ABSTRACT

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The Doctrine of Man in Karl Barth and F.D. Maurice

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Summary:

Karl Barth and F.D. Maurice are of different centuries, countries, and denominations yet there are remarkable similarities between them. These similarities are particularly apparent in their respective anthropologies, their doctrines of man. There is, both men assert, but one starting point for a true anthropology, Jesus Christ. This means that anthropology must be built on Christology. Both theologians start emphatically with this point, and their anthropologies, as they are developed, parallel each other. Man, to be real or true, must be in fellowship with God which both permits and requires that man be with, that is, in fellowship with, his fellow man. Out of the solid core of agreement on the nature and condition of man Barth and Maurice agree on two further matters which represent the extremes of the argument: the existence and nature of nothingness and the happier possibility that perhaps all men are saved.
THE DOCTRINE OF MAN IN KARL BARTH AND F.D. MAURICE

by

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KARL BARTH AND F.D. MAURICE

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in

KARL BARTH

and

F.D. MAURICE
NOTE


ABBREVIATIONS

CD . . . . . . . Church Dogmatics by Karl Barth
Life . . . . . The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice
Kingdom . . . The Kingdom of Christ by F.D. Maurice

Full bibliographical detail of these three works can be found at the back.
DEDICATION

In all humility I dedicate this work to two men who are inspired teachers of the Word:

The Reverend Doctor J.C. Kirby

and

The Reverend Doctor J.C. McLelland

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They not only opened my eyes to Maurice and Barth but also filled me with a love of learning.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christocentrism</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barth's Anthropology</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Kingdom of God</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Das Nichtige and Eternal Death</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apokatastasis</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliographies</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

On looking at our title the reader may well be tempted to ask "Why Karl Barth and F.D. Maurice? They are not of the same century nor of the same country. Within the Church they are not of the same tradition. What have these two, one an English Divine of the nineteenth century, the other a Continental theologian of our own day -- what have they to do with one another? Of course they are both Christians but what more do they share than their "common Christianity"? Why attempt to couple them together?"

Forgetting for the moment that "common Christianity" is probably an illusion, it is my belief and I hope to show that these two men share a great deal more than at first would appear. I hope to show that Barth and Maurice are in substantial agreement in many important areas of thought particularly in their understanding of the nature and condition of man.

There are, as we would expect, differences between the two. It could not be otherwise. Great men are not slavish copiers of other men's work. We will find differences in style, in vocabulary, in the materials each had to work with, and in opinion at some points. But underlying all these various differences there is, I believe, a solid core of agreement and to show that agreement is my purpose.

There is value in attempting this. Understanding each will help us to understand the other. It is also useful, in this ecumenical age, to show any agreement, understanding, sympathy, which transcends the sectarian boundaries. So we may well ask wherein
1 For animated comments by Maurice on the subject of "common Christianity" see Life I, p. 259: he calls it "the mere caput mortuum of all systems".

2 Examples large and small can be found. There is conflict over natural theology: one need only compare Maurice's attitude in The Religions of the world and their Relations to Christianity considered in Eight Lectures by Frederick Denison Maurice, Fourth Edition, Macmillan and Co., London, 1861, with Barth's well-known treatment of natural theology to see the difference. Again, Maurice tends to be in favour of infant baptism, Barth not. Cf. Barth's The Teaching of the Church regarding Baptism, SC. Press, London, 1943, with Kingdom I, p. 268ff. There are also smaller instances; e.g. Maurice uses the notion of heaven and earth in a different way than does Barth. Maurice tends not to be so cosmologically precise and sometimes speaks of heaven where he ought to say God: he is not as conscious as Barth of the fact that heaven too is part of the created cosmos. Cf. Kingdom II, p. 76 and The Doctrine of Sacrifice deduced from the Scriptures by F.D. Maurice, Macmillan & Co., Cambridge, 1854, p. xvii with Barth's treatment of heaven in CD III/2, § 43/1.

3 One of my own reasons for attempting this comparison is to help validate an intuitive (if somewhat tautological and non-academic) principle: that two men who speak the truth must say the same thing.
they are alike. But before we consider even superficial likenesses
I should like to say a word about F.D. Maurice: Karl Barth is per-
haps the best known theologian of our age while Maurice, though
well known in his own day, is not popular today despite the revival
of interest in him in the last fifteen or twenty years.

Frederick Denison Maurice was born in 1805 in England, the son
of a Unitarian minister. He eventually became an Anglican and an
Anglican priest though he acquired a great familiarity with many of
the various English sects of his time before (and even after) he
settled himself within the protection of the English Prayer Book.¹
He was associated during his life with Oxford, Cambridge, King's
College (which extruded him in 1853 and has regretted it ever since),
and founded, or helped to found, Queen's College, London, and the
"Working Men's College". He was also one of the leaders of the
Christian Socialist Movement of the mid-century along with Charles
Kingsley and Malcolm Ludlow. During his life he was enormously
admired by some and despised by others, the former probably being
the greater number. One has only to scan his letters to see that he
was a man of great sympathy and charm and humility.

He was also a prodigious writer whose interests ranged considerably
beyond the purely theological: Maurice himself felt that all matters
were theological and his published writings extend to nearly 5,000,000
words.² Sermons, tracts, published letters, articles on every sub-
ject, theological essays, even a novel; all came in a steady stream.
He was a truly great man who may, in three or four centuries, be re-
cognized as occupying the same place in the nineteenth century that
Karl Barth occupies in the twentieth.
1 Life I, p. 512: "It is my protection and the protection of the Church against Anglicanism and Evangelicalism and Liberalism and Romanism and Rationalism . . . ."

2 Witness to the Light by Alec R. Vidler, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1948, p. 228

3 This biographical material can all be found in the Life.
In background Barth and Maurice are in no particular way similar; we shall not learn about them in that way. The two great wars which have shaped so much of Barth's thought were unknown to Maurice and the poverty and working-class struggles which Maurice knew had been largely eased by Barth's day. Perhaps we can conclude that each was exposed to, and sensible of, the human suffering which was about them. But a detailed examination of their respective backgrounds will not help us in our comparative study.

But despite all disparity the two men are remarkably alike. First and foremost (and this is a very general remark) they are alike in their generosity of spirit by which I mean the magnitude of their care for men, the openness of their love for mankind. This love is manifested at all levels from the daily pastoral round which each for some time pursued to the seriousness and passion with which each writes theology. This generosity of spirit is perhaps a quality which both men share with the man next door but my concern will be to show how this generosity is manifest in their understanding of the human condition. This generosity, this love for all, will be particularly apparent in the last chapter when we consider the apokatastatic element in the thinking of each man.

They are alike too in that each man is, in his own century, an intellectual giant though Barth is perhaps more recognized today than Maurice was a hundred years ago. Yet despite (or perhaps because of) the enormity of their intellectual span neither is a carping, cavilling schoolman, afraid to be caught out in some proposition. Each is willing to grow, change, admit error.
Barth is willing to go to the work of changing his mind: see the Author's Foreword to Volume I/1 of the Church Dogmatics, p. VII ff. Maurice as well has an open mind and a willingness to meet men: consider this: "A man will not really be intelligible to you, if, instead of listening to him and sympathising with him, you determine to classify him." (The Religions of the World, p. 94)
Wherein are they alike? They are similar in that they both show, in all their theology, a recognition of only one starting-point, the Christocentric; this Christocentrism do they particularly insist upon when they set themselves to examine the human condition, to establish a theological anthropology. This Christocentrism is the first thing we shall have to examine before we can come to grips with anthropology proper and therefore it will be the subject matter of Chapter I, a short but vital chapter.

A note of caution, however: we will not find Maurice saying, for example, that a theological anthropology must be Christocentric. As I suggested earlier, there are differences in vocabulary between the two men and part of our task is to try to draw the equation between differing labels for concepts. Indeed, Maurice is less consistent than Barth and often changes words round to suit his own convenience. But granted this (natural) difference we can continue to ask wherein they are alike.

Parallels of all kinds, some not strictly pertinent to our subject, abound: one need only the courage to look for them. One can find, for example, in Barth and Maurice a common dislike of "system" and a preference for "method" which go hand in hand with their willingness to be dogmatic. One can see that both have the same fear of theology which degenerates into "opinions about God" and becomes a man-made stumbling block. We can see that both are opposed to the construction of cosmologies. We can see that despite a warm sympathy for much of Schleiermacher's thought both men feel obliged ultimately to reject Schleiermacher's theology of consciousness. We can find each fulminating against religion. The list could be prolonged.
It is not by accident that Barth has written a *Dogmatics* and not a *Systematics*. The whole Christocentric approach requires that man follow revelation as it comes to him rather than attempt to build any system. Barth asks whether the term "Systematic Theology" is not as paradoxical as "wooden iron": see *Dogmatics in Outline* by Karl Barth, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, New York, 1959, p. 5 (Barth's new foreword to the Torchbook edition), and compare with *Life II*, p. 43 ff., in which Maurice speaks of his "system-phobia". See also *Witness to the Light*, pp. 9 -- 15. Dr Vidler quotes Maurice (p. 74) as saying, "The Theological method is the oldest of all methods. The Bible begins it in the first Chapter of Genesis. God speaks, Man hears.". *God speaks, Man hears*: this is the very language of Barth. See also *Kingdom I*, pp. 238, 239.


Cf. *Kingdom II*, pp. 74 & 75 with *CD*, III/2, § 43/1.


Cf. *CD*, I/2, § 17, "The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion", particularly that section titled "Religion as Unbelief", with *Life I*, p. 369. See also *Life I*, p. 86: Maurice's son tells us that in later years Maurice looked upon religion as an "essentially heathenish word". See also *Life I*, p. 518: "Religion against God. This is the heresy of our age . . . ."
But wherein are they alike regarding their anthropology, their view of man's condition? What is man, sinner or saved, or simul justus et pecator? If Christ have truly conquered can man still be in what Maurice calls "a state of depravity or pravity"? What is meant by the phrase Kingdom of God? Do all men belong to it? If so, what is sin? Will all men ultimately be saved, dare we proclaim a universalist doctrine? This is the kind of question which we must answer to see if Barth and Maurice truly adhere to the same principles despite whatever differences of time and place and background there may be between them. How to go about it?

Our method shall be this: in the first chapter we shall look at the Christocentrism held to by each man as to an anchor; this is the necessary first step. From that centre we shall, in Chapter II, examine the Barthian anthropology by laying it out in somewhat condensed form, at the same time relating to it Maurice's views. Then, in Chapter III, the process will be somewhat reversed: we shall look at Maurice's Doctrine of the Kingdom and see how well it is supported by the comparisons of the previous chapter. This much will accomplish the main burden of our work leaving only two areas of importance to touch upon. These will be taken care of in the two remaining chapters: Chapter IV will compare and contrast Maurice's notion of Eternal Death with Barth's discussion of das Nichte and relate both to the sin and evil with which mankind apparently finds itself confronted.

The last chapter will consider the doctrine of universalism, of apokatastasis, to discover to what extent it is present in the thinking of each man and to what extent each dares ultimately to announce it. There will be no particular need for a conclusion since the compar-
ative evaluation will be made constantly throughout the work.

What sources? While each man has published literally millions of words we need examine relatively few works. Neither man is systematic but both use method: in Barth's case the method consists in a sort of spiral manoeuvre over each subject attacking it ever more closely from all points of view. The focus of his helical flight over anthropology is in Volume III/2 of the *Church Dogmatics*, the material on *das Mächtige* is found in III/3. These, with occasional other references, particularly to *The Humanity of God*, shall be our principal sources for Barth.²

Maurice is more diffuse a writer than Barth: he is a systematic theologian carrying all his ideas jumbled in one very large carpetbag. His insights are to be found throughout his works but two of the major sources which will be of use to us here are the *Life* and the *Kingdom*. The *Life*, properly speaking, is not a work at all but rather a collection of letters written at various times to various people. But Maurice was a Victorian who took letter-writing very seriously and in his private letters he poured out his convictions with all his pastoral zeal. Much of the material on *Eternal Life* and *Eternal Death* is to be found in the *Theological Essays*.

Before we begin to look, however, for answers to some of the questions raised about the nature of man and the alleged similarity of thought between our two theologians we must consider with some seriousness the Christocentrism of each man. It is for each his necessary point of departure and must be therefore, for us likewise, the point of departure.
1 See the Editors' Preface to CD, I/2, pp. vii ff. for an account of Barth's method.

2 The Humanity of God by Karl Barth, John Knox Press, Richmond, Virginia, 1960
CHAPTER I
CHRISTOCENTRISM

My desire is to ground all theology upon the Name of God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; not to begin from ourselves and our sins; not to measure the straight line by the crooked one. This is the method which I have learnt from the Bible. There everything proceeds from God; He is revealing Himself, He is acting, speaking, ruling. (1) F.D. Maurice

The importance of this chapter is inversely proportional to its length. We must recognize this vital point of departure from which the thinking of each of our two men starts. Fortunately, the Christocentrism or Christological concentration of Karl Barth is so well known as to need little mention here. From the basic formulation in his work on Anselm through to the Dogmatics — and, indeed, generally throughout his work — Barth maintains the same constant emphasis. H. Hartwell says of the Dogmatics that it is "... wholly christological in the sense that in it, generally speaking, every theological proposition has as its point of departure Jesus Christ, the Son of God and the Son of Man, in the unity of His person and work". This Christocentrism is no less apparent in Barth's work on the doctrine of man than elsewhere. In discussing man as an object of theological knowledge, Barth asserts that we can know man only by looking at the human nature of the man Jesus and concludes that this "means nothing more nor less than the founding of anthropology on Christology". And so, in the next chapter, we shall find it to be.

We shall also find, as the quotation which opened this chapter might lead us to believe, the same concentration in the thought
1. The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. xlv


4. CD, III/2, p. 44 & passim
of F.D. Maurice. Rarely does one find a paragraph with so much theology (and good sense) compressed so neatly into such a small space. This one paragraph reveals a wealth of knowledge of Maurice: his interest in method rather than system, the priority which he attaches to the Bible, the priority and initiative which he understands God to have, and, of course, the capsule outline of how anthropology is to proceed.

