The Forgotten Europe: Eastern Europe and Postcolonialism

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Introduction: Out of Communism’s Rubble: Redefining Eastern Europe After the Cold War

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the peoples and literatures of Eastern Europe have become overlooked due to a perceived political irrelevancy, leaving Eastern European literature, with a few exceptions, missing from the global literary and intellectual landscape. A wide range of those texts which, thirty years ago, were read widely in the West have since gone ignored, leaving Tony Judt to account for the phenomenon by stating: “to the extent that we do have a shared recollection of intellectuals, it is all too often reduced to the stereotype of a rather narrow band of left-leaning Western “progressives” who dominated their own stage from the 1950s through the 1980s: Jean-Paul Sartre, Michel Foucault, Günter Grass, Susan Sontag” (Reappraisals 13). The forty year period which spanned the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union has been reduced to a more favourable memory, in which the truth regarding the Soviet Union’s human rights abuses and encroachment on the political and cultural landscape of Eastern European nations has been reinterpreted as a struggle between the democratic values of the West and the authoritarian East. According to this narrative, the West inevitably triumphed as a result of its superior way of life, which only served to reinforce Western values. This is evidenced by the rise of American triumphalism, which was articulated by Francis Fukuyama in his work The End of History and the Last Man (1992) in which he imagines “a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government had emerged throughout the world [...] as it conquered rival ideologies like hereditary monarchy, fascism, and most recently communism” (xi). This type of thinking which Fukuyama
exemplifies, makes it easy to overlook the realities of the Cold War and allows for an oversimplification of its history as it reduces the conflict to the assumption that the West’s “triumph” over communism was an inevitability.

In his essay “Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet?” David Chioni Moore addresses the lack of overlap between postcolonial and postcommunist studies. He claims that the two fields have largely ignored one another, although they have the potential to complement one another, and seeks to redress this error by including the former “Second World” nations under the umbrella of postcolonial studies. In particular he cites Ella Shohat’s 1992 article “Notes on the Post-Colonial,” in which the author compiles an extensive list of colonial and postcolonial nations, which entirely overlooks the nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as being representative of the two fields’ ignorance of one another:

What is remarkable or, rather, remarkably ordinary here is the way in which a scholar enormously concerned with the fate of colonized and recently decolonized peoples across the planet should treat events that were widely perceived, at least in the twenty-seven nations from Lithuania to Uzbekistan, as a decolonization, instead as a distant [...] noncolonial event. (116-17)

He blames the lack of attention paid by postcolonial scholars to Eastern Europe and Central Asia as being a result of the “Three-Worlds Model”:

When most of the Second World collapsed in 1989 and 1991, the collapse resulted in the deflected silence apparent in Shohat, and it still remains difficult, evidently, for three-worlds-raised postcolonial
theorists to recognize within the Second World its postcolonial
dynamic. In addition, many postcolonialist scholars, in the United States
and elsewhere, have been Marxist or strongly left and therefore have
been reluctant to make the Soviet Union a French- or British-style villain.

(117)

Moore has indentified the difficulty intellectuals have faced in thinking beyond the
“Three-Worlds Model” as well as the reluctance of some left-leaning intellectuals to
accept the Soviet Union as a colonial force, as two of the primary roadblocks which have
impeded the postcommunist world’s acceptance into postcolonialism.

Like David Chioni Moore, I have come to see postcommunist Eastern Europe as a
type of postcolonial landscape, noticing that it has been easier for postcommunist
countries to gain membership in NATO than to be granted postcolonial status. It is
therefore my attempt to redefine the respective literatures of the Eastern Bloc as
postcolonial, as few have attempted to understand the experience of living in Soviet
occupied nations as being similar to colonialism. It is my attempt to examine the types of
literature and thought which contributed to Eastern Europe’s occupation in order to offer
a new perspective on the literature which arose as a result.

This is not to suggest that I consider the postcolonialism of Eastern Europe to be
analogous to any other type of postcolonialism. I recognize the types of colonialisms
which have come to characterize traditional postcolonialism are area and era specific.
Instead Eastern Europe endured a different sort of colonialism as a part of the new Soviet
empire, which began to take shape in the aftermath of the Russian revolution. This new
empire represented a new type of colonial aggressor, neither entirely dissimilar nor
corresponding to the imperial traditions of its monarchical predecessors, both in Russia and in the West. Rather, the Soviets “became successors to an old expansionist empire” in much the same way as “the American revolutionaries developed out of the British empire. In both cases the ideologies that justified intervention had developed from concerns that were formed in earlier centuries, under different regimes” (Westad 40). While they did not represent the same colonial empires from which they developed, the Soviet and American empires benefitted from the firmly established models of subjugation as well as colonial discourses of the late nineteenth century which claimed the lands associated with traditional postcolonialism.

When coming to power in Russia, the communists inherited a multiethnic state comprised of the many territories conquered by the Tsarist Empire. Initially, the Soviets undertook a program which acknowledged the different ethnicities of the empire: “The Bolshevik strategy was to assume leadership over what now appeared to be the inevitable process of decolonization and carry it out in a manner that would preserve the territorial integrity of the old Russian empire” (Martin 1). The communists looked to empower the various ethnicities of the newly formed Soviet Union by encouraging the use of national languages. The communist leadership sought to make national languages the official languages of their respective territories, instead of Russian, as they trained new elites to take active roles in governing their people, and encouraged cultural output by mass producing books, newspapers, and journals (1-2). This was done in order to circumvent Russian chauvinism as well as to promote the transition into a postnationalist world. Initially, Lenin and Stalin argued that in order for the Marxist postnationalist world to

1 It should be noted, however that many of Imperial Russia’s Eastern European holdings were lost in the aftermath of the First World War when they were granted independence.
exist, nationalisms had to be encouraged in order to move beyond them (4-5). This is not to suggest that the various ethnic territories possessed any real power over the governing of their territories, as the Soviet Union was not intended to function as a federation. Rather, Moscow exerted direct control over its vast empire and the various ethnicities that resided within its borders (13).

Under Stalin, throughout the 1930s and World War II, the attempt to accommodate ethnic minorities within the Soviet Union was significantly altered as the state abandoned all pretence and recognized the position of the Russian culture as being more integral to the national interests of the Soviet Union than the other cultures which existed within the Soviet multiethnic state. The ethnic Russian relationship to the Soviet state became rearticulated in a February 1, 1936 editorial in Pravda, in which the Russian culture was noted as being “first among equals” (Martin 452). This title stuck as Russian culture became indistinguishable from that of the Soviet state as the culture of the largest ethnic group was given primacy over the cultures of the other ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. All “non-Russians [...] were required not only to learn the Russian language but to familiarize themselves with the Russian culture [...] Russian culture was given even deeper primordial roots than the national cultures of other Soviet nations. The Russian people, language, and culture served to unify the Soviet Union” (461). This marked a drastic shift in the Soviet Union in regards to its previous relationship with the varied ethnicities that inhabited it. With the newly acquired lands in Eastern Europe as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 and World War II, the Soviet Union applied the processes of Russification it had developed throughout the 1930s to its Eastern European holdings. The process by which the Soviet Union sovietised Eastern Europe in the
postwar period was accomplished by enlisting the aid of those politicians who had spent significant amounts of time in Moscow, who were forced to model their own governments on the one in place in Russia (Rees 11).

Whereas the Americans claimed to have derived the justification of their civilizing mission from the Enlightenment principles of individual freedom and liberty, the Soviet Union positioned itself as “the undisputed leader of the world communist movement. It was based upon a radical critique of western individualism, and posited the view of a modern, dynamic society based on collectivist principles” (Rees 11). Coupled with ideology, the Soviet Union presented itself as the liberator of Europe from the grip of fascism, although this was an afterthought: “Stalin intended to turn Eastern Europe into a buffer zone that would guarantee Soviet security. From this zone, he intended to exact reparation payments for the war damage caused by the Germans. In Soviet propaganda, it was presented as the liberation of these countries from Nazi tyranny” (10). The intent to relegate Eastern Europe to the position of buffer zone was deliberated before values were considered. The values attached to the liberation of Eastern Europe were secondary to the primary mission of reparation extraction and the creation of a dehumanizing buffer between the East and the West in which the nations of Eastern Europe discovered themselves. It is through the Soviet Union’s attempts beginning in the late 1940s at Sovietizing the region that Eastern Europe lost its connection with the West. This disconnect began before the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, which further obfuscated the region and greatly enhanced a growing misinterpretation between East and West.
Communism was seen by many Eastern Europeans primarily as a foreign construct forced onto them. By examining the relation Poles have with the historical events which transpired during the Cold War period and their communist past, Geneviève Zubrzycki has surmised that “Poles inject Communism into a long narrative vein of conquest, occupation and oppression by powerful neighbours, and their struggle for independence” (23). In this light, communism has been understood by those Eastern European nations which comprised the Eastern Bloc as a period of foreign domination by another imperial power, and another time period in which their autonomy was taken from them. According to this, there is little which separates the Soviets from the earlier Romanovs’ Empire which spread into Eastern Europe, and the other larger powers surrounding the region.

Along with the state apparatus of the Soviet Union, Soviet art and culture were also exported to the lands west of the Soviet borders as artists throughout the Eastern Bloc were made to work within the confines of Socialist realism, an art form which has its roots in the traditions of Russian realism (6). In an introduction to Bohumil Hrabal’s *Closely Watched Trains*, Josef Škvorecký describes the proliferation of Socialist realism in postwar Eastern Europe as a form of art which “‘took power’ rather than ‘appeared’” organically and which sought “to eliminate from the reality of socialism anything that might cast a shadow over the rosy hues: firstly, any social criticism of the postrevolutionary status quo, and secondly, aspects that they considered ‘decadent and offensive to socialist morality,’ mainly violent death (except death in the grand heroic mode) and sex (except Victorian-style innuendo)” (8). This Soviet imposed art form sought to silence the national oppositions which arose as a challenge to foreign-backed
rule, and any deviation was punished, which can be seen in the Soviet Union’s handling of the Prague Spring. As Czechoslovakia strayed from the Soviet prescribed version of communism Leonid Brezhnev declared what became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine: “Each communist party is free to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in its own country, but it is not free to deviate from these principles if it is to remain a communist party [...] The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries, and they cannot look indifferently upon this” (Judt Postwar 443). The Brezhnev Doctrine became a reaffirmation of Soviet control over the Eastern Bloc and elucidated the logic of Soviet communism. Brezhnev warns Eastern Bloc countries that they are free to carry out the tenets of Marxism-Leninism in their own countries, but when he tells them that they are not free to deviate from those tenets if they are “to remain a communist party,” he is not suggesting that they have the freedom to cease existing as a communist party. The nations of the Eastern Bloc are to remain communist parties and are therefore prohibited from behaving in any way which deviates in any way from the dictates of Moscow. The second half of the Brezhnev Doctrine quoted above serves as a warning to the other member nations of the Eastern Bloc as he urges them to become involved in suppressing the Prague Spring, which was certainly the case on August 21, 1968, when 500 000 Warsaw Pact troops from Poland,

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2 On January 5, 1968, Antonin Novotný was replaced by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party with Alexander Dubček. Dubček, in his abbreviated tenure as First Secretary, relented to social pressures to relax control on the media and end censorship. This led to what became known as the Prague Spring, when Czechoslovakia briefly flirted with the idea of multi-party elections and greater civil liberties. These measures terrified Czechoslovakia’s authoritarian neighbours (Judt Postwar 440-2).
East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia and put a stop to the reforms (444).

It is the period which follows the Prague Spring which I am most concerned with in my analysis of postcolonialism and Eastern Europe. In the first chapter, I am going to investigate the types of discourse which contributed to the creation of Eastern Europe as a separate entity during the Cold War. The discourse which surrounded the Cold War had its foundations in the types of colonial discourse which proliferated in the late nineteenth century. I will examine texts such as Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* and Anthony Hope’s *The Prisoner of Zenda* as they relate to the creation of a Slavic *other* and their place within the colonial discourse as it pertains to Eastern Europe. It is my assertion that the ideas which these texts display, and the discourse to which they are related, served as a prelude to the Cold War. This will lead me to a discussion of Ivan Klima’s *Love and Garbage* in the second chapter, as I examine how the narrator dissects the stereotypes which arose surrounding Eastern Europe as a result of the colonial influenced writings of chapter one. The narrator of *Love and Garbage* portrays the results through his encounters with representatives of the West, whose interactions reduce the protagonist of *Love and Garbage* into an Orientalized *other*. This will lead, in the third chapter, to Nina FitzPatrick’s *The Loves of Faustyna*, in which the protagonist, Faustyna, works to discover a place for the female within the postcolonial framework. *The Loves of Faustyna* explores the traditional models of women and postcolonial national allegory and subverts them through Faustyna’s various transgressions.

By working with these texts I aim to explore the relation between postcommunism and postcolonialism as these concepts apply to Eastern Europe. Eastern
Europe throughout the Cold War period serves as a special type of postcolonialism, due to the region acting as the confluence of Western discourse and Eastern colonization. Throughout the Cold War the West lacked actual direct control over the Eastern Bloc, although it possessed discursive mastery of the region. This discursive mastery allowed and made excuses for the Soviet Union’s direct control over Eastern Europe, which turned the region into a different type of colony than those colonies traditionally associated with postcolonialism. As Eastern Europe acted as the buffer between the two superpowers, the fate of this swath of land was determined by the caprice of those same powers which lay directly to the East and West. This is attested to by the novels and thought of the region throughout the Cold War, which are on display in Klima’s Love and Garbage and in FitzPatrick’s The Loves of Faustyna. These same novels investigate the relations between East and West Ivan Klima and Nina FitzPatrick present privileged outlooks on the relation of Eastern Europe to the Cold War, due to their positions as exiles. Both authors spent time abroad, Klima lived in America for a number of years and FitzPatrick emigrated to Ireland from Poland. As a result, both authors inhabit outsider status and so have a special relation to the Cold War, as they manage to avoid culturally loaded logic those people who possess some type of citizenship are often influenced by.
Chapter One: The Whirlpool of Races: Creating the Eastern European Other in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Writing

The discourse surrounding the Cold War had its foundations in attitudes shaped by colonialism. In both eras, social consciousness was an afterthought, despite being presented as a political catalyst. Imperial powers positioned the process of colonization as a *civilizing* mission, despite the blatant economic advantages derived by the Western powers. In the postwar world, the Soviet and American governments used the differences in social and political outlooks as mere afterthoughts in the expansions of their spheres of influence; it is this late attachment of political values which is shown by Max Millikan and Walt Rostow’s 1957 *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*. This proposal argues for a foreign policy platform which embodies what the writers deem to be American values: “In their largest sense [these] proposals [...] are designed to give fresh meaning and vitality to the historic American sense of mission—a mission to see the principles of national independence and human liberty extended on the world scene” (353-54). Like the former colonial powers, such as England and France, the Americans and the Soviets approached their position in the postwar world as civilizing missions as they each perceived themselves as the exclusive inheritor of European modernity (Westad 4). It was through the use of an inherited preoccupation with discursive mastery of other regions of the world that these Cold War powers were able to maintain their positions in the world. This was a discourse that was inherited from the narrative that
surrounded and maintained colonialism, and is a discourse that is closely associated with power.³

From the Enlightenment era to the Cold War, Eastern Europe has been subjected to gross misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Around this misinterpretation arose the field of Slavic studies in the Western World, which subsequently gave birth to the discourse which surrounds the region. Early examples of the discourse are represented by the various travelogues written about Eastern Europe and the Balkans, such as Charles Boner’s *Transylvania: its Products and its People* (1865), and Major E.C. Johnson’s *On the Track of the Crescent, Erratic Notes from the Piræus to Pesth* (1885), to name only two. Both works include detailed drawings of the “strange costumes” (Johnson 138) and the “strange customs and ceremonies” (Boner 221) of the various Eastern European peoples they encounter. Before it became the Eastern Bloc, this region was made into an *other* as the West demiorientalized its nations by portraying them for their differences from the western consumers of this travel writing, in a similar manner to the ways in which western European travel writing *othered* inhabitants of the Orient, as told by Edward Said in *Orientalism*. This *othering* of Eastern Europe was then transferred from its traditional place in the colonialist discourse and reused in the period following World War II, as the previously created stereotypes led to a greater disconnect between the West and member nations of the Soviet Bloc.

