Decentralization and Democratization: The Case of Water User Associations in Turkey

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Abstract

This thesis examines whether and under what conditions the recent decentralization of irrigation management in Turkey can deepen democracy through a comparative study of irrigation management decentralization in two provinces in Turkey: Urfa and Aydin. In Turkey, the state agency, which planned, built, and managed all major irrigation schemes, transferred the duty of water management, fee collection and maintenance to Water User Associations (WUAs) starting in 1993. The democratic processes established by WUAs in Urfa were plagued by allegations of bribery, corruption, embezzlement and service delivery failures; whereas Aydin WUAs have proven to be the very definition of successful decentralization in irrigation management. The hypothesis is that inequalities in access to resources, unequal power structures, low-levels of education and inexperience with civic activism lead to weaker links between decentralization and democratic deepening. Moreover, these same factors increase the likelihood that decentralized organizations will fail to satisfy their users in the provision of efficient and effective services. Hence, I hypothesize that the same factors are responsible for hampering the performance of decentralized institutions. I argue that divergent outcomes in decentralized irrigation management are a result of diverging social, economic and political contextual variables. The study shows that if there are significant inequalities in access to resources and power, decentralization does not promote democratic deepening and does not improve the performance of service delivery. This is especially true if the actors do not have a past of civic activism.
Résumé
Cette thèse considère si la décentralisation récente de la gestion de l’irrigation en Turquie peut approfondir les processus démocratiques, et sous quelles conditions, au moyen d’une étude comparative sur la décentralisation de la gestion de l’irrigation dans deux provinces turques : Urfa et Aydin. En Turquie, dès 1993, l’organisme de l’État qui avait planifié, construit et géré l’ensemble des plans d’irrigations a transféré les tâches reliées à l’aménagement des ressources en eau, la collecte des frais et l’entretien aux associations des usagers de l’eau (AUE). Les processus démocratiques établis par les AUE se plaignaient d’allégations de trafic d’influence, de corruption, de détournement et de retards de livraison de service tandis que les AUE d’Aydin ne manifestaient que du succès en gestion d’irrigation décentralisée. L’hypothèse propose que l’accès inéquitable aux ressources, l’inégalité des dynamiques de pouvoir, les faibles taux de scolarité et le manque d’expérience en activisme communautaire contribuent à l’affaiblissement des liens entre la décentralisation et l’approfondissement des processus démocratiques. Or, ces mêmes facteurs réduisent les probabilités que les services de ces organismes décentralisés seront fournis aux utilisateurs de manière efficace. Ainsi, je propose que ces facteurs mêmes contribuent à la pauvre performance des organismes décentralisés. Mon argument démontre que les résultats divergents relatifs aux structures décentralisées de gestion d’irrigation sont liés aux variables sociales, économiques et politiques du contexte. L’étude démontre que les inéquations d’accès aux ressources et au pouvoir nuisent au potentiel de la décentralisation à approfondir les processus démocratiques ou à
améliorer la performance de la livraison des services. Ceci se manifeste encore plus fortement si les acteurs souffrent d’un manque d’expérience en activisme communautaire.
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CPR – Common Pool Resources
DIE – Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (State Institute of Statistics)
DPT – Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (State Planning Organization)
DSI – Devlet Su İşleri (State Hydraulic Works)
GAP – Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (Southeast Anatolian Project)
WUA – Water User Associations
YTL – New Turkish Lira
CHAPTER 1: Decentralization and Democratic Deepening: the Potential and Performance of Decentralized Institutions

Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.

Reinhold Niebuhr

Democracy is nurtured by illusion, its mysteriously compelling principles deemed both unattainable in theory and at the same time inescapable in practice (Wokler, 1994:21).

Introduction

This thesis examines whether the recent decentralization of irrigation management in Turkey can deepen democracy. The central questions to be considered include: the conditions under which decentralization leads to democratic and positive performance of decentralized institutions; whether identical organizational structures lead to similar outcomes in locations with differing socio-economic contexts; and whether, in practice, decentralization lives up to expectations of the positive outcomes attributed to it by international financial institutions, which have been responsible for pushing states to devolve the provision of services.
I answer these questions through a comparative study of irrigation management decentralization in two provinces in Turkey: Urfa and Aydin. I define decentralization, as per Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1984:9), as the “transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority to the state’s field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments or NGOs.” In Turkey, the State Hydraulic Works (Devlet Su İşleri - DSI) planned, built, operated and maintained all major irrigation schemes up until 1993. In line with neo-liberal measures to reduce state involvement in service provision, the agency transferred the duty of water management, fee collection and maintenance to Water User Associations (WUAs).¹ These associations were expected to lead to self-governing irrigation associations and promote democratic structures and governance.

I define democratic deepening as the process of increasing the quality of democracy – its successes and failures in addressing existing and potential conflicts. For in a deep democracy, citizens should be able to participate in decisions affecting their lives, allowed to contact their representatives between elections and aggregate their interests through a variety of civil society organizations and should be knowledgeable about the mechanisms of redress if they feel wronged. Citizens of a deep democracy are empowered to participate at various governance levels and this study examines whether a policy reform

¹ Along with Mexico and Colombia, Turkey decentralized large irrigation systems to local organizations (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2000). The Turkish name for these associations is Sulama Birligi and the literal translation would be Irrigation Union. In the literature different authors refer to them using a variety of terms such as Water User Associations (Kudat and Bayram, 2000), Irrigation Associations (Svendsen, 2001) or Water User Groups (Harris, 2004). This thesis will refer to these groups as Water User Associations.
(decentralization) creating opportunities to participate at the local level can enhance the ability of citizens to become active in other areas of their lives, leading to broader pressures for democratic deepening at the national level.

This research is guided by the puzzling fact that identical institutional setups of WUAs did not translate into uniform performance in the operation and maintenance of irrigation schemes. On the one hand, the democratic processes established by WUAs in Urfa were plagued by allegations of bribery, corruption, embezzlement and service delivery failures; on the other hand, WUAs established in Aydin have proven to be the very definition of successful decentralization in irrigation management. The Aydin associations operated smoothly, were on track financially, soon acquired the necessary machinery and showed satisfactory overall performance. What factors explain these divergences in outcomes?

I hypothesize that inequalities in access to resources, unequal power structures, low-levels of education and inexperience with civic activism lead to weaker links between decentralization and democratic deepening. Moreover, these same factors increase the likelihood that decentralized organizations will fail to satisfy their users in the provision of efficient and effective services. Hence, I hypothesize that the same factors are responsible for hampering the performance of decentralized institutions. Furthermore, the performance of a decentralized organization is not independent of its democratic functioning. If we consider the ideal types of both variables, there are four possible outcomes of decentralization: democratic associations that perform well (or fail to perform well); and non-democratic associations that perform well (or fail to perform well). In the
democratic association scenario, mechanisms of accountability and responsiveness within decentralized organizations allow users to replace the executive and the chair in order to improve performance and attain a satisfactory level of service provision if need be.

In the non-democratic association scenario, with an enlightened dictator serving as a chair, it is possible that a decentralized association could operate efficiently and effectively while performing to the satisfaction of service recipients. This would not provide a stable equilibrium in the long run, as changes in leadership could lead to deterioration in service quality, malfeasance, corruption and the breakdown of the association. Finally, in cases where decentralized associations perform unsatisfactorily in a non-democratic setting, individuals may gradually seek alternative mechanisms of accountability. The likelihood of this action is not high, but in an institutional setting where the rules and regulations allow for stakeholders to petition for redress, it is a possibility.

This research challenges the literature which posits a mechanical positive relationship between decentralization, democratic deepening and improvements in service provision.\textsuperscript{2} Manor (1999:48), for instance, argues that “poor as well as prosperous people participate more and increase their collective action potential as a result of decentralization” even if the elites capture the benefits resulting from decentralization in the short-run.\textsuperscript{3} In reality, however, many decentralized institutions have failed to substantiate these expectations. Scholars have attributed

\textsuperscript{2} See Rondinelli, McCullough, and Johnson (1989) and Dillinger (1994).
\textsuperscript{3} Crook and Manor (1998) emphasized the importance of socio-political factors in the success of decentralization in Karnataka-India but Manor seems to disregard this in his later assertion.
the failure of decentralized institutions to an inappropriate design of
decentralization programs or the implementation of institutional designs that fail
to take local power dynamics into account (see, among others, Hadiz, 2004).
However, these factors do not fully explain why there were diverging outcomes
within a single decentralization program. This study shows that certain social,
political and economic conditions may prevent decentralized institutions from
realizing the beneficial outcomes that are suggested in the literature.

In this study, I employ the comparative qualitative method to understand
the link between decentralization and democratic deepening. I focus on the
decentralization of irrigation management because it is one of the few sustained
decentralization reforms pursued in Turkey during the 1990s. Furthermore, it is
substantially different from the decentralization of the central state’s powers and
responsibilities to municipalities – which has been the focus of most scholars
working on decentralization in Turkey (see Goymen, 1982; Heper, 1989; Koker,
1995; Ozcan, 2000). Local governments have a substantial role to play in
democratic deepening but are complex organizations offering diverse services,
making it more difficult to delineate their users and service areas.4 Focusing on
the WUAs and their performance allows this study to focus on one service area –
irrigation provision – and limits the number of stakeholders under examination. In
order to test the hypotheses outlined earlier, I conducted 148 interviews with a
variety of actors implicated in irrigation management.

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4 This is not to say that the examination of municipalities is impossible. One of the most
interesting examples of decentralized participatory governance is the case of Porto Alegre and its
participatory budgeting. Baiocchi’s (2003) examination of this case provides valuable insights
about the link between decentralization and democratization.
I argue that divergent outcomes in decentralized irrigation management are a result of diverging social, economic and political contextual variables. My comparative examination indicates that if there are significant inequalities in access to resources and power, decentralization does not promote democratic deepening and does not improve the performance of service delivery. This is especially true if the actors do not have a past of civic activism.

The implications of this study are particularly important in an international setting where multilateral financial institutions promote decentralization as a policy tool that might potentially resolve service delivery and problems in democratic participation. The World Bank and other international donors promote the decentralization of service delivery and make the release of funds conditional on the formation of decentralized institutions. In the case of irrigation management, Wilder and Romero Lankao (2006) and Sehring (2007) show that the creation of WUAs was the condition upon which donors provided funding for new investments in the water sector in Mexico and Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan respectively. The donors do not necessarily force a particular institutional structure upon the recipient countries but the simplest implementation scheme for central governments is often to establish identical institutions across the board without taking into consideration the social, economic and political differences on the ground. This thesis shows that these differences impact the functioning and democratic character of decentralized institutions.

The study implies that decentralization can deepen democracy if the decentralized institutions promote stakeholder participation in decision-making. If
there is empowerment through participation in decentralized institutions, participants will acquire transferable skills that they could apply in other institutional settings. This thesis shows that the blueprint of WUAs implemented across the world generates greater inequalities in water distribution and does not allow for the participation of subordinate groups if the social, economic and political contexts are not conducive to such participation. Hence, although decentralization offers the possibility of empowering citizens, specific social, economic and political factors may hamper the newly established institutions’ democratic potential and performance. If these contextual factors were taken into account prior to and during the decentralization process, adjustments could have been made to the institutions to improve their performance. I discuss the importance of institutional design in the conclusion chapter.

The decentralization of irrigation management in Urfa did not lead to positive outcomes in terms of democratic functioning and performance. Even though decentralization does not always lead to better democratic functioning and improved service delivery, it nevertheless provides the citizens with a close-to-home institution which, in theory, belongs to them. Even if they are unable to participate in the first place and are treated unequally by the institutions, they do develop a sense of being rights-bearing citizens, which they can start to act on as they accumulate more experience with these institutions. This study shows the processes through which this takes place. Having briefly outlined the main questions, the hypotheses and the methods, I will give an overview of the theories of decentralization and democratic deepening in the next section.
Literature Review

Decentralization

The roles of states and the locus of politics have changed significantly over the past few decades. The state was seen as the engine of economic growth and socio-cultural transformation in the post WWII period. Yet since the 1980s, state policies have been blamed for costly, contested and sometimes failed development projects (see for instance Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) that do not allow for local participation and self-governance (see, among other the case of Africa in Wunsch and Olowu, 1990). Within this context, donors and development agencies promoted decentralization as a solution to sub-optimal decisions taken at the center without knowledge of local conditions and preferences. Turkey is no exception to this global trend. In line with deepening of democracy in the post-1980 period, there has been an increasing emphasis on strengthening local governments and devolving responsibilities of planning to regional development agencies.

Decentralization is the delegation of political or bureaucratic authority to local levels (Smith, 1985:9). In the case of natural resources, such as forests or water, Agrawal and Ostrom (2001:488) define decentralization as “any act by which the central government cedes rights of decision-making over resources to actors and institutions at lower levels in a politico-administrative and territorial

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5 Scholars such as Escobar (1995), Scott (1998) and Mitchell (2002) are critical of the top-down developmentalism of states. Others, such as Chambers (1997) and Fung and Wright (2003b), promote participatory approach to development as a response to these criticisms.
hierarchy.” Decentralization can take on many different forms including the deconcentration of the central government’s responsibilities; the delegation of decision-making powers; and devolution, where the decision-making, financial allocations and management responsibilities are transferred to lower levels (Crook and Manor, 1998). Devolution has the most potential when it comes to deepening democracy and improving service delivery. Chapter 4 shows that decentralization of irrigation management in Turkey is a case of devolution.

The logic of decentralization assumes that local-level units are more easily accessed, monitored and pressured by individuals and groups. Decentralization can disperse political power and help create new civic spaces, enabling individuals to develop democratic skills and practices. Hence, decentralization can be associated with increased participation in local decision-making, greater efficiency and democratization. The outcomes of decentralization, however, vary. Forestry decentralization in India (Sundar, 2001:2017) and municipal government strengthening in Latin America in the 1980s (Herzer and Pirez, 1991), for example, did not contribute to the deepening of democracy (Goldfrank, 2002) while the decentralization reforms in India led to improvements in popular participation in the state of Kerala (Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri, 2007). Promoting decentralization without considering the socio-economic context where it takes place risks disregarding potentially unwelcome outcomes, such as “elite capture” of decentralized institutions (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Bryld, 2001; and Dasgupta and Beard, 2007), corruption, or the reinforcement of existing inequalities.
The decentralization of irrigation management accords farmers the rights of timely service delivery and maintained infrastructure in return for irrigation fees. The fact that these rights exist on paper, however, does not necessarily mean they are upheld equally in reality. This is why it is important to analyze the impact of social, political and economic contextual variables on the outcomes of decentralization. This section first reviews the literature on common pool resource (CPR) decentralization and the factors which prompted the trend to decentralize the management of CPRs. Then it delineates the benefits and problems associated with decentralization in the literature followed by an overview of theories of democracy and democratic deepening.

Decentralization of natural resource use has mostly been analyzed through the CPR literature. A resource is considered a CPR if three conditions are met: there is common property; it is difficult to exclude potential users; and the use of resource by one user subtracts from the resource available to others (Ostrom et al., 1994). Irrigation systems are common pool resources because it is difficult to exclude potential users once the infrastructure is built, and the withdrawal of water by users at the head subtracts from the tail-end users (Wade, 1987; Tang, 1992). Although the CPR literature is not directly concerned with democratic deepening, a brief review of previous studies of resource-use-decentralization helps identify relevant variables for this thesis.

The goal of the New Institutionalist CPR research on water resources is to explain the conditions under which resource management is sustainable (see, among others, Ostrom, 1992; Tang, 1992 and Lam, 1996). The factors that
determine the sustainability of the resource according to this literature include the type of institution established to manage it, and the characteristics of the resource and those of the users. In the case of irrigation, relevant characteristics might include the number of irrigators; cultural and social features of the users such as ethnicity, race and tribe; the amount of irrigated land they hold, and the location of their plot within the system (Tang, 1992:12). Agrawal (2001) argues that due to the focus on institutions in the CPR literature, the impact of resource system characteristics, the features of user group and the external social, physical and institutional environment on the institutional durability has to a large extent been unexplored. In other words, there is a lacuna in scholarly writing on the impact of social, economic and political context on the operation of decentralized institutions.

In trying to bridge this gap, this thesis analyzes the case of irrigation management decentralization in Turkey, which began in the early 1990s with the support of the World Bank. Multilateral development aid agencies have been promoting decentralization since the 1990s. It is important to examine the origin of the decentralization drive in order to understand why it became such an important policy tool and which types of institutions are favored over others in the process.

*Origins of the Recent Campaign for Decentralization*

Even though in practice it is primarily the governing elites who decide to begin decentralization (see Oxhorn, 2004:15), opinions are split in the literature on the
main propagators of decentralization. Following a review of factors such as the fiscal crisis of the states, the impact of international agencies, pressure from below and the socio-structural causes of decentralization, O’Neill (2004) argues that in the case of Bolivia, for instance, political parties which were losing votes at the national level while maintaining a strong subnational support were responsible for the substantive decentralization move in 1994. Some scholars attribute a major role to international agencies (McCarthy, 2004) that promote decentralization as a cure-all solution to developing countries (Beer, 2004). On the other hand, Selee and Tulchin’s (2004:299) concluding chapter in the edited volume studying cases of local governments throughout the world claim that they have only a minor role to play.

Lundquist (1972:15) asserted that little was published in political science journals on decentralization during the 1960s. Since that time, academic and political circles have intensified their interest in the process of decentralization, and the last two decades have seen an increasing number of publications on decentralization (see for instance, Burki et al. 1999; Manor, 1999; Sundar, 2001; Oxhorn et al., 2004). This came as a reaction to the over-centralized mixed economies in the developing as well as developed countries in the post-World War II period. In developing countries the centre was the planner, financier and service provider because it had to stimulate economic development (Bennett, 1990:10). The concentration of political and economic power, which was a product of the over-centralized state apparatus, imposed limits on personal freedom (Devine, 1988:4). This was the motivation for decentralization from a
leftist perspective, which supported the need for a free self-governing society (Devine, 1988:13) in order to empower the citizens in the decision-making processes.

The World Bank and other international development agencies promote decentralization primarily as a means to improve service delivery, reducing the burden on the central government budget and as a means to demonstrating to citizens that democracy works (McCarthy, 2004:1201; Kolavalli and Brewer, 1999:249). Over-centralized states are seen as the source of efficiency shortfalls and budget deficits. In order to reduce financial and economic problems associated with centralized states, the Bank has allocated between $300 million and $500 million per year on loans to projects with a decentralization component (Treisman, 2007:3). The World Bank expected decentralization to “promote civic empowerment, diminish corruption, enhance efficiency and improve public service delivery” (Andrews and de Vries, 2007:426). The empirical literature on decentralization and its impact on democratic deepening show that it is impossible to conclude that decentralization leads to more participation (Andrews and de Vries, 2007:447).

Despite contradictory findings, the Bank is still adamant about requiring that decentralization be a part of reform packages. The rationale is that “it would be quicker and more cost-effective to begin the process of devolution, permit learning by doing and build up capacity through practice” (Ahmad et al., 2005:48-

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6 Svendsen and Meinzen-Dick (1997:141) argue that the uniformity of World Bank’s position towards sectors like irrigation leads to similar trends throughout the world. They caution readers on the problems of reliance on “global generalizations and incompletely grounded and adapted principles.”

7 This constitutes roughly between 7 and 12 percent of World Bank loans for 2007.
49, quoted in Andrews and de Vries, 2007:426). Those who are critical of the participatory model of the World Bank argue that it promotes decentralization partially to prevent popular resistance to changes in policy at the centre – such as cuts in the budgetary allocations to education and health (Gore, 2000:796). When service delivery in these domains is decentralized, the central state relieves itself of some of the crucial responsibilities necessary for the reproduction of a healthy population.

In the case of Turkey, the decision to decentralize irrigation management was taken by the state following recommendations by the World Bank. The trend, globally, is to transfer the operation/maintenance of irrigation schemes to users (see, among others, Lee, 1990, for the case of Chile; Bruns and Helmi, 1996 for that of Indonesia). WUAs have been the most frequently crafted institutions for irrigation management transfer – see, for instance, Nikku (2002) for the case of Andhra Pradesh; Khanal (2003) for that of Nepal; Gorriz et al. (1995) for Mexico, Sehring (2007) for the cases of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; Veldwisch, (2007) for the case of Uzbekistan’s experience. Meinzen-Dick (1997) provides a survey of farmer participation in irrigation projects in six countries including Mexico and argues that farmer participation is stronger in some contexts than in others. The factors that impact farmer participation according to her survey are the institutional organizers and training programs, the partner bureaucracy and the enabling conditions. These three factors are virtually identical in the case of irrigation management decentralization in Turkey. This thesis examines whether top-down decentralization can have positive effects on democratic deepening
despite claims that bottom-up demands for decentralization are more likely to have democratizing effects (Parry and Moyser, 1994:52).

Benefits of Decentralization

Decentralization is associated with a range of political and economic benefits.\(^8\) From an economic perspective, it is said to increase efficiency of local service provision, be more responsive to local conditions and be better situated in making use of information that is hard to transmit to the centre (see, for instance, Mintzberg, 1983:96-97; Wolman, 1990:32; Bardhan, 2004:180). This thesis focuses on the political impacts of decentralization. The political benefits of decentralization outlined in the literature include greater accountability; dispersion of political power; the creation of new civic spaces; and the development of political skills of individuals.

Political authority is not omniscient, and the acknowledgement of this is essential for the promotion of decentralization. Individuals should be trusted to know what is in their best interest unless there is evidence of the existence of a superior knowledge held by a minority of people (Saward, 1994:13). Politically, decentralization is believed to enable greater accountability (Smith, 1985:4-5) as local level units are more easily accessed, monitored and pressured by societal agents and groups. This has the potential of rendering accountability of decision-

\(^8\) Throughout the history of the development of the modern state, there were periods where decentralization was popular and others where it was seen as beneficial to centralize decision-making and implementation. Industrializing late developers (Gerschenkron, 1962) centralized the governance structure in order to facilitate capital accumulation whereas there was increasing interest in decentralization in the 1950s and 1960s as a reaction to intense bureaucratization (Lundquist, 1972:16).
makers more direct (Wolman, 1990:32). Decentralization can lead to the dispersal of political power and help create new civic spaces where civil society organizations can flourish, and therefore enable individuals to develop democratic skills and practices (Rosenbaum, 1998). Therefore, it can provide a training ground for democracy and strengthen civic life (Smith, 1985; Wolman, 1990:34) by increasing participation in local decision-making (Bergh, 2004:781).

Participatory opportunities are generally widened as a result of decentralization (Parry and Moyser, 1994:52) and a positive relationship between decentralization and democratic deepening is possible but does not materialize in many cases (Goldfrank, 2002). Carino (1994:346) argues that different forms of decentralization can engender democratic governance but can also cause less accessible and responsive government. The presumption in favor of decentralization is that individuals can develop a capacity to participate effectively in the context of their local environment (Devine, 1988:139).

Even though participation is important for deepening democracy, it is unrealistic to expect that everyone will participate at every occasion. Burki et al. (1999:32) claims that local democracy will not induce participation by all local stakeholders and that only those who have important issues/problems will participate. According to the authors, the openness of the system to participation is important as it helps reduce the likelihood of conflict while decisions are being made. Therefore, decentralization prevents the emergence of new conflicts even if it does not necessarily mean that everyone will equally participate in each decision-making step.
The attempts to generate and sustain participative and egalitarian organizations throughout the world since the 1980s have not proven to be easy (Reed, 1997:44). The outcomes of decentralization did not live up to the expectations or declared objectives of policy-makers partially because participation in decentralized institutions was often eroded by interference from above (Smith, 1985:188). Burki et al. (1999:31) argue that it is not enough to have regular local elections to ensure the participation of stakeholders in decentralized institutions: incentives and mechanisms for participation between elections are a must. This thesis examines whether decentralization engenders these mechanisms of participation in the case of Water User Associations in Turkey.

Problems of Decentralization

Based on formal modeling of decentralization, Treisman (2007) concludes that neither the arguments for, nor the ones against, decentralization can be generalized. He argues that the outcomes of decentralization are at best unclear and that in most cases they pull in different directions.

To choose to decentralize, in most settings, requires a leap of faith rather than the application of science. To devote hundreds of millions of dollars to persuading others to decentralize, given the current knowledge, seems odd to say the least (Treisman, 2007:6).

This thesis addresses the need to examine individual cases of decentralization in order to substantiate or criticize existing models of decentralization and their impact.
Heller (2001:132) argues that “to govern is to exercise power, and there are no a priori reasons why more localized forms of governance are more democratic.” Decentralization will not promote deepening of democracy if it devolves power to unaccountable local elite groups (Parry and Moyser, 1994:53). If the elites are embedded in a system with unequal resource and power distribution, these inequalities tend to be replicated within the decentralized institutions in such a way that advantaged groups get to control the decentralized institutions. This is called elite capture.

Even if elites are not directly running the decentralized institutions, they can often more effectively communicate their problems in comparison to economically or socially disadvantaged people. Those who are underprivileged have difficulty in raising their voice to compensate for their weak economic position within society (Parry and Moyser, 1994:54). The relative likelihood of elite capture is higher within decentralized institutions in comparison to the governance of central state’s provincial directorates. Higher level units employ personnel appointed by the centre and these employees are less likely to be from the region. However, this does not mean that they will not yield to the power exerted by local strongmen. It is necessary to compare the centralized and decentralized management in order to see the relative impact of elite capture of decentralized institutions.

Those who argue that decentralization strengthens political equality by providing extra opportunities to participate in policy-making presume that power is equally distributed through the right to vote (Smith, 1985:24-25). However, this
may not be the case, and decentralization can aggravate power inequalities by creating new centers for power. It is true that localized decision-making can facilitate collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged, but powerful individuals will also have access to and an influence on local decision-makers (Smith, 1985:26-27). The challenge is to create institutional mechanisms that allow dissenters to have their voices heard by society and decision-makers. Furthermore, there is no agreement as to how effective different types of power are at different levels of society. For instance, smaller communities – which gain precedence through decentralization – are capable of enforcing social conformity and repressing political dissent (Smith, 1985:73). Unless decentralized institutions challenge inequalities of power, income and social status, there will not be a significant impact on participation.

In villages and towns where economic and social power is strongly hierarchical, the local government tends to be dominated by landlords and other possessors of economic power. If, as is often the case, they do not hold a governmental office, they effectively influence the choice of officials... Being conservative government, village government is likely to resist opportunities to expand its services to the common people (Fesler, 1965:543 quoted in Smith, 1985:200).

As the previous quote indicates, decentralization can engender parochialism (Smith, 1985:5), perpetuate the inequalities that are inherent in a society, and reinforce the position of powerful elites. Ironically, while purported as a means of reducing corruption, decentralization may actually strengthen local
elites (and increase the risk of corruption and embezzlement) by providing them with greater access and control over local resources (Burki et al., 1999:31). While decentralization should hinder the misuse of public resources by increasing the opportunities for local service users to monitor decentralized institutions, this assumes an active and potent local citizenry, which is knowledgeable about the mechanisms through which decentralized institutions can be held accountable. The case of Water User Associations shows that this is not always the case and that decentralization can ultimately cause more corruption and embezzlement, rather than less.

**Decentralization in Practice**

Studies mapping the link between decentralization and democratic deepening have, for the most part, focused on the role of municipal governments in boosting local political participation (see, among others, Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee, 2004). While this strand of literature is very important, it is nonetheless important to delineate and analyze the participation of stakeholders in micro-level associations since the service area, stakeholders and the type of service are more clearly demarcated in small local groups. Based on Heller’s (2000:485) emphasis on the need to explore “the dynamic interactions between institutions and social processes,” this thesis examines the interaction of water users with WUAs in order to understand the conditions under which democracy can be deepened and performance improved. McCarthy (2004) examines the case of forest decentralization in Kalimantan-Indonesia and contrasts the messy practicalities of
the process with the clear-cut portrayal of decentralization narratives. He argues that despite the discrepancies between the narrative of democratic decentralization and the messy reality, decentralization offers possibilities for learning to the villagers. This thesis undertakes a comparative study of irrigation management decentralization in order to determine whether this holds true for the WUAs in Turkey as well.

Generally, the promised benefits of decentralization have failed to be substantiated in practice, and the empirical evidence indicates that there can be positive as well as negative outcomes (see, among others Selee and Tulchin, 2004; Larson and Ribot, 2005). The process of decentralization often creates unfulfilled expectations and unanticipated problems according to Grindle (2007:2). The mixed results of decentralization in deepening democracy and in improving the performance of service delivery was attributed to three factors in the literature: lack of capacity, lack of financial resources of decentralized institutions, and problems with accountability (Johnson, 2002 quoted in Francis and James, 2003). In the case of irrigation management decentralization in Turkey, the first two factors were fixed across cases while accountability showed variation because of the social, economic and political factors, which are the independent variables of this thesis.

There are numerous examples of divergent outcomes of decentralization. For instance, Herzer and Pirez’s (1991) study of the municipal governments and popular participation in Latin America in the 1980s concluded that participation depended on the existence of popular organizations at the local level and
politicians favorable to participation in municipal government positions.

Decentralization of health services in rural China has not led to the projected benefits (Tang and Bloom, 2000), and in the Philippines, even in cases where local (decentralized) health boards were functioning, only the mayors and municipal health officers felt empowered and the awareness of devolution was low among community members (Ramiro et al., 2001).

Burki et al. (1999) examine the case of education, health and road management decentralization in Latin American countries and conclude that the outcomes of decentralization were not very positive in terms of improving service provision. They conclude that in countries with competent local governments, decentralization of road management, for instance, worked much better than in others. Decentralization may not only fail to deliver on its promises, but it can also endanger existing local arrangements that might be more participatory and effective. For instance, Sundar (2001:2017) claims that the decentralization of forestry in India led to the destruction of traditional social capital without putting in place an adequate participatory system.

Despite problematic outcomes, decentralization has the capacity to introduce democratizing changes in the “forms of relationships between the state, the market and civil society” (Garcia-Guadilla, 2002:90). Decentralization reforms in Indonesia led local district elites to reinforce modes of clientelism by extracting forestry resources legally instead of previously prevailing illegal activities (McCarthy, 2004). Nevertheless, decentralization gave way to possibilities for democratization of resource use by forcing extractors to negotiate
access at the local level instead of simply getting the green light from authorities at the center. This multi-level bargaining allowed certain communities to get a share of the use of forest resources (McCarthy, 2004).

Hence, decentralization can have positive as well as negative outcomes. What factors influence the outcomes of decentralization? Decentralization in contexts with significant inequalities in control of economic resources and power may not contribute to democracy according to Warren (2001:88). Bardhan (2004:176) examines the case of decentralization in India, and argues that “local democracy and institutions of decentralization are more effective in the states (like Kerala and West Bengal) where land reforms and mass movements for raising political awareness have been more active.” Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of access to resources – the first independent variable – when analyzing the decentralization process.

Hadiz (2004) asserts that power struggle and interests are crucial factors that need to be examined within studies of decentralization. He criticizes the neo-institutionalist scholars, such as Crook and Manor (1998), who tend to assume that countries are able to choose the most appropriate form of decentralization. Instead, Hadiz claims that particular designs of decentralization have the potential of reflecting power dynamics within the society. This could be true for the case of the institutional design of the WUAs. Hadiz suggests that to ensure the success of decentralization, the World Bank often works only with the existing elite, rather than disturbing the existing social order by setting up a more egalitarian institution. When power distribution is very unequal, the existing elite will
promote their own self-interest. Therefore, I will analyze power relations – the second independent variable – and their impact on deepening of democracy within a decentralized setting and the performance of service delivery.

Why is it important for decentralization to increase participation of citizens and to deepen democracy? The next section examines theories of democratic deepening and participatory democracy in order to show why democratic quality is important.

**Democracy and Democratic Deepening**

The most recent surge in the literature on democracy followed the “Third Wave” of democratization. This literature emphasized the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (see, among others, Stepan 1986 and O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986) especially for Southern Europe, Latin America and, more recently, Central and Eastern Europe. The transition literature focused predominantly on the role of the elite in bringing about democratization. Grugel (2002:59) suggests that the focus on elites within the transition literature shadowed the importance of civil society, associationalism and citizenship in the construction of democracy. Despite this criticism, the consolidation literature, which chronologically followed

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*9 Third Wave of democratization is a term coined by Huntington (1991) to refer to the wave of transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy starting with Greece, Portugal and Spain and culminating with the regime change in Central and Eastern Europe.*
the transition literature, did not fundamentally change its approach to the
eexamination of these new democracies (Tulchin and Ruthenberg, 2007:1).10

Academic literature and policy circles emphasize the importance of
democracy and democratization because it is the best known alternative to other
forms of governance and in theory provides “fair and just ways of deliberating
over and negotiating values and value disputes” (Held, 2006:261). It has the
potential of creating a regime where the opinions of all citizens, whose basic
liberties are guaranteed, are valued. The system works on the basis of persuasion
and compromise rather than imposition. Furthermore, the regime is open to
adaptation on a gradual basis instead of being susceptible to radical disruption
(Beetham, 1994:41). The word democracy itself means 'rule by the people.'11 It is
possible to derive many interpretations of this definition depending on who is
counted as legitimate “people” in a system and whether all those who constitute
the “people” are eligible to equally participate in decision-making.

Robert Dahl (1971) is frequently quoted in theoretical as well as empirical
studies of democracy. He uses the term “polyarchy” instead of democracy and
argues that competition for office and inclusiveness of the system are the two
dimensions of a polyarchy. Dahl evaluates these two dimensions through eight
institutional conditions that determine whether a regime is democratic or not.

10 Przeworski (1991:26) argues that a democratic regime is consolidated when democracy becomes
‘the only game in town’ while Schedler (1998) and O’Donnell (1996) question the validity of the
term.
11 See, for instance, Collier and Levitsky (1997) for an overview of the changes in the concept of
democracy.
Schmitter and Karl (1991), who build on Dahl’s definition of polyarchy, identify nine procedural requisites for a democracy to work.\textsuperscript{12}

These widely accepted principles can assist in evaluating whether a particular regime is 'democratic,' but great variations exist from one country to the next in the implementation of 'democracy'. Merely identifying a regime as 'democratic' or 'non-democratic' is insufficient to assess its democratic value. The quality of democracy (its achievements and limitations), must be more closely examined (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler, 1998; O’Donnell, Cullell and Iazzetta, 2004). In order to show that a deeper democracy is important and desirable, I will outline the distinctions between realist/liberal and participatory democracy theories.

There are two main schools of democratic thought: realist/liberal and participatory/strong. Realists such as Schumpeter (1952) and Sartori (1987) believe that the competition among political leaders is enough for a democracy. Democracy, in other words, refers to institutionalizing competition for power (Grugel, 2002:18). Liberal democracy functions through the aggregation of individual interests that are represented through elected delegates (Grugel, 2002:14) and is characterized by an emphasis on individuals and their universal civil/political rights, and equality before the law (Parekh, 1994:199). Leaders are compelled to be responsive to citizens in order to win elections (Parry and

\textsuperscript{12}Nine procedural requisites outlined by Schmitter and Karl (1991) for democracy to work are as follows: 1) Control over government decisions is vested in elected officials; 2) Frequent and fair elections; 3) All adults have the right to vote; 4) All adults have the right to run for office; 5) Right to express themselves; 6) Right to seek out alternative sources of information; 7) Right to form independent associations; 8) Elected officials should not be subjected to informal constraints imposed by non-elected officials; 9) Polity must be self-governing.
Moyser, 1994:46). The citizens are active solely to the extent that they vote for the political leaders in elections.

Lukes (1974), who questions the validity of the assumption of pluralist interest representation, criticized pluralism by claiming that there are structural, ideological and “hidden” dimensions of power. This, in turn, makes the pluralist interest representation inherently undemocratic in circumstances where power and resource distribution is significantly asymmetrical. Grugel (2002:22), for instance, argues that extreme income inequalities are incompatible with bringing about equal citizenship. Inequalities of wealth and status can result in inequalities of education and power, and prevent a healthy democracy from emerging (Pateman, 1970:39). In contrast to realist theorists, participatory democracy theorists emphasize the importance of participation as a way of empowering individuals.

Participatory democracy, advocated by theorists like Pateman (1970), Macpherson (1977), Barber (2003) and Devine (1988), is based on achieving common ground through deliberation. Young (2000) uses the term communicative democracy while Dryzek (2000) employs discursive democracy to refer to participatory democracy, which rests on the notion of active social citizenship (Grugel, 2002:30) where preferences are not exogenous but socially formed and are able to change through deliberation in order to attain socially desirable goals (Devine, 1988:14). “Negotiated coordination,” the term used by Devine (1988:24-25) to refer to a strong democracy, which “creates the possibility for people consciously to transform their perceptions, values and motivation by confronting their own interests with those of others and seeking a resolution.”
This type of deliberation is not necessarily idealistic and can come about in practice (see the model of “empowered participatory governance” and the cases that represent examples of this model in Fung and Wright, 2003a). In smaller communities, such as within the irrigation organizations, deliberative democracy is feasible, and it could function in larger groups if the representatives of different segments of society are able to effectively represent their constituencies.

