LAURENCE KOHLBERG'S
THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT
AND
KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

- by -

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THESIS ABSTRACT

THESIS TITLE: LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

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The purpose of this thesis is to draw attention to the relationship of Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy to that of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

An attempt will be made to show a parallel hierarchy of moral development in Kant's moral philosophy to that of the six stages of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

When dealing with Kohlberg's stage six of moral development, there often exists, in the mind of the Kohlberg reader, a lack of clarity as to what is expected of the moral agent at this stage of moral development. There also exists a need to expand the moral philosophical implications of stage six.
moral reasoning. Kant provides us with a groundwork for this in his moral philosophy when he discusses the concept of autonomy versus heteronomy.

An attempt will also be made to show the implications for moral education of this interpretation of Kohlberg's theory of moral development from a Kantian perspective.
**SOMMAIRE**

**Titre de thèse:** Théorie sur le Développement Moral de Lawrence Kohlberg et la Philosophie Morale de Kant.

**Département:** Les Fondations Sociales de l'Éducation

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Le but de cette thèse est de souligner l'attention sur la relation entre la philosophie morale d'Immanuel Kant à la théorie de Kohlberg sur le développement moral.

Un effort sera fait pour démontrer l'hiérarchie parallèle du développement moral semblant exister dans la philosophie de Kant vis-à-vis les six étapes de la théorie de Kohlberg sur le développement moral.

En lisant la sixième étape de la théorie de Kohlberg sur le développement moral, le lecteur se sent confus sur la question de l'effet moral à ce stage du développement moral. Là aussi, il y a un besoin d'élargir les implications morales philosophique de la sixième étape du raisonnement moral. Kant à ce sujet, nous apporte des fondations avec sa philosophie morale quand il oppose le concept d'autonomie à celui d'hétéronomie.

Aussi, une tentative sera faite par une prespective de Kant pour démontrer les implications d'éducation moral sur l'interprétation de la théorie du développement moral de Kohlberg.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT AND KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I: KOHLBERG AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II: KANTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRE-CONVENTIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III: HETERO NOMY AND THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV: THE EXPRESSION OF KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY AT THE POST-CONVENTIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. UNIVERSITY ASPECT OF MORALITY: CATEGORIES</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. FORMAT OF SUGGESTED MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION
THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT
AND
KOHLMERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

In order to clarify the rationale of this philosophical analysis of Kohlberg's theory of moral development in Kantian terms, it is important at this point, to explain the connection between the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the moral development theory of Lawrence Kohlberg.

As we examine Kohlberg's idea of how moral reasoning develops in the human intellect, we can see that his theory of moral development is reasonable and functional not only from the perspective of the psychological concepts of moral development, but also in its philosophical foundations. Through observation, introspection and philosophical analysis, it can be shown that the concepts that form the framework of
Kohlberg's stages of moral development are evident in human moral behaviour. Evidence for this can be found, for example, in the work of Jean Piaget and his associates, which supports Kohlberg's theory in the area of developmental psychology.

Piaget's research with children postulates that the child's conception of the physical and social world evolves through a sequence of invariant stages (or serial philosophies) of thought. 1

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral judgement is just such a sequence of invariant stages of thought. Other research findings, to be discussed later on in the paper, also support Kohlberg's theory. It is not, however, the goal of this paper to elaborate on the research findings of developmental psychology to support Kohlberg's theory, but rather, to investigate the philosophical basis of his findings on moral behaviour and its development.

In order to comprehend the basis of any philosophical concept evident in Kohlberg's work, it will be necessary to explore and determine the a priori assumptions that underlie any philosophical argument that can be applied to this theory. Fundamentally, Kohlberg's philosophical argument is that moral development is based on elements of justice,
and human moral behaviour develops according to various stages with respect to these elements of justice.

Although Kohlberg's concepts of justice and morality follow the Platonic view, it will be the objective of this paper to show that there are indications of Kantian moral philosophy throughout his theory of moral development. During the process of this philosophical investigation, these indications of Kantian moral philosophy will be brought forth.

To begin with, a general interpretation of Kohlberg's theory of moral development will be made, in order to clarify the manner in which the six stages operate within the context of human behaviour. Research findings that support Kohlberg's view of moral man will then be explored from the perspective of researchers, such as John Wilson, R.M. Hare, C.M. Beck, R.S. Peters, and others. Following this discussion, the main thrust, then, will be to present evidence of Kantian moral philosophy as it appears in the various stages of Kohlberg's theory.

To illustrate the Kantian philosophical basis of Kohlberg's theory, it will be necessary to look at Kant's concept of moral principles. Kant presents his concept of morality in terms of a universal moral law and the ability of a person to will in
obedience to such a moral law. Obedience to such a moral law is what determines, for Kant, the will of a truly moral agent.

Kant presents an argument to demonstrate the freedom of the will. The freedom that he attempts to establish, however, is not merely negative freedom consisting of the absence of constraint by empirical causes. It is also a positive freedom, which, according to Kant, consists in the ability to make acts of will in accordance with the moral law that applies to all rational beings. As will be explained later, Kant maintains that the will is free only when it acts solely out of reverence for the moral law. Freedom, in this sense, is what Kant calls autonomy of the will. The will is acting under heteronomy when it is determined by any other principle. 3

During the analysis of Kohlberg's first five stages of moral development from a Kantian perspective, it will be shown that it is heteronomy that determines the will. Each of the first five stages will be analyzed from the philosophical perspective of heteronomy. Furthermore, it will be seen that, just as there is a hierarchy of moral development from stages one to five, there is also a parallel hierarchy of heteronomy of the will from stages one to five. For Kohlberg's stages, a
hierarchy exists inasmuch as a person moves sequentially from stage one toward stage five; moral reasoning becomes more developed and closer to Kohlberg's idea of an ideal moral person at stage six. In a parallel manner, heteronomy of the will is hierarchical inasmuch as it exists to the greatest degree at stage one and to the least degree at stage five. We will trace, therefore, the development of the first five stages from a parallel philosophical analysis of heteronomy of the will at each stage of Kohlberg's theory.

The next step in our investigation will examine the yielding of heteronomy of the will to autonomy of the will at stage six. When a person makes moral decisions at the stage six level, Kohlberg states that it is with this form of reasoning that a person becomes a truly moral agent, who uses supreme principles of morality in his moral judgements. At this point, it will be explained how autonomy of the will should determine the reason for moral decisions.

It is at stage six that the moral person strives for the supreme principle of morality, which is the supreme principle of autonomy, which implies that the determining ground of the moral will must be, not any
empirical rule or concept, but a formal concept of lawfulness, in general.

Furthermore, Kant states that moral decisions are affected by imperatives. Imperatives will be described as two kinds - hypothetical or conditional, and categorical or unconditional. The imperatives or formulas in which practical principles of reason are expressed are hypothetical or conditional in stages one through five of Kohlberg's theory. It is only at stage six, that we see an emerging of categorical imperatives, although stage five shows some signs of this form of reasoning.

To further illustrate the supreme principles of moral reasoning, the Kantian concepts of freedom and justice will also be considered, as they apply to the hierarchy of heteronomous moral principles toward autonomous ones at stage six.

Once an understanding of the parallel hierarchy of heteronomy of the will and Kohlberg's hierarchy of moral development is reached in this paper, the implications of this philosophical analysis for education will be examined. This will be done from the assumption that moral education is developmental, and that it should be the aim of moral educators to develop in their students a morality that expresses
itself in the form of stage six moral reasoning and autonomy of the will.

In other words, there will be positions stated, why the aims of moral education should be to encourage a sense of morality that holds justice as the basis of moral decisions with a stage six type of reasoning. These positions will be stated with respect to the Kantian moral law, as well as Kohlberg's notion of principled moral behaviour, based on self-chosen ethical principles. Kohlberg proposed that these are principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. 4

Few would argue with the last three statements as being morally desirable. However, what requires clarification when we are speaking of stage six morality are concepts such as "self-chosen ethical principles", and "consistency of these principles". On confronting such statements, one may wonder what it is that will determine whether these self-chosen principles are truly right, good and moral. Furthermore, one may wonder what determines consistency of such principles, and how such consistency will be maintained in a relativistic or individualistic world. In very many cases, moral philosophy today has become
very relativistic and individualistic. As a result, it would seem necessary to anchor these concepts in some established philosophical perspective. Two such philosophical perspectives are those of Plato and Kant.

On reading Kohlberg's dissertations on this subject, there is definitely a trend of thought which is not only Platonic, but also Kantian. The Kantian perspective surfaces most clearly when we compare Kant's criteria of sound moral judgement with that of Kohlberg's stage six. For Kant, moral judgements are formal, and based on universalization, coherence and comprehensiveness as criteria of the "moral law". Similarly, Kohlberg's stage six expects that a moral agent makes judgements based on universal, coherent and comprehensive moral laws. The philosophy of Kant, like Plato's, also presents concepts that are relevant to the developmental stages. Kant provides a sound quality of moral philosophy that supplies a greater abundance of relevant information on the topic in question here than Plato. The relevance of Kant's moral philosophy also serves our purpose well when discussing Kohlberg's theory.

Although Kohlberg's work presents empirical verification for the claims he makes from a psychological perspective, we will, in this study, only analyze the philosophical basis of Kohlberg's work.
This is a significant undertaking in itself, since a philosophical expansion is undertaken in this study. A clear definition of morality as indicated earlier, by moral philosophers, along with a clear notion of a true moral agent is important. The subsequent analysis of similarities between the philosophical basis of Kohlberg's theory and Kantian moral philosophy will attempt to illustrate the nature of a true moral agent.
CHAPTER I

KOHLBERG AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The topic of moral education has been one of the constant concerns of philosophers, theologians and educators for many decades. This discussion of moral education continues to be popular, mainly because of its crucial importance, and because of the continual addition of relevant new information. The rapidly changing values of today's society are compelling educators to look more closely at what moral education means in the classroom in terms of its cognitive and effective implementation. The question — "What is a moral person?" — has also been challenged, and certain basic concepts of morality are no longer standing as firmly in the minds and consciences of modern people as they did at the turn of the century.
Basic moral principles themselves are often being put to the scrutiny of present-day theorists. The interest among analytic philosophers in issues of moral education can be traced to Hare's discussion of the question: "How shall I bring up my children?"; in *The Language of Morals*. 5

Such philosophers as Hare, Peters and Wilson in England; Frankena and Scheffler in the United States; and Crittenden, Beck and Sullivan in Canada, are analytically focused on moral issues in terms of their relationship to moral education. 6

Although a definitive position of the analytic school has not evolved vis-a-vis the moral sphere and moral education, there has been a common research emphasis and a common understanding. All begin with the understanding that age, physical well-being, family background, educational environment, religion and nationality influence the values held by persons and the reasons they give for their value judgements. They all attempt to present an analysis of the processes of moral reasoning or to provide a clear conceptual schema for the understanding of these processes. One such conceptual schema is the use of five components to illustrate the process of moral reasoning. They are as follows:
a) reasoning
   - thinking, reason, deliberation and cognition

b) moral principles

c) autonomy
   - choice, the individual and decision-making

d) intentions
   - commitment, beliefs and concern

e) acting
   - doing, behaviour and performance

The analytic philosophers discuss the moral situation as a complicated phenomenon in which an individual is confronted with a choice between alternative courses of action which are labelled "good" or "bad"; "right" or "wrong". A moral person is one who carefully deliberates on the alternatives, and makes reasoned choices which reflect an appeal to moral principles. A moral principle is a universal mode of choosing; a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt in all situations to which it applies. By principle, we mean
something more abstract than the ordinary rule. Rules like the Ten Commandments are proscriptions or prescriptions of action. When conventional morality chooses to be morally pretentious, it labels such rules "principles". One cannot universalize the rule "be loyal to your family", to all people, since not everybody has a family. Also, one does not have to believe in situation ethics to realize that no proscription or prescription of a class of acts is universalizable. We know that it is all right to be dishonest and steal to save a life because a man's right to life comes before another man's right to property.

By moral principle all thoughtful men have meant a general guide to choice rather than a rule of action. Even one who talks of "the principle of loyalty to your family" means something like a "consideration in choosing" rather than a definite rule prescribing a class of acts. The strongest notion of principle is that defined by pure utilitarian doctrine prescribing the single principle of the "utilitarian doctrine" (act always so as to maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number) and by the Kantian doctrine prescribing the single principle of the
categorical imperative. This "strong" conception of principle implies a single logically or intuitively self-evident or rational maxim for choice; from it one can deduce any concrete morally right action in a situation, given the facts of the situation as the minor premise of the deduction. Such a strong conception of principle is one which not only is universalizable to all men and all situations but also is absolutely definitive of right action in any situation. Kant, of course, rejects this utilitarian doctrine. His own doctrine prescribes the single principle of the categorical imperative, which will be discussed later on. In Ethics and Education, Peters describes the nature of a rational morality which is loyal to principles, autonomous and committed to reason, and routinized in habits. Peters contends that the polarity of reason and habit, moderated by freedom and choice, characterizes morality. Moral man thinks, refers to principles about the good, chooses freely, and internalizes his choices as habits. The moral person is one who, once having made his choice, is committed to it, and acts accordingly.

John Wilson also argues that the moral sphere is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. He exemplifies
this complex phenomenon of morality in his taxonomy of moral components, such as: PHIL, EMP, GIG, KRAT, and DIK:

1. PHIL refers to the moral component of an individual that enables him to have the concept of a "person". The individual also claims to use this concept in an overriding prescriptive, universalized principle. He has feelings which support this principle, either of a "duty-oriented or person-oriented" kind.