These binaries which came to define the Cold War have a longer history, as Larry Wolff outlines in *Inventing Eastern Europe*. The divisions between East and West are

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³ I am using the term discourse in the manner which Edward Said describes it in the introduction to *Orientalism*, which is to say that the discourse surrounding Eastern Europe is one that possesses an institutional grounding as well as a relation to various forms of power.
constructs which date back to Voltaire and the Enlightenment. It is during the Enlightenment that Western European thinkers came to reappraise the intellectual landscape of the continent. Prior to this period, Renaissance Italians divided the continent between Northern and Southern Europe. Renaissance Italians positioned themselves as the contemporary inheritors of ancient Rome, embodying the height of civilized culture and continually under threat from the uncivilized North, which came to represent the barbarian hordes of antiquity (5). It is with the beginning of the Enlightenment in France that thinkers such as Voltaire began to reimagine the continent as the product of a West/East conflict, casting the West as the inheritors of Renaissance Italy’s cultural predominance and the East as the uncivilized challengers to this order. Larry Wolff points out that Enlightenment thinkers created Eastern Europe as a complementary other half through which the West was able to view itself: if the West stood for culture and civilization in this equation, Eastern Europe became viewed as the dividing line between civilization and barbarism (4). For Louis Philippe, Comte de Ségur, St Petersburg was the place which most embodied this confluence and contradiction, standing as the combination of “the age of barbarism and that of civilization, the tenth and eighteenth centuries, the manners of Asia and those of Europe, coarse Scythians and polished Europeans” (13). And so it is that the Slavic peoples of the eighteenth century came to embody the Scythian hordes of antiquity, positioning Western Europe as the inheritor of Classical thought. These sentiments became fixed formulas in the nineteenth century, as Balzac casually sums up: “The inhabitants of the Ukraine, Russia, the plains of the Danube, in short, the Slav peoples, are a link between Europe and Asia, between civilization and barbarism” (13). It is through such interpretations that Eastern Europe,
the eclectic mix of cultures stretching between Germany and Russia, becomes cast as a demiorientalized buffer between Occident and Orient.4

In his seminal book *Orientalism*, Edward Said makes the argument that philosophical, or imagined geography, was a significant component of colonialism. As he points out: “It did not trouble [Alphonse de] Lamartine that what on the map was a blank space was inhabited by natives; nor, theoretically, had there been any reservation in the mind of Emer de Vattel, the Swiss-Prussian authority on international law, when in 1758 he invited European states to take possession of territory inhabited only by mere wandering tribes” (216). By imagining blank spaces on the map as being uninhabited by “civilized peoples,” international law is conceived by de Vattel as a means by which colonialism and the displacement of indigenous populations becomes a justifiable action. This legal outlook is informed by the Western attitude that imagines a relationship between geographical space and civilized/uncivilized peoples. A similar type of outlook informs the attitude of Westerners towards the Eastern half of the continent. It is this sentiment which is embodied by Bram Stoker’s 1897 novel, *Dracula*. In the writing of *Dracula*, Stoker steeped himself in the discourse of Eastern Europe as he worked painstakingly to research the region he was writing about. As a result, Stoker’s work manages to reiterate the stereotypes and the prejudices of his Western source material, like the travel writers mentioned earlier, and others such as Emily Gerard and her 1885 essay “Transylvanian Superstitions” and William Wilkinson’s 1820 *An Account of the

4 The boundaries and even existence of Eastern Europe is one that is politically loaded and varying opinions will be investigated later in the chapter. For simplicity sake I have decided to define Eastern Europe as it is traditionally understood in the West, which is the area characterized by the Soviet Bloc, with the exception of East Germany, which is and was seen as belonging to Western Europe.
Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (Auerbach 331). As such, Dracula serves as the fin-de-siècle literary culmination of nineteenth century Slavic studies. As a result, the protagonist of Stoker’s novel, Jonathan Harker, approaches Transylvania noting that the region is absent from the map, rendering it a blank territory and implying that it is yet-to-be-“discovered.” Assigning to this region a heterogeneous population, rife with tribal superstitions and lacking of any coherent order, Stoker designates the location of Castle Dracula “in the extreme east of the country, just on the borders of three states, Transylvania, Moldavia, and Bukovina, in the midst of the Carpathian Mountains; one of the wildest and least known portions of Europe” (1). Occupying an insufficiently crystallized presence on the map and presented by Harker as a place of untameable chaos, Transylvania is portrayed as existing outside of any established empire, and therefore eluding customary political, legal, and cultural expectations.

Despite being under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Transylvania of Bram Stoker’s imagination is made to appear as though existing in a primitive precolonial era. Jonathan Harker carries on his description of his destination: “I was not able to light on any map or work giving the exact locality of the Castle Dracula, as there are no maps of this country as yet to compare with our own Ordnance Survey maps” (1). The Ordnance Survey maps to which Harker refers are linked to the history of British colonization and militarism. The Ordnance Survey maps have their history in the aftermath of the Scottish rebellion of 1745 when Lieutenant-Colonel David Watson “brought forward a project for the subjection of the [Scottish] clans, which was warmly received” (Porter 167). Watson outlined what would become the Ordnance Survey maps by arguing for “the survey of [Scotland] and the cutting of roads to permit patrolling by
small armed parties encamped at certain salient points” (167). As a result, the act of mapping becomes a political tool for the spread of empires as it is soon accompanied by the use of violence. Watson was in favour of creating maps of Scotland not for their own merit, but because it would allow for greater knowledge of territory in Scotland and provide for easier subjugation of the local populations who would otherwise rebel against British rule. In his play *Translations*, Brian Friel stages the lasting effects of the Ordnance Survey maps over the people of Ireland, who are stripped of their history, the power to name the world in which they exist, and their language:

The sappers have already mapped most of the area. Yolland’s official task [...] is to take each of the Gaelic names—every hill, stream, rock, even every patch of ground which possessed its own distinctive Irish name—and Anglicise it, either by changing it into its approximate English sound or by translating it into English words. For example, a Gaelic name like *Cnoc Ban* could become Knockban or—directly translated—Fair Hill. These new standardised names were entered into the Name-Book, and when the new maps appeared they contained all these new Anglicised names. (38)

The traditionally Gaelic names of Ireland are being reimagined and reshaped as English denominators. By renaming the landscape the men tasked with mapping Ireland are sent as a preliminary force in order to aid in the task of subjugating the local populations of Ireland. This fact is brought to its conclusion in Friel’s play when Yolland, the engineer tasked with renaming the local geography, disappears. These newly created Ordnance Survey maps are employed by the British military to coerce the local population to return
the missing engineer, or else face violent reprisals, such as eviction from the newly mapped lands (referred to by their newly bestowed British names) and the destruction of property (80). The play demonstrates the nature of the Ordnance Survey maps, which is inherently at odds with the native whose territory is the subject of the mapping. The mapping process seeks to radically redefine the life of the native by robbing them of their ability to name their homeland. It also lets the native know that, in the eyes of the colonizer, the native language is powerless, and reminds the population of their subservient position in the newly mapped colony. As a result, military force is always an option for enforcing this loss of identity. By invoking the Ordnance Survey maps, Jonathan Harker becomes an advocate for this British method of colonization.

Harker’s attitude towards the unknown lands of Eastern Europe is representative of the prevalent late nineteenth century views of Eastern Europe. Bram Stoker drew heavily from the discourse that surrounded Eastern Europe at the time, and was particularly influenced by Emily Gerard’s travelogues and accounts of the superstitions of the region (Arata 466). When Jonathan Harker invokes the image of the Ordnance Survey maps, he is operating within a Western discourse which views the blank space on the map as a primary candidate for colonization. While the territory is in reality inhabited, it is imagined as a backward region lacking civilization and, as such, poses a challenge to Western culture. It must therefore, according to the colonial attitude, be brought under the influence of a larger, more civilized power. As a result, maps become an important tool in the process of cultural colonization as it is here that the notion of “philosophical,” or imagined, geography becomes visually manifested. Borders can be erected or destroyed on a whim by the larger powers, erasing not only entire states, but even peoples. Even by
shifting the borders of nations whole new characteristics can be assigned to ethnic
groupings. This process by which the larger powers project characteristics and properties
onto nations was referred to by John Ledyard as “Philosophic geography” which Larry
Wolff describes as the freely constructed geographical sentiment (7), according to which
the territories east of the Prussian-Polish border no longer sit comfortably in the
European imagination, but become an extension of the Asiatic barbarians and pose a
threat to the ongoing survival of the cultured West. When it has been found suitable, the
Poles have been reimagined as belonging to the sphere of Western Europe. During the
period of the First World War, it became a popular idea that an independent Poland
would as a roadblock to “German and Habsburg political ambitions in Europe.” As such,
the notion of Poland as the Eastern defender of Western Christendom gained popularity
(Sam Johnson 155). Wolff points out that in the era of Ledyard and other Enlightenment
thinkers, the Eastern border of Europe was fluid and continually shifted between the
Volga and Don, whereas today it is situated at the Ural Mountains. This demonstrates the
arbitrary manner in which a boundary was erected between the “civilized” European and
the uncivilized Asiatic cultures. This Eastern border between Europe and Asia is in fact
an artificial construct which is intended to separate peoples and draw a distinction
between them.

In Dracula, Bram Stoker engages in his own philosophical geography as he
imagines land formations, “races,” and medieval elements as characterizing the
Transylvania of his novel. Castle Dracula is depicted as being unmapped, and, as a result,
as being a backward place, as suggested by Harker’s comparison of the blank
Transylvanian map with the order provided by the British Ordnance Survey maps, which
comes to represent the achievements of a more developed civilization. When he suggests “every known superstition in the world is gathered into the horseshoe of the Carpathians, as if it were the centre of some sort of imaginative whirlpool” (2), Jonathan Harker is making the case that Transylvania is frozen in a preindustrial, superstitious state. This implies that the region is marked by its inherent backwardness whose premodern features present a challenge to the West. With the emigration of Count Dracula from his native lands, Transylvania and its backwardness threatens the propriety and order of Victorian England with what Maud Ellmann refers to, in her introduction to *Dracula*, as a “regression to the primitive” (ix).

In *Dracula*, it is the perceived breakdown of the British Victorian social order which entices the Count to leave his castle in Transylvania in favour of England: “Vampires are generated by racial enervation and the decline of empire, not vice versa. They are produced, in other words, by the very conditions characterizing late-Victorian Britain” (Arata 464-65). The Vampires’ predilection for empires in a state of decline carries with it a judgement on the state of the late nineteenth century standing of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By depicting the territory in which Castle Dracula is situated as missing from the map and by conjuring the image of the Ordnance Survey Maps, Stoker is tacitly criticizing the Austro-Hungarians who have failed to implement a tool for establishing order in the manner of the British, and as such have failed to defend against imagined ethnic tensions. According to Stephen D. Arata, the “racial heterogeneity combined with racial intolerance considered barbaric in its intensity—defined the area east of and south of the Danube, with the Carpathians at the imaginative centre of the turmoil” (464). As a result, the Austro-Hungarians have failed to bring
civilization to the peoples of south-east Europe by failing in their endeavour to put an end to the “barbaric” ethnic tensions of the region.

The argument is made by Larry Wolff that Eastern Europe is seen by the West as a land of contradictions whose very existence underwrites Western Europe’s sense of order and propriety. The region is perceived as made up of a collection of small nations comprised of heterogeneous populations which, because it is lacking in any real, homogeneous, population, it is inherently unstable. This attitude is one that is reflected by Bram Stoker in the Transylvania of his imagination, which he describes as the “whirlpool of European races” (28). In his analysis of Transylvania, Stoker creates a tiny microcosm of the entirety of Eastern Europe. His Transylvania is more influenced by the writing of various source material, such as Emily Gerard’s essay “Transylvanian Superstitions,” than it is by reality. Stoker’s depiction fails to adequately reflect the reality of the demographics of Transylvania as he engages in creating an imagined landscape. At the time of Dracula’s genesis, the population of Transylvania was estimated to be over two million. Of this population, according to the official census undertaken by the Hungarian authorities, the percentage of population based on mother-tongue was:

- Romanian: 56.98% (1880), 54.98% (1900)
- Hungarian: 25.92% (1880), 29.54% (1900)
- German: 12.45% (1880), 11.95% (1900)
- Slovakian: 0.64% (1880), 0.61% (1900).
- Ruthenian: 0.42% (1880), 0.45% (1900)
- Serbian/Croatian: 1.33% (1880), 1.42% (1900)
- Other: 2.26% (1880), 1.42% (1900). (Light 39)
As can be seen in the results from the census, the population of Transylvania was predominantly comprised of native-speaking Romanians as the majority, followed by Hungarians, and to a much lesser extent Germans. While Transylvania was certainly not homogeneous, it was not quite the “whirlpool” Stoker and his sources portray it to be. There are numerous problems with Stoker’s depiction of the ethnic make-up of the region. In his depiction of the landscape surrounding Castle Dracula, Stoker over-represents the Hungarian population and under-represents the Romanian population. Stoker chose to place Castle Dracula at the Borgo Pass, which at the time was overwhelmingly Romanian, as Romanians accounted for 97% of the population, while the Hungarians, whose language is predominantly encountered as well as their customs, were absent from the population of the Borgo Pass. To demonstrate the confusion, Duncan Light argues that: “The couple who run the Golden Crown Inn in Bistritz are probably Hungarian: they speak German as a second language and give Jonathan Harker a crucifix suggesting that they are Catholics” (41). Even Slovaks are seen in greater abundance in Stoker’s depiction than the Romanians of Transylvania, although in reality there were, according to the 1880 census, only 25,196 Slovaks in all of Transylvania. 90% of the Slovak population was found in the Western Banat and Crișana regions of Transylvania, while only 258 Slovaks were recorded in the entirety of Bistrița county, the location in which Jonathan Harker begins his diary (43). It is on the road between Klausenburgh (Cluj) and Bistrița that Harker first encounters Slovaks, although the two

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5 The censuses which Duncan Light references are based on Austro-Hungarian censuses which took into account mother-tongue as opposed to national identity. The result of which is to demonstrate that even Count Dracula’s placement within the Borgo Pass is inaccurately constructed, as the Szekely, a Hungarian speaking people, are, along with the Hungarians, absent from the area.
cities are located beyond the boundaries of Banat and Crișana, and the likelihood of encountering Slovaks along his route would be virtually nonexistent.

In his depiction of Transylvania, Stoker presents an imagined, distant Eastern European land composed of an unstable heterogeneous population. As a result of the unstable makeup of the population, violence is believed to be a characteristic of the region and is even believed to be an inherent component of the ethnicities of the region. Through the Count’s extended description of the bloody battles of the region this attitude is further supported, as he describes the various ethnicities, such as the Szekelys and their ancestors the Huns, as possessing “fighting spirit[s]” and “warlike fury” (28-30). As a result, the peoples of Stoker’s fictional Transylvania are made to appear as though savage violence is their defining genetic characteristic. This predisposition towards barbarity is one that extends far beyond the borders of Transylvania, as the region is comprised of all the peoples of Eastern Europe. Although Stoker’s British audience is reminded that these violent peoples are inferior both in manner and culture, they also lag behind as though still existing in a previous, more uncivilized era. To evidence this, the reader is provided with an extended description of a Slovak which is counterbalanced with the description of Harker. While the Slovaks appear “more barbarian than the rest” of the races in Transylvania, they are in actuality “very harmless and rather wanting in natural self-assertion” (3). Alternatively, Harker is described by his mentor, Mr Hawkins as “a young man, full of energy and talent in his own way, and of a very faithful disposition. He [...] has grown into manhood in my service” (17). This juxtaposition of Harker’s vigour and the Slovak’s harmlessness leaves the Slovaks emasculated by Englishman’s gaze as their harm is reduced to mere appearance. Even his hosts, who offer him a crucifix as a ward
against the Count have their (Catholic) religious beliefs reduced to superstitious mystical
charms and talismans which offend the Englishman’s modern religious propriety, as he
describes them as “idolatrous” (5). Jonathan Harker’s remarks upon the superstitious
nature of the region, when paired with the inhabitants’ tendencies towards violence, make
the region appear as though they are an uncivilized, premodern people, as they believe in
the power of charms and the “evil eye” (6). The women of Stoker’s Transylvania are also
victims of the Englishman’s gaze as he notes that they “looked pretty, except when you
got near them [...] they were all very clumsy about the waist” (3). In his diary Jonathan
Harker is dismissive of the ethnicities, religions, and peoples of not only Transylvania,
but, as a repository of the different nationalities of Eastern Europe, the entirety of
Western Europe’s other half. Because of this, Bram Stoker positions Jonathan Harker as
the representative of the British reader. He is portrayed as a vigorous young man who
represents the virility and moral fortitude of the British Empire as he displays energy,
manhood, and faith. In this way, the contradictory nature of the heterogeneous “whirlpool
of European races” is juxtaposed with the pure homogeneity of the West.