Participatory democracy theory emphasizes the importance of participation for a deep democracy. Political participation is multi-dimensional and involves activities such as voting, party campaigning, contacting representatives and officials and protesting (Huntington and Nelson, 1976:12-13; Parry and Moyser, 1994:46; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Political participation is defined as a combination of attitudes and behavior. The attitude of an individual towards participation can be evaluated through his/her knowledge of politics and interest in the process, his/her sense of political competence/efficacy and of civic duty (Ozbudun, 1976:4). In brief, political participation of different groups, especially the subordinate ones, increases democratic quality by allowing citizens to have a say in decisions that affect their lives.

In a deep democracy citizens have access to their representatives between elections, they can organize in associations or interest groups that have access to decision-making channels and different groups are equally represented within the system. Equally important for a deep democracy is the ability of subordinate

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13 Fung and Wright (2003b) conclude their edited volume by stating the importance of countervailing power to ensure the democratic deepening impact of empowered participatory governance reforms such as decentralization. Countervailing power refers to the ability of the weak and less organized to challenge the powerful. This thesis examines the case of Water User Associations in order to analyze whether decentralization can engender countervailing powers.
groups to express an autonomous voice (Rueschemeyer, 1998:10). Grindle’s (2007) study on local governments in Mexico finds that, despite complaints about citizen apathy in Mexico, there is remarkable local initiative and efforts to influence government among very poor communities. Hence, decentralization has the potential of positively influencing democratic governance by giving a political voice to disadvantaged groups. For subordinate groups to have a voice there has to be democratic participation at different levels of governance – such as local governments, decentralized institutions – and in other spheres of public and private life – such as the workplace and the family. Dahl (1985), for instance, argues that political equality is not possible unless there is democracy in the workplace.

Democracy in the workplace is important because individuals experience subordination and hierarchy at work (Cole, 1919 quoted in Pateman, 1970:38) and spend a considerable time of their daily lives in their workplaces. Therefore, “only if individuals can be self-governing in the workplace” will there be training for democracy (Pateman, 1970:38). The study of Inkeles (1969) on “participant citizenship syndrome” indicates that the factory is the “school for citizenship” even though education and exposure to mass media are also important factors. Decentralized irrigation associations can be considered equivalent to the workplace in rural areas for farmers. Decentralized associations are possible candidates for becoming schools for citizenship in regions where individuals did not have much exposure to politics other than voting in elections.
Decentralization provides the opportunity to deepen democracy as “the
taste for participation is whetted by participation: democracy breeds democracy”
(Barber, 2003:265). Even the minor experience with self-government and political
action can inspire a desire for more. Barber claims that in the US, “[s]urveys and
polls suggest over and over again that while citizens distrust politics in the
abstract, they desire concrete participation and work to enlarge the scope of that
participation when they have once experienced it” (Barber, 2003:266). Thus
empowerment through participation constitutes an important element for the
sustainability of democracy.

Empowerment, which can be acquired through participation in political
life, implies that once people become active in one domain of their lives, it is less
likely that they will remain passive in other areas (Devine, 1988:159). This is
what makes participation and empowerment important achievements for a deep
democracy. Participation of the masses has always been resisted by those who are
in positions of power. The gradual expansion of suffrage to the non-elite and
finally to women is a demonstration of the struggle which was required to
increase even the most basic form of democracy. Other types of participation are
more forcefully resisted in different parts of the world. In Latin America, for
instance, local elites and state security forces attempt to prevent participation of
rural masses outside of elections, and when this is combined with clientelism
strong and autonomous associations cannot flourish (Cammack, 1994:189). The
impact of decentralized institutions as venues for participation is important to
uncover the effect of the decentralization process on the potential for deepening democracy.

Citizenship is generally defined as a bundle of rights and obligations (Turner, 1994). Citizenship is a set of civic, political and socioeconomic rights that are based on a collection of social conventions (Destremau, 2001). Rights are socially constructed and are meaningless unless recognized by others (Warren, 2001:68). Citizenship rights are no different and have always been the result of struggles (Nun, 2003:47). Civil, political or social rights need to be recognized collectively in order to be enforceable.

Even when these rights are legally recognized, “institutional opportunities for the formal exercise of citizenship” (Davis and Brachet-Marquez, 1997:87) are not readily available to all citizens on the ground. There is a gap in the literature on “the actual experience of citizenship” (Wong and Wong, 2004:104) and what normative theory has outlined as pertaining to citizenship is constrained, in reality, due to differences in resources, gender, class, etc. Discourses about and practices of citizenship should be examined in order to unpack people’s understanding of the realities of everyday life (Dean, 2001). Only then can we examine whether reforms that accord individuals with rights actually empower them to make use of these rights and maintain them in the long-run. It is for this reason that a minimalist democracy does not necessarily ensure a deep democracy.

Participation in decision-making transforms masses into active citizens who acquire a sense of the public that is beyond pure self-interest (Barber,
Citizens in a strong democracy are “neighbors bound together neither by blood nor by contract but by their common concerns and common participation in the search for common solutions to common conflicts” (Barber, 2003:219). Even if a regime governs on citizens’ behalf with all the requirements of a good liberal government (efficiency, equitability and respect for liberty), it is imperative for citizens to be able to participate in decisions that affect their lives (Barber, 2003:244).

An active citizenry, which is able to participate in decision-making processes, is not easily developed, and significant barriers can exist that limit this process. A meaningful democracy, in the sense of full citizen control over decision-making and implementation, is not possible in the presence of significant inequalities in income distribution (Yashar, 2005:51). Unequal income distribution prevents some people from taking political action to protect their interests (Hadenius, 1994:76). Hence, access to resources is the first variable singled out by the literature on democratic deepening.

The second factor is the distribution of power – which is closely linked to the distribution of resources. Citizenship “refers to a conflictive practice related to power – that is, to a struggle about who is entitled to say what in the process of defining common problems and deciding how they will be faced” (Jelin, 1996:104). The advantaged groups in a society will not be willing to allow the subaltern groups equal voice for fear of being challenged discursively (Warren, 2001:81). Discursive challenge allows an issue to be brought to the public sphere and discussed and is the first step to bringing about change. For deliberation to be
possible, all individuals should be recognized as rightful and equal speakers. The most significant barrier to the development of an active citizenry is that those who are most disadvantaged (socially, politically, and economically) are the ones who are the least organized. Therefore, increasing participation under conditions of inequality carries the risk of reinforcing the already existing inequalities or creating new ones. Fung and Wright (2003b) assert that the democratization potential of participatory institutions depends on whether they can engender countervailing power to challenge the wealthy and educated groups who may dominate in decentralized decision-making. They argue that “appropriate institutional designs can facilitate the rise and entry of countervailing voices” even if it is very difficult to ensure such democratizing successes (Fung and Wright, 2003b:267). The concluding chapter will discuss the importance of context sensitive institutional design for decentralization to have democratizing potential.

The following chapters examine the link between inequalities and the operation of the Water User Associations in order to test the hypothesis that inequalities in income and power distribution lead to a weaker link between decentralization and democratic deepening.

Knowledge of rights and laws are important for the citizenry to be active. Learning by being involved in local public or small scale private activity is essential for a deep democracy (Barber, 2003:234). Hence, local institutions can be a crucial training ground for democracy “[b]ut to the extent that they are privatistic, or parochial, or particularistic, they will also undermine democracy”
(Barber, 2003:235). Direct political participation, or learning by doing, is the most effective method of civic education according to Barber. Hence, an active civic past empowers citizens and makes them more likely to pressure their councilors to represent their interests and to force the decentralized institutions to be more accountable to service users.

In the context of irrigation management decentralization, farmers are confronted with an organization that is composed of individuals from their village and the neighboring ones instead of dealing with distant bureaucrats. This could prove conducive to participation. One can learn to be a citizen by being involved in local politics. Pateman (1970:31) claims that participation has an educative role at the local level and that it enables individuals to learn “democracy”. Whether decentralization enhances this learning process will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5.

The democratization potential of decentralization is not limited to the actual democratic performance of decentralized institutions. The change that is brought through decentralization is the creation of institutions that are more accessible to local citizenry. Even if these institutions do not function fully democratically, they may create the space for individuals who are dissatisfied with the service provision to ask for redress. Decentralization can provide the population at large experience with democratic accountability and help bring about rights-bearing citizens. I do not argue that democratic deepening initiated through the decentralization of irrigation management will help solve all the problems of democratic quality in Turkey. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, the history
of democracy in Turkey is fraught with forces that thwarted the democratic process – such as the military and the overbearing bureaucracy. These fundamental problems lie in the way of a more participatory democracy, and have been reinforced by the inability of the individuals to organize in civil society organizations. What the decentralization is capable of doing is familiarizing individuals with formal settings much closer to their daily lives where they can interact and acquire the experience and tools necessary for political mobilization in other areas. These broader implications of the decentralization process will be discussed in the conclusion chapter.

**Structure of the Thesis**

Following the brief presentation of the case and the hypotheses in the introduction, this chapter gave an overview of the theories of decentralization and democratic deepening. The literature review singles out access to resources, power relations within society and past civic experience as being important in shaping the quality of democracy once a regime made the transition to democracy.

Chapter 2 provides a more detailed account of the hypotheses and the measurement of the dependent and independent variables followed by the methodology to test the hypotheses. Chapter 3 outlines the historical context of democracy and decentralization in Turkey. Even though Turkey’s transition to democracy occurred quite early, the quality of its democracy has been hampered
by military coups, restrictive constitutions and state practices. Turkey is an example of how there can be sustained procedural democracy at the national level without allowing space for local initiative and political participation. Chapter 4 depicts the operation of WUAs by delineating their structure, budget and audit mechanisms. Based on the theoretical debate, the historical background and the structure of the WUAs, the second part of Chapter 4 examines the impact of resource and power distribution, education levels and past civic activism on the way associations function and interact with water users. Chapter 5 evaluates the impact of decentralization of irrigation management on democratic deepening in Urfa and Aydin. Chapter 6 summarizes findings from previous chapters, outlines future research prospects in the field of decentralization and democratic deepening and delineates policy prescriptions.
CHAPTER 2 – Democratic Deepening and Performance of Decentralized Institutions: Hypotheses and Measurement

The previous chapter gave a brief overview of the hypotheses and reviewed the theoretical debates on decentralization and democratic deepening. The literature review on decentralization pointed to resources and power distribution as important variables to consider when examining the performance and democratic potential of decentralized institutions. The review of the scholarly work on democratic deepening indicated the importance of examining the civic experience of those involved in decentralized institutions in addition to the resource and power distribution.

This chapter undertakes a more detailed discussion of the hypotheses and the dependent and independent variables. It first gives an account of the measurement of the two dependent variables: the quality of democracy within the WUAs and their performance. Then, the chapter proceeds by outlining the assessment of the four independent variables – access to resources, power dynamics, education levels and civic past. The discussion of the dependent and independent variables will be followed by an elaboration of the justification of case selection, the fieldwork, and the limits of the current study.
Hypotheses and Measurement

I hypothesize that certain contextual features – such as inequality in the distribution of resources and power, low education levels and a weak past civic activism – reduce the likelihood that decentralization will lead to democratic deepening and enhanced performance in service delivery. It can be difficult to separate outcomes that are attributable to decentralization from ones that are due to other changes (Ribot, 2002:8); however, the interaction of farmers with the WUA, instead of the state agency, has the potential of inducing water users to be involved with the running and monitoring of the associations. On paper, the WUAs are to be governed through a democratic structure, which stipulates that the associations be managed by a council of representatives and an executive board selected by the representatives. In practice, the associations can easily become non-representative organizations benefiting the powerful few and not allowing the participation of all water users.

Dependent Variables

It is necessary to separately evaluate the democratic quality of the associations as well as their performance levels and satisfaction of water users in order to understand the impacts of decentralization. It is quite possible that an association could operate efficiently and effectively, without being democratic or encouraging participation by the water users. In this case, the decentralization process would not lead to democratic deepening. Alternatively, an association could operate
democratically, but not perform efficiently or effectively. Therefore, it is necessary to consider these two dependent variables separately while examining the impact of decentralization on democratic deepening.

The Quality of Democracy

My first dependent variable is the quality of democracy and I assess it using an adapted version of Beetham’s (1994:28-29) “democratic audit,” which is a non-composite scale with four main dimensions. The standard practice in political science is to measure democracy through composite scales such as the Freedom House index. These aggregated scales, which produce rankings of regimes ranging from “not free” to “free,” are useful for comparative studies. The weights to be used in aggregating different indices to an aggregate scale, however, are debatable. Moreover, Elklit (1994) argues that ranking countries based on quantitative scales is not appropriate as only an ordinal and multidimensional scale is meaningful.

Furthermore, most composite measures of democracy base their point of reference on the minimal score attained by established Western democracies in evaluating regimes and, as a result, are over-judgmental of other societies (Beetham, 1994:35). Qualitative and non-composite measures of political processes are more accurate in understanding and evaluating a political system. Beetham (1994:31), who views democracy as a continuum, believes that while it is possible to measure some dimensions quantitatively, most political phenomena can only be measured qualitatively. This is the reason why a democratic audit
does not produce a composite index but employs indices of democracy which are evaluated separately. I first review what these dimensions are – see Table 2.1 for a list – and why they are important in assessing democratic quality.

Table 2.1 Four Dimensions of a Democratic Audit (Beetham, 1994: 28-29)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular election of legislature and head of government</td>
<td>Regular open and fair elections free from intimidation and bribery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness and Accountability</td>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accessibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>effective representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>effective scrutiny of executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>oversight of decisions and expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>access to legal forms of redress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil and Political Rights</td>
<td>equal exercise of rights and duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>equally effective exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence of Civil Society</td>
<td>Easy with which citizens can get redress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Availability of participation in all its forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constraints on participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first dimension is popular election of the legislature and the head of government through fair and free elections. The election process should be “free from intimidation and bribery” and information should be available to all parties. Democratic audits examine the extent to which these conditions are satisfied by a regime.
The second dimension is the continuous accountability of government. The precondition for accountability is the availability of knowledge through independent media and the possibility of demanding redress in cases of injustice. This dimension is evaluated in terms of responsiveness, accountability, rule of law, the availability of equal opportunity in appointment to public office, and the territorial dimensions of democracy. Responsiveness of government is measured by examining whether policy-making and implementation involve consultation; whether elected officials are accessible; and whether elected officials represent their constituents’ interests effectively. Accountability is evaluated through the analysis of how effective the legislature is in scrutinizing the executive, overseeing legislation and public expenditure, the accessibility of information on government activities, and how publicly accountable the elected representatives are about their private interests and sources of income. The most important component of the rule of law is how easily citizens can gain access to legal forms of redress and how effective they are.

Civil and political rights, the third dimension, should be guaranteed for the first two dimensions to be meaningful. These rights are necessary if citizens are to gather to form the nexus of civil society. The measures of civil and political rights include indices of citizens’ ability to securely exercise their rights; social, economic or other factors that constrain the enjoyment of these rights; and the effectiveness of procedures for informing citizens of their rights.

“Independence of societal self-organization,” which is the fourth dimension, is very important according to Beetham (1994:30). Autonomy of
social organizations enables citizen groups to influence and monitor government decisions while remaining independent. A society is democratic to the extent that: different social groups and their opinions are represented by the media; private corporations are internally democratic and publicly accountable; citizens are politically aware and willing to participate; and the education system and political culture are democratic.\(^\text{14}\) The assessment of civil society examines the ease with which citizens can get redress, the availability of participation in all its forms and the constraints imposed by social, economic or other factors.

This thesis employs the dimensions in Table 2.2, which are adapted from Beetham (1994), in order to assess the democratic quality of the Water User Associations. The first dimension assesses whether councilors and chairpersons are elected through free and fair elections, which are free from intimidation and bribery. Furthermore, adapting criteria developed for macro-level studies of democratization by Petras and Vieux (1994), a determination of the democratic nature of the irrigation management systems is made based on whether elected officials have the ultimate authority in decision-making, or whether there are non-democratic (e.g. bureaucratic) institutions that shape policy.\(^\text{15}\)

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\(^{14}\) According to studies on political culture and democratization, democracy is more likely in a society where mass participation is achieved in an orderly manner where the government is secular and elite-led (Grugel, 2002:48). Political culture is a slippery term and tends to be employed as the residual explanatory variable. It has been argued that a certain type of political culture inhibits the formation of enduring democracies. However, even though political culture remained constant, several countries became stable democracies just by virtue of the changing international context. Therefore, it is more promising to examine the impact of institutions, acculturation and socialization on democratization. Barber (2003:233) claims that political socialization is a biased and broad term and prefers to refer to conscious forms of learning and political experience.

\(^{15}\) Ozbudun (2000:3) states that “even a minimal procedural notion of democratic consolidation must include the superiority of democratically elected civilian authorities over nonelected ones.” This is especially important for democracy in Turkey as the military – the nonelected “political actor” – has historically assumed the role of the protector of the republic as outlined in Chapter 3.
Table 2.2 Four Dimensions of a Democratic Audit (adapted from Beetham, 1994)

- **Popular election of council and chairperson of WUA**
  - Regular open and fair elections free from intimidation and bribery
  - Elected officials have ultimate say; no imposition from non-elected bodies

- **Openness and Accountability**
  - Responsiveness
    - Consultation
    - Accessibility
    - Effective representation
  - Accountability
    - Effective scrutiny of executive
    - Oversight of decisions and expenditures
      - Transparency of budget
      - Published annual report
  - Forms of Redress
    - Access to legal forms of redress
    - Effectiveness

- **Rights**
  - Equal exercise of rights and duties
  - Equally effective exercise

- **Independence**
  - Ease with which citizens can get redress
  - Availability of participation in all its forms
  - Constraints on participation
    - Economic
    - Social

The second dimension assesses the responsiveness, accountability and forms of redress. Responsiveness of the associations is gauged by examining whether consultations with water users are held regarding important decisions, whether there is effective representation within the associations, and whether the associations are accessible to the water users. The accountability of the associations is evaluated by examining whether there is effective scrutiny of the executive and whether decisions and expenditures are monitored by the
councilors. The transparency of the association budget and the availability of the WUA annual report are key components necessary for the councilors to monitor and scrutinize the executive and the performance of the associations.

The third dimension (rights) evaluates whether all water users are able to effectively exercise and execute their rights and duties. This dimension is assessed by examining the interaction of water users with the WUAs and whether the associations treat all farmers equally in terms of service delivery and fee collection. The last dimension (independence) is concerned with whether citizens can obtain redress easily if they feel they have been wronged and whether there are constraints on participation. Interviews with waters users provide the basis on which this dimension is assessed.

Performance of the WUAs

The second dependent variable in this study is the performance of WUAs, assessed using an adapted version of Grindle’s (2007) scale for the assessment of the performance of local governments in Mexico. Table 2.3 outlines the parameters through which Grindle (2007:57) examined the performance of municipalities in Mexico, and this study will use a modified version of these criteria to assess performance in Turkey (see Table 2.4 and Chapter 5). Grindle argues that increasing competition did not necessarily lead to better governance. Often, conflict over resource distribution and patronage in local government increased as a result of decentralization. Grindle (2007:125) shows that the local
population was more interested in getting tangible benefits from municipalities and was less interested in holding them accountable for their actions.

Table 2.3 Performance criteria of municipalities developed by Grindle (2007:57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Responsiveness</th>
<th>Development Orientation</th>
<th>Change initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic laws and regulations in place</td>
<td>Regular meetings of municipal council</td>
<td>Signage and equitable access</td>
<td>Undertaking complex, long-term or “invisible” public works</td>
<td>Effort to improve the above-mentioned indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational plan for municipal development</td>
<td>Operational system for performance monitoring of personnel</td>
<td>Functioning web site</td>
<td>Use of municipal resources to promote economic development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computerized tax systems</td>
<td>Professionals chosen to head up municipal offices</td>
<td>Council meetings open to public</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Decision rules” for public work projects</td>
<td>Councilors’ own office space</td>
<td>Regular “citizen days”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low “reputation” for corruption</td>
<td>Publicly available budget</td>
<td>Elected sub-municipal officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Efficiency of the associations will be assessed through the examination of the basic laws and regulations that are in place, and the content of the laws in question. I will examine whether the associations have an operational plan, computerized fee collection records and whether they abide by the decision-making rules and processes that are provided by the bylaws. The reputation for
corruption decreases the likelihood that the associations are efficient and this variable will be assessed through interviews with water users, civil society organizations and state bureaucrats. The last dimension of efficiency is the development orientation of the associations, which will be assessed by evaluating the level of maintenance undertaken by the WUAs.

The effectiveness of the WUAs is measured by whether the associations hold regular council and executive committee meetings, whether the executive committee monitors the performance of the association personnel, whether they employ professionals to operate the WUA, and whether the budget and the annual report are available to the public. Two of these dimensions (the council meetings and the annual report/budget) are also significant in the assessment of the democratic performance of the associations. In addition to the parallels between the effectiveness and democratic performance, the responsiveness of the associations is also a measure of both the democratic audit and the performance of the associations. In these ways, operational effectiveness and democratic quality are closely related.

Table 2.4 Performance criteria for WUAs (adapted from Grindle, 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic laws and regulations in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance of laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational plan for the WUA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computerized fee collection records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Decision rules”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low “reputation” for corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undertaking sufficient maintenance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effectiveness
   Regular meetings of WUA council
   Performance monitoring of personnel
   Professionals chosen to operate WUAs daily activities
   Publicly available budget and annual report

Responsiveness
   Equitable access
   Council meetings open to all water users (not only the councilors)

**Independent Variables**

Having discussed the two dependent variables, I will next outline how I assess the independent variables: access to resources, power dynamics, past civic involvement, and education levels.

Access to resources will be assessed through land distribution statistics, the ratio of landless peasants and access of farmers to non-usurious credit. The data for these variables was collected from the State Institute of Statistics (Devlet İstatistik Enstitusu – DIE) and field interviews.

"Power" is conceptualized in its relational form, and power distribution assessed through an examination of the structural and hidden dimensions of power (see Lukes [1974] for a discussion of power). The mechanisms through which power is reproduced vary between provinces: in Urfa the tribal social structure and large families are the causes of skewed power distribution whereas in Aydın it
is the economic power of large farmers. The impact of power is analyzed through material from the interviews, participant observation and secondary sources.

The third independent variable, civic experience, is assessed using a historical analysis of formation, persistence and activities of civil society organizations and levels of mobilization. Crook and Manor (1998) claim that social and political mobilization is important if decentralization is to have a positive impact on institutional performance. Moreover, civil society fosters associational benefits when it is “doubly differentiated from the state and from primary social groupings (families, kinship groups, lineages)” (Heller, 2000:489). The vibrancy of past civic activism is assessed through the number and effectiveness of associations and cooperatives in the two provinces.

The last variable is the education level of farmers. Political scientists have found that education has a significant and positive impact in motivating people to vote and to engage in other types of political participation (see, among others, Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). In the academic literature, the main impact of education was projected to be an increase in political knowledge of the educated individuals. However, studies of political socialization do not provide a clear answer as to how education and political knowledge are related and how the latter impacts participation (Dudley ad Gitelson, 2002). Baiocchi’s (2003:55) study of Porto Alegre shows that lack of education is not related to whether a person can effectively participate in participatory budgeting. Initially, I did not consider education to be an important factor in the examination of decentralized irrigation management. However, the interviewees consistently referred to the
impact of farmers’ lack of education and training as an impediment to the functioning of the WUAs and healthy irrigation practices. Therefore, I decided to include it as a variable in the hypothesis. I assessed education levels through field interviews, and the descriptive statistics collected by DIE on literacy rates and schooling ratios.

Chapter 4 describes these variables in depth in order to test whether resource distribution, power structures, education levels and experience with civic activism lead to differences in the levels of participation in the WUAs and whether performance of service delivery is affected by these variables. The independent variables are interdependent and are not mutually exclusive. They interact with each other such that significant inequalities in resource distribution generally accompany severe power inequalities. Inequalities in access to resources impact education levels as well: those who have fewer resources are less likely to complete compulsory public schooling because they are employed in order to contribute to the family income. Power inequalities generally prevent mobilization of individuals to protect their self-interest or the interests of their community. The cumulative impact of these factors can be detrimental to the emergence of a substantial democracy. Chapter 4 discusses each of these variables, illustrating how the two provinces differ, and how these variables interact with one another to impact the democratic deepening potential of these associations.
Case Justification

The two provinces were selected for the comparative study of irrigation management decentralization for the following reasons. First, differences in the socioeconomic and political contexts of the provinces provide a fertile ground to examine the impact of these differences on how the decentralized institutions work and whether decentralization promotes democratic deepening. Land and power distribution is more egalitarian in Aydin than in Urfa, and this thesis analyzes the impact of these inequalities on the outcome of decentralization as it pertains to the deepening of democracy. Second, state bureaucrats are predisposed to viewing Aydin as having an exemplary management style, and it is important to compare how they fare in comparison to Urfa. Third, there are variations in the states' engagement with these provinces: Aydin, in the west of Turkey, is seen as more advantaged in receiving state investments whereas residents of Urfa feel that they have been left out of the development spree of the republican era (at least until the Southeast Anatolian Project [GAP - Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi] was implemented).

Urfa is situated in one of the least developed regions – in Southeast Anatolia by the Syrian border – and started irrigation in the mid-1990s. The socio-economic gap between Urfa and the rest of Turkey was shown as the prime motivation behind the initiation of the Southeast Anatolia Project, which includes 13 projects for irrigation, 21 dams, 17 hydropower plants, and a potential to

\[Ozbudun\textsuperscript{’s (1976:101) ranking shows that the region which includes Urfa, ranked last in the level of development according to the studies conducted in the 1960s. This did not change in the last four decades. The development trajectory started to change only in the new millennium as a result of irrigation in Urfa.}\]
irrigate approximately 1.7 million hectares (Morvaridi, 1990; Kibaroglu, 2002). Although the project’s main target was the production of hydroelectricity until the end of the 1990s, increasing regional discrepancies, the rising Kurdish unrest and changing attitudes towards large hydroelectric dams pushed the GAP administration to formulate an integrated regional development project-master-plan, which incorporated social and economic developmental goals for the affected regions (Carkoglu and Eder, 2005:170). Increasing income in the region through irrigated agriculture and agriculture-related industrial investments (Tomanbay, 2000) became one of the frequently cited goals of the project. Irrigation, as part of GAP, started in 1995 and the area covered was increased tenfold by 1999 (Ören et al., 2000). The WUAs were established right before irrigation began and the operation and management were immediately transferred to the associations. There was groundwater irrigation in a small section of the Harran Plain prior to 1995. These were operated by the DSI and were transferred to the WUAs beginning in 1995.

Land distribution is skewed in Urfa, and a hierarchical social structure associated with the tribal nature of social organization, referred to as the aşiret system, is in place in this region. Cropping characteristics in the region have changed significantly following the shift to irrigated agriculture and on average 80 percent of arable land is used to cultivate cotton (Akuzum et al., 1997:550; Yildiz,

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17 The level of inequality is high and human development indicators consistently low in comparison to Aydin and Tekirdag (see UNDP Human Development Report of Turkey, 2004). Urfa ranks 68th among 81 provinces in the socio-economic development ranking put together by the State Planning Institution (DPT, 2003).
18 Even though there were changes to the goals and concerns of the project at large, it remained part of the “developmentalism from above” (Carkoglu and Eder, 2005:174) paradigm as the quotes in chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate.
2004:28) whereas in the past most farmers produced wheat and barley. Total agricultural production jumped from $31.5 million to $121 million in one year following the shift to cotton production (Unver and Gupta, 2004:172).

Patterns of landownership have not changed significantly in the region and the share of landlessness among rural inhabitants is 40.3 percent in the GAP region (Karli, 2004). These landless peasants live off sharecropping or work as wage laborers on other people’s fields and do not benefit from the increases in income which resulted from irrigation. The only positive impact for the landless laborers is their ability to find employment in Urfa, whereas prior to irrigation they had to travel long distances to other parts of the country as seasonal agricultural workers (Harris, 2004; Kudat and Bayram, 2000). Urfa has the second most unequal income distribution among seven GAP provinces (Ozcan and Ozlale, 2004:150).

In contrast with Urfa where cotton cultivation began in the latter part of the 1990s, Aydin has produced cotton since the end of the 19th century. Irrigated agriculture in the plains of Soke and Aydin began in the 1950s. At first, cotton fields were irrigated using make-shift pumps that functioned with the power generated by tractors. It required carrying water through pipes over long distances. The irrigation canals of the Soke plain were constructed in the 1980s and irrigation was managed by DSI until it was transferred to the Soke Plain WUA in 1998. The irrigation infrastructure in the Aydin plain was built in the

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19 Economists saw sharecropping as a primitive method of production and argued that it would disappear with modernization. However, as Wells’ (1996) analysis of California strawberry production shows, sharecropping can be a rational response to existing state regulations in agriculture and other industries.
1990s and became operational in 1998, the year in which the Aydin Plain WUA was established.

During the interviews, I stated that I was researching the functioning of the WUAs and never mentioned that I was interested in the impact of decentralization on democratic deepening. Yet, there were many instances where the association personnel indicated that democracy was not compatible with the socioeconomic structure of the Southeast region where Urfa is situated. Table 2.5 shows that per capita GDP is significantly lower in Urfa (see Table A1 in Appendix 1 for the changes in GDP per capita in the 1990s for the three provinces). Despite improvements in the standard of living of landowners, there is still widespread poverty and illiteracy. The province of Urfa is composed of a Kurdish population to the north of the city center whereas the population in the Harran Plain – to the south of the centre – is predominantly Arab. The city-centre and some of the villages in the Harran Plain are turkomans – which is a minority in the region (Sencer, 1992-1993:543).

20 The ratio of population which belongs to different ethnic groups is not exactly known in Turkey since the census stopped asking this question a while ago. According to a survey study done by Erkan (2005:74) 57 percent of Urfa’s population speak Kurdish as a mother tongue as opposed to 13 percent which speak Arabic. Although there is a significant Kurdish presence in Urfa, whose votes go to the Kurdish political party HADEP/DEHAP, the population has not been involved in violent clashes between the military and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). DEHAP received 19.4 percent of the votes in Urfa in the general elections of 2002 behind AK Party which got 23 percent – the governing party with religious affiliations. The Kurdish identity is prevalent in the province but violent conflict has not taken root in the province. Some interview participants attributed this to the flat topography of the province whereas others claimed it is because of the relative economic prosperity of Urfa compared with other Kurdish provinces. PKK is considered a terrorist group by Turkey and has been fighting for political and social autonomy of the Kurdish population residing in Turkey.
Table 2.5 Socio-economic features of Aydin and Urfa (2000)\textsuperscript{21}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urfa</th>
<th>Aydin</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1,443,422</td>
<td>950,757</td>
<td>67,803,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization ratio (%)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>64.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size (# of individuals)</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of working population employed in agriculture (%)</td>
<td>72.80</td>
<td>61.95</td>
<td>48.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (%)</td>
<td>67.60</td>
<td>87.44</td>
<td>87.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate of women (literate women/total # of women-%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>80.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ratio of agricultural product to total agricultural production in Turkey (%)</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>$ 673</td>
<td>$ 1,536</td>
<td>$ 1,535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the level of urbanization is similar in the two provinces, the percentage of working population employed in agriculture is higher in Urfa. This indicates that around 15 percent of Urfa’s urban residents still work in agriculture either as sharecroppers or agricultural wage laborers. This percentage is much lower for Aydin. The share of agricultural production as a proportion of total agricultural production for Turkey for these two provinces is similar: Aydin produces 2.47 percent of total agricultural production and Urfa 2.36 percent. The ratios are small as agricultural production in general is distributed evenly among the provinces that are agriculturally productive. No single province dominates and most provinces provide between 2-3 percent of Turkey’s total agricultural production.

\textsuperscript{21} These figures are from 2000, the year when the last comprehensive census was conducted.
The most significant difference between the two provinces, other than their per capita GDP, is the level of literacy: in Urfa 67.6 percent of males are literate whereas in Aydin this ratio is 87.4 percent. The ratio of illiteracy among women (48 percent) is much higher than that of Aydin (19 percent) and the average for Turkey (19 percent). Overall, these similarities and differences between the two provinces provide a fertile ground for the comparison of decentralized irrigation management.

**Methodology**

This thesis uses the comparative method whereby the cases are selected such that there is maximum variation in the independent variables – inequality in access to resources, unequal power distribution, education levels, past civic activism – and minimum variation in the control variable – the organizational setup of the WUAs (Lijphart, 1975:164). The fieldwork intended to achieve “complex seeing,” as advocated by Bertolt Brecht, by which “he meant something more than despair at the myriad contradictions of the world, instead he wanted to make these contradictions visible and show the causal link between wealth and poverty, money and power, and expose the different sides of the argument in such a way as to encourage debate” (Unwin, 2005:55).

In order to test the hypotheses, I conducted fieldwork in two provinces of Turkey with significantly different socio-economic profiles: Urfa and Aydin (see

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22 See Tables A11, A12 and A13 in the Appendix 1 for education and literacy rates in Urfa and Aydin.
Map A1 in Appendix 3). The fieldwork was conducted in 2005 over a six-month period in Ankara, Aydin, and Urfa (see Table 2.6), and was funded by a Social Science and Humanities Research Award\(^ {23}\) and a Centre for Developing Area Studies grant. The research combined different methods of collecting qualitative data: semi-structured interviews, participant observation and group conversations.

My first visit to the field was in 2004 and I spent one week in Urfa. Through informal chats with farmers and irrigators I tried to construct a preliminary map of the experience of irrigation on the ground.

In 2005, I went to Ankara and conducted research in the libraries of state agencies such as GAP and DSI. I conducted interviews with state officials and examined the theses and research on irrigation (Harris, 2004) and water user associations (Baran, 1996; Cetin, 2003; Kumbaroglu, 2004) that had been conducted over the previous decade in Turkey. Making use of their questionnaires and interview guides, I compiled my own interview guide and modified it based on the first few interviews that I conducted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>June – August 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>August; December 2005</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Following Urfa, I went to Aydin where I employed the same field strategy. I first found a contact through a friend among Aydin WUA farmers and

\(^{23}\) Social Science and Humanities Research Grant, fund number 209741.
interviewed him. Then I interviewed the personnel of the two WUAs: Aydin WUA and Soke WUA. I interviewed the provincial branches of political parties, other agricultural related institutions, chambers of agriculture, agricultural engineers’ chamber, and the chamber of industrialists, among others. Upon my return to Aydin in December, I conducted the farmer interviews by visiting the villages and meeting up with farmers and local authorities.

I returned to Urfa and Aydin in the summers during the three years following fieldwork for brief visits. I talked to a couple of people whom I had interviewed to get their views on how irrigation practices had changed, and kept a record of changes in the decentralized WUAs by talking to a couple of general secretaries and local farmers. In the summer of 2007, as I was doing research for a project on environmental change and forced migration, I was invited by a research team of the Sociology Association of Turkey working on an assessment of the GAP project to a focus group meeting in Urfa. The Sociology Association from Ankara was working on the evaluation of the successes and the failures of the GAP project. The research team convened two focus groups with the stakeholders: one in Urfa and the other in Mardin. Urfa, which houses the regional development agency of GAP, was chosen for the focus group meeting because it is the first province to start irrigation as part of the project.

The focus group discussion gathered many stakeholders from Urfa. There were representatives from DSI, GAP administration, the municipality, WUAs, research institutes and the local university. I was expecting them to follow the official line and present that the project was a success story in increasing incomes
and prosperity in the region; however, they were frank in relaying their observations on the GAP project as having beneficial outcomes but also having shortcomings. Many of the ideas put forward by these stakeholders reaffirmed the findings of this thesis on irrigation management decentralization in Urfa, and the focus group provided an excellent opportunity to listen to the interaction among different stakeholders who, under normal circumstances, would be very difficult to bring together in one place.