2. EMP refers to having the concepts of various emotions (moods, etc.), and being able to identify emotions in oneself, when these are at a conscious or unconscious level. This involves being able to identify emotions in others, as well, whether at the conscious or unconscious level. A term normally used for this component would be "empathy".

3. GIG refers to knowing other (hard) facts relevant to moral decisions. This involves knowing sources of facts.
and knowing how to deal with moral situations using these facts, as evidenced in verbal or non-verbal communication with others.

4. **KRAT** refers to being, in practice, relatively alert (noticing) to moral situations, and seeing them as such. It also involves describing them in terms of PHIL, EMP and GIG, and thinking thoroughly about such situations, and bringing to bear whatever PHIL, EMP and GIG one has. As a result of the foregoing, KRAT makes an overriding, prescriptive and universalized decision to act in others' interests. This implies being sufficiently whole-hearted and free from unconscious counter-motivation to carry out (when able) the above decision in practice. 10

The educational implication here is that moral education cannot be limited to one subject, educational setting, or time span. Rather, it must take place simultaneously in formal and informal educational settings; on different grade levels, and in many subject areas.
William Frankena argues a similar point in his writings on the philosophy of education, titled Ethics. In his essay, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral Education", Frankena states that moral education can be outlined by the following factors:

a) the need to appeal to a child's reasoning in moral education.

b) the ability to handle conflicts of reason so as to be able to make decisions of principle.

c) the ability to confront new situations openly, and to be guided, yet not chained by principles.

d) the ability to be an autonomous, freely choosing moral agent.

Israel Scheffler has also dealt with the complex nature of moral education though in a less extensive manner than Wilson and Frankena. However, he does make a statement on the treatment of moral education in schools:

The challenge of moral education is the challenge to develop critical thought in the sphere of practice, and it is continuous with the challenge to develop critical thought in all aspects and phases of schooling. Moral schooling is not, therefore, a thing apart, something to be embodied in a list of maxims, something to be reckoned as simply another subject or another activity, curricular or extracurricular. It does indeed have to pervade the whole of the school experience.

Thus, we see that moral education,
according to the previously mentioned researchers, is something that affects all aspects of schooling, and therefore, must deal with the entire person.

Lawrence Kohlberg is also one who is concerned with the moral development and moral education of the total person. He describes himself as a modern psychologist concerned with the development of morality. He claims that his more relevant source is not Freud, Skinner or Piaget, but Plato. His methods and conclusions differ from the writers just discussed, but, at the same time, there are aspects of morality on which they agree, and which support assumptions of the analytic perspective: 13

Kohlberg's work is, in a way, a rejection of previous approaches in moral psychology. Neither does he accept a Skinnerian notion of morality as reinforced behaviour, nor a Freudian notion of morality as superego identification. In place of these approaches, he presents a developmental notion of morality, which is composed of three levels and six stages of development. 14

He also contends that a child's normal thinking must go through a developmental process,
whereby morality is directly linked to previous and more advanced stages of moral thought and judgement. Kohlberg claims that such moral thinking is universal, and is not culturally determined. However, such moral thinking is analyzable and testable only in specific cultural terms and settings.

The highest level of moral development here is justice, and it is justice which is the key to all levels of moral life and education. The concern and task of moral education is, for Kohlberg, to have the young come to know the idea of justice. 15

It is at this point that the Platonic philosophy of Kohlberg is apparent. He believes that "he who knows the good chooses the good", and that "youths who understand justice act more justly". 16 From this Platonic view, virtue is considered ultimately one, and has always the same ideal form, regardless of climate or culture. The name of the ideal form is justice. Virtue is understood here as philosophical knowledge, or institution of the ideal form of the good, not merely correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs. This knowledge of the good can be taught, but the teachers, according to Plato, must be philosopher-kings. The teaching of virtue can be accomplished by the asking of questions, and the pointing of the way, not the
Moral education is the leading of men upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that which was not there before. 17

This statement of the Platonic view, however, is meant to be interpreted as a characterization of self-chosen principles at stage six. Kohlberg's philosophical and psychological research presupposes the ideal of justice as the central moral principle. Furthermore, he stresses the importance of the individual to the moral process. He also admits that morality is very much related to a person's individual will, and the process of moral reasoning becomes the ultimate criterion of an active moral agent. This process of moral reasoning becomes the ultimate criterion of morality, and is internalized within the will of a moral person.

Since Kohlberg states that justice is not a character trait in the usual sense, one cannot make up behaviour tests for justice, as one can make for honesty, service and self-control. The reason for this is that justice, unlike the other virtues, does not express itself in a concrete rule of action. To be honest means not to cheat, not to steal, and not to lie. Justice is not a set of rules; it is a moral
principle. By a moral principle, we mean a mode of choosing in accordance with which the claims of competing rules can be resolved, and which we want all people to adopt always in all situations. 18

There are exceptions to rules, Kohlberg says, but no exception to principles. For example, it is permissible to be dishonest and to steal in order to save a life because a man's right to life comes before another man's right to property. Such a decision could be justified by the principle of justice. A moral obligation is an obligation to respect the rights and claims of another person. A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims, and the principled basis for resolving claims is justice or equality. Here, every man's claim is treated impartially, regardless of the man. A moral principle is not only a rule of action, but a reason for action. As a reason for action, justice is called respect for persons.

Using hypothetical moral situations, and interviewing adults and children throughout the world about right and wrong, Kohlberg has found the same forms of moral thinking in all cultures. There are six forms of thinking, and they constitute an invariant sequence of stages in each culture. These stages are summarized in the following table.
Definition of Kohlberg's Moral Stages

I. Preconventional Level

At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favours) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours", not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences.
The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behaviour is that which pleases or helps others, and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behaviour. Behaviour is frequently judged by intention -- "he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice".

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus.
Aside from what it constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion". The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation.

Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human right, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.
The actual definition of these stages of development is based on a treatment of 28 basic aspects of morality (moral concepts or values) to be found in any culture (See Appendix I). A presentation of one of these 28 concepts, (the concept of the value of life), is outlined in Appendix II. It defines and gives examples of the way this value is defined at each of the six stages of development.

The progression, or set of stages, just described implies more than age trends.

First of all, it implies invariant sequence, which means that each child must go step-by-step through each of the kinds of moral judgement outlined. Even though a child may move at varying speeds, and stop or become "fixated" at any level of development, he must move in accord with these steps.

Secondly, stages define "structured wholes", or total ways of thinking, not attitudes towards particular situations. The 28 different aspects contributing to stage definitions concern the motives of moral action. There is a distinction here between moral form and moral content. That is to say, an individual at stage six on a "cognitive" aspect (universalized value of life), is also likely to be at
stage six on an "affective" aspect (motive for difficult moral action in terms of internal self-condemnations).

Thirdly, a stage concept implies universality of sequence under varying cultural conditions. It implies that moral development is not merely a matter of verbal values or rules of the child's culture, but reflects something more universal in development; something that would occur in any culture. In general, the stages in moral judgement just described appear to be culturally universal.

If one accepts that moral values are universal, then Kohlberg states that one must also consider that there is a hierarchy of values. 21

An example concerning hierarchies of value, is the current North American problem of law and order versus justice. Some people feel that, if there is law and order, there is no need for justice, while others, at stages five or six, are convinced that the purpose of law and order is the maintenance of justice. Development in conceptions of justice leads to a hierarchical relation between law and order and justice. Because of this acceptance by Kohlberg of a hierarchy of values, there results a conclusion that the higher stages of judgement are more moral than the lower stages in the formal sense.
Kohlberg's claim is that stage six thought or language is fully moral; that this stage six is a closer approximation to the characteristic which philosophers such as Hare, have taken as defining distinctively moral language. The claim, however, that stage six is a more moral mode of thinking than the lower stages does not say that we should grade individuals as more or less moral. Kohlberg argues that there is no valid or final meaning to judging or grading persons as morally better or worse. Judgements of persons as morally good or bad are judgements of praise and blame, and are not justified by the existence of universal moral principles, as such. At the highest stage, the principle of justice (or the principle of maximizing human welfare) prescribes an obligation to act justly (to further human welfare); it does not prescribe the duty to blame the unjust, or give us rules for giving out blame to the unjust. Moral theory is not required to set up standards for evaluating the moral worth of persons, and the claim that stage six is a more moral way of thinking is not an assignment of higher moral worth to the stage six individual.

We must now clarify why Kohlberg claims that the higher stages are more moral than the lower stages. Like most philosophers, he claims that the
term, "moral" refers to moral judgements or decisions based on moral judgements. The term, "moral", here, is referred to as a judgement, not a behaviour or an effect, such as "guilt". Like most moral philosophers since Kant defined in terms of a formal character of a moral judgement or a moral point of view, rather than in terms of its content.

Impersonality, ideality, universalizability, and preemptiveness are among the formal characteristics of moral judgement. These can be seen in the reasons given for a moral judgement; a moral reason being one which has these properties.

Moral judgements are judgements about the right and the good of action. Not all judgements of "good" or "right" are moral judgements, however; many are judgements of aesthetic, technological or prudential goodness or rightness. Unlike judgements of prudence and aesthetics, moral judgements tend to be, or are expected to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds. 22

The next stage is to examine the characteristic of "invariance" in Kohlberg's stages. Invariance can be best explained where reference is made to Kohlberg's six stages of moral development, from the lowest toward the highest level of maturity -
stage six. With respect to stage development, invariance means that one must progress through the stages in order, and one cannot get into a higher stage without passing through the stage preceding it. Therefore, for example, one can only arrive at stage three after having passed through stages one and two. Moral development is growth, and takes place according to a predetermined sequence or hierarchy.

Another factor inherent in Kohlberg's theory of moral development is that subjects cannot comprehend moral reasoning at a stage more than one stage beyond their own. Yet, it is interesting to note that subjects are cognitively attracted to reasoning one stage above their own predominant stage.

Also, movement through the stages is effected when cognitive disequilibrium is created. That is, when a person's cognitive outlook is not adequate to cope with a given moral dilemma, a cognitive disequilibrium is created. A person will look for more adequate ways to resolve dilemmas. That is: If, in a given situation, one's cognitive framework cannot resolve a problem, the cognitive organism adjusts to a framework which does. . . . When such a disequilibrium is provoked, it causes thinking about
the inadequacies of one's reasons and a search for better and more adequate reasons. 23

Besides these qualities of stage development, Kohlberg also points out that, up through stage four, each stage represents a wider and more adequate perception of the social system, and an ability to think more abstractly. 24

Thus, while reasoning at the first two stages involves quite concrete reasoning about individual persons and events, with little or no perception of a society, reasoning at the third and fourth stages involves gradually more abstract thinking, in which a perception of society, its groups, and its institutions develops. In any case, it must be understood at this point, that analysis of moral development is not based on the content of the decision, but on reasons for the decision.

In stage five, the individual perceives the necessity of laws, but he perceives laws as reformable, subject to critical examination, and valid only when agreed on by the whole society. On the other hand, in private matters, which are matters outside the agreement of society, what is considered right is often seen as a question of personal values and opinions.
In stage six, the level we are most concerned about from a Kantian perspective, the individual defines right by a decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles of justice, or reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. 25

This stage is the full-flowering of the morally mature individual, whereby the individual must show understanding, autonomy, and a natural tendency toward justice and equity. The mature person must also understand that laws and conventions are not sacred in their own right. There are optional ways of living, and alternative value systems.

This understanding can only come with exposure to various value systems, and an appreciation of the reasons for the existence of these different systems. However, once an individual perceives these different life-styles, he will, in a sense, transcend his own, and see it as just another life-style or value system alongside alternatives. This will cause him to make a deliberate choice concerning values or life-styles. This is considered autonomy - when one who understands various options chooses to pursue one or another.
Still, according to Kohlberg, this choice of values or life-styles is not made arbitrarily, since the overriding limitation on any choice is a concern for others. Self-serving, egotistic choices are always retrogressive. In choosing for oneself alone, one opts out of moral life altogether. Thus, the concern for others, which limits the choice of justified options must be, as a concern for others, a concern for justice and equity. Kant emphasizes here, the need for respect and dignity, since one who does not respect or love himself can be cruel to others, as well as to himself, and still satisfy the "golden rule".

It is also important to note that moral maturity does not come automatically with chronological age. Moral development may be arrested or stimulated. Thus, we find physically and chronologically mature adults who are at stages as low as one or two, or who never get beyond stage four.

However, Kohlberg does state that the sequence of moral development is universal. That is, the nature of the sequence is not significantly affected by widely varying social, cultural or religious conditions.

The only thing that is affected is the rate at which individuals progress through the sequence.
For example, it was found that, although middle-class and working-class children move through the same sequence, the middle-class children move faster and further. 27

Neither is this sequence dependent on a particular religion, or any religion at all, in the particular sense. Kohlberg found no difference in the development of moral thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, and atheists. Some of these universal aspects of morality are outlined in Appendix I.

In any event, stage six is difficult to comprehend. Even Kohlberg himself admits that interview data is quite sparse, and, to explain stage six, he usually refers to examples of literature or words of contemporary heroes, such as Gandhi or Martin Luther King. He cites the following passages from King’s notes from a Birmingham jail as an example of stage six reasoning:

One may ask, ‘How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?’ The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws, just and unjust. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. One has the moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. Any law that uplifts human personality is just, any law that degrades human personality is unjust.
An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. 28

This may be true principled thinking. However, what in it makes it stage six? What makes it a reasoning higher and better than stage five reasoning? What makes it morally and cognitively more adequate?

This is a difficult issue indeed, and is one Kohlberg has not succeeded in resolving in his own mind. 29 One sign of this irresolution is his recent theorizing about a stage seven, which is purely hypothetical, and not based on data, as are the moral stages. It (stage seven) is a post-conventional religious orientation, both dependent upon, and demanded by a stage six orientation to the ethical.

