ABSTRACT

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Al-Fârâbî's Philosophy of Education presents a new departure in the interpretation of this tenth century teacher's writings: previous metaphysical and political science emphases on the macro-scale have been at the expense of the human scale, a level which provides genuine insights vis-a-vis his theory of instruction. The explanatory power of such a prescription is evident in the focus it provides for the results of his investigation of the known sciences, political regimes, philosophers, syllogistic arts and deliberative virtues. The educational space thus mapped elucidates the functioning of such taxonomies for the evaluation of innovations at the micro-level, and the process of courteous translation whereby a student is brought into contact with the logical demands of the subject by the deliberation of the teacher. The intelligibles comprising the curriculum content are tensions of the human predicament - acquired willingly through the positing of counter-factuals which create space for and indeed are the mutual investigation.
Al-Fârâbî's Philosophy of Education présente une nouvelle interprétation des écrits du maître pédagogue du dixième siècle : les interprétations précédentes, en soulignant l'aspect métaphysique et de science politique, ont mis l'accent sur le niveau macroscopique, aux dépens du niveau humain qui, pourtant, nous offre une vue authentique de sa théorie de l'enseignement. La valeur explicative de cette méthode est mise en évidence par le fait qu'elle permet de voir la convergence des résultats de ses recherches dans les sciences connues, dans les régimes politiques, sur les philosophes, dans les arts syllogistiques et dans les arts de la délibération. L'espace éducatif ainsi défini éclaire le fonctionnement de ces systèmes de classification pour une évaluation des innovations au niveau humain, ainsi que le processus de la "transmission courtoise" par laquelle l'étudiant est mis en contact avec les exigences logiques du sujet, par la délibération du maître. Certaines tensions de la condition humaine forment les composants du cadre logique du curriculum, acquis volontairement par la mise en place de mythes alternatifs qui créent un espace pour la recherche mutuelle, et, en fait sont cette recherche.
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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of al-Fārābī, *muʿallum al-falāṣifah*. 
(1) TRANSLITERATION - all transliterations are italicized; the Institute of Islamic Studies transliteration system for Arabic has been closely followed except in the case of the following:
the 'ain is transliterated by (') e.g. al-'aql al-fa'âl;
the hamzah is transliterated by (') e.g. fadâ'ül;
and the long vowel is indicated by a circumflex (') e.g. al-Fârâbi.

(2) CITATION - all authors except al-Fârâbi have been cited in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style author-date system i.e the name of the author followed by the date of publication of the relevant text and the page number(s) - e.g. (Mahdi, 1975, p. 117).

(3) SHORT TITLES - short titles have been used for all of al-Fârâbi’s books a list of which will be found in Appendix 2. The number of the appropriate page or fasl has been quoted immediately after the short title in the citation which is italicized e.g. (Attainment, pp. 45-46) or (Madani, fs. 33). In the endeavour to keep the citations simple the page numbers quoted refer to the pagination of the edited Arabic text which the English translations quote in the margins or within the text, except for Mabâdi’ which has the translation on pages facing the Arabic text within the same publication. Hence Aristotle for instance refers to Aristutâlîs as well. Wherever appropriate the same applies to the number of the quoted fasl.

(4) DATES - dates for the relevant events are given according to both Muslim and Christian calendars.
INTRODUCTION: THE CURRICULUM PROPOSAL

Perhaps the best point of departure for an investigation of al-Fārābī's philosophy of education is to be found in Regime (p. 55) where he prescribes a curriculum for the inhabitants of the virtuous city. The proposal requires each one of the inhabitants of al-madinah al-fādilah to have knowledge of - [1] the highest principles of the beings (mabādi' al-mawjūdât al-aqsâ) and their ranks of order,¹ [2] happiness (al-sa'âdah), [3] the supreme rulership (al-nâsah al-ûlâ) of the virtuous city and the ruling ranks of order in it, and subsequent to these three, [4] specified actions which lead to happiness - actions which should not only be known but which the people of the city should be directed to perform.

Another prescription can be found in Mabâdi' (pp. 276-279). The first requirement of the curriculum for the city which al-Fārābī wishes to bring into existence is similar to the one in Regime but there is more detail. It begins with knowledge of the First Cause, together with its qualities and knowledge of all the material and immaterial existentia which form the warp and woof of the universe. This is to be supplemented by awareness of the justice, the wisdom, the order and the perfection which prevails amongst these existentia of the supra- and infra-lunary worlds.

The third specification of Regime is likewise explained in Mabâdi' to include the manner in

¹ In a descending hierarchy the six principles to which the first part of the treatise has been devoted are -

- the First Cause - al-sabab al-awwal
- the Second Causes - al-ashâb al-thawâbî
- the Active Intellect - al-'aql al-fa'âl
- soul - nafs
- form - surah
- matter - maddah
which the rulers attain their exalted ranks and the status of people in *al-madinah al-fâdilah* as a consequence of this rule in comparison to their counterparts in the cities opposed to the virtuous city. Passing reference is made to the manner in which their souls will differ after death and happiness or felicity is mentioned only as a condition of the souls of the former. The second treatise also prescribes specific knowledge of the role of *al-‘aql al-fa‘âl* in connection with the growth of man’s knowledge, revelation and the freedom of choice which enables man to decide whether or not to carry out the above mentioned actions leading to happiness.

Consider now *Aristotle* (pp. 68-69) where al-Fârâbî concludes, after being compelled to investigate the purpose of man’s existence, that knowledge of this purpose necessitates knowing "the purpose of the totality of the world and we cannot know this without knowing all the parts of the world and their principles (*ajzâ‘ al-‘âlam kullahâ wa mabâdîrahâ*)". Observe in addition, the philosopher’s assertion in *Plato* (p. 5) that the prerequisites for the perfection which gives man his ultimate happiness are "a certain knowledge and a certain way of life" where the certain knowledge is defined as "knowledge of the substance of each of the beings (*al-‘ilm bi-jawhar mawjûd min al-mawjûdât kullihâ*) : this knowledge is the final perfection of man and the highest perfection he can possess”.

To arrive at the knowledge of such universal breadth al-Fârâbî prescribes a methodology of research in *Aristotle* (pp. 70-86), *Attainment* (pp. 4-8), *Ihsâ‘* (in the very order of the chapters enumerating the various sciences), *Madani* (fs. 89) and *Plato* (pp. 6-7).2 The elaboration of the

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2 An alternate indication of the scope of the curriculum implicit in al-Fârâbî’s writings can be gauged by the classifications and/or bibliographies in Brockelmann (1943, Atef (1951), Rescher (1962), Walzer (1965) and Butterworth (1983). Consider the following three taxonomies :  

[1] Brockelmann (1943, Band 1, pp. 232-236 and Supplement, Band 1, pp. 375-377) categorizes the writings into :  
(a) Logic, (b) Ethics and Politics including for instance *Mabâdh*, *Nawâmits*, *Tahâlî* and *Tanbih*, (c) Mathematics, Astrology, Alchemy, Mystic Sciences and Music, (d) Miscellaneous works which include *Ihsâ‘* and *Risâlah ‘Aql*;  
(e) Writings on Aristotle and (f) Writings on Plato.  

[2] Rescher (1962, pp 42-44) makes the following divisions : (a) Logic; (b) Rhetoric and Poetics; (c) Theory of Knowledge; (d) Metaphysics and General Philosophy, (e) Physics and Science; (f) Music and (g) Ethics and Political Philosophy  

[3] Walzer’s (1965, pp 780-781) taxonomy is : (a) Commentaries on Aristotle; (b) Introductory monographs further subdivided into - Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics and Politics e.g. *Tanbih, Madani, Nawâmits, and Miscellaneous e.g. Jam*; (c) Major works "concerned with the sovereign position to be given to philosophy within the realm of
various dimensions of the investigation is intended to avoid any confusion and to arrive at the intended destination. Nor has al-Fârâbî ignored the veritable procedure of instruction for those who, in some way or other cannot, or do not, pursue the inquiry on their own: the concern for pedagogical principles is manifest in the detailed treatment devoted to the subject in, amongst other writings, Alfaż (pp. 94-104), Aristotle (pp. 78-85), Attaqment (pp. 29f and 40-42), Mabâdi' (pp. 69-71), Plato (pp. 16 and 21-23) and Regime (pp. 55-57).

The question then arises as to why this ninth/tenth century philosopher (died 328/950 in Aleppo), who came to be renowned as al-mu'allim al-thâni or the Second Teacher after Aristotle, prescribed this particular curriculum content and these particular methods of investigation and instruction. In other words how did al-Fârâbî address the perennial questions of man and the world in which he lives? How did he utilize the traditions he considered his heritage to raise such questions and provide appropriate answers? What for instance was the impetus for, and the logic of, a classification of knowledge which Sâ'id al-Andalusî (died 355/1070) called "unprecedented" in comparison to both the Arabic/Islamic and the Aristotelian classifications of the sciences (Farmer, 1960, p. 3; Mahdi, 1975b, pp. 117 and 147), or which has more recently been referred to as "a neat blend of an Aristotelian classification of the sciences, thinking and with the organization of the perfect society and the philosopher-king" i.e. Ihât, Mabâdî, Tahâlî and Syâsah.

Such taxonomies are only the more more recent "footnotes" to a long tradition of reading this tenth century teacher: the philosophical heritage in Islam being supplemented by translations into other civilizations See for instance Farmer (1960) and Rescher (1962) for translations into Latin European Christendom, Davidson (1963), Kraemer (1971) and Strauss (1945 and 1987) for translations and paraphrases by Maimonides (514/1135 - 573/1194) and Falcura (c 1225/1846-1295/1916) in the Jewish tradition The bibliography of the present thesis gives examples of more recent translations of the same tradition

3 Nasr (1985) has an interesting discussion of five different explanations offered for the attribution of this appellation to al-Fârâbî.

4 The interrogation here is raised in the sense that, if one suspends judgment regarding the tradition to which al-Fârâbî "belonged", whether this tradition be Platonic, Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, Islamic Aristotelian, Muslim, Shi'i, Sufi, or any other, one can then begin to appreciate al-Fârâbî as al-Fârâbî It is we who, basing ourselves on an appreciation of his writings, or a non-appreciation of them, impose these categories However judging from the way in which he chooses to elaborate or to ignore the various facets of his education, in the broadest sense of this word, it would seem that he did not derive his "identity" from any particular one or even all of these traditions The same would probably hold true for others whom al-Fârâbî educated, whether in person, through his books or both.
the liberal arts and the Arabic sciences?" (Kraemer, 1986, p. 9).