**Sampling and Access to Interview Participants**

I used a variety of sampling techniques. I arranged interviews with the general secretaries of all the WUAs and their personnel, and with all relevant state agency bureaucrats. In certain cases they channeled me to other agencies or officials – hence, I used snowball sampling. As for farmer interviews, I employed both theoretical sampling – whereby the researcher collects, analyzes and codes data so as to decide what else to collect (Glaser and Strauss, 2004:226) – and spatial sampling where I visited villages in different locations throughout the plains of Urfa and Aydin in order to talk to the local authorities and farmers in their houses, village squares or coffee houses. I decided to no longer conduct further interviews once I had completed interviews in the predetermined villages. By that time I had already reached saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 2004:229): I was not obtaining additional useful information or acquiring new perspectives on irrigation or social practices.
Gender of the researcher

The gender of the researcher is an important issue in qualitative research (Cook and Fenow, 1990; Bell, Caplan and Karim, 1992). The research areas for this project differ in their social dynamics and gender relations. Turkey, generally, has a patriarchal and male-dominant social fabric, but there are differences between the provinces under examination. Urfa, in the Southeast, does not afford many opportunities for local women to be present in the public space unless they are educated and have a job. In Aydin, women share a more equal part in social and economic life. As a female researcher, it was surprising to have such open access to male spaces in Urfa as well as in Aydin. Male interview participants had no difficulty in sharing their views and talking freely with me. It seemed like my education level and my status as an outsider attributed a “third gender category” to Zeynep-the-researcher.24

The interviewees were mostly male farmers, bureaucrats and academics. I had open access to coffee houses, to the offices of the WUAs – which are male environments – but also to homes of people in the villages, which are mixed environments. During my stay I had a close interaction with women and children of the villages and the city-centre that allowed me to acquire a deeper understanding of the social dynamics of the region. Being a female researcher

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24 By third gender I refer to not being considered as male or female according to how these are locally defined. The third gender category occurred to me when male interview participants started talking to me about their family lives and jealousy between their two wives. I felt the same thing when I was invited to dinner at the sofra (cloth spread on the floor where dinner is served) as a guest with all the other male members of the household and guests. This privileged position is given to almost all female guests who are not from the region – such as teachers of village schools or female engineers etc. This shows that education level of the female counterpart and her origin transforms her gender status. She is able to participate in conversations and events in male public spaces.
opened the world of women and allowed me to understand the social and familial relations in a way that I would not have had otherwise. I was even able to find out my dowry-worth: an old man who owns all the land in his village – which is composed of his household of 60 people – and who has three wives told me that I would be worth at least $13,000 CAD and that had I been a little taller my price would be double.

**Interviews**

I conducted 148 interviews over four months. The general interviews refer to the ones I conducted with bureaucrats, agricultural experts, political party provincial chairs, non-state organizations such as chamber of agriculture, and chamber of industrialists. The WUA interviews refer to interviews I conducted with the personnel and chairs of the associations.

Table 2.7 Number and Types of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Interview</th>
<th># of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Interviews</strong></td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa WUA Interviews</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa Local Authority Interviews</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa Farmer Interviews</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urfa Total</strong></td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin WUA Interviews</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin Local Authority Interviews</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin Farmer Interviews</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aydin Total</strong></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As outlined in Table 2.7, I conducted 65 interviews in Urfa and 30 in Aydin. The difference in the number of interviews is due to the larger number of associations in Urfa (22) than in Aydin (2). There are two reasons for the difference in the number of associations that are present in the two provinces. First, the Harran Plain in Urfa has over 100,000 hectares under irrigation whereas the irrigation schemes in the Soke and Aydin Plains in Aydin cover approximately 50,000 hectares. Second, the associations in Urfa are much smaller in size on average.

The interviews were semi-structured or nonschedule-standardized interviews. This type of interview is also called a “focused interview,” where the interviewer has a list of questions for each interviewee (Denzin, 1989:105; Richards, 1996:201). The interviews aimed at achieving an understanding of others’ construction of reality (Jones, 2004:258). The interviews took place in the houses or workplaces of participants as well as the offices of the WUAs.

Farmers were stimulated to talk on broader issues of social structure and development as well as narrower issues such as irrigation and crop selection. The first few interviews were important in familiarizing me with the farmer’s jargon.

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25 See Appendix 2 for a list of interviews according to different categories. The reference to interviews will be given in the following manner: U Farmer Interview refers to interviews conducted with farmers from Urfa. “A” in an interview reference indicates it is an interview conducted in Aydin. The general interviews were conducted with bureaucrats or experts in Ankara or in the respective provinces. The personal names used in the text are not the real names of the interviewees.

26 In the aftermath of the fieldwork in Urfa, I visited a farmer friend in Mersin (the south of Turkey) and he was very entertained that I could actually speak with the right agricultural jargon when asking questions about irrigation and agricultural production. I wanted to visit his fields and interview him in order to get a sense of how much I was able to understand the farmers.
I did not tape record the interviews because it would have made the respondents less forthcoming in answering the questions. I took notes during the interviews on a note-pad and each night copied them to the computer while also adding the context of the interview setting. I numbered the interviews and removed the names of the interviewees to preserve their anonymity. The list of interviews and their dates are listed in Appendix 2.

**Group Interviews**

Group interviews refer to interviews undertaken with several farmers simultaneously. It is different from a focus group as the small group of farmers that took part in the interview were not purposefully sampled, selected and brought together by the researcher. Instead, they were either sitting at a rural-coffee shop, participating in a meeting on agricultural production or were sitting in the village square or home and agreed to participate in the research. Group interviews provided valuable information that would otherwise be very difficult to obtain, as they facilitated interaction among farmers without the continuous intervention of the researcher. This made it possible for the local dynamics and thought processes to be relayed to the researcher without having to probe the participants with specific questions.

**Participant Observation**

27 The quotes used in the text are not transcriptions from a tape-recorder but rather notes transcribed during the interviews with the participants.
The “observer as participant” has access to a wide range of information (Junker, 2004:224). Participant observation gives the researcher a rich experience and the possibility to “become aware of incongruous or unexplained facts” (Becker and Geer, 2004:249). I was able to sit in the offices of the WUAs and observe the interaction of farmers with the WUA personnel and take notes on their conversations. They were aware that a researcher was in the room as they were talking and this may have affected their attitudes. The variety of information which I derived from these settings constituted a valuable confirmation of the material that I was able to gather through WUA and farmer interviews. Participant observation allows the researcher to be sensitive to subtleties and leads to a better understanding of the context.

**Limits of the Study**

When drawing conclusions from this study, there are at least three limitations which must be borne in mind. The first is that this study is looking at a very particular form of decentralization, of transferring the use of a natural resource to the users. The conclusions that will be drawn will be limited to decentralization of service delivery. They can be broadened to the case of local governments but are less likely to extend to the case of decentralizations where regional governments are introduced or a federal structure is created.
The second limitation is that the study does not have a gender perspective. Therefore, an important type of inequality that will not be dealt with in this thesis is gender inequality. The WUAs are male public spaces and the interviews were conducted predominantly with male farmers. In Urfa, women are not present in the public domain as much as their counterparts in Aydin; however, in agricultural production, women are considered part of the household/family – which is large and socially very important (Sencer, 1992-1993:558-559) and do not participate in irrigation related matters. The feminist understanding that “the personal is political” should be acknowledged for a healthy participatory democracy; however, this discussion cannot be carried out within the boundaries of this thesis. For those interested in the gender dimension, Harris (2004) offers an in depth analysis of gender aspects of large-scale development projects and irrigation in Urfa.

The third limitation of the study is that it can only speak to the situations of landed farmers and those who rent land with a formal contract. Sharecroppers and informal tenants who rent land based on a verbal contract are not part of the WUA constituency and they are excluded from electing the WUA councilors and, therefore, from decision-making and ensuring accountability. As described in Chapter 4 in relation to access to resources, in Urfa this is particularly true, and limits the extent to which WUAs can have democratizing effects.

These constraints should be remembered while reading the thesis and generalizing conclusions from it.
CHAPTER 3 - Democratization and Decentralization in Turkey

This thesis examines whether decentralization can deepen Turkey’s existing yet shallow democracy. Turkey has had a multi-party regime since the 1950s with significant military influence on civilian matters and three military coups (see, for instance, Brown, 1989; Evin, 1994 and Hale, 1994). The modernization reforms implemented in the 1930s and 1940s aspired to establish a democratic regime. However, the procedural democracy that was established in the 1950s failed to transform into a deeper democracy.

This chapter provides an overview of the democratization process experienced in Turkey, and highlights the factors that hampered the enhancement of democratic quality. I argue, in concert with the existing scholarship on Turkey, that the presence of the military as an important political actor, the restrictions on mobilization and participation brought about by the 1980 coup, and the strong, centralized state tutelage are significant impediments to the further deepening of democracy. I nonetheless acknowledge that at the local level, opportunities exist for political actors to advance their interests, and to gain experience and support for national level politics. The examination of these central/local power dynamics points to the importance of local level politics and to the potential of decentralization in deepening democracy.

This chapter gives a historical account of democratization and democratic deepening in Turkey. This historical review examines the central-local power
struggles in order to put decentralization of irrigation schemes into a historical context in Turkey.

**Democratization in Turkey**

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923. Its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, had gradually disintegrated as a result of internal nationalistic movements and the colonization of parts of the Empire by Britain and France. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his followers had a vision that the only way to modernize the country was through “westernization.” Reforms in social, economic and political arenas, which had begun during the last phases of the Ottoman Empire, enabled a rapid transformation of the economy and society. Some of these reforms were resented by the more conservative sections of society, but were nonetheless forcefully implemented.

Discontent with the governing Republican People’s Party (CHP) engendered attempts to establish a multi-party system that could represent the interests of those who were not satisfied with the single-party regime. Although the first few attempts failed (and opposition parties were banned following civil strife), the Democrat Party (DP), founded in 1945, was able to defeat CHP in the elections of 1950.
The victory of DP and its ability to govern and overturn some of the reforms was the beginning of the multi-party democracy in Turkey,\textsuperscript{28} which makes it part of the second wave of democratic transition (Ozbudun, 2000:6). The regime in the latter part of the 1940s was characterized as an “ideological democracy” in contrast to a competitive one (Heper, 1989:1-2) where the intellectual-bureaucratic elite recognized the legitimacy of political governments as long as “their policies conformed to Ataturkism-as-an-ideology.” There were many obstacles in achieving a representative and open democracy.

Despite aspirations for a democratic regime, the strong state tradition in Turkey continued to restrict opportunities for organized action (Toprak, 1995), and the Constitution of 1982 attempted to prevent the deepening of democracy by preventing the mobilization and organization of civil society (see, among others, Bayar, 1996; Kubicek, 2002). As the next section shows, democratic performance in Turkey is tainted with the impact of non-democratic forces.

**Democratic Performance of Turkey**

Political participation in Turkey is high in some respects, such as voter turnout rates (80 percent on average since 1950),\textsuperscript{29} but remains low in all other areas – such as membership in political parties, active involvement with local governments and protests or demonstrations. Adaman and Carkoglu (2001) state


\textsuperscript{29} http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm accessed on 11 April 2005. One explanation for the high voter turnout is the compulsory nature of voting. More important in sustaining a high voter turnout is the nature of political conflicts between cleavages in Turkey.
that the multi-party regime did bring about expanded political participation but failed to get citizens involved in decision-making processes.

Kalaycioglu (2005:198) claims that Turkey is “a secular democracy operating in a society and culture deeply divided into profane/mundane versus sacred/spiritual, into Alevi and Sunni sectarian communities, into anticlerical and clerical groups, into Kurdish and Turkish ethnic nationalists, into ethnic versus civic nationalists, and into leftist versus rightists.” The institution of democratic principles in Turkey was fuelled by concrete goals, and was seen as a means to achieve westernization, modernization, economic development and social development. Heper (1991:17) argues that democracy was adopted as a natural component of modernization in Turkey and not as a response to rising social pressure.

This overarching project was not implemented gradually but forced upon the population through the Kemalist elite consensus. Hence, there was an elitist approach to the political and economic project for redesigning the future of the country. Even political parties, which should ideally aggregate and represent the interests of social groups, were simple vessels through which elite conflict occurred (Heper, 1985:104). This top-down project did not leave much space for citizen participation when the demands of the latter differed from those of the elites. When citizenship is granted in a top-down manner, the citizens tend to be passive actors within that democracy (Turner, 1994). This has been the case in Turkey, with the exception of labor unions and leftist revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 1970s.
There was a 20-fold increase in the number of associations between 1950 and 1980, even when the rise in population is accounted for (Ozbudun, 1976:94). This increase was engendered by the increased unionization among workers. Ozbudun states that the ratio of population to the number of associations was greater in provinces with less socio-economic development, which indicates a “positive relationship between socio-economic development and the intensity of associational activity” (Ozbudun, 1976:94). Overall, though the advent of a multi-party regime in Turkey did result in an increase in political participation, this was mostly limited to voting turnout, as the leader-dominated system made use of clientelistic ties with kinship networks, religious and ethnic groups (Adaman and Carkoglu, 2001).³⁰

This liberal phase in Turkey was brought to an end when mobilization started to endanger the stability and durability of the regime. The military, seen as the guardian of the republic, ventured in to protect the regime and put an end to “excessive mobilization.” Ultimately, the centralized unitary state system employed a number of measures that prevented meaningful participation of its citizens. The most significant were the restrictive nature of the elitist state tutelage, which closed many aspects of public life to political debate, and the presence of the military in political decisions, which was strengthened by the institutional legacy of the 1980 military coup.

³⁰ The parties in Turkey are not well institutionalized in the sense that loyalty is to the party leader and not to the party program – personalities attract more attention and more votes than the program of the party (see among others Cornell 2001, 57; Sayarı 2002a, 3).
**Strong state tutelage:** The strong and centralized state apparatus was weary of social mobilization of any kind. Keyman (2005:40) denotes that Turkish modernity was “state-centric” and defined society on the basis of duties toward the state. The state-centric model of associational life in Turkey meant that civil society organizations were not independent from the state (Keyman, 2005:42). Heper (1991:16) claims that formal controls and tutelage over professional chambers and civil society organizations of the 1940s were rendered informal in the liberal post-1960 era. This, in turn, fostered clientelistic relationships between individuals and the state as the former sought direct contact with the latter instead of going through associations which were manipulated by the state (Heper, 1991:17).

Even economically strong groups felt disempowered vis-à-vis the state as emphasized by a businessman who states that they never challenge “devlet baba” (state as a father), fearing that it will not bode well for them (Heper, 1985:103). Since the Ottoman modernization efforts, citizenship was experienced as a top-down project whereby the citizens were to serve the interests of the state prior to thinking about their freedoms and rights (Keyman, 2005:41; Caymaz, 2007). This republican model of citizenship did not emerge as a result of social and political struggles but was imposed by the state (Caymaz, 2007).

**The Role of the Military:** The military sees itself as the protector of the republic and has interrupted the democratic system three times – in 1960, 1971 and 1980 (Benli Altunisik and Tur, 2005:205). In each case, the military did not stay in
power for long and handed power over to civilian governments. However, the military is still an important actor in politics, and this is the reason that Turkey is not considered a consolidated democracy (see Tachau, 2002). The military’s power is still visible through its declarations that forced democratically elected governments to resign or call for early elections in 1997 and 2007 respectively. The presence of internal threats, such as the Kurdish issue and the rise of political Islam, are the main excuses of the military for its involvement in politics for the last 20 years. Despite reforms that are taking place as part of the EU accession negotiations, the military is still a significant actor impacting democratic governance, through institutions like the National Security Council, composed of military and civilian members, and which oversees that the policies implemented are in line with the “interests” of the republic.

1980 military regime: The coups of 1960 and 1971 were significant in changing the regime but the most influential in terms of affecting democratic quality was the 1980 coup. The military junta of 1980 appointed a council to prepare a new constitution. The last changes to the new constitution were made by the National Security Council (Parla, 2002:33). It was effectively forced upon the people through a referendum, where the vote cards were of different colors and the color

31 The transition to democracy in 1960 coup occurred a year later. The 1971 is characterized as a half-coup by Ozbudun (2000:24) as it did not suspend the constitution, dissolve the parliament or outlaw political parties. Transition to democracy in the last military take-over began in 1983. The difference between the 1960 and 1980 coups are that in the earlier one the military commissioned a new constitution and a new electoral law and passed few other laws whereas the later one passed more than 600 laws (Ozbudun, 2000:26) in addition to commissioning a new constitution which blocked Turkey’s democratic consolidation for many years to come in the name of stability.
could be seen through the envelope if the person voted against the new constitution.

Parla’s (2002:46) analysis of the constitutions of Turkey points out that the 1982 constitution rescinded some of the rights and freedoms accorded by the 1961 constitution.\(^{32}\) The latter was found “a size too big”\(^{33}\) for Turkey’s conditions and was seen as the source of the clashes between the right and left youth movements. The transition to democracy began in 1983 with the elections, which brought a civilian government to power. The 1982 constitution gave the president – who normally has ceremonial powers in a parliamentarian system – the role of a strong executive. The working class was demobilized and society at large depoliticized by the National Security Council regime (Ozbudun, 2000:27).\(^{34}\)

The Constitution restricted the freedom of demonstration by making it dependent on permission, and allowing the governors of provinces to ban demonstrations if they feared that these might pose a threat to national security or to the regime (Parla, 2002:54). Foundations, associations and professional organizations were prevented from organizing events that were outside their activity area in order to prevent their politicization. Political parties were not

\[^{32}\] By restricting the rights of organized groups, the 1982 constitution prepared the ground for the smooth progression of neoliberal reforms to liberalize and deregulate the economy while privatizing public enterprises. Bugra (2007:49) argues that objections to liberalization of the economy that had the potential to hurt some segments of the working class were quieted down through repressive legislation introduced by the military government.

\[^{33}\] The claim was that Turkey was not ready for a constitution which granted individuals rights and freedoms without restrictions. The 1961 constitution granted many organizational rights which were seen as the source of the conflicts that inflicted Turkey’s social and political scene in the latter part of the 1970s.

\[^{34}\] The goal of the new constitution was to establish a depoliticized society through the establishment of Council of Higher Education in order to control the universities whose faculty cannot engage in politics and enabling the government to confiscate publications that are deemed dangerous (Sunar and Sayari, 1986:184).
allowed to have formal contact with labor unions or other associations and the latter were banned from engaging in politics (Parla, 2002:60, 64). Overall, the aim of the state apparatus and the military was to minimize collective political activities (Parla, 2002:62). Some of these restrictive clauses were removed through constitutional amendments in 1995 and 2001, but a civilian constitution prepared in consultation with civil society groups is still missing.

At the first election following the military coup, Motherland Party of Turgut Ozal received 45 percent of the votes in opposition to two other military-backed political parties (Benli Altunisik and Tur 2005:45-46). This was important in showing the reaction of citizens to the military rule. It also decreased military’s control of the transition process (Sayari, 2002:16). The victory of the central-right Motherland Party was also indicative of the desire of voters to be governed by a centrist party which pulled some Islamists and nationalists into the centre (Benli Altunisik and Tur 2005:46).

The coup of 1980 and the new constitution limited the activities of civil society organizations and their link to politics (Ozbudun, 2000:27). Collective rights and freedoms – such as the right to organize, demonstrate and form unions – were severely restricted (Tanor, 2005:51). Even though some of these “illiberal provisions of the constitution” were overturned in 1995, there has been only a minimal increase in the number of associations, as many civic organizations prefer to remain unofficial in order to avoid the restrictive legal structure imposed
by the law on associations and foundations.\textsuperscript{35} Despite restrictions in associational life, the post-1980 period saw the rise of new movements such as human rights, environmental, feminist and gay movements. The space available for mobilization and civic initiative has expanded as a result of these organizations and movements (see, for instance, Arat, 1994 for the case of women’s movement in Turkey).

Concurrently, the “periphery”\textsuperscript{36} was able to mobilize through Islamist, Kurdish and the Turkish ultranationalist movements during the same period (Benli Altunisik and Tur, 2005:49). A recent study on civil society in Turkey argues that despite the increasing numbers and impact of civil society organizations in recent years, there is scant citizen participation in these organizations (Bikmen and Meydanoglu, 2006). Furthermore, Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan (2000:493) claim that, in the 1990s, while civil society has demonstrated a greater willingness to express grievances and voice demands, the state has simultaneously become increasingly insulated from popular pressures. Hence, while there are increasing demands for democratic deepening, the target of these demands, the state, is losing its governing capabilities and regulatory mechanisms through privatization, deregulation and liberalization of the economy.

\textsuperscript{35} A new law on associations was legislated in 2004 and the one on the foundations is pending in parliament (Bikmen, 2006:31). It should be mentioned that these laws do not apply to the WUAs and these associations which are set up for irrigation purposes are not considered to be part of civil society organizations.

\textsuperscript{36} Serif Mardin (1973) was the first scholar to use the centre-periphery concept to analyze the political cleavages in Turkey. At the outset of the republic, the centre is composed of the political bureaucratic elite whereas the periphery is made up of non-elite business and agricultural sectors of society. Bureaucratic elite was in charge until the 1950s and the Ottoman tradition of the political centre versus the weak bourgeoisie continued (Heper, 1985). Many scholars employed the centre-periphery concept thereafter as a useful framework for understanding politics in Turkey. See, among others, the edited volume by Sayari and Esmer (2002) on elections in Turkey.
The political party structure is another impediment to a deepening of democracy. In most cases political parties are detached from civil society in Turkey. This detachment implies that electoral stability is not an indication of a consolidated democracy but rather the continuation of vertical clientelistic networks to attract votes (Ozbudun, 2000:78-83). Furthermore, the internal structure of political parties is not democratic in Turkey and the party leader has the upper hand in determining the candidates prior to elections. These prevent meaningful participation of citizens in politics.

Political activism was reduced significantly as a result of restrictive policies in the post-coup period. Political parties changed their voter mobilization tactics by using media campaigns rather than individual recruitment. In the post-1980 period, only religiously-oriented parties continued recruiting support through extensive door-to-door canvassing (Ozbudun, 2000:84; Sayari, 2002:24).

In terms of politics and party dynamics, a significant difference between the Southeastern region and the rest of Turkey is the presence of the Kurdish movement. The PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was established in the late 1970s and gained strength in the post-1980 period as the repression of the military regime was especially brutal in this region against the Kurds. As PKK attacks on the military intensified, the state's response was solely militaristic, and the movement portrayed merely as a bunch of terrorists demanding secession. In order to strengthen the military response, armed village guards were employed by the state and a state of emergency, lasting 15 years, was declared in the eastern provinces (Benli Altunisik and Tur, 2005:53).
Even though Urfa never experienced terrorist activities or emergency rule, it was subjected to the restrictive atmosphere of the Southeast as it has a significant Kurdish population. The struggle between the army and the PKK came to a halt as a result of reforms that afforded the Kurdish population cultural and linguistic rights, but the implementation of these measures was slow and insignificant, and peace hard to achieve without coming to terms with the death of 30,000 people, the evacuation or burning of 3,000 villages and the migration of three million people from the region to the cities in the West of Turkey (Benli Altunisik and Tur, 2005:54).

As the above discussion indicates, the passive citizenry emanating from a top-down democratization process was further depoliticized through strong state tutelage and consecutive military coups. Cizre-Sakallioglu and Yeldan (2000:498) describe the state of democracy in Turkey at the outset of a new millennium as follows:

[C]ivil society has some latitude but no real strength; the parliament contains oppositional forces but has no real authority; the judiciary operates with some independence at times but is by and large politically controlled; the media can uncover the dark connections between organized crime and state security forces, ranging from unknown murders to drug smuggling, but is itself oligopolistically owned and prone to using nationalist and populist influences to sway the people. The ability of civilians to control the military is weak, but the polity is not a military regime. (…) These contradictory components make an unambiguous characterization of the Turkish political system difficult. The public sphere is clearly weak and ineffective, but the political class which wields power observes enough democratic procedures not to be considered totally undemocratic.
Were democracy in Turkey evaluated on the basis of the criteria outlined in Chapter 2, it would only qualify as a democracy to a certain extent. The first criterion, that the legislature and leaders be popularly elected in free and fair elections, does not pose any problem for Turkey. With the exception of the election in 1945, there has been no contestation of electoral results. The second dimension of a democratic audit includes responsiveness (consultation, accessibility and effective representation), accountability, and rule of law. In these respects, Turkey has major shortcomings.

Consultation with citizens is a recent phenomenon and in certain issue areas it is not welcomed. Government and representatives are accessible through personalized networks and it is hard to claim that there is effective representation, especially because of party discipline. Further limiting the representativeness of the system is the continuous influence of the military in politics. Governments have been urged out through memoranda given by the Turkish Armed Forces.

Civil and political rights, which constitute the third dimension of a democratic audit, are not equally exercised in Turkey. Hence, a democratic audit of Turkey would conclude that it is a weak democracy. Decentralization has the potential of solving these problems by dispersing political power that was previously confined to the centre. The next section examines the central-local power dynamics in Turkey.
Central-Local Power Dynamics in Turkey

Turkey is a unitary and centralized state governed by a parliamentary system. The office of the president, the council of ministers and the ministries are the central administrative organizations in Ankara. The provincial administration represents the central state in the provinces. The governor of each province (vali) is appointed by the council of ministers and should be approved by the president. Koker (1995:58) argues that the top-down modernization strategy of the Republic of Turkey was tainted with contradictions: a modern society was forced into existence within an authoritarian-centralized political framework. Whereas Esmer (1989:47) claims centralization was seen as necessary for rapid economic development, Heper (1989:4-5) argues that the distrust of local autonomy was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Under these circumstances, a strong, centralized, and highly bureaucratic state apparatus emerged (Ozbudun, 2000:7).

The concept of local municipalities existed in the Ottoman Empire as far back as the 1860s, but their powers and responsibilities were very limited. The law that regulated the municipalities in the Republic of Turkey (Law No. 1580, 03.04.1930) gave many powers and duties to the local governments without giving them the necessary budgetary allocations (Klein, 1982:70-75). Eventually, these duties were slowly appropriated by the central government and the municipalities were entrusted with only the basic services such as garbage collection, sewage, transportation and basic health services.

\[37\] In the Ottoman Empire local councils had been founded in 1840 and were strengthened with the restructuring of the Ottoman local governments in 1864 (Guler, 2006:116-129).
In Turkey, local authorities are public corporate entities and are divided into three categories: provincial administration, municipalities and villages. There are approximately 3,000 municipalities with elected mayors and municipal councils (Incioglu, 2002:74-75). Despite the presence of municipalities and regular local elections, the central government influences local government decisions, transactions, composition and personnel (Heper, 1989:4). Furthermore, the central government allocates and determines a significant portion of the local governments’ budget. Between 1946 and 1960 local strongmen were still dominant across the country and the presence of local councils whose members were elected presented an opportunity for the local elite to capture the local governments. Guler (2006:241) argues that the reason for strong state tutelage of the municipalities lies in the attempt of the state to prevent these elites from using their position to the detriment of urban development, which required the transfer of labor power and resources from agriculture to industrial sectors.

Migration to the cities, which started in the 1950s, increased the importance of municipalities.\textsuperscript{38} Mayors demanded more power and resources from the centre in order to cope with rapid urbanization and rising urban concerns (Incioglu, 2002:76). The tension between the central government and local governments reached a new height with the New Municipality Movement of the 1970s, which was undertaken by the elected mayors from the Social Democratic Parties. They sought more autonomous, productive and participatory municipalities (Goymen, 1982:139).

\textsuperscript{38} The share of urban population increased from 25 percent in the 1950s to 43.9 percent in 1980 (Bugra, 2007:43). The mechanization of agriculture in the 1950s transformed agricultural laborers who migrated to the cities to cheap industrial workers (Aydin, 1986:58)
This movement served as the basis for demands to increase decentralization by strengthening the financial base of municipalities and by allowing them to be more independent in their decision-making. Some positive changes were made in making the municipalities more participatory, but the reform movement faced “an indifferent if not hostile and/or inappropriate political, cultural and bureaucratic context” (Heper, 1989:7). They were discredited when their financial resources were cut by the right wing central government (Goymen, 1982:139, Finkel, 1990:191). The movement was thus thwarted by the hostile central government but the “administrative experience accumulated by this ‘Municipal Movement’ survived into the 1980s” (Finkel and Sirman, 1990:13).

The 1980 military coup suspended all political activity including the functioning of local governments. They were re-activated in 1982 when the new constitution was enacted. The prevailing fear of political activism pushed the military to triple the financial resources of the municipalities in order to prevent the mobilization of local residents and their municipal representatives because of a lack of services. The legitimacy of the military coup was based on the chaotic environment caused by the political activism and left-right clashes of the pre-coup era. Under these circumstances the military regime increased funding of the municipalities as a means to reduce mobilization and demands for participation. Financial reforms in the 1980s allowed municipalities to raise funds through private credit. The mismanagement of these funds led to severe financial crises in
some municipalities. The changes of the 1980s did not increase the powers of the municipalities or local participation to a large extent.

The 1982 Constitution maintained the power of the judiciary to audit and impeach popularly elected local authorities, and accorded the Ministry of the Interior the authority to suspend local authorities under investigation. In a way, this move can be seen as strengthening the central state vis-à-vis local governments (Parla, 2002:98). While the state was retreating in economic domains through deregulation and privatization, there was concentration of governmental powers in other areas. Ozbudun (2000:136) argues that this centralization of power restrained interest articulation by civil society organizations including major economic interest groups. The central government was using extraordinary powers to legislate and steer economic and political life, and there was a perception that civil society was allowed only so long as it was not political in nature.

The 1990s witnessed a new development and actor in municipal politics: the religiously oriented party – first the Welfare Party, then the Virtue Party and finally the Justice and Development Party. The religious movement conquered local politics by referring to justice and redistribution and had their mayors elected in large and important cities like Istanbul as well as smaller towns. This created the split vote between local and general elections. Votes are split when the electorate has a differing choice of parties between the local elections and general elections. In the late 1990s, the outcomes of local elections differed from national electoral patterns as the voters, who were concerned with the quality of municipal
governance beyond partisanship, voted for political parties successful in local government despite their disagreements with this party’s political ideology (Incioglu, 2002:76-77). Religiously-oriented political parties benefited from the post-1980 period, and strengthened their cadre and local links through successful mobilization techniques and unprecedented municipal service delivery. The election of Justice and Development Party (AKP) to two consecutive terms of government is based on the success of their municipal organization and efficiency. Hence, the success of AKP is an indication of the importance of local politics in influencing national outcomes.

When AKP formed the government in 2002, it attempted to reform local authorities by updating the municipality law (Law No. 1580) that had been in effect since 1930, and which constituted one component of local governance structure. The two other components were the Village Law (Law No. 442) from 1924 and the Provincial Local Administration for which the legal framework was set in 1913. The World Bank and the European Union had been encouraging Turkey to transform its local government system since the late 1980s (Guler, 2006:11). The administrative tutelage of the central state was to be reduced by the new legislation, which had been under development since 1996.

The new law aimed at the contracting out of municipal service provision across Turkey. The goal was to facilitate the integration of local settings with the globalized economy and allow local governments to construct a welcoming environment to attract foreign direct investment (Guler, 2006:9). This was in line with the new conceptualization of municipalities by international donors such as
the World Bank. This new model of local governance is based on the premise that public resources are limited, and this necessitates the recourse to financial markets and commercialization of service provision to fund local governance (Guler, 2006:262).

However, the new municipal legislation, which was accepted in 2005, led to widespread debate in Turkey. Civil society organizations, state bureaucrats, academics as well as other interested parties had diverging opinions on the extent of powers the local governments should possess. There were even those who claimed that giving so much power to the municipalities was preparing the ground for a federal system (Keles, 2006). The perpetual fear of Kurdish separatism in Turkey makes the state suspicious of any act which effectively decentralizes power to local levels. The new legislation gives municipalities a more active role in promoting local development. They are now able to use municipal lands as they see fit and can give incentives to investors who invest in their city. All municipalities with populations above 50,000 are responsible for having strategic plans.

Decentralization reforms in Turkey are not restricted to the municipal level or the transfer of irrigation management to the users. The decentralization of development planning is under way following the establishment of regional development agencies in 2006. This reform was spearheaded by the European Union and its regional development funds. The main goals are to establish

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39 Law No. 1580 was replaced by Law No. 5272 in 24.12.2004 but was cancelled by the Constitutional Court due to procedural mistakes during legislative voting in the parliament. The current law No 5393 has been in effect since 13.07.2005.
cooperation among public institutions (central and local authorities; universities),
the private sector and civil society. According to the State Planning Organization,
which provides coordination in development planning at the national level, there
will be 26 regional development agencies in Turkey. Irrigation management
decentralization, which has been under way for more than a decade, can provide
valuable lessons for the future decentralization reforms. The conclusion chapter
elaborates on the implications of findings of decentralization reforms in Turkey.

This chapter examined the history of democratization in Turkey and the
factors that prevent a deepening of democracy. The first major deterrent of a
meaningful democracy is the role of the military in politics, and the three military
interventions in the 20th century. In conjunction with the strong military and
subservient civilian government, the citizenry of the republic was not very active.
The conception of citizenship in Turkey was predominantly one where individuals
saw themselves as burdened with duties towards the states without making direct
and political claims of their rights. The process of decentralization has the
potential of making the citizenry more active by giving them the opportunity to
participate at local decision-making levels.

This chapter showed that despite long-term maintenance of procedural
criteria that define democracy, Turkey cannot be considered a full-fledged
democracy according to a Democratic Audit. The chapter also showed that the
local level has gradually become an important arena for political participation and
contestation in Turkey. This thesis will complement studies of democratic
deepening in Turkey by examining the organizations which were established at the local level in order to enable the self-management of irrigation water by users.
This chapter describes the process of decentralization in the irrigation sector in Turkey, including the structure, responsibilities, budget, and audit process for the water user associations. This foundation is then used in the discussion and assessment of the independent variables, including access to resources, power relations, past civic involvement and education levels.

**Decentralization of Irrigation Management in Turkey**

In Turkey, State Hydraulic Works (DSI) is the state agency responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of large-scale irrigation infrastructure (Unver and Gupta, 2002). Historically, State Hydraulic Works operated the irrigation schemes through a top-down approach with very low levels of farmer participation. Cost-recovery rates for the irrigation projects were very low,
averaging only 10 percent (Akuzum et al., 1997:552). In many cases, maintenance was not (and could not be) performed due to a lack of funds, and the long-term sustainability of these projects depended on significant changes being made.

The director of the DSI Operation and Maintenance Department asserts that the DSI Act of 1954, which modeled DSI based on the USA's Bureau of Reclamation, allowed for the transfer of management of state-owned infrastructure to local user associations. In 1964, only very small-scale irrigation systems were transferred to the users, and it was not until 1993 that any significant developments occurred on this front (Cevikbas, 2001:98; General Interview #10).

In line with the neo-liberal measures to reduce state involvement in the provision of services, the operation and maintenance of irrigation infrastructure was transferred to water users starting in 1993 (Kudat, 1996). The number of irrigation management transfers and the type of institution to which the transfer was made are given in Table 4.1 below. There was a sharp increase in the number of transfers to the WUAs beginning in 1993, and by 2002, a total of 1.5 million hectares had been delivered to user associations.

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40 This model of irrigation management transfer was inspired by the Mexican example (Palerm-Viqueira, 2004). World Bank promoted decentralization of irrigation since 1989 in Mexico (Whiteford and Melville, 2002:17). Officials from the State Hydraulic Works traveled to Mexico a few times under the guidance of the World Bank in order to see the functioning of that system on the ground (Svendsen and Nott, 1999).
The literature review in Chapter 1 demonstrated that international
development agencies typically favor decentralization efforts throughout the
developing world. Table 4.2 below shows that the WUAs are the preferred type of
institutions in the decentralization process in Turkey. Of all the land where
irrigation management was delegated to local institutions, 89% was transferred to
WUAs, with only 11% going to all other management institutions (such as village
and municipality councils). Furthermore, the table shows that the average area of
irrigation controlled by the WUAs is 5,246 hectares and is much larger than the
area controlled by other types of institutions. Therefore, it is important to examine
the case of WUAs in decentralization of irrigation management as they govern the majority of the decentralized irrigation.

Table 4.2 Distribution of Area of Transferred Irrigation According to Institutions (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/Organization</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Average Irrigated Area (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Village Authority</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>36,985</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>57,338</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>1,626,286</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>5,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>74,355</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Service Unions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>30,249</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>755</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,826,245</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The head of the operation and management transfers department at the DSI states the reason for the establishment of the WUAs as follows:

There have been major changes in Turkey following 12 September [1980 military coup]. The concept of state was debated again. They said state should shrink and this process started with the service sector. The budgets were cut. We started nation-wide trainings in 1993 and measured whether we could transfer large-scale projects or not. It was decided that we could. We declared Adana, Antalya, Konya and Izmir as pilot provinces. While we were planning in this manner the process accelerated and transfers took place everywhere. In 1993 we transferred 10,000 hectares. In 1994 200,000 hectares and in 1995 700,000 hectares were transferred. Normally we were expecting to reach this amount by the year 2000. (General Interview #10).