To blame this irresolution on Kohlberg alone would be unfair, since, in reaching stage six, we are, according to Kant's own data, probably leaving a vast majority of people behind. Even though the latter may be the case, it is still possible to analyze moral reasoning (at stage six) from various philosophical perspectives.

This calls to mind an example of the fundamental difference between the ethical theories of
John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant. Mill held that the value of any action lay in the worthwhile consequences it produced, whereas Kant thought that the worth of any action lay in the law or maxim under which it was performed. 30

For Mill, the basic principle of human action is utility - do what will promote the greatest balance of pleasure over pain in the universe as a whole. For Kant, it is to do what you can will to be done by all rational beings in the kind of situation you are in.

Whatever one's basic premises are, it follows that certain dispositions are to be cultivated. First, we must cultivate the dispositions to act for the ends, or on the principle affirmed; for instance, in Mill's view, we must promote the disposition to act for the greatest general happiness. Second, we must cultivate whatever dispositions are required for promoting the end, or carrying the principles in question. Both Mill and Kant think, for example, that it follows from their premises that we should develop our intellectual abilities and a will to be honest. 31

Turning our attention back to the six stages, we see that Kohlberg arranges them in pairs, locating each pair in one of three levels, which he
names respectively, the "pre-conventional", "conventional", and "post-conventional" levels. The characteristic of these levels reflects specific difference in the wideness of the view of the social system, and difference in one's ability to think beyond one's immediate concrete situation.

It is from the perspective of these three levels that we will examine the existence of Kantian moral philosophy in Kohlberg's work. In the subsequent chapter, Kohlberg's theory will be identified with the development of Kantian philosophy. This approach will first deal with the pre-conventional level, at which stages one and two reflect Kant's philosophy of moral development. One of the first questions to be raised in relation to Kohlberg's stage theory of moral judgement is: What is the relationship between a person's moral judgement and his actions?
CHAPTER II
KANTIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
AND
THE PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

The argument that Kohlberg's developmental theory is mainly empirically directed is, of course, unquestionable. However, the fact that his theory has an a priori philosophical basis can be argued, as well, in relation to Kantian moral philosophy, and, in particular, to principles outlined in Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*. 32

Since this work would, in itself, require interpretation, a simpler and more fundamental work will be more useful in analyzing Kohlberg's stages, namely Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. 33
The method of the *Groundwork* is to start with the provisional assumption that our ordinary moral judgements may legitimately claim to be true. Kant then asks what the conditions are which must hold if these claims are to be justified. With this inquiry, Kant hopes to discover a series of conditions until he comes to the ultimate condition of all moral judgements - the supreme principle of morality. We shall see, along parallel lines, how Kohlberg also uses certain conditions in his stages to reach the supreme level of moral development in stage six.

Kohlberg and Piaget follow in the tradition of Immanuel Kant when dealing with the relationship between thought and action. E. V. Sullivan states that, like Kant, Kohlberg is interested in the development of abstract and universal laws or structures. 34

Kohlberg's theory does not really focus on action or commitment, and what ultimately follows is the thought/action dichotomy that prevails in the development of modern thought. In Kohlberg's stage theory, we are always trying to get from thought (judgement) to action within the context of abstract formal structures. Increasingly higher stages are more abstract, and, as we approach the ideal (stage six),
we achieve a purer form of the moral. So, it would
follow that the lower stages are more concrete and
content-oriented.

In the light of this theoretical thrust, abstract and formal as moral structures are, they are
more valued as they approach stage six. Here, Kohlberg
follows Piaget's theory of moral development, and
therefore, shares some of Piaget's inherent Kantian
formalism. Piaget systematically prefers structure
(abstraction) over content (the concrete context)
methodologically, and Kohlberg seems to fully accept
Piaget's methodological attack.

We can identify this content and concrete
orientation at stages one and two of the
preconventional level of Kohlberg's theory in terms of
the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action.
However, from an abstract point of view, we can see the
Kantian concept of "imperfect duty".

A "perfect duty", for Kant, is one which
admits of no exception in the interests of inclination.
Kant uses the example of suicide here, by saying that
we are not entitled to commit suicide, even though we
have the strong inclination to do so. Kant explains
this in the following manner:

A man feels sick of life as the
result of a series of misfortunes
that has mounted to the point of
despair, but he is still so far in possession of his reason as to ask himself whether taking his own life may not be contrary to his duty to himself. 36

Kant used the argument that it is from self-love that a person makes it his principle to shorten his life, and that this is in contradiction to a system of nature whose function it is to stimulate the furtherance of life. Hence, this maxim can neither subsist as a system of nature, nor hold as a universal law of nature, and is, therefore, opposed to the supreme principle of duty. This supreme principle of duty is that an action done from duty has its moral worth, not from the results it attains or seeks to attain, but from a formal principle or maxim - the principle of doing one's duty, whatever that may be. To act for the sake of duty is to act on a formal maxim, "irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire".

As we have seen from our discussion of stages one and two in Kohlberg's theory, a person does not act out of a sense of duty in the Kantian sense at these stages, but rather, out of an inclination to avoid punishment (stage one), and to instrumentally satisfy his own needs (stage two). Therefore, moral judgements here, are made on a basis of imperfect duty,
and therefore, cannot be considered as part of the universal law of nature, as Kant describes it.

Furthermore, a person at stage one or two acts according to subjective conditions of the will or practical reason. These subjective conditions are certain impulses or "inclinations" that affect the will. An example of this would be the inclination not to do something because of physical consequences.

On the other hand, "objective principles" are those on which a rational agent would necessarily act, if reason had full control over passion. These objective principles seem almost to constrain or to necessitate the will. Where an objective principle is conceived as necessitating, it may be described as a command or imperative, and is expressed by the words, "I ought". Kant classifies these imperatives as follows:

All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical imperatives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wills (or that one may will). A categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end. 37

The imperatives that would command the will of a stage one or two judgement would be, in the
Kantian sense, "hypothetical", since actions done at this level of moral reasoning are done as a means toward the attainment of some end, namely, avoiding punishment, and satisfying one's own needs. These ends are "pragmatic", since the end which every rational agent wills by his very nature is his own happiness. They are also "conditioned", since they are based on the willing of some end, which, in this case, is happiness. The avoidance of punishment and satisfying one's needs would, in Kantian terms, be pragmatic and "conditioned", since they are based on a means toward an end, rather than on an impersonal principle, valid for others, as well as himself, exclusive of passion or self-interest.

Thus, Kant's concept of duty applies here in the imperfect sense, and does not adhere to the Law of Nature as he describes it. It could be said then, that stages one and two are expressions of imperfect duty, because there is latitude for more inclination. As an example of imperfect duty, we may decide to adopt the maxim of developing our talents, and of helping others, but we are, to some extent, entitled to decide arbitrarily which talents we will adopt, and which persons we will help.

The obedience and punishment orientation is actually an egocentric deference to superior power,
prestige, or to a trouble-avoiding situation. The objective form of responsibility depicted here would be typified by a response such as that of a criminal who obeys a prison rule by stating: "I'll do it because I don't want to do more time". This same person may accept a rule because he wants to keep out of trouble.

We can see here the parallel between wanting to keep out of trouble and Kant's notion of pragmatic imperatives. The prisoner, in a sense, is prudent in not breaking any rules of the prison, so that he does not end up "doing more time". Prudence in not breaking rules avoids the physical consequences of punishment for not complying to what is demanded by a superior power. As an example, in every society, human life is a basic value, even though cultures differ in their definition of the universality of this value, or of the conditions under which it may be sacrificed for some other value. In stage one, the value of human life is based on the social status of physical attributes of its possessor. The value of a healthy person's life, in this case, would be more valuable than that of an elderly person who is fatally ill. If it may be said that the basic value of physical objects and social status are pragmatic, then it may also be said that such an end as the value of human life is a pragmatic
imperative, and is one that every rational agent wills by his very nature.

The motives for moral behaviour at this stage may be due, however, to either physical or psychological punishment experiences. Such punishment experiences could be inflicted by a parent on a child by either the use of an external punishment (i.e., the spanking of a child), harsh words, or the withdrawal of some desired object of an offender's well-being (i.e., the withdrawal of a promised privilege, or love by a parent). Therefore, the pragmatic possibility of some form of punishment "influences" the rational agent to perform a moral act.

The first stage of moral development is, in this way, a hypothetical imperative, since an action here is good solely as a means toward an end, which is to avoid punishment. There is an inherent interest or motive here to do good for the sake of personal satisfaction. From a Kantian perspective, there is a strong "influence" of punishment on the will to do good in order to avoid punishment.

In any case, a rational agent must regard himself as capable of acting on his own rational principles. This presupposes that his will is free to do what is right, or do what is wrong, and suffer the consequences. This, Kant says, puts us into a vicious
circle, since we must suppose ourselves to be free because we are under moral laws, but we must also be under moral laws because we have supposed ourselves to be free.

The escape from this vicious circle lies in the realization that reason, as the power of ideas, goes beyond sense experiences. Thus, man conceives his will as free from determination by sensuous causes, and as obedient to laws having their ground in reason alone.

Yet, reason would overstep its limits if it pretended to explain how freedom is possible. The only things we can explain are objects of experience, and to explain them is to bring them under the laws of nature. Freedom, for example, is merely an idea, since it does not supply us with examples which can be known by experience.

In short, we cannot explain a free action by pointing out its cause. Punishment, on the other hand, since it can be known by experience, can be looked upon from the point of view of causes. It is these causes that determine moral behaviour at stage one.

We can now confidently say that Kantian philosophy places Kohlberg's stage one at a level of moral development wherein the reasons for actions are
based on maxims that treat rational beings as means to an end, rather than ends in themselves. Authority, in this case, represents rational beings, and the means would be a structure of thinking which obeys authority to reach an end. The end, of course, would be to seek reward and avoid punishment. Obedience would be the cause that would produce the effect of attaining reward and avoiding punishment. Thus, Kant would consider acts at this stage to be prudent, but lacking in moral worth. 39

Similarly, at stage two, the objective principles are conditioned by a will for some end. That is to say, that these principles give rise to hypothetical imperatives, which motivate a person to do good as a means to an end. The end in this stage is that which satisfies the self's needs, and, in some cases, that of others. The imperatives at stage two are also pragmatic, inasmuch as there exists an orientation to exchange and reciprocity.

The analytic proposition of cause and effect may apply here, as well, since it prevails that if a person agrees to help someone (cause), then that person helped, if at stage two morality, would promise to help the other in return at some time (effect). Thus, we can see a cause-effect relationship.
Another factor that is involved at this stage is that of moral interests or motives for human action. An interest only arises, according to Kant, through a combination of feeling and reason. Consequently, interests are found only in finite rational agents who are sensuous.

Kant then states that there are two types of interest. When the interest is based on the feeling and desire aroused by some object of experience, one may be said to have a mediate or pathological interest in an action appropriate to attain the object. When the interest is aroused by the idea of moral law, it may be said to take an immediate (or practical) interest in the action willed in accordance with this idea. The basis of the interest we take in moral action is what is called "moral feeling".

In the case of stage two, the moral interest would be based on a feeling or desire aroused by some object of experience. This mediate interest is aroused by the naively egoistic orientation of stage two. The object of experience would be expressed through the needs of the self, and occasionally, others' needs. The feeling or desire would be to obtain an object of experience by means of reciprocity.

This, again, is a case for the hypothetical imperative, whereby an act is motivated.
by a means, rather than an end. The ends are subjective or relative, insofar as the moral agent at stage two is mainly concerned with self-interest.

Two major advances occur at stage two over stage one thinking, since there emerges a more positive conception of what is good and a more adequate view of society, tempered by egoism. The stage two person can be considered a hedonist, or pleasure-seeker.

Although stage two thinking is characterized more positively as the pleasant consequences related to actions, judgment is still concrete, dealing with a particular action and its expected consequences. Therefore, it may be said that imperatives and good will are conditioned at this stage of moral development.

Therefore, based on what has been said so far, we can see that, from the Kantian philosophical perspective, Kohlberg's stage two of moral development involves actions based on judgments due to motives of "imperfect duty". Such an imperative of imperfect duty is to act on a certain motive with room left for the determination of the occasion and the specific kind and direction of the action. 41

So far, we have not mentioned Kant's concept of heteronomy, which is important, in our
investigation of the preconventional level of moral development. Kant considers heteronomy of the will as the source of all spurious principles of morality, and describes it in the following manner:

If the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own making of universal law -- if therefore in going beyond itself it seeks this law in the character of any of its objects -- the result is always heteronomy. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so in virtue of its relation to the will. This relation, whether based on inclination or on rational ideas, can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives. 42

In this case, a person would say:

"I ought to do something because I will something else". The will is, in this manner, under the influence of an inclination or alien interest, when making judgements on principles of morality. Thus, for example, the reason why I ought to promote the happiness of others is because the realization of their happiness is of consequence to myself.

These heteronomous principles are either empirical or rational. When they are empirical, their principle is always the pursuit of happiness, although some of them may be based on natural feelings of pleasure and pain, while others may be based on a
supposed moral feeling or moral sense. When they are rational, their principle is always the pursuit of perfection, either a perfection to be attained by our own will, or one supposed to be already existent in the Will of God, which imposes certain tasks upon our will.

Heteronomous principles would characterize moral reasoning at Kohlberg's stages one and two, because, in these cases, principles are guides for acting in a way that will achieve some desired objectives. We follow them as long as we want the object, and think they are the best means of getting it.