The taxonomy of Islamic sciences comprised the traditional/religious sciences made up of linguistics, study of the Qur'an and the Hadith, kalâm (dialectical theology) and fiqh (jurisprudence) of which the premises were the revealed texts, and the philosophic/rational sciences based on observation and reason. The Aristotelian taxonomy of the philosophic sciences comprised the theoretical sciences (mathematics, physics, and theology), the practical sciences (ethics, politics which was the supreme practical science, and economics) and the productive sciences (Ross, 1964, pp. 20 and 62). Regarding the later categorization of the liberal arts in medieval Europe, they consisted of a higher and a lower division of subjects: the quadrivium (arithmetic, astronomy, geometry and theoretical music) and the trivium (grammar, rhetoric and poetic) respectively.

Ihsâ' on the other hand is the unprecedented taxonomy where al-Fârâbî marshalls a variety of sciences from at least the Muslim and the Greek cultures and in five chapters discourses on the eight sciences of [1] language, [2] logic, [3] mathematics, [4] divine and natural sciences, [5] political science and the sciences of jurisprudence and theology. The immediate surprise of al-Fârâbî's taxonomy seen in the light of the above classifications is the absence of the theoretical/practical distinction of knowledge due to Aristotle as well as his ethics and his economics (Najjar, 1958, p. 94 and 1984, p. 106). In addition, logic, which was for Aristotle

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5 The extent to which the philosophic/rational (or "foreign") sciences were accepted depended on the particular kind of Islam one refers to ... in the "orthodox" who did not accept any science not grounded in revelation to the more "liberal" for whom knowledge grounded in extra-revelatory sources was not taboo. The division became sharper with time, the former gaining ground from the reaction to the Inquisition (see p. 6 of this introduction and chapter one, p 13). Thereafter the traditional sciences or sciences of the Qur'an "had total control over the institutions of learning" (Makdisi, 1981, p 75). The concomitant "privatization" of the other subjects of the curriculum is discussed in chapter five (pp. 78f).

6 Theology later came to be known as metaphysics i.e. the work in which Aristotle developed the doctrine referred to by him as Wisdom, First Philosophy or Theology was given the title Metaphysics by Andronicus of Rhodes because it came after the Physics (McKeon, 1941, p. xviii) The implicit subsequence in Greek is also apparent in the Arabic translations al-tabî'ah and ma' ba'd al-tabî'ah

7 Aristotle's productive sciences do not seem to deserve much attention from al-Fârâbî.
"part of general culture which everyone should undergo before he studies any science... (Ross, 1964, p. 20) and was not subject to classification, is now accorded a place in al-Fârâbî's enumeration. No less intriguing is the presence of two theologies, one natural, the other revealed on either side of the science of politics ('ilm al-madâni): natural theology, metaphysics or what al-Fârâbî calls 'ilm 'llahi is discussed in the same chapter as natural science prior to political science, and kalâm and figh are expounded upon in the final chapter together with but after political science.

The enigmatic character of al-Fârâbî’s educational prescriptions is given further depth when one reads right at the beginning of Attainment that the conditions for the attainment of happiness - "earthly happiness in this life" and "supreme happiness in the life beyond" - are four human things. That this assertion is made in what serves as an introduction to the previously mentioned Plato and Aristotle with their demands for knowledge of the utmost breadth raises the question of whether al-Fârâbî is not proposing a different curriculum from the one proposed above, thus highlighting the "trial of patience" which the translator (Mahdi, 1969b, p. 10) refers to in his introduction to al-Fârâbî's exposition of the two philosophers whose writings are supposed to embody "the ways to re-establish [philosophy] when it becomes confused and extinct" (Attainment, p. 47).

Al-Fârâbî could of course be referring indirectly to any number of or even all of the events which either preceded or were coextensive with his lifetime. Consider first the late third and first half of the fourth/late ninth and the first half of the tenth centuries which witnessed a weakening of the centralizing authority of the Sunnî ‘Abbâsîyah on the one hand and the

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These four human things (al-ashyâ' al-masnîyah al-arba') which become the leitmotif of Attainment are -

- theoretical virtues: fadâ'il nazariyah
- deliberative virtues: fadâ'il fikrîyah
- moral virtues: fadâ'il khuluqiyah
- practical arts: sanâ'î 'amaliyah

Longer discussions on the virtues will be found in the following chapters of the present thesis. As for the practical arts, a lack of interest in Attainment seems to be similar to the lack of attention in Istaw regarding Aristotle's productive sciences noticed above.
emergence of the Shi'i Hamdani, Fâtimi, Bûyî and Qarâfî political powers on the other. Al-Fârâbî himself was caught in this turbulence: he had to flee Baghdad in 330/945 when it was captured by the Bûyî forces and took refuge with Sayf al-Dawlah, a Hamdani prince (regency: 333/945 - 356/967) in Aleppo.

The same background also holds the reaction to the Mu'tazili led Inquisition (mihna) during the reigns of the 'Abbâsi khulafâ' al-Ma'mûn (regency: 198/813 - 218/833), al-Mu'tasîm (218/833 - 227/842), al-Wâthiq (227/842 - 232/847) and al-Mutawakkil (232/847 - 247/861). This was the political climax of a theological debate between the Mu'tazilah who were more inclined to use reason, albeit grounded in the revelation, to interpret ambiguous statements in the Qur'ân than their opponents the legal traditionists (ahl al-hadîth). Among the issues at stake was the question over the un-createdness of the Qur'ân, in support of which Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (died 241/855, a founder of one of the four major schools of law) was imprisoned by al-Ma'mûn (Hodgson, 1974, p. 389). Other legal traditionists, holding the same view were likewise persecuted until 234/849 when al-Mutawakkil turned the tables on the Mu'tazili position.

This reaction has been well documented: Watt (1973), for instance refers to the triumph of Sunnism, Makdisi (1981) documents the traditionalization of curriculum in the institutions of higher education, Hodgson (1974) notes the persecution of the Shi'i community and the destruction of shrines and Christian churches. Another issue in this controversy was the question of causality: on the one hand was the general Mu'tazili position explaining events in terms of cause and effect and opposed to this position was the figure of al-Ash'arî refuting human causality by attributing all actions to God. Further discussion on this issue together with the attendant questions of free will and determinism will be found in chapters three through five.

The above controversy, which is in some measure also due to the contact with other traditions and hence the need to universalize and/or defend the revelation, was coextensive with the development of jurisprudence (ustûl al-fiqh) which itself was not free of controversy either. There is al-Shâfi'i (died 204/820), the founder of another school of law which survived the
"formative period", who reversed the creation of prophetic traditions out of the tribal traditions dating to the pre-Islamic era by restoring authority to the Qur'an. This was followed by the drawing up of taxonomies of the prophetic *sunnah* in terms of decreasing probability as premises, which the jurists took as points of departure for their deliberations in legal *issus*.

Of course it is also possible that al-Fârâbî may not have been referring to any of these events of the Muslim empire in which his life was lived but to the state of affairs in both the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions. He could well have been noting the condition of the Alexandrian school which had almost perished except for its last few adherents who moved to Baghdad where al-Fârâbî became one of the, if not the, foremost exponent of Aristotelian logic (see chapter one, pp. 10-13). He could equally well have been evaluating the Neoplatonic tradition in terms of confusion since in his estimation the more important political emphasis of Platonic writings seemed to have been lost in deference to speculation about the metaphysical concepts (see chapter two, p. 32). His criticism may even have reference to an awareness of Christian history which had absorbed and subsequently controlled philosophy (see chapter one, p. 12 and chapter four, pp. 66-67).

With these contextual circumstances in mind the present thesis is an investigation of a probable trajectory into pedagogical space envisaged by al-Fârâbî i.e. what should be taught to whom, how and why. The primary intention is to make manifest the humane orientation of the educational prescriptions al-Fârâbî drew up in the trying times just depicted. The thesis takes the form of five chapters the first two of which are an exposition of the nature and the procedure of al-Fârâbî's philosophic inquiry. This is followed by an account of the Active Intellect - the bridge between the higher eternal world of the heavens and the lower world of generation and corruption of which man is a part but not completely so. Next in turn are two chapters analyzing al-Fârâbî's theory of instruction and the conclusion. The appendices include a glossary of terms.
1. THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION

The intended destination for al-Fârâbî, as previously mentioned, is certain knowledge of the highest principles of the beings and their ranks of order. This in its turn will become the basis of the specified actions for the inhabitants of the virtuous city leading to happiness. The point of departure for this endeavour is "in part possessed by man from the outset without his being aware of it and without perceiving how he acquired it or where it comes from. This is primary knowledge.... The first premises are known by primary knowledge; on their basis one proceeds to the subsequent knowledge gained from investigation, inference, instruction and study" (Attainment, pp. 2-3; also Aristotle, pp. 62 and 127, and Madani, fs. 31).

The "given" primary knowledge (al-'uūm al-uwal), alternately termed the first intelligibles or the primary cognitions, is knowledge of the first premises which can now be employed as the principles of instruction with respect to a problem, i.e. the thing under investigation, in order to arrive at the conclusion i.e. the principle of being of that thing (Attainment, pp. 4-5 and Aristotle, pp. 63 and 75). To put it differently, in the first instance the principles of instruction are the grounds of our knowledge of the principles of being but subsequently the conclusions are "the sources and the grounds of the existence of the premises that happened to be employed as principles of instruction" (Attainment, p. 8).

Each investigation or science for instance begins with the first premises (al-muqaddamât al-uwal) relative to each thing [T1], species [S1] or genus [G1]. Demonstrations (barâhin) proceeding from these yield conclusions or principles of being which in turn become the premises to derive the principles of being of [T2], [S2], or [G2] higher in the order of being. Alternatively the same
principles of being can be employed as premises to derive other, inferior principles of [T1], [S1] or [G1] which could not be found without first deriving its principle of being. In this manner one gradually ascends through a cause and effect relationship to the ultimate principle. The procedure of arranging the premises so as to "make the conclusion (natîjah) follow necessarily from them" is the method of demonstration or the certain science the aim of which is to make known with certainty the beings and what they contain (Attainment, p. 7 and Aristotle, pp. 73-74).

The primary difference between a principle of instruction (mabda' al-ta'llîm) and the principle of being (mabda' al-wujûd) of any particular thing, species or genus lies in the number of causes which the two make manifest. A principle of instruction comprises three causes - [1] the material cause: by virtue of which a thing exists potentially, [2] the formal cause: by virtue of which it is in act and [3] the efficient cause: by virtue of which it moves from potentiality to actuality. Knowledge of "why" the same thing exists can be given solely by [4] the final cause: the reason for its existence. This cause is comprised by the principle of being of that particular thing (Attainment, p. 5 and Aristotle, p. 92). In al-Fârâbî's terminology the formal cause is "what", "by what", and "how" the thing is; the final cause is "for what" the thing is. The material and the efficient causes are both subsumed under "from what" the thing is as agent principle and material principle.