These sentiments are further investigated by Arata who argues that Stoker’s
choice of Transylvania as the setting of Dracula is not coincidental. Stoker’s original
intent was to set his work in the South-Eastern Austrian state of Styria, as homage to
Sheridan Le Fanu’s Carmilla; however:

In rewriting the novel’s opening chapters [...] Stoker moved his Gothic
story to a place that, for readers in 1897, resonated in ways Styria did not.
Transylvania was known primarily as part of the vexed “Eastern
Question” that so obsessed the British foreign policy in the 1880s and
‘90s. The region was first and foremost the site [...] of political turbulence
and racial strife. (462-63)

By reorienting his novel, Bram Stoker demonstrates the irrelevance of borders in Eastern
Europe as the novel changes its setting from Styria to Transylvania without sacrificing
any of the plot. This attitude was earlier articulated by the eighteenth century diplomats
John Ledyard and Louis Philipe, Comte de Segur, who felt the borders between civilized
Europe and the uncivilized East was at the Prussian-Polish border (Wolff 6). In the
imagined geography any country situated in the swath of land between Germany and
Russia, the Baltic and the Balkans, can be substituted for another.

Vesna Goldsworthy’s Inventing Ruritania, a book largely concerned with Western
concepts of the Balkans, examines the tiny, nonexistent Germanic nation of Ruritania, as
portrayed by Anthony Hope’s 1894 novel The Prisoner of Zenda, making use of the
fictional nation as a symbol of Western configurations of the Balkans. As a result,
Goldsworthy proves that any nation unlucky enough to be caught in the aforementioned
region of Eastern Europe becomes interchangeable with another. As Goldsworthy points
out, the Ruritania of Anthony Hope’s novel has been misinterpreted and repositioned, as
it is originally depicted by Hope as a tiny Germanic kingdom on the border of Germany
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but has since been permutated into a South-Eastern
European kingdom. One example of this is Anthony Kamm’s 1993 entry in the Collins
Biographical Dictionary of English in which it is incorrectly referred to as a Balkan
nation (Goldsworthy 45). Goldsworthy argues that in the Western imagination any nation
in Eastern Europe can take the place of another. Like Stoker’s decision to change Styria
into Transylvania, nations can be shifted across continent without repercussion. Recently
Hope’s novel has been adapted into an episode of the television show *Futurama*, entitled “The Prisoner of Benda.” The writers have substituted the Germanic kingdom of Ruritania from Hope’s novel with Robo-Hungary, which embodies the perceived Eastern European stereotypes, such as superstitious peasants and political instability and intrigue. Kamm’s, Stoker’s, and *Futurama*’s shifting of nations into Eastern Europe demonstrates the Western perception that Germany and German-speaking peoples are seen as being a part of a wholly stable West, whereas instability is a characteristic of the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

The temporal gap between Stoker’s imagined Transylvania, Anthony Hope’s *The Prisoner of Zenda*, other practitioners of the Ruritanian Romance, and social policies is not so large. To illustrate a similar point, Edward Said discusses and makes use of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of *cultural hegemony* to account for the closure of this gap, through which certain cultural forms come to influence state institutions and official policies (7). It is through cultural hegemony that the myth of the *other* is born and propagated. Said explains that:

> A text purporting to contain knowledge about something actual [...] is not easily dismissed. Expertise is attributed to it. The authority of academics, institutions, and governments can accrue to it, surrounding it with still greater prestige than its practical successes warrant. Most important, such texts can *create* not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. (94)

In his description, Said is utilizing Gramsci’s concept of *cultural hegemony*, and showing how it makes the transition into Foucault’s theories of *discourse*. While Said is discussing
the process of cultural hegemony in regards to the Orient, this is a helpful model when engaging with the Eastern European discourse and accounting for the temporal shift from popular novels such as *Dracula* and *The Prisoner of Zenda* to official policies. In its time *The Prisoner of Zenda* became a popular novel that sold hundreds of thousands of copies within the lifetime of its author, has seen numerous theatrical incarnations, and spawned the genre of the Ruritanian romance.\(^6\) As a result, the stereotype of the unstable Eastern European nation became a part of the zeitgeist and significantly altered the Western outlook on the governments of the region.

Due to the popularity of the works, attitudes and stereotypes which popular writers like Anthony Hope and Bram Stoker exhibit in their texts made the transition from culture into official policies in the manner Gramsci articulates. The link between specific ethnicity and undesirable characteristics began to permeate immigration policy in Western Europe and the United States. As a prelude to the oncoming Cold War, the United States in particular began to target Eastern and Southern Europeans as being genetically inferior:

Those in favour of restricting immigration did claim that certain ethnic groups were more susceptible to disability. The justification for discrimination on the basis of disability helped account for the immigration quotas included in the Immigration Act of 1924. The New York Supreme Court, for instance, blamed immigrants for “adding to that

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\(^6\) This is a genre characterized primarily its fictional Eastern European setting. Novels within this genre typically involve elements of intrigue within a royal court. Hope’s work played a large role in influencing writers such as Bram Stoker, who looked to *The Prisoner of Zenda* when taking liberties in his description of Transylvania (Goldsworthy 46), and Agatha Christie, whose 1925 novel *The Secret of Chimneys* is set in the fictional nation of Herzoslovakia, a conflation of Czechoslovakia and Herzegovina (67).
appalling number of our inhabitants who handicap us by reason of their mental and physical disabilities.” In particular, it was said that Southern and Eastern Europeans were mentally defective. Slavs, for instance, were “slow-witted,” whereas Jews were “neurotic” and virtually “the polar opposite of our pioneer breed.” The federal immigration policy thus intermingled race, ethnicity, and disability” (O’Brien 9).

These attitudes, which made their way from fiction into official discourse, imagined that ethnicity carried with it a genetic predisposition towards disability. This was backed by the pseudoscience of “experts” such as Madison Grant, who held the distinguished titles of “Chairman, New York Zoological Society; Trustee, American Museum of Natural History; Councilor, American Geographical Society” (Grant, iii), also serving as the vice president of the Immigration Restriction League. Grant’s work in eugenics, The Passing of the Great Race, was lauded by Theodore Roosevelt as well as cited by members of Congress during discussions on immigration, with his work playing an integral role in the drafting of the 1924 Immigration Act (Tucker 11).

While, in the 1924 Immigration Act and prior to World War II, Slavs are portrayed as being “more susceptible” to genetic disabilities, during the Cold War era they are presented as being more susceptible to the “traditional Oriental despotism” (Pietz 58). The same colonial attitude which attributed undesirable mental and moral characteristics to people of a different ethnicity can be seen operating during the Cold War era as the notion that ideology was an inheritable trait began to be attributed to the Slavic inhabitants of the Eastern Bloc. This genetic tendency became an integral characteristic of the totalitarianism imagined by such figures as George Kennan, who
served as a diplomat in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and is considered the primary architect of the United States policy of containment (58). William Pietz argues that the outlook taken by Kennan and others in the diplomatic community is one that is influenced and shaped by the colonial discourse which preceded it, as the ethnic characteristics that made one susceptible to mental disease are now overlaid with susceptibility to ideology.

It is difficult to ignore the attitudes espoused by intellectuals and members of the diplomatic community. Edward Said writes in *Orientalism* of Napoleon’s insistence on enlisting the aid of scholars of the Orient in his war with the British over Egypt and Napoleon “gave his deputy Kleber strict instructions after he left always to administer Egypt through the Orientalists and the religious Islamic leaders whom they could win over” (82). In Napoleon’s invasion and administration of Egypt, Oriental scholars were given direct power over their Oriental subjects, as the barrier between power and scholarship became indistinguishable. This marked a dramatic change in the scholar’s relation to power as it “became the first in a long series of European encounters with the Orient in which the Orientalist’s special expertise was put directly to functional colonial use; for at the crucial instant when an Orientalist had to decide whether his loyalties and sympathies lay with the Orient or with the conquering West, he always chose the latter” (80). Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt changed the dynamic between power and scholarship as Orientalists were forced to work on behalf of the colonialist empires, effectively ending scholarship’s ability to remain politically disengaged. Through the work of Napoleon’s Oriental scholars “the Islamic Orient would henceforth appear as a category denoting the Orientalists’ power and not the Islamic people as humans nor their history as
history” (87). The process Said is describing is one in which the peoples of the Orient are being dehumanized by the gaze of Western scholars as they are categorized and robbed of their voices, as agency to represent themselves is usurped by Western scholars, in a manner similar to the Ordnance Survey maps earlier discussed by Johnathan Harker.

Maria Todorova, in her 1997 book *Imagining the Balkans*, applies Said’s methodology to a study of the Balkans and the discourse which surrounds the region. In a point of departure from Said, however, she argues that the discourse which surrounds the Balkans, while pervasive in Western popular media, is innocuous on the grander geopolitical level. Todorova states: “This is not to say that a great number of the scholarly practitioners of Balkan studies in the West do not share privately a staggering number of prejudices; what it says is that, as a whole, the rules of scholarly discourse restrict the open articulation of these prejudices” (20). While Todorova optimistically puts her faith in the institutions of academia to restrict the private prejudices of scholars, the role academic “experts” came to play in the Cold War is such that her faith can be characterized as being misguided. In fact, Todorova points to the Carnegie Institute’s rereleasing of a 1913 report in 1993, when it was used to draw parallels between the Second Balkan War (1913) and the conflicts which broke out in the aftermath of the dissolution of Yugoslavia nearly eighty years later. Todorova notes that the two conflicts are entirely dissimilar. The Second Balkan War as a result of the outcome of the First Balkan War (1912-13), and pitted Bulgaria, who felt cheated over the division of Macedonia, against its former allies. The conflict in which the former Yugoslavia found itself engaged throughout the 1990s involved different belligerents as Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, belligerents in the first two Balkan Wars, were never a part of the conflicts
involved in the conflict which was localized to the borders of the former Yugoslavia. To compare the conflicts is to misinterpret the history of the region and to grossly misunderstand the conflict of the 1990s. Along with this oversight, Todorova also cites George Kennan’s introduction which begins with a self-serving “praise of the peace movements in the United States, England, and northern Europe” (4). Todorova is demonstrating how the West views the Balkans as being in the same position it was eighty years before, as though the interim period under the Tito and the communist regime had simply frozen the multiethnic people of the Balkans in time, and it was the dissolution of the communist regime which allowed the peoples of the Balkans to resume their hatred of one another. It is attitudes such as those exhibited by “experts,” such as Kennan, that inhibited governments from becoming involved in serious peace-keeping missions in the region and allowed leaders, such as President Clinton, to justify a position of nonaction. Contrary to Todorova’s misplaced optimism in the mechanisms of academia to inhibit scholars from being swayed by their private prejudices, academia plays no such role. In fact, as Said discusses, academia allows scholars to appear as “experts,” who are often complicit in supporting colonial structures of power through the creation and propagation of authoritative discourses.

7 Todorova further evidences this claim by comparing the Western reaction to the First and Second Balkan Wars. According to Baron d’Estournelle de Constant, who wrote the introduction to the original report at the time of the outbreak of the Second Balkan Wars, the First Balkan War was viewed by the West as “the supreme protest against violence, and generally the protest of the weak against the strong,” while the Second was seen as a descent into savagery (4). The major difference between the two wars was who the violence was directed at: in the First Balkan War was seen as the struggle for independence against the Turkish (Eastern) conquerer; while the Second Balkan War was perceived as European nations killing one another.
In a similar manner to what Said discusses in *Orientalism*, Western scholars and “experts” have sought to define and categorize Eastern Europe and its inhabitants. Like Napoleon, throughout the Cold War, the United States enlisted the aid of scholars and “experts” in their respective fields. W.W. Rostow, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger all made the transition from academia to serving the White House as National Security Advisors. Throughout the Cold War, the varying opinions of “experts” played an integral role in shaping aspects of Western and Eastern relations, such as the concept of détente.

As the Western powers have divided the postwar world into spheres of influence they have used notions formerly tied with colonial discourses to justify the division of the continent. In Churchill’s note to Stalin at Yalta, the British Prime Minister proposed percentages of influence that divide Eastern Europe between the West and the Soviet Union. In the note Churchill suggests that the nations east of the divided Germany are to fall into the Soviet sphere of influence while Churchill claimed “Greece with its immortal glories” as a nation under the Western sphere of influence (Wolff 2). This draft choice is due, in part, to the Western perception that Greece, as a non-Slavic nation and the cradle of European civilization, is perceived as a Western nation.

Greece itself has an interesting history of representation in Western accounts. Due to Greece’s geography and the role which the Byzantine Empire played in the histories of the Eastern European nations, I maintain that Greece is, in fact, an Eastern European nation. There is a level of discomfort which the West exhibits at such a view, and it is

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8 By examining the *Russian Primary Chronicle*, which was compiled in the twelfth century and tells the history of Kievan Rus throughout the years 852-1120, it is evident the influence Greek Byzantine legal codes, religion, and writing had on the lands of Eastern Europe (Riha 1).
precisely this attitude which Winston Churchill represents in his approach to Greece and Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II. In particular, his decisions characterise the Western ability to imagine national and ethnic properties to suit one’s outlook.

Dealing with Greece in particular, Churchill’s position is one that is informed primarily by Enlightenment principles of what constitutes traditional Europeaness. In Balkan Ghosts, Robert D. Kaplan argues that the West has fabricated a Greece that it wants to exist. Kaplan points to philhellenes, such as British travel writer Patrick Leigh Fermor, who have reduced the nation into opposing false binaries, which they label Hellenes and Romios. The former label hints at the Hellenic Greeks of antiquity, who are believed by the West to be characterised by “principle and logic,” “enlightened disbelief,” and who follow a “Western code of honour.” Contrary to the Hellenes are the Romios, a title which hints at the country’s eastern, Byzantine past. Fermor felt that the Romios stood for opposing values and were characterised by being instinctual, superstitious, and unscrupulous. What is created in this binary of Hellenes and Romios is another West and East dichotomy, though one that is traditionally overlooked by Western appraisers of the country who are informed by a philhellenistic outlook (242-43). This exact sentiment is captured in Jules Dassin’s 1960 film Never on Sunday, which tells the story of a contemporary American philhellene, who bears a moniker recalling the Greece of antiquity, Homer Thrace (played by Jules Dassin), and his disappointments at discovering that the contemporary Greece is lacking in those purely Hellenic qualities he cherishes.

Due to the Enlightenment’s positioning of Western Europe as the inheritor of Greek culture, people like Winston Churchill and the fictional Homer Thrace have decided to overlook the more “Eastern” aspects of Greece. Robert Kaplan remarks upon
the tendency which the western media had during the rule of the Greek military junta (1967-1974) to portray the junta as embodying the characteristics of the Eastern-oriented Romios. Contrary to the authoritarian-minded Romios, those who fought for a democratic Greece came to embodies those characteristics of the enlightened Hellenes of antiquity (258). Again, this imagines ideology as an ethnically inheritable quality as democratic values are cast as being Western values and totalitarian regimes are made to appear Eastern in origin, further augmenting Pietz’s claims of the West’s perception that the East is characterised by its susceptibility to a “traditional Oriental despotism.” According to the Western logic, when Greece conducts itself in a favourable manner it is due to those classical aspects of its culture, although when it deviates it is attributed to the menacing Eastern characteristics of the nation.