Baran (1996:142) claims that DSI’s budget allocations kept on increasing following the transfer process in 1993. He claims that this is paradoxical but one should not forget that DSI cannot just lay off its personnel. It can only re-allocate them and wait until they retire for there to be a decrease in the budgetary pressure caused by DSI’s personnel expenditures.
As the above quote illustrates, very little time elapsed between the decision to decentralize and the implementation of this decision. A GAP bureaucrat recognized that control over the transfer process was effectively lost by DSI during the first few years of decentralization (General Interview #11). The same employee noted that while the GAP administration had undertaken a study of the Southeast prior to the start of irrigation to develop a model compatible with the social structure and climate, their recommendations were ignored during the decentralization process. Having analyzed the models developed and implemented in countries such as Mexico, France, Spain and the USA while also studying the features of the region, they had developed the GAP-MOM (Southeast Anatolian Project-Management, Operation, Maintenance) model (Akuzum, Kodal and Cakmak, 1997:553), which differed from the structure of the WUAs. These studies, which aspired to tailor the institutions to the specific circumstances of the Southeast region, were disregarded during the transfer and WUAs were accepted as the blueprint model.

In the WUA model there are permanent seats for local authorities whereas the GAP-MOM model would have incorporated all users to play an active role in the associations and to participate in the elections. A GAP bureaucrat believes that this model is possible within any type of organizational structure – whether it is an association, a cooperative or a company – yet according to him, the most appropriate structure for participatory management is the cooperative (General Interview #11). However, cooperatives are not very popular in Turkey, and many people have had negative experiences with cooperatives, especially in the housing
sector. As many of the interviews in Urfa indicate, cooperatives are largely distrusted in that region because of the negative experiences with cooperatives in the 1970s, where many collected money from the contributors and then vanished.

The irrigation cooperatives are ruled by direct democracy and all the irrigators are part of the cooperative decision-making council. Therefore, the size of the irrigation scheme constrains the possibility of cooperative formation (some of the WUAs in Urfa and Aydin have up to 3,000 users). It was only in provinces where the cooperative movement was strong and the irrigation scheme size small that irrigation cooperatives were formed and took over the operation and maintenance of the schemes.

At the outset of the decentralization process, there was an open debate between the Ministry of Agriculture which supported the formation of cooperatives and the Ministry of the Interior and DSI which favored the WUA structure. The latter was preferred because WUAs were operated by existing elected local authorities, and this was deemed to be more efficient than electing all the representatives among water users. Furthermore, this type of organization did not challenge the existing authority structure.

Harris (2005:186) claims that state agencies expected positive outcomes from the WUAs in Turkey. WUAs were expected to increase efficiency, to promote sustainability of irrigation resources, and to establish horizontal networks among farmers, especially in the Southeast of Turkey. This expectation was based on the belief that WUAs, which are in charge of providing irrigation services to
their members, would provide the first experience of horizontal associations – especially in the Southeast – rather than the vertical tribal or kinship ties.

Horizontal networks are seen as necessary to transform the rigidity of tribal hierarchies in the Southeast, reduce social inequalities and increase communication among farmers (Kudat and Bayram, 2000).42 In order for WUAs to have such a democratizing impact, farmers should be able to take part in the management of irrigation. This research explores whether water users have the power to hold the WUA accountable, monitor the work done by the executive, and pressure their representatives for changes.

Some observers of the WUAs in Turkey believe the farmers have not developed a sense of ownership of the system. The vice-governor of Urfa responsible for the local authorities had just returned from a training visit to the USA organized for the chair and personnel of the WUAs in Urfa. He stated that what struck him the most was that irrigation associations in the USA paid back the amount invested by the state. “Here [in Turkey], the state builds and then transfers” he said, and added that if farmers were to contribute to the cost of construction they would feel ownership of the system (General Interview #12).

The vice-governor failed to mention the special status of the Southeast as one of the least developed regions in Turkey. This is the reason why there is no scheduled re-payment of the investment cost to the DSI. The cabinet will decide when the repayment will begin for the case of Urfa. On the contrary, in Aydin, the

42 Skidmore (2000) claims that horizontal associations tend to have a more positive impact on collective action and development than vertical associations that rest upon exploitation and coercion.
repayment has already begun (A Interview #4). Soke Plain irrigation scheme was set up in the 1980s and the repayment had begun prior to the founding of the association. Following the establishment of the WUA, the association paid the last installments to DSI in 2002 and completed the repayment. The Aydin Plain WUA, where repayment began after the establishment of the association, is in charge of paying 87,000YTL each year for 31 years (A Interview #7).

The state agency – State Hydraulic Works – maintains ownership of the resource infrastructure. The responsibility for the secondary and tertiary canals is transferred to the WUAs. Even though irrigators are in charge of the management, technical staff is hired to carry out the operation of the system (Palerm-Viqueira, 2004). The legal standing of the WUAs is usually guaranteed by an enabling law, which authorizes its establishment, and the transfer agreement between the state agency and the WUA. In the case of Turkey the transfer of irrigation management to the associations progressed much faster than planned. In 1995 alone the area transferred was three times that of the yearly plan. There was no opportunity to prepare an enabling law that would be the legal foundation for the associations. The associations were established using a patchwork of the Village Act (No. 442), the Local Government Act (No. 1580) and the Provincial Governance Act (No. 5442). Currently, approximately 95 percent of all irrigation

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43 Prior to the foundation of the association, DSI was in charge of collecting the irrigation fees from water users. These fees were partially used for the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure and partially to pay the investment back to DSI central budget.

44 87,000 New Turkish Lira is approximately $72,500 CAD.

45 WUAs were created in cases where the irrigation scheme covered more than one village (Svendsen, 2001). In other cases it was the village administration which took over the operation and management responsibility.
systems constructed by DSI have been transferred to user associations throughout Turkey (A Interview #7).

Responsibilities of the WUAs

When the Ministry of the Interior approves the formation of a new WUA, standard bylaws have to be adopted and approved by the association council. The WUAs are in charge of collecting the water demand forms before the beginning of each irrigation season (usually in April) and forwarding the total demand to the state agency (DSI) which is responsible for allocating the amount of water from the reservoir. According to the bylaws, the WUA is responsible for distributing water, maintaining the canals and collecting the fees within its zone. The associations differ in their ability to bring water on time to all users within their districts (Kudat and Bayram, 2000).

During the off-season (between November and April) the associations are responsible for maintaining and cleaning the secondary, tertiary, and drainage canals that carry the water to and from the fields under their jurisdiction. The technicians and workers of the association carry out repair work in order to ensure effective water distribution.

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46 The associations are set up by the local authorities in an irrigation zone and apply to the DSI in order to sign the transfer agreement and protocol which gives them the right to collect fees and assigns them the responsibility to distribute water and maintain the canals. DSI maintains the ownership of the systems and can dissolve the associations if appropriate operation and maintenance are not guaranteed (A Interview #7).

47 The transfer agreement is signed between DSI and the WUA and determines the responsibilities of the association (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000a:2.3)

48 Secondary canals carry the water from the main canal to the tertiary canals, which carry it to the fields of the farmers. Drainage canals are important because if the excess water is not drained from the fields, it can damage the crop and can cause salinization of land (GAP, 1996:20).
During the irrigation season, the association is responsible for ensuring that all users receive sufficient water to irrigate their crop. The distribution of water is organized in a variety of ways in Urfa. The most common one is the rotation system among different tertiary canals and a distribution ranking among farmers set by technicians. The distribution technique promoted by DSI (State Hydraulic Works) is used by only one of the associations – the one which is at the head of the main canal and which has no problem getting an abundant share of water. In this arrangement, farmers submit water demand forms to the field technicians three days prior to irrigating their fields. The number of siphons they can use to divert water from the canal to their field is determined by the size of land they irrigate. The field technician is in charge of auditing the process. Both farmers and the field technicians from this particular association mentioned that, if detected, the extra siphons – which mean overuse of water – are removed by the technician. The field agents of the associations patrol the territory for infrastructural problems and ensure smooth running of the water distribution process.

A general secretary from Urfa stated that when irrigation first began, they did not resort to this system of compulsory ‘irrigation request forms’ and did not limit the number of siphons. At the time they could not irrigate more than 3,000 hectares of their zone due to insufficient water whereas with the monitoring of

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49 See Map A2 in Appendix 3 for a map of the irrigation scheme in the Harran Plain to the south of Urfa.
50 Siphons are pipes used in order to divert water from irrigation canals to the fields.
siphons by the field personnel, there are only 100 dönüms which are not irrigated out of the total area of 7,841 hectares – which is approximately 78,410 dönüms (U WUA Interview #17).

According to the interviews with the farmers in Urfa, the associations at the head of the secondary canals do not face problems in water availability; however, associations nearer the end of the canal system often face distribution problems. A general secretary stated that they did not receive the amount of water allocated for their association because the WUA which serves the zone above theirs did not release the appropriate quantity of water. He has to go up the canals to release water because “[t]here is not enough water. We are the last association down the canal system. So, often, the water simply does not reach us. The farmers are very upset [because of water shortage] while Syria is complaining that their land across the border is flooded with the water from the drainage canals. We don’t even get as much water as the amount which flows through the drainage canals. (…) Just like a field employee, I go up the canal in order to lift the gates of the canal and if someone from the other association sees me, there will be conflict. That’s why I ask our chair to go and ask for permission” (U WUA Interview #11).

In Urfa, farmers who cultivate fields that are at the end of tertiary canals experience difficulty in irrigating their field. One of the sharecroppers I interviewed stated that it takes him a week to irrigate the amount of land that

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51 A dönüm is approximately equal to 1 decare – Yalman (1971:192) stresses that it is 33x33m (approximately 10 dönüms is one hectare). The farmers refer to land sizes in dönüms whereas in official statistics decare is the unit of measurement. This thesis will follow on this dual use.
others irrigate in one day because water flows to the canals by his field only at night and not in large quantities. He also added that water starts flowing more when he pays a visit to the WUA together with the owner of the land (U Farmer Interview #18). Given the high proportion of sharecroppers to landowning farmers in Urfa, a significant share of water users are excluded from the WUA system from the start. This is a problem in achieving a participatory irrigation management and fulfilling the potentials of decentralization in terms of political benefits.

**Structure of the WUA**

Having summarized the responsibilities of the WUAs, this section presents an overview of the structure of the associations in order to provide the background for the assessment of the level of democracy and performance in Chapter 5. The WUA is composed of a council, an executive committee, a chair, a general secretary (who is an agricultural engineer), a treasurer and other association personnel.

*The Council:* According to the bylaw the main decision-making body of a WUA is the Council. The Council is composed of the local authorities who are permanent members (such as the village headmen and the mayor) and selected representatives from each village. The council has a four-year term. The total number of representatives of a WUA is a function of the number of villages and
districts that are within its boundaries. The number of representatives from each village depends either on the number of water users or the amount of land within the village boundaries. The councilors elect the chair and the executive committee of the association. The general secretary of the association is required to have a university degree in agricultural engineering and is responsible for the steering of the associations’ daily operations and coordination.

The council is responsible for: a) the election of the chairperson and the members of the executive committee; b) the approval of work plans and the budget; c) determining/approving irrigation prices\textsuperscript{52} for the coming season; and d) the decision to acquire machinery and employ new personnel. According to the councilors, the most common discussion at the council meetings is the level of irrigation fees (Local Authority Interviews #2, #7, #8 and #9). The council meets three times per year in Urfa (February, June and November) and twice in Aydin (April and November). This difference is due to the ability of associations to modify their bylaws. Despite the provision in the law for three meetings a year, the WUAs in Aydin realized that a meeting in June would not be well-attended because it is the peak season for irrigation and agricultural production.

Long before the new law which set a minimum of two meetings a year, the associations in Aydin were convening their assemblies only twice a year.\textsuperscript{53} The quorum for the council meetings is half of the membership and is sometimes not attained in the first meeting so a second one is typically scheduled three days or a week later, and takes place irrespective of whether there is a quorum or not. An

\textsuperscript{52} Irrigation prices refer to the price of water farmers pay to the associations.

\textsuperscript{53} See the Epilogue to Chapter 5 for the specifics of the new law.
emergency meeting could be held at other times by written request of the chair or one third of councilors.

According to the WUA interviews and an analysis of local newspapers, participation in the council meetings is low. Some general secretaries claimed that the meetings attract a full house when the irrigation fees and budgets are discussed or when there is an election (U WUA Interview #4, #5, #6, #16, #20; A WUA Interview #2). Alternatively, active opposition to the chair also livens up the meetings and can attract larger crowds, as indicated by one councilor: “Especially the meetings of March and November are poorly attended because these are months of work. But, if there’s opposition to the chair, then participation is high” (U Local Authority Interview #4). According to the local newspaper of Soke, the council meetings of November are poorly attended even though the irrigation fees are determined during this meeting (Soke Ekspres, 6 November and 12 November 2003; 9 November 2004) whereas the April meetings are fully attended (90/93 members attended in both 2003 and 2004) due to the debates on budget and chairperson election (Soke Ekspres 13 March 2003, 27 April 2004).

In Urfa the general secretaries complained that the chairs of the associations were usually only primary school graduates, and this made communication between the two difficult. The general secretaries, who are agricultural engineers, claim they attempt to run the associations based on sound engineering and financial principles, but the chairs are looking for prestige and are unwilling to listen to them. The significance of education level has been reiterated
in most of the interviews either as a hindrance to proper irrigation or as the reason for the lagging socio-economic development of the region.

In the Aydin Plain association, the chair was a university graduate at the time of the fieldwork. In the Soke Plain WUA it is habitual for the representatives to elect the mayor of Soke as the chairperson (U WUA Interviews #11 and #16; A WUA Interviews #1 and #2), allowing the WUA to have access to the machinery and capabilities of the municipality in Soke. Kudat (1996) indicates that this is a widespread practice in irrigation decentralization. There have been candidates other than the mayor in the past but they lost the elections. Chapter 5 will examine the potential impact of this practice on the democracy within these associations.

*The Chair of the WUA*: The chairperson is elected by the councilors for a term of four to five years. It is important that council members know the rules and regulations, and that they voice the demands of their constituents during meetings. It is surprising – or maybe natural given the fact that they did not compete for these positions *per se* – to discover through interviews that some of the headmen or mayors in Urfa had not read the bylaw of the association in which they are councilors (U Local Authority Interview #1, #2 and #7). In the absence of a well founded knowledge about rules, one would not be surprised with the *de facto* dominance of the chair.
**The executive committee**: The WUA is run by an executive committee which is headed by the chair of the association. The executive committee is elected by the council from its members via secret ballot for a one year term. The general secretary and the treasurer of the association are also members of the executive committee and they meet at least twice a month. Although important decisions like approving the budget and determining the irrigation fees are taken by the council, the executive committee is responsible for the day to day functioning of the association. It is responsible for examining the budget, for preparing the yearly work and investment plans of the association and for presenting it to the council, and making sure that the expenditures are made according to budgetary provisions.

**The Budget of the WUAs**

Budgetary autonomy is an important element in the functioning of the decentralized institutions. Unlike the local governments which are dependent on transfers from the central state budget in order to function, WUAs have an independent income generation system. They devise their planned budget prior to the council meeting in November. Once approved, the budget provides a guideline on how the revenues will be spent during the following year.

One of the most important contributions of the creation of WUAs was to relieve the state budget of an important burden. A GAP bureaucrat, who organizes pilot areas where farmers are trained in self-organization and self-management, indicated that he was responsible for the formation of the first few WUAs even
prior to the 1990s in Adana. He said that the reason for the inauguration of WUAs is the limited working hours of civil servants as opposed to the 24 hour nature of irrigation management. He added that water distribution was not fairly done during the state agency governance because of political influences. He stated that the public agency employed an excessive number of personnel and that expenditures were very high, which made it impossible to allocate a budget for investments (General Interview #7).

A GAP bureaucrat argued that one of the main reasons for the transfer of irrigation management to the users was the inability of the state agency to collect the irrigation fees (General Interview #7). The state agency was unable to collect the fees as there was a deliberate attempt to subsidize the irrigation water within a hyperinflationary context. The regulation for the collection of debt to the state was such that if a farmer did not pay his irrigation fees, a mere 10 percent fine was added to the sum the farmer owed to DSI. No further fine was imposed on the debt, which could then be paid many years later. In a country with an 80 percent inflation rate, the significance and persuasive value of this 10 percent fine quickly lost its significance (A WUA Interview #2).

This deliberate policy of subsidization meant that DSI was incapable of recuperating operation and maintenance costs. DSI is dependent on the allocation from the central budget for its activities and this was seen as a major problem by

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54 There were a couple of irrigation schemes which were transferred to the users because they were in remote areas and it was too costly for DSI to operate and maintain them.
55 A general secretary of the Soke Plain WUA asserts that at the time of DSI, their irrigation zone was managed by 150-180 employees. “Today, there’s maximum of 80 people working. Farmers access us much easier since my phone is on 24 hours. Previously, after 5 pm they could not access anyone” (A WUA Interview #2).
international development agencies. The transfer of irrigation operation and management to the users was the result of the pressures from the World Bank and IMF. Under such circumstances it was very hard for the government or the DSI to continue their policies of subsidies.

The revenues of the WUA consist mainly of irrigation fees, donations, aid and fines. Irrigation fees constitute the majority of the revenues – approximately 85 percent (see Tables A3, A4 and A5 in Appendix 1 for the budgets of a sample of WUAs). The fees (per dönüm) are set by each association and depend on the crop that is cultivated (Unver and Gupta, 2002). The initial results show that while the fee collection rate of the state agency prior to the transfer was on average 38 percent between 1989 and 1994, it reached an average of 72 percent in 1995 under the governance of WUAs (Svendsen and Nott, 1999). According to a study conducted by Yercan (2001) on three WUAs in the province of Izmir, which is neighboring Aydin, the associations are financially self-sufficient. The associations have better performance in collecting the irrigation fees in comparison to the state agency.

56 The level of irrigation fee is determined during the council meeting. The executive committee recommends a fee level that would ensure the operation and maintenance of the system. The council members usually object to this level and decide to reduce the fee (U WUA Interview #3, #5, #16; A WUA Interview #1, #2). In order to ensure the functioning of the WUA, the executive committee proposes to the council a price that is above the cut-off point knowing that it will be reduced. The agricultural coordinator of the GAP administration stated that the farmers had a natural tendency to keep the fees low. He claimed that low education levels combined with the inability of farmers to perceive the irrigation scheme as a long run investment leads them to set lower irrigation fees which would disable the association from catering to unexpected infrastructural expenses if and when they arise. His interpretation of this short-sightedness is the expectation that if there is a failure in the system, DSI will intervene to fix it (General Interview #11). An engineer stated that repair and maintenance is never fully undertaken in the WUAs because it requires sound budgets and machinery. Only in large WUAs repair/maintenance is performed close to ideal standards (A Interview #7). Problems with maintenance are a common problem throughout the world. Jensen et al. (1990:51) claim that an estimated 50% of World Bank irrigation projects have deteriorated because maintenance is seen as the most easily postponable expenditure.
The associations depend on the collection of fees for survival – unlike DSI whose budget depended on transfers from the general budget.\(^{57}\) Following decentralization, farmers who have not paid the previous year’s due are not given access to water and the associations can enforce penalties (A Farmer Interview #9, #10). The WUAs can impose sanctions such as interest on debt or undertake legal action against farmers leading to bailiff.\(^{58}\) In general, WUAs send the list of their debtors to the Ziraat Bank where farmers’ ‘direct income support’\(^ {59}\) is deposited by the state. The bank automatically transfers the amount the farmer owes to the association’s account (A WUA Interview #2). A general secretary from Urfa stated that when the landowner (who receives the direct income support) and the farmer are different people, they cannot confiscate anything from the bank in return for the farmer’s debt (U WUA Interview #14).

The collection rate within the irrigation season (prior to late payments and confiscation of agricultural support funds from farmers who fail to pay) declined in most of the associations in the past two years. Decreasing agricultural product prices and the difficult financial situation farmers find themselves in are stated as

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\(^{57}\) There is variation in the proportion of fees that the associations can collect from their users: whereas some can collect only 60 percent of their budgeted water fees, others approach 100 percent (Unver and Gupta, 2002:13).

\(^{58}\) Kumbaroglu’s (2004:160) survey conducted with 113 chairpersons and 115 general secretaries of WUAs in Turkey concludes that approximately 90 percent of the interviewees responded that they were imposing sanctions on farmers who do not pay their fees.

\(^{59}\) Direct Income Support is a type of support given to landowners per each donum they own up to 500 donums. It was initiated by the World Bank backed agricultural reform package. Originally direct income support is used in EU countries as a payment to farmers who are asked not to cultivate to keep prices stable. In Turkey, the aim was to register farming population and the agricultural lands.
the causes for this decline (U WUA Interview #4, #11). Average collection rates for some of the WUAs can be seen in the Table A6 in Appendix 1.60

The budgetary autonomy renders the associations able to freely decide about their expenditure items. This autonomy, however, should be complemented by systematic and in-depth audits if embezzlement and corruption are to be prevented. The next section recounts the audit odyssey of the WUAs.

Audit of the WUAs

The executive board members are in charge of auditing the day-to-day operations of the WUAs. Self-auditing mechanisms for the WUAs do exist but are not widely utilized (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000b:141). A group of councilors can be selected to audit the accounting, to interpellate the chair, to scrutinize the annual report submitted to the council by the chair and to impeach the chair (Cetin, 2003:71). DSI has the right to oversee the management of the associations, and the department of operation and management can audit the WUAs. At the November meeting of each year, the WUA executive is responsible for the presentation of the annual report to the councilors. This report details the operations of the WUA and how the expenditures were allocated between various budgetary items. This provides the basis for councilors’ decision to approve the

60 Collection time of the fees matters as well. Some farmers in Urfa complained that the association was asking for payment prior to the harvest. In Urfa, most associations collect the first installment of the total fee in June and take the rest in August. Given that harvest for the most lucrative crop, cotton, is in September and October, it makes more sense to collect the majority of fees in the post-harvest period – which is the practice in Aydin. Aydin WUA collects ¼ of fees in May and the rest in November and December in two equal installments.
finalized budget of the previous year.\(^{61}\) If the councilors fail to approve the finalized budget, legal processes will ensure that an investigator is sent from the Ministry of the Interior (A Interview #7).

The planned budget for the following year, once approved by the council, is sent to DSI for feedback.\(^{62}\) Then the budget needs the approval of the governor of the province. If the governor’s office does not object to the document within 15 days, the budget is considered official. Hence, the routine audit of the associations’ budget is the responsibility of the governor’s office on a yearly basis. For unsatisfied stakeholders, there are two avenues for redress: complaint through the court system or objection. In the latter method, the stakeholder can object to the decisions of the council and this would activate the auditing bodies (Cevikbas, 2001). In practice, according to the general secretaries of the associations, regular audits are either simply not done, or are undertaken by incompetent officials. Effective auditing is far from reality.

One of the interviewees, who had worked for DSI, argues that neither the state agency nor the governor’s office carry out effective audits because they would not want to be on bad terms with the associations (General Interview #7). The Local Authorities Director in the governor’s office in Aydin asserted that they received the budgets of the associations for audit and they rubber-stamped it unless there was a complaint by users or councilors (A Interview #5). Halcrow-

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\(^{61}\) I was presented with printed annual reports at the associations in Aydin and Soke whereas in Urfa no one mentioned the existence of printed reports and when I asked a couple of general secretaries whether they had printed annual reports the response was negative. Halcrow-Dolsar (2000a:3.27; 2000b:142) report states that there were no printed annual reports in the association U-WUA#14.

\(^{62}\) State Hydraulic Works is responsible for supervising the associations but fails to do so effectively (Unver and Gupta, 2002).
Dolsar (2000a:2.10) report argues that the ineffectiveness of the audit process is a result of the lack of skilled personnel in the governor’s office.

Despite the problems associated with the WUAs in some regions in Turkey, the director of the DSI Operation and Maintenance Department is satisfied with the result of these transfers as the following quote indicates:

We have transferred the operation and maintenance of 94% of the irrigation schemes and not even one was returned to us [through the revocation of the WUA either because the users did not want to manage or through disciplinary action by the DSI as a result of bad management]. This is a great success. (…) The WUA personnel are not appointed from the centre. It creates employment. It is managed by a council. The farmers select the councilors. These were the multiple aspects of self-organization and self-management. We have, thus, provided a democratic opening (General Interview #10).

I will recapitulate the previous section on the process of decentralization and the structure of decentralized irrigation associations in Turkey by pointing out why this transfer constitutes decentralization:

1. WUAs have the authority to operate and maintain the irrigation scheme;

2. WUAs have the responsibility to collect fees and have budgetary autonomy;

3. WUAs are wholly independent from higher levels of government as long as they perform well.
The need for a new law that would determine the principles of WUA functioning was articulated by different agencies. The draft law which was circulated among different state agencies in 2004/2005 was discussed in several meetings that gathered WUA officials and state bureaucrats; however, this draft was never debated in the parliament. Instead, the WUAs were brought under the jurisdiction of the new legislation pertaining to local governance unions (Law No. 5355, *Mahalli Idare Birlikleri Kanunu*, 26 May 2005). Accordingly, the WUA councilors – except for the mayors and headmen who are the automatic members – are now elected by farmers from the villages instead of being assigned by the headmen/mayors. The duration of the chairperson’s mandate has been shortened to be two years. However, there was no major change in terms of the mandate of the WUA. See the Epilogue to Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the legislation of the new law and consecutive developments.

The above section presented a detailed account of the responsibilities, structure, budget and audit of the WUAs. The remainder of this chapter will assess the independent variables for the two provinces under analysis in order to prepare the ground for the analysis of democratic potential and performance of decentralized associations.

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63 One of the members of parliament from Urfa claimed that the reason for discarding the draft law specializing on the WUAs was the haste to create a new law now that the Law on Municipalities had been renewed and no longer regulated the functioning of WUAs or other local authority unions (General Interview #2).

64 The research for this study started before the enactment of the new law. Therefore, the findings refer to the old law even though they apply in most cases to the new setup and functioning. There is a section on the changes brought about by the new law in Chapter 5.
Social, Economic and Political Context

The review of the literature on decentralization and democratic deepening suggested that three variables are important for the outcomes of decentralization: the access to resources, power dynamics and experience with civic participation. The fourth variable that will be presented here is the level of education and literacy and was made part of the study following the emphasis attributed to it by the interviewees in Urfa. The remainder of this chapter assesses these variables for the cases of Urfa and Aydin.

Access to Resources

In irrigation management transfer, farmers are generally treated as an undifferentiated group – in other words, differences in land ownership are not accounted for in the design of WUAs (see, for example, Sinha (1996) on the Rajasthan case). In areas where there are significant inequalities in land distribution, large landowners may effectively control the newly established institutions, and prevent decentralization from having a positive impact on democratic deepening. Inequalities may prevent decentralization from having a positive impact on democratic deepening. I examine whether and how access to resources – land distribution, landlessness and access to non-usurious credit sources – impact the participation of water users in the WUAs in order to assess the impact of decentralization on democratic deepening. I collected information
on whether there are differences in how WUAs treat large vs. small landowners and sharecroppers vs. landowners through official statistics and interviews with WUA executives, employees and farmers.

**Land Distribution in Urfa**

Aksit and Akcay (1997:526-527) carried out research in the Southeast in 1993 and delineated six types of villages in the region, including those where:

1) the land is owned and operated by a large owner and the villagers work as sharecroppers or on rented land;

2) most land is owned and operated by medium-sized farmers;

3) there is a mix of large landowners and medium-sized farmers;

4) there is a mix of large landowners and small farmers;

5) the majority of land is owned by small farmers; and,

6) the majority of farmers work on state-land which they rent.

In contrast to the other regions where the countryside was populated predominantly by independent small owners, large landownership of a tribal (aşiret) leader was common in the Southeast since the Ottoman State gave large land parcels to the tribal chiefs in the process of sedentarizing the population.

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65 Aşirets are based on “genealogical kinship relations, social belongingness and the notion of community” (Erhan, 1997:513). Relationships are based on blood relations and status is determined at birth (Erkan and Ok, 2004:56).
Lineages and communal belonging were kept intact until recently (Erhan, 1997) and the landless members of the aşiret would work the land of the chief (agha) while receiving protection in return. With the foundation of the republic, the central state used this social structure to its advantage by protecting the power of the chiefs in exchange for their allegiance to the central state (Keyder, 1987). The chiefs also participated in national party politics in order to preserve their position as local leaders (Erhan, 1997). Carkoglu and Eder (2005:171) argue that the concentrated land ownership in the hands of tribal leaders and the aşiret structure led to underdevelopment in the region.

In Urfa there was an attempt to implement land distribution in 1945 when state-owned lands were given to landless peasants, but these peasants sold much of that property to large landowners because they lacked the means to invest in yearly operations and inputs (Ozesmi-Yildiz, 2002:41). Land Reform Legislation in 1973 was the second attempt to redistribute land in Urfa. The Land Reform Agency confiscated the land of owners who had more than 1,000 dönüms in order

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66 The cadastral records for land in Turkey recognize individuals as land owners. Parcel shares are divided among the family members of the deceased.

67 Prior to the sedentarization of the population in the region, aşiret referred to nomadic tribes (Sencer, 1992-1993:605). However, currently aşirets are social institutions – somewhat intertwined with the more economic institution of agha system – whereby the aşiret leader or agha owns large stretches of land (Sencer, 1992-1993:590). The agha system is an institution of leadership whereby the agha – as the owner of large stretches of land – provides work for the peasants and mediates between the state institutions and the peasants (Yalman, 1971:189). Many modernizationist scholars consider the agha system as one of exploitation. However, as Yalman (1971) argues, the system had an important social role.

68 Law No. 1757 (Toprak ve Tarım Reformu Kanunu – Land and Agricultural Reform Law). The Harran Plains of Urfa was chosen as a pilot region for the reform process. It has not been implemented elsewhere before being revoked by the Constitutional Court in 1978. This was not the first attempt at land reform. The first debate on land reform took place in the post-World War II period when the single party government wanted to implement land reform as a panacea to dissatisfaction with its agricultural policies during the war. However, large landowners who have been supportive of the government withdrew their support and the reform was never implemented (Benli Altunisik and Tur 2005:26).
to redistribute it to landless peasants; however, the legislation of 1973 was annulled by the constitutional court in 1978 and the agency’s role was transformed to that of a different kind of land distribution: reallocation of state lands to landless farmers. In 1984, the new legislation returned some land to the previous owners (General Interview #1, #25). The only type of land distribution that is currently practiced is the allocation of state owned lands to landless farming households. 43 dönüms of irrigated land or 143 dönüms of dry farming land are distributed to landless farming households (General Interview #25). The strong landlord class in Turkey effectively prevented attempts to redistribute land (Aydin, 1986:62).

Table 4.3 for Southeast Anatolia region where Urfa is situated shows that the majority of farmers own less than 50 dönüms. It can also be seen from the table that over the years the percentage of households that are engaged in “small farming” operations increased although the percentage of land they control remained more or less the same – meaning there was a reduction in the size of land they own individually. Large landowning families that own more than 200 dönüms comprised 6 percent of total households but controlled 46 percent of land in 1950. Their share of total land increased to 58 percent in 1970 when they constituted 10 percent of landowning families. Over the years there has been an increase in the share of rich and marginal farmers whereas the percentages of middling groups (those who own between 50 and 200 dönüms) have declined. In

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69 Law No. 3083 (Sulama Alanlarında Arazi Düzenlenmesine Dair Tarım Reformu Kanunu – Agricultural Reform Law for Land Reorganization on Irrigated Land).
70 Land distribution was completed in 89 villages in Urfa. 3783 people were distributed a total of 259,137 dönüms. Prior to the distribution by the Agricultural Reform Agency, these state-owned lands were rented out on a yearly basis (General Interview #25).
2001 those who own more than 200 dönüms constituted 11 percent of total households and controlled 57 percent of land.

Table 4.3 Land holdings in Southeast Anatolia*, 1950-2001 (percentages)

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<tr>
<td>0-49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
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<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>50-99</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>100-199</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>200-499</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>8</td>
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</table>


* Land census data presented here is based on provinces of Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Urfa, Van, Batman, and Sırnak (Batman and Sırnak were not administrative provinces before 1990)

** It should be noted that the borders between the ownership categories of the 1950 agricultural census were slightly different from other censuses (1950 categories: 0-50, 51-100, 101-200, 201-500 decares).

A more specific example from the Harran Plain in Urfa illustrates the severity of inequalities in land distribution in this Southeastern province. The land distribution within the irrigation zone of WUA #14 in Urfa shows that farmers who own more than 500 dönüms make up only 3.5 percent of the population while controlling 32.7 percent of the total land (see Table A8 in Appendix 1). Small
farmers who own up to 50 dönüms constitute 51.6 percent of the population but control only 11.9 percent of total land.

In Urfa, inequality of land ownership varies across villages. There are cases where the whole village belongs to one person (U WUA Interview #8, U Farmer Interview #12) or a family owns more than one village (Aydin, 1986:60). Families who do not own land and who do not have access to alternate sources of income – such as truck drivers or remittances from migrant workers – work as seasonal agricultural laborers or as sharecroppers. Some landowners prefer to allocate their plot to sharecroppers either because they have a job and do not reside in the village\footnote{Absentee landlords entrust the cultivation of their plots to agents from the village – vekil (Sencer, 1992-1993:618) who cultivates the total area without paying rent to the owner. They give 35-40 percent of the total revenue from the sale of the crop to the landowner. Costs of cultivation, such as water fees and worker wages, are paid by the agent. The absentee landlord receives all types of agricultural support provided by the state. Since most support types – except for the premiums on production – are paid to landowners, the actual cultivators – be it sharecroppers, agent or tenants without a formal contract – do not receive these payments. Historically, support policies in developing countries have benefited large farmers whereas small farming households’ income declined; Turkey is no exception (Koymen, 1999:26-27).} or because their land is too large for them to cultivate on their own given the labor intensiveness of cotton cultivation.\footnote{See, Ozbudun (1976:163-165), for further details about land distribution.} Ozesmi-Yildiz (2002:30) states that the proportion of sharecropping in Urfa is much higher than the rest of the country. For instance, in the Harran Plain (South of Urfa) a World Bank study estimated the ratio of sharecropping to be 56 percent of the total number of farming households in 1999 as opposed to 27 percent in 1994 (World Bank, 1999 quoted in Ozesmi-Yildiz, 2002:30).\footnote{Ozesmi-Yildiz (2002/2003:95) argues that the reason for this increase is the inauguration of a large irrigation project without setting up support systems in areas of credit provision, marketing and labor. In fact, the shift to irrigated agriculture increases sharecropping because large landowners are no longer able to cultivate their plots because crops such as cotton are labor-intensive.}
There are various types of sharecropping in cotton cultivation.\textsuperscript{74} Kürekçi is responsible for all labor costs but the landowner pays the irrigation fees as well as other input expenses. The kürekçi only gets 30 percent of the output. Icar is a different sharecropping arrangement and the icarci is responsible for all types of expenditures – including fertilizers and water fees – and gets 60 percent of the output (Ozesmi-Yildiz, 2002-2003:97-99).\textsuperscript{75} There are also regular rent arrangements where the tenant pays rent to the owner and cultivates the land. In Urfa sharecropping and rent arrangements are informal and there is no contract giving the land use rights to the tenants.

Table 4.4 illustrates the degree of landlessness and the percentage of sharecropping in the Southeast.\textsuperscript{76} As only land owners and those who rent land through a formal contract for a minimum of three years are considered legitimate water users by the WUAs, the high rate of landlessness and sharecropping means that significant shares of agricultural producers are not part of the WUA system in Urfa.

\textsuperscript{74} There are different sharecropping arrangements depending on the crop: see Morvaridi (1998) for the case of sugar beet in the east of Turkey.
\textsuperscript{75} Ozesmi-Yildiz (2002-2003:95) argues that sharecropping increased following the inauguration of irrigated agriculture in the southeast. The reason for this, she claims, is the lack of credit, marketing and labor infrastructure that should have been set up prior to the beginning of irrigation in the region. Aksit and Akcay (1997) consider the 30 percent sharecropping as a modern form of contract which came into being following the introduction of cotton production to the Southeast.
\textsuperscript{76} The general secretaries of the WUAs indicated that one of the negative consequences of having sharecropping is over-irrigation which can cause environmentally adverse outcomes such as salinization, and rising water table (U WUA Interview #9). Landowners or farmers who rent land for a number of years would be more careful about over-irrigation since it has adverse effects on the fertility of land. However, sharecroppers have no incentive for the long-term health of the soil – since they are not sure whether they will be working the same parcel in the following years – and tend to irrigate much more than necessary (General Interview #30). The environmental consequences of irrigation are a major issue and cannot be dealt with within the limits of this thesis.
Table 4.4 Landowning patterns in the Southeast provinces - 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of villages</th>
<th># of farming households</th>
<th>Landless households (%)</th>
<th>Villages with rent arrangements (%)</th>
<th>Villages with sharecropping arrangements (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adiyaman</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>49,340</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>101,336</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>51,729</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardin</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>85,884</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urfa</strong></td>
<td><strong>689</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,579</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>59.7</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Siirt</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>54,601</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Impact of Inequalities in Urfa

Inequalities would not matter in relation to the deepening of democracy if all members of a polity had equal access to decision-making and were treated equally by the institutions; however, as the remainder of this section outlines, there are inequalities in water allocation, service provision and maintenance in the context of irrigation in Urfa. Originally the bylaw suggested that farmers within the irrigation zone of an association elect the councilors but this practice was abandoned in Urfa due to tensions and conflict during elections. The representatives were not elected from the water users at large: they were appointed by the headmen. Therefore, large landowners, aşiret leaders or their agents became councilors and naturally favored the interests of large farmers (Unver and Gupta, 2002).