The method of demonstration is apparently the true method by which all the beings, material and immaterial, can be investigated and al-Fârâbî devotes a great deal of space to this under the rubric of logic e.g. in Aristotle (pp. 70-85), Attainment (pp. 3-8), Ihsâ' (the chapter on logic, pp. 21-53), and Plato (pp. 6-9). For instance in Aristotle (p. 70) he asserts that the knowledge that man should possess and on the basis of which he ought to act must be the certain science and hence this also ought to be his goal "in everything he investigates, be it natural or voluntary".

9 Other terms used for the principles of being are the universal rules (ustûl kulliyah) or the extremely general propositions (qadâ'yâ kulliyah jiddan). Both of these occur in a discussion of Aristotle's Categories - i.e. the ten categories of substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action and passion - which sets the stage for the investigation of nature (Aristotle, p. 92).
Or again in *Attainment* (pp. 3-4) he insists that investigation and instruction ought to be preceded by enhancing one's innate aptitude for science (logic, writes al-Fârâbî "improves the rational part of the soul, directs it toward certainty and the useful approaches to instruction and study, makes it discern the things that deflect from certainty...." - *Aristotle*, p. 71) so as to be able to distinguish between the one method leading to certainty from the others which merely conclude in partial certainty at best, merely belief or even in confusion.¹⁰

The primacy al-Fârâbî accords logic and the demonstrative science is due to the decisive influence of the Aristotelian school of Alexandria which gave logic primacy in the curriculum and at "the heart of logic the Science of Demonstration as incorporated in the *Posterior Analytics*" (Zimmermann in *Interpretatione*, pp. xxi-xxii and cviii). Al-Fârâbî's contribution in this particular field, where it seems reasonable to assume that he had written commentaries on all the logical works of Aristotle (p. xxxiv) based on a good, direct knowledge of his works (p. lxxvii) and drawing on the whole tradition of philosophical literature with great leeway in the selection and the organization of material, is deemed significant enough to draw the conclusion that "with al-Fârâbî logic had once more become [i.e. subsequent to its decline in Alexandria] a living, developing, productive science" (p. xxiii).

Al-Fârâbî's formalist approach to logic is seen in the background of the confrontation between the Greek provenance of logic (coupled with the fact that the translators were mostly Christian e.g. Hunain ibn Ishâq and his son Ishâq ibn Hunain) and the esteem in which the grammatical tradition was held in Arabic thought. The Greek formula to the effect that logic was about the form rather than the content of utterances and about the form of words as expressions of

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¹⁰ The importance of logic is further evident in the prolegomena which precede al-Fârâbî's paraphrases and commentaries on Aristotle's treatises on logic:

[1] *Risâlah Logic* and *Fusûl Logic* precede *Qâlibâryûs* and other paraphrases of works comprising Aristotle's *Organon*. These are found in *Al-Manak* (manuscript MS 812) in the Hamidiyah Library, Istanbul. Haddad (1974, p. 240) quotes from this manuscript which comprises "Introduction to Logic, Fusul or Sections on Logic, Isagogy, Categories, Parâ Imminûras, Al-Qiyas or Syllogism, Al-Tahîli or Prior Analytics, Al-Burhan or Posterior Analytics, Al-Jadal or Topics, Sophistics, Rhetoric and Poetics".

[2] *Tanbîh* and *Alfâz* precede commentaries on the *Organon* (Mahdi in *Alfâz*, pp. 21f; also Berman, 1974).
1. the nature of philosophical investigation

thought rather than of words themselves was sharpened into a division of competencies as "grammar is about expression (lafz), logic about meaning (ma'na)" (pp. xli-xlii). However al-Fârâbi’s awareness of the implications of this path led him to another line of thought via Aristotle’s clue "that languages vary while thought is the same for all on which the Aristotelians of Baghdad placed heavy emphasis in their arguments with the grammarians" (p. xliii). From the perspective of form this became, for al-Fârâbi, the formula that the "linguistic form of an utterance changes in translation from one language to another, the logical form does not".

Zimmermann continues that "The thought which I believe was uppermost in his mind was that since the inventors of different languages had endeavoured to capture the same logical structures in different ways some could be expected to have been more successful than others from case to case; and that where the grammatical conventions of a given language failed to arrange for the display of the logical structure of thought with optimum perspicuity it was the logician’s task to amend them" (p. xlv).

This thrust towards universality in theorizing about language and logic, which manifests itself in the extensive use of artificial formulae and references to other languages is perhaps not surprising considering that al-Fârâbi, who was Turkish by birth, lived in Baghdad, was educated in the Greek logical tradition by Christian teachers eventually became a teacher to students from different traditions and wrote in Arabic. Al-Fârâbi traces his own intellectual heritage, in a treatise no longer extant, to the Alexandrian school of Greek philosophy (Rescher, 1963; Rosenthal, 1975, pp. 50-51 and Mahdi, 1981, pp. 9-11). He describes the movement of the school from Alexandria to Baghdad and its pedagogy. He mentions his teacher Yuhannâ ibn

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11 In Rusâlah Logic (fs. 4) al-Fârâbi makes a distinction between intelligibles and expressions in terms of interior and exterior speech (al-nutq al-dâkhîl and al-nutq al-khârîj) Not only does logic give rules for the former it also gives rules for expressions which are common to all languages thus protecting the rational faculty from error in both cases. Grammar on the other hand protects from error in a restricted sense since it gives rules for expressions particular to a language.

12 Also noted by Butterworth (1984, p. 113), Marmura (in 1983, p. 94) comments on the general abstractness and (in 1979, p. 316) on the lack of "references to the particulars of the political scene" of al-Fârâbi’s writings.
Haylân and the reading of Aristotle's works. He takes pride in the fact that he was the first Muslim to read Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* with a man who had spent many years studying it with a master who in turn had an earlier master thus forming a chain of authorities. Being Muslim was a distinct advantage as Christians were prohibited from reading certain works of logic comprising the *Organon* of Aristotle (Zimmermann in *Interpretazione*, p. cvii; Pines, 1970, p. 783; Druart, 1987, p. 284).

This personal account of al-Fârâbî is one instance of the many fruitful dialogues between the Greek culture and the Judaic/Christian/Muslim tradition. In the Muslim context this enterprise received impetus from the numerous translations of Greek philosophical and scientific treatises during the reigns of al-Ma'mûn, who provided an institutional framework in the *bayt al-hukmah*, and al-Mu'tasim. These years represent a peak in the period of two hundred years 185/800 - 385/1000 of translation activity (Walzer, 1962, p. 6; also Marmura, 1987, pp. 268-269). Marmura, Pines (1970, pp. 780-784) and Walzer carry details of translators, works translated and subjects focussed on in this period. Pines (1970, p. 782) comments that "the translations seem to represent the earliest large-scale attempt known in history to take over from an alien civilization its sciences and techniques universally regarded as valid".

It is in this context that al-Fârâbî seems to have made a conscious decision to partake in this universal approach with his own trajectory of theorizing. He need not have and there were many who did not - from amongst the Christians, the Jews and the Muslims. There is another dimension to this formalist approach which Zimmermann (in *Interpretatione*, p. xlvi) evaluates as "experimenting and speculating towards a more radical theory of logic". The originality has analogy in al-Fârâbî's political theorizing. This will be treated more extensively later (chapter four, p. 55) : suffice it here to mention that the relationship of logic and grammar bears the same form as the relationship between the one universal philosophy and many particular religions (p. xliii, n. 2). The latter are better or worse approximations of the one truth.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) Mention may also be made here of al-Fârâbî's contribution to *usul al-fiqh* vis-a-vis the development of the concept of
The controversy between the relative competencies of logic and grammar had its outcome in a public debate in 317/932 in Baghdad in which the philosophers' representative Abû Bishr Mattâ ibn Yûnus was bested by the grammarian Abu Sa'id al-Sîrâfi (pp. cxxii-cxxxix). The debate which took place about a century after the Mu'tazilî led Inquisition is a testimony for such activity. Nevertheless it would seem to have put the philosophers further on the defensive and al-Fârâbî's writings in this context are critical of the more recent, mostly Christian, inheritors of the Alexandrian school as he attempts to identify to a greater extent with the older, Greek precursors (Zimmermann in *Interpretation*, pp. cx-cxi; also Mahdî, 1961, p. 3 and Rosenthal, 1947, p. 72). On the other hand, the hostility that was directed at the philosophers had its outcome in fostering cordiality between them despite the different religious backgrounds: the Muslim al-Fârâbî, his student the Jacobite Yahyâ ibn ʿAdî and the latter's student the Nestorian Hasan ibn Suwâr for instance, were united by their common faith in Hellenic tradition of philosophy (pp. cxi-cxii) which presupposed a conviction that the message of philosophy was of universal and perennial validity and that it could, and should, guide all reasonable men in pursuit of rational truth.

the 'ʿilah (cause, ratio leges, in syllogistics "the middle term") and the to refinement of scholastic method (jadal)

[1] Hallaq's discussion of al-Fârâbî's exposition on the subject of the 'ʿilah in Qyâṣ draws the conclusion that al-Fârâbî "demonstrated that the presence of 'ʿilah in any argument is a prerequisite for a valid conclusion" (1987, p. 65) Further, if one takes into account the many subtitles accorded to Qyâṣ by al-Fârâbî himself (e.g. "A Brief Exposition of the Logic of the Philosophical Theologians" - see Gyeke, 1972, p. 38, note 5 and Hallaq, 1987, p. 50) there seems to be good reason to doubt whether Qyâṣ is commentary on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* at all (Gyeke in Hallaq, 1987 p. 50) In any event even if the treatise is a commentary on the *Prior Analytics*, Rescher's comments (in Qyâṣ, p. 43) throw some light on al-Fârâbî's attempts to disguise his originality - whether out of fear, expediency or deference

[2] Nor has al-Fârâbî's contribution to jadal been ignored Makdisi (1981, p. 107) writes that the commentaries on Aristotle's *Topics* treating the methodologies of question and answer in disputation have played a significant role in the resolution of conflict to reach consensus (ijmā') - another important concept in *usul al-fiqh*

This humanist orientation is the focus of at least two works by Kraemer (1985 and 1986) The concentration of both is on the second half of the tenth century in Baghdad under the Bûyi rule. Referring to this period immediately after al-Fârâbî in terms of a renaissance (e.g Adam Mez), the cosmopolitan spirit of the Baghdad school of Aristotle (1985, p. 148), or the urbane humanistic culture (p. 156), Kraemer recalls other students of Yahyâ ibn 'Adî e.g. Abû Sulaymân al-Sujjatî, Abû Hayyân al-Tawhîdî, as well as those who were "in close contact" with the school e.g. the philosopher, historian, courtier Abû 'Ali Miskawayh, and two Jewish philosophers Wahb ibn Ya'âsh and Abû'l-Khayr Dawûd