The emergence of postwar attitudes regarding the nations of Eastern Europe can be seen as having their foundation in Winston Churchill’s famous address in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. The language and ideas Churchill used to describe the new conflict came to typify the conflict. In his address, Churchill remarked upon the figurative disappearance of “all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe” behind the “iron curtain” of the Soviet sphere of influence (232). The language Churchill employs in his description of the transition of Eastern Europe into the sphere of Soviet influence highlights the Western outlook that Eastern Europe was, at the time, undergoing a process through which it would become even more distanced from the West than it had been. Due to the West’s lack of knowledge regarding their Eastern neighbours, Churchill’s declaration is a self-fulfilling prophecy as it only gave further grounds for the West to remain misinformed about the Soviet Bloc. Through the creation
of a discourse surrounding Eastern Europe, which was based upon and shared similar
c characteristics with the discourses of (cultural) colonialism, the West was able to
fabricate a narrative which accounted for the Cold War status quo of the world. The logic
which this discourse presented was one in which the West was engaged in a near
eschatological conflict with an enemy who in their very ethnic constitution embodied the
type of government by which they were led. The East/West conflict of the Cold War
came to be understood in this manner and informed those who were involved with the
region throughout the time period.
Chapter Two: Sifting Through the Empire’s Trash: Stereotype and Voice Reclamation in Ivan Klima’s *Love and Garbage*

The discourse of Slavic studies has been responsible for the proliferation of stereotypes about Eastern Europe, the results of which are on display in Ivan Klima’s 1986 novel *Love and Garbage*, as the narrator’s encounters with Western representatives come to illustrate the influence of the colonial era’s mentality and approach to the region. By examining Klima’s *Love and Garbage* I analyze how inhabitants of Eastern Europe come to view their relationship with the West, while also examining the West’s tendentious understanding of life behind the Iron Curtain. As Klima’s novel shows, the West approaches Eastern Europe with its own cultural biases, which oftentimes simplify the reality and make the region incomprehensible to Western observers, and who subject it to a level of condescension and intellectual subordination. In order to demonstrate this, I will examine the themes of exile, ideological divide, and Western expectations as they are depicted in Klima’s *Love and Garbage*. Through the nameless protagonist’s dealings with various representatives of the Occident, Western attitudes are portrayed by the Czechoslovakian author as being wilfully misinformed about Eastern Bloc citizens. This results in an ignorance in the artistic achievements and humanity of the region, as the citizens behind the “Iron Curtain” become useful only in their ability to strengthen political positions in the West, of both those with and without communist sympathies.

In his novel *Love and Garbage*, Ivan Klima portrays the Western biases against the people of Czechoslovakia. This in turn leads to a Western misinterpretation of Eastern Bloc intellectuals. When the nameless narrator decides to leave America to return to Czechoslovakia, he relates the response of his audience: “they asked me to explain what
on earth possessed me to want to leave their free and wealthy country to return home, to a poor and unfree country, where they’d probably lock me up or send me to Siberia” (2). In his decision to return home, the nameless narrator of Love and Garbage shocks his audience by deciding to leave the liberty and wealth of the West for the oppressed and impoverished Eastern Bloc. In their reaction to the narrator’s decision “to return home, to the place where there were people I was fond of, where I was able to speak fluently, to listen to my native language” (2), the American audience demonstrates their colonial mentality as they believe that they are in possession of a superior manner of life, which is articulated as American values. It is this mentality which earlier informed Millikan and Rostow in their 1957 A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy and their aims of containing Soviet totalitarianism. The audience betray their prejudices against the communist government in Czechoslovakia, which they regard as being the antithesis to American values, as the Eastern Bloc is believed to impede a life that works towards individual happiness.

When his American hosts reduce the Cold War into a conflict of binary oppositions, the narrator of Love and Garbage decides not to inform his Western audience of the true motivation for returning to Czechoslovakia. Instead he feels it necessary to lie as the reality simply does not fit in with his audience’s purview of the world. In his essay “The Cuts of Language: The East/West of North/South,” Timothy Brennan points out that this inability to translate culture adequately is due to the difficulty of moving beyond ideology. When translating cultures and texts: “[the] failure to accord semantic coherence to a world of political culture that is not precisely linguistic or, for that matter, either racial or geographic,” is a failure due to the fact that, “[behind] the
doctrine of incommunicability is also, and primarily, the ghost of belief” (41). Brennan is arguing that every culture possesses its own ideology and outlook which is infused and tied into the culture itself. This makes the process of reproduction impossible as the grammar and signifiers of one culture will not necessarily translate into another and maintain the same meaning as in the original language, as citizens approach other cultures fully inculcated in the logic and ideologies of the cultures to which they belong. As a result, when scholars attempt to translate another culture’s work there is a whole world of politics and ideology which remains inexpressible and unknowable as they are incommensurate in their understandings of the world. By referring to the “ghost of belief,” Brennan is pointing to that which remains inexpressible for these reasons.

When citizens of the West and of the Soviet Bloc approach one another they do so already loaded with the baggage which goes along with culture. This idea is further expounded upon by Odd Arne Westad: “Central to the American ideology was its anticollectivism [...]. The collective symbolized all the fears American eighteenth century revolutionaries had for the corruption of their republic. Outside of the United States the essence of nonliberty consisted in being controlled by others, through feudal bondage or [...] through seduction by a party or a movement” (11). According to Westad, America is a society characterized as privileging and possessing an inherent distrust of the will of the collective, ideologically taking the position of privileging the individual. As a result of this history, the United States interprets itself as being in binary opposition to the values of collectivism as embodied by the Marxist-Leninist principles of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.
Cultures, whether ideologically motivated by the needs of the collective or the individual, approach one another with their own firmly rooted ideological outlooks. Cultures interpret one another according to these outlooks, leading to stereotyping and misunderstanding. This accounts for such positions as the West’s suspicion of the Slavic people of Eastern Europe. Timothy Brennan argues that Eastern Europe is considered by the West to be a “racially suspect Europe [...] too Slavic to be anything but the Russians” (49). The Slavs are, even throughout the Cold War, viewed through the colonial gaze as being an ethnicity susceptible to contagion. Brennan argues that arguments about hygiene and disease became integrated into arguments of political ideology during the Cold War (Brennan 50).

Despite these strong, culturally motivated positions, Ivan Klima argues for a more nuanced approach to understanding the Cold War divisions between East and West. In his essay “A Rather Unconventional Childhood” he presents the conflict between the East and the West, as embodied by the Cold War, as a confrontation “not [between] the forces of good and evil that do battle with each other, but merely two different evils, who compete with each other for the control of the world” (24). Instead, Klima argues that the Cold War is not a new phenomenon, but is rather a continuation of the conflicts which have directly preceded it, casting the Cold War as a conflict between two ideologically opposed, although morally comparable forces. Klima’s description of the postwar landscape sees Europe as being separated into two distinct spheres and reoriented as a land of binary oppositions, continually on the verge of confrontation with one another. As cultural exiles, Ivan Klima and the narrator of Love and Garbage, possess a rare insight into the Cold War which others lack, as a result of the cultural values imparted to citizens
by the two ideological blocs. Because the two are barred from citizenship they are free of those ideological constraints and are able to view the conflict from various positions.

Because his American audience forces him to hide his true motivations for returning to Czechoslovakia, the narrator feels the need to relate a more noble cause: “I said that back home people knew me. Even if I had to sweep up garbage in the streets I would be for them what I was, what I wanted to be to the exclusion of anything else, a writer, whereas here, even if I could drive around in my little Ford, I would always be just one of those immigrants on whom a great country had taken pity” (2). As he lies to his audience the narrator is also careful to flatter them by informing them of the luxuries afforded by America and the gifts the nation bestows upon its citizens. Unfortunately for the narrator, he is not a citizen of the United States and is instead in the difficult position of being an exile, although he cannot articulate this fact. He is aware that by returning to Czechoslovakia he will not be allowed to retake his position as a writer and instead will be forced into the menial job of a street sweeper: “I knew that if I was a street-sweeper I would, for the majority of people, be simply a person who swept the streets, a person hardly noticed” (3).

The experiences of Klima’s narrator abroad mirror those of the Polish exiles Timothy Garton Ash writes about in his essay “The Uses of Adversity.” After being pressed on the topic of his planned return to Poland, one of the Polish exiles admits that he is “going back because he thinks he’ll be happier there than here” (177). This demonstrates that the life of the exile is one in which the émigré is never able to completely detach his or her self from the spectre of the homeland. In *Representations of the Intellectual* Edward Said observes:
There is a popular but wholly mistaken assumption that being exiled is to be totally cut off [...] from your place of origin. Would that surgically clean separation were true, because then at least you could have the consolation of knowing that what you have left behind is, in a sense, unthinkable and completely irrecoverable. The fact is that for most exiles the difficulty consists not simply in being forced to live away from home, but rather [...] in living with many reminders that you are in exile, that your home is not in fact so far away, and that the normal traffic of everyday contemporary life keeps you in a constant but tantalizing and unfulfilled touch with the old place. The exile therefore exists in a median state, neither completely at one with the new setting nor fully disencumbered of the old, beset with half-involvements and half-detachments, nostalgic and sentimental on one level, an adept mimic or a secret outcast on another. (48-49)

It is not enough for the exiles to live in a different or “free” country, as the exiles are always aware of the existence of the homeland. The exiles are also deprived the pleasure of becoming true citizens of the host nation, existing in a “median,” or liminal, space between the two cultures, reminded of the fact that they do not belong in either nation. This split is embodied by the theatre producer with whom the narrator meets in St Louis. The producer has decided to perform one of the narrator’s plays, which would be an illegal action in their native Prague. Despite the freedoms offered by America and the West, the narrator learns that the producer’s watch is still set to the Central European Time of Czechoslovakia instead of the Central Time Zone of the United States (163).
This image depicts the split the narrator and the producer experience as exiles while living in America. The homeland continually looms in their memories and it is due to being caught between these two worlds that the narrator decides to go home. He reasons that as an exile in America he is unable to fully integrate and become a citizen, while in Czechoslovakia he experiences a similar sentiment as his political positions during the Prague Spring have left him as an exile in his home country. He reasons that between the two forms of exile, the latter is the more preferable since, in Czechoslovakia, there are “people I [am] fond of, where I [am] able to speak fluently, to listen to my native language” (2). Although neither country allows the narrator the full benefits of citizenship, the latter position of exile is the more preferable. This is due to the narrator’s desire, as a writer, to maintain a connection with his native language.

The fate which awaits the narrator of *Love and Garbage* in his homeland is one not uncommon to the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, whether it is those remaining in their home country or those returning from abroad. In the aftermath of the 1968 Prague Spring, the Czechoslovak authorities undertook a massive purge of public intellectuals such as journalists, writers, television personalities, film directors, and student leaders. Those forced from their professions found their way into menial jobs such as street sweepers, as depicted in Klima’s novel. Others were forced into different positions of manual labour and the service industry (Ash, “Czechoslovakia” 63). Those members of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia, like the narrator of *Love and Garbage*, who maintained a position of opposition to the post Prague Spring Husak regime, found themselves placed in a state of internal exile as they became estranged from their once prominent positions
in society. Edward Said describes the process in which the intellectual as exile plays a special role in society as it is possible for the exile to see the world as it truly is:

The exile is unable to join in with the life of the citizens of the new country. It is easy to become disheartened, but it is important to remember that the exile is being given a chance to live a new life as a beginner. The exile will always be marginal and so the exile’s work is always new and must be invented instead of being influenced by someone else, since there is no one else. (62)

The process Said describes and privileges (and probably romanticizes) the position of the intellectual exile. Said’s perspective imbues the intellectual with the ability to view the world around him or her with a fresh perspective as a result of their estrangement and marginality, which in turn liberates the exile from the constraints of accepted discourses that influence the life of the citizen. According to Said’s logic, since the narrator of Love and Garbage finds himself doubly exiled (first in his homeland when he is forced from his occupation as a journalist; second, as a political refugee while in America) he is placed in the privileged position of viewing the conflict through a detached perspective as he belongs to neither the Eastern Bloc nor the West.

Through his experiences in the Terezin concentration camp, which the narrator survives as a child, he comes into contact with the Western colonial mindset, which achieved its culmination under the Nazis who attempted to transform human beings into garbage. The narrator quotes Rudolf Hoess, the first commandant of Auschwitz, and the process he devises for the eradication of the Jews. Hoess, according to the narrator, describes it as the “method of effectively and economically removing human garbage
from this world, in a businesslike and precise manner, in the spirit of our revolutionary age” (148). The narrator characterizes this attitude as being symptomatic of “a world in which the person who in his actions perfectly embodies emptiness and vanity, cruelty and a moral void, is granted the right to regard all those who differ from him as garbage to be swept away, garbage of which he cleanses the world” (149). Hoess’ attitude is informed by the authority of the colonial discourse, which arrogantly presupposed the validity of its actions when faced with putatively noncivilized nations and ethnicities. Its morally bankrupt vanity allowed it the privilege to decide the fate of the lives of the other. Aimé Césaire draws the parallel between the logic of imperialism and that of the Nazis in his essay “Discourse on Colonialism,” stating: “before [Western Europeans] were [Nazism’s] victims, they were its accomplices; that they tolerated that Nazism before it was inflicted on them, that they absolved it, shut their eyes to it, legitimized it, because, until then, it had been applied only to non-European peoples” (312). Those methods which were used to liquidate the “human garbage” of Eastern Europe, were perfected in the overseas European colonies. Césaire sums up the colonial mindset in his equation: “colonization = ‘thingification’” (316). Césaire’s equation invokes those earlier sentiments of Rudolf Hoess that left an indelible mark upon the psyche of the narrator.

At points in the novel, the narrator shows how he has internalized the colonial discourse as he views himself and those he encounters as living garbage. As a result, the narrator places an emotional barrier between himself and the other characters of the novel, which is exemplified in his relationship to the youngster, Štycha. The narrator remarks: “The youngster [...] scarcely smiled: it suddenly occurred to me that death was hovering over him. I had that sensation from time to time, more often in my childhood.
I’d look at somebody and suddenly I’d be scared that the person would soon be gone” (32). Throughout the course of the novel the narrator is hesitant to forge a relationship with the youngster and refuses to learn his name until the final chapter of the novel.

Despite his impulse to view people with the colonialist attitude that some people exist as living garbage, the narrator of *Love and Garbage* is also of the contradictory opinion that “No matter ever vanishes. It can, at most, change its form. Rubbish is immortal, it pervades the air, swells up in water, dissolves, rots, disintegrates, changes into gas, into smoke, into soot, it travels across the world and gradually engulfs it” (6). According to the narrator, one can never effectively dispose of trash, it may change shape but the trash is never gone. By possessing this opinion, the narrator, as an exile between East and West, undermines his earlier sentiments. The narrator recalls his encounter with the president of the Ford company who assures him, when asked where the discarded vehicles go, that: “Anything that was manufactured could vanish without trace, it was merely a technical problem” (15). This is a similarly dismissive attitude that Rudolf Hoess and the various regimes of Eastern Europe took towards their discarded members of society. The Ford president’s description of the removal of the outdated vehicles as being “a technical problem” is made to bear a striking resemblance to Hoess’ description of the removal of “human garbage” as being conducted in a “businesslike manner.” This creates the association between the postwar Western outlook of consumption and waste with the prewar colonialists who viewed people in a similar manner.

As a result the narrator must reconcile the part of him which views the living as the soon-to-be discarded and the part of him which understands that trash can never be effectively removed. In order to reconcile his disparate viewpoints the narrator decides
that he wants to become a garbage man so that he is able to cleanse himself emotionally of the past (221). As a garbage man the narrator is able to rediscover his past memories in the discarded remnants of Prague. The narrator reflects on the ways in which Prague’s sweepers spend their workdays: “by talking, by reminiscing about better moments in their lives” (124). Through their interactions with rubbish the sweepers are forced to relive their respective pasts as a means for coping with the boredom and the reality of their lives. The fragmented narrative style of *Love and Garbage* bears witness to this as the narrator’s memories ebb and flow throughout the novel in a disjointed, surreal manner as he is torn between the present and the past. The other sweepers also demonstrate this through their interactions with the narrator as they relay their own memories and stories from better times. These reminiscences are so important to the narrator because the sweepers are, for the most part, those members of society for whom the government no longer has any use. The narrator is a writer who was forced out of his profession during the government reprisals against public dissidents in the aftermath of the Prague Spring; Rada is a religious man who used to study at the seminary in Litoměřice but whose religious views have also put him at odds with the regime; Mr Pinz, the seacaptain, lost his hand in a fishing accident and as a result is now unable to work as a sailor; Franta is a castrated former sex offender; and there is the character referred to as simply the youngster, Štycha, who used to play in a jazz band until an accident in the chemical plant robbed him of his health and his ability to play music, rendering him unable to find more fulfilling employment. All of these characters have found that they are no longer useful to Czech society and so have been discarded like the refuse they clean from the streets of
Prague. By telling their stories, the narrator is giving a voice to his coworkers and rescuing them from the “trash-heap” of history.