Fee Payments: Unequal enforcement of fees is documented by an in-depth study of one of the associations in Urfa (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000a:3.28). General

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77 Updated figures for some of these categories are presented in Table A10 in Appendix 1.
Secretaries from a number of WUAs in Urfa stated that farmers are not treated equally by the associations as exemplified by the following quotes.\textsuperscript{78}

If I make reductions for large landowners, I should also help out small farmers (U WUA Interview #2).

Farmers who have on average 500 dönüms [large landowners] do not pay. Middling farmers pay well and the associations could not survive without them (U WUA Interview #19).

We cannot collect the dues from large farmers and we oppress the small farmers (U WUA Interview #10).

These claims indicate that the nature of the inequalities differ across associations in Urfa, but do not negate the fact that there is differential treatment of farmers according to the amount of land they command and power they yield vis-à-vis the association. WUA executive committee members, for instance, pay reduced fees or get free access to water (U WUA Interview #20; Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000a:2.10).\textsuperscript{79}

The interview material indicating inequalities in fee collection was triangulated by participant observation in the WUA offices. As I sat and observed the interaction of WUA personnel and the water users, farmers came quite frequently to ask for reductions in their dues to the associations. Farmers themselves are aware of unequal treatment as the following quote from a small farmer indicates: “The WUA sides with large farmers. The poor are being oppressed. The irrigation fee is too high” (U Farmer Interview #19). Small

\textsuperscript{78} None of these unequal treatments were probed in the interviews. The general secretaries chose to mention these details while talking about the functioning of the associations.

\textsuperscript{79} Unequal treatment of farmers was confirmed by the provincial leader of ANAP, the chair of the Association of Businessmen and Industrialists of Urfa (SUSIAD) and an engineer of the research institute of the Ministry of Agriculture (General Interview #26, #27, #30).
farmers feel powerless vis-à-vis the associations as the following quote from a small farmer illustrates: “Who would listen to us? Only when we have guns would they listen to us” (U Farmer Interview #14).

*Access to water:* A small farmer from the pressurized pipe irrigation system in the north or Urfa stated that he has often observed a powerful farmer prevent the other from accessing water. He believed that the WUA ought to be responsible for ensuring that farmers get equal access to water (U Farmer Interview #4). Another farmer from Urfa, who was angry because of a water dispute, stated the following: “I called him [in order to sort it out]. But if he doesn’t give me water, there will be a fight. He [the other farmer] says that I don’t have the right to get water from there. They have always and everywhere told me that I do not have the right” (U Farmer Interview #8).

Unequal treatment is not confined to irrigation issues in the Southeast. An auditor from the electricity company whose job is to monitor and fine those households which use electricity illegally stated that people who have affinity with the governing political party get preferential treatment: “I normally work in the Hilvan area but there are many MPs from that district. So we cannot do our job. Recently, my director gave a penalty for illegal use and he was immediately appointed [exiled] to another province.” (General Interview #23).

In a comprehensive study of irrigation associations in Turkey, Baran (1996:107) claims that the chair can annul the penalties and extend the payment deadlines for some farmers. General Secretaries that I interviewed complained that some influential users can simply call the chair and request that penalties for
misuse of water or damaging the irrigation infrastructure be cancelled. It is unlikely to expect that all users will have the same power over the chair.

Overall, interviews with farmers and WUA general secretaries illustrate that inequalities in the distribution of land translate into unequal treatment within the WUAs in Urfa.\(^{80}\) The next sub-section will outline the features of resource distribution in Aydin and compare the outcomes in terms of potential of participation of farmers in the association decision-making.

**Land Distribution in Aydin and Urfa**

In the Aegean Region where Aydin is situated, land distribution was slightly more equal than in the Southeast at the foundation of the republic; however, while cultivation in the former province targeted the market, the latter did not have a developed commercial agricultural sector in the 1950s (Koymen, 1999:19).

There are two large plains in Aydin: Aydin Plain and Soke Plain (see Map A4 in Appendix 3 for their locations). Soke Plain was dominated by large beys in the early decades of the republic: there were the timars of Kocagoz, Ozbas and Tanman families.\(^{81}\)

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\(^{80}\) Inequalities impact how farmers interact with other institutions as well. The example of training provided by GAP administration illustrates this point. Normally, association chairs and general secretaries were sent for training to the US. Some influential large landowners took advantage of these trips whereas small farmers were not given such an opportunity. GAP administration organizes field trips to other regions of Turkey so that farmers can see for themselves the agricultural technologies that are being employed. However, as the following quote indicates, mostly rich farmers benefit from such trips: “Training is provided to aghas by the GAP administration. They would not spread their knowledge” (U Farmer Interview #3).

\(^{81}\) Timars were the public land whose management was given to sipahis (military leaders) during the Ottoman Empire. The sipahis were in charge of managing the land and collecting the taxes in the name of the central authority. The timar system was abolished in 1831 and the Ottoman Land
Faruk Tanman owned 75,000 dönüms at the time. He has been given these lands by Atatürk. He was the chair of the chamber of agriculture, his brother in law was a senator. When the villagers rebelled to get their land, they sent soldiers and had them beaten (A Interview #12).

Tanmans were worried about the prospects of a land reform in the plain, so they generated the idea of converting the peninsula neighboring the plain into a national nature reserve operated by the state. The reserve, which was founded in 1966, engulfed considerable parts of the river delta which forms the plain and turned it into a flamingo reserve in which the farmers do not have the right to cultivate. Tanmans lost part of their land to the reserve but received confiscation compensation and the reserve stopped land reform from taking place (A Interview #12).

These beys became very wealthy from the proceeds of their cotton production, but their investments and spending was limited to urban centers and cities, and very little was returned to the rural communities. They gradually sold their land over the years (A Interview #14) and land distribution became more equal in the Soke Plain through sales, inheritance and the redistribution of state owned land to farmers. For instance, in a village on the Soke Plain, a very fertile piece of state land was cultivated by the bey of that village until the land reform distributed that plot among the farmers of that village (A Interview #17).

Code and Registration Act was put into effect in 1858 in order to strengthen the central state and weaken the local (Yalman, 1971:184-186). Tapu Law (1858) which followed the land code resulted in the registration of land by legal title by influential families (Yalman, 1971:187).
Based on the 1997 Village Inventory conducted by the State Institute of Statistics (DIE-Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü), the percentage of landless farmers in Aydin is 3 percent (as opposed to 42 percent in Urfa). Out of these, the majority work on rented land and only one third engage in sharecropping (DIE, 1997:37). Currently, there are 360,000 dönüms of irrigated arable land on the Soke Plain. The land is owned by approximately 300-500 individuals but there are at least 5000 registered farmers. For instance, one farmer stated that he owns only 600 dönüms but he cultivates 2000 dönüms (A Group Interview #1). In comparison to Urfa, landlessness is much less prominent in Aydin and many of the rent arrangements are legally contracted giving tenants more security in tenure and terms of tenure than is afforded by the predominantly verbal contracts in Urfa. The differences in land tenure impact the interaction of farmers with WUAs, as those who do not own land and who do not have a formal rent arrangement are not part of the WUAs. Judging by the percentages of landlessness and sharecroppers in Urfa, there are many more farmers who are excluded from the WUAs in Urfa than in Aydin, where most rent arrangements are formal and there is much less sharecropping and landlessness.

In terms of the distribution of land among landowning households, Table 4.5 below describes the state of affairs in the Aegean Region.
Table 4.5 Land holdings in the Aegean Region*, 1950-2001 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership Categories**</th>
<th>A: Percentage of Total Households</th>
<th>B: Percentage of Total Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-49</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-499</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Land census data presented here is based on the provinces of Izmir, Aydin, Manisa, Balikesir, Burdur, Canakkale, Denizli, Isparta, Mugla.
** It should be noted that the borders between the ownership categories of the 1950 agricultural census were slightly different from other censuses (1950 categories: 0-50, 51-100, 101-200, 201-500 decares).
*** 0 stands for percentages smaller than 1 percent.

As the comparison of Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 indicates, in the 1950s, households controlling more than 100 dönüms were 12 percent of total households in the Aegean region whereas the same percentage for the Southeast was 24. The total amount of land owned by the same group constituted 54 percent of total cultivated land in the Aegean region whereas it was 69 percent in the Southeast. In the 1990s the percentage of households holding more than 100 dönüms had reduced to a mere 7 percent in the Aegean region, whereas it had increased to 35 percent in the Southeast. The percentage of total land that this group controls was 31 percent in the Aegean region and 76 percent in the Southeast. Except for 1950, farmers who own less than 100 dönüms controlled between 60 to 70 percent of total land in the Aegean Region. This contrasts with the Southeast where farmers who own less than 100 dönüms always controlled less than 31 percent of total
land. These comparative figures depict the level of inequality in the Southeast in contrast to the Aegean region, which has a larger ratio of small farmers.

Table 4.6 Land holdings in Urfa and Aydin, 1991-2001 (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-49</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-199</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200-499</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* 0 stands for percentages smaller than 1 percent.

Province-based data on land distribution does not exist prior to the 1991 census. Table 4.6 shows the severity of the inequalities in land distribution in Urfa where 28.6 of farmers who owned less than 50 dönüms controlled only 5 percent of total landholdings. In Aydin the majority of farmers – 83.7 percent of farmers in 1991 and 71.9 in 2001 – owned less than 50 dönüms of land which constituted 45 percent of total landholdings in 1991 and 29 percent in 2001. In 1991 in Urfa, 7 percent of farmers owned more than 500 dönüms and controlled 40 percent of total landholdings.
Direct income support policy pays a per dönüm support to farmers who own up to 500 dönüms. In order to fully benefit from this cash support, large farmers who owned more than 500 dönüms distributed their holdings among family members decreasing the share of large landowning farmers from 7 to 5 percent. In addition to this façade improvement, the share of small farmers (those who own less than 50 dönüms) and the share of the total land they control have increased slightly from 1991 to 2000 in Urfa. However, land distribution in Urfa is still much more skewed than in Aydin and landlessness is much higher in the former than the latter. Inequalities and unequal treatment are much less widespread in Aydin than in Urfa according to the interviewees.

Impact of Inequalities in Aydin

The users in the Aydin and Soke Plain WUAs never referred to any favoritism or corrupt activities in the collection of irrigation fees or in the imposition of penalties. Unlike the case of Urfa where some WUAs do not enforce the payment of irrigation fees for the executive committee members, in Aydin, all farmers pay their fees irrespective of their position within the association. There were, however, indications during interviews that powerful farmers could influence the distribution of water in the Soke Plain. Even though the order of water distribution is determined through a lottery, farmers claimed that they had to be present at the draw in order to ensure there was no trickery behind their back; however, they are empowered to be present during the lottery and to ensure that
their rights are not violated. They are not intimidated by the system and the powerful farmers.

Access to Credit in Aydin and Urfa

In Turkey there are two sources of agricultural credit: Ziraat Bank (the publicly owned Agricultural Bank) and Tarim Kredi Kooperatifleri (Agricultural Credit Cooperatives) (Aydin, 1986:191). In Urfa, only 3.9% of farmers were able to obtain credit from Ziraat Bank, versus 11.9% in Aydin (see Table 4.7). Many farmers must borrow from money-lenders, loan sharks, usurers or buy their fertilizer and pesticides on credit from suppliers. This is corroborated by the study of Ozesmi-Yildiz (2002-2003:95) who states that most farmers from Urfa were ineligible to borrow from Ziraat Bank because they did not have formal rent contracts and no guarantee letters.

Table 4.7 Percentage of Holdings with access to credit in 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ziraat Bank</th>
<th>Other Public Banks</th>
<th>Agricultural Credit Cooperative</th>
<th>Other cooperatives</th>
<th>Percentage of holdings with access to credit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The agricultural consultant of the Soke Chamber of Agriculture claimed that in the west of Turkey most farmers are able to get credit from Ziraat Bank whereas in the East this is not the case. The reason for the lack of credit to farmers from Urfa, according to him, is the failure of farmers from the East to pay back previous loans to the bank.\(^{82}\) Furthermore, he stated that those who get credit in the East are probably the same 10-20 people who are absentee landlords and not the agricultural producers who work as tenants on their land (A Interview #13).

An alternative source of credit for small farmers is the agricultural credit cooperatives (ACC). These were established in 1935 to provide credit (in kind and in cash) to small farmers who could not benefit from Ziraat Bank loans, which generally require property ownership as a prerequisite. ACCs are established with a minimum of 30 partners and have 1.5 million partners throughout Turkey. While the ACC was mentioned as a source of credit only in one of the villages in Urfa, in Aydin many farmers claimed to be borrowing from the cooperatives. Table 4.7 shows that while only 1.5 percent of farmers from Urfa had access to ACC funds, 19.5 percent of farmers from Aydin benefited from these cooperatives. The ACCs in Urfa did not work well and were mostly bankrupt.

Overall, farmers in Urfa have considerably less access to non-usurious credit in comparison to those from Aydin. This reinforces the earlier findings with respect to land distribution, as once again, it is those farmers who lack resources

\(^{82}\) Karli and Celik (2003:39) state that the highest rate of unpaid credit to Agricultural Credit Cooperatives in the southeast is in Urfa and constitutes 64.5 percent of total credited amount in 1999.
who also cannot secure formal credit without resorting to usurers in order to
finance the costs of agricultural production.

**Distribution of Power**

Power will be conceptualized in its Weberian form and will refer to the ability of
persons, groups and institutions to obtain compliance through a variety of means
(Duara, 1988:4). There are forms of power that are produced and reproduced as a
result of certain institutional forms (Reed, 1997:40). In Urfa, the institutional form
from which power emanates is the traditional tribal structure (the *așirets*), and
power differentials stem from the feudal/familial structures. In Aydin, power
differentials come from resource ownership and administrative positions. The
creation of WUAs has the potential to strengthen some of these forms of power
while reducing the hold of others, but it also potentially creates new centers of
power based on the position of individuals in the associations. This section
examines the extent to which power is unequally distributed in the two provinces
and shows how these inequalities impact the functioning of the WUAs.

This section examines how local power networks – stemming from the
feudal system – impact the participation of water users in the WUAs. Tribal
networks can prevent water users from feeling and acting as rights-bearing
individuals in a user-provider relationship with the WUAs. Many farmers and
WUA personnel claimed that these hierarchical and traditional structures should
be dissolved for the development of the province and the region. As the following quote illustrates, farmers who are not aşiret leaders are dissatisfied with it: “Aşiretcilik should be eliminated. The state supports this system. Instead of dealing with someone from the population at large, they prefer to deal with an aşiret leader” (U Farmer Interview #26).

Reports based on extensive fieldwork in the Southeast concluded that traditional structures such as family, kinship, tribal or ethnic group are commonly used in identifying people, but that these feudal structures have lost their ability to provide economic support and cooperation/coordination between members (Erkan and Ok, 2004:61). The interviews indicated that the power and social grip of the aşiret system has declined over the years: “For the last 20 years, the aşiret era has ended. The aşiret leader used to order people to join fights. No one these days will go into trouble for the leader. He still exists in name. Today, everyone is his own agha, has his own responsibility. (…) People have gained consciousness and they see that they have the right to oppose” (U Farmer Interview #4).

However, the situation is not uniform across rural Urfa: many interviewees referred to the aşiret system or the feudal structure – which they use interchangeably – as the source of a number of problems in Urfa including the malfunctioning WUAs. A general secretary from Urfa claimed that “despite their democratic appearance, WUAs are not democratic” because of the feudal structure (U WUA Interview #6). A councilor blamed the poor performance of the associations in Urfa on the aşiret system and argued that the chairs of the WUAs
come from the feudal structure (U Local Authority Interview #3) hence, indicating that there is elite capture.

Not all Urfa interviewees were entirely dissatisfied with the feudal structure. It provides a form of social glue and many of the prevalent social problems in larger cities (such as theft, muggings and gang violence) do not flourish in Urfa because everyone knows everyone (U WUA Interview #8). Nevertheless, many of the interview participants identified the aşiret system as a problem vis-à-vis the performance of the WUAs. There are hopeful observers such as the mayor of Harran who claimed that the associations had a positive role to play in sidelining the negative aspects of the aşiret system:

WUA increases dialogue among people. The agricultural engineer is there to help inform farmers about irrigation techniques. They contribute to the village works with the machinery they own. And they are also slightly important for the entrenchment of democracy in the region. It renders people conscious. It pushes people towards being individuals and away from aşiretcilik” (U Local Authority Interview #8).83

There is no direct link between the political parties and the functioning of the WUAs, but an understanding of the general political and electoral dynamics may help in understanding the operation of the WUAs. The AKP (Justice and Development Party – the governing party which has religious connotations)84 district vice-president claimed that local politics based on the aşiret system were

83 It is ironic that this person who mentions the potential of WUAs in getting rid of the tribal system is a powerful asiret member. His wife was elected an MP from Urfa in the 2007 general elections. He is a large landowner and a powerful tribal figure in Harran.
84 AKP is the breakout party from the more traditionalist Islamist party and has been the governing party since 2002.
becoming less important thanks to their party which does not select its local
election candidates from aşiret strongmen. He also noted that they would like to
make it possible to be an MP without having to be an important aşiret member
(General Interview #21) – yet this promise was forgotten in the 2007 general
elections.85

In contrast to the statements by the AKP member, interviews with the
provincial branches of other political parties indicate that the aşiret system is still
important in politics despite its diminishing power over individuals. The
provincial leader of DSP (Center-left party) stated that the aşiret system is still
powerful in the rural areas whereby the agha can ask the electorate in a village to
vote for a certain candidate and people would follow (General Interview #17).

There is a tendency, among scholars and state bureaucrats, to associate the
problematic performance of the WUAs with the persistence of the feudal
structure. Farmers are said to lack individuality and are seen as incapable of
making decisions without consulting their relatives. Echoing the concern with the
negative impact of the feudal structure, interview results show that the unequal
power structure of the aşiret is replicated in the Water User Associations in Urfa.

In Harran, the WUAs were perceived as the keys to a rent
seeking mechanism. A power structure, which parallels the
foci of power of the region, emerged in the WUAs. In other
words, the vote commissioners that are active at times of
general or municipal elections in the region are also active

85 It was noted by many interviewees that for the first time Urfa has a mayor who works well: “He
is a medical doctor and was the AKP candidate although he was not really affiliated with the party
before the elections. His candidacy was supported by the leader of AKP and he had a difficult time
performing his duties at the beginning because the aşiret networks’ strongmen threatened him. The
PM sent a couple of bodyguards from Ankara to protect him. He provides good services and is
changing the face of the city” (U WUA Interview #14).
in the WUAs. The fact that these were transformed into kingdoms and that the chairs were visiting Ankara with their newly acquired cars increased the attraction of WUAs. In Harran, people who spoke Turkish and who had relations with the politicians had taken control of these associations at the beginning. Later on, when others realized that there is rent in the WUAs, they started competing for the management of these associations. The governor’s office had to take measures during WUA elections because there were fights (General Interview #1).

The headman of a village who is a councilor in two associations argues that he has major reservations about the WUAs and states: “The real aim was to enable democratic governance. But there’s the feudal structure. I spoke to the vice-governor and told him that the associations are an extension of the feudal structure. All the chairs are aşiret leaders or their children. People are incapable of acting. The state should undertake audits. There is corruption. We complain to the governor’s office but they are incapable of responding. They send us to other institutions where, in return, they tell us this is the jurisdiction of the governor’s office” (U Local Authority Interview #4). Hence, not only farmers but also councilors feel disempowered vis-à-vis the WUAs because of feudal and clientelistic ties. The following quote from a headman of a village from Harran Plain is a good illustration of this:

We go whenever they call us [for a council meeting]. Otherwise we keep silent. There’s rent seeking in Urfa. The man [chair] might have dug my canal or sent me a truckload of sand or is my relative. There’s aşireticilik. There was no council meeting this year for instance. If we speak out about this, the council will be dissolved. But we keep silent (U Local Authority Interview #5).
The differing views about the predominance of the aşiret system and its impact on the social and economic activities of farmers in Urfa make it difficult to draw any conclusions about the influence of the tribal ties on the functioning of the WUAs. The research indicates that the aşiret system is still alive with respect to social habits of the people from Urfa; however, farmers are free to cultivate the land they work on and receive the going wage or share of the crop depending on the agreement with the landowner, irrespective of whether he is an aşiret leader or not. The inequalities and hierarchical relations that emanate from the aşiret system are replicated within the WUA structure, but water users are aware and knowledgeable about their rights and duties vis-à-vis the associations. While the users have acquired a sense of being rights-bearing citizens, there are obstacles to the exercise of these rights stemming from the aşiret structure and the large family structure.

In Urfa, the structural dimension of power (the aşiret structure) is bolstered by hidden forms of power such as the impact of large families. Even when farmers wish to hold the associations accountable for failures in service delivery, they are prevented from doing so by their relatives as the following quote illustrates: “whenever I want to ask for my right, the news reaches my uncles and I am sidelined. Anyway, I am part of the feudal structure” (U WUA Interview #6). An Arab farmer describes the Harran Plain of Urfa as follows: “Legal rights do not exist in Harran, because it is United Arab State” (U Farmer Interview #20). This farmer is frustrated with the ineffectiveness and the inegalitarian service delivery of the WUA and states the limits to his power as
follows: “I wanted to press charges against the WUA because our field has become barren due to their negligence. But, they did not allow me” (U Farmer Interview #20). Here again, he was referring to the large family structure preventing him from pressing charges.

The large family structure, which is a sub-group of aşirets, significantly impacts the lives of individuals who live in large households. The average household size in Urfa is 7 as opposed to 3.5 in Aydin (DPT, 2003). The families in Urfa usually live as extended families with the grandparents, the male children and the grand-children. The extended family usually operates as a single economic unit but the rest of the family (cousins, uncles) are not part of the same economic unit. Therefore, the implicit rule that elders are not to be contradicted may end up hurting the interests of other family members as the quotes illustrated.

“Familism,” which was a term used to describe the importance of loyalty to family over and above any other social organization in southern Italy (Mutti, 2000:582) can be used to describe the social context in Urfa. The importance of family is not a problem per se, but if family members are unable to uphold their rights because the extended family asks them to forgo some rights, then this particularistic familism can be detrimental for the development of a democratic system. In the literature, familism is associated with “weak voluntary associations, lack of civicness and lack of interpersonal and institutional trust” (Mutti, 2000:582). These were all qualifiers used to describe Southeastern Turkey and the problems of democracy encountered in the region. A farmer from the Harran Plain in Urfa who experienced problems with the WUA wanted to complain to the
prosecutor’s office for over a year but his relatives asked him not to file a complaint because the chair of the association had done them a favor (U Farmer Interview #20). As one farmer from Urfa said: “everyone is related to each other somehow and that’s why there is a lot of ‘hatr olayi’ [meaning there are many actions taken or not taken with consideration of relatives’ or friends’ well-being]” (U Farmer Interview #18). He blamed this type of social behavior as the source of malfunctioning organizations in Urfa.

Aydin’s social structure is very different from that of Urfa and this influences the way the WUAs function in the two provinces. The families are smaller and there is no tribal system. Even though there have been large and powerful landowners in the plains in Aydin since the 1920s, their influence has diminished as they gradually sold their land and lost their political power. Farmers mobilized to protest the usurpation of state land by the powerful landowners. They were repressed by the military, but their message had an impact, and state land was eventually distributed among farmers to prevent further protest (A Interview #12). In contrast to farmers from Urfa, who are not affiliated with any association or organization other than their tribal/religious/ethnic organizations, the majority of farmers in Aydin are TARİŞ (producer cooperative for agricultural producers) members. Their experience with producer cooperatives and other types of civic associations together with the fading importance of large landowners made it possible for power to be more horizontally distributed among farmers in Aydin.
In the Soke Plain WUA, the important element in the association power structure is the consensus on electing the Soke mayor as the chairperson of the association. It is believed that his political personality will help the smooth functioning of the association. This can be considered problematic in terms of the ability of water users to participate but none of the water users referred to this as a problem. One of the village headmen who had become a candidate for the association chairperson position declared that he participated in the electoral competition but lost.

It would be naïve to think that there is no favoritism in Aydin. TARİŞ chairperson claimed that there is politics involved in the management of the associations and that sometimes the general secretary of the WUA acts under the pressure of influential people (A Group Interview #2). One of the farmers referred to the fact that he would not be treated equally if he were to be involved in a judicial process with a wealthy landowner (A Local Authority Interview #1). These were all minor complaints in comparison to the level of disempowerment and dissatisfaction with the WUAs that the farmers and councilors from Urfa articulated.

Overall, the power distribution is more equal in Aydin. In Urfa the asiret structure is the main propagator of power differentials. Farmers from Aydin are more experienced with civil society and state organizations and are able to react when they are unequally treated. The sense of disempowerment that is present in Urfa was never mentioned in Aydin WUAs. The analysis until here shows that resource and power distribution have significant consequences in terms of service
distribution within the WUAs. These two factors interact with each other in the sense that skewed resource distribution and unequal/hierarchical power relations reinforce each other. When one of them starts to change, it is very likely that the other will follow. In the case of Aydin, the dissolution of the economic power holders – i.e. the large landowners – led to more egalitarian power dynamics.

There was a third factor which was an important catalyst for change in Aydin: an active civic past. The following section will explore the importance of civic past.

**Past Civic Activism**

Do water users see themselves as rights-bearing citizens? Is their interaction with the associations affected by this? Is the performance of the associations affected by the past civic activism of the water users? This section compares Urfa and Aydin and shows that Aydin has a much stronger civic past. Civil society in which citizens are equipped and experienced in dealing with institutions is more vibrant. This manifests itself in the way water users interact with the WUAs. The past interaction with formal institutions provides farmers with the experience of being rights-bearing citizens who are knowledgeable about mechanisms of accountability and redress.

Before moving to the examination of the two provinces, I will briefly provide an overview of conceptions of citizenship in Turkey to give the reader a
foundation on which to evaluate the provinces of Urfa and Aydin. Conceptions of citizenship in Turkey (e.g. see Keyman and Icduygu, 2003; Icduygu and Kaygusuz, 2004), are mostly duty-based, and self-interest of the individual is a secondary consideration to obligations toward the state. The language of rights, according to these analyses of citizenship, does not exist in the public realm.

Caymaz’s (2007) study on individuals’ perceptions of what citizenship means is a valuable addition to the literature on Turkey. 86 Caymaz (2007) conducted in-depth interviews with 61 interviewees from diverse backgrounds and concludes that even though there is a variation in how individuals perceive citizenship (depending on their education level and socioeconomic standing), most interview participants referred to the duties of citizens toward the state and failed to mention their own rights. Caymaz (2007:75) argues that the interviews signaled the disempowerment of citizens vis-à-vis the power of the state. Only those who were politically active talked about the importance of rights, which indicates that having civic experience results in empowerment. Parla (2002:45) argues that in opposition to the 1961 constitution – which attempted to balance and identify the rights and duties of citizens – the 1982 constitution restricted rights and freedoms of individuals. The citizenship conception in Turkey is predominantly “sacrificial” (Barber, 2003:222): the citizen has to sacrifice his/her self-interest until the interests of the state have been served.

86 Parlak (2007) examines the case of resettlement in the case of large dams in Turkey. The study is based on face-to-face questionnaires with individuals who had to migrate because their village was submerged by the dam reservoir. She claims that she had to remove a question on what citizenship means from her questionnaire as her interviewees were perplexed about the question.
Even though a sacrificial and weak self-perception is predominant in relation to the state in Turkey, there are temporal and regional differences in citizen engagement in politics and activism. The periodic differences are outlined by Akin’s (2007:436) study of petitions in the early republican era. Akin argues that the state formation was not completely top-down as citizens were disputing state policies and raising their demands through the petition office in the early years of the republic. Petition writing, however, was not available to all citizens. They had to be literate or within reach of literate petition composers.

There are significant regional differences in citizens’ activism and engagement in politics as well. Civil society organizations in Urfa are less numerous and less effective than in other parts of Turkey (Agah, 2001, Karli and Celik, 2003). A sociological study of the region prior to the beginning of irrigation in Urfa concluded that there was a weak tendency among farmers to form cooperatives (Sencer, 1992-1993:5). Carkoglu and Eder (2005:172) argue that the existence of a local clientele dependent on the distribution of state rent hampered the development of civil society and participation in the region. Heller (2000:489) claims that pronounced inequalities within a society can undermine the procedural guarantees of civic and political rights and subvert the exercise of citizenship by creating extra-constitutional forms of authority such as clientelism. This has been the experience of farmers from the Southeast.

Villagers from the Southeast had limited contact with the state until the implementation of the GAP project, described by some as a Fergusonian anti-

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87 The southeast region has a much lower ratio of agricultural cooperative membership whereas the western provinces are much more organized (Ozbudun, 1976:96; Agah, 2001).
politics machine, enabling the state to be closer to the population of the Southeast. The following comment about the state confiscating a portion of land for the irrigation projects indicates the level of contact a farmer from Urfa feels he has with the state: “I am 50 years old and it is the first time in my lifetime that the state is providing a service to this village. And they confiscate 8 percent of our land for the project without paying the confiscation dues” (U Farmer Interview #4). The limited state presence and the absence of political and legal guarantees to individual citizens (powerful and influential aşiret leaders or large landowners notwithstanding) disempowered the citizens of the region and subverted the exercise of citizenship.

Most social organizations in Urfa are either religious or aşiret based. They do not provide their members experience with horizontal ties, which are very important for the deepening of democracy. The comparison of the number of associations and active cooperatives in the two provinces illustrates the absence of civic engagement in Urfa. The number of associations in Urfa is considerably lower (especially when the provincial population is taken into consideration) than that of Aydin as Table 4.8 illustrates.

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Ferguson, 1994.
Table 4.8 Number of Associations in Urfa and Aydin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th># of Associations</th>
<th>Total population of province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AYDIN</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>950,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URFA</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1,443,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of the Interior.  

There is even a starker contrast between the two provinces in the number of cooperatives (which are very important venues for the self-organization of rural inhabitants): while Aydin has 1,326 cooperatives with 122,407 partners, Urfa has 190 cooperatives with 21,469 partners. These numbers constitute 12.9 and 1.5 percent of the provincial population respectively (see Table 4.9).

Table 4.9 Number of Active Cooperatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active Coops</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coops</td>
<td># of Coops</td>
<td># of Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYDIN</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>122,407</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URFA</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>21,469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Ministry of Industry and Trade.

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Given the significant differences in the numbers of associations and cooperatives in Urfa and Aydin, it is not surprising to find that farmers from Aydin feel more empowered vis-à-vis formal state and non-state institutions. They have a developed “culture of accountability” emanating from the interaction of civil society with the formal institutions. In Aydin, the traditional position of strong landowners and the elite has been eroded since the 1950s. In contrast to farmers from Urfa, who are not affiliated with any association or organization other than their informal tribal/religious/ethnic organizations, the majority of farmers in Aydin are TARİŞ (producer cooperative for agricultural producers) members. The sale of agricultural products in Aydin is done through this cooperative, which is composed of 73 agricultural sale cooperatives providing services to 75,600 producers. It is one of the largest cooperatives in Turkey and was founded in 1949. Farmers in Aydin are experienced with tools of activism such as strikes and protests and have experience with formal institutions that the farmers in Urfa do not. The lack of past civic experience in Urfa results in less responsive, less effective WUAs than might be expected had there been active, involved citizens. Farmers in Urfa who encounter irrigation problems often have few formal channels with which to resolve their concerns, and must instead rely on direct intervention by leaders on a case-by-case basis.

In Urfa, when farmers have a problem with the WUA services or infrastructure failures, their first course of action is typically to call the chair or general secretary through his mobile phone (U Local Authority Interviews #1, 91)

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91 The culture of accountability is a term used by Crook and Manor (1998) in their assessment of the outcomes of decentralization.
#2). In Aydin, one of the farmers in Soke Plain stated that they report breakdowns to field personnel and the technician of the association. They contact the general secretary of the WUA only if the technician fails to fix the problem (A Farmer Interview #2). If contacting the general secretary does not work, “we ask the chair to champion our cause” (A Farmer Interview #6).

This stands in stark contrast to the attitude in Urfa, where both farmers and association personnel asserted that the farmers would directly call the association if they had a problem. This indicates that associations are better institutionalized in Aydin and there is higher trust in the association personnel (and the internal processes and structure of the WUA) compared with Urfa. Farmers from Urfa do not trust that the associations function according to the rules, and instead prefer to contact the top of the organization in order to solve problems. It is not clear why there is such a significant difference between the attitudes of water users in Urfa and Aydin but past experience with state institutions and other civic associations (or the lack thereof, in the case of Urfa) might shed light on the reasons for this divergence. The remainder of this section examines the attitudes of farmers towards the state and shows that there are differences between the two provinces. These differences are engendered by the variations in their civic experience and do not stem from culture or religion as the changes in Aydin since the 1950s indicate. Cultural differences are not the cause because water users from Urfa who live in a feudal structure are not happy with the structure either.

The following examples illustrate the differences of farmers’ attitudes towards state institutions between Urfa and Aydin. In many of the Urfa villages that are located in the lowest part of the Harran plain, high water tables, caused by
the lack of appropriate drainage canals and the infrequent cleaning of the existing infrastructure (General Interview #7), are a severe problem, and can significantly reduce agricultural productivity. The institution responsible for the construction of drainage canals is the Village Works Directorate. While the land consolidation and drainage canal construction ought to have been completed prior to the start of irrigation, poor project planning and a lack of coordination resulted in irrigation beginning prior to the completion of the commensurate drainage facilities in Urfa. The progress is slow and some farmers are frustrated with the situation.  

In one village, the rising water table had serious consequences. One farmer (who also worked for the municipality and was evidently more aware of methods of redress and legal complaints) recounted: “Drainage canals should be constructed. Otherwise people will rebel. Last year, in the winter, water sprang out of the ground throughout the village. The basement of the new primary school building is flooded and oil from the boiler got mixed into the water. They tried draining it but it didn’t work. The trees dried up and died in my gardens. The water also springs from under our houses. We will sue them once the legal holiday is over. There are people who already resorted to legal action against Provincial Agricultural Directorate [the provincial branch of the Ministry of

Provincial Agricultural Directorate [the provincial branch of the Ministry of

92 The reason for the uncoordinated project inaugurations is the political nature of irrigation projects. “The designed system [of irrigation infrastructure] is wrong as far as I can see it. The tunnel [carrying the water from the dam] was opened with a great haste and water arrived. But then they said to themselves ‘what are we supposed to do now?’” (General Interview #29). A general secretary stated that he “inaugurated the same irrigation scheme three times with three different prime ministers. It is all for political rent” (U WUA Interview #1). A farmer from Aydin said that he was surprised when he visited Harran Plain in Urfa at how late they had planted the cotton. He was then told that every year the politicians had been promising them that water will start flowing but it never did until that year. And they planted the cotton only when they saw the water (A Farmer Group Interview #16). Hence, before necessary infrastructure could be prepared, politicians forced state agencies to inaugurate the projects so that they could themselves claim the prestige.
Agriculture] and DSI” (U Group Interview #5). Those who have experience with formal institutions on a regular basis in Urfa are more knowledgeable about mechanisms of complaint and legal action.

Farmers blamed the state institutions for their lack of coordination in finalizing project infrastructure and providing training about irrigated agriculture. “We demand that district agricultural directorate send people to give seminars once a month. We should raise the consciousness of the farmers. GAP administration should also do that. Their wages come from our pockets. It is not acceptable that they sit in air-conditioned offices all day” (U Farmer Interview #4). This particular small farmer – who worked in constructions in big cities and who has a developed sense of being a rights-bearing citizen – has a very clear understanding of his rights and blames the state institutions for their inability to assist farmers in improving agricultural productivity.