One could quarrel, of course, and say that Maurice's Trinitarian formula is not, strictly speaking, Christocentric. Perhaps it is not. But we need not concern ourselves overmuch with any apparent problems arising from a different name to which each man makes his appeal: Jesus, God, the Trinity. The same problem can be said to apply to Barth: Hartwell says of him that "it may even be doubted whether his theology can be classified as wholly christocentric, seeing that to both the Father and the Holy Spirit a prominent place is assigned in it." ¹ Hartwell is almost contradicting himself: if one wish however, to make this nice distinction one could make it equally well of Maurice. But this is silly hair-splitting; the fact of the matter is that both Barth and Maurice understand God-as-revealed-in-Jesus to be the point of departure for both theology generally and an understanding of man more particularly.

Maurice tells us in the introduction to his Doctrine of Sacrifice that we must not attempt to measure the straight line by the crooked one. This is an image and a concept which we shall meet again in subsequent chapters for this is not an isolated fragment of F.D. Maurice's thought in this regard. In all his thinking he requires of us that we perceive not only the primacy but also the initiative
The Theology of Karl Barth, p. 16
of God as Creator and Ruler. (He is revealing Himself, He is
acting, speaking, ruling.) This emphasis applies not only to theo-
logy in general but also to anthropology in particular though
Maurice never speaks of anthropology as such. One letter, from
Maurice to his friend, Ludlow, will reveal some of this character-
istic Maurician emphasis though examples are commonplace and easily
found. In this particular letter we are told that God "Himself is
the root from which all human life, and human society . . . are de-
derived", that "society is not to be made anew by arrangements of
ours, but is to be regenerated by finding the law and ground of its
order and harmony the only secret of its existence in God.", that
the Kingdom of Heaven "is among us, and is not to be set up at all".
In this day Barth is usually given the credit for the discovery or
rediscovery that God must be our starting point in thinking about
man. It is interesting to consider that Maurice was making the same
point one hundred years ago.

There is no need now to enlarge further upon this point: as we
proceed with our work in this essay we shall meet time and time
again citations and thoughts which reveal this Christocentric bias,
emphasis, insistence, on the part of our two theologians. We shall
be brought back repeatedly to this same fundamental premiss: that
in and through Jesus Christ is derived our knowledge of the nature
of man. Therefore, having set the stage at the outset with this
recognition we can move on to Barth's anthropology.
1. *Life II*, pp. 136 -- 138: a letter to John Malcolm Ludlow from F.D. Maurice, dated Sept. 24, 1852: in the middle of the letter (p. 137) Maurice says, "I wish very earnestly to be understood on this point, because all my future course must be regulated on this principle, or on no principle at all."

CHAPTER II

BARTH'S ANTHROPOLOGY

The Cosmos:

The principal source of Barth's anthropology is Volume III/2 of the Church Dogmatics, and more particularly, paragraphs 43, 44, and subsections one and two of 45. So it is here that we shall begin. Rather than attempt to present the argument in some completely new and (inevitably) condensed form, we shall find it more useful to follow Barth point by point as he works his way to a definition of real man. To his orderly pattern we can relate Maurician thoughts as they apply. Of course, in this first section on the cosmos, as well as in other places, we can leave out many points on the Barthian helix which, while they might help to fill out a total picture, are not necessary or useful to the comparison with Maurice.

Barth starts (as is his fashion) by putting first things first. What use to speak of man until one mention man's vast setting, the heaven under which and the earth on which man finds himself? So Barth's first subsection of § 43 is titled Man in the Cosmos. Here Barth says several things which we can rapidly scan: he says that man is certainly not the only creature, that both the cosmos itself and all within it are God's creatures, that man is determined to some extent by the cosmos and is in relation to it. These are observations which, while they may be implicit in Maurice's thought, are certainly not explicit. But Maurice would probably have agreed with Barth's conclusion: that an explanation of man in terms of the cosmos alone would be false. Barth says
This is not so arbitrary a stopping-point as might appear at first glance for Barth himself at the beginning of his long footnote on p. 274 says that "we have now reached a provisional conclusion in our investigations. What we shall have to say in our third sub-section will not add anything material to it."

Perhaps this is related in some way to the scientific atmosphere of the day: Maurice was content to "leave physics to dear Kingsley": see Life II, p. 137.
... theological anthropology cannot purport to be a doctrine of man as a cosmic being explicable in the light of this determination. The fact that he is determined by the cosmos, by heaven and earth, and how this is the case, theology will explain only by reference to his divine Creator, and therefore to the Word of God, not to the cosmos or a particular view of the cosmos. (1)

Cosmologies, or what Maurice calls philosophies, are not in themselves wrong but they must be subordinated to the theological point of reference. Maurice, more than a hundred years before Barth wrote the passage we have just read, said to his friend, A.J. Scott, that

I believe . . . that there is Light near us, from which all our light flows . . . . And the acknowledgment of the light and of our relation to it is, I suppose, the point where philosophy and religion meet. (2)

The important words here are and our relation to it. Maurice felt that a philosophy (or an anthropology though he does not use that word) was a useful thing in understanding and coming to grips with the universe, but that anyone should entertain a philosophy of man without the Light was to him a horrible thought. Such a philosophy would certainly be, in his view, a warped one and those who held it would be in terrible error. One must start from the Light. And therefore Maurice would be in complete sympathy with Barth's warnings in the first subsection of III/2 in which he tells us how not to proceed.

Barth points out that it is not the task of Dogmatics to invent a cosmology though it may from time to time use one. Nor must anthropology, which has to do with man in the cosmos, aspire to become cosmology. These procedural injunctions are paralleled in Maurice's thought and can be seen (at least implicitly) in one short passage:

... theology is not (as the schoolmen have represented it) the climax of all studies, the Corinthian capital of a mag-
1 CD, III/2, p. 16

2 Life I, pp. 322, 323: it is rare to find Maurice using the word religion in a favourable context: see note 5 on page 4A. Oddly enough, Maurice does not capitalize his second light which lends a certain ambiguity to the citation.

3 CD, III/2, p. 4

4 Ibid., p. 8

5 Ibid., p. 15
significant edifice, composed of physics, politics, economics, and connecting them as parts of a great system with each other -- but is the foundation upon which they all stand. (1)

Maurice goes on to say in this same (rather famous) passage that he is "only a digger" by which he meant that his job was to dig out the foundations of man and his world, that is, reveal them, not to try to build them.

Barth, in this first section, develops a more startling idea than those which we have met so far above. After pointing out that while the Word of God gives us an ontology of man but certainly no ontology of heaven and earth he goes on to say:

The question of the possibility of a cosmos without man is as pointless as the question of the possibility that it might not be, or might not have been created by God. As created by God, it is the heaven and earth of man; it is his beyond and present; it constitutes the twofold determination of this creature. The universe was created for the sake of God's gracious plan. Hence its goal and centre is man ... (2)

Maurice, immediately after saying that theology is not the climax of all studies but their foundation, continues by saying that God himself "... is the root from which all human life, and human society, and ultimately, through man, nature itself, are derived." The purpose of nature, which is Maurice's 19th century word matching Barth's cosmos, is directed toward man. Of course, that man is in some sense the chief creature is a commonplace of orthodox Christianity: the point on which Maurice and Barth are clearly decisive and in agreement is that the cosmos or nature is created for man.

We are still left with our original question, however. What is man? We know only so far that he is a creature, one of many creatures big and little, living and without life, all of which together make up
1. *Life II*, p. 136


the cosmos. We know only that he is somehow the central figure in the created cosmos. But we have no ontology of heaven and earth, can we have an ontology of man? This is the question to which Barth next addresses himself.
The Object of Theological Knowledge:

Barth, having in seventeen pages dismissed the problems which might be raised by any misunderstanding of mankind's relations with the cosmos, goes on to title his second section Man as an Object of Theological Knowledge. He opens with these words: "Man is made an object of theological knowledge by the fact that his relationship to God is revealed to us in the Word of God."¹ This is what is special about man. This is why we are the central creature. Compared to galaxies we may be insignificant; we are but small parts of God's creation but nonetheless a very special part. For, of all God's creatures, how and why man is the creature of God is revealed. The task of anthropology, Barth tells us, is to ask what kind of being it is which stands in this relationship with God. To do this anthropology must restrict its quest to an understanding of the human creaturiness defined by this relationship with God and made known by it.² In other words, we are back to the Maurician point we saw earlier; we must not measure the straight by the crooked but the crooked by the straight.

The reason why we must follow Maurice's dictum is because a further difficulty is going to meet us when we try to build an anthropology: in the Word of God man is shown as a traitor to his own essential being. Man has debased himself, covered his own creaturely being with shame, made himself, in Barth's delightful word, impossible.³ He is impossible because he has chosen an ontological impossibility, that of sinfulness, for even in sinning man does not create. Man's sin is not an act of creation: "It clearly has the character of that which
Barth goes on to say that "Thus theological anthropology cleaves to the Word of God and its biblical attestation.": CD, III/2, p. 19. This compares favourably with a statement of Maurice's which we have already seen: "My desire is to ground all theology upon the Name . . . . This is the method which I have learnt from the Bible.": The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. xiv.
God did not will to create . . . ." The problem is one to which we shall return in our discussion of gas Michtige.

But despite the fact that man is untrue to his own essential being there is still hope, for even as a sinner man is still the creature of God. As Maurice says in a more homely fashion, children do not cease to be children because they are disobedient children. They still exist in a certain relation. So Barth continues to show that while man has broken the covenant, he did not make it and cannot dissolve it. "He can sin and make himself impossible. But he cannot even do this outside the covenant. He cannot sin without the grace of God, but only against God." If, however, we describe man as sinful have we said the last word about him? Barth says not for man's sinful nature is secondary to his real nature. Man's real nature is to be that being who acts within the covenant in right relation to God. This thought is paralleled by Maurice when, in writing of baptism, he says

We tell all men, those who are most incredulous of our message, most hostile to it, that this Name is about them, that they are living, moving, having their being in it. They do not acquire this privilege by baptism; we baptize them because they have it. (4)

So we are left still with our same question: how to find man's real nature? And Barth has an answer for us. "The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the problem of human nature." And again, "As the man Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the source of our knowledge of the nature of man as created by God." Therefore anthropology must be founded on Christology. We must not attempt to determine what human nature is and then, on that basis, attempt to describe the nature of the man Jesus. Rather the reverse. Barth him-
1 CD, III/2, p. 33


3 CD, III/2, pp. 33, 34

4 Witness to the Light, pp. 104, 105: taken by Vidler from The Conflict of Good and Evil: Twelve Letters to a Missionary by F.D. Maurice, 1865, p. 179: italics added

5 CD, III/2, p. 43

6 Ibid., p. 41
self, in a long note beginning on page 44, explains at length why his method is of necessity the reverse of the usual human practice.

We can, at this point, permit ourselves to jump ahead a little in Barth's methodical procedure and consider a later section titled Phenomena of the Human: this will give us an opportunity to see how closely Maurice can be demonstrated to parallel Barth in general outline. We have already seen that Barth insists that we push beyond the phenomenal (as he calls it) to the real in our search for a theological anthropology. Reality, as Barth understands it, is defined and measured by Jesus Christ. In this particular section Barth sets himself to examine some of the various philosophical "platforms" which men have devised in order to explain, or attempt to explain, themselves to themselves.

For the point at issue is who is the man who wants to know himself and thinks he can? How does he reach the platform from which he thinks he can see himself? What kind of a platform is it, and what kind of a knowledge will he give himself from it, when for some reason he wants to see himself otherwise than from God, looking at himself and not at God? (1)

Barth considers the "platforms" erected by Zockler, Otto, Titius, Fichte, Brunner, and others, and finally dismisses them as inadequate for the purpose for which they were devised. He says:

In this sub-section we have spoken of man's attempt to understand himself when he is presumed to be able to do so in his own strength and by his own resources . . . . But we have not encountered real man in this way. (2)

How do we know that we have not encountered real man in this way? Because, Barth tells us, these various views and platforms will not satisfy the criteria of man which are established in Jesus. However, this is an argument which we shall come to shortly: at the moment we
1  CD, III/2, p. 75

2  Ibid., p. 121
must examine Maurice's attitude to philosophical "platforms".

Maurice too knew the futility of platforms. He agrees substantially with Barth that they are not essentially wrong in themselves but are, ultimately (to go back to Barth's language) inadequate as true anthropologies. There is a passage in Maurice's Theological Essays which, while long, ought to be reproduced here since it captures so well the sentiment and essence of the Barthian attitude to "platforms".

I do not think it dangerous that any man should get any knowledge of any subject whatever; the more he has the better . . . . But yet I cannot help seeing also, that Legislation, Ethics, Economics, even Physical Science, may themselves contribute to the foundation of superstitions, if the man is not first called into life to receive them and to connect them with himself. I am sure, at all events, that an infinite responsibility rests upon us . . . to be calling forth . . . the heart and conscience of men, so that first being able to see their Father in Heaven truly, and themselves in their true relation to Him, they may afterwards manfully investigate . . . the conditions under which they themselves, His children, exist, and the laws which govern all His works. (1)

So much for philosophical platforms. What Barth calls a view of (merely) phenomenal man is what Maurice calls a superstitious view. To see real man requires that we see ourselves in our true relation to our Father in heaven first.

Before we diverged to consider the Phenomena of the Human we were engaged in a problem: to discover man's real nature. Barth had told us that Jesus is the source of our knowledge of the nature of man, a position with which Maurice agrees. Barth continues by saying that not only is Jesus the source but he is the only source. Not because we interpret him (which attempt results sooner or later in a cosmology or "platform") but because he reveals himself to us. 2
1  *Theological Essays*, pp. 28, 29: italics in the original

2  *CD*, III/2, p. 53
There are, of course, differences between us and Jesus which Barth takes a few pages to outline but these are differences which arise only because while Jesus is man he is also God and because of the remoteness which our sin places between us. In spite of these differences we share the same (human) nature. Barth concludes by saying

The threefold fact that it is first in Him, that in Him it is kept and maintained in its purity, and that it is manifest in Him, implies a different status but not a different constitution of His human nature from ours. (2)

How to answer our question about human nature? We are invited, Barth says, to know ourselves as we really are by inference from Jesus' human nature. We must therefore discover exactly who and what the man Jesus is. Barth appropriately titles his next section Jesus, Man for God; it will be our task to follow him there.