The function that the narrator performs plays a similar role to the *samizdat* movement. This method of self-publishing was able to provide Eastern European dissidents with a voice, as those writers which were no longer allowed to publish in state supported journals and magazines were able to express themselves for an audience again. Timothy Garton Ash describes the process of copying *samizdat* texts as he watches a small gathering of students who copy out twelve carbon copies at a time by typewriter (twelve is the maximum that can be typed at a time) and who then distribute the work at a later time to others (“Czechoslovakia” 162-63). Because the regime views no statement as being apolitical, authors who had their work banned were forced to find other means for publishing themselves. *Samizdat*, a concept originating in Russia, is where “[v]irtually all the best [...] Czech writers” published (66). This was their way of ensuring that their voices would continue to be heard, as those who have been discarded by the government never disappear. It is by giving his coworkers a voice that the narrator is rescuing his fellow sweepers from being forgotten entirely just as those who have been discarded for political purposes were able to reclaim their own voices.

Throughout *Love and Garbage* the narrator experiences times when he has trouble maintaining his own agency, such as when he meets with a French journalist. The topics which she wishes to discuss are centered around political matters in Czechoslovakia: “She wanted to know how the struggle for human rights would develop in my country, what was the attitude of my fellow-countrymen to her fellow-countrymen [...] She was also interested to know whether I regarded war as probable, the peace
movement as useful, and socialism as practicable” (48). The French journalist is probing the narrator about his political opinions in order to assess his usefulness to the Western narrative of the Cold War. He is unable to fulfill her expectations as his answers not only lack expertise but any potential answer he could provide the journalist lacks the brevity she is looking for. He wonders if any “one of her questions could be answered in a form that would fit into a newspaper column” (48). This forces the narrator to realize that he is unable to make himself understood by the journalist as they are both speaking different ideological languages. The narrator would like to speak to the French journalist as a writer and an artist, while her narrative would have him behave as a representative of the Czechoslovak dissident movement. It is true that the regime in Czechoslovakia does not approve of the narrator as an author, but it would be a mischaracterization of him to be labelled a dissident. As a result, the narrator feels that the French journalist is speaking a type of “jerkish,” in a similar fashion to the Czechoslovakian authorities. He describes this abbreviated “language” as consisting “of 225 words” (49). In this passage the narrator is implying that the language the journalist is speaking is one that has been reduced to only a few essential words and concepts, robbing language of the beauty of metaphor and reducing one’s thought processes to a shallow logic of binaries.

The narrator’s consideration that the journalist is making use of a type of shallow “jerkish” language notes his frustration at being unable to express the richness of metaphor with her. The implications of the use of “jerkish” are that the journalist is limiting her thought processes by reducing the grander aspects of a complex language and creating a simplified body of essential concepts. Even when the journalist turns the
conversation to topics of literature, it takes place “more out of politeness than anything else” (49):

[She] asked if I was interested in Kafka’s work because it was forbidden...
For the sake of accuracy I added that his work was not forbidden; they were merely trying to remove it, from public libraries and from people’s minds... She wanted to know why they did this to his work in particular. Was it politically so subversive? Or was it because Kafka was a Jew? [...] I’d say that what was being most objected to in Kafka’s personality was his honesty. (49)

The journalist is insisting on the utilitarian purposes of Czech literature, lacking the ability to understand metaphor. The journalist’s search for political struggle in the author’s work, while praising his stance, demonstrates the West’s cultural bias against the nations of Eastern Europe. M. Keith Booker and Dubravka Juraga describe the Western approach to artistic endeavour: “New Critical and other formalist approaches in the Western academy [...] declared a formally complex [...] modernism the epitome of high literary art and consigned any political art to the debased category of propaganda” (80). In Western art the emphasis is placed on depoliticization and the idea of the autonomous artist, whereas because Eastern European writers are judged by their political usefulness to the West and the manner in which they discredit the various communist regimes, their art is devalued before even being approached.

In his memoirs, To the Castle and Back, Vaclav Havel remarks on his invitation to dinner at the White House that: “Many of the guests told me I was their hero, that they had read my speeches and essays and seen my plays” (86). This declaration by Havel’s
fellow guests highlights that it is not his artistic output which matters most to them, but rather his position as a dissident. This severely undercuts the value of Havel’s literary accomplishments as they are now viewed through the prism of his work as a political activist and politician. Like Havel’s fellow dinner guests, the journalist is betraying her prejudices as she treats the narrator and his work with condescension. Writing about Havel’s *Largo Desolato*, Douglas Soderberg has argued: “In a society like ours based on the Bill of Rights, we may easily view [the paranoias of the play] as the ultimate absurdity” (227). The implications of this statement are that Havel is working from a position in which he can be viewed for his usefulness in the struggles between the larger powers of the Cold War. According to Soderberg, Havel’s work *seemingly* supports American values by showing the lack of artistic and intellectual freedom in the East. By conjuring the image of the Bill of Rights, Soderberg is implicitly signally the supremacy of American values, placing the free West in a position of primacy above the East. The result of these critical expectations is that there is a great deal of self-fulfilling prophecy when Western readers approach Eastern European texts. This limits and devalues the effectiveness of Eastern European literature as it is denied the privilege of being detached and taken seriously, as it is instead approached by Western intellectuals for its political expediency.

This Western bias is a commonly felt sentiment amongst Eastern European intellectuals, as they felt that many Western journalists and critics during the Cold War often engaged their Western counterparts in a patronizing manner. These prejudices inform the journalist’s attitudes as she chuckles at the perceived naivety of the narrator’s answers to her question, as she mocks his assessment of the political landscape of
Czechoslovakia and the other nations of the Eastern Bloc. The narrator’s assessment of the situation is correct; because, as he earlier points out, literature has the ability “to make the dead live and to stop the living from dying” (34). This is a powerful tool in the totalitarian society under which no action may take place without the consent of the regime. There is a moment in the novel when the narrator finds himself in a garbage dump watching, what he initially believes is, an impromptu scavenging through the trash by a number of people:

We soon became aware that nothing that was happening before us was happening without a plan, and that all the running around and exploratory digging was directed by a massive bald-headed fatty in a black suit. Unlike all the rest, he never once bent down to pick up anything, but merely strolled about as their supervisor [...] [he] had to pay a good deal of money for the right to mine the treasures in this mountain. (135)

The narrator is watching a scene in which even the lowliest job, such as scavenging the garbage dump, is controlled by the regime. The rights to dig through the trash have been bought by the man in the suit and sold to him by another person with more authority. The man in the suit is literally directing the people where to dig as they hope to find items of value which have been discarded. In a society where all aspects of society are heavily regulated, literature, through its ability resurrect the dead and the forgotten, has the potential to present a challenge to the heavily guarded status quo. By depicting the conditions of the scavengers, in this instance, the narrator is returning them from the world of the forgotten, in a similar manner as he does for his fellow street sweepers. The power of art was a central image for other Czechoslovakian and Eastern European artists.
The image used as the central motif by Kundera to symbolize the inability to alienate the past from the present in his novel *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* is the doctored photo which omits Vladimir Clementis. Although the regime wished to remove Clementis from history by doctoring photographs of the once prominent politician, they fail to remove his hat. Clementis’ hat hangs in the air as an uncomfortable reminder of the past, as Kundera reminds his reader of the inability of the state to distance itself from its past, much in the same way that the narrator of *Love and Garbage* does.

The French journalist cares very little for the narrator’s analysis of the situation in communist Czechoslovakia. This is primarily for the reason that in the aftermath of Europe’s division, “a temporally specific idea existed that the world was divided into communists and anticommunists, and there was no space to occupy in between” (Shore 7). As a result, foreign intellectuals and journalists, like the journalist Klima’s fictional narrator encounters, felt the need to approach their Eastern Bloc subjects as validating one of two positions: either being pro or anticommunist. Western intellectuals viewed the world as being separated into camps which sympathized with either the United States or the Soviet Union. The journalist that the narrator of *Love and Garbage* encounters can be seen as representing the position of most of the Western intellectuals and journalists Klima encountered in his role as a notable Czech novelist and *samizdat* publisher, as leading members of the Western literati came to believe in the false dichotomy this Manichaean logic presents.

The horrors of life in the Eastern Bloc found their own apologists within more left leaning Western intellectual circles which made Eastern Europe into an experimental laboratory for their own Marxist dogmatisms. Most prominent amongst these intellectuals
was Jean-Paul Sartre, considered a moral authority amongst the left leaning, Western intelligentsia (Ash 171). Many Eastern Bloc writers and dissidents felt betrayed by Sartre and his Western contemporaries. In an interview with *Les Nouvelles Littéraires*, the Polish author Antoni Słonimski “chastised French writers for their silence, accusing them of naïveté and a wilful refusal to recognise the reality obtaining in the communist bloc.

Bitterly Słonimski recalled how in 1956 Sartre had not wanted to see Polish writers break from socialist realism, for fear this would weaken the socialist camp against the United States. ‘Freedom for him, every limitation for us’” (362). Sentiments of feeling ignored or condescended were popular amongst Eastern European dissidents, as Timothy Garton Ash relates:

> when I was talking to Ivan Klima in Prague about Western intellectuals’ fatuous envy of the persecuted [...] Klima exclaimed ‘You know, the man responsible for all this nonsense is Sartre.’ Sartre, he said, had come to Prague in the early sixties, looked around for a day or two, and then given a speech to Czech writers in which he told them how fortunate they were. ‘You have real subjects,’ he said. ‘We in the West no longer have any real subjects. (171)

The Czech and Polish intellectuals are expressing their disappointment in this abdication of social responsibility by Western intellectuals. These sentiments were popular amongst prominent Czech and Polish writers as Western intellectuals proved themselves selective in the social causes with which they chose to align themselves. When it came to issues surrounding Western colonialism of overseas nations, intellectuals, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, were vocal in their opposition, which can be seen when he advocates for Fanon’s
postulations on the restorative capabilities of anticolonial violence in his 1961 introduction to Frantz Fanon’s *The Wretched of Earth*, which specifically discusses the experience of the anticolonial movements in Africa. In contrast to his position on Western colonialism abroad, he is more than silent when he addresses Eastern European intellectuals by asking them to submit to the demands made upon them by their Soviet backed governments, such as urging Polish authors to maintain the rigid guidelines of the Soviet imposed socialist realism and informing Czech authors about the “fortunate” circumstances of their life in the Eastern Bloc.

It is true that Jean-Paul Sartre took various political positions during his lifetime, his statements made to Czechoslovakian and Polish dissidents were made at around the same time he wrote his introduction to Fanon’s *The Wretched of the Earth*. Sartre’s condescending statements should also be remembered in the context of the 1947 Polish elections which saw anticommunist politicians widely intimidated and election results rigged by the Soviets (Judt *Postwar* 136), as well as the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia (139). This is not to suggest that intellectuals were willingly complicit in the oppressive actions taken by the regimes in the Eastern Bloc. Tony Judt offers three very basic reasons for Marxism’s allure for Western intellectual circles: Marxism, through “its sheer epistemological cheek,” is a huge idea which attempts to offer a grand narrative and expain *everything*; Marxism also fits into the Western notion of the progressive narrative, in that the world is moving toward a better future; and Marxism was also appealing to Western intellectuals because of its morality by arguing the necessity of caring for even the poorest member of society (*Reappraisals* 138-40). For these reasons and more, Marxism became an idea which Western intellectuals found the need to fight for even
though the reality did not agree with their utopian ideologies. To lend communist regimes the air of legitimacy, Western intellectuals allowed themselves to be susceptible to the rhetoric of communist scholars as well as the dialectics worked out by the regimes themselves: “This cynical application of dialectics to the twisting of minds and the breaking of bodies was usually lost on Western scholars of Marxism, absorbed in the contemplation of past ideals or future prospects and unmoved by inconvenient news from the Soviet present, particularly when relayed by victims or witnesses” (Judt Reappraisals 135). The idea of Marxism became much more important to the leftist intelligentsia of the West than the reality played out to their immediate east.

Attitudes offered by communist sympathizing intellectuals, the most prominent amongst them being Jean-Paul Sartre, allowed the Soviet Union to maintain authority over their Eastern European satellites for the length of time that they did. As many Western intellectuals abdicated their moral responsibility in the face of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, their work was able to make cooperation with these oppressive regimes appear more tolerable, as substantial bank loans were made to the East from the IMF and the World Bank to support their failing economies: “Communist economists in Prague recommended phasing out subsidies and introducing ‘real’ prices, but their political masters feared the social consequences of such a retreat and preferred to increase their debts instead” (Judt Postwar 582). The Eastern Bloc nations found themselves in a difficult financial position, and instead of making the difficult decisions which economists suggested, the governments of the Eastern Europe maintained their authority through the use of substantial bank loans from the West.
These loans allowed the communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc the ability to remain in power longer than they would have otherwise survived as these loans were, for the most part, used to subsidize the production of cheap consumer goods so as to fulfill the promises earlier made by Socialism (580-82). In his essay “The Power of the Powerless,” Vaclav Havel discusses the importance possessions played as an instrument in maintaining order over the populace. Havel offers the parable of the greengrocer, a man who runs a grocery store and has decided that he will no longer take part in creating the “panorama” of life under the communist regime. Amongst the many punishments the greengrocer and his family will face, “He will be relieved of his post as manager of the shop and transferred to the warehouse. His pay will be reduced. His hopes for a holiday in Bulgaria will evaporate” (39). These material goods on offer by the communist government to the greengrocer are intended to coerce him into accepting the living conditions under the regime. As such the communist states made use of their substantial loans to fabricate a life of normalcy and maintain a great deal of control over their population by working on a system of rewards and punishments. If the greengrocer does not cooperate he is liable to lose his job and status, he will lose money, and he will no longer have permission to travel for a vacation. This type of Faustian bargain demands that the citizen no longer make substantive claims for greater autonomy and individual freedoms from the state in return for luxuries.

While both anticommunist intellectuals and intellectuals with communist sympathies sought to position themselves as being separate entities on a surface level, they are closer in nature than they portrayed themselves. Both groups of intellectuals exploited the political landscape in Eastern Europe in order to gain political leverage in
their own countries at the cost of overlooking or misinterpreting the actions of the regimes to the East. This creates a type of wilful ignorance on the part of the Western intelligentsia as Eastern Europe becomes relevant only for utilitarian political purposes. Anticommmunist intellectuals, like the French journalist the narrator of *Love and Garbage* encounters, saw themselves as combating the evils of communism and the spread of ideology into the West. When the French journalist scoffs at the narrator, her attitude is very much informed and fits into the Western discourse which surrounded Eastern Europe. This renders their interview meaningless as she approaches the narrator having already concluded her story, needing from him only relevant and brief sound bites which support her anticommmunist position and reinforce the Western narrative of the world. This narrative celebrates its accomplishments and seeks to categorize the world, creating an insular world of us (the civilized West) versus them (the barbaric *others*). Instead of dispelling this myth, those Western intellectuals with communist sympathies also support this myopic understanding of the world. These intellectuals come to take positions which excuse the abuses of power perpetrated by communist regimes in Eastern Europe. When they inform Eastern dissident intellectuals of their inconvenience to the political causes of the West, they, like their anticommmunist counterparts, fall victim to the same insular logic, as communism becomes an acceptable form of government for the *other*.