It is this self-interest that one is trying to secure at stages one and two of moral reasoning. Since moral value at the preconventional level resides in personal needs rather than in persons and standards, then objective principles become egocentric, and right action becomes that which instrumentally satisfies the self's needs and, occasionally, others' needs. The typical response of an individual at this point of moral development would be: "I'm number one. I look after me. If you help me out, maybe I'll help you sometime".
This form of reasoning not only reflects self-interest, but also, heteronomous principles that would consider another individual as a means toward some end. In other words, one may occasionally satisfy others' needs as a means toward an end of satisfying one's own needs.

Now that we can say that Kant's concept of heteronomy is applicable to Kohlberg's first two stages, we can also see evidence of a hierarchy of moral reasoning and maturity that applies to the concept of heteronomy, as well as to stages one and two.

It is at stage one that a person is at the least mature stage of moral thinking, according to Kohlberg, and it is this stage that is least philosophically adequate in comparison to higher stages. That is, each higher stage defines a more coherent and rational way of resolving moral conflict.

Similarly, Kant states that a moral judgement based on heteronomous principles cannot lead to a truly moral act. Therefore, since stage one exhibits the greatest extent of heteronomous reasoning, it is also the least philosophically adequate form of moral reasoning, in the Kantian sense, as well.
Furthermore, if we go on to stage two moral reasoning, we can see that there is heteronomy involved in making moral judgements at this stage, but the will making these judgements is less heteronomous here than at stage one. This is most evident in the fact that stage two moral decisions are less egocentric than at stage one. If we apply this to the concept of the value of life, stage one is more heteronomous than stage two, because, for the stage one reasoner, the value of human life is confused with the value of physical objects, and is based on the social status of physical attributes of its possessor. At stage two, on the other hand, the value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons.  

In both cases, however, moral reasoning is fundamentally rooted in "inclinations" and "interests", which regard persons as means, rather than ends in themselves in the Kantian perspective. Further illustrations of this can be found in Appendix II.

The heteronomy of moral principles discussed so far does not restrict itself to stages one and two, but continues at the conventional level of stages three and four. This leads us to the focus
of the subsequent phase in the philosophical analysis of Kohlberg's theory of moral development.
CHAPTER III
HETERONOMY AND THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At the conventional level of moral development, Kohlberg states that moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectations of others.

At stage three, there is a "good boy/nice-girl" orientation to seek approval, please, or help others. There is also a conformity to stereotypical images of the majority of natural role behaviour, and judgement by intentions. 45

Kant says, on the other hand, that, if the will seeks the universal law in the character of any of its objects, the result is always heteronomous. In that case, the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so, in virtue of its relation to the will. This relation, therefore, whether based on inclination or on rational ideas, can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives.
In this case, one might say: "I ought not to lie if I want to maintain my reputation". This object of "maintaining a reputation" is now an influence on the will, and practical reason administers a matter of interest. Thus, the reason why one ought to promote the happiness of others is because the realization of their happiness is of consequence to oneself.

This is clearly a reasoning process in stage three, since the inclination to be moral depends on conventional order or the expectation of others. The happiness of others, in this case, is of consequence to oneself. For example, if one does not conform to the wishes of the majority or its stereotypical images, then that person is not considered to be a "good boy/nice girl". The influence, therefore, on the stage three person is that reasoning at this stage adheres to the moral standards set by the majority. The object of the will of one's action is to seek approval, or to be pleasing to others.

We must keep in mind, though, that moral stages are structures of moral judgement or moral reasoning, and must be distinguished from the content
of moral judgement. In a dilemma, for example, that raises the issue of stealing a drug to save a dying woman, the choice endorsed by a subject (steal; do not steal) is called the content of moral judgement in the situation. The reasoning about the choice defines the structure of the moral judgement. This reasoning centers around the universal moral values described in Appendix I.

A moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of these values as they conflict in concrete situations. The stage or structure of a person's moral judgement defines:

1. what he finds valuable in each of these moral issues; and,
2. why he finds it valuable.

As an example, at stage three, life is valued in terms of the individual's relations with others and their valuation of him. At stage four, life is valued in terms of social or religious law.

Having reviewed the nature of stages of moral judgement, we must also consider the relation of moral judgement to moral action. Kohlberg states that, if logical reasoning is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for mature moral judgement, mature moral judgement is necessary, but not a sufficient condition for
mature moral action. One cannot follow moral principles, if one does not understand or believe in moral principles. However, one can reason in terms of principles, and not live up to these principles.

Principles, as explained before, are to be distinguished from rules. The conventional morality of stages three and four is grounded on rules; primarily "thou shalt nots", such as represented by the Ten Commandments. Rules are prescriptions of kinds of actions. Principles, on the other hand, are universal guides to making a moral decision, such as Kant's "categorical imperative", which we will discuss later. Conventional morality, then, would involve heteronomy of the will, according to empirical principles.

Furthermore, Kant classes the principle of moral feeling with that of happiness, wherein every empirical principle of heteronomy promises a contribution to our well-being, merely from the satisfaction afforded by something - whether this satisfaction is given immediately and without any consideration of advantage, or is given in respect of such advantage.

This perspective demonstrates Kohlberg's stage three, since a person at this stage is as good as possible in order to conform to the expectations of society. This could be due to a possible effect of our
will, not only to be as good as necessary to seek approval, but also, to attempt to reach an ideal maximum level of conformity or approval, so that one may be considered "one of the best" persons one can possibly become naturally.

Taking the empirical principle into consideration, a stage three person would have a natural or moral feeling, that being of good moral character leads to personal happiness, because it meets the approval of others. On the other hand, not being of good moral character would cause one to be unhappy, because this would lead to disapproval.

The conventional level necessitates a move from the concrete egoistic view of the preconventional to a cognitive perspective of the values of the group, group practices, and group rules. Actions are, in this case, evaluated in terms of how well they fulfill the expectations of a group in their own right, regardless of the consequences to oneself.

Kohlberg describes this in the following way:

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family group or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate or obvious consequences. The attitude is not only of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but loyalty to it, of actively
maintaining, supporting and justifying the order and identifying with persons or groups involved in it. 47

At the third stage, the person begins to realize that the esteem and approval of others is becoming more important than concrete rewards, and approval comes only when one is willing to do one's share. Belonging to a significant group, where one is important, reinforces one's sense of self-worth. Since a feeling of self-worth is, in a sense, a pursuit of happiness by creating a sense of well-being, then we should classify it as an empirical heteronomous principle. Kant says, however, that to be happy is one thing, but to be good is another; and, to confuse the two is to abolish the distinction between virtue and vice. All these doctrines of heteronomy suppose that moral law has to be derived from some object of the will, rather than from the will itself, and must consider morally good action to be good, not in itself, but merely as a means to an anticipated result.

So it is with the stage three person, whose object is to conform to the approval of a group, and who acts in a moral way, in order to receive an anticipated result, which is the approval of the group itself, leading to a sense of self-worth. If this
group is a group that promotes the theological concept, which derives morality from a divine and supremely perfect will (God), then the group may represent a church community for the stage three person. In any case, the will does not give itself the law, but an alien impulsion of seeking approval does so through the medium of the subject's own nature, in order to realize self-worth.

Kant suggests here that man is not responsible to his reason alone. For, he is responsible in an equal way to his appetites and emotions. Reason heads the claims of man's sensuous nature; it operates in an instrumental, and hence, heteronomous fashion. 48

From this statement, one deduces the fact that there is some degree of instrumentality that extends into stage three from stage two, since one is generally concerned with one's need to be approved by a group to achieve a sense of self-worth.

At stage four, there is an authority and social order maintenance orientation. This orientation is to "doing duty", and to showing respect for authority, and to maintaining the given social order for its own sake. There is also a regard for earned expectations of others. It would be as if saying,
"Look, you're supposed to help others. It's like a rule. Without people doing their jobs, society couldn't function."

The question that arises now, from a Kantian perspective, is whether this stage is what Kant terms a sense of duty or a reverence for law. Kant states that, under human conditions, wherein we have to struggle against unruly impulses and desires, the good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty. This acting for the sake of duty may be perfect or imperfect, as stated previously. Hence if we are to understand human goodness at stage four, we must examine how the concept of duty relates to stage four reasoning.

Kant says:

Human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination -- still less because it is done from self-interest -- but because it is done for the sake of duty. 49

An action is not considered by Kant to be morally good and out of a sense of perfect duty, if it is done out of self-interest. We may, however, be inclined to attribute moral goodness to right actions done solely from some immediate inclination, for example, from a direct impulse of sympathy or generosity. To test this, we must isolate our reasons
for acting, and consider first an action done solely out of duty, and not out of inclination.

In the case of a duty done out of immediate inclination or natural sympathy, it may be right and praiseworthy, but it has no distinctively moral worth in Kantian terms. It is the motive of duty, for its own sake, not the doing of a dutiful action out of some motive of inclination, that gives moral worth to an action.

The formal principle of duty, to Kant, is:

An action done from duty has its moral worth, not from the results it attains or seeks to attain, but from a formal principle or maxim -- the principle of doing one's duty, whatever that may be.

Thus, to act for the sake of duty is to act on a formal maxim, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire. Only such "dutiful" actions can have moral worth, according to Kant.

If we consider the principle of duty for the stage four person in Kohlberg's theory, we see that the basis principles of moral thinking are not in line with a sense of perfect duty, as Kant defines duty. The stage four person would be acting more out of a sense of imperfect duty, because such a person would be inclined to follow the laws of society, since he has an
interest in the realization of such a systematic harmony in his society. Therefore, it is one's positive, but imperfect duty to further the purposes of social laws, in order to maintain a systematic harmony.

It is also in the person's self-interest to uphold laws, so that, by supporting them, he may be protected against some harmful act being committed against him. Furthermore, a person may obey laws, not because it is right and of moral worth to do so, but because there is a fear of being caught and punished for breaking a law. Therefore, the fact that there are sanctions, such as legal punishment or a guilty conscience, may cause a person to act out of an inclination to avoid such sanctions.

There is also the inclination here to take on the social perspective of a social system with agreed upon rules and roles. Even though there is an orientation toward external norms of authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of social order, there is still the inclination to maintain a given social order for its own sake. This is where the Kantian notion of duty is "imperfect" at stage four, because the reason for obeying laws at stage four is to avoid social chaos and protect society as a co-operative scheme in which governance of the scheme is produced by society.

Thus, at stage four, we are not yet at
the moral level of Kant's formal principle of duty, because moral behaviour is still affected by an inclination to satisfy one's desire to conform to social systems, and not solely because one feels it is a duty to act in a moral way.

Furthermore, Kant's concept of duty involves a reverence for the law, since he sees duty as an obligation to act from reverence for law. Perhaps it would be better to say that to act on the maxim of doing one's duty for its own sake is to act out of reverence for the universal moral law.

Kant holds that, if a maxim of a morally good action is a formal maxim (not a material one, satisfying one's desires), it must be a maxim of acting reasonably; that is, of acting on a law valid for all rational beings, as such, independent of their particular desires. Because of our human frailty, such a law must appear to us as a law of duty - a law which commands or compels obedience. Such a law, considered as self-imposed (by our own rational nature), excites a complex feeling of reverence or respect, which is due, not to any stimulus of the senses, but to the thought that the will is subordinated to such a universal law, and independent of any influence of sense. Thus, we must say that a morally good action is one which is done out of reverence for
the law, and that this is what gives it its unique and unconditioned value. 51

Although Kohlberg's stage four person is concerned with authority and social order maintenance, there is an inclination to obey laws of a given social order, rather than out of reverence for a universal law that is valid for all rational beings. The stage four person's reverence is only for the law of a particular social order, such as a country or state. This reverence is not unconditioned, because it has an interest in avoiding social sanctions or the breakdown of a social order.

Furthermore, laws made at this stage are often conditional on the wishes, agreement, and viewpoint of the majority of a particular society, and not on the agreement of all rational beings. Therefore, laws at this stage are valid for only a particular society, and not all rational beings. There is also a particular desire or interest not to be rejected by the society one lives in, or to be put into prison for breaking laws.

This stage four reasoning, then, is not of the principled type that Kant is referring to when he speaks of duty and reverence for the universal law. Kant's principled thought is not concerned as much with what a social system is, but rather, with a postulation
of principles to which the society and the self ought to be committed.

Principled thinking is more a move toward the moral theory of Kant, since this principled thought is not only concerned with justifying the particular laws of one society, but is also concerned with the most basic principles from which all laws are derived. This is the point from which most post-conventional moral development begins.

Kohlberg makes a strong distinction between social rules and moral principles. For him, many social rules and laws are arbitrary conventions; social regulations fall into the moral domain only when they can be justified by universal moral principles. Since social and legal norms are never totally just, it is sometimes possible to comply with such norms and still be acting immorally, or not to comply, yet be moral. 52

Moral judgement becomes crucial in such circumstances, since it enables a person to distinguish those situations in which rule compliance is moral from those in which it is not.

At stages three and four, we see an accent on moral knowledge and socialization. At these stages, social rules and laws are arbitrary conventions which cannot be justified as universal moral principles.
According to Kohlberg, at stage four, rights are:

(a) categorical general freedoms and expectations, which all members of society have; and,

(b) rights awarded to particular roles by society.