But let us at this stage sum up a little and also reconsider a warning already given in the introduction. It would be a mistake to even pretend that in Maurice we can find exactly the same argument laid out point by point. Nor would we want to. It has not been the case up till now nor shall it be as we progress in our search of Barth's anthropology. Maurice had not a tidy Swiss mind but rather an English mind and English minds are a little like English gardens. I doubt that Maurice ever thought about these matters with the same degree of intensity. But nonetheless there is agreement between the two men in the sense that Maurice would doubtless have applauded what Barth has to say about theological anthropology. Certainly thus far we have discovered agreement on the major premises. Regarding the philosophical "platforms" we have seen that Maurice definitely agrees. And with the general Christological
1 CD, III/2, pp. 47 -- 52

2 Ibid., p. 53

3 Ibid., p. 54
premiss that it is to Christ (or to God) to whom we must look to find our nature and purpose Maurice also clearly agrees. However, as this chapter develops we shall find that there is not as much formal complexity in Maurice as Barth offers; this is why we can safely leave out some of the Barthian orchestration. Yet while Barth's music may offer more studied harmonies the two melodies are essentially the same. More we cannot ask.
Jesus, Man for God:

We must now examine a section to which the warning about Maurician parallels will certainly apply. § 44 of the Church Dogmatics is arranged in the following way: Barth speaks first of Jesus, the man for God, then of the Phenomena of the Human which we have already briefly scanned, then finally of real man. When we spoke of the phenomena of the human we saw that Barth felt that the various "platforms" which men erect in the struggle to develop a human anthropology would never lead us to real man. And why? Because they would not satisfy the various criteria we would establish for real man. And those criteria are first established in the man Jesus. In the subsection Jesus, Man for God Barth establishes six points which we can affirm concerning the nature of the man Jesus.¹ We must, if only in the most cursory fashion, consider these six points since Barth will go on to develop a parallel six points concerning the nature of mankind.² But these initial six points about the man Jesus have little parallel in Maurice's thought (unless one consider them in a most vague and general way), not that Maurice would deny them but rather that he never articulated them. Nonetheless, we shall eventually see that Maurice can be shown to be in hearty agreement with the derivative six points about the nature of mankind.

What are these points concerning the nature of the man Jesus? We must affirm of one who lives with us the same human life in the same world:

1. that of this man alone (i.e. Jesus) can it be said that he is identically God;
1  *CD*, III/2, p. 68ff.

2 that this presence of God in man, this man, is an act, a saving act;
3 that this act takes place in a history with which God's glory is bound up;
4 that this man exists in the glory of God, in the act of his Lordship: he does not exist outside this act of sovereignty, but within it;
5 that he has no neutral existence behind the history but is himself the history;
6 that he is essentially for God, in order that God's work may happen, his kingdom come, his Word be expressed. (1)

On the basis of these six points, this initial Christological approach, we can begin to explore the nature of man in general, bearing in mind, as we have previously recognized, that there is an enormous difference between the nature of man in general and the nature of the man Jesus. Nonetheless, these six points about the man Jesus will offer us certain criteria -- the criteria which were not met by the various philosophies and anthropologies erected by men.

About man in general Barth develops six parallel points -- and this is where we shall discover in Maurice such a high degree of agreement. We must bear in mind, however, that in developing these parallels there are two differences between the nature of the man Jesus and our human nature: the mystery of our sin and the mystery of his identity with God. With these warnings in mind we can proceed to the six preliminary points about man in general. Since these points will be so important to us it is worth quoting from Barth at length.

CD, III/2, p. 71
If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that in His humanity we are confronted . . . with the being of God, then necessarily, assuming that there is similarity between Him and us in spite of all dissimilarity, every man is to be understood . . . to the extent that he is conditioned by the priority of this man, in his relationship with God, i.e., in the light of the fact that he comes from God, and above all that God moves to him. (1)

If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that the presence and revelation of God in Him is the history of the deliverance of each and every man, then . . . every man is a being which is conditioned by the fact that this deliverance is for him, that every man as such must exist and have his being in a history which stands in a clear and recognisable relationship to the divine deliverance enacted in the man Jesus. (2)

The remaining four can be summed up a little more succinctly: they have the same format of "if" and "then".

3. We can say that man is not an end in himself but is for the glory of God.
4. We can say that whatever freedom means, man cannot escape the Lordship of God.
5. We can say that man's being is a participation in what God does for him; man's freedom is freedom to decide for this in the course of a history initiated and sustained by God. This is what makes sin the ontological impossibility.
6. We can say that man's being is existence in the service of God. "These are the limits within which we shall always have to move in our search for a theological concept of man."3 Within these limits Barth will provide us with still more analysis and definition for we have not yet arrived. We have only the framework, the criteria of what we must look for. Our quest now leads us naturally into Barth's section, Real Man. But before we go on to explore that we
1. OP, III/2, p. 73
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 74
ought to stop for a moment and see how congruent Maurice's thought can be found to be with the six points about the nature of man. Therefore we shall re-examine the six points in the light of Maurice's thought.
Maurice and the Six Points:

If Barth's first point is understood to mean simply that man as such must be understood as belonging to God in some general sense, then Maurice would be bound to agree. But so would several dozen other theologians. However, Maurice's thought can be tied a little more closely to the sense of the Barthian point.

In his argument Barth says that man is to be understood to the extent that he is conditioned by the priority of this man (Jesus). What can we find in Maurice to show his recognition of this priority of Jesus? We have already seen it to some extent established in our section on Christology. For Maurice, this headship or priority of Jesus is the only thing that enables men to meet together as men: that is, we can only act together as real (to use Barth's word) men under the headship of Christ. Consider the following from a letter of Maurice's:

I have endeavoured in my tracts to prove that if Christ be really the head of every man, and if He really have taken human flesh, there is ground for a universal fellowship among men . . . . I have maintained that it is the business of a Church . . . to make men understand and feel how possible it is for men to fraternise in Christ; how impossible it is to fraternise, except in Him. Now the denial of a universal head is practically the denial of all communion in society. (1)

And we certainly belong to God: "The truth is that every man is in Christ; the condemnation of every man is, that he will not own the truth . . . .". We have seen before that Maurice wants all men to acknowledge this headship of Christ, to acknowledge their true relation with the Father. These statements show the awareness of Maurice to the point Barth has made for us. But we can go on.
1 Life I, p. 258: Maurice does not make as nice a distinction as Barth does between Christ and Jesus: in the passage just quoted it would be better for the sake of our parallel if Maurice used Jesus -- meaning the man -- rather than Christ. But he conveys the same meaning with his clause "and if He really have taken human flesh".

2 Ibid., p. 155

3 The Doctrine of Sacrifice, p. xlv
What else does Barth stress in his first point? That not only is man from God but that God moves to him. This is equally clear in Maurice: in that same passage from The Doctrine of Sacrifice which we have referred to just above we see Maurice speaking of God as acting, speaking, ruling.\(^1\) We have heard Maurice say "God speaks, man hears."\(^2\)

The sense of the Maurician thought shown above will also apply well to Barth's second point. The only word which will trouble us at all in the second characteristic of man is the word history. Leaving it aside for the moment we see that to the idea of the deliverance of every man, to the idea that this deliverance is for every man, to the notion that man has his being in a clear relationship to the divine deliverance enacted in the man Jesus, Maurice can give his endorsement.

But what of history? Barth seems to use this word in a special way: the reader of Church Dogmatics will meet it later contrasted with state.\(^3\) But we need not for our purposes go into that definition and contrast now. Maurice does not make the same equation that Barth does when the latter says (in the fifth point of the characteristics of the man Jesus) that this man Jesus was himself the history of the divine deliverance.\(^4\) Without working out in detail Barth's precise usage we can say that Maurice does not use the word in that way. He can and does, however, use the word as Barth does in the corresponding point about man. In that point Barth speaks of man's freedom, saying that "His \(\text{man's}^7\) freedom will be his freedom to decide for God; for what God wills to do and be for him in
1. *The Doctrine of Sacrifice*, p. xlv

2. See note 1, p. 4A.


this history.". Here we can see that an esoteric technical sense (to which the closest that Maurice could come would be when he calls Jesus the ground on which he can meet men, the safest, deepest ground of all\(^2\)) is not intended. Rather history seems to mean the whole sweep of divine activity from Creation to Last Things of which vast reach Jesus Christ is the focus and central point. Certainly Maurice, as we can see in The Kingdom of Christ, understands the events in the history of Israel -- the promise to Abraham, the crowning of David, and so on -- to be all part of a history "initiated and sustained by God".\(^3\) In a more common understanding of the word history Maurice certainly yields to the absolute priority of God.

Also, to the notion that in some way men have their being in (the history of) Jesus which notion Barth infuses into his six characteristics of man, Maurice would also assent.

The Evangelists . . . go on to record in words perfectly calm and simple the death of their Master and His Resurrection. As events they are related; no comment is made upon them . . . . we are made to feel . . . "He certainly died, who, as we believed, was the Son of God, and the King of Israel; He actually rose with His body, and came among us who knew Him, and spake and ate with us: this is the accomplishment of the union between heaven and earth; it is no longer a word, it is a fact." And of this fact, the risen Lord tells His Apostles that they are to go into the world and testify; not merely to testify of it, but to adopt men into a society grounded upon the accomplishment of it. In connexion with that command, and as the ultimate basis of the universal society, a NAME is proclaimed . . . . (4)

The notion that a NAME (which is the ultimate basis of the universal society) is that within which all things exist is as close as Maurice can come to a parallel with Barth's identification of Jesus with his history.
1. **CD, III/2, p. 74**

2. **Life I, p. 258**


4. *Kingdom I*, p. 254: note Maurice's use of *heaven* and *earth*. It is interesting to compare with this passage of Maurice's a similar one from *Earth*: "And if the four Evangelists conclude with the account of His resurrection, and if in the light of this all the New Testament witnesses look to Him as the One who sits at the right hand of God and will come again from the heaven to which He has ascended, this does not mean that they have ceased to think of the real man Jesus. But the real man Jesus is the working Jesus. They seem never to have thought of a human being beyond history or prior to history, or hidden from and transcending history, when they thought of the real man Jesus. They always found the real man Jesus in His work and history." (*CD, III/2, p. 58*).
It also follows that what Maurice has to say about men, families, nations, and the Kingdom in those parts of The Kingdom of Christ which we have already mentioned above will apply as well to the third point: that man is not an end in himself but is for the glory of God. The whole covenant relationship (with family, with nation, and ultimately, with mankind) as Maurice describes it involves man in a destiny bound up with God's inscrutable power and glory. And once, of course, that we admit that God has the priority, that God has established a history and a covenant, that God comes to men, then the sixth point too will follow: that man's being is existence in the service of God. If the word service seem a little harsh to our emancipated ears we can substitute for it participation as Barth uses it in his fifth point.

All we have tried to do above is to show a correlation between Maurice and Barth's six points: a longer discussion and examination of family, nation, and man will follow in the next chapter.

This leaves us with points four and five still unspoken to: that man's freedom is freedom to decide for God (but only for), and that whatever freedom means man cannot escape the Lordship of God. Do these mean that man cannot decide against God? Or is it simply that that which decides against God is no longer man, real man? And, we may ask, if any man sin, that is, decide against God, is there nowhere he can flee to escape God's Lordship? But if God be Lord always, then how can any man do this "impossible" thing, sin? While at this preliminary stage we can say that Maurice agrees in substance with Barth on these two points, our discussion of the
problems involved is best left for later. In that chapter in which we compare das Richtig with Eternal Death the problem of human sin will be taken up. The problem of man's freedom to decide for God, but only for, will become clearer as we proceed along Earth's path.
Real Man:

We are now prepared to return to Barth and his pursuit of real man. Barth himself gives us an excellent summary of the point at which we have presently arrived concerning man: he says

If [These six points] are right, in relation to real man we have to do with God and man, with God's action towards him, with the glory of God in his existence, with God's lordship over him, with man's action in relation to God, and with the service of God which man must accept in this relation. (1)

Granted this, where to continue in our search? When Barth drew out for us the six human characteristics which paralleled the six characteristics of the man Jesus, we saw (in Barth's un-condensed version in the Dogmatics) that he continually said

"... assuming that there is similarity between Him and us".2

How do we know that this assumption is valid? We must put on again, if we have ever taken them off, our Christocentric glasses. We are not to measure from men to the man Jesus but rather the other way. This assumption, says Barth, is validated by the message of the Bible. "Speaking of this one man, it says of all other men ... at least that they were and are creaturely beings whom this man is like for all His unlikeness, and in whose sphere and fellowship and history this one man also existed in likeness with them."3 We say, says Barth, deny it but we have in Jesus a human companion, neighbour and brother. A denial of this makes it no less true.4 It is true that our fellow men are -- or can be -- companions and neighbours as well. But in other men we do not meet that man whom we meet in the man Jesus for in the man Jesus we also meet God. This man is identically God. To be in fellowship with this man, therefore, is to be in relation to the
1 CP, III/2, p. 95

2 Ibid., pp. 73, 74

3 Ibid., p. 133

4 Cf. Maurice: Life I, p. 258. "... the condemnation of every man is, that he will not own the truth ..."
Other who is God. Jesus is the link or bridge between man and God. "Basically and comprehensively ... to be a man is to be with God. What a man is in this Counterpart is obviously the basic and comprehensive determination of his true being. Whatever else he is, he is on the basis of the fact that he is with Jesus and therefore with God."  

Maurice too recognizes this, that Jesus is the bridge between men and God. We have already seen traces of this in the Maurician passages and allusions we have looked at thus far and we shall find more of it in the following chapter. But we can also see it -- as well as a Maurician parallel to Barth's statement that the Bible is the source of our knowledge of the similarity between man and Jesus -- in the following. "... I accept ... the Bible proclamation of the One Person in whom God is at one with His creatures, in whom He can meet them and they can meet Him ... ."  

It is precisely because we are in relation to God through Jesus Christ that sin is what Barth calls an "ontological impossibility". Since we are in relation to God and since the priority and initiative within this relation come from God, to deny God is to deny ourselves. To be a (real) man is to be with God, it is as simply as that. Barth takes this one thought and amplifies it to considerable length.  

We shall later see, in the chapter on Maurice's idea of the Kingdom, the same premiss established: that real man, that is, man as God intends that he should be, is a citizen of the Kingdom and that man's sin consists in not claiming his citizenship. We will not find Maurice using the terms real and impossible. However,
1 CD, III/2, p. 135


3 CD, III/2, pp. 140 -- 150
this constitutes no difficulty in seeing the agreement between the two for Barth himself does not always use this same language. In his criticism of Brunner, for example, he makes a statement which sums up his thought about man in language which Maurice would easily have understood: he says "If man has his being in the Word of God, he can do only that which corresponds to the Word of God.". Furthermore, while Maurice does not use the word real, he does use reality in a sense very similar to Barth's. Are not the Barthian sentiments expressed above well (and not chronologically) reflected in the following from a letter of F.D. Maurice's to a friend?

