s was highly dependent on employment of modern tools of recruitment such as mass-public sermons and
religious media outlets. The emergence and ascendance to power of Shas party in Israel reflects a similar pattern (Tepe 2008). Furthermore, the flexible framework of the *Bounded Integration Model* enables its application onto cases that represent different departure points and paces of developmental projects. Israel was a relatively modern society at the time of independence and experienced gradual elevation in modernization throughout time. In contrast, the starting point of the Turkish Republic in terms of modernization was relatively low but the country experienced phases of dramatic progress along the 20th Century, especially under the Menderes Government in the 1950s and the Özal Government in the 1980s. Changing levels of modernization undoubtedly influenced the social status of religion and the nature of interaction between religious actors and the state in both cases. Nevertheless, no specific correlation among modernization, religious integration, and democratization can be articulated. In Israel, gradual modernization was complemented by lower levels of public observance but also by the ascendance of the Haredi Shas party to power. In contrast, the state-religion relationship in Turkey in the 1970s was more constructive than during the 1990s, despite the rapid modernizing progress that Turkey has experienced in the 1980s.

Finally, while the *Bounded Integration Model* does not affirm explicit relationship between international trends and the state-religion relationship, the two case studies demonstrate that such an influence, what Peter Gourevitch calls *The Second Image Reversed*, does exist (Gourevitch 1978). In Turkey, The decision of the Kemalist government in 1946 to open the political arena to competitive elections and the subsequent empowerment of religion in politics were highly dependent on the context of the Cold War, particularly the aspiration of the Turkish elite to align with the West and resist Communist influence. Also, the decision of the Turkish military to intervene in politics in 1980 was undoubtedly dependent on the outcome of the Iranian Revolution and the anxiety that this revolution provoked among the Kemalist elite. Likewise, in Israel the main turning points in the peace process with the Palestinians which were responsible to escalation in the relationship between the state and the settlers were pressured by international forces, primarily the United States. Despite this observable trend, however, a thorough investigation and articulation of specific theoretical
assertions regarding the relationship between international trends and the shape of the state-religion relationship requires further research.

General Implications and future research projects

Typically, the process of researching and writing raises additional and related questions that cannot be treated adequately in the volume of a single study. Nevertheless it is worthwhile to raise some of these questions, as they might aid theoretical advancement and serve as departure points for further research.

As I demonstrated above, the Bounded Integration Model and the lessons of this study are applicable to a wide range of societies and states across the globe. This study adopts, in congruence with mainstream democratic theory, a flexible definition of democracy that extends beyond the conceptual boundaries of the West, instead of imposing the narrow Western perspective on societies with other cultures and historical backgrounds. The diverse character of the selected case studies demonstrates nicely the potentially wide applicability of this study. Israel and Turkey are sui generis cases. While both are located geographically in the Middle East region and their background distinguishes them from the Western experience in many respects, both have had a very long and rich exchange with the Western world. Also, the variation on religious doctrine between the cases implies that the applicability of the model is not confined to specific religious content. Finally, the model fits both newborn countries and existing countries had gone through regime transformation. While Israel represents a case of a completely newborn state, Turkey represents a case of an existing state that gone through comprehensive reform, from an Islamic Empire to modern secular nation-state.

No less important, while this study employs religious identity in the development and testing of the Bounded Integration Model, the model is by no means confined to religious identity. Instead, the model might be applicable, with necessary adjustment, in exploring the integration of other types of collective identity - linguistic, ethnic or racial – to the public and political realms. The characteristics of the Bounded Integration Model, particularly its dynamic perspective, flexible definition of

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306 In fact, Huntington gives special consideration to both cases in his canonical Clash of Civilizations, claiming (mistakenly) that Israel is an integral part of the Judeo-Christian Culture and that Turkey is an exemplar of a country torn between civilizations (Huntington 1996).
democracy, civil society as an arena of thin consensus and view of the interaction as a bounded range, make it an efficient descriptive, prescriptive and predictive tool of analysis for the interaction between various collective identities and the state.

It is also of value, however, to estimate circumstances in which the *Bounded Integration Model* might be less applicable or usable. To start with, the model and the lessons stemming from this study are more applicable to democratic states or ones that are in the midst of transition to democratic governance. Of course, non democratic regimes might also accommodate religion in the political order. Such integration was conducted in the past for various reasons, mostly related to legitimacy and stability, in places ranging from Sadat's Egypt (Hinnebusch 1981; Ashour 2009), to Pinochet's Chile (Behrman 1974; Fleet and Smith 1997). Nevertheless, the ever existing capability of a non democratic regime to arbitrarily and without deliberation change its attitude towards religion whenever such a change fits its interests make the lessons of this study less applicable to such regimes. Correspondingly, while the framework offered in this study might be relevant to consolidated Western democracies, it is likely to be less usable in such states. Western democratic countries developed their institutions and interaction with religious segments in society throughout centuries and their high level of democratic governance guarantees that collective and individual preferences are reflected in a relatively significant and representative way in the public and political spheres. High degree of liberal-constitutionalism (Zakaria 1997) and consolidated institutional structures ensure that religious integration in Western democracies remains within the bounded range and that the boundaries of this range are subject to very low levels of fluctuation, thus making the dynamic approach of the *Bounded Integration Model* less significant.