General rights usually take primacy over role-rights (having a right differentiated from a particular legitimate expectation). 53

Obligations here are responsibilities, that is, welfare states of others or of society for which one is accountable. These responsibilities arise through:

(a) being a member of society; and,
(b) voluntarily entering into roles which entail these responsibilities (obligation or duty as commitment, and responsibility differentiated from what is typically expected of a role-occupant. 54

Moral development proceeds from stage one through to stage four in an invariant and universal sequence. This "stage" concept is further
discussed by Richard Haier, when he states it as being fundamental to Kohlberg's theory. There are three criteria for Kohlberg's cognitive stages:

1. each stage represents a "structural whole" (i.e., they are consistent);
2. stages occur in an invariant sequence;
3. higher stages displace and reorganize lower stages. 55

Furthermore, stages three and four are consistent "cross-culturally". Charles White verifies this in his study of Bahamian school children, and finds the same results as he would in North American youths. 56

Berg and Mussen have found a consistency in the showing of empathy (matching one's own feelings with the corresponding feelings of someone else). They found that, as a person's moral judgement develops, so does his sense of empathy. 57 Therefore, one can postulate that there is greater empathy at stages three and four than at previous preconventional levels of moral development (i.e., stages one or two).

Heteronomy at stages three and four sees the child as dominated by rules imposed by others. The authorities cited by children are, naturally: parents, teachers, and the police. Here, too, each moral
situation will bring out its characteristic authority. Thus, the prohibition of lying derives characteristically from the home, of cheating from the school, and of stealing from both home and school, reinforced by fear of the police.

The controls of heteronomy are the actions of reward and punishment. Here, again, each situation brings one or another into prominence. Hope of reward is strong in seeking to save life, and in taking a purse found in the street to the police. Fear of punishment is a strong deterrent against cheating in the classroom, and against taking the property of others.

Fear of punishment - which, itself, defines offences - further develops control of immediate impulses; for fear inhibits action. In the early stage of raw heteronomy, such punishment is characteristically physical, if slight. Later, it is administered through deprivations, and, later still, verbally. Children speak overwhelmingly of fear of punishment, but minimally of rewards; the stick clearly predominates over the carrot, so psychologically weak is heteronomy.
Piaget states that heteronomy is only an obstacle to moral growth. However, both Kohlberg and Kant regard the heteronomous stages as vital because Kohlberg states that it is only through learning that he 'must', that the child can ever come to know what he ought. It is only through imposed discipline that he can achieve self-discipline. Kant, on the other hand, sees heteronomy as an essential moral apprenticeship to achieve moral mastery.

True heteronomy is never an end in itself. It is, rather, a means to an end - the fuller moral development of the child. Nothing has been learned where offence is followed by physical assault, and the matter thereby concluded. Where the offence is reasoned, moral learning has occurred. An affectionate relationship, as the context of heteronomy, is powerfully influential. However, it, too, will seek to free, not to enslave, if it is to have a worthy end.

Heteronomy remains an imposed morality. Such outward conformity cannot be truly moral. It may, of course, degenerate into hypocritical subservience. Every prohibition may be observed, every law obeyed, but without any content of morality in such conformity. Yet, the paradox remains. There can be no freedom
without discipline, there can be no autonomy without heteronomy.

Moral growth begins even within the stage of heteronomy. It is the extension of the heteronomous precept that develops into a universal law, however rigid and overbearing in its claims. It is at the stages three and four that we observe dramatic development within the individual, so that the external morality of heteronomy is increasingly internalized to become part of the child himself.

No longer is the child wholly controlled by the crude, external sanctions of reward and punishment. The controls, now, are increasing social praise and social blame - in a word, the voice of public opinion.

Why should public opinion have such immense power? Why should such deference, going beyond all reason, be paid to it? For many, if not most adults, it is their supreme moral control. But, already, we see it at work in the growing child. Two factors are involved in its development. The first is the child's own concept of himself - his self-respect, or self-regarding sentiment. It includes that submission to the
powerful authority of the adult, which underlies the processes of imitation and suggestion, and which, therefore, makes the child receptive to the claims of authority. Such submission and receptivity, thus implanted in childhood, are similarly evoked by the collective voice of public opinion. In short, the powerful voice of parental authority is succeeded by the powerful voice of public opinion.

Other influences reinforce the power of social approval and disapproval. They include fear, deriving from the earlier fear of punishment; the active sympathy that finds its greatest dread in social isolation; and altruistic motives, of varying quality, ranging from reciprocal affection to the veiled egoism that derives pleasure from giving pleasure to others.

To the first factor of self-respect we must add the second factor of mutual respect, in seeking to account for the power of mutual respect, in seeking to account for the power of public opinion.

Piaget, ignoring self-respect and the part played by heteronomy in its growth, is able to lay overwhelming stress upon mutual respect. For him, it is the source of reciprocity; and such reciprocity, in its turn, the source of autonomy. For the child now
experiences from within himself the active desire to treat others as he would wish them to treat him; and awareness of the Golden Rule progressively and automatically extends it into a universal morality of love.

We need not accept such dizzy optimism to agree that the sense of mutuality is a vital factor in any progress towards autonomy. Indeed, awareness of others, feeling for others, and therefore, concern for others are the basic hallmarks of all morality. It is living in society that gives rise to morality, and makes it necessary. Here, then, is a further sense in which morality has a social genesis.

The stages three and four, thus, have two essential characteristics. There is development within the child, in growing awareness of others, and of responsibilities towards them. There is development outwards towards others, expressed most clearly in sensitivity to their opinion and attitudes—that is, to the voice of public opinion. Here is a dramatic development, indeed since this sensitivity is similar to that of most adults, and it must certainly play some part in the moral motivation of all adults. For any pragmatist denying ultimate ideals, this level of moral reasoning must be the
highest level of morality and, both in theory and in practice, is held in high esteem by such pragmatists.

The primary aim of education, throughout history, has been to socialize the child, moulding him into a conforming member of the group. Many would still hold this to be its goal, especially today, when decay in attachment to ultimate ideals leads to increasing emphasis upon social relations.

All such outlooks identify the moral with the social. They thereby fail the acid test of accounting for the autonomous, individual conscience that challenges and condemns the prevailing social morality, and, thereby, remains, as it has always been, the source of all man's moral progress. Such a morality is, essentially, egoistic, however tinged with altruism. Secondly, its controls lose their force when there is no danger of being found out, and particularly, when the individual is out of range of them. Above all, such a morality is limited to the code of a particular society, or sub-grouping of society. Moral codes differ, as we would expect. The code to which allegiance is given, may be limited, defective, even absurd.

Finally, moral codes must tend towards rigidity in moral judgement; there are certainly no seeds of moral
progress within it. This form of moral reasoning (at stages three and four) remains a vital stage, and certainly, a prerequisite of autonomy. It advances over other forms of heteronomy in the lower stages in three respects.

First, at its very lowest, it is itself evidence of decreasing egocentricity, and thus, of moral development. The co-operation thus made possible implies, secondly, the individual's developing awareness of himself as a member of a community. Thirdly, self-respect increasingly replaces fear as the basis of moral conduct.

This movement from heteronomy to autonomy leads us towards stages five and six of the post-conventional level of moral development in Kohlberg's theory.
CHAPTER IV

THE EXPRESSION OF KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY

AT THE POST-CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At the post-conventional level of moral development, Kohlberg states that moral value resides in conformity by the moral agent to shared and shareable standards, rights or duties. Here is where the moral philosophy of Kant comes very close to the philosophical basis of Kohlberg's moral development theory.

The proximity of philosophy does not completely occur, however, at stage five, since this stage is still based mainly on a conventional, contractual and legalistic orientation, similar to stage four morality. Furthermore, there is a recognition, at stage five, of an arbitrary element
or starting point in making rules or expectations. Duty is defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, as well as the will and welfare of the majority.

One could say that, at this stage:

... it's a law that people consented to. We all have an obligation to work through the agreed structure to get laws which appear wrong changed. When an injustice is committed, it is best to work through the system to end it. 59

Principled thinking, according to Kohlberg, involves a postulation of principles to which the society and the self ought to be committed. This involves a move toward moral theory, by which is meant not only a concern for justifying particular laws or rules, but a concern for discovering the most basic principles from which all laws are derived. 60

This allows one to look at any system or society, including one's own, as a fact which may or may not live up to an ideal order. Reason is the basis of judging what the ideal is toward which society ought to strive. The principles which reason furnishes are the basis of ethical theory.

Such a state is autonomous, since one is freed from society's views, and, according to Kohlberg, is the most adequate ethical or moral position, as is
the case in Kantian moral philosophy. There is one criterion for moral maturity in Kantian philosophy, and that criterion is autonomy in judgement. What this means for Kohlberg is that it is deciding on the basis of self-chosen principles, which is distinguished from simply "making up one's own mind" about what is right or wrong.

If a person spends his entire life doing what he is told to do by an authority, merely because of fear of authority (stage one), or because it brings pleasure (stage two), or because it is expected by a group (stage three), or because it is the law (stage four), he has never really made moral decisions on his own. One must achieve autonomy in the formulation of ethical principles in order to be morally mature, and must develop one's own principles of judgement and action.

Thus, Kohlberg describes the post-conventional level, autonomous principled level of moral development as one where there is:

... a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. 61

The autonomous person must accept the
group only insofar as his own conscience can live with it. No group mind may supplant his own conscience. Autonomy in Kant's ethics, on the other hand, is that freedom consisting in self-determination and independence of all external constraint. Kant defines autonomy of the will as subjection of the will to its own law, the categorical imperative, in contrast to heteronomy, its subjection to a law or end outside of the rational will. 62 This autonomy is particularly characteristic of the human will, since it involves the freedom of the rational will to legislate to itself and this is that which constitutes the basis for the autonomy of the moral law.

Autonomy of the will is that property of the will by which it is a law to itself, and always so chooses that the same volition (the act or power of willing) shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law. 63

Maxims could be described here as:

1. a voluntary act that proceeds according to a "subjective principle of action", (e.g.: in breaking a promise, one has as one's maxim: "When it is to my advantage, I will make a promise and not keep it.")
2. That one can tell whether an act is right or not by asking whether one can will its maxim to be a universal law. 64

There is a progression here, similar to that of Kohlberg's, in the order of the categories of unity of the form of the will (its universality), plurality of matter (the objects, or the ends), and the totality of the system of these. In forming our moral judgement of actions, it is better to proceed always from the general formula of the categorical imperative: Act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law. 65 This general formula of Kant's categorical imperative is concerned with the formal principle of moral actions. But rational actions have ends as well as principles. For an action to have true moral worth, its end must have unconditioned or absolute worth. Kant maintains that only rational agents can have such unconditioned value. This is consistent with his account of the good will as rationally self determining, and with his postulation that:

It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a goodwill. 66
Thus when considering the end, as opposed to the formal principle of moral action, Kant arrives at the formula:

Act in such a way that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of all others, never as a means only but always equally as an end. 67

In Kohlberg, the major difference between stages four and five is in the belief of the fixity or "givenness" of law, and the difference in the belief of the existence of an authority to promulgate the laws.

Stage five sees the law as something which is created by man, based on what is seen as the common good. Law is man's own invention, democratically designed to meet man's needs. The stage five person, by being in a position to challenge and critically examine a law, is, in a very important sense, free of the law until he decides it is rational, and, consequently, decides to subject himself to it. When positively-made law interferes with the person, it is not meant to aid, and becomes self-defeating.

Stage five thinking, although critical, is not arbitrary, since one's rejection of existing laws and the proposals of new laws must be subject to
rational considerations and critiques. They cannot be rejected simply because they do not serve one's interest, or because they do not meet one's own ideals.

Society is seen as absolutely essential and its preservation is seen to rest on a critical appraisal of its rules and practices. Therefore, one has the legal and moral obligation to obey just laws and to disobey unjust laws. Any law that uplifts human personality is just, and any law that degrades human personality is unjust.

At stage five, Kohlberg's moral development theory approaches a similarity to Kant's canon of moral judgement that we should be able to will that the maxim of our action should become a universal law. However, there are still traces in the stage five person of hypothetical imperatives, since the objective principles of the common good are conditioned by a will for the end of the preservation of society. The will of the moral person, here, is still "conditioned"; and actions at this stage are still "good", as means to an end (the preservation of individual rights).

At stage five, having a right has an awareness of human or natural rights or liberties which are prior to society, and which society is supposed to protect. It is usually thought by a person at stage five that freedoms should be limited by society and law only when they are incompatible with the like freedoms of others (i.e., natural rights, differentiated from societally awarded rights).
Obligations are what one has contracted to fulfill in order to have one's own rights respected and protected. These obligations are defined in terms of a rational concern for the welfare of others (obligations that require rational concern for welfare, differentiated from fixed responsibilities).\(^{68}\)

Moral principles, at stage five, are still empirical, since reasoning at this stage involves the pursuit of happiness, either based on natural feelings, such as pleasure and pain, moral feelings, or moral sense. Heteronomous principles here can be defined as rational, in Kantian terms, since stage five reasoning seeks perfection in establishing laws that serve individual rights and those of the majority in the best possible manner.

To describe the will at stage five as free would be to say that it can act causally, without being caused to do so by something other than itself. However, a stage five person is free to observe laws, not because he does so out of individual inclination, but because it is the will of the majority in a society. Therefore, obedience of the will to a law at stage five is caused by something other than itself, namely, by the will of the majority, and is not truly
free in the Kantian sense. Thus one cannot find the moral law which Kant defines as leading to moral good at stage five. We must look on to stage six.

At stage six, moral decisions are guided by self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are judged valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the latter.

Principles, in this case, are universal principles of justice, such as the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of the human being as an individual person. These are not merely values which are recognized; they are principles used to generate particular decisions. The reason for doing right is that, as a rational person, the stage six individual has seen the validity of principles, and has become committed to them.

The social perspective is a perspective of a "moral point of view", from which principles are grounded. The perspective is that of any rational individual, recognizing the nature of morality, or the basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not means. This is in accord with Kant's formula which bids us to treat persons never merely as means, but always as ends in themselves. This is the thinking that appeals to logical comprehensiveness.
universality, and consistency. Yet, stage six is concerned with the logic of moral reasoning which also requires a valid proof. Thus, if one is willing to have everyone adopt one's reason for doing something, one has a genuinely universal, comprehensive, and consistent rule.