I would wish to live and die for the assertion of this truth: that the Universal Church is just as much a reality as any particular nation is; that the latter can only be believed real as one believes in the former; that the Church is the witness for the true constitution of man as man, a child of God, an heir of heaven . . . . (2)

We can ask ourselves if we cannot equate real man with true constitution of man? Barth tells us elsewhere that real means, in effect, summoned. This notion that man, real or true man, is man summoned by God is also congruent with Maurice's concept of the Kingdom of God as we shall eventually see.

We have now arrived at an important stage of our search: we have a certain definition of real or true man, or, at the least, we have defined the limits within which we must operate. We have also seen thus far that there is a high degree of concord between the views of Barth and the views of Maurice with regard to the anthropological points we have touched upon. We are not, however, finished with the subject. We have yet to examine Barth's thought.
1 CD, III/2, p. 131
2 Life I, p. 166
3 CL, III/2, p. 150
in § 45. But for our purposes here we need not consider the rest of Barth's exposition in the subsection Real Man. The spiral moves ever inward, the argument is convolute and arranged with an order and symmetry which Maurice (without the faculty of precognition) could not have been expected to emulate. Barth speaks of history, of state, of act and responsibility, subject and object:¹ Maurice did not formulate his thoughts in this way, not even in this kind of way. Yet we are entitled to feel, as far as we have gone, that we have established yet more points of correlation regarding the nature of real man.

Before we move on to Barth's next section it would be wise (for the sake of following his argument clearly) to outline simply his final concluding points. We shall find no specific Maurician correlation for these.

1 As human life is a being in responsibility before God, it has the character of a knowledge of God.

2 As the being of man is being in responsibility before God, it has the character of obedience to God.

3 As the being of man is a being in responsibility before God, it has the character of an invocation of God.

4 As the being of man is a being in responsibility before God, it has the character of the freedom which God imparts to it. (2)

This brings us to the end of Barth's description of real man as the creature of God. We have seen so far that man is only real man as he is content to be, indeed, thankful to be, the creature of God. We have seen that man's freedom is freedom only to be the thankful creature of God. We have seen that man is only real man
1 OD, III/2, p. 157ff.

2 Ibid., pp. 176, 179, 186, 192
within the covenant which God has made with and for him. Now we must continue by asking what man is vis à vis man, how man's determination as God's covenant-partner is connected to his human life, his creaturely being. Therefore we must consider Barth's following two sections of § 45: Jesus, Man for other Men and The Basic Form of Humanity.
The Basic Form of Humanity:

Our present question is how far \( \text{man's humanity as his creaturely form} \) corresponds and is similar to his divine determination, his being as the covenant-partner of God. (1)

Barth opens § 45 with a section titled Jesus, Man for other Men. This section is parallel to the one we have previously seen, Jesus, Man for God: in these two we can see the bridging action of the man Jesus as Barth understands it. We have also briefly mentioned Maurice's view of this bridging action. Therefore we can plunge right into § 45 picking up Barth's reminders and warnings as we go.

In our search for an anthropology, Barth tells us again, we must found our anthropology on Christology, we must beware "platforms" and natural knowledge, we must look to the humanity of Jesus. And where do we find the humanity of Jesus? It lies in the fact, it is that, Jesus is man for other men. His humanity can and must be described in the proposition that he is man for man, for other men. The humanity of Jesus can only be described as fellow-humanity.

Now to this notion we shall not find an exact analogue in Maurice. There is in him no such precision which can debate the distinction between a man for man and a man for God. He would probably consider each to mean the other in any event. But is this not precisely Barth's meaning? Barth concludes by saying

... the inner relationship in this man is a relationship of clear agreement because His humanity ... consists in the fact that, as He is for God, He is also for man, for His fellows. (3)

If this be so we have a valid basis on which to take up our true question, the anthropological question. If we turn from the man Jesus to other men we cannot expect to find an exact congruence
1  CP, III/2, p. 206

2  Ibid., p. 208

3  Ibid., pp. 221, 222
between the humanity of Jesus and the humanity of men -- nor is there total dissimilarity. There is not total dissimilarity for we can call both Jesus and other men men. But there is not complete similarity because we can say of no other man but Jesus "... that from the very outset and in virtue of his existence he is for others". (We shall see that the most we can say of man is that he is with others.) We must attempt to find our way to an anthropology lying of necessity between these two poles of similarity and dissimilarity.

Because the man Jesus is man in fellowship with others and because we are not totally dissimilar from the man Jesus, we can say that we too are in some way in fellowship with others. Were we not, were we completely without fellows, or opposed to them, we would be fundamentally alien to the nature of the man Jesus and thus not true men. Men can ignore their fellows, or pretend to be against them but this does not mean that they are without them. Theological anthropology cannot seriously entertain the idea of man without his fellows. "It knows man well enough as the man of sin, but not as the man who actualises his creaturely nature in his sin, whom God has created for this actualisation."

We must, then, understand the humanity of man to consist in the determination of his being as a being with the other. The man who is not with his fellow is not (to use simple language) doing what God wishes him to do -- which is to be with the other. On the basis of what has gone before we can say, then, that the man who is not with his fellow is not real man. Earleth expresses this in several gripping sentences.
1. "CD, III/2, p. 222"

2. "Ibid., p. 243"

3. "Ibid., p. 228: Barth continues on the following page: "We have to rule out the possibility of a humanity without the fellow-man. Hence we must not discuss it." Do not suppose for a moment that Barth does not discuss it. Pages 230 -- 242 are spent discussing exactly this problem and with reference to Nietzsche."
This understanding of man means that "We describe humanity as a determination of human being." (determined by God as his covenant-partner). It means that "We describe humanity as a being of man with others." It means that "We describe humanity as a being of the one man with the other." Barth presses on to consider the meaning of the statement "I am." and the nature of the I-Thou relationship and concludes that these require that real man be man with his fellows, man in encounter. He continues by amplifying the nature of encounter and the various categories of encounter from the act of one man in looking the other in the eye to the gladness which is the secret of encounter.

All can be summed up to give us this:

Ontologically ..., we have to do with real man only when his existence takes place in this encounter, only in the form of man with his fellow man. (4)

That is our theological anthropology. That is the basic form of humanity.

It may seem almost too simple. But what has Maurice to say about it? We will not find Maurice using the notion of categories of encounter, nor Buber's I-Thou concept, and to a certain extent our argument for congruency will have to be an argument from silence. But only to a very limited extent. With regard to the idea that man is only man if and when he is with man we will find Maurice giving silent assent. It is implicit in The Kingdom of Christ, it is implicit in Maurice's whole concept of the Kingship of Christ. The expression is never as Barth puts it. But let us consider Barth's definitive statement again and compare it to what Maurice we have already seen.
1. CD, III/2, p. 243

2. Ibid., pp. 244 -- 248: obviously derived in part from Buber. It is interesting to note that Maurice uses Thou in quite a different way: see Kingdom I, p. 235 and also Life I, pp. 248 -- 249.

3. Ibid., pp. 256 -- 265

4. Ibid., p. 249
we have to do with real man only when his existence takes place in this encounter, only in the form of man with his fellow man. (1)

When we considered the six points about the nature of man we heard Maurice say that it is impossible for men to fraternise except in Christ. We have also heard him say that the truth is that every man is in Christ. The plain sense of these two statements is that men can fraternise, that their condition is such that they must do so, that they cannot fraternise except in Christ. Can we understand fraternise to mean the same as to encounter? On the basis of what we have seen and will see we can answer "Yes!".

We must dismiss, of course, any injunctions of Maurice's about loving one's neighbour and so on, a thousand well-meaning preachers would tell us no less.)

We can now sum up and consider where we have been led in this chapter. We have followed through the major aspects of Barth's anthropology and we have tried whenever possible to correlate Maurice's thought to it. The attempt, on the whole, has been successful. We have seen agreement on the subject of cosmologies and philosophical "platforms". We have seen that in effect both Barth and Maurice consider man himself to be a traitor to his own essential being. Concerning the six points about the nature of man we have found a high degree of congruence in the points which we considered and probably silent agreement concerning those which are to be left until later to be examined. We have heard each man say (each in his own way) that Jesus is the link or bridge between man and God, and that because we are in relation with God, to do God's will is the only way to be real (Barth) or true (Maurice) man. Finally, we have
1 CR, III/2, p. 249

2 Life I, p. 258

3 Ibid., p. 155
seen that real man (man in Christ) must be man with others in en-
counter (can and must fraternise).

This accomplishes the purpose of our second chapter. Now we
may stand the whole subject on its head, so to speak, and consider
Maurice's doctrine of the Kingdom.
CHAPTER III
THE KINGDOM OF GOD

That state, that city, Jesus said, was come -- was now within us, had we eyes to see. And it is come. Call it the Church, the gospel, civilization, freedom, democracy, association, what you will -- I shall call it by the name by which my Master spoke of it -- the name which includes all these, and more than these -- the kingdom of God. (1)

Introduction:

That doctrine of the Church to which Frederick Maurice clung most fiercely and which was most central in his thought was the Doctrine of the Kingdom of God. His first theological work -- he had previously written a now all-but-forgotten novel, Eustace Conway -- was titled The Kingdom of Christ and this title is explicit. We have already considered in some small degree Maurice's Christocentrism. Yet we shall not come fully to understand his idea of the Kingdom and of man's place in that Kingdom by considering this one work, The Kingdom of Christ, alone. We cannot proceed as we did when exploring Barth's anthropology: we cannot pick one work and follow it through.

And this for two reasons: it is neither possible nor useful. It is not possible because Maurice's theology is more diffuse even than Barth's; thoughts are scattered here and there. Maurice himself makes it clear in his own title that the Kingdom is only a collection of hints. We shall have to skip about culling ideas and insights as one picks daisies in an English meadow. We shall use the Kingdom and the Life and other works of Maurice's and gather what hints we can. We shall find too that there is a concise,
Alton Locke, Tailor and Poet by Charles Kingsley, Collins' Clear-Type Press, London & Glasgow, no date: first published in 1850, p. 438
if not entirely accurate summary in Charles Kingsley's novel, Alton Locke.¹

Nor would it be useful to attempt to work through one book or essay of Maurice's and correlate to it thoughts of Barth. To do so, or attempt to do so, would be methodologically tautological. Having already followed Barth's sequence and related to it some notions of Maurice's it would be a waste to put down Maurice's thoughts and assign Barthian citations to them. We would learn little more than we already have in the last chapter.

Rather we shall have to try a new way: to discover the global pattern of Maurice's theology and only occasionally remind ourselves of Barth. And to do this we shall have to try to disentangle Maurice's Doctrine of the Kingdom from various other sub-doctrines: e.g., his notion of the three great political truths -- Tory, Whig, and Radical --² or his concept of the fundamental conservatism of the State and of the communism of the Church.³ We need not embroil ourselves in these political and social considerations. But we can and will notice in passing that same emphasis which we have already seen: the Christocentric or Theocentric. "Starting then from the primary theocratic doctrine, from the proclamation of Christ the everlasting Word as King of Kings and Lord of Lords, I . . . ."⁴ This is Maurice's necessary preamble in a letter dealing with political matters. This is his necessary approach to all matters. We have seen this sturdy insistence before in our sketch of Barth's anthropology. This is the common point from which all parallels between Barth and Maurice spring.
Kingsley was a dear friend and great admirer of Maurice: Alton Locke was written partly to arouse sympathy for the Chartists and partly to show where, in terms of the Maurician theology of which Kingsley had drunk deeply, Chartism had gone wrong. Kingsley's appreciation of Maurice was misguided at some points particularly on the subject of Democracy: see F.D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology by Arthur Michael Ramsey, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1951, p. 100 & passim.

1 Life I, p. 485ff.

2 Life II, p. 8ff.

3 Life I, p. 485
However, in the light of the differences between the two men it is wise before proceeding to consider two notes of warning; one concerning Maurice's method and the other concerning his faith. We have spoken earlier of the method of the two men, more particularly of Barth's spiral approach. A comparative word on the theological method of Maurice will not be out of place now. If we can describe Barth's method as one of spiralling ever closer in to a centre, we could describe Maurice's procedure as a series of dashes from one periphery to the other, each radius rushing in to the truth and then emerging with the seemingly opposite statement. But when Maurice has worked round the circumference of any argument the centre becomes fairly well defined provided one hold all the arguments in tension. One discovers, however, that these "dashes from one periphery to the other" make Maurice extraordinarily hard to write about -- and even think about. Maurice is not to be laid out, as college students would have it, in point form. When this chapter was originally conceived headings were boldly set out: The Kingdom, Real Man, True Man, and so forth. These headings still stand but with Maurice to talk about one thing is to talk about all. On the one hand the paragraph of Kingsley's which opens this chapter is a perfectly adequate summary of Maurice. On the other hand, to get the full view, 360 radii so to speak, would require the re-production of all Maurice's work. Our task here must lie somewhere in between.

With this kept in mind we can move to the second warning: that concerning Maurice's faith. We are inclined, some of us, in this day in which it is announced that God is dead only half to believe
the Good News: we assent but often with the reservation that this Good News is not really here and now -- some other time or place perhaps. We are children of our day. But we shall never fully understand Maurice unless we recognize the immediacy of his belief in the reality of Redemption, the reality of the Trinity, the reality of the Kingdom, all truly here and now. It is this reality to which we have seen Kingsley's fervent testimony at the beginning of this chapter. It is this reality to which Maurice testifies when he says that we can only believe in the reality of nations as we believe in the reality of the Universal Church. It is the reality of these things for Maurice (and certainly in large part for Barth as well) which we must accept before we can understand his doctrine. Otherwise the man seems but a dreamer.

I have had the pleasure of teaching Maurice to seminarians. This experience has shown me that students generally are baffled by the utter seriousness with which Maurice holds first principles and doctrines. We have already seen some of those clear statements of faith which Maurice was so apt to make. Therefore, as we consider his doctrine, let us suspend whatever disbelief may be our customary companion in life and thought.
1. Life I, p. 166
Alton Locke:

Kingsley included in his novel, *Alton Locke*, a rather artificial chapter titled *The True Demagogue* in which he poured onto paper his vision of the Kingdom as he saw it and as he had learned it from Maurice. The discourse is put, in rather disjointed and contrived fashion, into the mouth of Eleanor, the "pattern countess" who is the "spiritual keystone" of the book.\(^1\) She tells Alton of the Kingdom which *is* and is not to be set up at all, and which is the only means to the peace and concord which he, a Chartist, has been seeking.