A headman from the Harran Plain claims that it is difficult to unite people behind common goods. “People do not send petitions. If there were as many signatures on a petition as there are villagers, this road would not be in such a poor condition [the road linking Urfa and their village is in very bad condition which makes driving very difficult and lifts a lot of dust]. And if the governor is afraid that people will complain to Ankara, more services will be provided. But there’s no unity here” (U Local Authority Interview #1).

GAP administration was set up especially in order to coordinate infrastructure and social projects that are part of the Southeast Anatolian Project. As described in Chapter 4, GAP-MOM project only reached a handful of farmers in the south of Urfa city centre where they established demonstration zones. The results of these activities were not communicated with the water users throughout the plain.
Aydin farmers did not refer to problems with state institutions as often as the farmers from Urfa. The following quote illustrates that there have been changes in the way farmers’ relationship to formal institutions has evolved in this western province: “In the past we used to go to TARİŞ Bank and they would put the papers in front of us and ask us to sign. We would not know what we were signing” (A Group Interview #1). Nowadays farmers feel much more empowered vis-à-vis formal institutions. In a meeting at the Chamber of Agriculture in Soke, company officials were introducing canola as a profitable crop for the winter and asked the farmers to sign a production contract whereby the company would purchase the harvested crop. The farmers were skeptical of the positive picture painted by the company officials and questioned them extensively about the details of the process. In the end, they were not convinced and decided to forgo this potentially profitable opportunity (A Group Interview #1).

In sum, farmers from Aydin have had a longer relationship with formal institutions (associations, producer cooperatives and state institutions) as a by-product of their market-oriented (if small- to medium-scale) production since the 1950s. This, in turn, empowered them vis-à-vis formal institutions with which they interact. They are no longer bullied by formal institutions as they are knowledgeable about their rights and feel empowered. It is the civic experience which they have accumulated over the years that transformed them from being passive farmers to empowered citizens. In contrast to the situation in Aydin, farmers from Urfa have a weak civic past and only those who feel empowered because of their profession (such as the aforementioned municipal employee) or
past experience talk about legal forms of redress in addition to complaining about the WUA and state agencies. Farmers in Urfa do not feel empowered, and cannot fathom having the capability to resolve their problems or encourage change, both because of their inexperience with civic activism and because of the impact of power relations already mentioned. While this conclusion may leave one with a pessimistic outlook on the prospects of democratic deepening in Urfa, based on the experience of Aydin since the 1950s it is possible to claim that decentralization has the potential of affecting change. The interviewees from Urfa, who did not have any contact with state institutions or experience with associational activities in the past, have interacted regularly with the WUAs for more than a decade now. Through their interaction with the WUAs, farmers can develop a sense of political efficacy. Yet, inequalities prevent this positive impact from materializing in the short-run as the analysis of the next chapter shows.

Education Levels and Literacy

All of the interviewees from Urfa made reference to education and literacy levels as being an important impediment to improvements in irrigation. This was not part of the independent variables for this thesis, but was added as a result of these consistent comments.

Saward (1994:9) argues that if the claim that some people have superior knowledge is accepted, then democracy lacks a secure foundation. Although he
acknowledges that there are technical areas where experts may have superior knowledge, he posits that politics is a qualitatively different sphere and specialized or superior knowledge is not legitimate (Saward, 1994:10-12). One reason for this is the practical inability of the political authority to have better knowledge of its citizens’ interests than those citizens themselves. This is one of the justifications for decentralization. Decentralized institutions should function such that they can respond to the interests and demands of citizens in a way that is impossible in a centralized system.

If decentralized institutions and their decision-making bodies dismiss lay knowledge because the holders of this knowledge do not have adequate levels of education, then decentralization will not have a democratizing impact as irrigation management will not be conducted differently than through a centralized management system. Pre-existing studies on irrigation and interviews with bureaucrats and WUA personnel abound with examples of their contempt for the education level of farmers (General Interview #16; Harris, 2005:195; Ayguney, 2002:2). Farmers are seen as the source of environmental problems that arise from over-irrigation. Some scholars used the analogy of a child who is given a “superb modern instrument” (irrigation infrastructure) to refer to the case of irrigation management decentralization.94 Karli and Celik (2003:27), for instance, claim that

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94 Back in the 1970s there were no dams on the Euphrates or Tigris but small portions of the fertile-crescent were irrigated from the rivers through small-scale projects undertaken by DSI. Yalman (1971:196-197) observes that irresponsible irrigation very quickly leads to soil erosion. She describes the situation as follows: “And as the years passed the yield began to fall. Irrigation handled in this irresponsible manner is like putting a superb modern instrument into the hands of a child” (Yalman, 1971:196).
the low education level of farmers in Urfa leads to “unconscious irrigation,” which refers to over-irrigation and environmental problems that arise from it.

It is true that literacy rates differ substantially among Urfa and Aydin as Tables A11 and A12 in Appendix 1 show. In Urfa the literacy rate in 2000 was 68 percent whereas the same ratio is 87 percent in Aydin. The gender inequality in Urfa in terms of literacy is a better indication of the discrepancy between the two provinces in terms of formal education. The literacy rate for men for the province was 82 percent whereas that of women was only 52 percent. In the villages in Urfa this ratio drops to 78 percent for men and 41 percent for women.

The ratio of those who have completed at least junior high school in the villages in Urfa is 14 percent for men and only 2 percent for women whereas the same ratio is 37 percent for men and 12 percent for women in the city centre of Urfa. In Aydin, the gender gap is much smaller in literacy: 94 percent of men and 81 percent of women are literate at the provincial level. The literacy rate in the villages of Aydin is higher in comparison to Urfa’s villages: it is 91 percent for men and 75 percent for women. The ratio of those who completed at least junior high school in the villages of Aydin is 14 percent for men and 6 percent for women. The ratio in the city centre of Aydin is 46 percent for men and 31 percent for women (see Graphs A2, and A3 in Appendix 3 for more details on comparisons of education levels).

Adaman and Ozertan (2007) show that education level of farmers in the Harran Plain of Urfa is positively but marginally related to the awareness of the environmental impact of over-irrigation. The more a farmer is schooled the more
aware he is of the problem of salinization caused by over-irrigation of the fields. The more important factor was whether a farmer received training in irrigation and agriculture. The same study found that education is not significantly related to the number of times a farmer waters his field. This shows that education levels are important for awareness of debates and problems but not necessarily for the type of action taken by individual farmers.

Adaman and Ozerton (2007) speculate that this may be because short-term economic concerns shadow the environmental impact of their action. However, most farmers do not accept the version of the bureaucrats/experts, who claim that it is lack of training and education of farmers that lead to over-irrigation and environmental problems such as salinization and the rising water table. One interview participant noted that even if they had the training and expertise to carry out a precise scientific irrigation program, they can never be sure that there would be enough water available for when they need it. Therefore, they irrigate when they can with as much water as possible to prevent losses in the event of a shortage. Whereas some farmers repeated the view of the experts that there was “unconscious” irrigation (U Farmer Interview #6, #10), others argued that they were knowledgeable and did not feel responsible for the environmental problems (U Farmer Interview #25).

Irrigated agriculture leads to greater pollution of land and water resources because it necessitates the use of fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides (Stewart and Nielsen 1990). Prior to irrigation most producers left some of their plots unsown as fallow land. However, following irrigation, the opportunity cost of fallow land is much higher than before. Therefore, most producers would use fertilizers to preserve the nutritive abilities of land. Some of the most detrimental aftereffects of irrigation are water-logging and salinization. The main cause of these problems is over-irrigation. When a system receives more water than it can consume, the excess water raises the level of the water table. This occurs much faster if the natural drainage of the soil is slow (Jensen, Rangeley, and Dieleman 1990:32). These problems can lead to serious outcomes, the worst of which is the need to abandon the land due to increased salinity and high water table.
The evidence from the fieldwork does not lead to a clear conclusion about the impact of education levels. Even though there is no direct and conclusive impact of education levels on the democratizing effect of decentralization, the association personnel and other experts do not consider the farmers from Urfa capable of participating in the WUAs. Therefore, the education level of a farmer is not necessarily an impediment to his participation in the association decision-making but the attitude of association personnel (if it is patronizing and denigrating towards small farmers who have no educational attainment) can be a palpable barrier to participation. This leads to feelings of disempowerment among small farmers who are not educated. In contrast, in Aydin, farmers are respected by the associations and the latter do not feel disempowered vis-à-vis the associations. Hence, education levels have an indirect effect on the democratizing potential of decentralization in the case of Turkey.

**Concluding Remarks**

Aydin and Urfa differ quite substantially in their socioeconomic structure. In Aydin the average size of landholding is smaller and farmers have more equal access to resources. There is much less landlessness and fewer farmers are sharecroppers. This chapter showed that the land tenure system is very unequal in Urfa and this translates into inequalities in service delivery, fee payments and access to water. A significantly greater proportion of persons in Urfa (compared
to Aydin) are excluded from participation in the WUA's because they are landless or engage in informal sharecropping. The interviews showed that farmers from Aydin feel much more empowered vis-à-vis the WUAs than those in Urfa.

Although none of the farmers in Urfa directly identified themselves as aşiret members, the importance of this structure has been mentioned over and over again in the interviews as an impediment to democratic forms of governance in the region. In Urfa, where the consensus is that the aşiret system is losing its importance, the associations are still dominated by the powerful and the wealthy who engage in “opportunity hoarding” by emulating the existing social relations from the aşirets in the WUA setting (see Tilly, 1998 for these terms), regenerating new forms of inequality in the region. The aşiret system and the large families impinge on individuals’ ability to act when they are not satisfied with the services they receive. There are deep-seated patron-client relations among the WUA chairpersons and the executive board members. Some farmers benefit from these networks and dissuade their relatives from complaining about the association even when there is unequal service provision or malfeasance. Hence, hidden and structural forms of power frequently prevent farmers from holding the associations accountable and asking for redress in Urfa.

In contrast, in Aydin, most farmers are members of cooperatives – for instance TARİŞ – and they have had experience in dealing with non-state associations and cooperatives. The social structure is such that democratic governance faces fewer impediments. Therefore, based on their prior mobilization experiences, it is more natural and plausible for Aydin farmers to monitor the
WUA and to hold it accountable. When they are not satisfied with the service delivery of an elected body, they change it. In Urfa, it is not uncommon for headmen to hold their position until their death, largely uncontested, because they are often the only literate individuals in the village; however, in Aydin, headmen tend to change frequently, and since the literacy rate is much higher, the number of potential candidates is much higher.\textsuperscript{96} Hence, there is greater local elite competition and accountability in Aydin.

“Democracy works better in places where education levels are high” (Local Authority Interview #4). As this quote from a headman in Urfa indicates, there is a common understanding that low education levels in Urfa are an impediment to democratic governance in the province. This idealization of education and its importance is visible in the domain of irrigation as well. Many interview participants referred to the ignorance of farmers and the unconscious irrigation practices for Urfa. This chapter showed that literacy rates of farmers from Urfa are lower than their counterparts in Aydin. When this factor (which has an indirect impact) is combined with their level of civic experience, farmers from Aydin are equipped to monitor the WUAs and hold them accountable such that the representative system of the associations works well. In contrast, in Urfa farmers are unable to access the WUAs because they are seen as ignorant and uneducated.

The next chapter examines the impact of these variables on the functioning of the decentralized institutions and shows that these factors, when taken in sum,

\textsuperscript{96} The headman is required to govern the village and manage the relations of the village with the state. Therefore, he/she should be literate.
explain the lack of democracy and the unsatisfactory performance of WUAs in Urfa. While each factor in isolation is not determinative, the interaction between them is significant. Unequal access to resources and non-egalitarian power distribution usually go hand in hand. Furthermore, they constrain individuals’ access to education and their ability to organize in civil society organizations. The greater the inequality in access to resources, the less likely it is that farmers will feel empowered and capable of protecting their rights.

When inequalities in access to resources diminish – either exogenously through land reform or endogenously through large owners selling their land and moving to the cities – there is more space for empowerment of small farmers. Not only do they have a greater opportunity to participate in civil society organizations, but they are also better able to make use of existing educational opportunities for their children. In sum, the distribution of resources is the most important variable to the extent that it also determines the power dynamics within a society. When access to resources becomes more egalitarian the other variables tend to move in the positive direction as well, allowing more space for participation and empowerment.
CHAPTER 5 – Democracy, Performance and the WUAs: The Importance of Context

This chapter compares the WUAs of Urfa and Aydin through the previously presented variables in order to determine the outcomes of decentralization. As indicated in Chapter 4, the WUA bylaws state that the organizations have a democratic, representative system – at least on paper. If WUAs function according to the rules outlined in the bylaws and they are democratically audited, then the associations can be said to be democratic, and the system functions well through the representatives that the farmers have elected. If farmers are satisfied, they may not feel compelled to participate in the associations other than through the institutionalized channels such as electing their representatives.

If, in contrast, the associations do not function according to the bylaws and there are democratic failures, then water users who feel wronged should ask for redress and attempt to hold the executive of the association accountable. If they are able to do so, then one can say that there is civic participation on the part of the water users. This chapter shows – based on interviews with the farmers, local authorities, state officials, political party provincial representatives, and analysis of the local media – that farmers in Aydin are satisfied with the service provision of the associations and, for the most part, do not lodge complaints about their associations. In Urfa, in contrast, some farmers found it necessary to resort to informal and formal means of redress, because they were not receiving their fair
share of service delivery. They knew that there were irregularities in the
operation of the associations such as malfeasance, corruption, embezzlement and
the “dictatorship of the chairperson.”

Evaluating the Level of Democracy of Decentralized Irrigation Institutions

This section examines the four dimensions adapted from Beetham’s (1994)
“democratic audit” in order to evaluate whether WUAs function democratically.
The first dimension is the way councilors and the chairperson are determined and
whether the elected officials have the ultimate say in the operation of the
associations. The second is the openness and accountability of the associations.
The third is whether all users can effectively and equally exercise their rights vis-
à-vis the associations. The fourth is whether the WUAs engender knowledgeable,
critical and active independent citizens. The democratic audit will reveal whether
water users are able to participate in a meaningful manner in the management of
the WUAs; whether they are able to influence council decisions through their
representatives; whether they are able to hold them accountable; and whether they
acquire a sense of political efficacy through being part of a WUA.
**Determination of the Councilors and the Chairperson**

The first criterion is whether the councilors and the chairperson of the association are popularly elected in regularly held open and fair elections (which are free from intimidation and bribery), and whether the elected officials have the ultimate say without facing impositions from non-elected bodies.

According to the associations' bylaws, part of the council is constituted by the elected local authorities who automatically become councilors. The election of all councilors among water users from the association would have been much more democratic; however, as these local authorities were elected by the population inhabiting these villages, this practice is indirectly democratic. The remainder of the councilors ought to be elected from among the water users, but this does not always happen in practice. Some associations utilized elections, but in other instances where the electoral process resulted in conflict or violence, the governor gave the responsibility of selecting the additional councilors to the headmen of the villages (General Interview #10). The procedure of electing the councilors was standardized in 2006 and the practice of appointment by the headmen was terminated – see the epilogue to this chapter for details. Until the new law came into effect, the councilors of associations in both Urfa and Aydin did not have a uniform method of electing or selecting these representatives.

Whether elected or selected, councilors are required to meet certain qualifications in order to serve as representatives of water users in the council of the WUA. Unless they are the permanent members (i.e. headmen and mayors), an individual should own 40 dönüms of land within the WUA irrigation zone – or
lease this amount for at least three years – in order to become a councilor. This rule results in the exclusion of sharecroppers and farmers who work on rented land without a long-term contract; but it risks including those who may have no connection to agricultural production and no knowledge of the needs of the producers in the council. For instance, the mayors and the headmen are not always agricultural producers. The assessment of access to resources in both provinces in Chapter 4 showed that there are more landless farmers who engage in sharecropping or informal rent arrangements in Urfa than in Aydin. Therefore, a larger share of agricultural producers are excluded from the WUA decision-making structures in Urfa.

According to the bylaw, the chair is elected by the councilors. In Urfa, chairperson elections are hardly free from corruption and intimidation, and many of the interviewees from Urfa indicated that the chair paid around a thousand dollars to each councilor in order to be elected. Such corruption is simply accepted as part of the association functioning in Urfa, even though its negative impact on irrigation management and organizational functioning is well known.

Most interviewed farmers were against the election of the chair by the councilors. A farmer from Urfa linked the irregularities in the election of the chair with the aşiret system and argued that all the voters from the villages within the WUA zone should vote to elect the chairperson.

WUA elections are not correct. The chair is elected with the votes of a few representatives. It is not a healthy election. There’s abuse. If voters from the villages elected the chair, it would be better. There’s aşiret system here. There are also people who misguide
others. If all farmers were voting, there would be no such control (U Farmer Interview #27).

The general secretaries echoed support for revision of the electoral process. According to an MP from Urfa, if all farmers were to vote for the election of the chairperson, favoritism and corruption could be prevented (General Interview #2). “It would be more difficult to pay all farmers in return for votes instead of paying just a group of representatives” (General Interview #3). Despite the seemingly democratic nature of this proposal, those advocating it usually make a distinction between land-owning farmers – who should have voting rights – and sharecroppers or landless agricultural workers – who should not be made part of the decision-making process (U WUA Interview #3, #6, #7, #17). The argument is that people who do not own land would not be familiar with the problems and needs of the landowners in relation to irrigation. This excludes the majority of actual cultivators in a province such as Urfa where sharecropping and informal rent arrangements are widespread.

Some of the general secretaries were more skeptical about changing the election mechanism of the chairperson, and indicated that there are strong aşirets in the region whereby the powerful individuals guide the weak when it comes to voting (U WUA Interview #2). It would be naïve to expect there to be dissenting voices in an association meeting when entire villages are guided and pressured to cast their votes for specific candidates during general elections (see Ozbudun, 1975 among others for the electoral practices of the East and Southeast regions of
Turkey).\textsuperscript{97} This practice is still prevalent in the rural areas of Urfa, especially in the Harran Plain.

In spite of the problems associated with the determination of representatives, these representatives do serve to bring together farmers and the associations. “We learn about fees etc from our representatives who go to council meetings. There are six representatives from this village. They probably objected [to high irrigation fees] but DSI probably told them that lower than this amount would not be sufficient to keep the association running” (U Farmer Interview #6).

Even in Aydin where WUAs are considered to be working closer to the ideal standards, there are practices that could be considered non-democratic. When the association in Soke was founded, one of the headmen nominated himself for the position of the chair; however, the decision to elect the mayor as the chair (so as to make use of the municipality machinery) was supported by the majority of councilors (A Farmer Interview #1). The mayor of Soke has been elected the WUA chair in Soke Plain ever since, even when multiple-candidate elections have taken place.

When considering the degree of democracy and autonomy that an organization has, one must also consider whether elected officials have the ultimate say in decision-making, or if there are non-democratic (e.g. bureaucratic) institutions that shape policy. The chair, the executive committee, and the council

\textsuperscript{97} This observation was confirmed by a lawyer in Urfa “We have to analyze the political structure of Urfa as well. Here someone sits next to the ballot box and one party gets all the votes. There’s also vote selling in Harran, in exchange for money, for the sake of someone or political considerations” (General Interview #1).
are the main decision-makers in the WUAs. In Urfa, most of the chairs of WUAs have over-extended their decision-making powers. In such cases, the council is effective insofar as keeping the irrigation fees at the lowest possible level, but other decisions (such as employment and the purchase of machinery) are made predominantly by the chair. In Aydin, the chairs work as a team with the personnel of the associations and do not dominate the decision-making or management of the WUAs.

Overall, bureaucratic institutions do not intervene in the functioning of the WUAs in Urfa or Aydin. Indeed, the associations wish they were in closer contact with other state institutions, which tend not to respect the WUAs as institutions. “We have close ties to DSI and the Governor's office. Other institutions [such as the provincial branch of the Ministry of Agriculture or Village Works Directorate] do not consider us a formal institution and do not respond to our demands” (U WUA Interview #4). Most general secretaries in Urfa complained about the attitude of public institutions. Some have a very negative experience with even the most important one – the governor’s office: “Sometimes when the governor’s office organizes meetings, they do not invite us. Nor do they respond to our written requests” (U WUA Interview #10).98

The elected officials from the WUA are not obliged to follow the recommendations of the DSI. The following quote shows that the associations can even refuse the offers made by DSI, which is officially the owner of the infrastructure: “DSI has transferred maintenance and operation. WUA has to

98 The governor’s office in Urfa never replied – unsurprisingly – to my request for a brief interview with the governor. I ended up interviewing other bureaucrats from the governor’s office.
maintain the infrastructure and they have the machinery but lack the financial resources. This has caused problems between the two institutions [WUA and the DSI]. DSI said ‘pay us a portion of the fees, and we’ll do the maintenance for you. But the WUA refused’ (U Local Authority #8). Therefore, the elected officials – especially the chair – have the ultimate say in the council decision-making process. As stated earlier, this is one characteristic of democratic functioning but dominance of the chair without constraints from the councilors can lead to negative outcomes. The chair can engage in self-enrichment without delivering the services equally to all users, and allegations of embezzlement are prolific in Urfa WUAs. In this sense, the autonomy of elected officials carries with it a price when there are large social and economic inequalities which hinder proper monitoring by the stakeholders.

**Openness and Accountability**

The openness and accountability of the WUAs is important in evaluating the level of democracy within the associations. This section examines three criteria within this category: responsiveness, accountability and the forms of redress.

**Responsiveness**

Responsiveness evaluates whether there is consultation with water users prior to decision-making, whether the associations are accessible to the water users and whether there is effective representation within the WUAs. In Urfa it is not
common to have regular consultation with water users or even with the councilors. When a WUA general secretary from Urfa claimed that they had “set the irrigation fees scientifically together with agricultural and electrical engineers, the chairperson and the general secretary,” a farmer replied: “It would have been right if you had included a farmer too.” (U Group Interview #1). He substantiated the rationale for his argument in another interview held individually:

They say, ‘this is the fee we have decided at the WUA. The governor and the district head were there’ they say. But was I there? Is there anyone who pays these fees over there? No. That’s not appropriate. There’s no one within the current executive who would defend my rights. The chairperson is a primary school graduate. Ignorant like me. An agricultural engineer should chair the WUA. These [chairs] are aghas’ sons. Only they can become chairs. A poor person cannot get votes” (U Farmer Interview #4).

Some farmers showed interest in participating in WUA meetings, as stated by the next quote: “I wish they invited farmers to the WUA meetings. They would not be in such a situation if they did” (U Farmer Interview #20). Others expressed little interest in the operation of the WUA, so long as they receive their water: “I don’t know anything about the functioning of the WUA. It is enough to get water” (U Farmer Interview #21).

The representativeness of the councilors is of the utmost importance, since this is what determines whether a WUA functions democratically or not and whether regular channels of communication between the councilors and the water users are operational, such that the latter is able to participate indirectly in the association. Some farmers believe that the council and the executive do not
represent their interests (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000a:2.10) as the following quote from a farmer in Urfa illustrates: “There has been no election in the village with regard to the WUAs. The elected authorities [headmen/mayor] are the representatives in the WUA council. They are not farmers. We should have elected the representatives among the farmers. They probably had good intentions in setting up this system. They thought there would be conflict if the farmers elected, so they let the headman decide” (U Farmer Interview #4). Hence, farmers doubt that councilors can defend their rights – especially since many councilors from Urfa had not even read the bylaws of the association (according to the local authority interviews that I conducted).

The association is open to all users’ demands and complaints but, in many cases, responds only to those who will have voting potential during the next WUA chair elections (i.e. the potential councilors who tend to be large landowners in Urfa). Therefore, council members and those with a voting potential get preferential treatment over smaller farmers. For instance, while sitting in a WUA office I witnessed first hand that the headman of a village – who is also a member of the executive committee – asked for the machinery of the association in order to dig a cesspool for his house. This personal demand was accepted by the general secretary of the association. Another such example from Urfa is stated by a general secretary: “The machinery is used both for irrigation related purposes and to build houses for the relatives and friends of the chair. We do not even charge for machinery rent when we do such jobs. This is not visible on paper obviously.

Baran (1996:88) argues that headmen and mayors appoint people who are close to them to the council of the associations.
This kind of service is given to those who have voting rights [i.e. council members]” (U WUA Interview #5). Hence, the responsiveness of the association is determined by the power of the farmers.

A farmer from Urfa asserts that, given the electoral system in place, it would be a virtual impossibility for the chair to protect the interests of all the farmers equally “Of course there is service provision of some sort. But not like the users wish. It is a good thing that people manage something. It is better than a civil servant managing it. But currently, someone elected by 20 representatives cannot serve people” (U Farmer Interview #27). The problematic nature of the chairs’ election was illustrated in the previous section and the agreed upon solution is to change the electoral procedure such that when farmers go to the polls for the election of their councilors – which will coincide with the local elections following the new law passed in 2005 – they also elect the chairperson.

The answers of interviewees from different associations indicate that the WUAs (in both Urfa and Aydin) are responsive to the farmers to the extent that the ones making demands are large and powerful farmers. While it might be true that these institutions are more apt to respond to wealthy farmers, one cannot draw any conclusions about the impact of this without first considering what the situation might be if irrigation management were still handled under the centralized DSI infrastructure.

The foundation of the associations coincides with the beginning of canal irrigation in Urfa; hence they have no experience with irrigation management by DSI. Conversely, farmers from Soke Plain WUA have experienced both
centralized and decentralized management. Some of the farmers stated that the access to the state agency was much more difficult in comparison to the WUAs. The following quote illustrates this: “I’m happy with the WUA. Previously, we could not explain anything to the state personnel. We needed drums and zurna [meaning a lot of noise]. At the time, I went to DSI office only once. Now, I go to the WUA office frequently, they have their personnel on the field. At least farmers are respected by the WUA” (A Group Interview #2).

An agricultural engineer who works in DSI’s Aydin branch described the benefits of the decentralization of irrigation management as follows: “Farmers have easy access to the WUAs in terms of services. They have developed a sense of ownership of the institution. When there is a problem, farmers do not come to DSI. They go to the association” (A Interview #4). A farmer who is a councilor in Aydin Plain WUA stated that: “At the time of DSI, farmers had to live with the mistakes whereas now they are managing their own association” (A Interview #1).

DSI still has power over irrigation as it allocates the amount of water that the associations receive. It can still be influenced by powerful people, such as members of parliament. While the general secretary of the Soke Plain WUA was in the DSI office complaining about the falling water level in the canals, an MP called the director of DSI and asked him to open the gates of Karpuzlu Dam – which would provide water to his plots or those of his clients. The director replied by saying that they were planning on doing that in a week but since he wanted it, they could do it right away (A Group Interview #2). As the quote shows,
decentralization does not necessarily result in immunity from higher-level political pressure.

Even though decentralization reduces the likelihood of political pressure on the WUAs from above, association personnel can be subjected to pressure from powerful and wealthy farmers or those with political connections in higher positions. A councilor from Soke Plain WUA stated that there are many positive aspects of the WUAs, but that the association personnel can be influenced by powerful farmers: “I am TARİŞ chair and I could pressure Efe Bey [the general secretary of the association] such that, if for instance, the village road is broken, he will send the machinery to mend it. It would take Village Works a year to fix it because you have to call an MP in Ankara for them to act. But I am against this because it can be overdone and these types of pressures prevent Efe Bey from doing his job properly. I heard that they constructed a road for the Celik family [a wealthy and large landowning family] for instance” (A Group Interview #2).¹⁰⁰

Aydin WUAs maintain a minimum level of service provision and responsiveness in contrast to the ones from Urfa. A farmer from Soke Plain WUA claimed that representatives were easily accessible in order to report the problems of farmers to the associations. He stated that at the time of DSI, not everyone was capable of reaching the state agency in order to voice their problems. “The farmers normally go to the city only once a year. How can he go there and tell them his problems. The representatives of the association are elected from the villages and the villagers talk to them about their problems” (A Farmer Interview

¹⁰⁰ Efe Bey was present during this group interview but did not comment on this other than nodding his head.
Therefore, the transfer of operation and management to the user associations is seen as a step in the right direction by the farmers in Aydin.

**Accountability and Forms of Redress**

Accountability of the associations is evaluated by examining whether there is effective scrutiny of the executive and whether there is oversight of the decisions and expenditures of the associations. Water users' ability to hold the associations accountable is very important in evaluating the level of democracy of the decentralized institutions. The discussion from Chapter 4 demonstrated that farmers do know their rights and duties vis-à-vis the associations. The users served by the associations in Urfa are aware of the problems and are dissatisfied with the lack of transparency of the associations as the following quote fleshes out:

“We are happy with the WUA but we are not happy with the chairperson. They don’t spend the revenues for WUA services. They don’t invest. They don’t report back on how the money is spent” (U Farmer Interview #11).

Formal means of redress are limited in Urfa, and one farmer justified the informal responses that people undertake if they are not satisfied with the WUA services: “There aren’t many alternatives. They could apply to the governor’s office. That depends on the agha status or political personality of the individual. I don’t know the legal procedures of complaint. There are no sanctions. No one goes through the legal procedures” (U Farmer Interview #27).
When the services are not appropriate, farmers who can overcome informal barriers (such as the pressures from family members referred to in Chapter 4), do contact the associations and ask for redress, although their concerns are not always addressed in an effective manner. “We have talked about these problems [drainage and water table issues] to the WUA chairperson but they chose to remain silent” (U Farmer Interview #25).

When problems persist, some may even threaten the associations with prosecution in order to create a sense of urgency. One of the mayors from Urfa indicated that there was some evidence of formal methods of accountability enshrining themselves into the Urfa lifestyle: “drainage canals need to be cleaned every year. In the past seven years, they cleaned them only once – this year – and this was achieved thanks to us. We said we would complain to the prosecutors’ office for malfeasance. They were worried and they cleaned them” (U Local Authority Interview #3). He said that recently, with his encouragement, there were people who used legal action against the associations, but cautioned that this type of action was not widespread in other villages of the Harran Plain (U Local Authority Interview #3).

A farmer who was dissatisfied with the operation of the association asserted that he sent a petition complaining about the chair of the WUA to the Vice-Governor in Urfa, but that this measure of accountability was largely ineffective: “I sent a petition to the Vice-Governor complaining about the chair. Then, I see that the chair has a close relationship with the Vice-Governor. The petition disappears in between” (U Farmer Interview #28). A general secretary
reiterates and confirms that this is the normal practice: “For instance, when a petition comes, the man from the governor’s office calls and says there is a petition about you. You go and see him and for 200 Lira the petition can disappear”¹⁰¹ (U WUA Interview #2, 17 July 2006). Hence, even when farmers are willing and comfortable with the idea of actively seeking formal redress, barriers (such as corruption) limit their effectiveness. It is not surprising in a country where both local and central governments are said to be infested with patron-client networks (Adaman and Carkoglu, 2001). The broader institutional structure – whether centralized or decentralized – is fraught with similar problems of accountability.

Interviews demonstrated that formal methods of accountability are rarely used in Urfa, except by farmers with extensive institutional experience, such as those who are employees of municipalities or who work for the WUAs. These farmers act on this knowledge to make demands in a more institutionalized manner and attempt to hold the WUAs accountable by sending petitions to the governor’s office (U Farmer Interview #20, U Group Interview #5, U Local Authority Interview #4). This indicates that those who have experience in the domain of local governments are more knowledgeable and capable of holding the associations accountable.

In most of the legal complaints that were filed against WUA executives, the plaintiffs were state authorities, such as the governors or the inspectors of the Ministry of the Interior, instead of the users. The following quote from an

¹⁰¹ 200 YTL is approximately 166 CAD.
influential lawyer in Urfa illustrates this point: “The previous governor realized that many WUA activities were unregistered and wanted to control and discipline them. Many WUAs were tried at the criminal court because of malfeasance, embezzlement and bribery” (General Interview #1). In Urfa, since the establishment of the WUAs in the 1990s, there has only been one audit carried out by the Ministry of the Interior investigators. These auditors were sent from Ankara following a demand by the governor of Urfa at the time, and did not entertain any local ties (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000a:2.11). Following their investigation, many chairpersons and general secretaries were charged, and some were even sentenced to prison terms (U WUA Interview #3, #2, Dilek, 2002:1). This was a one-shot audit and further action has not been taken, as the following quote indicates:

The judges are also confused. According to which law are we to judge them, they say. The labor law or state personnel law? For the past 5 years there has been no audit from Ankara either. They [the auditors of the Ministry of the Interior] had frightened the chairs a little bit. But when they did not show up again, it deteriorated (U Local Authority Interview #4).

Whereas some general secretaries from Urfa claimed that it would be better for them if the auditors from the interior Ministry came on a regular basis (U WUA Interview #5) others were more cynical and argued that it is possible to hide irregular accounting procedures from auditors (U WUA Interview #16). For the associations to be accountable there has to be regular scrutiny of the executive committee members and oversight of the decisions and expenditures by the
councilors. For accountability to be effective, information on the budget and activities of the association should be available to the councilors. The associations in Urfa do not publish annual reports or budgets, which makes it hard for councilors to monitor the executive committee or the chair. This stands in sharp contrast to the case of Aydin associations, which publish and distribute their annual reports and budgets to the councilors and concerned parties. The interviewees from Aydin did not mention bribery, corruption or malfeasance vis-à-vis the functioning of the associations in Aydin.

Overall, the accountability of the associations poses a greater problem in the case of Urfa since the associations in this province do not have an effective scrutiny over the executive – which is dominated by the chairperson in most cases – and the expenditures of the associations. Access to legal forms of redress is limited, first, because water users are not accustomed to formal means of complaint and second, because there are informal barriers preventing them from acting – such as the large family structure that prevents farmers from acting as rights-bearing individuals. Furthermore, the effectiveness of formal actions of redress is dubious at best, as bribery is widespread in the broader institutional structure as well.
**Rights**

The ability of users to equally exercise their rights and duties is an important factor in determining whether WUAs function democratically. Chapter 4 showed that farmers are not treated equally by the associations in Urfa where there are significant inequalities in access to resources and in power relations. Farmers from Aydin referred to the impact of powerful farmers in general, but the latter were not seen as an impediment to water users’ access to service delivery and the association. Whereas the WUAs are the first experience with non-traditional associations for farmers from Urfa, farmers from Aydin have had a much longer experience with forms of associations such as cooperatives and state organizations. This enables them to act as rights-bearing citizens vis-à-vis the institutions they interact with. They do not feel disempowered in their interaction with the WUAs.

**Independence of societal self-organization**

The widely accepted argument among social scientists researching the East and Southeast of Turkey is that the traditional networks such as kinship, tribal and religious groups prevent farmers from behaving as individuals. This research shows that farmers are aware of their individual rights and duties towards the WUAs but are not always able to uphold them due to extended family pressures. This, however, is not an indication that the Southeast is a lost cause for democratic transformation: the WUAs are providing ground for practice to
farmers from different backgrounds in the operation of a non-traditional association. This can, in time, bring about an independent societal self-organization, which is capable of sustaining a democratic system at the local level through engendering knowledgeable, critical and active citizens. As it stands now, there are barriers to achieving such an independent society. While the farmers in Aydin are now members of the largest producers’ cooperative and have ample experience with civic organizations, this was not always the case. The changes that have taken place in Aydin since the 1950s demonstrate that it is possible for social and political structure to change over time to accommodate greater civic participation.

Many of the factors that cause associations to be less democratic are also responsible for performance problems. The following section examines the performance of the associations in both provinces and shows that the WUAs in Aydin are efficient, effective and responsive whereas the ones from Urfa face severe problems in satisfying farmers and providing efficient, effective service and being responsive.

**Performance of the WUAs and Satisfaction Levels of Farmers**

The performance of the WUAs is evaluated by adapting the performance criteria for local governments developed by Grindle (2007) and outlined in detail in
Chapter 2, to consider efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of the associations in Aydin and Urfa.

Efficiency of WUAs

Efficiency of the WUAs is evaluated by examining whether basic laws and regulations are in place, whether there is an operational plan for the WUAs, whether fee collection records are computerized, whether decisions are made and rules followed by the association's executive committee members in accordance with their bylaws, whether there is a reputation for corruption, whether WUAs have a development orientation, and whether farmers are satisfied with the association services. In Urfa the associations’ basic laws and regulations are in place, but as the previous chapter noted, some of the WUAs in Urfa do not collect fees from their executive committee members or from powerful farmers. Furthermore, there were references to council and executive committee meetings not being held regularly within Urfa associations.