14 Zimmermann seems to infer al-Fârâbî's "Hellenism" to be a "militant reaction to the opposition of those rejecting Greek thought primarily because it was un-Arabic and un-Islamic" (p. cxxvii)

15 This humanist orientation is the focus of at least two works by Kraemer (1985 and 1986) The concentration of both is on the second half of the tenth century in Baghdad under the Bûyi rule Referring to this period immediately after al-Fârâbî in terms of a renaissance (e.g Adam Mez), the cosmopolitan spirit of the Baghdad school of Aristotle (1985, p. 148), or the urbane humanistic culture (p. 156), Kraemer recalls other students of Yahyâ ibn 'Adî e.g. Abû Sulaymân al-Sujjatî, Abû Hayyân al-Tawhîdî, as well as those who were "in close contact" with the school e.g. the philosopher, historian, courtier Abû 'Ali Miskawayh, and two Jewish philosophers Wahb ibn Ya'âsh and Abû'l-Khayr Dawûd
The decisive influence of the Alexandrian school vis-a-vis logic and the science of demonstration notwithstanding, the position accorded to demonstration by al-Fārābī is by no means unequivocal. Consider Plato (pp. 6-9 and 12-16) where he evaluates the various methods of investigation known to him. With the desired goal of "knowledge of the substance of each of the beings" in mind his stringent criteria determine that [a] the religious investigation and the religious syllogistic art can only supply an insufficient amount; [b] the science of language does not supply any of it at all; [c] poetry leads one further away from it; [d] rhetoric supplies a limited amount; [e] sophistry is almost play; [f] dialectic is extremely important, to the point where "frequently it is impossible to come to that knowledge until the thing is investigated dialectically". Yet, another faculty is needed to supplement the dialectic: this faculty it turns out is "the theoretical art that supplies knowledge of the beings" i.e. philosophy (p. 13) and the methods of investigation which the man who aims at philosophy should use are "the method of division and the method of bringing together (tarîq al-qism wa-tarîq al-tarkîb)" (pp. 15-16). This reference to other methods apart from demonstration\(^{16}\) is the subject of discussion by modern commentators regarding their provenance and their place in al-Fārābī's method of investigation.

Consider first Galston (1981) commenting on al-Fārābī's reticence concerning demonstration and the status finally accorded to dialectic in a paper which makes a survey of a number of al-Fārābī's writings to make manifest the nature of his philosophical inquiry and its relation to Aristotle's view of the same. For this writer al-Fārābī shows general agreement with the Alexandrian Organon\(^{17}\) by claiming that demonstrations yield certainty wherever he depicts logic in general as leading people to what is correct and real, and as embodying the capacity to point out errors (p. 24). Yet in Alfâz, Aristotle, Hurûf, Ihsâ', and Risâlah Logic he is ambiguous about

\(^{16}\) And not only in Plato as will be shown below.

\(^{17}\) This was divided into three groups comprising -
[1] the Categories, the De Interpretatione and the Prior Analytics as the elements of perfect reasoning
[2] the Posterior Analytics by itself
[3] the Topics, the Sophistic, the Rhetoric and the Poetics as a supplement, to the second part, comprising the modes of imperfect reasoning
the use of demonstration and prefers to use wisdom, philosophy, methods leading to certainty, etc., in precisely the situations where one would expect him to use demonstration. Galston concludes that al-Fârâbî is distinguishing between two kinds of knowledge and the methods leading to them rather than merely utilizing synonyms of demonstration (pp. 25-26).

This conclusion is substantiated by the distinctions al-Fârâbî draws in Risâlah Logic and Alfâz between what "is" for instance dialectical or rhetorical reasoning and what "is called" demonstrative reasoning. The reluctance to take over generally accepted views is given further credit in Alfâz where al-Fârâbî connects unqualified assent with unqualified reasonings and syllogisms, both being generic categories or (theoretical) intelligibles without concrete examples. Further in Alfâz he mentions the composition, and the functioning, of dialectic, sophistic, rhetoric and poetics but fails to do the same for the functioning of demonstration (pp. 26-27). Here Galston draws a second conclusion: al-Fârâbî's implication that demonstrations are not an actual but only an ideal case.

However al-Fârâbî, for Galston, is asserting the limitation of the authority of demonstration to that of a standard for evaluating these imperfect methods rather than its superiority over them (p. 28). She finds support for this in the commentaries on Aristotle's Topics and Posterior Analytics and in Aristotle, the latter treatise being one of the places where al-Fârâbî advocates the use of a training art (sanâ'at al-riyâdah) which would help one to "find all possible syllogisms about any question whatsoever". This is in "preparation for the art of certainty (al-sanâ'ah al-yaqîniyah)" (p. 78). The training art is called dialectic (p. 79) and its use in the presence of others or by oneself is referred to as being quick-witted. The initial difficulty of acquiring demonstrative syllogisms is thus surmounted by beginning with dialectical syllogisms and generally accepted premises but increasing the sophistication of the analysis by "applying the scientific rules of demonstration to them" (Galston, p. 28). With this procedure al-Fârâbî connects the more abstract conceptualization of demonstration to the everyday investigation which accepts generally accepted true and false statements and subjects them to inquiry in order
to arrive at the truth.\textsuperscript{18}

As for the question of the extent to which dialectic takes over the function of demonstration in the method of certainty the answer is provided in part by Aristotle himself who was equally reticent about the scope of demonstrations. He only brings up the question of acquiring the requisite premises at the very end of the Posterior Analytics and then at the beginning of the Topics "where the claim is made that it is necessary to discuss the principles of the sciences by means of generally accepted opinions" (Galston, p. 31). She then quotes Aristotle (Topics, 101b3-5): "This process belongs specifically or mainly to dialectic; for being an investigation it is on the path to the principles of all inquiries".\textsuperscript{19} Galston's final conclusion is that al-Fârâbî's inquiry in terms of the principles of instruction and the principles of being is thus a reformulation of the Aristotelian distinction between what is prior by nature and what is prior to us (p. 31).\textsuperscript{20}

Galston's evaluation of the importance al-Fârâbî accords dialectic is manifest in a statement that al-Fârâbî himself makes regarding the investigation in natural science (Aristotle, pp. 91-92). He concludes a discussion on the application of the Categories to the subjects of natural science stating the use of both dialectic and demonstration in his investigation. All evident premises are investigated using the dialectic until it "can proceed no further" (p. 91). The inquiry is then repeated using scientific rules and the premises meeting the criteria are "put forward as demonstrations". As for the ones that do not "l e leaves them as they are, set down in his books as provisions for the investigators who will come after him, so that in their quest for the certain

\textsuperscript{18} The training art will be discussed further in chapter five on the theory of instruction (pp. 79 and 86f). Galston (p. 29) writes that al-Fârâbî ascribes to Aristotle a method that is essentially one of testing, refutation and continual refinement. This would seem to be close to Popper's hypothetico-deductive method the difference, at this point, being that for Popper truth would not be known as the truth even if one arrived at such a conclusion.

\textsuperscript{19} Using the same quotation McKinney (1983, pp 186-187) also draws attention to the "much neglected Topics" especially the second chapter (101a34-101b4) which "holds the key to comprehending Aristotle's general methodology'.

\textsuperscript{20} Mahdi (1969b) p 133, note (5) 1 - also refers to Aristotle's \textit{causa cognoscendi} and \textit{causa essendi} as the source of al-Fârâbî's principle of instruction and principle of being.
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Science they may investigate what is given there about the material to be investigated, the method of investigation, and the use of dialectic. This then is the sum of the inquiry into natural science. For in everything into which he inquires he brings together two approaches - dialectic (al-jadal) and the certain science ('ilm al-yaqin) - until he finally arrives at what is certain about everything he wants to know.

Al-Farabi's apparent equation of demonstration and philosophy is also commented upon in an analysis of Ihsâr by Mahdi (1975b). Enumerating the parts of logic in Ihsâr, (p. 71) al-Farabi writes that in "the fourth [part of logic] there are rules by which one examines demonstrative (burhâniyyah) statements and the rules of the affairs that make up philosophy and everything by which [philosophy's] activities become more complete, excellent and perfect". But this is in contrast to the next sentence that in "the fifth [part of logic] there are rules by which one examines dialectical statements and the rules of the affairs that make up the art of dialectic and everything that by which [dialectic's] activities become more complete, excellent and perfect".

However Mahdi is at pains to correct the false impression of philosophy as the equivalent of demonstration. If this were the case then we should expect a demonstrative political science (1975b, p. 123) since in Rslalah Logic (p. 227) politics is one of the parts of philosophy. That this is not the case in Ihsâr is shown in the chapter on mathematics (which follows the one on logic) where al-Farabi, after explaining that geometry is divided into limited fundamentals and principles, and unlimited things derived from them, notes the two methods of inquiry into this science - analysis (tahlîl) and synthesis (tarkîb) and ascribes both to the ancient practitioners of geometry apart from Euclid who used only the latter. Mahdi (p. 126) concludes that these two methods are at least one of the "affairs that make up philosophy" - the method, indeed, that leads to the discovery of the principles of theoretical science in general - that is not covered by demonstration". Hence al-Farabi is in actuality criticizing, subtly, the generally known

21 Both the methods are also mentioned in Plato (pp. 15-16) and were discussed above (p. 14). The two would seem to allude to methods other than dialectic
1. the nature of philosophical investigation

(mashhûrah) view of science that restricts it to merely demonstration.22

Analysis and synthesis have also drawn comment from at least two authors - Gyekye (1972) and Gutas (1983) but from quite different perspectives. Gyekye comments on a section in Qiyâs where al-Fârâbî again explains analysis and synthesis: comparing al-Fârâbî's treatment of the two methods with that of Pappus of Alexandria (fl. 320 AD) Gyekye concludes, as far as synthesis is concerned, that "In both Pappus and al-Fârâbî synthesis is purely a process of deduction; it is what is now known as the axiomatic method" (p. 37). But whereas Pappus did not regard analysis as a deductive system (p. 35) al-Fârâbî on the other hand treated analysis in a syllogistic framework and hence regarded it as deduction.