It is worth considering some paragraphs of this chapter since we will find capsule summaries of Maurice which will help us to grasp at the centre of Maurician thought. We have already seen one such paragraph on the presentness of the Kingdom. Let us consider further and then it will be easier to understand the place and nature of man in this Kingdom.

She spoke of Him as the great Reformer; and yet as the true conservative; the inspirer of all new truths, revealing in His Bible to every age abysses of new wisdom, as the times require; and yet the vindicator of all which is ancient and eternal -- the justifier of His own dealings with man from the beginning. She spoke of Him as the true demagogue -- the champion of the poor; and yet as the true King, above and below all earthly rank; on whose will alone all real superiority of man to man, all the time-justified and time-honoured usages of the family, the society, the nation, stand and shall stand for ever. (2)

In this concise summary by Kingsley we see much which is faithful to Maurice -- and a little which is pure Kingsley! But the first sentence touches -- as all Maurician theology must of necessity touch -- upon the inevitable primacy of Jesus. We see that political truths -- if they are truths! -- of whatever shade
See John Malcolm Ludlow: The Builder of Christian Socialism by N.C. Masterman, Cambridge, at the University Press, 1963, p. 132. While Kingsley was perhaps more to the left than Maurice, more involved with and likely to confuse democracy with the Kingdom, Ludlow was farther left still. His "democratic bile" was stirred by hearing the "basis of all democracy" enounced by Eleanor, the countess and aristocrat.

2 Alton Locke, pp. 428, 429
or colour come from Jesus. We see that all new truth and wisdom, like all old wisdom, is inspired by Jesus Christ. Therefore, again, we know that while we must bend our efforts to solve the riddle of man and of his problems, ultimately the only true starting point will be with Jesus. Jesus is the true Teacher, the true Demagogue, and from him all knowledge will flow and does flow. Though expressed by Kingsley in an emotional rather than a theological way this is a notion which we have already met in our comparison of Barth and Maurice.

We also see a hint of something which is more fully developed in Maurice than perhaps Kingsley knew: the progression from family through to nation and finally to man (mankind). Kingsley mentions family, society, and nation but does not develop the theme in as biblical and consistent a fashion as does Maurice. This theme is sufficiently important to return to later.

But first there is one more passage from Maurice's disciple which we ought to consider. In the same chapter Alton speaks of his faith in the idea of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and begs that his faith in this idea not be taken from him. Eleanor tells him (and his fellows) not to attempt to realise that idea for themselves. And why?

Because it is realised already for you. You are free; God has made you free. You are equals -- you are brothers; for He is your king, who is no respecter of persons. He is your king, who has bought for you the rights of sons of God. (1)

We need not concern ourselves for the moment with the question whether Kingsley is here attempting to justify democracy as God-given. The important and Maurician thought is the notion that we
1 Alton Locke, p. 435
are already free, have already been freed; that we are already equals, already brothers. We are brought back here to that section of Chapter II subtitled The Object of Theological Knowledge: man may be a traitor to his own essential being, man may have made himself impossible, but man is still in a certain relation (Maurice), man can break the covenant but not dissolve it (Barth). For we are not, in Maurice's view, awaiting redemption; it is already here. Man is already redeemed: regardless of political errors Kingsley had absorbed that great Maurician lesson. The nature of man as Maurice understood it was to be free in Christ, equal in Christ, to live as Christ lived. All else is a betrayal of true human nature.

This is a point which must be well and truly grasped. I have already spoken of the mystification of seminarians by this doctrine. Both Barth and Maurice can easily be misunderstood at this point in their anthropology, easily misunderstood because it is a question of holding two concepts together in tension. One can go too far in one direction or the other. For example, Alan Richardson, in his able little book titled The Bible in the Age of Science, takes Barth to task for anthropological inadequacies. He feels that Barth's reaction to Schleiermacher was good and necessary but that Barth has developed a false anthropology on which his theology hangs and on which, therefore, his theology falls. Richardson says that Barth "... starts from the assumption that fallen man is totally ignorant of God, that all his faculties, including his reason and conscience, are perverted, and that he therefore possesses no point of connection with God at all."1 "... man has no natural capacity for the knowledge of God."2 The point and problem is which man?
1 The Bible in the Age of Science by Alan Richardson, SCM Press, London, 1961, p. 92

2 Ibid., p. 93
Is fallen man real man? When Richardson accuses Barth in this terrible way, of what man are we to understand Barth to be speaking?

(This could, but need not, embroil us in the whole problem of natural theology to which Barth is opposed and which Maurice accepts to some degree without question. Perhaps Richardson, an Englishman, is more willing to embrace the notion of a natural theology through which man can somewhat know God. English "common-sense" theology has never quite forgotten Pelagius!)

There are, and this is putting it terribly simply, two possible men to consider. One is the fallen man, the natural man, the man who has, Barth says, no point of connection with God at all. The other is man as redeemed by Christ. Which is the true man? Which is man? This is the point at which our usual perspective traps us. We assume, we have to assume, (particularly in this day and age) that man means fallen man. But for Barth and Maurice the fallen man, the man who is ignorant of God, is not true man. He is something else called impossible or by some other epithet. But he is not true man. True man does know God, is redeemed. When Barth speaks of fallen man he is not speaking of true man.

It is a question of perspective, of emphasis. Has the work been wrought? The last paragraph of Kingsley which we considered was in a past tense. Has the work been wrought? Barth and Maurice feel it has. They are not, of course, so foolish as to deny the obvious: that men still injure each other. But it is not true man who does this. And even when man makes himself impossible he does not dissolve the covenant, he remains in some relation. This perspective is part of that generosity of each man of which I have spoken earlier.
Of course, this view will raise for us a problem: Barth and Maurice both make it seem that all men are true men albeit disguised under some impossibility or illusion. Is this then a universalist doctrine which they share in common? This particular question will have to be considered at length in a later chapter.

How could Maurice believe this sort of thing? How could he believe it so intensely as to convert friends to his view as Mr Kingsley was converted? How could he see true man while his eyes rested upon the villain before him? To see this at least through Maurice's eyes if not through our own we must pursue farther yet Maurice's doctrine of the Kingdom. We have already seen many hints both in Maurice's writing and in the little summaries given to us by Kingsley. Now we must thank Kingsley and leave him (until the last chapter) and try to say something more definite about the Kingdom.
The Kingdom:

What then is this Kingdom? What can we say of it which is any more orderly than what we have already heard Maurice saying? Before we consider the man who inhabits (whether he knows it or not) it we can say at least three things of the Kingdom. First of all, it is real. Here we can borrow one of Barth's favourite words, serious, and say that we must take this idea seriously: the Kingdom is real. We have already heard Maurice say that we can only believe any particular nation real as we believe in the reality of the Universal Church. The Kingdom is the great existing reality which lies behind all human society, human studies, human institutions and all truly human society and institutions are not to be made by men at all but already exist and are supported by a sure ground beneath them. The Kingdom is clearly among us and is not to be set up at all. Society and humanity are divine realities as they stand and not as they may become. And we know all this by the witness of the Bible which tells us not what we should be but what we are and to what we have been restored. This is the Kingdom of which we are (all) citizens. And it is because this Kingdom is real that acts of sin are not real, not true, in Barth's word, impossible. (Here we must not deceive ourselves any more than Barth and Maurice have deceived themselves: they know perfectly well that foul things happen and are done to men by men. But they know too that inasmuch as the Kingdom is real the sinful acts of men do not have that reality of that which God wills to exist.) An act of sin is impossible because Christ died to take away sin not simply to exempt any from punishment for sin. This is the first
1. Life I, p. 166


3. Witness to the Light, p. 158

4. Life II, p. 567
thing we can say about the Kingdom.

Tied to this first idea of the reality of the Kingdom is a second: that the Kingdom is all-embracing. Maurice understands the clause He descended into Hell to mean (whatever else it may mean) that there is nothing created which the Lord has not redeemed.\(^1\) Instantly we see again that problem of universalism raised for which we must wait until Chapter V. But here we can recognize the all-pervasiveness of the Kingdom. The man who is citizen of that Kingdom cannot, in Maurice's eyes, escape its dominion, travel beyond its thrall. We have no choice but to be, willingly or unwillingly, in the Kingdom. We can ignore our citizenship if we choose but it is still a fact. This then is the second characteristic of the Kingdom, that it reaches everywhere throughout the whole created universe and that no man can escape it.

Finally we can say about the Kingdom that it has (reasonably and naturally enough) a King. Maurice seems a little confusing at this point because he uses several and various titles to describe Jesus but there can be no doubt that King is one of his more frequently used ones.\(^2\) And even when his reference is to some other epithet the implication is very obvious: for example, when he calls Christ the Head of every man\(^3\) the notion of kingship is not very far away. Over the Kingdom and to the farthest corner of the created cosmos extends the reign and power of this King.

And therefore over men. We can now return to pursue our basic question: what kind of man is it lives in this Kingdom? What kind of man is it who, Maurice tells us, could not think, breathe, live a single hour except he were joined to Christ?\(^4\) We shall find in
1. Theological Essays, p. 162

2. Life II, pp. 243, 244; Life I, p. 485

3. E.g. Life I, p. 155; p. 258

4. Ibid., p. 155
Maurice no six points laid out as we have in Barth. But we can learn still more of this man who is the unescaping citizen of the Kingdom.
Family, Nation, Man:

We have already mentioned in Chapter II Maurice's organic concept of the development of family, nations, and man. I use the word organic (which is not in the least a Maurician word) because it is precisely the word (today) to describe Maurice's view. His understanding of the growth of revelation and redemption fits, as well he knows, the analogies of the vine and the mustard seed far better than the analogies of his nineteenth century mechanical instruments. For Christ is the head of a body not the teacher of a religion.¹

In the Kingdom Maurice speaks of the Spiritual Constitution of man: he says that the fact that men exist in families (which fact seems to disturb the inventors of systems) is a natural fact, a fact of relationship which men cannot alter. One can have a dog, choose to be a friend, but one is a son. It is most significant, Maurice says, that the covenant is made with the patriarch Abraham and his seed, that is to say, with a man as head of his family and, through him, with his family.² "That there is a God related to men and made known to men through their human relations, this was the faith of Abraham ..."³ This is the meaning of the covenant as Maurice understood it. Our relationship to God is interpreted to us by our human relations -- one can almost pun on the word -- and our capacity for fulfilling these relations arises from the acknowledgement of the higher relation. The important thing about our relations in family is that they are inescapable as the covenant relation with God is inescapable. And so Maurice says that the fact of family is the first sign of our spiritual constitution. Family: a relationship not into which we can enter by individual choice but which we are in by simply
1  Life II, p. 138

2  For this material see Kingdom I, p. 229ff. and especially p. 238ff.

3  Ibid., p. 240
being in it and from which there is no escaping.

Likewise the Bible teaches us that this family for which Abraham covenanted was to become and did become a nation. And what did the Jews learn in and of and from this nation? That a nation is exclusive -- but exclusive of what? Exclusive, Maurice says, of those who felt they had the right to pick and choose their own gods. The nation was the still larger sign that men were bound in relation. Through the nation men learned still more of that same lesson which they learned through the fact of family: that the covenant relationship was not something of this or that man's choice independently made. They learned rather that there was Law, that there was a King, an earthly King who could rule only so long as he ruled in accordance with the wishes of the King above. The Jews learned that power and authority were things from beyond themselves, that God was not someone who could be bought and sold and propitiated with burnt offerings. They learned that the relationships we have here are possible only because of the relationship we have above and that all relations here point to the one above. The facts of family and nation all pointed to and revealed the Divine King who works (primarily) through men.

And who became man.

As with family and nation so the ultimate revelation of the Kingdom in which not simply one family, not simply one nation, but the whole of mankind is included. Mankind is in an unescapable relation. We are brought back to the point which we saw in Chapter II: Barth says that man may break the covenant but he cannot dissolve it. So Maurice, though the words are different. "The truth is that every
man is in Christ; the condemnation of every man is, that he will not own the truth . . . .” This, Maurice tells us, is the great lesson of the New Testament. As the Old taught us of family and of nation so the New teaches us of the Kingdom. Though there is a difference of character and style in the writers of the New Testament yet each attests to the notion that Christ came to proclaim a Kingdom.

And of this Kingdom all men are citizens. What then is the nature of man? What is his true state? What we have seen thus far shows us that Maurice, in what I choose to call his organic view of family, the nation, and man, sees mankind to be in an unescapable relation with God which relation determines what the true nature of man must be. And with this we are coming near the end of this chapter for we have been brought back in full circle to those points and problems which we considered in Chapter II. This excursion into Maurice's thought will inevitably bring us back to the comparison we have seen before. It remains to us to consider only one thing further and once more: the nature of real man as we find it in Maurice. That will be our last part of the chapter on the Kingdom of God.
1. *Life* I, p. 155

Real Man, True Man:

The crooked line must not be made the measure of the straight, but the straight of the crooked. God must be declared as he is in himself. We must be shown what we are as he has constituted us in his Son before we learn what we are when we revolt from his constitution. (1)

Let us sum up a little to find out exactly where we are. We have seen in many places, not least of all in the passage above, Maurice's Christocentric approach. Here, as we have shown, his thought runs intently parallel to Barth's. We have also seen that Maurice's "anthropology" obliges us to start from Christ rather than from sinful man or from any other starting point: here again the parallel with Barth is obvious. Can we go farther and answer more precisely the question how we are constituted in God's Son? Yes, this question has also been answered for us: we know from Maurice that the true model of humanity is Jesus, that we are in him and like him, that we are meant to be like him, that he has made us like him. We know that we are free, that we are redeemed, that we are citizens of the Kingdom of Heaven. And all this in the present tense, not the future.

We can go a little farther still and say that Maurice clearly agrees with Barth on the basic form of humanity: that we have to do with real man only when his existence takes place in the encounter with his fellow man, that is, that it is impossible for men to fraternise except in Christ. Yet we cannot be completely sure that Maurice would ever have been orderly-minded enough to set down this one fact with a given priority attached. We cannot be as precise as Barth is precise in § 45 of the Dogmatics: we saw when we examined Barth's six points concerning the nature of man that while Maurice was in substantial agreement with most yet the agreement with some
1 An Introduction to F.D. Maurice's Theology, p. 169: Davies has taken the passage from Maurice's The Faith of the Liturgy and the Doctrine of the Thirty-Nine Articles, pp. 26 to 28, published in 1860. The passage has been in part italicized by Davies which italics I have dropped. The reader is invited to notice the considerable similarity between this passage and the one which opened Chapter I: Barth's whole anthropological method is contained in this one injunction.