In Aydin WUAs, no irregularities were reported by the farmers and the associations generally adhere to their bylaws. The operational plan is determined by the council in the November meeting and should be followed by the executive committee and the chair of the association. There are irregularities and inefficiencies in this domain in the associations in Urfa, and as Chapter 4 indicated, councilors feel disempowered to challenge the chair and the executive committee about the implementation of the operational plan. The fee collection records are computerized in all WUAs.
The associations in Urfa have a reputation for corruption. Harris (2005:190), who examined the case of irrigation in Urfa, indicates that the main problems of the associations are embezzlement of funds, nepotism and injustice. There was widespread rumor of corruption in the associations of Urfa and numerous interview participants made reference to corruption being prevalent within their WUAs. A report on the WUAs in the Southeast argues that there were many occasions where the association would offer dinner and gifts to councilors prior to the election of the chairperson (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000b:155). In Aydin, there was no reference to corrupt activities. An interviewee from Aydin said that there is very little corruption in Aydin, unlike the East of Turkey where corruption abounds (A Interview #1). In Urfa, some chairs have already been convicted of charges related to corruption (General Interview #1; Harris, 2005:191). Cetin (2003:79-80) states that the audits carried out by the Ministry of the Interior investigators in 1997-1998 resulted in many legal suits against the association chair and personnel in Urfa.

One of the methods of embezzling funds, according to a general secretary, is to pay the equivalent of the value added tax of merchandise to the supplier in return for an invoice without actually purchasing the product. In this case, the person responsible for such a purchase – usually the chair of the association – can embezzle the equivalent of the value of that product without there being an actual purchase (U WUA Interview #2, 17 July 2006). This cannot be detected by auditors unless the purchase is a totally unnecessary one for the association or purchased in massive quantities – like a ton of screws for one WUA in Urfa. Only
an independent and careful audit, like the one conducted by the Ministry of the Interior inspectors, can detect such anomalies and start the legal process.\textsuperscript{102}

One general secretary lamented the level of abuse of association resources for the personal gain of the chair by saying, “If the chairs only got their salaries! We deal with all their personal affairs as well. The gas station where the chair and the association fill their tanks is the same. The chair has the gas coupons of the association; so at the end of the month when I go to the station to make the payment I realize that the chair bought gas for his personal use as well” (U WUA Interview #12).

The general secretary of a WUA that recently began operations in Urfa admits the banality of corruption within the WUAs as follows: “[t]hey told us we could use bribery, here too, during elections. But we said, if we do such a thing, we would blow up the foundations of our association” (U WUA Interview #1).

“The chairperson does not get paid so much money. He gets 15,000 lira a year.\textsuperscript{103} But, he can provide employment to the people he knows” (U Farmer Interview #12). The power to employ people is very important in order to secure the support of the employee’s family and friends in a region where large families dominate and where informal ties are very important.

\textsuperscript{102} Not all irregularities are necessarily corrupt. Sometimes, general secretaries wish to employ their technicians for additional jobs that the association should normally outsource to other companies through a bidding process. Since the technician does not have a company, in order to get an invoice for the job and make the payment to the technician, the association pays the equivalent of the value added tax for the expenditure to a friend’s company and gets the invoice. In this case, which I witnessed during a participant observation in an association, funds are not being embezzled. However, this just shows how easy it is to engage in corrupt activities.

\textsuperscript{103} 15,000 YTL is approximately $11,000 CAD.
Embezzlement of WUA funds by the chair and corrupt activities lead to financial problems for the associations. These problems range from delayed social security premium payments (SSK) for the personnel to serious delays in paying their salary. In Urfa most of the general secretaries complained that they were paid every 6 months instead of monthly salaries and had to live by using their credit card. They indicated that this was because of a failure to collect the fees on time and the spending priority of the chairs (U WUA Interview #3, #7, #8). In Aydin, WUA accounting is much better organized, and the chair is not as easily able to embezzle funds. The salaries of WUA employees in Aydin are comparable to those of the private sector and there are no delays in payments. The personnel employed by the associations in Aydin are satisfied with their working conditions unlike the ones in Urfa who stated on many occasions that they would change their jobs if they had a chance.

Embezzlement of association funds and corruption result in dissatisfied farmers and poor service delivery for the WUAs of Urfa. A previous chair of one of the WUAs in Urfa stated during an interview that the associations are incapable of engaging in large-scale cleaning of canals and maintenance because their revenues get embezzled (General Interview #3).

The development orientation of the associations is evaluated by examining whether sufficient maintenance is undertaken by the WUAs and whether there are plans for long-term public works that would improve the infrastructure. The chair of the association has the authority and responsibility to disburse expenditures authorized by the council. There are some guidelines which are put in place in
order to determine the share of each expenditure item in the budget and these are loosely followed by the WUAs.

One such criterion stipulates that the share of the maintenance and repair item in the budget be around 30 percent of total expenditures. This is put in place in order to ensure that an appropriate level of maintenance is undertaken each year by the WUA. In the projected budget, maintenance and repair are allocated approximately 25-30 percent of total expenditures. During the fiscal year, however, this portion is reduced to approximately 10 percent through transfers to expenditure items such as personnel salaries, their social security payments and taxes (U WUA Interview #8). Furthermore, the expenditure item that can easily be cut in the case of insufficient revenue collection is maintenance (U WUA Interview #4, #7, #19).104 Some general secretaries claimed that the irrigation infrastructure is relatively new and does not require 30 percent of the budgeted expenditures (U WUA Interview #4, #5) whereas others claimed that due to insufficient regular maintenance, the systems could collapse in a decade or even earlier (U WUA Interview #2, #8).

An independent study conducted in one of the WUAs in Urfa indicates that the association has carried out only a few of the necessary maintenance jobs in the 1998/99 period (Halcrow and Dolsar, 1999:7). The situation in Aydin is not very different: Aydin Plain WUA allocates on average only 10 percent to repair and maintenance (A WUA Interview #1; see also Table A3 in Appendix 1 for the

104 Kumbaroglu (2004:166) claims that the main reason for the insufficiency of maintenance funds in the budgets is the lack of available funds according to the survey conducted with the general secretaries and the chairs of associations throughout Turkey.
details of the budget for this association in 2004). The reason for this, as stated by the director of the association, is the need for a large number of personnel due to the nature of the canals in their zone. Therefore, they need to allocate a much larger share of their budget to personnel expenditures.

An agricultural engineer from DSI in Aydin stated that the associations had the necessary machinery and allocated sufficient funds for repairs and maintenance. He indicated that it was not really possible to define a standardized ratio for this expenditure item (A Interview #4). Hence, all associations are undertaking the minimum amount of maintenance that enables the associations to sustain their service delivery. There is little indication, as stated by farmers and state officials, that they are undertaking projects that will improve the infrastructure or ensure long-term viability of the infrastructure. DSI is still the owner of the infrastructure and is seen as the responsible party in making major changes and improvements to the infrastructure.

Many of the WUA general secretaries from Urfa claimed that there were infrastructure problems when the associations assumed management of irrigation from DSI, caused by faulty construction. The chairpersons should have investigated the physical structures before signing the transfer protocol; however, they were either ignorant or too keen to complete the transfer process and did not perform this routine. In the Aydin WUAs the chair and the general secretary examined the state of the infrastructure and made a deal with DSI so that the latter would continue to maintain the canals until they were cleaned completely.
In contrast, in the Urfa WUAs, faulty infrastructure was transferred to the associations, which, in turn, had to undertake the maintenance of frequently malfunctioning components. Farmers and association personnel in Aydin have more experience with state institutions and bureaucrats, have more civic experience and are able to negotiate what is in their and the farmers’ best interests. Instead, in the vertically organized Urfa, both farmers and association personnel had much less direct experience with state agencies and were impatient to take over the irrigation management. They did so without much concern for the long-term complications that later arose.105

Differing satisfaction levels have been reported by scholars studying the WUAs (see, Guvercin and Boz, 2003 for results from the Duzici district in Turkey; Baran, 1996; Kumbaroglu, 2004). The interviews with farmers indicate that despite their responsibility to make sure that both the distribution and drainage canals are clean, the associations in Urfa did not have a satisfactory record of cleaning the drainage canals. As a result, the fields neighboring the clogged canals become less fertile because of excessive water and increasing salinization. When unsatisfied water users demand better service, the associations do not respond, as the following quote from a farmer in Urfa indicates:

There’s only one drainage canal for 4000 dönüms and it is mostly filled with reed. It does not drain properly. There’s

105 Transfer protocols were not different in these two regions. It was a separate agreement between the Aydin WUA and the DSI which provided Aydin WUA with DSI assistance in maintenance until the canals were all cleaned once. See the epilogue to this chapter for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

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high water table problem. I have been waiting for the last 4 years [for a solution]. This year, I will sue someone but I cannot find anyone to hold responsible. WUAs put the blame on DSI, and DSI sends you back to the WUAs (U Farmer Interview #25).

In the Aydin Plain WUA, farmers are satisfied with the level of water and with the operation of the association. According to a survey with 193 farmers from Aydin Plain WUA, 80 percent of farmers stated that they received water on time (see Table A15 in Appendix 1 for the results of the survey conducted by Koc et al. 2006). In Aydin, even farmers who cultivate plots at the end of the canal system stated that they received sufficient amount of water (A Farmer Interview #3).

One of the association directors in Aydin WUA is a retired DSI bureaucrat and he ensures that the operation is at its best. The distribution of water in Aydin Plain WUA is organized such that the field technicians distribute the siphons allocated to them among the farmers within their zones. In other words, the daily water allowance for a particular zone is divided among farmers by the technician. When there is water shortage, which is more likely during the months of July and August, the allowance of each farmer is reduced equally (A Interview #1). Farmers from Aydin Plain WUA are satisfied with the performance of the WUA.

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106 Water table level refers to the level of the groundwater. High groundwater levels are harmful for crops and leads to lower yields. It is also harmful for houses and other property in rural areas (Scheumann and Freisem, 2001:9).

107 Aydin Plain WUA was fully operational in 1998 and the management was transferred to WUA during that year. The Soke irrigation system was constructed in 1981 and was fully operational by the end of the decade. DSI operated the system until its transfer to the WUA.
and on a couple of occasions they stated that their association functioned better than the Soke Plain WUA (A Farmer Interview #3, #15).

Farmers from the Soke Plain WUA indicated that there is insufficient water in the canals during the peak irrigation season. In contrast to the case of Urfa where the source of water is a dam reservoir, in Aydin the water flows from Menderes River (River Maeander) without the presence of large dams. Therefore, at times, the level of water in the canals is insufficient. The chair of the Chamber of Agriculture in Soke claimed that at the time of the project planning, they had forecast a much lower cotton cultivation in Soke Plain (A Interview #10) – the exact same problem that Urfa is currently facing. The interviewed farmers and officials did not blame the management of the WUA for the shortage of water and instead laid the blame on DSI, since it is their responsibility to allocate water to the canals. They claimed that the reason for the shortage was the level of water in the system in the summer and referred to the necessity of completing a nearby dam, long talked about but never completed.

According to the survey conducted by Koc et al. (2006) with 240 farmers from the Soke Plain irrigation zone, 75 percent of farmers receive water on time and 77 percent of them claim that the WUA management is better in terms of sustainability than the DSI management ever was. Prior to the formation of the

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108 See Map A3 in Appendix 3 for a map of the Aydin Plain Irrigation Scheme and Map A4 for the location of Aydin and Soke WUAs.

109 Ozesmi-Yildiz (2002-2003:95) claims that 95 percent of the irrigated lands are used for cotton cultivation in the Southeast. It produces 40 percent of Turkey’s cotton production. However, area of cotton cultivation slightly decreased as a result of the declining cotton prices. See Table A9 in Appendix 1 for the changes in crop distribution within the irrigation zone of a WUA in Urfa.
WUAs, farmers could not access the state agency whereas now they complain about water shortage to their association personnel or chair and the latter usually pays a visit to the state agency in order to ask for the release of a larger quantity of water to their canals (A Interview #10).

In sum, if we rank the satisfaction levels of farmers with the associations, Urfa farmers are the least satisfied with service provision. In Aydin, Soke WUA waters users are less satisfied than the Aydin WUA farmers. Under DSI management, farmers from Soke WUA zone did not pay their irrigation fees for many years and could still keep on irrigating. It is therefore no surprise that most farmers from Soke Plain complained that the fees determined by the associations were too high. In contrast, farmers from the Aydin Plain WUA claimed that prior to the construction of the irrigation infrastructure (which was decentralized to the user association following inauguration in 1998) they had to pay for oil to operate the tractors in pumping water from the river, which cost much more than what they are currently paying to the association. Hence, appreciation of the WUA management is relative to what the farmers experienced beforehand.

This section showed that the associations in Aydin are more efficient and the most important difference in comparison to the WUAs in Urfa is the extent to which operational plans and decision-making rules are followed in Aydin. The next section examines the effectiveness of the associations.
**Effectiveness of the WUAs**

The effectiveness of the WUAs is evaluated by examining whether there are regular meetings held by the associations, whether effective monitoring of the personnel is in place, whether professionals are chosen to operate the associations and whether the budget and the annual report are publicly available. Officially, there are two or three council meetings a year. Vital decisions about the following year’s operations are taken in these meetings, and the previous year’s budget and activities are approved. In theory, these meetings allow farmers’ representatives to relay farmers’ demands to the associations, to keep the executive accountable and to monitor the budget. In Aydin and in some of the Urfa WUAs, council meetings are held regularly as per their bylaws. However, interviews with councilors from Urfa indicate that meetings are not always regularly held in some of the associations (U Local Authority Interview #5).

During the first few years of the transfer process, observers from DSI took part in the council meetings of WUAs on a regular basis, but in the past two years, observers in Urfa have ignored the invitations sent by the association general secretaries. Some general secretaries stated that the associations were now mature, and did not need observers. Others claimed that even if there are no observers from state agencies, they would invite the general secretary of a neighboring association to their council meeting, just to make sure there is an external witness to the decisions taken in council. This shows that the problems of the associations in Urfa are partly caused by the lack of oversight by the state. As the previous chapter showed, the farmers of Urfa are unable to reach their representatives and
their representatives do not always get to participate in council meetings because of irregularities. Taken together, these result in reduced effectiveness of the associations in Urfa.

In Aydin, none of the interview participants referred to irregularities pertaining to council meetings, aside from the concern expressed over the fact that non-farmers could be deciding on issues which are vital for farmers. Representative democracy does not necessarily mean that stakeholders are the only ones who can protect their own interests. As long as representatives have regular ties with interested parties and can aggregate their demands and express them in the decision-making process in order to protect their interests, the process can be said to be effective. The Aydin WUAs have a good track-record for functioning well but the ones in Urfa breed dissatisfaction and corruption.

The interviews with the WUA general secretaries from Urfa indicate that in many cases the executive committee of the WUAs is effectively dominated and controlled by the chairperson. In some of the associations in Urfa, the chairperson has the most powerful position and no council member can challenge the “dictatorship of the chairperson,” as one general secretary from Urfa put it. This is corroborated by the study of Karli and Celik (2003:72), whose survey results indicate that 70 percent of farmers from Urfa believe that the chairperson has the ultimate say in the associations whereas 30 percent attributed this power to the

110 As outlined in Chapter 4, the headmen and mayors occupy the permanent seats in the council. Some of these locally elected individuals do not engage in agriculture. The rest of the representatives to the council were selected by the headmen or mayor prior to the legislation of the new Law (Law No. 5355).
executive committee. There were no survey respondents who believed that the council was effective.

In some associations, executive decisions are made by the chair without holding a meeting. The necessary official documents are then brought to the houses or offices of the committee members for signing (U WUA Interview #20). As one general secretary openly asserted, “the committee members reside in the villages. So we do not hold meetings as long as there is nothing to discuss. We convene the meeting on paper. The only associations where there are regular executive committee meetings are the ones where there is opposition to the chair” (U WUA Interview #4).

Interviews with other general secretaries in Urfa confirm the practice of irregular or “on paper” meetings of the executive committees (U WUA Interviews #3, #7, #8, #9, #10 and #12). The “on paper” meeting is a way of fulfilling legal requirements set by the bylaw but also serves another purpose: “they get paid – huzur hakki – every time they convene. That’s why sometimes they meet 5 times a month. This is undercover rent seeking” (U WUA Interview #6). In this case, it is naïve to expect that there will be a healthy audit of the budget or of the functioning of the associations by the councilors.

The second and third factors which are evaluated to determine the effectiveness of the associations are whether the personnel are professional and

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111 See Bryld (2001) for a similar system of on-paper democracy in the case of Indian Panchayat Raj in Karnataka. The reservation system which reserved women one thirds of all seats was not able to empower women because they were elected officially but in most cases it was their husbands of brothers who participated in the decision-making.
whether they are monitored. The permanent personnel of the associations consist
of the general secretary, the treasurer and field technicians. The general secretary
is an agricultural engineer and this satisfies the requirement of professionalism of
the personnel.

Field guards and additional personnel are hired seasonally based on need.
According to the bylaw, the executive committee is in charge of recruiting the
personnel. However, in practice, in Urfa the chairs decide who gets hired and
fired from the associations. Over-employment often occurs in Urfa due to
promises made prior to elections, as the chairs employ people as a favor to the
families of employees or to accumulate prestige, rather than based on any actual
organizational need or requirement (U WUA Interview #5; Cevikbas, 2001:105).
A general secretary from Urfa claimed that the personnel appointed by the chair
do not even show up for work (U WUA Interview #10) and tend to accept bribes
on the field (Harris, 2005:191). This type of nepotism cannot be prevented by
the general secretaries of the associations, because they could be fired if they took
any action (Harris, 2005:191).

Many general secretaries wish the permanent personnel (i.e. the general
secretary and the treasurer) were appointed by the state instead of being
dependent on the approval of the chair and the executive committee of the
association. They claim that they have to “accept all the wrongs the chair does as

\[112\] Bribery pertaining to the services and procedures of the WUAs was often mentioned in Urfa.
For instance, a headman from Harran Plain stated that farmers bribe field guards to get more
water: “There are guards [in the field]. They give him money and make him give more water to
their side. If I am strong in the WUA executive, then I can do as I wish. And in that case, there
isn’t a fair structure” (U Local Authority Interview #4).
right” because their future rests “between the two lips of the chairperson” (UWUA Interview #2, #5, #11, #12). The positions of most general secretaries are precarious in Urfa and this is mentioned in a study which closely examined one of the WUAs, where a technician was trained for a year and fired suddenly following the election of a new chair (Halcrow and Dolsar, 1999:7).

Overall, in Urfa there are many problems related to the personnel of the associations. The following quote shows that these shortcomings push farmers to take matters in their own hands, even though this risks delegitimizing the associations and generating conflicts due to uncertainties in access to water.

WUA personnel do not have a satisfactory performance. Some of them are imaginary personnel [meaning that they do not show up for work]. There’s not enough water when needed. And when not needed, it flows to the drainage canal. Now people are having keys made for themselves [to control the flow of water within canals] (U Group Interview #5).

Despite the problems that were mentioned in the interviews pertaining to the association personnel, it was recognized by interviewees that the personnel is accessible through mobile phones, 24 hours a day, in contrast to the management of the state agency where civil servants were not available after office hours. Field agents of DSI worked in shifts but this was not the case for the managerial team. The personnel of the associations work longer hours than DSI personnel. Sometimes the technicians are called to fix emergencies in the middle of the night. However, the accessibility of the WUA personnel and chair does not necessarily translate into efficient and equally provided service delivery.
Patron-client networks that are prevalent in Urfa in the employment of WUA personnel are not present in Aydin. Farmers from Aydin did not refer to any malfeasance in terms of WUA functioning or their employment practices, whereas corruption and embezzlement were widely declared and acknowledged by farmers in Urfa. The general secretary of the Soke Plain WUA indicated that he would not keep an employee who does not work. He claimed that all personnel know the conditions of work prior to starting the job (A WUA Interview #2).

The last criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the WUAs is whether they make their budgets and annual reports public. The budget and the annual report should be distributed to councilors during the meeting in November. In Aydin, these documents were available even to the researcher, whereas in Urfa, it is not standard practice to distribute a printed annual report and budget even to the councilors. The chair summarizes the previous year’s operations orally, and presents the actualized budget to the councilors. The published annual report provides information to the councilors and water users and makes monitoring easier. Therefore, WUAs in Aydin are more transparent about their activities and their budgets in contrast to the associations in Urfa. Overall, the analysis of effectiveness of the associations shows that Aydin WUAs are more effective in comparison to the ones in Urfa.

**Responsiveness of WUAs**

The responsiveness of the WUAs is evaluated by analyzing whether water users have equitable access to the associations and whether procedures that are
followed are equally applied to all farmers. According to the bylaws, the associations do not have to open their meetings to water users at large, who should be informed through the councilors who are their representatives. Only a few of the associations allowed water users (who are not councilors) to attend meetings.

Decentralization and Democratic Deepening: A Conditional Relationship

Having analyzed the four contextual variables, their impact on the performance of the WUAs and on the level of democratic governance within the associations, we can turn to answering the initial research questions: Under what conditions does decentralization lead to democratic and good performance of decentralized institutions? What are the conditions under which decentralization is associated with deepening of democracy? This thesis focuses on actual practice in addition to formal rules, and shows that decentralization does not automatically lead to democratic functioning even if the bylaws are such that they institute an indirect democratic organization.

The State Hydraulic Works (DSI) considers the decentralization of irrigation management as a success story across the board. The Southeast Anatolia Regional Development Agency’s (GAP) report on irrigation management in Urfa concludes that water users follow the rules and do not harm the irrigation infrastructure. It states that farmers pay their fees and know they will not receive
water if they are indebted to the association (GAP, 1996:35). DSI evaluates the
associations in a similarly functional/technocratic manner and claims that the
transfer is a success since none of the transferred irrigation schemes have been
returned to the state agency’s management due to problems within the WUAs. In
contrast to the optimistic evaluations of the official reports, this chapter outlined
the problems and prospects of the WUAs in both Urfa and Aydin which are
summarized in Table 5.1 (a) and (b).
Table 5.1(a) Outcome of decentralization in Aydin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOMES OF DECENTRALIZATION</th>
<th>AYDIN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Function according to bylaw</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More responsive to wealthy farmers but WUAs better than DSI responsiveness</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure maintained in collaboration with DSI</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Farmer Satisfaction | Farmers are satisfied |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC AUDIT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Determination of chair and councilors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Openness and Accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forms of redress</td>
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<td>Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independence of Societal Organization</td>
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</table>

| RESULT | WUAs are indirectly democratic organizations. They function well and satisfy their stakeholders. |
Table 5.1(b) Outcome of decentralization in Urfa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTCOMES OF DECENTRALIZATION</th>
<th>URFA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irregularities in functioning (meetings not held regularly)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption and embezzlement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget allocations and expenditures not transparent</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unequal treatment of farmers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Problems with maintenance – hasty transfer process</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Farmer Satisfaction | There is dissatisfaction |

**DEMOCRATIC AUDIT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determination of chair and councilors</th>
<th>~ (bribery and intimidation)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Openness and Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>~ (responsive but not always and equally)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forms of redress</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independence of Societal Organization</td>
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</table>

**RESULT**

WUAs are not democratic and they yield dissatisfaction. Farmers who are experienced with non-traditional socio-political organizations are more likely to ask for accountability through formal means if they can by-pass the family pressure. And even then, corruption makes their complaint/petition “disappear.”
*Institutional design and blueprints:* The formal rules that were made at the outset of the decentralization of irrigation management were decided by the central state agency – State Hydraulic Works (DSI) – and were used as a blueprint by all irrigation schemes in Turkey which were previously operated by DSI. This “centralized decentralization” did not take into account regional differences and as this study shows, it resulted in corrupt and non-representative associations in Urfa.

Overall, the associations are free from the interference of non-elected bureaucratic institutions, but in the absence of proper monitoring, this type of devolution leads to unwanted consequences such as corruption and embezzlement. Those who designed the decentralized institutions should have taken these into consideration and implanted a more elaborate monitoring mechanism in provinces where there are greater inequalities (such as Urfa). Individuals who feel disempowered within the social hierarchy are less likely to be able or willing to monitor or hold the executive committee and the chair accountable.

*Analysis:* This chapter illustrated that the most important problem with the associations in Urfa in terms of efficiency is the level of corruption that is present in the operation of the WUAs. In Aydin such allegations were not mentioned by the interviewees and the sporadic independent audits did not result in court cases.
and jail sentences, as did their counterparts in Urfa. The associations’ democratic potential is based on the representation of water users by councilors who should attend the regularly held meetings and elect the executive committee members and the chair. The examination of the effectiveness of the associations shows that meetings are not regularly held and that the chair is dominant in making the decisions in Urfa. The interview results show that farmers from Urfa feel disempowered to hold the association accountable for its ineffectiveness. This is caused by the inequalities in resource distribution and power differentials that exist in the province and the lack of past civic activism. The associations in Aydin hold regular meetings and the farmers feel empowered vis-à-vis the WUAs and their personnel and executive committee.

As for the transparency of the budget allocations, farmers and general secretaries from Aydin never referred to shady expenditures or corruption, whereas in most of the WUAs in Urfa there were complaints of embezzlement and non-transparency. The associations in Aydin publish annual reports and the chairs present the reports at the council meeting. This is the procedure outlined in the bylaw. The associations in Urfa, however, do not publish annual reports. The procedures in Urfa are much less transparent and remain within the purview of the chair. Urfa has greater inequalities which are replicated within the association structures and procedures. These, in turn, increase the likelihood of the associations acting without transparency and treating farmers unequally.

This thesis shows that there is unequal treatment in the WUAs in Urfa, with the most significant problem being the access to water (or lack thereof).
There are irregularities and favoritism in fee collection based on the socio-economic status of the farmers. It was shown that these were problems encountered in Urfa and not in Aydin and that the associations in the former are less responsive than the ones in the latter. Overall, farmers in Aydin are much more satisfied with their associations and the services they receive than the ones in Urfa. The causes for the malfunctioning associations in Urfa are the inequalities in resource and power distribution. WUAs in Urfa reproduce these inequalities within their organization and are not efficient, effective or responsive.

This chapter illustrated that there is bribery involved in many of the association elections in Urfa and that there are barriers in holding the associations accountable. The lack of accountability of the associations in Urfa is attributed to the inequalities in resource and power distribution and the lack of experience with civic activism.

I had hypothesized that the lack of experience with civic activism and the enduring feudal structure would result in less participation in the WUAs of Urfa because farmers would not see themselves as rights-bearing citizens. The communitarian nature of the social structure limits the ability to form an accountability-inducing collective, because of selective benefits different members of the tribe hierarchy draw from the WUA system at different times. As the interviews illustrate, farmers in Urfa were not oblivious or without a desire to act based on their own self-interest; however, the tribal/family structure prevented them from doing so. Even when farmers are knowledgeable and willing to utilize formal mechanisms of accountability (such as sending a petition or complaint to
the governor’s office), there are informal mechanisms like the large family structure or the aşiret system, which prevent them from taking action. In the event that they manage to file their complaint officially to the governor’s office, mechanisms of corruption often render the accountability process ineffective. This stems from the inequalities of land and power distribution that are prevalent in Urfa.

The inequalities aside, self-perception of a farmer as a rights-bearing citizen is a function of his relationship with formal institutions. The discussion in the chapter showed that the average farmer in Aydin has had a longer exposure to formal institutions – such as cooperatives – and has acquired a sense of citizenship based on rights and duties. The reduction of inequalities over the years in Aydin – which resulted from large landowners selling their land at a gradual pace to support their more elaborate urban lifestyles – helped farmers realize that they are in a position to ask for their rights when they feel wronged.

It is interesting to note that those farmers who pursued the legal mechanisms of accountability in Urfa were the ones who had continuous interaction with formal institutions – either as employees of municipalities or as headmen. This indicates that even though the WUA structure is not conducive to permitting an increased quality of participation in the short-run, it could have positive outcomes in providing an arena for farmers to interact with formal associations (over which they have at least some theoretical influence) and develop civic skills that enable them to become more effective in influencing decision-making in the long run.
The findings, however, do not imply that all farmers in Aydin are actively involved in the decision-making of the associations. The WUA operates according to the bylaws and has open elections for the positions. They have transparent budgetary allocations and perform most of their duties. There is, however, a certain apathy among the farmers vis-à-vis the associations. They are satisfied as long as they get their water, the fees are not too high and the infrastructure is maintained. They are aware of their rights and would uphold them if necessary. They do not feel disempowered vis-à-vis the associations. Given the circumstances and the operation of the WUA, they get what they want and need, and many do not see any need to be involved in influencing the association's performance.

*Potential for democratic deepening:* The empirical material and the analyses illustrate that decentralization does not lead to democratic deepening in all socio-economic settings. Significant inequalities in access to resources and in power relationships, and disempowerment caused by the lack of past civic experience and formal education leaves little space for decentralized institutions to function democratically. This chapter showed that this is the case in Urfa; however, Urfa’s decentralized institutions are not necessarily hopeless, and may still serve the purpose of developing democratic potential. It was shown that they provide an atmosphere where farmers continuously interact with an association that is supposed to serve. It was shown, through the interviews, that the farmers are developing a sense of citizenship which makes them aware of their rights and
duties towards the associations. Those water users who do not feel served by the WUA can start behaving like rights-bearing citizens and demand accountability, which will push the associations to be more democratic and allow more input – direct and indirect, through their representatives – from the water users.
Epilogue – WUA Reform: The More it Changes, the More it Stays the Same

Since the beginning of the decentralization process the WUAs have functioned such that they were able to maintain a minimum level of service delivery, and not one of the associations has completely failed to manage the irrigation infrastructure that it took over. Nevertheless, as the discussion in this chapter showed, there are serious shortcomings and user dissatisfaction with the associations, especially in Urfa. In an effort to improve the situation, the general secretaries of several Urfa WUAs collaborated together and drafted some recommendations for a reform of the associations. These recommendations were communicated to the DSI administration in Ankara as well as the GAP project administration (U WUA Interview #2). The bureaucrats of these institutions were aware of the inadequate speed with which the decentralization of irrigation management took place. They decided to draft a WUA law as well. This section will summarize these recommendations, describe the process through which the new law was legislated, and examine whether the negative effects of the contextual factors identified in Chapter 4 are alleviated as a result of the new legislation. The recommendations of the general secretaries are important in order to understand how the new law (which was legislated in 2005) responded to grassroots demands.

The general secretaries in Urfa were in favor of regular elections where all farmers would have the right to vote for the chairperson of the association. They
also suggested that all councilors be elected so that there would no longer be automatic members. They wanted the chairperson to be at least a high school graduate and the rights of employees to be protected. They suggested the formation of a commission among the WUA members which would convene to debate the irrigation fees and present their case to the council. They also pointed to the necessity of having routine audits every year conducted by the governor’s office or DSI in order to check whether the association regularly pays its personnel, social insurance dues and taxes. The general secretaries recommended that the personnel be hired and fired through a decision of the council and that these tasks not be left to the sole discretion of the chairperson.

Even though the discussion in the previous sections indicated that Aydin WUAs performed much better than their counterparts in Urfa, the general secretaries and personnel of the associations in Aydin identified some problems as well. A memo written by the general secretary of the Soke Plain WUA indicates that there are seven types of problems with the functioning of the WUAs. The first one relates to the legal basis of the associations and the confusion brought about by the lack of a founding law for the WUAs. He argues that there should be a law governing water use just like the ones that exist in Spain where this type of law was legislated in 1866. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the decentralization of irrigation management in Turkey initially proceeded at a fast pace, and there was no time to legislate a law governing the irrigation associations.

To address this situation, a draft law on WUAs was prepared by DSI in consultation with the WUAs, provincial branches of DSI, state agencies dealing
with agriculture and universities. This process began in 1997 and the draft was ready in 1999 (Halcrow-Dolsar, 2000a:2.5). In 2005, Unions of Local Authority Law (Law No. 5355 – 26.05.2005), which includes one paragraph pertaining to the definition and responsibilities of the WUAs, was legislated. This law regulates all types of associations involving local authorities and is not specific to the irrigation associations. This was a disappointment as the draft law on irrigation associations, which was developed and amended through consultation with the stakeholders, was not even brought to the parliament. The reason for the disregard for the draft WUA law, which came about through a long consultative process, shows that the centralist attitude of the Turkish state is still very present. The bureaucrats of DSI or the WUA general secretaries did not have an explanation as to why their efforts were thwarted by the central state.

The second problem identified by the Soke general secretary is related to infrastructural deficiencies of the irrigation schemes. He argues that the maintenance of the infrastructure – such as drainage canal cleaning – was not fully undertaken prior to the transfer to WUAs. The transfer protocols, which identify the conditions of decentralization of irrigation infrastructure from DSI to the WUAs, were not prepared in consultation with the demands of the associations and were forced upon them. Soke Plain WUA’s general secretary claims that his association resisted the imposition of this protocol and modified it prior to signing it.

As a result, DSI agreed to help the association clean up drainage canals after the transfer because they had not been able to complete the job before they
decentralized the scheme’s management. The general secretary argues that other associations faced operational problems because they could not resist DSI’s *fait-accompli*. This has been mentioned in most of the interviews with the general secretaries from Urfa. The transfer protocol was signed by the chairs of the associations without first inspecting the infrastructure. This resulted in malfunctions which later needed to be fixed by the associations (U WUA Interview #14).

The third type of problem he refers to are the small size of some of the associations which renders them financially unsustainable. The fourth problem is the inability of the associations to maintain their qualified personnel because they only have a few permanent positions. The engineers who are employed as temporary staff do not want to stay on because of the disadvantages of a temporary position.

The legal status of the associations vis-à-vis other state institutions is also a problem for WUAs throughout Turkey. Kumbaroglu’s (2004:171) survey finds that the chairpersons’ and general secretaries’ most important problem was the lack of recognition of WUAs as legitimate institutions by other state institutions. The general secretary claims that although most of the confusion has subsided, there are still some problems – which, according to Kumbaroglu’s (2004:171) survey participants, could be solved by a specialized WUA law. The sixth type of problem that he mentions in his memo pertains to the lack of training provided by the state agency to the personnel of the WUAs. He states that the Soke Plain WUA initiated a training program in 2001 with the collaboration of the
Agricultural Vocational School of Soke and trained the water distributing technicians for 16 days.

As was mentioned above, in order to address some of these problems and modify the institutional design, DSI decided to draft a law that would slightly modify the functioning of the associations. However, this law was abandoned without even reaching the parliament and the law on Unions of Local Authority brought the WUAs under its jurisdiction. The WUAs were asked to modify their bylaws according to the new law. The changes brought about by the new law were contested to the extent that, ultimately, not much has changed. Since all the interviews with the associations and the farmers were undertaken prior to the implementation of the new bylaw, the results of this study do not cover the new period. However, it is interesting to note these changes in order to understand the dynamics that come into play at times of attempted reform.

The new bylaw brought about two fundamental changes to the functioning of the WUAs. First, elections are now held at the village level to determine the councilors (other than the headmen and mayors who are automatically assigned as councilors). Farmers in Aydin are satisfied with the new system, whereby the councilors are determined through the votes of the farmers. A councilor of the Soke WUA claimed that when the headmen determined the councilors, it was possible for the headman to appoint non-farmers as representatives. He asserted that only farmers could empathize with farmers (A Farmer Interview #1).

Originally, the new bylaw stipulated that only those water users who are residents in a village would vote in the elections. This excluded many farmers
who resided in the district centre and cultivated land in the villages. When elections were carried out, many farmers who resided outside of the village boundaries were antagonized. A farmer from the Soke Plain WUA claimed that they were dissatisfied with the residency requirement of the new law. He said that the new law came about because they were not satisfied with the setup of the WUA. He believes that all farmers who pay the association for water should have the right to vote and be elected (A Farmer Interview #8). In Soke Plain WUA, in one village, only 58 out of 1200 farmers were able to vote at the elections because of the residency requirement (A Local Authority Interview #2). This rule was in place for only one election (in 2006) and following the pressure exerted on the Ministry of the Interior by farmers who do not reside in the villages the bylaw was modified to remove the residency clause (TBMM, 2005:1049).

The elections for the councilors will no doubt render the system more democratic; however, the chairperson is still selected by the councilors; hence the system is still open to corruption in WUAs where chairs have a history of embezzling funds as it pays to be the leader of the association. Therefore, the bylaw was changed and supported with legislation, but the practice has not evolved in the direction that the observers or the general secretaries would have wished.

The second major change that the new bylaw stipulated was the reduction of the chairperson’s term in office. In the old system, the chair served between

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113 Law No. 5445 Mahallî İdare Birlikleri Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun – Law on Changes to the Local Authority Unions Law (legislated on 29.12.2005; published in the official gazette on 04.01.2006).
four to five years. Due to problems of accountability, the new bylaw reduced the
term of the chair to two years so as to enhance accountability. If the chair is
approved by the council at the end of two years, then he could serve three more
years. Therefore, the new clause granted the council an accountability check of
the chairperson’s performance; however, some chairpersons and general
secretaries, particularly in Urfa, opposed this clause by arguing that the new
personnel brought in with the new chair would have only started learning the job
when they will be replaced with new ones in the eventuality of a new chair being
elected by the council at the end of the two years (U WUA Interview #6). The
pressures of the WUAs resulted in another modification in 2006: the term of the
chairs was extended back to five years.