In writing *Love and Garbage*, Ivan Klima deals with the issue of being rendered obsolete by both the communist regime and by the West. Through his contacts with representatives of the West he finds that he is unable to express himself to his audience. This can be seen when he discusses his departure from America for his homeland and in his dealings with the French journalist. In the former instance he is unable to express to
his hosts the reasons for his departure as their logic has become obscured behind the shallow thought processes of freedom and oppression. It is by returning to his homeland that he is able to return to his language and thereby, ironically, regain his voice, as he is returning to an oppressive country which attempted to silence him. In his dealings with the French journalist, he is unable to express himself as an artist, and it is for his relevance as a political figure that he is contacted. Through his double exile, first from his homeland and then from the West, the narrator is able to view the Cold War in an altogether different manner from the citizens of either side of the ideological divide as he takes up the position of the outsider. By struggling to assert his voice under the Czechoslovakian regime, and in the face of those expectations the West has placed upon him, he is able to regain his personhood. While he is able to regain his voice living under a communist regime, it is in the absence of communism that some members of society have a difficult time asserting their humanity. When communism came to an end in the Eastern Bloc a whole new struggle for identity began. In the next chapter I will examine Nina FitzPatrick’s *The Loves of Faustyna* and the role which women were asked to play in colonial, anticolonial, and postcolonial movements, as the women within these movements, like the narrator of *Love and Garbage*, found the need to attempt to assert their own voices.
Chapter Three: The Three-Women Model: National Allegory in Nina FitzPatrick’s *The Loves of Faustyna*

In her 1994 novel, *The Loves of Faustyna*, starting from the experience of Poles during and after the communist regime, Nina FitzPatrick investigates the role of women in anticolonial and postcolonial movements. Like Ivan Klima and his narrator, Nina FitzPatrick can be seen as a double exile. Just as FitzPatrick does not fit in her native Poland, when she emigrated from Poland to Ireland she won the 1991 Irish Times/Aer Lingus Irish Literature Prize in 1991. When she could not prove her Irish heritage she had her award taken from her, effectively telling her that she is not sufficiently Irish. This double exile has put her in, like Klima, in the position of being able to Western and Soviet colonialism as related to one another, and she uses this to explore concepts of womanhood and national allegory in *The Loves of Faustyna*. FitzPatrick does this by ignoring traditional tropes of the woman as a symbol for nationhood in the anticolonial movement, she seeks to subvert this tradition of representation in order to return agency to the female in the period after communism and Soviet occupation. FitzPatrick accomplishes this by offering the protagonist Faustyna, who attempts to navigate the traditional roles offered by male-oriented anticolonial movements. By investigating issues of sexuality and motherhood as they pertain to *The Loves of Faustyna* and to the wider history of Poland, as well as the more general anticolonial discourse, I seek to examine the ways in which women have sought to assert their own voices in opposition to narratives that would reduce their options in the postcolonial world.

In her work *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, Ania Loomba argues that the anticolonial movement has traditionally been structured as a gendered struggle, with
specific roles assigned to female and male participants. She criticizes early postcolonialist scholars, such as Frantz Fanon, for their gender blindness, specifically pointing to Fanon’s coding the anticolonial struggle in terms of Freudian castration (136-37). Fanon would have been aware of the legitimacy of Loomba’s claims. Fanon was educated as a psychiatrist and his writing attests to the veracity of Loomba’s arguments, as, in Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon actively portrays the process of colonization as a struggle created not only by ethnic division, but also a struggle for masculinity, as the two aspects become merged: “[For the Negro] the first encounter with a white man oppresses him with the whole weight of his blackness” (116). According to Fanon, it is within this struggle for ethnic autonomy that the struggle for masculinity exists as the colonial other becomes a repository for the colonizer’s sexual anxieties: “For the majority of white men the Negro represents the sexual instinct (in its raw state). The Negro is the incarnation of the genital potency beyond all moralities and prohibitions” (136). According to this reading, the subject of Black Skin, White Masks, the “Negro” male, becomes debased as a human being in relation to his sexual instincts as the Western colonizer interprets the colonized as the living embodiment of those Western latent sexual desires which have become taboo. Fanon goes on to argue that the colonized comes to literally represent the phallus, and it is by being killed by the colonialist that he “is castrated. The penis, the symbol of manhood, is annihilated, which is to say that it is denied” (125). As can be seen in Frantz Fanon’s psychoanalytic description of the colonial struggle, Loomba’s claims that the anticolonial struggle is criss-crossed by gender dynamics are well-founded: as the terms used to describe the struggle for national independence become
focused upon the phallus, this vocabulary asserts the primacy of male participation and the subordination of females.

While colonization is portrayed as the Freudian attempt by the colonizer to “castrate” and thereby lessen sexual anxieties by removing the threat of the hyper-sexualized other, who is made to embody those anxieties, the emasculated colonial subject is only able to regain his stolen masculinity through the use of violence. Fanon describes this process in *The Wretched of the Earth* when he states: “[Decolonization] infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is truly the creation of new men. But such a creation cannot be attributed to a supernatural power: The “thing” colonized becomes a man through the very process of liberation” \(^9\). It is only through violent struggle that the colonized are able to reassert their lost masculinity and thereby reclaim the castrated phallus as they make the transition from shamed “thing” back into man by achieving liberation. As a result, violence becomes a necessary tool in the quest for regaining a sense of stolen masculinity.

If decolonization is the struggle of the colonized man to reclaim his lost sense of masculinity, as Fanon describes, then this masculine endeavour leaves scholars such as Ania Loomba pondering the relation of females to the colonial, anticolonial, and postcolonial movements. While Loomba bemoans the implications, she argues that women are often asked to perform the role of “national emblems” within the struggle for national independence (182). The national and colonial discourses typically portray female bodies as symbols of “the conquered land” (129). As a result of the close

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\(^9\) In the original French, Fanon uses the term *hommes*. 
association between the female body with land, women become living symbols of the
nation and are made to serve the colonial, anticolonial, and postcolonial movements as
secondary figures to the men and the struggle for regaining their stolen masculinity. The
violence which the colonizer utilizes in the subjugation of the colonized becomes recoded
as an assault on national femininity: “In colonialist as well as nationalist writings, racial
and sexual violence are yoked together by images of rape, which in different forms,
becomes an abiding and recurrent metaphor for colonial relations” (138). The identity of
women is closely associated with the nation, as women come to symbolize the land of the
nation; as a result women are often cast as victims of sexual abuse, allegorically
representing the violence committed against the nation by an alien force.

The idea of women as being central to the creation myth of a nation is popular
throughout national allegory. The eponymous heroine of William Butler Yeats’ Cathleen
Ni Houlihan, becomes the central figure used to symbolize the 1798 Irish rebellion
against the British (Dumbleton 48). When she initially arrives at the house of a family
celebrating the marriage of their son, Cathleen comes as an old woman. She is questioned
by the family as to her troubles, to which she responds that her “four beautiful green
fields” have been taken from her (Yeats 46). These four lands symbolize the four ancient
counties of Ireland: Leinster, Munster, Ulster, and Connaught. The old woman calls upon
the young groom to forsake his marriage and to give himself to her. The young man
accepts, against the wishes of his family, and leaves with the old woman, who is seen
transformed into a young woman who has “the walk of a queen” (58). Because of this
infusion of young blood, the symbol of Ireland as the old woman becomes transformed
into a young queen. Ania Loomba argues that within national allegory women are
oftentimes cast in one of three main roles: victims of sexual abuse, whores, or mothers, which, according to Loomba, is generally a popular trope in the “Anti-colonial or nationalist movements [which] have used the image of the Nation-as-Mother to create their own lineage” (182). Within Mexico’s creation story, La Malinche, the native female interpreter for Hernan Cortes’ sixteenth century conquest army, comes to figure prominently as the whore. La Malinche was not only Cortes’ translator but became his lover and bore him a son. Because of her role in the conquest of Mexico, La Malinche “embodies both negative national identity and sexuality in its most irrational form, a sexuality without regard to moral laws or cultural values” (Cypess 7). In this tale, the woes of the nation are scapegoated onto the person of La Malinche, whose actions are considered a betrayal.

The trope of the “Nation-as-Mother” has implications for the real anticolonial movement as “symbolism shapes the real-life roles women are called upon to play” (Loomba 186). As such, the symbolism of femininity thrust upon the female population is one which is primarily encoded by men. Such narratives place emphasis upon the violent struggle which men are forced to undergo in order to gain independence, whereas women’s role is restricted to their capacity for reproduction, as a means of strengthening the nation. While national independence gained through the anticolonial movement is an empowering movement for the men involved, it strips women of a more active role and demands a more subservient role: “Under colonial rule, the image of nation or culture as a mother worked to evoke both female power and female helplessness. The nation as mother protected her son from colonial ravages, but was also herself ravaged by colonialism and in need of her son’s protection [...] As mothers to the nation, real women
are granted limited agency” (182). By being placed in the position of “mother to the nation,” women’s roles within society, while apparently elevated to a venerated status, are reduced to a limited field of choices subservient to the patriarchy.

In writing *The Loves of Faustyna*, Nina FitzPatrick is attempting to subvert the three prescribed roles Ania Loomba outlines in *Colonialism/Postcolonialism*, according to which women can only be victims, whores, or mothers within the colonial, anticolonial, and postcolonial society. Instead FitzPatrick offers a female protagonist, Faustyna, who seeks to undermine the traditional tropes of national allegory. In creating Faustyna, Nina Fitzpatrick comes close to placing her female protagonist in all of these categories at various points throughout the novel. As a result of her shirking the constraints of the gender biased colonial definitions of what constitutes femininity, Faustyna is able to reclaim agency over her body. This enables her to carve out a different position for women in postcommunist Poland, as her femininity presents a direct challenge to the patriarchal nature many postcolonial societies take after transitioning from colonialism to anticolonialism into post. Ania Loomba has described this phenomenon when she contends:

> Colonialism intensified patriarchal oppression, often because native men, increasingly disenfranchised and excluded from the public sphere, became more tyrannical at home. They seized upon the home and the woman as emblems of their culture and nationality. The outside world could be Westernised but all was not lost if the domestic space retained its cultural purity. (142)
As Polish men are denied their freedoms, they, like the men of other colonized nations, hold to traditional values in order to maintain some semblance of their culture. Often, these traditional values (Catholicism in the case of Poland) are associated with constraining women into emblematic roles of subservience to the masculine cause.

The first popular trope which the reader of *The Loves of Faustyna* is confronted with is the symbol of the female body as representative of the conquered nation. Typically, as Loomba argues, the woman as representative of the conquered land is generally subject to sexual violence or being made a whore. The novel allows for either of these narratives to occur as the young Faustyna decides to embark upon a journey to the hotel room of a Russian man to whom she refers as Mikhail Sergeyevich, and who is later identified as Mikhail Gorbachev, in order to offer him her virginity. Faustyna is informed of Mikhail Sergeyevich’s existence by her roommate in the girl’s dormitory, Oblivia. Mikhail Sergeyevich originally called Oblivia to arrange for a romantic encounter, but as Oblivia has been previously engaged by two other men, she arranges for Faustyna to meet with the Russian. This changes the living arrangement from an innocent girls’ dormitory and gives it the appearance of a brothel, as Oblivia passes on her gentleman caller to her roommate. Mikhail Sergeyevich has called for Oblivia; however he is unaware as to her appearance, and as a result “there’s no problem” as to who arrives

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10 Oblivia is the character’s nickname. Faustyna explains the origin of her friend’s nickname: “She belonged to a special breed of women who answered ‘I don’t know’ to most things […] she would say ‘I don’t know’ with so many different inflections, flavours and textures that most men found her disturbingly profound […] By holding out an empty head and silence to them she forced men to fill the disquieting vacuum with their own ideas. They had to surpass themselves and were therefore grateful to her for their own brilliance” (6). Oblivia’s ability to charm men, as Faustyna states, is as a result of her shallowness allowing men the ability to see their finer qualities in her. She makes men feel secure, and therefore possesses an alluring charm to majority of those she encounters.
at the Russian lawyer’s door in the Europa Hotel (7). It is significant that Mikhail Sergeyevich is staying in the Europa Hotel, as it is a nod at Poland’s position within the European continent, and acts as an allusion to the national narrative.

The initial set-up of Faustyna’s arrival at Mikhail Sergeyevich’s hotel room mirrors Edward Said’s description of Gustave Flaubert’s impression of the women of the Orient. Flaubert wrote to “Louise Colet reassuringly that ‘the oriental woman is no more than a machine: she makes no distinction between one man and another man’” (Orientalism 187). This is certainly the attitude which Oblivia possesses as she arbitrarily decides who is to sleep with which of her suitors: “I take Mateusz, you take Mikhail Sergeyevich and we dump Jozek” (FitzPatrick 7). This is an arrangement which Faustyna initially rejects, although she relents to her friend’s request. Despite the reaction of the young women, Said’s quote from the personal correspondence of Gustave Flaubert is telling of the foreigner’s attitude towards the local women, as they are viewed in relation to their putative sexual promiscuity. Flaubert portrays the women of the Orient as sex-machines who make “no distinction between one man and another man,” and certainly these are Mikhail Sergeyevich’s hopes when he arranges a meeting with Oblivia.

The fact that Mikhail Sergeyevich cares little who arrives at his hotel room repositions him as a type of Flaubert’s sex-machine, who makes no distinction between one woman and another woman; as he has no prior knowledge of Oblivia’s appearance and makes no attempt to discover it when Faustyna arrives at his room. It is not only the Russian who is othering, as Faustyna is reversing Mikhail Sergeyevich’s gaze and treating him in a similar manner that Flaubert treats his Oriental women. Faustyna is eager to lose her virginity and it is irrelevant who she loses it to. When an ominous cloud
in the shape of “a human buttocks” (1) appears over Krakow, Faustyna’s concern is dying “pure as a parsnip” (6). She agrees to go to the Russian and imagines him as possessing the “boundless melancholy of the steppes” (11). By associating the Russian with the steppes she imagines him as a member of those armies from the Russian steppes which have historically ravaged Poland. Norman Davies notes: “Ancestral memories of the Huns and the Mongols have been invoked on every occasion the Russian armies have marched on Poland from the East” (quoted in Jolluck 250). In *Exile and Identity*, Katherine R. Jolluck elaborates on the powerful position the Russian steppes occupy in the Polish psyche when she writes: “the people of the steppe stand firmly outside the world of the Poles, universally abhorred, clearly a despised ‘other’ [...] the Asiatics are used to signal and denigrate the essence of the most bitter foes of the Polish nation, the Russians” (245). By imagining Mikhail Sergeyevich as a sort Asiatic *other* from the Russian steppes Faustyna is acknowledging the multigenerational distrust which exists between the Russians and the Polish. While it becomes a national shame when she offers him her virginity, because he is Russian, she is also able to imagine it as a rape. By wilfully offering her virginity to the Russian colonizer, Faustyna is also able to undercut the symbol of the female-as-nation by acknowledging and thereby reclaiming her sexuality, a traditionally taboo subject. She notes that, “I was a virgin but I had no illusions. I was the kind of woman who had to be ravished. I was so full of myself that I could never yield to anybody without being forced. I had to be taken against my will. I knew that in my case rape of one kind or another was a historical necessity” (9). By positioning the wilful loss of her virginity in terms of a rape, Faustyna places herself in the precarious position somewhere between victim and whore. Faustyna’s “rape” is a
“necessity” because historical pressures have cast women in roles of victimhood or fragility. As such Faustyna attempts to pre-empt the national narrative by staging the rape. This is why Faustyna positions herself as a victim, although when she acknowledges that she wishes to be “taken” against her will, she is admitting that she is arriving at Mikhail Sergeyevich’s hotel room with the expectation that she will be “ravished” by him, suggesting the inadequacy of the model which historical narratives offer.

Because of the social pressures placed upon her, it is important that Faustyna establish herself as the victim of rape in her sexual relations with Mikhail Sergeyevich. Just prior to losing her virginity, the spirit of Faustyna’s great-grandmother is conjured in Faustyna’s mind as the memory of the old woman’s hatred for the Russians becomes a factor in her decision to accept Mikhail Sergeyevich’s invitation. Faustyna’s great-grandmother is seen as existing as a part of the young woman: “A hatred, not my own, stirred in my belly. Great-grandmother shook her fist in my face and screamed. You slut! You Judas!” (14). It is understood that as a Polish woman, Faustyna does not possess autonomy or agency over herself and is responsible to the generations which preceded her. As she points out, the hatred for the Russian Mikhail Sergeyevich is not her own, but rather the by-product of a multigenerational distrust of the colonizers to the East. This is further acknowledged when Faustyna notes: “There were deep strata in both of us—Permian, Devonian, Silurian, Cambrian, Pre-Cambrian—which we tacitly agreed to leave unexplored” (15). Faustyna would prefer to leave their histories ignored and left buried in those deep strata, otherwise the multigenerational ethnic tensions which exist between Poland and Russia would make sex an impossibility. However, Faustyna is unable to
silence her great-grandmother, although she does her best to ignore the old woman’s labelling her descendent a “Judas” for going forth with her tryst with Mikhail Sergeyevich. The term “Judas” makes Faustyna guilty of a second betrayal, no longer just to the Polish nation, but also to the Polish religious traditions. By being referred to as a Judas, the significance of Catholicism in Polish life is being conjured.