Having a right at stage six implies that there are universal rights of just treatment which go beyond liberties, and which represent universalizable claims of one individual upon another. Obligation, on the other hand, involves any right or just claim by an individual, giving use to a corresponding duty to another individual. 70

Obligation, for Kant, is the necessity of a free action under the categorical imperative of reason. An action is allowed if it is not opposed to obligation, and this freedom that is not limited by any opposing imperative is called "competence." 71

Duty is that action to which a person is bound, and is, therefore, the content of obligation. Because obligation includes, not only partial necessity, but also constraint, the imperative is a law according to whether the performance or nonperformance is represented as a duty. An action which is neither commanded nor prohibited is merely allowed, and is considered morally indifferent.
If one is to consider stage six of Kohlberg's theory to be principled thinking, then it must include the concepts of duty and obligation in the Kantian sense.

Our investigations of Kohlberg's theory show us that this concept of obligation is parallel to Kant's philosophy, since Kohlberg states that obligation at stage six is any right or just claim by an individual that gives rise to a corresponding duty to another individual. 72

Only at stage six are rights and duties completely correlative. The meaning of correlative rights is well defined by Raphael Daiches in the following passage:

We turn next to the nation of "rights". There are two senses of the word, the first meaning, "I have no duty to refrain from so acting", the second in which I describe the same fact as I describe by saying, "Someone else has a duty to me". The second kind of a right might be called "a right of recipience". Whenever I have a right of action, I also have a right of recipience. In virtue of the second definition of rights, the two forms of expression: "A has a duty to B" and "B has a right (of recipience) against A" are correlative in the sense of analytically implying each other. They may not be connotatively tautologous in ordinary speech, though they are in the more precise language we are recommending. 73
The question at this point may be to ask what a universal principle of justice is. Kant's moral philosophy will be of use to us to explain this.

In Kant's *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, the definition of "Recht", or justice, law and right, refers to what is right for all men and all places. 74 It does not require any kind of enactment or recognition on the part of a political authority to establish its objective validity, for it is known as a consequence of the categorical imperative.

Categorical imperatives, as stated before, are unconditioned objective principles, not based on the previous willing of some further end, without any "if" as a prior condition.

Kant's general definition of justice, on the other hand, which is reflected in Kohlberg's idea of justice at stage six, is the body of principles that can be made into external laws. Justice supplies the a priori principles of possible legislation, and it is the political authority that makes and administers actual external laws in accordance with them. The latter may not always be the case, but this should be so.
Liberty (negative freedom) and violence are considered as correlative opposites by Kant. Where there is liberty, there is no violence, and where there is violence, there is no liberty. Man's innate right to liberty or freedom consists in the right to be free from violence. The basis of man's right to liberty is the fact that he is an autonomous being - a sovereign lawmaker as well as subject to the law which is the moral law.

This right to liberty is justified only as long as it is lawful, since it is man's capacity for making state laws that serves as the ethical foundation for his right to political liberty. Thus, the lawfulness of the state also sets the limits of rightful liberty. Violence is wrong, therefore, because it is an infringement of the lawful liberty of the state as well.

Such rudimentary concepts as liberty and freedom are part of Kant's moral philosophy, and are relevant to our discussion of stage six: principled thinking. It is the concept of freedom on which are founded unconditional practical laws, which are called "moral". These moral laws are imperatives, commands, or prohibitions. Since the will is affected by the senses and does not conform by itself to the
pure will, the will often opposes the senses. Moreover, these moral laws are categorical or unconditional. From this, we see that certain actions, or their opposites are, according to these imperatives, morally necessary or obligatory. Hence, for such actions, there arises the concept of a duty. The transgressions of such laws is combined with a moral feeling that we can assume to be a sense of guilt. However, we can take no account of these moral feelings, since they tend to vary from one person to the next.

So far, we have still not given a satisfactory interpretation for the concepts of justice, which is important to consider, since Kohlberg states his moral development theory as being formed on justice.

Kant presents us with an excellent framework of what justice is in The Metaphysical Elements of Justice when he states that the moral concept of justice applies only under the following three conditions:

a) Justice applies only to the external and practical relationship of one person to another in which their actions can in fact exert an influence on each other directly or indirectly.
b) Justice applies only to the relationship of a will to another person's will not to his wishes or desires, which are the concern of acts of benevolence and charity.

c) The concept of justice does not take into consideration the matter or content of the will, that is, the end that a person intends to accomplish by means of the object that he wills.

From these statements, we may deduce that justice is the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another, in accordance with the universal law of freedom. To describe such a will as free would be to say that it can act causally, without being caused to do so by something other than itself. Every action, therefore, is "just", when, in itself, or in its maxim, is such that the freedom of the will of each can coexist together with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law.

If my action can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, then anyone who hinders me in performing the action does me an injustice since this opposition cannot coexist with freedom in accordance with universal laws. That I adopt acting justly as a maxim is a
requirement that ethics imposes on me. 77

At Kohlberg's stage six, just as in
Kantian philosophy, justice is the body of principles
that can be made into external laws. It is justice
that supplies the a priori or universal principles of
possible legislation. However, for Kohlberg, these
universal principles can only be legitimate if any use
of coercion accords with liberty.

The illegitimate use of coercion to
legislate would transgress liberty, and thus, be a
form of violence. It is man's right to be free from
violence, since it is an infringement of lawful liberty,
and the basic rights of the individual are not created
by the state, but protected by it. The source of law
is the will, and it becomes universal or
comprehensive when the will of each is the will of all.

Let me point out here that justice,
according to Kohlberg, is not a character trait in the
usual sense. You cannot make up behaviour tests of
justice as you would for honesty, service or self-control.
One cannot conceive of a little set of behaviour tests
that would indicate that Martin Luther King or Socrates
were high on the trait of justice. The reason for this
is that justice is not a concrete rule of action, such
as that which lies behind virtues like honesty.
John Rawls, in his work, *A Theory of Justice*, discusses the concept of justice a la Kohlberg when he states:

The conception that a moral choice is a choice made in terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral philosophy that moral principles are ultimately principles of justice. In essence, moral conflicts are conflicts between the claims of persons, and principles for resolving these claims are principles of justice, "for giving each his due". Central to justice are the demands of liberty, equality, and reciprocity. At every moral stage, there is a concern for justice. The most damning statement a school child can make about a teacher is that "he's not fair." At each higher stage, however, the conception of justice is reorganized. At Stage 1, justice is punishing the bad in terms of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," At Stage 2, it is exchanging favours and goods in an equal manner. At Stage 3 and 4, it is treating people as they desire in terms of the conventional rules. At Stage 5, it is recognized that all rules and laws flow from justice, from a social contract between the governors and the governed designed to protect the equal rights of all. At Stage 6, personally chosen moral principles are also principles of justice, the principles any member of society would choose for that society if he did not know what his position was to be in the society and in which me might be the least advantaged. Principles chosen from this point of view are, first, the maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which are not to the benefit of all, including the least advantaged. 78
Specifically, in stage terms, Kohlberg seems to indicate that stage six is identifiable with Kant's a priori knowledge, and all lower stages are forms of empiricism leading to stage six a priori knowledge. In one sense, morality, in the Kantian sense, begins at stage six, when a practical reflective process has reached full maturity.

At this stage six, moral reasoning is most mature, because it is more differentiated and integrated than lower stages. In developmental terms, this creates a more stable form of reasoning, able to deal with more situations. Moral reasoning and ethical responsiveness is present in all stages, but only at the higher ones, as stage six, is this reasoning fully elaborated. Higher stage thinking produces judgements which are more universal, consistent, and based on objective impersonal criteria.

None of these aspects of moral reasoning, however, tell us the ultimate aims of mankind, what the good life is, or who is to be praised or blamed. Moral reasoning is the process for deciding what to do in a situation in which a person has conflicting obligations. Higher stage judgements simply better fulfill the decision-making criteria of universality and objectivity. So, by saying a person uses higher
stage reasoning, we are not assigning more intrinsic value to that individual. 79

Kohlberg's stage six strives for the "Ideal" or ideal of moral reasoning, as does the philosophy of Kant. Although this "Ideal" is a type of perfection, it is not found in empirical reality, but should be the object of moral striving. As an illustration of this concept, one may say that, even though a person reaches stage six moral reasoning, that person is never really perfectly morally mature or perfectly moral, but is striving toward the ideal of becoming as principled a moral person as he can possibly be.

There are other aspects of Kant's moral philosophy that apply to Kohlberg's stage six, such as the good will. This good will is defined as good without qualification or restriction. It is good in all circumstances, and, in that sense, is absolute or unconditioned good. We may describe it as the only thing that is good in itself — good, independently of its relation to other things.

As a universal principle, this would apply to Kohlberg's concept of principled thinking, because, at this stage, a moral act should be good in all circumstances. This is not to say that a good
will is the only good, since there are plenty of things which are good in many respects, but not in all circumstances. The goodness of a good will is not derived from the goodness of the results which it produces. The conditioned goodness of its product cannot be a source of the unconditioned goodness which belongs to a good will alone.

Thus, the good will of a person at stage six is not conditional upon fear of punishment as in stage one, or reciprocity as in stage two. It (the good will) is unconditional at stage six.

To understand human goodness, we must also examine the concept of duty, because, under human conditions, where we have to struggle against unruly impulses and desires, a good will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty. As has been explained, Kant maintains that a human action is morally good, not because it is done from immediate inclination or self-interest, but because it is done for the sake of duty. The motive to do good, then, at stage six morality is different than the motives for doing good in stages one through five. In the latter cases, the motive for doing good is out of inclination, such as fear of punishment, seeking reward, respect for the laws of society, and so on. An action done at the level of stage six morality
is done, not because of the results it attains, but from the principle of doing one's duty, whatever that may be.

In order for a moral judgement to be truly principled and universal at stage six, there must be a sense of duty and reverence for law in the terms described by Kant. Otherwise, a morally good action would be conditional on circumstance, a particular situation, or the senses, in general. If the unconditioned value of duty and reverence is not present at stage six, then moral actions take on the conditional qualities of the lower stages.

Rational agents (who have the power to act according to principles) have a subjective principle, or maxim for their actions, which must be distinguished from objective principles, (principles on which a rational agent would necessarily act if reason had full control over passion). So far as an agent acts on objective principles, his will and his actions may be described as "good".

Imperfectly rational beings, like men, may or may not act on objective principles, because they seem to constrain or necessitate the will. This implies that they (objective principles) seem to be
imposed from without instead of being a necessary manifestation of the will. Where an objective principle is conceived as necessitating, it is described as a command. 81

The formula for such a command or imperative is expressed by the words, "I ought". When a person says, "I ought" to do something, he recognizes an action to be imposed or necessitated by an objective principle valid for a rational agent. Such principles, which give rise to categorical imperatives, have the general form, "I ought to do such-and-such", without any "if" as a prior condition. Actions derived from categorical imperatives are good in themselves, and not merely good, as means to some further end. Thus, one would act only on that maxim through which one can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law. Laws such as "Thou shalt not kill" are derived from the categorical imperative as their principle. 82

The manner in which this concept of the categorical imperative becomes a canon of moral judgement at stage six is that we should be able to will that the maxim of our action should become a universal law of freedom, because, according to Kant, ethical action presupposes freedom.
An illustration of the categorical imperative at stage six can be made when speaking of developing one's talents since Kant holds that man's duty to develop his faculties is not dependent on any advantage their development may bring him. On the contrary, it is a command of morally practical reason, and a duty of a man towards himself, that he should cultivate his capabilities and be a man who is well adapted to the purpose of his existence. For, as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his powers should be developed, since they serve him, and are given him for all sorts of possible ends.

What chiefly distinguishes man from the rest of creation, according to Kant, is his possession of freedom, which, in turn, depends on his possession of reason - not in a sense that he is capable of theoretical activity, but in the sense that he can set ends or purposes before himself, rather than merely fulfilling passively the purpose of nature, like the rest of creation.

It is these human purposes that require the exercise of some talent or capacity for its fulfilment. Man's ability to conceive of purposes would be of no value, and his freedom incomplete, if he
were not also endowed with the capacity of discovering and adopting the best means for the attainment of those purposes.

Hence, to refuse to develop any of one's talents would be irrational, and would be failing to take rational means to achieve one's aim or purposes.

This latter example of developing one's talents is uniquely characteristic of stage six morality, since it is neither contrary to the law or social contract to refuse to develop one's talent. Also, seldom would one be punished for such a refusal, as would be the reason for acting morally at stage one. It is mainly an exercise in expressing one's human rational freedom to do what one ought to as an autonomous individual. This last statement leads us to the role of autonomy in moral reasoning at stage six.

In Kantian terms, autonomy is a combination of the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of the End in Itself. As stated before, the Formula of the Universal Law, is "to act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law"; and the Formula of the End in Itself is:
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. 84.

It would be at stage six that such a supreme principle of action could be possible. At this level of moral development, a person's actions would be ends in themselves, since a moral agent at this stage would act as he ought to, because of the absolute value of an action, and not merely because of the result it produces. The actions of a person here, are not a means to attain some end, such as happiness, wealth or fame, but it is the moral worth of an act that is of sufficient value for a person to pursue it. Thus, the absolute or unconditional value of an action is an end in itself.