2 CD. III/2, p. 249

3 Life I, p. 258
was an implicit one only.

Following then the comparison between the two men there is little more to say, yet we have seen enough to show the congruence. F.D. Maurice himself allows of no greater precision on the subject of the nature of man. True man is, has been, redeemed by Christ, the head of the race. What we find in Christ is what we should find in men were it not for that obscuring lie of sin.

I could believe that the Head of man had entered fully into the condition of every man, had suffered the temptations of every man, had wrestled with the enemy of every man; and that He had brought our humanity untainted and perfect through that struggle. And this because He never lost His trust in His Father, His obedience to His Father -- had never asserted independence as Adam did, as each one of us is continually doing . . . . And no man has a right to say, "My race is a sinful, fallen race," even when he most confesses the greatness of his own sin and fall; because he is bound to contemplate his race in the Son of God, and to claim by faith in Him his share of its redemption and its glory. (1)

But though tens of thousands of men live after the flesh, yea, though every man in the world were so living, we are forbidden by Christian truth and the Catholic Church to call this the real state of any man. (2)

This then is true man, citizen of the real Kingdom which is already here and now. With this we have completed the work of this chapter and therefore the large part of our work. The significant evidence is in. The remaining two chapters will show further congruencies but those congruencies are at a slight remove from the core of the work of Chapters II and III, the problem of the nature of man. Yet as we have gone on it has been convenient from time to time to refer two problems to future chapters: the problem of sin and the problem of universalism. Therefore we shall now turn our attention to these.
1. *Life II*, p. 408: italics in the original

2. *Life I*, p. 155: italics in the original; Cf. *CD*, III/3, p. 309: "How do we know, then, that our fellowship with Him is our true and natural state?"
CHAPTER IV

DAS NICHTIGE AND ETERNAL DEATH

Introduction:

In 1853 F.D. Maurice was made to leave his teaching position at King's College, London, where he held two chairs. The Council of the College had been for some time worried about the effect that Mr Maurice's association with the College might have on its public reputation. This fear on the part of the Council had started at the time of Maurice's association with Charles Kingsley and with Christian Socialism, and had grown steadily: nothing Maurice wrote eased the governing body's apprehension. With the publication of the Theological Essays the Council and the Principal felt they could act inasmuch as they understood the essays, more particularly the last essay, to be against the accepted teaching of the Church. Maurice was not in the least surprised; he had been expecting this. "I knew when I wrote the sentences about eternal death, that I was writing my own sentence at King's College."¹

The controversy, while it set the religious press buzzing in 1853, is not one which would startle many people today. We have bigger and better pike to fry. We need not concern ourselves with the actual controversy as such nor even with the philosophical implications of Maurice's doctrine; these are not of primary importance to our purpose. We shall, however, look a little into Maurice's teaching on this matter for there is considerable similarity between his thought and that of Barth in Volume III/3 of the Dogmatics. It is this similarity, in the light of our comparative title, that we must follow.
up. In considering the nature of man we must also consider that frontier beyond which he is no longer true man.

However, that there is similarity does not mean that there is a one-to-one congruence. We shall not find so much that Maurice's idea of eternal death is equal to das Nichtige but rather that it is contained within it. As usual, Barth has methodically set himself a larger scope and task. However, with his comprehensive view of sin and nothingness we shall find the usual implicit agreement in Maurice. We shall also find, as we have already found, certain particular areas of explicit agreement such as the relation between real death (Barth) and eternal death (Maurice).

We shall first look at Maurice's famous essay on eternal life and eternal death and attempt to bring out its main points in order to have some material to chew on. We shall then examine in summary fashion Barth's treatment of das Nichtige and see to what within it we can relate ideas and thoughts of Maurice's. Finally we shall attempt to pick up a few correlations. Therefore we move to Mr Maurice's essay.
Eternal Life and Eternal Death:

Maurice sets himself in his essay to answer the criticisms and objections which would be raised, he felt, by those who misunderstood the Church's teaching on the subject of punishment and damnation. While Maurice puts in the mouths of his critics several objections and gives his answers to them we need only concern ourselves with two problems. That is sufficient to give us the kernel of his thought.

First, there are many (Maurice thinks) who feel that the Church teaches a doctrine of everlasting damnation, of an endless period of suffering, awaiting those whom God has tried and found wanting. Some even suppose that this is a punishment imposed by God. Second, those who believe this idea feel that it is supported by the Bible inasmuch as the New Testament speaks more of eternal life and eternal death than does the Old Testament despite the fact that the New is supposed to be the testament of love. It appears to many that the Bible emphatically supports the idea that eternal punishment is part of the plan of God in the work of Jesus Christ.

Maurice answers these with his usual disarming simplicity. He gives us first of all a warning: we must not permit ourselves to understand the word *eternal* as used in the Bible to have different meanings depending on what it modifies. The plain, straightforward method of the Bible forbids this kind of interpretation. The word *eternal* in the New Testament ought to be understood first of all in reference to God. And then, having learned what the word means there, we can better understand it elsewhere. "Its use when it is applied to Him must determine all its other uses." If this is so
1 Theological Essays, p. 447
what meaning can we attach to the word when we speak of man's future life, future bliss, or future misery? Does it mean without beginning or end? No, because we are not (as God is) without beginning.

Furthermore, Maurice says, we should not try to understand the revelation of God in mere negatives, this is not the Bible's way. Surely the revelation of God tells us not that he is not this and not that but rather that he is -- is righteous, for example.

The eternal life is the righteousness, and truth, and love of God which are manifested in Christ Jesus; manifested to men that they may be partakers of them, that they may have fellowship with the Father and with the Son. This is held out as the eternal blessedness of those who seek God and love Him. (1)

Eternal life has, in Maurice's view, nothing whatsoever to do with time at all. It has to do with what Maurice calls a state, the state of being in fellowship with God.

And if we are taught in the New Testament that eternal blessedness is to have fellowship with the Father and the Son then surely it ought to follow that not to have and seek this fellowship, to set ourselves up in opposition to the Father and the Son, is eternal damnation. If we can say this last then we ought not to suppose that eternal will mean something else when coupled with the word punishment. "If it is right, if it is a duty, to say that Eternity in relation to God has nothing to do with time or duration, are we not bound to say that also in reference to life or to punishment, it has nothing to do with time or duration?" 2

If we cannot say that eternal life and eternal death have to do with time what can we say about them? They are, in Maurice's view,
1 Theological Essays, p. 449

2 Ibid., p. 450
states, to be found in the immediate now. (Some today might find a place for the word existential in a description of Maurice's intense feeling here.)

Every man who knows what it is to have been in a state of sin, knows what it is to have been in a state of death. He cannot connect that death with time; he must say that Christ has brought him out of the bonds of eternal death. Throw that idea into the future and you deprive it of all its reality, of all its power. (1)

Eternal life then, is simply the life lived in fellowship with God and eternal death is the state of being without that fellowship. These are states which we can certainly know while we are what the world calls alive: to what extent we know them after death and in exactly what form Maurice declines to say. His humility will not permit it nor is he that concerned. In a letter written at the time of the controversy Maurice lists fifteen points which sum up his thought on this question: the first six start with the words to say and the remaining nine with the words not to say.2 For example: "Not to say who has the Son of God because I do not know." The questions what happens to us after death and whether we go to some heaven or some hell are to Maurice of very little concern compared with the question of what our state or condition is now. Particularly are the questions about the future state offensive to him if they are coupled to the idea of endlessly prolonged time.

And with this idea of eternal life we circle back to concepts we have seen before: that true man is a citizen of the Kingdom, that man can break the covenant but not dissolve it, that men are still in a certain relation even when they deny that relation. We are also led to an idea which we have seen before but which we will have to explore
1 Theological Essays, p. 475: italics in the original

2 Life II, p. 20
further: that to sin is to be impossible, or, as Maurice puts it, that to sin is to attempt to assert our own independent existence which means that we lose all communion with our fellow men since we can fraternise only in Christ.

This idea of the impossibility of sin can be further amplified by considering two more salient points in this essay which Maurice sums up in one small line. He tells us that we must avoid that false teaching which asserts that Christ relieves us from the punishment for sin.¹ The two points are concerned with the nature of punishment and the nature of sin and of both these, Maurice feels, there can be a misconception.

We have already seen Barth's notion that sin is an ontological impossibility. Maurice seems, in his involved way, to have an apprehension of the same idea: sin is not, cannot be, a reality, not a reality of the same order as God's Kingdom. Rather sin is a lie which men make and believe.² Maurice does not call sin an ontological impossibility but nonetheless uses the same source as Barth to derive the same idea: sin is not real because Christ has conquered sin itself. Neither man, of course, asserts that sin is unreal; they both know too well that sin has its own terrible reality. But that reality is the reality of that which God does not will to create. We shall see when we consider das Nichtige that this lie of which Maurice speaks resembles Barth's concept of nothingness.

It follows from the above that there is no punishment for sin. If sin is not possible, if sin is a lie, if the state of sin is not the true state of man, then true man cannot and will not be punished for it. Certainly there can be no punishment in the sense of injury or

retribution inflicted by God according to some celestial scoresheet. Maurice says that men wish there were punishment because that would at least keep them in some sort of contact or relation with God. But we are not punished: there is something far worse than punishment and that something is simply to be left alone by God in our lie. "The thought of His ceasing to punish them, of His letting them alone, of His leaving them to themselves, is the real, the unutterable horror."¹

How nicely Maurice chose his words in unknown to us but unutterable is singularly apt. When man turns his face away from God and towards nothingness the horror is truly unutterable because of nothingness one can say nothing.

Maurice certainly says little about it. He does not define the whole area as neatly and definitively as Barth does and therefore it is to Barth we must now turn. As we do we shall see that the various Maurician hints which we have so far garnered -- the idea of man's true state, of the lie that men make, of the agony of being left to oneself -- fit like brightly coloured tiles into the mosaic of Barth's thought.
Das Nichtige: the Problem and Misconception:

"There is opposition and resistance to God's world-dominion."¹

This is the clear and straightforward way in which Barth introduces his examination of the problem of nothingness. That this statement is true we know and this opposition, this alien factor, which Barth calls nothingness, partakes of the nature of that which God does not will to create and sets itself up in opposition to God and his lordship. So much follows by definition. What more can be said initially of this opposition, this nothingness? It is not one of God's creatures nor can it be some other principle or power of existence since God is Lord over all. With these defining statements in mind -- the definition can be prolonged and is always fraught with paradox -- Barth has chosen to call this alien factor nothingness.²

There is, however, a problem as Barth points out: how to maintain, if God be Lord over all, both his holiness and his omnipotence? For if the opposition and alien factor is a creature of God then God is not holy. And if the opposition is some act or creation of mankind which God can only at best passively permit and observe then God is not omnipotent. In the face of this problem how can the lordship of God be understood? Here we must accept a warning from Barth, a warning which Maurice would heartily endorse, that all theological contentions are broken. Theological statements always fail the object they attempt to reveal. They are, in Barth's word, broken and necessarily broken and contentions about nothingness, as exemplified by our little problem above, reveal the focal point of this brokenness.³

It is precisely nothingness which constitutes the brokenness between
Barth knows and points out that objection may be taken to the word *is* in the question *what is nothingness*: see CD, III/3, p. 349.

Ibid., p. 293ff. "Theology can never form a system, comprehending and as it were 'seizing' the object." We have already seen the attitude of both Barth and Maurice to systems: in the light of the immediate argument consider the following passage from Maurice. "We do want . . . to learn . . . not how we may define God (define God! Repeat the words to yourself, and think how terrible they are), but that He is . . . .": Life II, p. 447
man and his Creator, it is nothingness which makes it impossible
for us clearly to apprehend God because it is nothingness which ob-
scures the relationship between God and man. Our knowledge comes,
of necessity, from beyond the break and as such is broken, yet at
the same time shows the existence of the break which is neither de-
erved from the goodness of God nor from the goodness of true man.
Therefore theological thought and contention must always be broken
and it is bearing this in mind that we consider with humility the
problem of the apparent conflict between the holiness and the omni-
potence of God. In other words Barth feels that we need not be too
distressed by a lack of formal propositional solution to this pro-
lem.

It may seem here that Barth has hedged a little: no matter. Our
concern in the first place is not with this particular problem and
we have already seen enough of Maurice to know that he is inclined
to hedge in exactly the same way. What is far more important in
Barth's exposition is his explanation of the break (which is nothing-
ness) and of the necessarily fragmented nature of our theological
statements in consequence. Having grasped this much we can return
to our basic problem and ask ourselves about the nature of this op-
position and resistance which is nothingness.

In pursuing this problem we must avoid a misconception of what
nothingness might be. We must not permit ourselves, Barth tells us,
to confuse nothingness with the negative, or left-hand, or shadowy
side of creation. ¹ It is true that in creation there is darkness,
there is decay, there is obscurity, but these, though they seem to
point to nothingness, are within the creation. They are balanced,
CD, III/3, p. 296 for these terms
and more than balanced, by light and growth and clarity. While darkness and decay may seem to point beyond themselves to nothingness yet they ought not to be identified with nothingness for they are creatures which God saw fit to create and as such they are very good. We cannot permit ourselves, even in the face of the Lisbon earthquake, to identify this darker side of creation with das Nichtige.

Particularly must we avoid this confusion since nothingness will easily and gladly masquerade under the name of the dark side of creation. When this happens we will fail to recognize the enemy for what it is, we can believe it to have some relation with and to the good side of creation and then even start to think of it as good in itself. Thus, as we shall see later on, we can misunderstand grievously the nature of real sin, real evil, and real death. Yet one of the ways in which nothingness operates is precisely under the form of the dark side of creation. This is of its nature and essence. Nothingness deceives us and we permit ourselves to be deceived and we deceive ourselves. Therefore we must ask ourselves how we can gain a true knowledge of nothingness.
Das Nichtige: Knowledge and Reality:

It will come to the reader as no surprise that Barth maintains that there is only one possible and true source for our knowledge of nothingness -- the knowledge of Jesus Christ. In and through Jesus Christ we can see that God spoke to and conquered that which was and is antithetical not only to God's creation but to God himself. Nothingness, when viewed from our human standpoint, can appear and does appear as something relative, something which may be a thing among others. But nothingness viewed from the standpoint of the Incarnation of God in Jesus Christ can be seen as that which is absolutely other, that which God only can master and has mastered. In the life and work of Jesus Christ we see that thing which is nothingness revealed in the light of the victory which God has won over it, a victory which for us is the hope of our own victory. Since it is our hope merely, since we must always fear and need always fear the evil work that nothingness can thrust upon us, we can and do confuse ourselves and see nothingness as a thing among others. We can and do see it as the darker side of creation. But in the knowledge of Jesus Christ we can see it clearly as that which God does not will to be.