Religion played a central role in the organization of opposition to the communist regime in Poland. The election of Karol Józef Wojtyła as Pope John-Paul II (“the Polish Pope”) in 1978, and his first papal visit to Poland in 1979, are both interpreted as major events in Poland’s history and came to be “regarded as the midwife of the Solidarity movement” (Zubrzycki 66). The Solidarity movement was founded in 1980, a year after Pope John-Paul II’s first visit to Poland as Pope, in the shipyards of Gdańsk as a response to the strikes spreading throughout Poland over the government’s attempts to increase the price of meat. Due to Solidarity’s success the movement became the first independent trade union in communist Poland on November 10, 1980, and boasted a membership of about ten million. The union initially strove to increase ties between itself and the Catholic church, as well as aimed to remain politically disengaged. The leaders of Solidarity understood that any overt challenge to the authority of the communist government would serve as a reminder to the leaders in Warsaw and Moscow the events of the Prague Spring. This scenario would provide Moscow the opportunity to yet again invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine as a means of invading Poland and quashing Solidarity, as well as other types of Polish political opposition to the regime. Despite Solidarity’s better efforts, attempts at staying detached from politics proved impossible as General Wojciech Jaruzelski rose to power and declared martial law on December 1981. This declaration
would eventually force the union underground, where it would remain until 1988 (Judt *Postwar* 590-91). From its inception Solidarity was headed by Lech Walesa, who also became the first democratically elected leader of Poland after the collapse of communism. He and other members of the Solidarity movement have made no secret about the union’s ties to Catholicism and the role the Church played in the opposition to the regime. As a result, there are deep associations between Catholicism and postcommunist Poland, as the identity of the latter depends upon the former. In its very organization “Solidarity recognized the moral authority of Roman Catholicism and the church, and constructed its discourses on those foundations. The church and its social teachings provided Polish society with the unified worldview that would be significant in the years of opposition under the leadership of Lech Walesa and the trade union” (Zubrzycki 67).

Members of Solidarity have been public about the fact that they were informed by their religious affiliations with the Church in their roles as dissidents and in their postcommunist duties. As recently as 2009 Walesa has publicly affirmed his conviction in his Catholic beliefs when he stated before an audience in Spain that “he would have resigned as president ‘twenty times’ before signing a law that would allow abortion in his country” (Catholic News Agency May 21 2009). By acknowledging the role his faith played in guiding his decisions as both dissident and president, Walesa is also highlighting the role that Catholicism plays in the life of Poland, as he states that if he had been asked to give consent to an issue which undermines his religious beliefs he would have preferred abdicating his position as president. Unfortunately his attitude also hints at the idea that the Church and the men who rose to positions of prominence in
postcommunist Poland had no intention of allowing women agency in decisions regarding their bodies. This is enforcing the type of control over women that Ania Loomba discusses when she points to the power over the domestic sphere men exercise as a result of their enforcement of traditional cultural values. This leads to a great deal of restriction in regards to the role women play in postcolonial societies. Because of Poland’s adherence to Roman Catholicism, Faustyna’s sexuality is transgressive of the restrictions placed upon her by the nation. Ironically, it is the anti-Soviet discourse, which seeks to overthrow the foreign control of Poland, which is restraining her as a woman, as she is dispossessed of the freedom to make decisions related to her body.

Because of Poland’s religious associations, women within the national allegory are meant to fulfill stereotypes of chastity and fidelity as a result of their associations to the Catholic Church. Jolluck discusses how Poland’s discussions about Russians take place within a traditional framework of West versus East. For centuries, West Europeans perceived Russia as an exotic other. Situating themselves firmly in the West, Poles emphasized their adherence to the Roman Catholic Church and their cultural ties to Latin civilization, which they contrasted with the Byzantine religious and cultural roots and the Asian features of the Russian land and society. In the Polish mind, Poland represented the outpost of Western-civilization. (248) Due to Poland’s tenuous position on the periphery of the West, it is important that Faustyna’s congress with Mikhail Sergeyevich be articulated as a rape. Since Poland and Russia are divided by their associations to Rome and Constantinople, if Faustyna betrays her religious duties she betrays Poland’s link to the West. According to the model which
Ania Loomba offers, Faustyna is set up to be the feminine embodiment of the Polish nation and to uphold the values. This is the reason why she receives a cold reaction from the Polish receptionist who gives her Mikhail Sergeyevich’s hotel room number “in a voice meant to exclude [Faustyna] from the land of the living” (FitzPatrick 13). The receptionist understands the purpose of Faustyna’s visit to Mikhail Sergeyevich’s hotel room. The receptionist has assessed the situation operating under the same model which Ania Loomba has outlined, as he interprets Faustyna’s actions as symbolizing the behaviour of a whore who is selling her nation’s honour to the Russian colonizer of Poland, which Mikhail Sergeyevich comes to embody. Jolluck accounts for the receptionist’s dismissive attitude of Faustyna: “Those ethnic Poles not fitting the description of Polish women as exceedingly patriotic, civic-minded, chaste, self-sacrificing, and nurturing are marginalized” (213). Because Faustyna fails to uphold the virtues of Poland, Faustyna is marginalized, as though she does not belong in Polish society. The receptionist’s alienation of Faustyna has an historical precedent in Polish literary tradition as seen in Jan Potocki’s novel *The Manuscript Found in Saragossa*, published in increments between 1805 and the author’s death in 1815, which carries with it a criticism of La Malinche and her role in Cortes’ conquest of Mexico: “I Koatril, son of Montezuma, have brought here the infamous body of [La Malinche], who yielded her heart and her country to the hateful Cortez, chief of the sea-brigands [...] Spirits of my ancestors [...] restore life to these inanimate remains long enough to make them suffer the agony of death” (460). The receptionist in the Europa Hotel shares a similar distaste to Potocki’s for those women who refuse to serve the nation as mothers; as these men reserve their deepest hatred for the women who do not conform. In Potocki’s retelling of
the La Malinche story, Potocki demonstrates Sandra Messinger Cypess’s claim that La Malinche has been robbed of her voice in her own story as she has been traditionally represented by men with political biases (1). This places Faustyna in a rare position as she is able to tell her own story while La Malinche is rendered voiceless throughout time, subject to the interpretations of subsequent generations.

Faustyna’s attempts at reclaiming sexual agency with the living embodiment of the foreign occupation, significantly undermines her position as allegorical figure and subservient woman. This is a significant point of departure for the novel, which shirks the popular tropes of national allegory and allows Faustyna to reclaim her alienated sense of humanity, in a way entirely dissimilar to the way Frantz Fanon describes the reclamation of a lost masculinity. Whereas the masculinity of the colonized is reclaimed through violence, Faustyna’s humanity is reclaimed by asserting control of her body. As a result, Faustyna is seen as going to Mikhail Sergeyevich of her own volition and offering her virginity to the Soviet colonizer. Upon deciding to offer herself to Mikhail Sergeyevich Faustyna remarks: “And just imagine—with a Bolshevik. As if those vampires hadn’t drawn enough blood from the nation already” (10). It is not just a “Bolshevik” who Faustyna is offering herself to in the Autumn of 1967, it is the future Soviet general secretary, long before he (Gorbachev) rose to prominence. Along with the blood of the Polish nation spilled by the Soviets throughout the two countries’ respective histories, symbolically the Soviet colonizers are also robbing Faustyna of her “virtue” (11). This serves to alienate Faustyna from the life of an honourable Pole as she has been “deflowered” by one of the conquerors.
When the time comes for her loss of virginity, Faustyna is literally deflowered by Mikhail Sergeyevich. Faustyna is careful to position her Russian lover as an invading force, as she “put on the matching set [of underwear] with the sunflower pattern [...] They were a diversionary tactic intended to confuse an invader with their cheerful innocence. Only a brute would lay hands on such trusting, open-eyed blossoms” (16). Faustyna uses the underwear to confuse and ward off would-be “invaders,” associating her virginity with the innocence of land and nature, as her sexuality becomes a physical manifestation of both. Faustyna imagines Mikhail Sergeyevich as the Russian brute needed to “ravish” her. As he approaches her, she notes: “I shrank into my sunflowers and they came off all the more easily” (17). Her imagination allows her to imagine the deflowering as a process more akin to rape. It is directly after this passage that she describes the moment of copulation:

Of course I could scream but I didn’t. Of course I could fight but I didn’t. I let him go on, aware that the whole thing was both necessary and ridiculous. The radio was broadcasting a repeat of a programme called The Matysiaks Family. My mother and I used to listen to the Matysiaks every Saturday evening. She was listening to it now. She was sitting in her matronly chair beside the radio, nodding her head and painting her fingernails. While she nodded away Mikhail Sergeyevich butted me triumphantly into a corner of the sofa. Just at the moment when Mrs Matysiak was scolding her son for escaping from reality and my mother was blowing on her nails he collapsed beside me, his face red as a bortsch soup. (17)
In this passage, Faustyna insinuates that what is occurring is, in fact, a rape, as she leads her reader to believe that she is being forced to yield to the Russian. She states that “I could scream,” suggesting that there was a part of her which would have preferred to break away from Mikhail Sergeyevich. It is by repeating the idea that she could have attempted to fight him off, although both times remained silent, that the idea of the rape which Faustyna stresses cannot by supported and becomes understood as a fabrication. It is by accepting his advances that Faustyna becomes an active participant in the act of copulation with Mikhail Sergeyevich. Faustyna’s actions put her in open defiance of those national symbols which associate themselves with her chastity and virginity. By failing to stop Mikhail Sergeyevich, Faustyna can be interpreted as being, according to Ania Loomba, an accomplice in the rape of Poland by “brutish” Russian invaders. However, to characterize this as a symbolic rape of Poland by the Russians is to misconstrue Faustyna’s departure from feminine symbols of nationality.

The scene quickly turns to farce, however, as she recognizes the “ridiculousness” of the whole act. Faustyna fails to describe in any detail the act of sexual congress with Mikhail Sergeyevich. Instead, the whole scene is summed up when Faustyna describes how the Russian “brute” “butted me triumphantly into a corner of the sofa.” The lack of passion at work in the moment of copulation between Faustyna and Mikhail Sergeyevich becomes noteworthy for its brevity and is severely undercut by Faustyna’s wandering thoughts. Faustyna is more preoccupied with the episode of *The Matysiak Family* playing on the radio than she is about being “butted” into a corner of the sofa. *The Matysiak Family* leads Faustyna to reflect upon her mother and of the tedium of their domestic life, as she spends a significant amount of time considering what it is her mother is doing at
the moment she is in the midst of being deflowered by this foreign invader. By conjuring the image of her mother painting her fingernails, Faustyna is unwittingly juxtaposing her mother’s more traditional femininity with her own. The femininity of Faustyna’s mother is the more socially accepted form as her mother is maintaining an attractive appearance, even in the home, while Faustyna has debased herself by offering herself to Mikhail Sergeyevich. Faustyna’s mind is so transfixed on the fictional Mrs. Matysiak scolding her son and her own mother’s painted fingernails fails to register the moment when Mikhail Sergeyevich climaxes. Instead, her Russian brute falls down beside her with a face, comically, “red as bortsch,” a soup closely associated with the poor cuisine of Russia.

The whole scene is presented as a farce, as this is not the rape of a young Polish woman at the hands of the Russian invader, but is a portrayal of explicitly bad sex. She leaves Mikhail Sergeyevich’s room feeling just as she did when she arrived and wonders to herself, “So, had I lost my virginity or not?” (18). The fact that her life has not changed leads her to the conclusion that it is not her who has lost anything: “If anybody had lost anything it was the Russian. After all, he had emptied himself with a howl into me and not me into him. He lay there unmanned and deseeded while I was ready to run to Planty Park and back. And how could anyone claim he had possessed me? What there was to possess, cuckoo spittle and snail slime, was inside me” (18). This postcoital reflection challenges the traditional gender roles as Faustyna asserts that she has nothing to lose but a meaningless title. She shifts the loss from herself onto Mikhail Sergeyevich who physically loses his “seed,” of which Faustyna is now in possession. Mikhail Sergeyevich is, as a result, emasculated by the process. While the Russian lays at her side, Faustyna
remarks upon the energy she now possesses, as she feels capable of running “to Planty Park and back.”

All of her time with Mikhail Sergeyevich is told in past tense, as the reader is informed that the Faustyna which is relating the story is one in the present who is aware of the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist Eastern Europe. From her vantage-point in the present, Faustyna informs her reader that she fails to remember precisely what Mikhail Sergeyevich’s face looked like, but she refers to him as “the man destined to destroy the empire and to lead us all back to the nineteenth century, [who] remains a headless horseman that rode me to nowhere” (19). In this passage Faustyna is counter-orientalizing her Russian by referring to his status as a horseman, again recalling the barbarian from the Russian steppes. Faustyna claims that Mikhail Sergeyevich “rode [her] to nowhere,” highlighting her feeling that the invader failed to possess her in the manner he was expected, which is to say he failed to “ravish her” or treat her as a victim of sexual violence. Russia’s position as violator of Poland, and other Eastern European nations, has historical merit. Tony Judt describes the Russians’ movement west during World War II when he states: “On its route west the Red Army raped and pillaged (the phrase, for once, is brutally apt)” (Postwar 20). At the end of World War II, Poland had roughly two hundred thousand orphans, many of which were “Russian babies” (20-21) the children born as a result of the sexual victimization of Polish women.

The full extent of rape in Poland as a result of the Red Army’s push west is a figure which is unknowable: “the way [Polish] women chose to discuss the issue renders it impossible to estimate the number of women raped” (Jolluck 168). As victims of sexual violence, Polish women have been rendered silent by their refusal to discuss the violence
which they have endured. Jolluck points to the reasons for this silence as stemming from traditional Catholic guilt:

   The female body, wrapped in traditional Catholic taboos, remained at the core of their sense of self, their sexuality a source of guilt and shame [...] Unable to separate their sexual honour from their identity, Polish women of this period did not find a voice that would enable them to talk openly of what they suffered at the hands of Soviet men [...] If traumatized by rape or forced prostitution, women felt compelled to remain silent. (175)

As a result of the internalization of national and religious values, Polish victims of sexual violence were made to feel ashamed of the trauma which they endured. This resulted in an overwhelming silence on the part of victims, whose very victimization was made to play a role of subservience to the larger, male-oriented national narrative.

Faustyna’s inability to feel like a victim places her outside of the accepted role women are forced to play. Instead of being cowed into silence, Faustyna’s sexual transgression significantly devalues the importance the Polish patriarchy places on sex, as she leaves Mikhail Sergeyevich feeling unchanged by her encounter with the Russian. This provides the first serious challenge to the national allegory, Faustyna tells of the role words possessed over her more virginal self: “For me words were still physical and intrusive. They smelled and groped, they dazzled or deadened me [...] Soon I would no longer flinch from ‘make love’ or ‘sperm’ or ‘state enemy’ or ‘gas chamber’” (22-23). It is due to the balance which Faustya has struck between whore and victim that she is allowed to recognize shallow logic of sexual repression, as well as remove the boundaries from language which the rhetoric of the state has imposed. In her transgression, Faustyna
has issued a flagrant challenge to the masculine understanding of sex as she minimizes the threat which the foreign invader can do to the feminine body, as she argues for a reversal of the power dynamics involved in the act of sexual intercourse by asserting her right to choose a lover regardless of social pressures.

While Faustyna straddles the boundary of whore and victim, she also comes close to functioning as the symbol of the mother-as-nation. It is significant to note that the child with whom Faustyna is pregnant has two possible fathers: the first is Damian, Oblivia’s brother, while the second is Barnaba. The two men represent separate ways of life within the Polish state as Damian, coming to Faustyna’s room in his “green battledress” (76), appears as a representative of the Polish state and the communist order, while Barnaba represents the dissident movement within Poland and comes to play a future role in the Solidarity movement (86). While it is a significant symbol to the allegory of Poland that the representatives of both communism and Solidarity have a role to play in the propagation of Polish national identity, as symbolized by Faustyna’s child, the fact that the child has two fathers casts aspersions on Faustyna’s already tarnished honour.