Kant's Formula of Autonomy arises from the previous argument, inasmuch as an autonomous moral agent acts in such a manner, that his will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim. This may seem as a repetition of the Formula of the Universal Law, but, here, the universal law we follow autonomously is the one we ourselves make as rational agents, and which we ourselves particularize through our maxims.
This is what Kohlberg implies when he defines stage six as the "Universal Ethical Principle", wherein right is defined by the decision of conscience in-accord with self-chosen ethical principles. For Kant, this is the most important formulation of the supreme principle of morality, since it leads to the "Idea" of freedom.

Since the Formula of Autonomy follows directly from the character of the categorical imperative itself, then it also excludes interest. It simply says: "I ought to do such-and-such because it is right to do so, and not because I happen to want this or that." Thus, a rational will makes the laws it is bound to obey, but does so, excluding interest.

In such a case, an imperative is made categorical, and principles of such imperatives are self-chosen, as in stage six of Kohlberg's theory. All other stages, from five down to one, explain moral obligation by some kind of interest.

The lower the stage of moral development, the more personal interest is involved, and the more heteronomous moral reasoning becomes. That is, stage four portrays the will as bound more by a law which has its origin in some object or end, other than the will itself. Similarly, stage two is more heteronomous
than stage three, and, lastly, stage one portrays the most heteronomy of all six stages.

It is only stage six that approaches Kant's so-called "Kingdom of Ends", which states that a person should act as if he were, through his maxim, a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.

This agreement states, that, so far as rational agents are all subject to universal laws, which they themselves make, they constitute a kingdom - that is, a State, or commonwealth. So far as these laws bid them treat each other as ends in themselves, the kingdom so constituted is a kingdom of ends. These ends cover not only persons as ends in themselves, but also the personal ends which each of these ends may set before a person in accordance with universal law.

As law-making members of such a kingdom, rational agents have what is called "dignity" - that is, an intrinsic, unconditioned, incomparable worth of worthiness. This is similar to Plato's concept of the philosopher king. When looking at Kohlberg's stages, one can imagine this type of dignity at stage six. As one reasons at the level of stage six, one enters the "Kingdom of Ends", wherein morality or virtue alone has dignity.
Pursuing the notion of virtue, Kant says that a thing has a price, if any substitute or equivalent can be found for it (such as a monetary value). A thing has worthiness or dignity if it admits of no equivalent. In this respect, virtue cannot be compared with things that have economic value (market price), or even with things that have an aesthetic value (fancy price). The incomparable worth of a good man springs from being a law-making member in a kingdom of ends.

In Kohlberg's theory, this is attained when one judges a moral act according to freely self-chosen ethical principles at the level of stage six. These stage six judgements could be considered virtuous, and having worthiness, or dignity.

The concept of freedom is crucial to autonomous moral judgement. When we consider will (or practical reason), we may define it as a kind of causality belonging to living things, as far as they are rational. To describe such a will as free would be to say that it can act causally without being caused to do so by something other than itself.

As at stage six, a lawless free will would be self-contradictory. To make our description positive, we must say that a free will would act under
laws, but that these laws could not be imposed on it by something other than itself. If they were, they would merely be laws of necessity, which is similar to how non-rational beings act. Non-rational beings can act causally only insofar as they are caused to do so by something other than themselves.

Thus, if laws of freedom cannot be other-imposed, they must be self-imposed. In such a case, freedom would be identical with autonomy — and, since autonomy is the principle of morality, a free will would be a will under moral laws. That the will of a rational being is necessarily free cannot be proven by any experience of merely human action (because of the limits of human capacity), nor can it be proven from the point of view of philosophical theory. 86

Kant goes on to say that, for purposes of action, it would be enough if we could show that a rational being can act only under the presupposition of freedom. Reason must function under the presupposition that it is not determined by outside influences, and that it is the source of its own principles. If a rational subject supposed his judgements to be determined by external impulsion, he could not regard these judgements as his own. 87
It is into this intelligible world of practical reason that stage six moral reasoning applies, because, at such an autonomous level of moral reasoning, a will should act causally, without being caused to do so by something other than itself. A moral agent at some other stage would be caused to act by something other than itself, such as the will of a majority in a society (stage five), or fear of punishment (stage one).

Therefore, it is safe to assume that, according to Kantian thought, which applies to Kohlberg’s stage six, the will must be free in order to act or think autonomously, and in a principled stage six fashion.

To summarize in Kohlberg’s terms what we have said so far in this chapter, stage six is the end point of morality, and therefore, the ideal to which morality strives. The universality that he attributes to this stage is similar to the universal law of morality presented by Kant. Thus, Kohlberg’s stage six becomes the model of moral man.

The end point of moral development here resides in a particular type of moral judgement that has universal significance for the species, and that type of judgement is a key definer of the “rational” and the “morally mature” person. This has a distinctively Kantian ring.
CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

To summarize what has been said in preceding chapters, moral principles are present in one form or another from Kohlberg's stages one onwards, except that prudence (welfare-consequences to the self) and authority have dropped out as reasons for moral judgement by stage six. From stage one on, reasons for moral judgement have two characteristics. First, they are ultimate terms, they refer to states of affairs which seem right or good in themselves and are in that sense "principles". Second, they refer to states of affairs that are involved in all moral situations and are potentially relevant to all people. There is no moral situation that does not involve considerations of people's
happiness, welfare or justice.

While benevolence (welfare-consequences to others), and justice (distributive equity and commutative reciprocity) are used as reasons for moral judgements from stage one onwards, they do not become genuine moral principles until stages five and six.

At the conventional stages, choices are made by reference to conventional rules, stereotypes and sentiments. The reasons for conforming to these rules include considerations of benevolence and justice as well as of prudence (welfare-consequence to the self) and social authority. Where there are ambiguities, conflicts or gaps in the rules, decisions are based on considerations of benevolence and justice. Not until stages five and six, however, is there an effort to derive systematically and consistently prima facie rules or obligations from these principles or to view obligations as fundamentally directed by them, rather than by concrete rules. In this sense, the fundamental aspect of principled morality is the adoption of a moral law-making perspective that takes into consideration the categorical imperative. This, of course, follows from the fact that if a principle is universalizable, there could not be different sets of rules for law-makers and law-obeyers since principles are metarules - rules
for the creation and evaluation of rules - rather than first-order rules. 89

It is only at Kohlberg's stage six that one can reach the level of moral reasoning that is based on universalizable principles of morality. This is due mainly to the fact that stage six recognizes the primacy of justice over all other moral considerations. Furthermore, stage six moral reasoning is based on autonomy of the will rather than heteronomy, in the Kantian sense. Heteronomy exists, as mentioned before, at Kohlberg's lower stages which suggests that stage six is the most morally adequate stage of principled judgement. From this perspective one can argue that the attainment of stage six moral reasoning is a philosophically justifiable goal of moral education. Perhaps the strongest reasons for adopting this view of moral education in the context of the public school are "negative", that is, it does not entail the violation of the child's moral freedom, which is involved in any other formulation of moral education goals.

In order to satisfy Kohlberg's stage six moral reasoning and Kant's autonomous principled reasoning, the content of moral education must be defined in terms of justice, rather than in terms of.
majority consensus which would depict heteronomous reasoning. This developmental approach from stages one to six (Kohlberg) and from heteronomy to autonomy (Kant) is also more legitimate for public schools since it defines an educational process respecting the autonomy of the child, whereas any other definition reflects indoctrination. This legitimacy exists because the experiences by which children move from stage to stage are nonindoctrinative, that is, they are not experiences of being taught and internalizing specific content. These experiences are rather those involving moral conflict and exposure to other, higher modes of thinking than one's own.

Insofar as the teacher deliberately uses such experiences as a method of moral education, he is not being "indoctrinative". In other words, there is little difference between effective teaching "about morality" and the teaching "of morality" in the sense of the stimulation of its development. 90

This parallel between Kohlberg's stage six and Kant's categorical imperative adds to Kohlberg's argument that stage six moral reasoning is the most adequate form of moral reasoning for any individual. Like Kant, Kohlberg's position is a "formalist" one, in which moral judgements are considered as consistent,
universalizable and prescriptive. To add to this concept of justice, Kohlberg identifies the main source of consistency between moral judgement and moral action as being the stage itself, that is, people at the higher stages are more morally consistent. Thus, the higher the stage, the greater the consistency between judgement thought and action. Why are decisions based on universal principles of justice better decisions? Because they are decisions on which all moral men could agree. When decisions are based on conventional moral rules, men will disagree, since they adhere to conflicting systems of rules dependent on culture and social position. Throughout history men have killed one another in the name of conflicting moral rules and values. Truly moral or just resolutions of conflicts require principles which are, or can be, universalizable.

Although both Kant and Kohlberg are formalists, which appears to limit their usefulness for moral educators, neither can be considered educationally irrelevant. Kohlberg follows the ideas of Dewey and Piaget in his program of moral education and objects to any deliberate efforts to inculcate majority values (stages four and five). He argues that the goal of moral education is the stimulation of the natural development of the child's own moral judgement.
and capacities, thus allowing him to use his own moral judgement to control his behaviour. The attractiveness of this approach to moral education is that it allows the person to take the next step in a direction towards which his nature is already directing him; it does not demand imposing another pattern on him. An example of such a program can be seen in Appendix III, along with the universal aspects of morality in Appendix I.

In Kohlberg's view, only this indirect approach to moral education respects the autonomy of the person. Any other approach involves some form of indoctrination. The child is free to develop along lines that nature directs him. These lines are the six stages of moral development. Kohlberg's Socratic approach creates dissatisfaction in the student about his own moral reasoning. He (Kohlberg) does this by exposing the student to moral conflict situations for which his principles have no ready solution. After the student realizes he has no ready solution to his problem, he is then exposed to disagreement and argument about these situations with his peers.

Kohlberg has used this method of moral education with children in schools in many parts of the world and has found the manner in which they develop from stage one to five or six is consistent
from one culture to another. Although he (Kohlberg) admits that moral reasoning does not necessarily imply moral behaviour, he finds there is some connection between the higher stages of moral reasoning and moral behaviour.

Teachers using the Kohlberg approach should act rather indirectly. They should not teach any specific moral content. Rather they should be interested in the quality of the students' reasoning by choosing various conflict situations and experiences. Thus, by exposing students to these conflicts teachers expose them to forms of reasoning higher than their own. What the teacher is doing here is stimulating the natural development of the child along the lines of the six universal stages.

In this form of moral education the teacher must choose real-to-life situations since real and challenging conflict issues in the moral domain are challenging to children and to adolescents. The students must also realize there is a conflict here and that the teacher is not playing games. The teacher must be actively involved in the process. It is not the teacher's task to sneak in his own solution at the end of the discussion and impose them upon the students. The incidents used should not be obvious ones.
Children or adolescents will be involved only if they feel that they are engaged in a conflict situation and not some game or school exercise.

It is my view that the approach to moral education offered by Kohlberg is a valuable approach to moral education for a number of reasons. Firstly, he affirms the value of human freedom. He attempts not to indoctrinate the child but to stimulate him to develop naturally. Kohlberg understands that values imposed on a child without his rational thought and choice will be values he will easily discard. Secondly, Kohlberg affirms the value of responsibility: A person is responsible for the judgements that he makes and the actions that he takes. Praise and blame are found within this system of moral education. Thirdly, Kohlberg affirms the notion of conscience. In fact, for Kohlberg stage six is reached when a person is most responsive to the dictates of his individual and principled conscience. Fourthly, in this system of moral education the value of justice is given highest priority. He considers the sense of justice almost a primitive and innate sentiment which develops as the person moves from one stage of moral reasoning to another. Finally, Kohlberg's approach places emphasis not on a set of laws but on rights.
and relationships.\textsuperscript{93} The effort in the Kohlberg program is to stimulate the person to move upwards on the scale beyond the law and order (stage four) approach to the stages wherein rights and conscience (stage six) are paramount. This affords the person the opportunity to confront moral reasoning at a higher level than his own. \textsuperscript{94}

It is beyond this law and order approach that Kant's moral philosophy helps Kohlberg's program of moral development. This help occurs inasmuch as Kantian moral philosophy suggests that moral reasoning of the autonomous and categorical imperative kind is most adequate for any person that wishes to become a truly moral agent. Kant strongly implies that the moral person must move from a heteronomous form of moral reasoning to an autonomous one for reasons suggested previously since Kant's perspective would expect that the first endeavour of moral education is the formation of character, which involves a readiness to act according to maxims.

To form this sense of moral character in children, Kant says they must understand duties toward themselves and others. They must also have a sense of obligation and benevolence. This is meant to say that we must arouse the sympathies of children, not so much to feel for the sorrows of others, as to
a sense of their duty to help them. Children should be full of the idea of duty, rather than full of feeling. The question remains, however, how does man become such a moral being? Is he, by nature, morally good or bad?

Kant says he is neither, since he is not by nature a moral being. He only becomes a moral being when his reason has developed ideas of duty and law (stage six). One may say, though, that man has a natural inclination toward vice, but it is by virtue that he becomes morally good. For this reason, among others, everything in education depends upon establishing correct principles, and leading children to understand them. This suggests that moral education should be the concern of all teachers in all subject areas throughout a school's curriculum and not only in moral or religious education classes.

Thus, from our philosophical analysis of Kohlberg's theory of moral development, we not only see that Kohlberg's theory is parallel with Kantian concepts of heteronomy and autonomy, but we also see that responses to moral problems examined in Kohlberg's study often do not go beyond reasons that seem to be directly moral. They also extend, at times, to
justifications of moral reasons themselves. We are considering, then, a "pure decision man" at stage six.

Similarly, the truly moral agent, for Kant, would be one who displays autonomy in his moral judgements and reasoning. This is not to say that one who does not display autonomy in his moral reasoning is immoral, but rather, that he makes moral decisions heteronomously. This can be paralleled to the hierarchical structure of moral reasoning in Kohlberg's stages.