Gutas' discussion of the two methods also traces al-Fârâbî's reference to them in Ihsâ' back to the Alexandrian school23 the objective being to discover the rationale for their use earlier and in al-Fârâbî's time. Gutas notes firstly the importance of classification by division "as one of the pillars of the Greek scientific method" (p. 256). By the late Alexandrian period classification of sciences by division firstly for descriptive and epistemological reasons and secondly for normative and ontological reasons seems to have ruled "every intellectual endeavour". Elias, for instance has a division of logic into five kinds of syllogisms i.e. demonstrative, dialectical, rhetorical, sophistical and poetic and a division of logic itself into three (p. 256 and 242).24 We

22 Apart from this example from Ihsâ' and two others quoted earlier from Aristotle (p. 70) and Amtaam (pp 3-4) which seem to equate philosophy and demonstration, Mahd also refers to Rasâlah Logic (pp 227 and 232) where al-Fârâbî writes that the fourth book, the book of demonstration (kubah al-burhân), includes the special rules by which the philosophic art is constituted, and Amtaam (p. 41) where philosophy is put forward as giving "an account that is demonstrative and certain". But then, in Rasâlah Logic politics is called human philosophy (al-falsafa al-insâniyyah) or practical philosophy (al-falsafa al-'amaliyyah) because it investigates only those things which are such that they are done by the will and obtained by the will (al-ru'adah) - i.e. politics is the provenance of the deliberative virtues. Yet further in Ihsâ' al-Fârâbî again seems to make the equation between political science and political philosophy by delineating the same area of investigation for both (p. 104)

23 This is done via a section in Miskawayh's Tarîb al-Sa'âdât which shows "its close relationship to the chapter on Logic in Ihsâ'" (1983, p 236). Working with the assumption that both the authors had access to a single translation (possibly of Abû Bishr Mattâ ibn Yûnus) Gutas traces the Greek original to Paul the Persian (mid 6th century AD), thence to David and finally to Elias both of Alexandria.

24 For the division of logic into three i.e. the categorization of Aristotle's treatises into three groups - see footnote [17] above
then find Paul the Persian repeating the classification and using the term *tarkîb* for the
descriptive and epistemological function and *tahlîl* for the analytic and normative function
(p. 257).

By al-Fârâbî's time the normative function becomes by far the more important: the fivefold
division of syllogisms being "the only ways in which the human mind can think" (Gutas, p. 257
quoting al-Fârâbî from *Alfâz*, pp. 96-97). This ontological reality is given further enhancement by
an account of the historical development of logic which reflects a similar status of the syllogistic
arts in *Hurâf* (pp. 150-157). The rise of the syllogistic arts forms an epoch of man's theorizing
about the world, an age which is prior to the emergence of philosophy and religion but posterior
to the rise of the practical and popular arts. Gutas (p. 259) comments that the chronological
sequence of methods listed in *Hurâf* is the taxonomy of the sciences found in *Ihsâ* and
concludes that al-Fârâbî's endeavour "is a rare accomplishment of idealist philosophy". A second
conclusion drawn from the same endeavour relates to the acrimonious relationship between the
logicians and the grammarians mentioned earlier. Gutas argues that by showing logic and
grammar, philosophy and religion "to be complementary parts of the same system [and] not
posited as contradictory parts of different systems" in *Ihsâ* and *Hurâf* al-Fârâbî was trying to
settle the debate and render the very questions concerning the relative merits of the subjects
irrelevant.

The historical development of the syllogistic arts which is described in *Hurâf* in terms of five
stages is summarized by Mahdi (1972, pp. 6-12) as follows. The first stage is the emergence
of rhetorical investigation of mathematics and nature arising out of man's desire to understand
the aetiology of the sensible things making up his environment, the desire itself being
subsequent to the development of the practical and popular arts. The second stage is a

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25 A shorter treatment of the same subject is also found in *Alfâz* (p. 94 - Haddad, 1974, p. 256) and in *Khaibah*
(pp. 54-57 - Butterworth, 1984, pp 112-113).

26 In *Aristotle* (pp 59-60) the same desire is subsequent to the desire for four soundnesses - of the human body, of the
senses, of the capacity to discern what leads to the first two, and of the power to labour to this end.
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consequence of the refinement of contending views arising out of rhetorical investigation. A mix of rhetoric, sophistic and dialectic gives way to dialectic when sophistic is rejected as a "false line of development" (p. 7). [3] The scene for the third stage is set with a dissatisfaction with dialectical investigation's inability to reach certainty. It leads to the emergence of two kind of investigations - (a) that of mathematical affairs whereby is enabled the distinction between dialectic and methods of certainty; and (b) that of political affairs which is a mixture of the certain methods and dialectical methods which themselves have become "almost scientific" (p. 8).

Though al-Fârâbî does not explain the cause of the "inclination to the knowledge of political affairs" Mahdi (p. 9) notes the implicit awareness of the difference between the sciences which are mathematical and theoretical and this new science based on the principle of will and choice. The connection between the latter science and Socrates has been made by Aristotle who gave no further explanation. Neither does al-Fârâbî (p. 9). The implication is, according to Mahdi, that the event described in *Hurâf* refers to Socrates because he has been shown to have the ability to "conduct a scientific investigation of justice and the virtues" (*Plato*, p. 22). Hence Socrates has been able to supplement a tradition of physical and mathematical investigation with a scientific investigation of political affairs.

The end of the third stage coincides with the time "when philosophy is about to be completed" and al-Fârâbî makes this out to be the "the time of Plato" (p. 8). [4] The fourth stage is attributed to Aristotle (p. 10) as the time when scientific investigation has attained near perfection: the complete differentiation of the five methods from each other, and the distinction between theoretical philosophy with its basis in demonstration and practical philosophy based on the faculty of prudence. [5] The fifth stage is the requirement, and the giving of laws - human laws given by the philosophers who have knowledge of all the above arts. The arts that emerge within this stage are religion, jurisprudence and theology.²⁷ At the end of this description of the

²⁷ These arts are not only dependent on the previous four stages but the use of conditional expressions at this point
1. the nature of philosophical investigation

development of the syllogistic arts Mahdi (p. 12) writes that for al-Fārābī this is a model in the light of which the philosopher depicts departures arising from innovations due to endogenous and/or exogenous sources.28

The hierarchy and the chronology of the five syllogistic arts in Iḥṣā‘ and Hurūf respectively throws light on al-Fārābī's discussion of the differences between them at the beginning of Attainment (pp. 3-4). An awareness of the different kinds of convictions, which are the consequences of the differences between the syllogistic arts, is of the essence whether they are utilized in research, in evaluation or in instruction. In other words knowledge of the "classes of the conditions and states of the first premises" becomes a prerequisite in the endeavour "to seek knowledge of the beings by investigating them ourselves or being instructed by others".29 Yet again we come across the thrust of educating a natural disposition for logic, an innate tendency for clarity of thought or internal speech.

As a final word to this discussion of the nature of investigation, the limitation of demonstration to theory or to theoretical philosophy following the distinction in Hurūf is well illustrated at the close of the first part of Attainment. Al-Fārābī has just completed his inquiry of the methods to attain the knowledge of the theoretical, the deliberative and the moral virtues and the practical arts which constitutes theoretical perfection (kamāl nazarī) (p. 16). He then stresses that as perceived by the intellect these four are "free of the states and accidents that they have when they exist outside the [thinking] soul" (p. 17). And it is only by joining them to these states and accidents that these universals can be made particulars. The argument applies to both natural intelligibles (al-ma‘qūlāt al-tabi‘iyah) which exist by nature, and voluntary intelligibles

implies that "legislation of this philosophic religion is not a normal or a necessary development, but something that is desirable or an object of wish". (Mahdi, pp 11-12) Thus change in the style of writing, the aim of which would seem to put further distance between the constellations of things philosophical and things religious, will be repeated in other books as will be shown below (p. 34).

28 The departures will be discussed in chapter five (pp 72f).

29 Al-Fārābī's thoughts on the five classes of convictions and premises as they relate to instruction utilizing the five syllogistic arts will be taken up in chapter four, pp 54f, and chapter five, pp 86f.
(al-ma'qûât al-irâdiyâh) which are brought into creation by the will of man.

There follows an extended exposition of the deliberative virtues (al-fadâ'îl al-fikriyâh) and their centrality vis-a-vis the actual creation of the voluntary intelligibles. One of the principal points of the discussion is the impossibility of the existence of invariable rules regarding the realization of all voluntary intelligibles: there are far too many temporal and spatial variations as a result of natural and voluntary obstacles, the latter "resulting from the wills of other individuals" (p. 18), and "things of this sort are not covered by the theoretical sciences which only cover the intelligibles that do not vary at all" (p. 20). The rest of the discussion concerns the various kinds of deliberative faculties in relation to the specializations in which they are employed; and the connection of the deliberative virtues with the moral virtues, the practical arts, and the theoretical virtues to which the former three are subordinate.

30 See the glossary for examples - s.v. al-fadilah (fadîl) al-fikriyâh.
2. THE PROCEDURE OF INVESTIGATION

Al-Fârâbî employs the investigative method just depicted in the first parts of *Aitaumment* (pp. 8-16) and *Aristotle* (pp. 86-133). The two accounts vary as a number of details in the latter treatise are not mentioned in the former and the premises and the conclusions of the two texts are different (this will be made clear in the course of the chapter). However as far as the method is concerned the relevant parts of both the texts can be summarized in terms of the following categories: [1] the total number of genera, [2] the transitions through the hierarchy of the beings based on the principles of being each genus employs, [3] the change in the nature of the investigations at the occurrence of each new transition, and [4] the subservience of each lower genus to the next one higher in the order of being.

There are three genera of beings - (a) a genus for which there are no causes, on the contrary the only being in this genus (*al-sabab al-awwal* or the First Cause) is the cause of all that exists; (b) a genus with all the four causes - the formal, the material, the efficient and the final - which comprises all the natural bodies; and (c) a genus without the material cause which comprises at least three different kinds of beings - the psychical, the intellectual and the metaphysical.

There are four transitions: (a) from the genus of numbers and magnitudes to the genus of

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31 The incorporation of the psychical into this genus may well be problematic. Consider that in *Aristotle* (p 114) al-Fârâbî seems to waver between subsuming the soul under a material or a non-material category i.e. with four or three causes respectively, the soul which serves as a link between the material animate aspect of man and the immaterial intellectual aspect. Secondly in *Aitaumment* (pp 12-13) the move from the natural principles to the principles of the being of animals with the soul and then to the rational animal with intellectual principles has no further explanation vis-a-vis the soul unlike the explanations for the other principles of being. This hesitation may reflect the doubt in *Aristotle*. Finally, like *Aitaumment* and *Aristotle* al-Fârâbî's classification of the sciences, *ihās*, has no mention of the science of the soul. Yet, the soul is the obvious "repository" of a number of faculties (e.g. *Siyārah*, p 4). This ambiguity vis-a-vis the categorization of the soul goes back to a similar debate between the positions adopted in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.
beings which cannot be intellected except when they are bodies or in bodies; (b) from this second genus of natural bodies to the genus which comprises two different kinds of beings neither of which are bodies or in bodies - hence the transition (b1) from natural bodies to metaphysical beings, and the transition (b2) again from the natural bodies but this time to the soul or the psychical beings; and (c) the fourth transition from the soul to the intellectual or rational beings. In terms of sciences the different genera are investigated by (a) natural science, (b) the science of metaphysics, and (c) the science of politics. The discussion below throws further light on the four transitions.