Faustyna’s own mother comes to inhabit the position of accepted motherhood, much as she earlier represented accepted femininity during Faustyna’s deflowering by Mikhail Sergeyevich. Faustyna’s mother is initially ashamed by the news of the out-of-wedlock pregnancy informing her daughter that she is “too old for a scandal” (96) thinking of the fallout it will bring upon her home. Despite this, Faustyna’s mother forgives her and although she sends her daughter away to avoid the shame, she does so with two hundred zloty in order to prepare for the child’s birth. This gesture symbolizes Faustyna’s mother’s position as the ever-dutiful mother, although, because Faustyna does not
perform the accepted roles of femininity her mother cautions her: “Faustyna, I can’t imagine you having this baby. You’re not able to look after yourself much less a child. Something terrible is going to happen. I can see it. You’re going to damage this baby” (96). Faustyna’s mother’s statements are made out of fear that because Faustyna is not a traditional woman that she will “damage” her child.

With the birth of her daughter, she tells how “I couldn’t bring myself to name her. It was one thing to give birth to her another to impose a name that would define her prematurely and stamp her for life [...] For the sake of peace and to fulfill legal requirements, I called her Marianna [...] When she grew up she called herself first Dominika and then Julia” (102). In refusing to give her daughter a name, except for legal requirements, Faustyna hopes to save her daughter from having her life predetermined by an imposed identity, such as virgin, whore or mother. Instead, she leaves it for Marianna-Julia to decide her own identity, just as Faustyna refuses even to be categorized as mother, as evidenced by her later lover, Aleksander, when he asks Faustyna to “[g]ive up this political nonsense. It’s leading you away from us” (113). Aleksander is asking Faustyna to give up life as a dissident in order to stay home and fulfill the role of the mother. By asking this of Faustyna, Aleksander is demanding that Faustyna silence her voice and return to a role of subservience within the home. It is this which Faustyna has struggled against since the night she lost her virginity to Mikhail Sergeyevich, and it is this which she hopes Marianna-Julia avoids in the postcolonial world.

Throughout the course of *The Loves of Faustyna*, the titular character, Faustyna, embarks upon the overwhelming task of asserting her voice. This leads her to challenge the established models of national allegory as she refuses to adequately conform to the
role of whore, victim, or mother. While it can be argued that Faustyna’s refusal to name her daughter or to offer her a clear trajectory in life are an abdication of her responsibility as a mother, I assert that Faustyna has performed the role of a different type of mother. While the type of mother Faustyna comes to represent is not seen in this three-women model, she is providing her daughter, Marianna-Julia, with a future, which is a luxury most women are not afforded. Throughout this chapter I examined women who have had their voices robbed from them by subsequent generations of male-oriented scholars, who have sought to reinterpret the behaviours of females and transition them into scapegoats for the shame of the nation, such as the example the story of La Malinche offers. It is Faustyna’s hope that she and, more importantly, her daughter avoid the same fate as La Malinche and the unknown number of Polish women who have been silenced as a result of their victimization. While Faustyna’s life is filled with struggle and setbacks, such as her later arrest and incarceration in an internment camp, she is hoping to break the stereotypes which have confined women to a subservient role to men, a position in which these women are valued primarily for their reproductive capabilities. The very fact that Faustyna has a daughter, rather than a son who will come to fight for Poland, underscores the idea that Faustyna is not meant to procreate in order to liberate Poland from foreign occupation, but rather that her purpose is to create a future Poland in which women have a part to play which is not limited to their reproductive organs.
Conclusion: Moving Towards Local Definitions

On February 5, 2011, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron delivered a speech in Munich, Germany on the topic of radicalization and the causes of terrorism. In this speech, Cameron made the assertion that “state multiculturalism” has failed and argued that Great Britain needs “a stronger national identity to prevent people turning to all kinds of extremism” (BBC). In his address, David Cameron has referenced the Western perception that stable and secure nationhood only exists with ethnic homogeneity and it is when the ethnic make-up of the country becomes too heterogeneous that nations no longer function. In regards to the constitution of nationhood, this has been a popular idea amongst Western conservative scholars and a popular sentiment of the Western colonial discourse which was prevalent in the late nineteenth century. In the first chapter I examined this colonial discourse, especially as it related to Eastern Europe, and focused on the portrayal of the region as seen in popular works such as Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* (1897) and Anthony Hope’s *The Prisoner of Zenda* (1894). These texts served as the literary culmination of the discourse which surrounded Eastern Europe and portrayed the region as a landscape in which ethnic heterogeneity and political turmoil were the rule, functioning on the assumption that there was a correlation between the two. As a result of this discourse Western Europe imagined Eastern Europe as its unstable *other*. It is this logic which laid the foundation for the discourse that surrounded Eastern Europe throughout the Cold War.

In the aftermath of World War II, Eastern Europe was removed even further from the West’s consciousness as the Soviet Union was allowed to spread its sphere of influence over the territory in the swath of land East of Germany and between the Baltic
and the Balkans. The West applied the discursive mastery it exercised over most of the rest of the world to Eastern Europe. This allowed and made sense of the Soviet Union’s exertion of direct pressure over the internal politics of Eastern European nations. As a result it becomes helpful to ground an examination of the Cold War experiences of Eastern Europe in the discourse of postcolonialism as similar mechanisms which granted the Western colonial empires control over their foreign holdings granted similar privileges to the Soviet Union.

The West justified their abandonment of Eastern Europe through erecting imaginary barriers such as the “Iron Curtain,” as articulated by another British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946, and reducing the countries and peoples of Eastern Europe into a territory only worth knowing in relation to their relevance in the larger Cold War. In looking at Ivan Klima’s 1986 novel *Love and Garbage* I explored issues regarding the West’s engagement with the Eastern Bloc, as related by an Eastern European writer. In *Love and Garbage*, the nameless narrator engages with representatives of the West throughout the course of the novel. In his depictions of his interactions with these Western representatives, the narrator portrays the stereotyping and biases which become projected onto those living on the Eastern side of the ideologically divided world. Through his interactions it becomes evident that the cause for whatever Western interest there was in the Eastern Bloc was as a result of the region’s political expediency and usefulness to the internal politics of Western countries. In writing his experiences and those of his fellow trash collectors, the narrator is aiming to reclaim his voice and rescue it from ending up in a figurative trash heap.
The theme of agency is one which returns in Nina FitzPatrick’s 1994 novel *The Loves of Faustyna* as the female protagonist, Faustyna, struggles to avoid the pitfalls of falling into one of the three categories in which national allegory interprets women, as outlined by Ania Loomba. By refusing to conform to the constraints which the titles of whore, victim, or mother place on women, Faustyna is attempting to claim agency over her body, her actions, and her thoughts. Faustyna is seeking to become valued as a person than for her capacity for reproduction and to create a postcommunist and postcolonial world in which women have as much a role to play as men. While the narrator of *Love and Garbage* is concerned with asserting his voice during the 1980s, a period when the Czechoslovakian government ruled with authoritarian control and was backed by the tenets of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the force of the Soviet led Warsaw Pact armies, Faustyna is concerned with claiming her agency not only during the Cold War but in maintaining that agency after the end of the conflict. Often, as Ania Loomba demonstrates, after gaining independence, national movements return women to positions of subservience to men, ignoring their contributions to the anticolonial movement and silencing any voice which deviates from the narrative. Faustyna attempts to circumvent this by providing for her a daughter a life of choices in which she is forced to develop her own identity instead of accepting one that is predetermined.

Throughout the three chapters I looked at the ways in which the discourses surrounding colonial, anticolonial, and postcolonial thought came to influence thinking in and on Eastern Europe. In the colonial and anticolonial logic, heterogeneity is an indicator of failure for a state. David Cameron’s assertion that state multiculturalism has failed is very much influenced by this type of thinking, as this failure poses a threat to the
security of the British state. As was examined in chapter one, Count Dracula, from Bram Stoker’s novel *Dracula*, acts as an Eastern European challenger to British nationhood who has the ability to destroy British society in the same way vampires have destroyed other imperial nations throughout the world. In calling for a “stronger national identity,” Cameron has established a model in which the threats to national security are seen as existing as a result of a multiethnic state failing to properly foster an understanding of “Britishness” to recent immigrants. His interpretation is that by enforcing a stronger national identity national security will no longer be compromised as the “foreign” ethnic groups will come to understand the British way of life. Essentially, David Cameron is laying the blame for social tensions on non-British ethnic groups and arguing that their inability to integrate has signalled the failure of state multiculturalism, and could, according to the colonial logic, become the destruction of Great Britain. Cameron identifies the problem with British multiculturalism as being too “passive” and offers the solution that the nation needs a more “muscular liberalism,” enforcing *British* values upon the populace in an attempt to homogenize the population and remove ethnic differences.

Maria Todorova has a different outlook on the process of ethnic homogenization in *Imagining the Balkans*. Todorova argues that the conflicts and ethnic tensions in the Balkans throughout the 1990s came as a result of the Balkan nations’ attempt to shed the lasting effects of the Ottoman Empire and to “Europeanize” itself: “the Balkans were becoming European by shedding the last residue of an imperial legacy, widely considered an anomaly at the time, and by assuming and emulating the homogeneous European nation-state as the normative form of social organization” (13). Todorova subverts the
traditional model associated with the ethnic tensions and violence which accompanied the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, by portraying the attempts at “ethnic cleansing” not as the
region’s atavistic impulse towards violence, as articulated by the West, but as the
region’s attempts to become a “modern” European nation.

This is certainly attested to by the period directly following World War II in
which the countries of Eastern Europe attempted to “modernize” through a similar
process of homogenization. With the shifting of the border of Poland and Ukraine, one
million Poles were forced to leave their homes, while half a million Ukrainians left
Poland for the Soviet Union between 1944 and 1946. Bulgaria sent 160 000 Turks to
Turkey, while Czechoslovakia brokered an agreement with Hungary in which 120 000
ethnic Slovaks were exchanged for the same number of Hungarians. In June 1945, the
government of Czechoslovakia, under Edvard Beneš, confiscated the property and
citizenship of nearly three million ethnic Germans, most of whom came from the
Sudetenland, and expelled them into Germany, of which an estimated 267 000 died in the
process. In total some thirteen million ethnic Germans were expelled from the lands of
Eastern Europe and transferred to Germany. While it may be tempting to portray these
expulsions as more Eastern European animosities, Chapter XIII of the Potsdam
Agreement between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States recognized:
“the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken” (Judt Postwar 25-26).
With the de jure acceptance by the Western powers, Eastern Europe began a process of
ethnic homogenization, which officially began when the Nazis invaded Eastern Europe
(25), in order purge itself of undesirables and to modernize. It is the lasting effects of this
process, as they are carried out by the communist regime, which Ivan Klima depicts in *Love and Garbage*. Tony Judt points out: “At the conclusion of the First World War it was borders which were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in place. After 1945 what happened was rather the opposite: with one major exception boundaries stayed broadly intact and people were moved instead” (27). Put in an insensitive manner, this was Eastern Europe catching up with “European” instinct towards homogenization as it sought to ethnically match the borders the West imposed in the Treaty of Versailles. This is not to suggest that nations of Eastern Europe became entirely homogenized, as most nations maintained populations of minorities. Instead what occurred was a “‘tidier’ Europe” was born (28).

Since the collapse of the communist governments in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, there has been a tendency in Eastern European politics to move back into the fold of Europe. Many of the former Eastern Bloc nations have since joined NATO and the European Union, despite the uneven economic playing field. In the immediate years after communism both Poland and Czechoslovakia sought to privatize national industries and to remove controls which the communist governments put in place. The Czechoslovakian finance minister, Vaclav Klaus, who later became the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic from 1993-1997 and who succeeded Vaclav Havel as president in 2003, sought to apply “shock therapy” to the Czechoslovakian economy and speed up the transition to capitalism (Judt 686-87). Not only did nations move to alter their economies to reflect those in the West (Vaclav Klaus was an avowed Thatcherite), but the impulse towards enforcing ethnic homogeneity returned with the collapse of communist regimes. This was evident in not only the former Yugoslavia, but in nations like Poland, with the
rise of Andrzej Lepper’s Self-Defence Party which benefitted from a broad base of support, although only ever played a minor position in Sejm (693).

Contrary to this drive towards ethnic homogeneity, as espoused by Poland’s Andrzej Lepper and Great Britain’s David Cameron, the Polish composer Henryk Gorecki recounted in a 1998 interview with Maria Anne Harley of the Musical Quarterly, his own impressions of a multicultural nation:

I was born in Silesia [in 1933], in a small, fine, wonderful place with a nice old Polish name. The village is called Czernica, between Rybnik and Raciborz. It is old Polish land. But there were always three cultures present: Polish, Czech, and German. The folk art, all the art, had no boundaries. These boundaries were supposed to exist, but they were shifted frequently to the right and to the left. But that did not mean that people started thinking differently. No, the land dictated. The region defined the identity of a person, of the inhabitant. A highlander [goral], is always a highlander, a highlander in the first place. A Silesian is always a Silesian. There is a certain land that transmits certain genes and not others. I did not always realize this. Where does my knowledge and my liking for Czech music come from? My knowledge of German or Austrian music? Why did, for instance, Mozart never speak of his being an Austrian, only as his being German? What is the reason for my worshipping Mozart, Schumann, Schubert, Brahms, Beethoven, Bach? [...] Polish culture is a wonderful mixture. There are German, Czech, Russian, even Tatar elements in it. And Jewish of course. [...] And yet, when you look at the
history of Poland, it is precisely the multiculturalism, the presence of the so-called minorities that made Poland what it was. The cultural wealth, the diversity mixed and created a new identity. [...] And now there are those who claim that Poland is some kind of monolith, that there is only one Polish identity while the others are strangers. That’s terrible. It is a lie. After all, there were Czech and German elements in the Polish culture, especially in Silesia. In the east there is a mixture of Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, even Romanian elements. Poland is different in every region.”

(73-74)

Gorecki’s analysis of his own upbringing attributes elements of his artistic achievement to the multicultural composition of Silesia, a south-western region of Poland. According to Gorecki, multiculturalism played an integral role in his early artistic education and helped shape him into a more complete composer as he had various artistic experiences from which to draw. In his analysis he also hints at the attempts by a vocal and hostile minority of Polish ultranationalists to purge the multicultural elements of Poland in favour of a more culturally and ethnically uniform Poland. This attempt to standardize a national Polish identity is one that has its roots in the Wilsonian tradition of nation states based on ethnic makeup, which reflects the Western anxiety of heterogeneous states as being inherently unstable entities. In his assessment of postcommunist Poland, Henryk Gorecki argues that Eastern European nations are attempting to dismantle their ethnic and cultural diversities in order to conform to Western perceptions of what constitutes the modern nation state. This attempt to standardize a national identity, while valued by the West, is one which Gorecki points to as a negative attribute as it robs nations of what it
was that made them great in the first, as it seeks to impose a grander national narrative upon all parts of the nation, regardless of their actual differences. Such cultural exchange, like that which occurred in Silesia during Gorecki’s formative years, allowed the budding composer a chance to appreciate the variety of artistic tastes as well as to come into contact with a broad range of people. According to the composer, all of this had a major impact upon his life and work, and without it he may never have come to appreciate the artistic output of other cultures, and thereby its benefit. The central point at the heart of Gorecki’s recollection of his life Silesia is that people should have the freedom to decide their place within a nation instead of relying on the uniformity homogeneity offers. There are sentiments which mirror those of Faustyna in her attempts to create a role for herself which does not necessarily conform to those roles offered by national allegory. According to Gorecki and Faustyna, nations, and the people who comprise them, should be given the ability to express themselves rather than having identities imposed upon them. These prefabricated identities do not provide freedom but, as Gorecki and Faustyna demonstrate, only serve to impose further restrictions upon the newly gained freedoms by the anticolonial movements, whether they are artistic, sexual, or political, as only prescribed types of citizenship become acceptable. Because of the restrictions Eastern Europe had imposed on it by the Soviet Union’s direct control over the region for over forty years, and through the discursive force the West has exerted even longer, tendencies towards homogeneity have been firmly established. It is by engaging with the region within the framework postcolonial studies offers that elements which have come to shape postcommunist Eastern Europe can be better analyzed from a new perspective.
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