If we assume that stage six (Kohlberg) and autonomous reasoning (Kant) are the pinnacle of moral judgement, then it would seem desirable to develop curricula in moral education that would foster both stage six and autonomous moral reasoning since the movement from conventional to the post-conventional levels of maturity represents a more mature recognizing, restructuring and transforming of the students' thought processes. Such programs would not only foster both stage six and autonomous moral reasoning, but also challenge even the most morally mature student.

The structure of the school can implicitly encourage a certain kind of morality; for example, an authoritarian, conventional one. Many efforts of
teachers to help students toward a post-conventional level of moral development are frustrated by a school atmosphere which emphasizes lower stage values or principles. A school atmosphere and organization which shows post-conventional features can greatly facilitate moral development toward higher stages. There must also be a relationship of mutual trust, respect, and co-operation between teacher and student.

It is also important to have teachers at a post-conventional level of morality, so as to stimulate higher levels of moral reasoning in students. This does not necessarily make a teacher a moral rebel or a danger to school order. In most cases, post-conventional moral arguments recognize the need for conventions, but they base the merits of the conventions on sound reasoning, rather than on some unquestioned authority source. 95

For reasons stated previously, Kohlberg's moral developmental theory and Kant's philosophy of autonomous moral reasoning can be applied to the practice of moral education in the schools. The implications for education can be seen as applying the highest level of moral reasoning in Kohlberg's theory (stage six) with a philosophical perspective that promotes Kantian autonomy in moral judgements.
In any event, the ideal is to cultivate a moral education program in the schools that strives for these ideal levels of moral judgements that would depict justice in the Kohlbergian and Kantian sense.

In any event, there is general agreement among moral development researchers that a higher or later stage or moral judgement (stage six) is "objectively" preferable to, or more adequate than an earlier stage of judgement, according to certain moral criteria. Similarly, as mentioned before, from a Kantian perspective, autonomy can be considered more morally adequate than heteronomy in making moral judgements. Thus, we see that the criteria to determine a truly moral agent in any school environment should involve a person who is at Kohlberg's stage six, as well as autonomous in his moral judgements, in the Kantian sense.

There are many things which teachers can do to create the appropriate environment for moral education in the classroom. To begin with, they can learn to have intellectual humility and a willingness to admit ignorance, acknowledge a mistake, or modify views in the face of sound counterarguments by students. The teacher should not pose as an intellectual genius...
or as an infallible source of knowledge. There are considerable pressures upon him from parents, the public, and even the students to maintain such a posture, but he must resist these forces. In particular, teachers must learn to give full acknowledgement of, and make constant use of, the expertise of students. Only in this way can a spirit of co-operative search for knowledge and wisdom be developed in the classroom. 96

In general, the teacher should show respect for the student as a person. This is easily said and repeated, but we often overlook the enormous backing of authoritarianism toward younger people which exists in society. Permissiveness is not what is needed; that is not respect; we are only "permissive" to inferiors. The teacher must treat students as other people, who have a diversity of abilities and desires (just as he has), and with whom he happens to be engaged in certain semipersonal co-operative activities. He has been given a degree of authority over them, that is true, but he should exercise that authority only insofar as a sizable majority are convinced that it is necessary for the co-operative activities in which they are engaged. He is a resource person, chairman, leader, but he should exercise these roles only insofar as it is deemed useful
by the group. If most of the students in a class feel at
a particular point that such a role is not needed, or
that someone could fill it better, that settles the
matter. All those people are unlikely to be wrong
although they could be.

There are many little things which can help. Seating arrangements can be changed. First
names can be used. Students can speak without raising
their hands. Students can speak directly to each other
in group discussions rather than through the teacher.
These things are not particularly important in themselves,
and their appropriateness may vary with the size and age
level of the group. However, they may serve as significant
symbols of an underlying relationship of mutual respect.

But while these arrangements and relationships are being established in the classroom, the
school as a whole may be militating against the
objectives of the particular teacher. There is a great
deal of research to be carried out in the area of
non-authoritarian school organization and its effects
upon moral development. Some experiments have been
performed and there are various books and articles on
free schools, open-plan schools, and non-authoritarian
schools in general. It is difficult to draw conclusions
from these experiments. Many of the free schools have been either too small, or too short-lived, or too unusual in some other way to enable us to make predictions about what might happen in a large school in a total system. Open-plan schools have been tried fairly extensively over a long period in some areas, but where they have succeeded it is difficult to tell why, and there have been many failures. Furthermore, it is questionable whether open-plan schools, working within a basically authoritarian system, can really be non-authoritarian. Sometimes, perhaps, they become even more authoritarian than usual, because of the difficulties of maintaining conventional "order" in an open-plan situation. This highlights the basic problem of bringing about institutional changes favourable to moral development in the schools; it is difficult to change the classroom without a change in the structural arrangements and authority channels of the school itself.

In conclusion, it is important for educators to realize that moral education should strive toward helping to develop a moral person that will reason, as closely as possible, according to an autonomous stage six morality. Kohlberg sets out
psychological and methodological guidelines to assist
the teacher in this development toward principled
reasoning, and other researchers have supplemented
Kohlberg's work giving added insights as to how moral
education can help create an autonomous moral agent
where possible. Kant, on the other hand, adds the
formal philosophical perspective that enhances the
validity and relevance of this theory of moral
development as it progresses from heteronomous to
autonomous moral reasoning. Kohlberg's theory may
bear the fruit of moral development but the Kantian
philosophy of moral reasoning establishes the roots.
FOOTNOTES


15. Ibid., p. 58.
18. Ibid., p. 69.
24. Ibid., p. 50.


29. Duska and Whelan, op.cit., p. 76.

30. Ibid., p. 77.


35. Ibid., p. 20.


37. Ibid., pp. 39 - 40.

39. Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", op.cit.; p. 110

40. Ibid., p. 122.


42. Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", op.cit., p. 102.

43. Scharf, op.cit., p. 28.


45. Scharf, op.cit., p. 29.


47. Duska and Whelan, op.cit., p. 59.


50. Ibid., p. 13.

51. Ibid., p. 15.


54. Ibid., p. 638.


58. Ibid., p. 186.

59. Scharf, op. cit., p. 29.

60. Duska and Whelan, op. cit., p. 68.

61. Ibid., p. 59.


64. Runes, op. cit., p. 191.

65. Duska and Whelan, op. cit., p. 69.


74. Kant, op. cit., p. XVIII.

75. Ibid., p. XIX.

76. Ibid., p. 34.

77. Ibid., p. 36.

78. Scharf, op. cit., p. 41.

79. Ibid., p. 94.


82. Wolff, op. cit., p. 184.

83. Ibid., p. 241.

84. Paton, op. cit., p. 33.

85. Ibid., p. 35.
86. Ibid., p. 40.
87. Ibid., p. 45.
89. Ibid., p. 60.
90. Sullivan, op.cit., p. 17.
91. Ibid., p. 18.
92. Scharf, op.cit., p. 41.
94. Elias, op.cit., p. 79.
96. Ibid., p. 48.
*APPENDIX I

UNIVERSAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY

CATEGORIES:

MODES

Judgements of obligation
- Right
- Having a right
- Duty
- Responsibility

Judgements of moral value
- Blame
- Punishability

Supportive judgements
- Justification
- Non-moral value
- Descriptive and definitional

APPENDIX I (Continued)

UNIVERSAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY

CATEGORIES

ELEMENTS OR PRINCIPLES

Teleological elements
  Prudential
  Social welfare

Attitudinal elements
  Love
  Respect

Rational elements
  Justice as liberty
  Justice as equality
  Justice as reciprocity

ISSUES OR INSTITUTIONS

Norms
  Social rules of norms
  Personal conscience
  Roles of affection and welfare

Relations and roles
  Authority
  Civil liberties
  Contractual reciprocity
  Institutions of punishment

Values
  Life
  Property
  Truth
  Sexual
APPENDIX I (Continued)

UNIVERSAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY

CATEGORIES

LEVELS

Judgement of acts
General judgements of rules
Judgements in situational conflict
Sociopolitical judgements
Normative and metaethical theory judgements
*APPENDIX II

SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE

MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE

Stage I: No differentiation between moral values of
life and its physical or social-status value.

Tommy, age 10 (Why should the druggist give
the drug to the dying woman when her husband
couldn't pay for it?):
"If someone important is in a plane and is
allergic to heights and the stewardess won't
give him medicine because she's only got
enough for one and she's got a sick one, a
friend, in back, they'd probably put the
stewardess in a lady's jail because she
didn't help the important one."
(Is it better to save the life of one
important person or a lot of unimportant
people?):
"All the people that aren't important because
one man just has one house, maybe a lot of
furniture, but a whole bunch of people have
an awful lot of furniture and some of these
poor people might have a lot of money and it
doesn't look it."

*C.M. Beck, et al., Moral Education:
Interdisciplinary Approaches (University of Toronto
APPENDIX II (Continued)

SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE
MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE

Stage 2: The value of a human life is seen as instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its possessor or of other persons. Decision to save life is relative to, or to be made by, its possessor. (Differentiation of physical and interest value of life, differentiation of its value to self, and to other.)

Tommy, age 13 (Should the doctor "mercy kill" a fatally ill woman, requesting death because of her pain?):
"Maybe it would be good to put her out of her pain, she'd be better off that way. But the husband wouldn't want it, it's not like an animal. If a pet dies you can get along without it -- it isn't something you really need. Well, you can get a new wife, but it's not really the same."

Jim, age 13 (same question):
"If she requests it, it's really up to her. She is in such terrible pain, just the same as people are always putting animals out of their pain."

Stage 3: The value of human life is based on the empathy and affection of family members and others towards its possessor. (The value of human life, as based on social sharing, community, and love, is differentiated from the instrumental and hedonistic value of life applicable also to animals.)

Tommy, age 16 (same question):
"It might be best for her, but her husband -- it's a human life -- not like an animal, it just doesn't have the same relationship that a human being does to a family. You can become attached to a dog, but nothing like a human you know."
SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE

Stage 4: Life is conceived of as sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties. (The value of human life, as a categorical member of a moral order, is differentiated from its value to specific other people in the family, etc. Value of life is still partly dependent upon serving the group, the stage, God, however.)

Jim, age 16 (same question): "I don't know. In one way, it's murder, it's not a right or privilege of man to decide who shall live and who should die. God put life into everybody on earth and you're taking away something from that person that came directly from God, and you're destroying something that is very sacred, it's in a way part of God and it's almost destroying a part of God when you kill a person. There's something of God in everyone."

Stage 5: Life is valued both in terms of its relation to community welfare and in terms of being a universal human right. (Obligation to respect the basic right of life is differentiated from generalized respect for the sociomoral order. The general value of the independent human life is a primary autonomous value not dependent upon other values.)

Jim, age 20 (same question): "Given the ethics of the doctor who has taken on responsibility of saving human life -- from that point of view he probably shouldn't but there is another side, there are more and more people in the medical profession who are thinking it is a hardship on everyone, the person, the family, when you know they are going to die. When a person is kept alive by an artificial lung or kidney it's more like being a vegetable than being a human..."
APPENDIX II (Continued)

SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE

MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE

who is alive. If it's her own choice I think there are certain rights and privileges that go along with a human being. I am a human being and have certain desires for life and I think everybody else does, too. You have a world of which you are the centre, and everybody else does, too, and in that sense, we're all equal."

Stage 6: Belief in the sacredness of human life, as representing a universal human value of respect for the individual. (The moral value of a human being, as an object of moral principle, is differentiated from a formal recognition of his rights.)

Jim, age 24 (Should the husband steal the drug to save his wife? How about for someone he just knows?)

"Yes, a human life takes precedence over any other moral or legal value, whatever it is. A human life has inherent value, whether or not it is valued by a particular individual."

(Why is that?)

"The inherent worth of the individual human being is the central value in a set of values where the principles of justice and love are normative for all human relationships."
*APPENDIX III

FORMAT OF A SUGGESTED MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME

PART ONE: What is Morality?

Chapter 1. The Nature of Ethical Inquiry
Chapter 2. Diversity of Moral Codes and the Problem of Objectivity
Chapter 3. The Purpose of Morality
Chapter 4. Justifying Moral Judgements
Chapter 5. The Self and Others
Chapter 6. Favouring an Inner Group
Chapter 7. Justice
Chapter 8. Morality and Compromise

APPENDIX III (Continued)

FORMAT OF A SUGGESTED
MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME

PART TWO: Ethics and Psychology

Chapter 9. Elements in Human Moral Psychology
Chapter 10. Different Moral Types
Chapter 11. Theories of Moral Development: Part One
Chapter 12. Theories of Moral Development: Part Two
Chapter 13. Problems in Attaining Moral Maturity

PART THREE: Ethics in Today's World

Chapter 14. Politics, Law and Morality
Chapter 15. Business, Economics and Morality
Chapter 16. National, Racial and Cultural Dysfunctions
Chapter 17. The Movement Toward Internationalism
Chapter 18. Quality of Life
APPENDIX III (Continued)

FORMAT OF A SUGGESTED MORAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME

PART FOUR: Ethical Theories

Chapter 19. Theories Emphasizing Conformity
Chapter 20. Theories Emphasizing Function and Purpose
Chapter 21. Hedonistic Theories
Chapter 22. Utilitarian Theories
Chapter 23. Subjectivism, Relativism and Objectivism

PART FIVE: Deciding What to Do

Chapter 24. Working out What is Right, "All Things Considered"
Chapter 25. Strategies for Thinking Effectively
Chapter 26. The Place of Principles and Rules in Decision-Making
Chapter 27. Multiple Motives in Decision-Making
BIBLIOGRAPHY