Further, in this same light we can see precisely that man's sin and guilt lie in his yielding to that nothingness. We can see that when man gives a place in his breast to that to which God is utterly opposed, and indeed has conquered, he fills himself with nothingness. He permits it to participate in his life and in so doing permits the participation of that which God does not will to create to act in his life. This is the true nothingness which is quite distinct from
1 CD, III/3, p. 302ff.
the darker side of creation. Yet without the revelation of the distinction between the dark side of creation and true nothingness which revelation is given us in Jesus Christ we could never perceive the difference. We would relativize our sin and guilt claiming human limitation or natural weakness. But since it has been revealed to us what true man is we can know, through Christ, that we are prey to the work of nothingness, and not prey only but also agents in the activity of nothingness. In the face of Jesus' love and grace we can see that there is not, nor can there be, any explanation, excuse, or justification which we can offer for our opposition and resistance to the graciousness of God.

Let us at this point stand back a little and take a fresh look at Barth's thought thus far. The primary insult offered by nothingness is to God. This is why it is in God, that is, in Jesus Christ, that we can see the battle and the victory so clearly. It is because the insult is offered primarily to God that it is in Jesus Christ only that we can see it. However, while the insult is to God, the primary assault of nothingness is on man and results in sin. But these two things alone do not exhaust the work of nothingness: nothingness results not only in sin but also in real evil and real death and, Barth tells us, in our affliction by a real devil in a real hell. Some of these further consequences of nothingness we shall have to consider in our comparison with Maurice but we shall reserve our discussion of that for a moment. First let us see what else Barth tells us about nothingness which will be useful in our pursuit.

In Barth's fourth section of his treatment of das Nichtige he discusses the reality of nothingness. He sums up, makes enumerated
1 CP, III/3, p. 310
1 CP. III/3, p. 310
lists, recapitulates his lists in miniature within the lists, and finally reassesses all again in four paragraphs at the end. Our purpose will permit us, however, to compress his score of pages into one: therefore let us move directly to those final paragraphs.

1 We must say of nothingness (Barth tells us) first and emphatically that it can be understood and seen only in Jesus Christ. Further, it can be understood in Christ because it has already been conquered in him. The reality of nothingness lies in the fact that it is the enemy of God which has already been seen, recognized, and routed. It has been deprived of continuity which is Barth's way of saying that the verb is cannot be applied to it in precisely the same way as we apply it to God's good creation. The most important recognition here, however, is the first: that nothingness can only be understood in Christ.

2 In view of the above no true power or significance is to be attributed to nothingness despite the evil and corruption which we do see about us. Whatever power nothingness may now have is fragmentary for it has been conquered once for all in Christ. "... its dominion, even though it was only the semblance of dominion, is now objectively defeated as such in Jesus Christ. What it still is in the world, it is in virtue of the blindness of our eyes..."¹

In sum, nothingness no longer has any real power.

3 In view of the above we can say that whatever semblance of validity nothingness may yet have must be within the power of the victor who has conquered it. When all shall be revealed we shall see clearly that the destruction of nothingness has been completed: until then God sees it as good that we should live confronted by
1 CD, III/3, p. 367
this semblance. We have already noted that Barth and Maurice are naturally aware of the terrible influence that nothingness (sin, eternal death) can have. Barth reminds us that this influence is a semblance only, because nothingness is really in the power of him who has conquered it. In sum, God permits that we live confronted by this semblance of a beaten thing.

4 Shorn of all power nothingness continues to be in its semblance of power. But being within the power of the victor who has crushed it we can say that nothingness, despite its resistance and opposition, is forced to serve God despite the fact that it may and does not will to. Nothingness continues to exist in this conquered form and reminds us of what it used to be and of, therefore, the gratitude which we owe to God who has conquered it. In brief, nothingness must and does serve God.
Maurice and das Nichtige:

What we have already seen in this chapter shows a high degree of similarity between Barth and Maurice regarding their understanding of eternal death and nothingness respectively. The whole flavour of the discussion of each makes this apparent. But recognition of this is not enough; we must now examine more closely some of the major points of contact and a fine starting point will be the four paragraphs which we have just abstracted from Barth.

1. With the first point, that nothingness is to be known and understood only through Jesus Christ, we know that Maurice agrees. He derives this knowledge from the same source as Barth though his approach is more oblique. The initial building-block, of course, is that Christocentrism which is the point of departure for all knowledge. Then Maurice brings us to the recognition that the meaning of the word **eternal** is to be understood as it is used of God. He goes on to say that eternal life is simply that fellowship with God within which we are and can be true men and to say that our knowledge of eternal life is derived from Christ. Since eternal life is that fellowship within the Kingdom and the want of it is eternal death we can say that Maurice feels that we derive our knowledge of eternal death also from the revelation of Christ though in a negative sense. He agrees with Barth that we can only recognize the enemy because the victory has already been won: eternal death is the want of that fellowship which has been revealed to us as our true state. Had we not that revelation of eternal life which we have been given we would not and could not recognize the other.

It is true that Maurice does not speak of a new sense in which the
See Theological Essays, p. 183. "I believe that Christ came into the world expressly to reveal the kingdom of Heaven, and to bring us into it. He and His Apostles speak of it as the kingdom of righteousness, peace, joy in the Holy Ghost. They present Righteousness, Love, Truth, to us as substantial realities, as the Nature of the Living and Eternal God; manifested in the Only-begotten Son; inherited by all who claim to be made in His image. And since they reveal Heaven to us, they of necessity make known Hell also. The want of Righteousness, Truth, Love, the state which is contrary to these, is and must be Hell."
word *is* must be understood, he does not say explicitly that eternal death has been deprived of continuity or perpetuity. But we shall see as this chapter progresses that Maurice feels, as does Barth, that the state of eternal death is a shadowy, half-real state.

2 That no true power or significance is to be attributed to nothingness Maurice knew full well. That is why he says of those who sin that they believe a lie, that they make a lie. That this lie still has power of some kind over man he admits but asserts that it is nonetheless a lie. The truth is that Christ the King has conquered and rules now his Kingdom. Barth's phrase about the blindness of our eyes is reminiscent of Maurice's notion that men will not own the truth.

3 On this point and the next Maurice is a little more ambiguous though there is still evidence to support our main argument. Maurice certainly does recognize that the powers of evil and of the evil one have been conquered by God: this is the whole burden of the concept of the redemption of all. Whether he would go as far as Barth and say that these powers are in the *control* of God, held in God's hand, so to speak, is another question. Maurice is very conscious of the pressure that the devil puts on him and seems to feel that the devil has some sort of freedom or autonomy to exercise this pressure. But he rejoins Barth as we see in the previous point above: that which puts pressure on him is *no-thing*. Maurice cannot call the devil a thing yet he hesitates to call him a person.† God controls any thing that *is*; that which is *nothing* (perhaps) he may not control despite having conquered it. This is as close as we may safely say that Maurice comes to Barth in this connection.
In connection with this and following paragraphs it will be useful to consider the following passage from Maurice: *Life II*, p. 403. "The evil spirit speaks to me as a person, tempts me to think that I am not a person, tries to reduce me into a thing. I should never dream of calling him a thing. What then do you require of me? I believe in nations not in nationalities, in persons not in personalities . . . . Mr. Hall, the Baptist preacher, was once accosted by one of his confrères: "Sir, do not you believe in the devil?" "No, sir," he answered; "I believe in God. Do not you?" Now he had an intense feeling of the devil as his personal and constant enemy; but he kept his belief for his everlasting friend."

The devil is in some sense a person or can act like one yet he is not a person in the sense that one can believe in him. Elsewhere Maurice says that the devil "If he is an evil will . . . must, I think, be a person." The words I think should be taken advisedly for in this passage Maurice says that he cannot tell us what the devil is by theological arguments but can only tell us what he feels: see *Life II*, p. 21.
To the recognition by Barth that God sees it as good that we should live confronted by the semblance of the reality of nothingness we have no precise Maurician parallel. Maurice admits, as one must, that we still have real sin and evil and death to contend with. He asserts that their power has been stripped from them but knows that they are certainly in some sense still with us. He admits, as we have seen, the reality of the devil, the tempter who tries to encourage him not to be a person, that is, a true man. Therefore he admits that eternal death, though conquered, is still in some form at large, so to speak, and still able to work evil in any who will permit it. But while he makes these admissions and agrees clearly that the semblance of the reality of nothingness is still at large we cannot know that he would think that God sees this confrontation with us as good. It is implicit, of course, in the whole idea of God's lordship and Maurice would probably agree with Barth here. But we have no proof-text.

Growing out of this last thought is another, that nothingness or the devil or evil, while existing in their semblance of power, nevertheless serve God. This is a point to which no firm Maurician evidence will speak. What little direct evidence there is is so conflicting as to make it seem almost as if Maurice were offering several different points of view. The best we can say here is that he admits the reality (of some sort) of eternal death and admits that it is conquered. If to be conquered by God means to serve God, well and good. Maurice will tell us no more about this idea of service. However, if asked the question in the negative he would probably give Barth's answer: that is, if we said that all does not serve the King and Victor he would disagree.
2 In this connection but not directly to this point Maurice says the following of the devil. "The Word upholds his existence, not his evil." (Life II, p. 21) Can we understand uphold to mean control and make serve? I think not. Maurice distinguishes between the devil's existence and his evil in a way that Barth would not. Maurice also fails to suitably "demythologize" the devil as Barth would have us do: see CD, III/3, p. 519ff.
We have seen, as we have seen before in other chapters, that when we sum up Barth's thought on a given subject we can find explicit Maurician correlation on most points and implicit agreement on the rest: so it is here on the four paragraphs related to nothingness. But we have not yet said the last word for there is more of Maurice which we can use to drive home the nails of our principal contention.

With the basic principle that the alternative to living as true man in fellowship with God is to be confronted, assailed, and even invaded and permeated, by nothingness Maurice soundly agrees. We have already seen and said that the term nothingness as used by Barth would correspond chiefly to the Maurician notion of a lie which men make and believe (and which leads them to eternal death). Much of the argument is now behind us but we can ask ourselves whether, if our argument is not correct, Maurice would permit himself to write such lines as these.

This condition I have made for myself; this state of independence, this fleshly Adam life is no state at all; it is a lie. In that I cannot please God. It is as impossible as that lying should please the God of Truth, as that enmity should please the God of Love. (1)

A man has no right to believe a lie. Sin leads him to do it; sin brings him into a condition of mind in which a lie seems truth to him. (2)

We can disregard Maurice's casualness with words, in this instance the word state. We have seen him use the word state before in reference to eternal death; now he says that eternal death, or the lie of which he speaks, is no state at all. No matter, the point remains that this lie as Maurice describes it is an exact equivalent of Barth's nothingness. It can be described in many ways all of which will seem somewhat paradoxical but it is nonetheless there: call it nothingness, a lie, eternal death, these are all of that nature which God does not
1. Life I, p. 156
2. Kingdom I, p. 289
will and which drags us away from true manhood and out of the Kingdom. A man who ventures into the areas circumscribed by these terms becomes untrue man, absurd, a participant in nothing. Had Maurice thought about the problem less poetically and more ontologically he would have happily agreed with the Barthian contention that sin as such is impossible. For there is no being as such in a lie.

We have seen Maurice's subjective and personal fears of the devil and we have wondered whether or not he assigned true personality to him. We must not deceive ourselves; Maurice does seem to assign some sort of personality or personhood to the devil, which, inasmuch as the devil shares in nothingness, would seem to contradict Barth. (Yet Barth has spoken of nothingness as having a will.) But in line with the equation we wish to draw between nothingness (and all it implies) and the lie of eternal death (and all it implies) let us consider this.

It was not a duty, but a terrible necessity, which led men of the old world to speak of Hades. They did not believe in it; there was nothing to believe. (1)

Does this not make it absolutely clear, despite the vagaries of Maurice's language, what is meant by eternal death? This confusing phraseology of Maurice's in which he seems to regard the devil as a person yet insists that we cannot believe in Hades nor yet in the devil is a sure indication that he is trying to describe to us that half-way or shadowy reality which nothingness has. For Maurice is caught as we all are caught (including Barth) in the terrible problem of trying to describe that which both is and is not.

There is one final point which will show clearly the parallel between Barth and Maurice and that regards the similarity between their respective descriptions of eternal death and real death. The one thing
Theological Essays, pp. 179-80: italics in the original
we would have to show first of all is that neither of them means what is known nowadays as death: biological death, the cessation of biological, physical life. Yet neither of them does. We have seen already that Maurice describes eternal death as the loss or absence of the fellowship of God, the loss or absence of eternal life which is a timeless thing. Eternal death is, as we also saw, a timeless thing. Inasmuch as it has nothing whatsoever to do with time it cannot have to do with biological death which is a material thing rooted in time.

Can we find the same distinction in Barth? Surely, it is no less clear though spoken of less, perhaps. When Barth speaks of real death he is no more speaking of biological death than Maurice. Biological death may be part of the dark side of creation but this is not what Barth calls real death. It cannot be or he would not warn us not to describe real death as “rest in God” which he does when warning us of the dangers of the misconception of nothingness. Biological death, being part of that darker side of creation which God nonetheless sees as good, would (and does) come under God’s care and protection and could, perhaps, be described as “rest in God”. But this is not what Barth is talking about. Rather by real death he means that which he has mentioned in connection with nothingness: real sin, real evil, and real death. And this real death is the same as the eternal death of which Maurice speaks.

Nor is it a mere matter of dying as the natural termination of life, but of death itself as the intolerable, life-destroying thing to which all suffering hastens as its goal, as the ultimate irruption and triumph of that alien power which annihilates creaturely existence and thus discredits and disclaims the Creator. (2)

Real death is one of the consequences of nothingness in Barth’s methodology. With Maurice it is harder to know what takes precedence over
1. *CD, III/3*, p. 300

what, whether the lie is contained within eternal death or vice versa. But of this we can be sure: that real death and eternal death are both the devastating signs and results of that turn away from God which is evil and sin.