Hence, the bylaw was modified to accommodate the desires of the chairs,
the general secretaries and the powerful farmers. There was no modification,
however, to the structure of the associations whereby the impact of inequalities
would be diminished.
Chapter 6 – CONCLUSION

“[A] State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes – will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished.” John Stuart Mill (1910:170 quoted in Barber, 2003:244).

In her article on the linkages between decentralization and democratization Bergh (2004) asks a fundamental question: “how do people become engaged as citizens rather than managed as subjects?” In line with this question, this thesis examined the conditions under which decentralization leads to democratic deepening.

There are a number of important reasons to critically examine the link between decentralization and democratic deepening. The first reason is that development agencies promote decentralization in developing countries and often tie the release of funds to the implementation of decentralization reforms. As such, an increasing number of states are finding it necessary to implement decentralization reforms, which do not always have clear outcomes in terms of the promotion of democracy and service delivery improvements. Secondly, the proposition that decentralization can promote a deepening of democracy is not without its caveats. Theoretically, decentralization opens new political spaces where individuals can gain political skills that they can use elsewhere, and thus
has the potential to promote a deepening of democracy. Enhancing the quality of democracy addresses existing and potential conflicts by giving citizens the chance to participate and deliberate in decision-making. In a deep democracy, all parties, including the subordinate ones, should have access to deliberative mechanisms and make their voices heard.

Most decentralization studies focus on local governments and compare the outcomes of decentralization among different political systems. In contrast, I explored the case of irrigation management decentralization in Turkey in the first half of the 1990s. In this case, the decentralized institution has a clearly identifiable responsibility and the stakeholders are more easily delineated in comparison to local governments. Local governments provide a wide range of services and it is not always simple to assess the level of participation within these organizations because of the complexity of the organizational structure. The WUAs have simple organizational structures and it is easy to contact their users to observe the interactions they have with the associations. I examined the WUAs in a comparative manner in order to determine whether there is a link between decentralization and democratic/satisfactory service delivery as the theory of decentralization postulates.

The thesis adapted non-composite criteria from Beetham (1994) and Grindle (2007) in order to evaluate whether the decentralized institutions are democratic and whether they provide an adequate level of service. I evaluated whether water users are able to participate in the WUAs, whether they are able to influence council decisions through their representatives, whether they are able to
hold the associations accountable and whether the water users acquire a sense of political efficacy through being part of a WUA. I examined the diverging outcomes of identical decentralized institutional structures in two provinces with very different social, economic and political contexts: Urfa and Aydın. I evaluated whether inequalities in access to resources and power, the education level of farmers and their experience with civic organizations impacted the outcomes of decentralization. While the associations in Aydın had exemplary performance in providing services, the WUAs in Urfa are accused of engendering corruption, bribery and embezzlement. I argued that decentralization does not lead to democratic functioning and better institutional performance if there are significant inequalities in access to resources and power dynamics. This is especially true if those who interact with the decentralized institutions have little or no experience with civic participation. The evidence on the impact of education was not conclusive but those who are more educated feel more empowered vis-à-vis decentralized institutions. Hence, education levels have an indirect impact.

Access to resources remains skewed in Urfa. Large landowners control a considerable portion of agricultural land, there is very high rate of landlessness and most of those who are landless gain a living through sharecropping. Sharecroppers and those with informal rent arrangements are excluded from the WUA structure because they are not owners. Even those who own small plots (approximately one third of the farming households own less than 50 dönüms in Urfa) do not have access to other resources – such as credit – and are treated unequally by the associations. Hence, inequalities have an impact on the
functioning of the WUAs: there are inequalities in access to water, the representatives are not always able to participate in council meetings because these meetings are not regularly held, and wealthy farmers who get to sit on the executive committee do not pay irrigation fees or receive significant reductions. In Aydin, there is much less inequality in access to resources and there were no allegations of irregular meetings or favoritism.

The power differentials among farmers in Urfa are primarily a result of feudal and familial structures. The aşiret system and the large family structure make farmers less likely to protect their interests because there is an understanding that the larger family should be respected. Power differentials cause farmers and some councilors from Urfa to feel disempowered. Hence, even if water users are knowledgeable about their rights, they do not always get the chance to uphold them. Chapter 4 showed that Aydin has higher education levels and literacy rates are much higher in comparison to Urfa. Even though there is no direct and conclusive impact of education levels on the democratizing effect of decentralization, the association personnel and other experts do not consider the farmers from Urfa capable of participating in the WUAs. Therefore, the education level of a farmer is not necessarily an impediment to his participation in the association decision-making but the association personnel have a patronizing and denigrating attitude towards small farmers who have no educational attainment. This leads to feelings of disempowerment among small farmers who are not educated. In contrast, in Aydin, farmers are respected by the associations and the latter do not feel disempowered vis-à-vis the associations.
Hadiz (2004) is very pessimistic about how decentralization reforms have been implemented worldwide in the recent past, and argues that the “theory of decentralization tacitly endorses the non-disturbance of the existing social order” (Hadiz, 2004:706). However, as this thesis illustrated, existing social orders – the social, political and economic structures – do change, albeit slowly and unintentionally. The experience of farmers from Aydin is illustrative of the nature of change. Significant inequalities that existed in land distribution in Aydin-Soke slowly gave way to a more equal distribution as large and powerful farmers began selling their land and moving to the urban centers. This equalization was accompanied by increasing educational opportunities in the region. Farmers, who did not feel empowered vis-à-vis the institutions with which they interacted in the past, have developed a culture of accountability through participating in civic organizations, with TARİŞ being the most notable example. TARİŞ operated under state tutelage until the end of the 1990s, but still exposed farmers to civic governance structures. These changes created very different social, economic and political environments in that province in comparison to Urfa. Farmers from Aydin are now better educated, empowered and able to participate in the associations despite the attempts of powerful farmers to influence the associations for personal gain. The changes to the social, economic and political contexts began in Urfa with the very slow dissolution of the aşiret system and the shift to irrigated agriculture.

Farmers from Aydin are also more experienced with civil society organizations and civic activism compared to those from Urfa. Historically Aydin
has had much more exposure to political activism and the number of associations and cooperatives are significantly smaller in Urfa compared to those in Aydin. Most civil society organizations in Urfa are based on religion or kinship, and do not provide their members with civic experience. Moreover, there was limited state presence in Urfa until the 1980s when the GAP project began and this meant that the only ones with experience with formal organizations were the headmen and aşiret leaders. The absence of popular interactions with the state and the strength of traditional social structures meant that citizens were not empowered to act and did not challenge the existing social order. This socio-political structure engendered significant amount of clientelism in the region and prevented the emergence of a culture of accountability, such as that which had developed in Aydin over the years. Hence, overall, Urfa has a weak civic past and the WUAs perform below standards – with many irregularities and unequal service provision; an outcome which would have been unacceptable in Aydin.

The unequal and sub-optimal service provided by the WUAs in Urfa may, in fact, prove to be positive in the long-run if they provoke a productive reaction from farmers, who have learned about their rights and duties. For the time being, however, those farmers remain unable to object to WUA failures because the feudal and familial structures tend to prevent them from acting. Even when they have tried to act, their objections have often proven ineffective. In Urfa, actors having more experience with formal institutions, such as municipalities and the associations, were adamant about pursuing methods of redress that would push the WUAs to be more responsive and create a culture of accountability among
farmers. Aydin farmers had not felt empowered vis-à-vis formal institutions when they began interacting with them in the 1950s. However, in time, they developed skills that allowed them to be more assertive in their relations with institutions – including the newly established WUAs. Most farmers from Urfa had never interacted with formal institutions before the arrival of WUAs, and decentralization has provided them with their only regular contact with non-traditional and non-state organizations.

**Theoretical Implications**

The most important theoretical implication of this study is that during the implementation of decentralization reforms policy-makers can deliberately or unintentionally ignore obstacles that could damage the democratic and good performance of the decentralized institutions. Three such factors were found to be the reasons for non-democratic and malfunctioning decentralized associations in the case of irrigation management transfer in Turkey: inequalities in resource and power distribution, and the limited past civic experience of the citizens. The fourth factor, education levels, has an indirect impact on the democratic deepening potential of decentralization. Had the state agency taken social, economic and political factors into account during the design phase and taken more time to implement context-sensitive institutional designs – instead of adopting a one-size-fits-all approach – they could have mitigated the unintended
and negative consequences of decentralization (i.e. corruption, embezzlement of funds, unequal and insufficient service delivery).

In terms of theories of democratic deepening, this study presents insights regarding political development over and above the discussion of the link between decentralization and its impact on democratic deepening. The link between decentralization and democratic deepening is established through individuals acquiring a sense of their status as rights-bearing citizens and of empowerment through their interactions and experiences with non-traditional institutions; such transformed individuals positively contribute to further democratic deepening despite the remaining structural limitations.

Following up on the findings of this thesis, it would be interesting to examine persons who are active in the WUAs and analyze whether they are similarly active in other political spheres. Preliminary results from Urfa and Aydin indicate that this is the case, but a more systematic exploration of those who actively take part in the WUAs could reveal, in greater detail, the ripple effects of decentralization and shed light on its impact on empowerment and democratic deepening. For this, I would need to look at the other associational activities of WUA members and perhaps of other citizens in the locality influenced by the WUA experience. A study of larger numbers of WUAs and their spillover effects constitute interesting areas to be considered in future research. The examination of municipal councils, their composition and their impact on the political activities of involved citizens is also an area of interest that would contribute to the literature on decentralization and democratic deepening.


Policy Prescriptions

The implementation of a uniform institutional structure throughout Turkey resulted in divergent outcomes. This study showed that contextual differences affect the outcomes of the decentralization processes. The question therefore arises: Was it possible to come up with a context-sensitive institutional design when irrigation management was being transferred to the users? The evidence indicates that it was. For example, DSI ignored alternative models devised by the GAP administration for the Southeast while designing the decentralized irrigation organizations.

How could context-sensitive decentralized institutions be achieved? Following Fung and Wright (2003b), I claim that it is possible to design and implement institutional structures which enable the poor and uneducated to challenge the wealthy and educated, i.e. to cultivate “countervailing power”. I argue that there are at least two ways of pursuing this end. First, decentralized institutions should be autonomous from arbitrary state interventions but not be exempt from oversight. The monitoring and auditing of decentralized institutions is very important to promoting non-corrupt and egalitarian service delivery. There should be more state oversight of decentralized institutions where there are more pronounced inequalities as the institutions are more prone to elite capture in these regions. The case of Urfa showed that inequalities in access to resources and power tend to generate corruption in decentralized institutions. Water users from Urfa are unable to monitor the associations given their lack of civic experience.
The institutional design of WUAs in Urfa could have incorporated more stringent monitoring and auditing mechanisms – including regular inspection by Ministry of the Interior auditors who would be independent of local authorities. Such state autonomy is an additional political condition of success. If this oversight were accompanied by the enforcement of penalties for unequal/inappropriate service delivery, plus encouragement and positive incentives for those who provide just and appropriate service, the negative impact of inequalities could be minimized.

Second, decentralized institutions should be flexible enough to change based on consultation with stakeholders – such as municipalities, environmental groups, water users and state bureaucrats. This requires evaluation of decentralized institutions in participatory fora, which could be organized by DSI. These evaluation meetings should be held periodically and be organized at different levels – provincial, regional and national. The outcomes of these meetings should be shared with individual WUAs, which should be permitted to reshape their institutions based on the findings and their particular experiences.

In theory, those promoting decentralization can institute organizations to protect the rights of the poor and powerless but it is important to examine the motivations of policy circles that initiate decentralization. What incentives do policy-makers have to give the poor and powerless more access to decision-making? There must be a regime promoting the ideals of social justice, equality and participatory democracy for decentralized institutions to foster democratic deepening. The case of Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting shows that Brazil’s Workers’ Party (for which good governance and egalitarian distribution have
always been major concerns) played an important role in ensuring that budget mechanisms worked to the advantage of the poor and powerless (Baiocchi, 2003:65). Another means of making decentralized institutions work equally for all groups even under conditions of significant inequalities is to make training and learning central components of the institutional structure. This is also clear from the case of Porto Alegre. Baiocchi (2003:67) concludes that participatory budgeting was not dominated by the wealthy and educated because the institutions had a significantly “didactic nature.” By learning the processes of participation, citizens were empowered to participate in decision-making. Hence, decentralized institutions should incorporate training within their organizational structures to ensure that potential participants have accurate knowledge of the operational mechanisms of these organizations. This would be the first step in the empowerment of stakeholders. It is indeed possible to devise decentralized institutions that are sensitive to local contexts, which will in turn improve service delivery performance and deepen democracy.
Appendices
Appendix 1

Table A1. Gross Domestic Product per capita - at current prices (USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2001*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aydın</td>
<td>2,865</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>2,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIE.
* The 2001 economic crisis resulted in sharp declines in GDP per capita.

Table A2. State of Transferred Irrigation Schemes at the end of 1995 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>31,416</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>30,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>45,733</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>51,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUAs</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>893,764</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,162,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6,796</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total  522  978,576  626  1,279,039

Source: YerelNET (www.yerelnet.org.tr)
Table A3. Budget of U WUA #4 (founded in 1997)

### 1998 Finalized expenditures (YTL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>Budget allocation (YTL)</th>
<th>Share of the expenditure within the estimated budget</th>
<th>Realized exp (YTL)</th>
<th>Share of the realized expenditure</th>
<th>realized exp as a percentage of total exp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>12,403</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>12,368</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>49,200</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3,919</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and capital expenditures</td>
<td>6,038</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>6,781</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>3,539</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Service acquisition)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4,997</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Suayb WUA</td>
<td>79,381</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31,604</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1998 Revenues (YTL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of revenue</th>
<th>Budgeted revenue (YTL)</th>
<th>Realized</th>
<th>Collected</th>
<th>% of collected over total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation Share</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3499</td>
<td>3499</td>
<td>8.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation fee</td>
<td>31,750</td>
<td>38954</td>
<td>36954</td>
<td>91.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35,100</td>
<td>42403</td>
<td>40403</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Suayb WUA
### 1999 Estimated Budget (Revenues)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Revenue</th>
<th>Amount YTL</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation Fee</td>
<td>90,281</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines</td>
<td>8,269</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State aid</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private aid</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
<td>110,050</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 110,050  100

### 1999 estimated budget expenditures (YTL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of expenditure</th>
<th>Budgeted amount</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>30,605</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery and capital expenditures</td>
<td>30,408</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Service acquisition)</td>
<td>12,037</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110,050</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Irrigation fee and crop distribution**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of cultivation (ha)</th>
<th>percentage</th>
<th>Unit price (YTL/dönüm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,155</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A4. Aydin Plain WUA Budget 2004 (YTL)

#### Revenues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Realization</th>
<th>Collected</th>
<th>collected/realized</th>
<th>collected as a percent of total budgeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Damage payments</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest revenues</td>
<td>43,158</td>
<td>43,158</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation fee revenues</td>
<td>372,769</td>
<td>280,204</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>irrigation fee</td>
<td>1,459,022</td>
<td>901,673</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other fees</td>
<td>4,237</td>
<td>4,237</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines</td>
<td>8,166</td>
<td>4,591</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late payment fee</td>
<td>69,658</td>
<td>69,658</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 participation share</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participation share</td>
<td>96,042</td>
<td>87,347</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,056,548</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,394,364</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>% of expenditure in total expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>539,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel allowance</td>
<td>865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Purchase</td>
<td>93,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption goods</td>
<td>350,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixture purchase</td>
<td>3,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Goods purchase</td>
<td>58,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and Repair</td>
<td>111,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td>222,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,380,783</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A5. Soke Plain WUA Budget (1998-2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Estimated Budget (YTL)</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>81,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>235,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>940,000</td>
<td>845,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>669,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>1,277,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>1,397,935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A6. Average Collection Rates for WUAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Average collection rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #4</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #8</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #9</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #11</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #14</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #16</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #18</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #19</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WUA #2</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WUA general secretary interviews.
Table A7. Irrigation start and transfer dates for the WUAs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WUA #</th>
<th>Date of Transfer</th>
<th>Irrigation Start Date</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>position</th>
<th>Council (#)</th>
<th>Users (#)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 1</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18,320</td>
<td>closed system</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>7,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 2</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4,324</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 3</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6,528</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 4</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7,887</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 5</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>15,841</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 6</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11,720</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 7</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6,884</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 8</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5,177</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA # 9</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8,044</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #10</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,780</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #11</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #12</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>7,841</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #13</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,219</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #14</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10,803</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #15</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUA #16</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>14,040</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WUA #1</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>end</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WUA #2</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1981-1991</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>3083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews.
Table A8. Land distribution in the irrigation zone of U-WUA #14 in Urfa (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land size (decare)</th>
<th>% of Irrigators</th>
<th>% of Total Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-24</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-49</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-74</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-99</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-249</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-499</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 +</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A9. Crop distribution in the irrigation zone of U-WUA#14
(Percentage of total land within the irrigation zone)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton*</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and Fruits</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* GAP master plan forecasted cotton cultivation to be 25 percent (GAP, 1989).
Table A10. Land tenure in rural households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Landed</th>
<th>Landless</th>
<th>Landed</th>
<th>Landless</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td># of HH</td>
<td>Size of land</td>
<td># of HH</td>
<td>Size of land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>102440</td>
<td>105063</td>
<td>2365</td>
<td>55635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>75753</td>
<td>98875</td>
<td>3554</td>
<td>261737</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A11. Education and literacy in Aydin and Urfa (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Total of literate</th>
<th>No school completed</th>
<th>Total of those who finished a school</th>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>Primary education</th>
<th>Secondary school</th>
<th>Vocational school at junior high level</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>Vocational High School</th>
<th>Higher education (MA, BA, PhD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aydin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urfa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>87.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A13. Education and Training in the Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>Not enrolled in school at the age of primary school</th>
<th># of people with higher education who reside in the village</th>
<th># of people according to where they received agricultural training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin</td>
<td>434319</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>515901</td>
<td>7628</td>
<td>6913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DIE Village Inventory, 1997.
Table A14. Irrigation Fees set by the WUAs for cotton and wheat in 2004 and 2005

(in YTL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>cotton</th>
<th>cotton</th>
<th>wheat</th>
<th>wheat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #16</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U WUA #20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WUA #1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A WUA #2</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A15. Farmer Satisfaction with the Aydin and Soke WUAs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aydin %</th>
<th>Soke %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you receive water on time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sometimes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is maintenance?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>well</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not well</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fair</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does personnel solve your problems?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion about water charges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cheap</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expensive</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUAs sustainable?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>better</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>worse</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no change</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Nazilli, Akcay, Aydin and Soke irrigation schemes located in the Great Menderes Basin were chosen for study, with total area 71,000 ha, where almost 23,752 users are organized into four WUAs. This table presents the results for Soke and Aydin WUAs. Total number of water users interviewed is 1010 - 193 and 240 of which are from Aydin and Soke respectively. The results for farmers from Aydin and Soke WUAs are given in the table above.
Appendix 2. Interview List and Interview Questions

General Interviews

General Interview # 1 Lawyer Urfa - 6 June 2005.
General Interview # 2 Member of Parliament from Urfa - 6 June 2005.
General Interview # 3 Large landlord (Urfa) - 6 June 2005.
General Interview # 4 Head of a news agency in Urfa - 6 June 2005.
General Interview # 5 Engineer from State Hydraulic Works (DSI) Urfa - 9 June 2005.
General Interview # 6 Head of the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers (Urfa) - 9 June 2005.
General Interview # 7 GAP Regional Development Agency responsible for Maintenance Operation for Irrigation Projects (Urfa) - 10 June 2005.
General Interview # 8 GAP Agricultural Development Project Expert (Urfa) - 10 June 2005.
General Interview # 9 Salt River Project (USA) General Secretary – 4 July 2005.
General Interview #10 DSI Ankara (Head of O&M Transfer) - 12 July 2005.
General Interview #11 GAP Ankara Agency (Coordinator for Agriculture) - 12 July 2005.
General Interview #12 Vice-Governor of Urfa - 22 July 2005.
General Interview #13 University Student in Urfa - 9 June 2005
General Interview #14 Internet Café Owner (Urfa) – 23 July 2005.
General Interview #16 CHP (Republican People’s Party) Head of Provincial Branch (Urfa) – 29 July 2005.
General Interview #17 DSP (Democratic Left Party) Head of Provincial Branch (Urfa) – 29 July 2005.
General Interview #18 DYP (True Path Party) member elderly man (Urfa) – 29 July 2005.
General Interview #19 DYP (True Path Party) District Head (Urfa) – 29 July 2005.
General Interview #22 GAP Entrepreneur Support and Guidance Center (Urfa) – 29 July 2005.
General Interview #23 Electricity Distribution Company Control Officer (Urfa) – 31 July 2005.
General Interview #24 Director of Provincial Local Authorities (Urfa) – 2 August 2005.
General Interview #25 Agricultural Reform Regional Director (Urfa) – 2 August 2005.
General Interview #26 ANAP (Motherland Party) Head of Provincial Branch (Urfa) – 5 August 2005.
General Interview #27 Urfa Chamber of Agriculture – 9 August 2005.
General Interview #28 President of SUSIAD (Urfa Industrialists and Businessmen Association) – 11 August 2005.
General Interview #29 Vice-Rector of Harran University (Urfa) – 12 August 2005.
General Interview #30 Agricultural Engineer at the Ministry of Agriculture Research Centre in Urfa – 15 August 2005.
General Interview #31 DEHAP (Kurdish political party) Provincial vice-president – 15 August 2005.
General Interview #32 Mayor of Urfa – 16 August 2005.
General Interview #33 A large farmer from Tarsus – 17 August 2005.
General Interview #34 Pamukova WUA Executive Board Member – 17 August 2005.
General Interview #35 Farmer from Aydin Plain – 22 August 2005.
General Interview #38 DSI AYDIN – 23 August 2005.
General Interview #42 Village Affairs Irrigation Dept – 24 August 2005.
General Interview #43 MHP party official – 24 August 2005.
General Interview #45 Soke Agricultural Highschool Director – 25 August 2005.
General Interview #46 TARİŞ Soke president – 26 August 2005.
General Interview #47 Soke Chamber of Agriculture consultant – 8 December 2005.
General Interview #50 Soke Agricultural Credit Coop – 15 December 2005.
General Interview #52 CHP Soke – 16 December 2005.
General Interview #54 Prof from Bogazici University – 5 January 2006.
URFA

U WUA Interview # 1 Ataturk Baraji WUA General Secretary (GS) - 2 June 2005+25July 2005.

U WUA Interview # 2 Bereket WUA GS - 6 June 2005.

U WUA Interview # 3 Imambakir WUA GS - 7 June 2005

U WUA interview # 4 Suayb WUA GS – 7 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #5 Tek tek WUA GS - 7 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #6 (Cabir Ensar) Yesilova WUA GS - 7 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #7 Tahilalan WUA GS - 7 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #8 Koruklu WUA GS - 8 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #9 Haktanir WUA GS - 8 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #10 Sevimli Elveren WUA GS - 8 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #11 Topcu Gundas WUA GS - 8 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #12 Yalini Onortak WUA GS - 9 June 2005.

U WUA Interview #13 Ataturk Dam WUA Treasurer – 26 July 2005.

U WUA Interview #14 Firat WUA GS – 1 August 2005.

U WUA Interview #15 Firat WUA Treasurer – 4 August 2005.

U WUA Interview #16 Kisas WUA GS – 1 August 2005.

U WUA Interview #17 Yukari Harran WUA GS – 2 August 2005.

U WUA Interview #18 Reha WUA GS – 8 August 2005.


U WUA Interview #22 – Firat WUA technician – 1 August 2005.

Group Interviews, Farmer Interviews and Local Authority Interviews


U Group Interview #2: Farmers from Yaslica (3 people) – 26 July 2005.


U Group Interview #5: Municipal employee in Kisas and his family – 3 August 2005.


U Farmer Interview #9: Farmer, Kisas – 1 August 2005. Turkish
U Farmer Interview #10: Small farmer from Kisas – 1 August 2005. Turkish
U Farmer Interview #11: Shop owner from Kisas – 1 August 2005. Turkish
U Farmer Interview #12: Altintepe Headman – 1 August 2005. Arabic
U Farmer Interview #14: Farmer from Hancagiz (Firat WUA) – 4 August 2005. Arabic
U Farmer Interview #15: Sharecropper from Akcamescit (Firat WUA) – 4 August 2005. Arabic
U Farmer Interview #16: Shop owner and small farmer from Karaali – 6 August 2005. Arabic
U Farmer Interview #17: Farmer who works on rented land from Ahvar village – 6 August 2005. Kurdish (zaza)
U Farmer Interview #28: Boydere Farmer – 3 August 2005. Arabic

U Local Authority Interview #1: Yaylak Mayor – 27 July 2005. Kurdish
U Local Authority Interview #2: Karacaoren Headman – 28 July 2005. Kurdish
U Local Authority Interview #3: Kisas Mayor – 3 August 2005. Arabic
U Local Authority Interview #4: Boydere Headman – 3 August 2005. Arabic
U Local Authority Interview #5: Abdurrahmandede Headman – 4 August 2005. Kurdish
U Local Authority Interview #6: Akcamescit Headman – 4 August 2005. Arabic
U Local Authority Interview #7: Kupluce Headman – 8 August 2005. Arabic
U Local Authority Interview #8: Harran Mayor – 8 August 2005. Arabic
U Local Authority Interview #9: Topcu Village headman Akcakale – 10 August 2005. Arabic
U Local Authority Interview #10: Bilecik village headman Akcakale – 10 August 2005. Arabic
AYDIN

A WUA Interview #1 Aydin Plain WUA – 23 August 2005.
A WUA Interview #3 Aydin Plain WUA – 15 December 2005.

Group Interviews, Farmer Interviews and Local Authority Interviews

A Group Interview #1 Soke Chamber of Agriculture canola presentation – 24 August 2005.
A Group Interview #2 Soke TARİŞ (Producers’ Cooperative) – 26 August 2005.
A Group Interview #3 May Seed Company Field Demonstration Day – 9 December 2005.

A Farmer Interview #1 Soke Tuzburgazi Farmer – 8 December 2005.
A Farmer Interview #2 Soke Ozbas Farmer 1 – 8 December 2005.
A Farmer Interview #3 Aydin Sazlikoy Farmer Recep Bey – 8 December 2005.
A Farmer Interview #8 Soke Sarikemer Farmer – 9 December 2005.

A Local Authority Interview #1 Sazlikoy Mayor Aydin SB – 12 December 2005.
A Local Authority Interview #2 Ozbası Headman Soke SB – 12 December 2005.
A Local Authority Interview #3 Golbent Headman Soke SB – 12 December 2005.
A Local Authority Interview #4 Avsar Headman Soke SB – 13 December 2005.
A Local Authority Interview #5 Uzumlu Headman Aydin SB – 14 December 2005.
A Local Authority Interview #6 Turanlar Headman Aydin SB – 14 December 2005.
A Local Authority Interview #7 Sandikli Headman Aydin SB – 14 December 2005.

Söke Ekspres Local Newspaper Archive
Interview Questions

WUA personnel
- How long have you been working in this association?
- Are you a permanent employee or a temporary one?
- Can you describe your duties?
- What type of irrigation is used?
- How many water users are there within the WUAs zone?
- Do you interact with the farmers?
- What do farmers do when they face a problem?
- What are the most frequent demands of farmers?
- What are your observations about the way irrigation is carried out?
- Do farmers obey the water use ranking?
- How does the budget get prepared?
- What was the ratio of collected irrigation fee to the total due?
- How many councilors are there? How many times a year is there a council meeting? How is the attendance?
- How often does the executive committee meet? How is the attendance?
- What types of issues are discussed in these meetings?
- Who speaks in the meetings?
- What are the duties of the chairperson?
- What are the duties of the personnel of WUAs?
- Does the association own machinery?
- Does the association own the building in which it has an office?
- What are the types of crops that are being cultivated within your zone?
- How is the budget prepared? What are the revenues and expenditures of the WUAs?
- Who monitors that the expenditures are done according to the budgetary guidelines?
- Is there an audit of the WUAs?
- How should the monitoring be done?
- How are irrigation fees determined?
- Have there been training programs within the WUAs? Or training provided to the personnel by other institutions?

DSI
- Can I get a map of the plain?
- When did irrigation start?
- Is the project complete? What kind of project is it (open canal or closed pressurized)?
- Do WUAs pay back the investment to the DSI?
- What are your observations on how the WUAs operate?
- What kind of changes are there compared to the era when DSI operated the infrastructure?
- Are farmers satisfied with the operation?
- How is the auditing undertaken?
- How is the maintenance undertaken?

**Political Parties**

- Can you describe politics in Urfa/Aydin/Tekirdag?
- Are there any MPs from your party representing Urfa/Aydin/Tekirdag?
- Can you evaluate the electoral performance of your party in Urfa/Aydin/Tekirdag?
- What kinds of projects should be undertaken in Urfa/Aydin/Tekirdag according to your party? What kinds of activities does your party organize?
- What are the types of agricultural policies that your party support? What is your opinion about the agricultural policies that are being implemented currently?
- What has changed in Urfa/Aydin/Tekirdag with the start of irrigation?
- What are your observations about irrigation in Urfa/Aydin/Tekirdag?
- Do you have any contact with the WUAs?
- How do the WUAs function?
- Are people satisfied with their functioning?

**State Bureaucrats**

- What are your opinions on the agricultural and irrigation policies of the state?
- What types of state policies have had beneficial results?
- Could you evaluate the irrigation practices?
- Who benefited the most from irrigation?
- Are there any problems with irrigation and its outcomes?
- What measures should be taken in order to solve these problems?
- What should be the role of the state in this?
- Are there training sessions for farmers on irrigation and agriculture? What kind? When? Offered to whom?

**Local Authority-specific questions**

- What is the number of households in the village?
- What percentage are farmers? What other types of income do villagers have?
- What is the percentage of farmers who own land?
- How many dönüms do the largest landowner in the village have? Does he cultivate it himself?

**Farmers and local authorities**

- Were you born in this village? [if not, why did you settle here?]
- Do you live here all year round? Do you have a house in the city-centre?
- What languages do you speak? / What is your mother tongue? / What language do you speak at home?
- How would you evaluate the economic situation of your household?
- Have you worked elsewhere / in the city?
- What is your education background?
- Do you own agricultural land? How many dönüms is your land? Do you cultivate it yourself? Do you practice sharecropping? Do you rent land?
- Do you have fallow land?
- [to those who are landless]: Have you ever owned land? When did you sell it? Are you cultivating this land as a sharecropper/tenant/kurekci/yardımcı?
- Has there been land consolidation here? [if yes] what has been the consequences for you? Better or worse?
- Has your field been leveled?
- How long have you been a farmer? Have you been cultivating the same field?
- Who works on your field? Who does the irrigation, hoeing, harvesting?
- Do family members work on the fields? Who?
- Which crops have you cultivated this year? How many dönüms?
- What did you cultivate last year? Was it profitable?
- How do you decide what to cultivate?
- Which crop is the most profitable one?
- Is your income only from agriculture? [if not] What other types of income do you have?
- Do you alternate crops from year to year?
- Do you use chemical fertilizers?
- Do you use pesticides? Herbicides? Insecticides?
- Do you have knowledge or experience with alternative crops?
- Do you have a tractor? When did you buy it?
- Do you have other agricultural machinery?
- Do you have animals?
- When you face liquidity problems, where do you get cash from?
- Which year did irrigation begin in your field?
- Which kind of irrigation do you undertake?
- Is there a drainage canal in your field?
- Have you taken part of an agricultural/irrigation related training session? Do you think it is necessary?
- Have you taken part in a meeting related to irrigation? When? How?
• How did you learn to practice irrigated agriculture?
• In general, what types of changes did irrigation bring to your village?
• Has there been changes in your life?
• Who should manage the irrigation water according to you?
• Within which WUAs zone are your fields?
• What are the duties of the WUA?
• How do they function?
• What are your thoughts on the functioning of the WUAs?
• Can you describe your relation to the WUA? What kinds of demands do you have from the WUA?
• What do you do when you have a problem with irrigation?
• How are the irrigation fees determined?
• Are there any problems with the infrastructure? Is there enough maintenance?
• How are irrigation rankings determined? How do you get informed about the ranking?
• According to you, why did the state bring irrigation to your region?
• How many times do you irrigate your crops?
• Can you describe how the village has changed in the last 10 years?
• What are the most important needs of the village? School, health services, roads, water table? Who do you communicate these needs to?
• Do you contribute to the operation and maintenance of irrigation schemes? How?
• Have you been to a meeting at the WUA? Would you like to?
• Do you follow the activities of the WUA? How do they perform?
• If you were not satisfied what would you do? Who would you contact?
• Have you ever resorted to legal means? Would you, if it was necessary?
• Are you satisfied with state agricultural policies? Support policies?
• How do you procure seeds and fertilizers?
• What should be done for development? What are the duties of farmers in bringing about development?
Map A1. Location of Aydin and Urfa
Map A2. Map of the Irrigation Scheme in the Harran Plain (south of Urfa)
Map A3. Map of the Aydin Plain Irrigation Scheme
Map A4. Map of Menderes River Basin (Soke and Aydin Plains)

Source: Modified from Yilmaz and Harmancioglu (2007).
Graph A2 and A3 – Junior High School Graduation Rates in Aydin and Urfa.

Appendix 4 – Ethics Review Forms
McGill University
ETHICS REVIEW
RENEWAL REQUEST/FINAL REPORT

Continuing review of human subjects research requires, at a minimum, the submission of an annual status report to the REB. This form must be completed to request renewal of ethics approval. If a renewal is not received before the expiry date, the project is considered no longer approved and no further research activity may be conducted. When a project has been completed, this form can also be used as a Final Report, which is required to properly close a file. To avoid expired approvals and, in the case of funded projects, the freezing of funds, this form should be returned 3-4 weeks before the current approval expires.

REB File #: 183-0505
Project Title: Decentralization and Democratization: the Case of Water User Associations in Turkey
Principal Investigator: Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu
Department/Phone/Email: Political Science, (514) 398-9073, kadirbey@yahoo.com
Faculty Supervisor (for student PI): Prof. Narendra Subramaniam

1. Were there any significant changes made to this research project that have any ethical implications? ___Yes ___No
   If yes, describe these changes and append any relevant documents that have been revised.

2. Are there any ethical concerns that arose during the course of this research? ___Yes ___No. If yes, please describe.

3. Have any subjects experienced any adverse events in connection with this research project? ___Yes ___No
   If yes, please describe.

4. ___This is a request for renewal of ethics approval.

5. ___This project is no longer active and ethics approval is no longer required.

6. List all current funding sources for this project and the corresponding project titles if not exactly the same as the project title above. Indicate the Principal Investigator of the award if not yourself.
   Fund 2007/41 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Grant
   Principal Investigator Signature: __________ Date: __________
   Faculty Supervisor Signature: __________ Date: __________
   (for student PI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Administrative Use</th>
<th>REB: _ AGR _ EDU _ REB-I _ REB-II</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>__ The closing report of this terminated project has been reviewed and accepted</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>__ The continuing review for this project has been reviewed and approved</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Expedited Review: __________ Date: __________
Signature of REB Chair or designate: __________ Date: __________

Approval Period: __________ to __________

Submit to Lynda McNeil, Research Ethics Officer, James Administration Bldg., rm 419, fax: 398-4644 tel:398-6831
(version October 2002)
Research Ethics Board I
Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans

REB File #: 183-0505

Project Title: Decentralization and democratization: the case of water user associations in South East Turkey

Applicant’s Name: Zeynep Kadirbeyoglu Department: Political Science
Status: Ph.D. student Supervisor: Prof. N. Subramanian

Granting Agency and Title (if applicable): N/A

This project was reviewed on March 24, 2005 by John Galaty, Ph.D. Chair, REB I

Expedited Review ✓ Full Review

Approval Period: June 1, 2005 to May 31, 2006

This project was reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the McGill University Policy on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects and with the Tri-Council Policy Statement on the Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Human Subjects

*All research involving human subjects requires review on an annual basis. A Request for Renewal form should be submitted at least one month before the above expiry date.
*If a project has been completed or terminated and ethics approval is no longer required, a Final Report form must be submitted.
*Should any modification or other unanticipated development occur before the next required review, the REB must be informed and any modification can’t be initiated until approval is received.

cc: Prof. N. Subramanian
References


Bruns, B., and Helmi. 1996. "Participatory Irrigation Management in Indonesia: Lessons from Experience and Issues for the Future." In Indonesia National Workshop on Participatory Irrigation Management Indonesia, 4-8 November.