Finally, the *Bounded Integration Model* requires some modification before it can be utilized as a tool of analysis for the integration of minority groups in the state. In the cases of Israel and Turkey the level of religious integration has always been dependent in a substantial way on the potential capability to fuse religious identity into the national character. Turkey treated nationalism and religion as competing identities while Israel treated religion as a core component of its national identity. This is a major reason why Israel was willing to go a longer way in recognizing religion in the public
sphere while Turkey has constantly tried to separate the two. Nevertheless, in both cases the demographic reality of a clear overlap within the majority population between the dominant religious and national identities enables high degree of fusion between these identities and, in turn, considerable weight for religion in the national identity, at least on the symbolic level (holidays, state symbols, national historiography etc.). Essentially, in both cases it is possible to conceive the state as a religious-nation state in which religion serves a core component of national identity (Juergensmeyer 1995; Rastow 1970). This is the case in places like Egypt, with a large Sunni majority and a ten percent Coptic minority, Indonesia's large Muslim majority and Chinese minority or the Central Asian Republics with their Sunni majority and Orthodox minorities.

This caveat implies that where it is impossible to fuse a specific identity (religion or other) into the national character, the model, as-is, has limited applicability. For instance, the possible degree of integration of Jewish religion into Israeli nationality and Israel's public character are fundamentally different than the possible degree of integration of Arab or Islamic identity into the Israeli national character. Correspondingly, the model is also restricted in societies where there exists no dominant majority group. Lebanon is a good example of such a case. Lebanon's population is divided between at least five distinct groups: Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, Maronite Christians, Druze and Palestinian Refugees (Sunni by religion). Such division makes it almost impossible to construct a joint national identity around a certain religion and ethnicity (Hudson 1997; Zisser 2000). While some recognition of religious or ethnic identity in Lebanese nationality is obviously possible, the character of such integration is likely to be fundamentally different than in cases where a fusion is possible. In order to be fully applicable to cases like that of Lebanon, the Bounded Integration Model requires considerable modification, or be substituted by another theoretical framework, the accomplishment of which is a task of further research.

Finally, I would like to raise two perplexing phenomena that came up throughout this study and deserve further inquiry. The first issue relates to the impact of the specific state organ that takes on itself to block what it perceives to be an excessive religious leverage. The two cases reveal that the identity of this organ might have significant political consequences. In Turkey, the military took on itself to protect the
fundamentals of the Kemalist project and when confronted with the growing power of religion it repeatedly employed coercive capabilities to prevent further religious empowerment. The result, however, was counterproductive. Not only the Turkish military was put under serious criticism, but the measures it employed facilitated an alignment between the religious and liberal camps and further deteriorated the popularity of the military and of Kemalist ideas.

In contrast, opposition to excessive and democratic demands of religious factions in Israel was headed by the High Court of Justice. Despite the unrepresentative nature of both interventions the HCJ's intervention in Israel had much lesser negative consequences to democracy compared with the consequences of military interventions in Turkey. Surprisingly, while the goal of the two institutions was essentially the same - blocking religious abuse of democracy - in Israel the liberal camp aligned with the Court whereas the liberal camp in Turkey aligned with religious groups in opposition to the military. This disparity supports Migdal's assertion that the state is by no means a unitary actor and that an adequate analysis of state policies requires disintegrating it to its various organs (Migdal 2001). It follows that is insufficient to identify the intentions of the state vis-à-vis certain identity groups in society. Instead, the methods and means used by different state organs in achieving the same goals might instigate distinct political results. However, this preliminary assertion necessitates further theoretical development and empirical investigation before solid conclusions can be made.

Another area that merits further research relates to the connection between formal integration of religion in the state and levels of social secularization. The findings of this study demonstrate a puzzling trend. The Israeli state integrated Jewish religion in the public sphere and at the same time the Jewish population in Israel became less observant. In contrast, Turkey tried to secularize the society by uprooting religion from public life but this attempt resulted in higher levels of observance and religious identification among the Turkish public. While these observable trends might be purely accidental another alternative is also possible. It might be that by integrating the religious element into the public sphere the state takes on itself the task of 'public guarantor of religion' and frees the individual or groups in society from the liability to protect religion by personal identification and observance. This is what happened in
Israel. Conversely, when the state tries to get rid of religious identity it transfers the duty
to protect the religious element of the collective identity into the hands of individuals in
the society. Of course, this preliminary note requires more elaboration as well as
articulation of a plausible theoretical explanation that integrates assertions from studies
in political psychology and identity politics. Nevertheless, proceeding in this path might
shed some light on the mechanisms of social religiousness and secularization in modern
societies.
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