Al-Fārābī divides each of the natural, the psychical and the intellectual beings into two parts. Each of the two parts serves a different purpose. For instance natural bodies are of two types, the first of which "is rendered substantial to the utmost by the nature that is the essence of each natural substance" (Aristotle, p. 113). The second, on the other hand, is "rendered substantial by nature in order that its substance (i.e. its nature in act) be a beginning - in the way of preparation and matter, or in the way of instrument - for another principle". The second principle is the soul (Aristotle, p. 113). Alternatively one could say that since animals are heterogeneous bodies composed of nature and soul, "the essence of the animate natural substance is constituted by the soul, just as the essence of the natural substance is constituted by nature". In an analogous manner when al-Fārābī is forced to investigate the soul he finds two types of soul "one that is rendered entirely substantial by the soul and another that the soul renders substantial for the intellect and the intellectual powers" (Aristotle, pp. 122-123).

The intellect, like the previous genera, is divided into two "a ruling part and a subservient part". The former is the theoretical intellect (al-ʻaql al-naẓarî) and the latter is the practical intellect.

Al-Fārābī seems to ignore the genus of numbers and magnitudes, which employs only the formal cause, in the enumeration of the genera (Attāwūr, p. 5). Yet a few pages later he has a discussion of the science of mathematics. In fact he writes that it is "the first genus of beings into which one should inquire [as it] is easier for man and in which perplexity and mental confusion are less likely to occur" (Attāwūr, pp. 8-10). Not only that. The same science comprises the third chapter of Ḥadīth and it would seem that al-Fārābī wants to draw attention to it by enumerating its seven divisions by name, the only science for which this is the case, in the introduction of the treatise (Mahdī, 1975b, pp. 115-116).
2. the procedure of investigation

(al-\textit{aql al-\textit{amali}) (\textit{Aristotle}, pp. 123-124). The theoretical intellect helps man to attain knowledge for its own sake, i.e. the theoretical or natural intelligibles, and the practical intellect enables man to attain knowledge which is instrumental for the creation of things useful for attaining perfection i.e. the voluntary or practical intelligibles.\textsuperscript{33} Al-Fārābī arrives at the intellectual principles when he finds the soul inadequate to explain man as well as to render man "in the highest degree substantial" (\textit{Aristotle}, p. 122). Using speech as a criterion to differentiate man from other animals he concludes that this faculty proceeds from the "intellectual principles and powers".

In \textit{Attainment} (pp. 13-14) al-Fārābī observes that these intellectual principles bear the same relation to the beings below the heavenly bodies as the metaphysical principles bear to the heavenly bodies\textsuperscript{34} and continues that the investigator "will acquaint himself himself with the principles for the sake of which the soul and the intellect are made, and with the ends and the ultimate perfection for the sake of which man is made". As in the case of nature which constituted the essence of natural substance, and in the case of the soul which constituted the essence of the animate natural substance, one can now say that the intellect constitutes the essence of the human natural substance: al-Fārābī writes that the intellect "is the final thing that renders man substantial" (\textit{Aristotle}, p. 125).

Subsequent to the observation of the importance of the intellectual principles in \textit{Attainment} (p. 13) al-Fārābī writes that "at this point the inquirer will have sighted another genus of things different from the metaphysical".\textsuperscript{35} A number of things become evident at this point. [1] The

\textsuperscript{33} In the context of this division of the intellect it is interesting that de Louvrehour invesves the hierarchy and makes the theoretical intellect servile to the practical intellect (1986, p 370) At least one conclusion of this position will be apparent later in this chapter

\textsuperscript{34} The human intellect, that is, in its relation to the two lower genera of the soul and matter corresponds to the relation between the celestial intelligences, their respective souls, which provide the spheres with circular motion, and the spheres - the last three are discussed in the third chapter of this thesis on al-\textit{aql al-\textit{fa'a\l}}

\textsuperscript{35} Mahdi (1969b, p 135 n 1 of section 18 of \textit{Attainment}) with support from \textit{Aristotle} (pp 129f) and \textit{Madani} (is 89) seems to feel that al-Fārābī may well be saying "another genus of things different from the physical [or natural]" rather than metaphysical Further, taking this genus of things to mean the "rational principles" or "the acts and
rational principles are a foundation and the necessary condition for an endeavour to perfection. [2] The principles "supply many things to natural beings other than those supplied by nature" and perfection is made possible by the exploitation and the manipulation "of a large number of natural beings". [3] Perfection is only possible in the company of many other men i.e. man is "a social and political animal" (see also Mahâdr, pp. 228-229 for a similar assertion). [4] Above all, these principles fall outside the cause and effect paradigm which has sustained his inquiry to this moment. They are no longer "mere causes by which man attains the perfection for which he is made".

Having enumerated the evidence that manifests itself at this point al-Fârâbî concludes that "there now emerges another science and another inquiry that investigates the intellectual principles and acts and states of character with which man labours towards that perfection. From this in turn emerge the science of man and political science" (Attainment, p. 14). It is only now that al-Fârâbî is able to return to the investigation of the metaphysical principles to which he had alluded at the transition between natural science and the science of metaphysics (Attainment, states of character with which man labors toward this perfection" (Attainment, p 14, lines 16-17; see also Mahdi, 1969b, p xv for confirmation of this) he writes that different could indicate "principles of 'political science' (below, section 20) rather than of 'divine science' (below, sec 19), or of 'practical' rather than the 'theoretical' intellect (below, III, [ n e. Aristotle] sec 99") However this does not resolve the issue as firstly al-Fârâbî has put forward only three genera altogether. the question then arises as to why the acts and states belong to another genus rather than another species since they are also non-material.

On the other hand it is possible that al-Fârâbî is deliberately positing a conundrum with his illusion to "another genus" and Mahdi may be leading to this idea Al-Fârâbî's taciturnity at this point would seem to point to the danger inherent in codifying the principles of political science to the principles of divine science despite the classification of both in the genus of non-material beings. It would imply assimilating the "becoming" of man to the "being" of the cosmos with a consequent loss of free-will. Yet a complete separation can be damaging as well since man's humanity, which is inextricably linked with the goodness prevailing in the universe, would be compromised (see the discussion on Strauss below, pp 31-32) The outcome would be a limitation of man to the infra-lunar world, in other words a reduction or a retrogression (this will be further discussed in chapter four. pp. 65-66)

In the context of this argument it is perhaps not surprising that al-Fârâbî refuses to accept the theoretical/practical distinction due to Aristotle alluded to in the introduction. The dangers of reductionism are already present. Yet any investigation must analyse. A possible answer may be al-Fârâbî's reference to the method of analysis and the method of synthesis (Plato pp 15-16 and the first chapter of this thesis, pp 14 and 18f) which the "man who aims at philosophy should use in his investigation" The implication would seem to point to an almost simultaneous procedure. One possible confirmation is the consistent ambiguity of the relationship between knowledge for its own sake and knowledge for pragmatic ends i.e. theoretical and deliberative virtues, and with this the analysis of the four human things in Attainment immediately followed by the assertion that the four are inseparable (this will be taken up again in the third chapter, p. 46)
pp. 12-13) making it evident that it is man's intellectual principles, rather than the natural principles, which facilitate the investigation into the metaphysical bodies. In addition he investigates them using "the methods he used in treating natural things" (Attainment, pp. 14-15). What is novel is that he treats them in a manner analogous to the natural beings. In other words he reduces them to the cause and effect paradigm once again alluding to the question of free will - just discussed in connection with the genus of things different from the metaphysical - with which only man is endowed.

The inquiry into the incorporeal metaphysical principles brings him finally to the being which cannot have any principles at all. On the contrary this being, termed divinity, is the principle or the cause of all there is and the only knowledge we have is our knowledge of its existence (Attainment, p. 5) i.e. the principle of instruction. This ultimate principle now becomes the basis for the explanations of the ultimate causes of the whole hierarchy of beings. Al-Fârâbî calls the subsequent descent "divine inquiry" (al-nażar al-dâhî) and the metaphysical beings are now

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36 A comparison of the directions from which al-Fârâbî approaches these transitions i.e. from the genus of natural (material) things to the genus comprising the metaphysical and psychological is revealing.

[1] In Attainment he discusses natural science and the objects of its investigation in two pages (pp 10-13). On arriving at the heavenly bodies and being compelled to look for "beings more perfect than nature and natural bodies", he finds the need for another kind of "science that inquires exclusively into beings that are metaphysical (ma 'bad al-sab'î 'at min al-mawjûdâtîf" (p 12) The latter are not only subsequent to the former in investigation but also above them ontologically. However he goes no further and instead proceeds to the soul and the intellect returning to the metaphysics later.

[2] In comparison to this treatment in Attainment, al-Iârâbi takes a different approach, and devotes much more room, in Aristotle (pp 86-113) The transition in the sciences comes after the discussion on the application of the Categories to the objects of natural science, and the discussions of the four causes and motion. The "discovery" of the outermost sphere (i.e. the First Heaven which will be brought up again later) which provides motion to all the natural bodies then leads to a first conclusion that this mover itself also "has a mover" and the second conclusion that another investigation and another theory, different from natural investigation and theory is now needed (p. 97) However al-Fârâbî then goes on to discuss creation in the context of the four elements (al istiqaqât i.e. fire, air, water and earth, pp 97-108) rather than referring to any unamotist theories of Neoplatonic provenance (Mahdi, 1969b, pp 5-6) Subsequent to the discussion of the creation of homogenous bodies (mawshâhîh al-a'yâ) and heterogeneous bodies (mukhtalaf al-a'yâ) and the organs of the latter kind, which comprise plants and animals, al-Fârâbî brings up the topic of the soul (pp 112-113) He now discusses the two types of natural bodies, the soul and the intellect as above.

[3] The limitation of natural theory is brought up once more after the discussion of these and the actualization of man's intellect by the Active Intellect. Al-Iârâbi raises the question of the heavenly bodies and whether they take part in the creative process apart from providing motion (Aristotle, p. 130) This shows the need for an inquiry into the beings "in a way more inclusive than natural theory"
named "divine principles" (al-mabâdi‘ al-ilâhîyah) \textit{(Attainment, p. 15)}. On concluding this inquiry al-Fârâbî returns to the question of man's perfection. He investigates the final, the formal and the efficient causes of the perfection of man and draws a distinction between the things that are useful to man and the things which obstruct his endeavour to perfect himself.