This, which is summed up under the headings of eternal death, nothingness, evil, sin, the lie, is the frontier on the brink of which Maurice and Barth see man to be. True man is not of this but is ever confronted by it. Yet while under this dolorous bane we can turn and look in the other direction. Therefore we shall consider next and last that notion that perhaps all men are (or will be) saved.
CHAPTER V
APOKATASTASIS

Introduction:

We come now to a field of thought far more joyous than that which we contemplated in the last chapter: it is now our task to consider, as we said at the outset, the extent to which each of our two theologians dares proclaim a doctrine of apokatastasis, of universal redemption. We shall look at this because much of what both Barth and Maurice have to say implies that such a doctrine is valid. They tend to say what they say in the same way too. They both seem to feel that the love of God is invincible, must eventually triumph, that all shall be (or have been) saved, that the state described as the true one of true man is the state all shall enjoy. It is far from them to describe the happiness and joy of serving God in terms which imply that only some can share it. Rather, with that generosity of spirit which was mentioned in the introduction, they seem quite cheerfully to talk as if they were speaking of all mankind.

And so indeed they are. We can find, we have seen already, innumerable statements which not only indicate this but virtually assert it directly. This is the direction and bias of both men. Barth, in his letter to the 1949 meeting of the Convention of Reformed Ministers, wrote that it is much more advisable “to preach a quickening gospel” at the “risk” (of the error relative to apokatastasis) “than to preach a law which kills without this risk.”1 Both Weber and Hartwell raise the question whether Barth’s position, particularly in Volume II/2 of the Church Dogmatics, does not lead to a doctrine of apokatastasis.2 Barth himself asks whether his position does not lead to a doctrine

2 Ibid., p. 101 and The Theology of Karl Barth, p. 110ff.
of universalism and warns us not to attempt to limit the loving-kindness of God. And the same emphasis is no less apparent in Maurice. We have only to cast our minds back to some of the passages we have already quoted from him to see it. When he says that every man is in Christ or that Christ came to conquer sin rather than exempt any from punishment his direction is already becoming clear. And as we progress we shall see more statements of this kind.

At this point, however, there is a quarrel which might be raised which we must avoid. It could be cheaply said that since true man is the redeemed man, the saved man, that by definition it follows that all men (i.e., the only true ones) are saved. From the discussion on Richardson in the chapter on the Kingdom this notion might be thought to follow. If so, we must look again: Barth and Maurice are not saying tautologically that the true men are the true men and that the others can go hang. There are no others. Not from the first. Not in the intention of the Creator of all. Barth and Maurice are simply talking about the basic, original, primal, first nature of man as created. That nature is the one of which they speak. That nature is the one intended from the first. They simply will not allow, as Ramsey points out about Maurice, sin and the fall to be the basis of theology. They are going back beyond that when they look for the nature of true man. They are moving to the true starting point which is in Christ.

Having reasserted that both our men support a doctrine of apokatastasis we must now contradict and say that ultimately it is not so. We shall find that in the final analysis neither goes so far as to say flatly that the love of God must conquer every single person. Their
1. *The Humanity of God*, pp. 61-62

2. Charles Kingsley clearly espoused a notion of the universal redemption of mankind though he was less subtle than Maurice and did not realize so clearly the need to qualify even this: see *Alton Locke*, p. 439 and *passim*.

(cautious and reasonable) position might be expressed in this way: that God wills to save and does save all men but that some men may choose to damn themselves.

So to look for the universalist statements will be our first task and then to disabuse ourselves of the idea that each man dares assert universalism completely will be our second, and final, task. With that last sobering note of recognition our labour of comparison will be ended.
The Redemption of All:

The various statements which Barth and Maurice make which show so strongly their bias in the direction of universalism can be made to fall (more or less) into several groups or classes. The first, and most obvious, class of statement which we can consider is that which speaks of men or mankind as if one integral unit was involved. (And if we have read Chapters II and III aright so it is.) By way of example we can look at the following:

... God has redeemed mankind ... (1)
... the Church must ... fulfill its witness of a redemption for mankind ... (2)
... Christ is the Redeemer of Mankind ... (3)

He is all of these as the Reconciler and Redeemer of the whole world. (4)

Examples are nearly endless. It might, however, be argued that men or mankind in these instances simply mean most men or those who live according to the Word of God or some such. Therefore we shall move on to consider other thoughts and sentences in which this particular form of use is not predominant. In leaving this kind of example, let us keep two things in mind: that by sheer weight of numbers these statements surely indicate the direction of thought involved and also that these statements are really meant despite the paradoxical existence of das Nichtige.

Avoiding the possible weakness of the statements we have just seen above are those in which it is made explicitly clear that all men or mankind mean precisely all men. Barth makes the matter a little clearer when he says that

On the basis of the eternal will of God we have to think of
1. *Life II*, p. 16: italics in the original


4. *The Humanity of God*, p. 64
every human being . . . as one to whom Jesus Christ is Brother and God is Father . . . . (1)

Maurice speaks to this with equal clarity:

Our baptism is the simplest and fullest witness of a redemption which covers and comprehends those who are not baptised. (2)

The sense of statements such as these matches precisely the anthropological development which we have seen in earlier chapters. The discussion of the nature of man starts not with man, nor with sin, but with the Creator and his plan and intention for mankind, for all men everywhere and of every condition. This is a natural and necessary correlation to Barth's six points concerning the nature of man. In The Humanity of God, written nearly a decade after the six points, Barth goes so far as to say that the human spirit is naturally Christian. This is what the human spirit was created for, therefore this is what it is. What we have already seen of Maurice shows that he would concur here. And this suggestion, that the spirit of man is naturally Christian, leads us to the final and most emphatic class of statement supporting universalism.

What we have already seen of Maurice shows that he would concur here. And this suggestion, that the spirit of man is naturally Christian, leads us to the final and most emphatic class of statement supporting universalism.

We have met before that passage in Maurice in which he tells us that the condemnation of every man is that he will not own the truth. What truth? That every man is in Christ. (Maurice almost makes it seem as if it were some heavenly gnosis that differentiates the Christian from the non-Christian or the "saved" from the "unsaved" but we can skirt this problem of "salvation by epistemology" as not central to our purpose.) Let us compare with this Maurician conceit a passage from Barth and marvel at the similarity of expression and concept:

Thus the so-called "outsiders" are really only "insiders" who have not yet understood and apprehended themselves as such. (6)
1. The Humanity of God, p. 53: italics in the original

2. Witness to the Light, p. 105: taken by Vidler from an article by Maurice in Macmillan's Magazine, April, 1860, p. 424: the article is titled "The Revision of the Prayer Book and the Act of Uniformity".

3. The Humanity of God, p. 60

4. Life I, p. 155

5. In connection with this problem and the apparent unreality of sin see F.D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology, p. 70.

6. The Humanity of God, p. 59
This is the most overt and clear kind of universalist claim that Barth and Maurice will make. But they are not shy of making it. Yet from this point on, and indeed, even within this point, there is a necessary note of caution. We must, despite all the truth of the claims made this far, include that paradoxical negative of nothingness which we met in the last chapter. Therefore, having passed our apogee, we must slant earthwards once again.
Apokatastasis and das Nichtige:

There is no need for us to peruse in depth the Barthian doctrines of the elect and of the rejected found in Volume II/2 of the Church Dogmatics. That would be a study in itself and in any event there are no tidy Maurician parallels to be found there. Rather we shall stay with our two men where we left them, that is, with the idea that it is God's intention that the totality of men should be saved. Alas, while this is true yet we cannot say with certainty that the totality will be saved. Let us re-examine those same two citations from Barth and Maurice with which we closed the last section.

In those marvellously congruent passages is also contained the warning which tells us that we have passed the peak of the affirmation that all will be saved. Barth continues his passage (which we have just seen above) by saying

On the other hand, even the most persuaded Christian, in the final analysis, must and will recognize himself ever and again as an "outsider." (3)

There is a sense in which all men are damaged, or, put more properly, are in the constant danger of being damaged by the ravages of nothingness. This is why Maurice, in the parallel passage to the one we have taken from Barth, covers and protects himself by using the word every: the condemnation of every man is that he will not own the truth. Contained within the joyous and bold affirmative of Barth and Maurice is also this negative. While all that has been outlined in previous chapters about the nature of man is true yet there is a sense in which "... man no longer knows what it means to be truly human." Man is always in contact with that frontier with which nothingness confronts him.
1. *CP*, II/2, pp. 421-422


3. *The Humanity of God*, p. 59

The matter is even more dangerous and grave than it is already
made by the confrontation at every instant with nothingness which
is the condition of all men. For despite the intention of God to
redeem or save all there may be some who will resist that intention,
embracing nothingness instead. Maurice knows this: despite his gen-
eral optimism he refuses to assert categorically that no-one can or
will resist God.

I ask no one to pronounce, for I dare not pronounce myself,
what are the possibilities of resistance in a human will to
the loving will of God. There are times when they seem to
me . . . almost infinite. (1)

He soberly admits that he does not know² and there the matter rests
with him.

This admission, however, that Maurice cannot ultimately embrace
universalism, does not invalidate all that has gone before.³ The
whole structure which we have built up in this paper still stands and
Maurice himself can give us an excellent summary of it.

But what is it to walk after the flesh? It is to walk as if
we were separate from Christ, when we are not separate from
Him, when we are united to Him. It is to set up a self apart
from Him, apart from our fellows, when He has claimed us as
one with Him, as one with our fellows. Here is, no doubt, the
great contradiction. Only let us remember that it is a contra-
diction, the contradiction of a fact. Evil is not our state;
good is our state; that for which God has created and redeemed
us; evil is the denial of that state. (4)

For great contradiction we can substitute the word lie of which we
have seen so much before. There may be, Maurice reluctantly admits,
some who pursue this lie, this nothingness, to their eternal death.
He hopes not and fervently prays not. But he cannot easily say that
all shall inherit eternal life. And with this we have answered an-
other of those questions which we asked in the Introduction; answered
it in regard to Maurice, at least. But what of Barth?
1. Theological Essays, p. 476: Maurice dislikes the conclusions he is forced to and goes on to say, "But I know there is something which must be infinite. I am obliged to believe in an abyss of love which is deeper than the abyss of death: I dare not lose faith in that love. I sink into death, eternal death if I do. I must feel that this love is compassing the universe. More about it I cannot know. But God knows. I leave myself and all to Him.". Here Maurice is speaking more from his great and passionate faith than from a theological premise. For a cooler approach on his part see the following note.

2. We have already cited one of Maurice's little rules for himself: here is that one, and two more which make the point plain. "Not to say who has the Son of God, because I do not know. Not to say how long any one may remain in eternal death, because I do not know. Not to say that all will necessarily be raised out of eternal death, because I do not know.": see Life II, p. 20.

3. For a discussion and denial of Maurice's universalism see F.D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology, p. 49.

4. Life II, p. 560: italics in the original
We shall find exactly the same answer in the case of Barth. Of course, we know that in the final analysis Barth cannot support a doctrine of universalism. We know this not only because Keber tells us so,¹ because Hartwell tells us so,² but also because Barth himself tells us so.³ But what is important here is not that Barth holds this position but the way in which he arrives at it; the way in which he structures all his theological thought on the premiss that God wills to save all, the way he speaks as though this were indeed what must happen, and the way in which he is reluctantly obliged to confess that this is not necessarily what will happen. In all this he is very like Maurice as we have seen.

Let us consider yet one more passage from Barth. In speaking of theology he says that

Its presupposition and occasion consist in the fact that the commerce between God and man indeed concerns all men, in that in Him, namely, in Jesus Christ, the most personal affairs of them all are treated and the life and death of them all are decided. (4)

The language of Maurice is echoed in this passage. We have indeed discovered that the commerce certainly involves all men; Maurice (and Barth) have been hammering this lesson at us for the last eighty-odd pages. But can we say that of necessity all men are saved? The hint and answer are found in the word death above: we cannot presume that Barth is here speaking of merely biological death. Rather does death mean the real death, the eternal death, which we have already defined. Here, while pointing out the centrality of Christ and his insistence on extending his work to all men, Barth makes that quiet (yet necessary) mention of that destruction which we may bring upon ourselves. Yet the mention of the possibility of that destruction
1 Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics: An Introductory Report, p. 101: Weber says that it would be against Barth's express opposition to impute to him a doctrine of apokatastasis.

2 The Theology of Karl Barth: an Introduction, p. 111: "... believing in a higher divine logic which surpasses the logic of finite human mind, Barth maintains in view of the freedom of the divine grace and on scriptural grounds that the question of whether or not ultimately all men will be saved must remain an open one." The notion of a higher divine logic is a very Maurician one!

3 CD, II/2, p. 422

4 The Humanity of God, p. 57: italics in the original
is always quiet in Barth and Mauricé, quiet in the sense that it always comes second, always comes after the mention and recognition of the initiative and priority of God in Christ.

That quietness, that reluctance, to noise abroad the damnation of this man or that man or some men or most men, is a characteristic of both our theologians, a characteristic both of the men and of their respective theologies. We have seen Mauricé's extreme resistance to a viewpoint which willingly denies the blessings of redemption to any and we have mentioned Barth's preference for a quickening gospel at the risk of universalism: our last word will be to permit Barth, in his own name and in Mauricé's, to provide an expansion of that quiet reluctance. Let us now look more closely at Barth's comments about universalism in The Humanity of God.

Barth asks if his position implies universalism and says that he will make "... three short observations in which one is to detect no position for or against that which passes among us under this term".¹ (The three observations are here presented in a shortened paraphrase.)

1 That we should not be panicked by the word at least until we have a clear idea of its sense or nonsense;
2 That we should at least be stimulated by Colossians 1:19 [and presumably 1:20] (and parallel passages) which says that God in Christ will reconcile all things to himself;
3 That we should beware as much or more than the danger of universalism the danger of the opposite "morosely gloomy" and legalistic position of those who deny it.²
1. The Humanity of God, p. 61

2. Ibid., the three observations are found on pp. 61 & 62.
Then follows a passage which we have cited before but not quoted: it is utterly true to the spirit of Maurice and makes us a fitting end to our researches.

This much is certain, that we have no theological right to set any sort of limits to the loving-kindness of God which has appeared in Jesus Christ. Our theological duty is to see and understand it as being still greater than we had seen before. (1)
1. The Humanity of God, p. 62
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Other works by Karl Barth are listed on the following page.

F.D. Maurice:

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