This al-Fârâbî remarks is political science (al-'ilm al-madanî) and defines it as "knowing the things by which the citizens of cities attain happiness through political associations in the manner that innate dispositions equip them for it. It will become evident to him that political association and the totality that results from the association of citizens in cities correspond to the association of bodies that constitute the totality of the world". With political science thus defined and making its appearance after knowledge of the "ultimate causes of the beings", knowledge of the difference between good and evil and knowledge of the requisite voluntary actions arrived at earlier, al-Fârâbî leads us to one of the central ideas of his thought. Consider now the way in which other ideas expressed in these treatises and others, supplement and "contradict" this central rubric.

Two points are immediately apparent. In drawing the structural correspondence between the cosmos and the polity al-Fârâbî alludes to the two constituents of the curriculum mentioned at the outset of the present chapter - knowledge of the highest principles of the beings and their ranks of order, and the supreme rulership of the virtuous city and the ruling ranks of order in it (this analogy will be repeated in \textit{Mabâdi'}, pp. 236-239; \textit{Madanî}, fs. 53; \textit{Millah}, fs. 19-26; and \textit{Regime}, pp. 54-55). Further, he concludes this section of \textit{Attainment} with the following statement: "This is theoretical perfection (kamâl nazari). As you see, it comprises knowledge

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37 In other words the universe now emerges in a new light. Whether the ultimate principle is termed the First Cause or Allâh, whether the descent is a consequence of knowledge "given" by the Active Intellect or an hypothesis of the investigator would seem to depend on the state of perfection of the intellect vis-a-vis the imagination (see following chapters).

38 The point made in \textit{Attainment} that the knowledge of the difference between good and evil is dependent on the awareness of man's perfection and that this perfection is only achieved by the cooperation of the will and nature is repeated in \textit{Aristotle} (pp. 69-70).
of the four kinds of things by which the citizens of cities and nations attain supreme happiness" (p. 16) - the four things being theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues and the practical virtues he had noted at the outset of *Attainment* (p. 2) as the efficient cause of the happiness man must achieve. \(^{30}\)

However this assertion conflicts (Mahdi, 1969b, p. xx) with the condition of complete knowledge which was the aim of more than one treatise. Nor is this all. The four things have been referred to as human things, an assertion which is repeated at the end of the third section of the same treatise (p. 36) where the author has completed an exposition of the "modes and methods through which the four human things by which supreme happiness is achieved in nations and cities". Yet the presence of divine favours in order to attain the same goal could hardly have escaped al-Fârâbi's attention (Mahdi, 1975a, p. 48). Notwithstanding this obvious contention al-Fârâbi makes no mention of such favours in *Attainment* or in the next two parts of his *Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*. On the contrary instead of referring to the chain of prophets in the Qur'ân including the one sent as a mercy to the worlds, *khâlîm al-nabîyîn*, the two Greeks are put forward as the authors of an account which embodies those very modes and methods and they in turn are only the more recent exponents of a chain of authorities which is said to have "existed anciently among the Chaldeans", transmitted through Egypt, Greece and the Syrians to the Arabs (*Attainment*, p. 38).

\(^{30}\) It would seem that the source of al-Fârâbi's discussion on these four human things is Aristotle *Physics* (Altman (1972), in an article comparing the four perfections discussed by Maimonides in *The Guide of the Perplexed* with Ibn Bâjah's perfections in *Rûbûj al-Widâ',* credits Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1098b, 13-15 and 1177a, 13 - 1178b, 32) with the origin of the discourses of the above three authors as well as that of Ibn Rushd's exposition on the attainment of happiness in his *Commentary on Plato's Republic*.

1. For Aristotle good things are divided into three - external goods, goods of the soul and goods of the body. Goods of the soul are then further sub-divided by the differentiation of happiness into contemplation and the exercise of moral virtues

2. Al-Fârâbi's four things are as noted above. As mentioned in chapter one (p. 19) he also writes of the four soundnesses in *Aristotle* (pp. 59-60) - of the human body, of the senses, of the capacity to discern what leads to the first two, and of the power to labour to this aim, subsequent to which the soul desires to know the causes of the sensible things

3. Ibn Bâjah writes of the perfection of - artificial instruments, the bodily organs, virtues of the soul or simply virtues, and cognitive virtues

4. For Maimonides the requisite perfections are those of possessions, of bodily shape and constitution, of moral virtues, and of rational virtues
Herein lies the point of reference with which it becomes possible to explain al-Fārābī’s re-evaluation of politics as depicted above in his historical situation: a situation which comes subsequent to revelation which in its turn comes subsequent to the two Greek philosophers.\(^\text{40}\) In the closing stages of Plato (pp. 20-21) al-Fārābī writes of two cities one "rendered perfect in speech" (kumilat... br'l-qawl) and the second to be "realized in deed" (an yahsala... br'l-fi'l). Linking the word and the deed are: [a] an account of the divine and natural things as they are perceived by the intellect and known by means of that science i.e. theoretical science; [b] a succession of men who will make a comprehensive investigation to make known all what is not yet known; [c] the virtuous ways of life to be prescribed for the inhabitants of the city; [d] the human perfection achieved by him who “combines the theoretical sciences and the political and practical sciences” i.e. the one who should rule; and above all [e] the legislator (wâdi' al-nawâmîs), the only one with the capability to realize the city in deed.\(^\text{41}\)

The desire for the development of knowledge (Rosenthal, 1947, p. 68) is also made in Aristotle. As was mentioned in the last chapter, al-Fārābī’s use of dialectic and demonstration in "everything into which he inquires" did not prove possible in all cases and these latter were to be left for investigation by posterity (pp. 91-92). And the final conclusions of Aristotle seem to reflect this inadequate state of knowledge as well. Al-Fārābī summarizes the discussion of the investigation which led to the knowledge that all of man’s faculties are subservient to the theoretical intellect, as well as to the differentiation between the voluntary acts which contribute to, or which obstruct man’s path to, perfection. He then writes of the inquiry into the exploitation of the natural beings which facilitate the attainment of happiness but argues that "the different ways in which to use them [i.e. the voluntary acts] with respect to plants, animals and so on is open to discussion" (pp. 131-132). However this is in conflict with what has been said in

\(^\text{40}\) Part of the explanation has been seen in the previous chapter (pp 20f) on the historical development of, and the ontological status accorded to, the various methods of inquiry in Hurîf and in Isha' respectively.

\(^\text{41}\) The word and the deed and the connecting statements occur within the discussions of the following Platonic dialogues: the Republic, Timaeus, the Laws, Critias and Eupnomos. Al-Fārābī is thus attributing foreknowledge of the revelation to Plato’s writings (see the discussion on Strauss below, pp. 31f).
Attainment (p. 14) where it was precisely the manipulation of a large number of natural beings that made the perfection possible. Al-Fārābī concludes in Aristotle that this knowledge is not available in natural or human science without "the investigation of the beings that are above the things natural in the rank of being" i.e. the metaphysical beings.

It will be noted that al-Fārābī had abandoned the inquiry into the metaphysical beings at the transition between the "science of nature and the science of what is beyond natural things in the order of investigation and instruction and above them in the order of being" (Attainment, pp. 12-13) and had only returned to it after having found the rational principles with which to work toward the perfection which had become clear in natural science. One can perhaps conclude that the results of the upward inquiry to the First Cause and the subsequent descent through "the ultimate causes of the beings" (p. 15) are an assumption of the philosopher. This is confirmed by the remarks of Aristotle just quoted after which al-Fārābī goes on to note that the incomplete knowledge of the natural and human sciences can only be completed by the investigation of the metaphysical beings (p. 132). Hence we note that Aristotle does not end in politics as do both the first part of Attainment and Plato. And it would seem to be from Plato's political philosophy that al-Fārābī derives his theoretical framework to explain revelation and prophecy: consider the comments of Strauss (1987) and Mahdi (1975b) on this issue.

Strauss writes in the context of Maimonides and his predecessors - referred to as the falsârifah or as the Islamic Aristotelians who include al-Fārābī, Ibn Sinâ and Ibn Rushd (since al-Fārābī founded this tradition the thesis will refer to him only although Strauss talks of all three and Maimonides in this context). Strauss' premise is that al-Fārābī's teaching is "fundamentally derived from Platonic philosophy". He rejects the insufficiency of "exact source analysis" and emphasizes rather the possibility held by Platonic philosophy (1987, p. 55). The possibility is that of a rational law directing man to perfection. However a law of this variety can only have a divine origin and though the divine in Plato's Laws is not the divine of al-Fārābī this becomes the common ground uniting Plato and al-Fārābī, "the highest point of perspective" (p. 55).
However Platonic politics has to undergo modification and this "implies a critique of Plato" (p. 106). The modification arises from the historical fact of revelation. This fact also changes the emphases of the discussions of the philosophers. Firstly Plato's questions relating to the Law are discounted because the possibility he pointed to has been realized in the Revelation. Secondly the Law needs to be understood in terms of the "preceding disciplines (metaphysics and psychology)" (p. 55). Thirdly the connection between politics and metaphysics "guarantees" that medieval philosophy does not lose sight of the latter and hence of its "human meaning" (p. 58).42

Mahdi's (1975b) approach is in the context of the distinctions al-Fārābī draws between two kinds of political science in Iḥṣāʾ (pp. 102-107). To each variety of political science belongs a virtuous royal craft (al-mihna al-malikīyah al-fādilah) and a non-virtuous royal craft (al-mihna al-malikīyah ghair al-fādilah). The difference between the virtuous and the non-virtuous relates to the distinction between what is beneficial and harmful to the efficient cause of political science i.e. the establishment of an association directed to true happiness versus an association directed to what is only believed to be happiness e.g. wealth, honour, power, etc. The difference between the two virtuous royal crafts is based on another premise. [1] The first virtuous royal craft (Enumeration, pp. 103-104) is defined as comprising a faculty for general

42 The re-evaluation of Platonic thought in terms of politics rather than metaphysics is the factor differentiating al-Fārābī from the Neoplatonists. Both Strauss (1945, p. 362) and Mahdi (1981, p. 14) quite adamantly stress al-Fārābī's subordination of the metaphysics of Timaeus to the politics of the Republic, Strauss writes of the rejection of other Platonic metaphysical treatises and Mahdi notes the complete lack of metaphysics in Plato and Aristotle (see also footnote 36). This debate over al-Fārābī's "Neoplatonism" is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, suffice it to raise the question that if al-Fārābī could ignore this particular interpretation of Plato and make manifest another could he not, at the very least, consciously separate interpretations which he did not consider relevant to his theorizing? (see also Galston, 1977) Is it also not possible that Neoplatonic speculation over Plato's writings was evaluated as "a false line of development" i.e. similar to the rejection of sophistc in favour of dialectic as depicted by the evolution of the syllogistic arts in Hurûf? After all, the conclusion of Aitainment regarding a confused or extinct philosophy could well be a prescription for this particular situation (Is it then not also possible that the same evaluation be made regarding the Neoplatonic interpretation of al-Fārābī's writings?) It would further seem that the criticism is by no means limited to the Neoplatonic school either. Indeed al-Fārābī silently criticizes Plato by not referring to his theory of Ideas or his doctrine of immortality (Strauss, 1945, pp 364 and 391) in a treatise which is supposed to treat Plato's philosophy from beginning to end. The quiet criticism is further extended to the subject of man's capacity to choose whereas due consideration is given to the topic in both Aitainment and Aristotle (two works which sandwich Plato in the Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle), amongst other writings. The implications of these criticisms will be discussed in chapter four (pp. 68f).
2. the procedure of investigation

rules and a faculty that man acquires after long practice in political deeds. [2] The second virtuous royal craft (pp. 105-106) is explained as including the theoretical and practical sciences to which should be joined the same experiential faculty.

For Mahdi these differences relate, respectively, to the distinction between a limited law which comprises only actions and a comprehensive law embracing both actions and opinions (1975b, p. 143). The first virtuous royal craft is concerned exclusively with practical matters "whose principle is human will and choice and which are isolated from theoretical science" (p. 136). On the other hand the theoretical sciences of the second virtuous royal craft comprise the sciences which have been enumerated previously in Ihsâ': logic, mathematics, natural science and divine science, and which have been the subject of investigation in Attainment and Aristotle above. The practical sciences are "perhaps the parts of the first account of political science and the arts subordinate to it" (p. 137). According to Mahdi this explanation is sustained by Millah (fs. 18) where al-Fârâbî makes the operation of the second virtuous royal craft dependent on "knowledge of the general rules of this art [politics], which is to be coupled with theoretical philosophy, and to which prudence is joined".43

The limitation of the experiential faculty is made evident further in a comparison of princes who possess the second virtuous royal craft to others whose rulership is ignorant. The latter can accomplish their tasks with the experiential faculty, a deliberative faculty and the ability to

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43 The central section, which makes up about one third of the text, of Millah (fs. 14-18) more or less follows the discussion of political science in Ihsâ'. After delineating the area of investigation of political science in Millah al-Fârâbî brings up the two kinds of rulership: first and subsequent to the first. The latter royal craft follows the first with respect to actions. The first, however, is still restricted to the two faculties for general rules and their practice. Later he writes of a political science which is a part of philosophy which investigates the universals but leaves their determination to another faculty. The connection is then made with the first royal craft by making it dependent on theoretical philosophy and prudence as noted by Mahdi above. Whereas Millah specifically draws the distinction between a political science and a political science which is a part of philosophy, Ihsâ' makes the demarcation by first showing the similarity between the areas of investigation and then broadening the knowledge subsumed under the second of the two virtuous royal crafts as mentioned above it includes theoretical and practical philosophy. It will be further remembered that two accounts of political science also appeared in Attainment - before and after metaphysics and/or divine science. In the final analysis, as will soon become apparent, the difference between the two virtuous crafts and their corresponding political sciences rests on the premises which one chooses - or not - to accept (also see the glossary under al-madinah al-jâhiliyyah, al-mubna al-malikiyyah and râ`asah).
imitate their predecessors without the "theoretical and practical philosophy" (Enumeration, pp. 106-107; Mahdi, 1975b, p. 145). The princes, or rather the succession of princes on the other hand are a condition for the establishment, ordering and regulation of the virtuous city so that it is not transformed into one of the non-virtuous cities or a condition for the restoration to its former state in the event of degeneration. However, they can in no way accomplish the required aims without the abstract sciences of wider scope which al-Fârâbî's political science subsumes.

The centrality of the second, comprehensive account of political science is given further credit in the manner in which fiqh and kalâm are defined - "For the jurist takes the opinions and actions stated explicitly by the founder of the religion and using them as axioms, he infers the things that follow from them as consequences. The dialectical theologian, on the other hand, defends the things the jurist uses as axioms, without inferring things from them" (Enumeration, p. 108).

Not content with either one of these sciences al-Fârâbî's intention seems to be one of evaluating the very axioms of the lawgiver and in so doing accord a place, within political science, to jurisprudence and theology in the same manner as all other sciences. 44 The latter sciences (i.e. logic, mathematics, natural and divine sciences) however preceded political science in the order of investigation whereas jurisprudence and theology can only follow it because historically they arise after the lawgiver's presence. The only way for political science to encompass the latter sciences is to develop a theoretical dimension which includes all the preceding sciences (Mahdi, 1975b, pp. 144-145). In so doing it emerges as the supreme science which orders all the other sciences.

44 The differences between the expositions of political science and jurisprudence and theology are couched in different vocabularies (Mahdi, 1975b, pp. 138-139) This change in style together with the fact of the later appearance of religion and the related arts is in keeping with the description of the historical development of syllogistic arts in the first chapter (p. 21) where it was observed that al-Fârâbî made use of conditional clauses when writing about religion and related arts. This would offer some explanation of the reluctance, noticed in the introduction of this thesis (pp 4-5), to discuss the productive sciences of Aristotle in Phail or the practical arts in Actaumen. Yet the practical arts were present before the beginning of rhetorical investigation in Hurlây It would then seem that the "old" practical arts would have to be reorganized under the aegis of political science. Or "new" arts more in keeping with this new rubric would have to be invented. Being far from universal and of less concern to philosophers they are left to princes of the future to create by deliberation in particular contexts (included in this category would be economics which in Aristotle's classification was a part of the practical sciences).
sciences: it is thus able to investigate all kinds of laws and lawgivers - human or divine, and all categories of regimes - past, present and future. And because it is comprehensive it seeks its justification in the metaphysics which precedes it.

The formulation of this science is regarded as highly innovative: it is termed "the philosoplic and political science of divine laws and revealed religions" (Mahdi, 1975b, pp. 142-143). Like his other thoughts which break new ground al-Fārābī "deliberately" understates the import of this one in order to avoid "the necessity of even enumerating certain delicate and controversial problems".
3. AL-'AQL AL-FA‘AL

In al-Fârâbî's cosmology al-'aql al-fa'âl or the Active Intellect is the last and the lowest in a series of ten intelligences\(^{46}\) emanating from the First Cause. Each of the first nine eternal intelligences is in its turn the cause of three effects: (1) its own sphere i.e. the planet which is of the same genus as all material existents, (2) the rotating motion of this sphere and (3) the being of the subsequent eternal intelligence in the hierarchy below it. The spheres of the nine intelligences are: the First Heaven, the sphere of the fixed stars, the sphere of Saturn, the sphere of Jupiter, the sphere of Mars, the sphere of the Sun, the sphere of Venus, the sphere of Mercury and the sphere of the Moon (\textit{Mabâdi'}, pp. 100-107).\(^{47}\) In his description of the movements of the celestial bodies (\textit{al-ajsâm al-samâwîyah}) al-Fârâbî writes that their motion is due to the presence of the First Heaven amongst them, with which they share a common nature, rather than by coercion "since it is impossible that there should be anything in the heaven which takes place by compulsion" (\textit{Mabâdi'}, pp. 132-133).

With the tenth intelligence the hierarchy of intelligences comes to an end. This tenth intelligence is situated below the sphere of the Moon and al-Fârâbî identifies it with the Active Intellect of Aristotle. He makes it the link between the celestial incorporeal existentia of the supra-lunar

\(^{46}\) 'Intelligence' is conventionally accepted English for 'aql (cosmological), in fact, however, neither the Greek nous nor the Arabic 'aql make any difference between "intellect" and "intelligence"

\(^{47}\) The nine intelligences make up the second level of the six principles of the beings i.e. the Second Causes. Al-Fârâbî's cosmology bears a resemblance to the Plotinian (c 270 AD) emanation scheme of One, Intellect, Soul, Material universe at every step (Davidson, 1972, p. 135); and the addition of the First Heaven to the cosmology seems to be due to the Ptolemaic (2nd century AD) modification of Aristotelian universe evoking Walzer's comment (in \textit{Mabâdi'}, p. 364) that al-Fârâbî "appears to be more aware of the progress of science than such outstanding and influential scholars and philosophers as Alexander of Aphrodisias in the third and Proclus in the fifth centuries".
3. *al-aql al-faʻāl*

world and the infra-lunary world of generation and corruption. Regarding this link between two qualitatively different worlds Davidson (1972, p. 113) emphasizes that 'before al-Fârâbî there is no known statement to the effect that the chain of celestial intelligences ends in an entity linking the celestial realm with the sublunary world…. let alone identify it with Aristotle’s active intellect'. Notwithstanding the different views concerning the various functions of the Active Intellect in the sublunary world in al-Fârâbî’s own writings, the thrust of his effort is directed to giving it a pivotal epistemological role in the development of man’s intellectual perfection as well as in the manifestation of prophecy.

The foundation for the activity of *al-aql al-faʻāl* is to be found in al-Fârâbî’s discussions of the creation of the world and the multiplicity of things arising therefrom. In both *Regime* and *Mabâdi’* these discussions make up the first, metaphysical parts of the treatises where emanation is depicted. Consider *Regime* (pp. 40-41) where, since he is writing on political regimes, he explains the way in which the actions of the celestial bodies create the "natural make-up (al-khilaq al-tabī‘iyah) and natural character (al-shiyam al-tabī‘iyah)" of different nations.

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48 Rather than a homogeneous universe composed of the chemical elements enumerated in the modern day periodic table, and governed by universal laws of gravitation and relativity

49 Davidson points out differences between four of al-Fârâbî’s works as they pertain to the role of the Active Intellect in the sublunary world. The relevant observations of this detailed paper are the classification of al-Fârâbî’s treatises as follows:

[a] *Musterstaet* together with its German translation and *Syâyeh* present a view close to the Aristotelian formulation in *De Anima* (§ 430a 10-15) i.e. that the Active Intellect is the cause of the the actualization of the human intellect (p 136).

[b] *Aristotle* presents a second view where the Active Intellect, in addition to the process of actualization, seems to be one of the possible causes of the existence of each species of living beings but not the individuals who owe their existence to their progenitors (pp 148-149)

[c] *Rašîlah ‘Aql* is a third view where the first intelligibles which are the basis for further knowledge are innate in man rather than being given by the Active Intellect. The latter simply enables man to abstract the forms already imbedded in material objects (pp 150-151) Apart from this the Active Intellect also has a greater role in the production of the sublunary world and this position of al-Fârâbî seems to be closer to Plotinus (p 152)

50 These are two of the three distinctive features of nations, which for al-Fârâbî are divisions of the absolutely perfect human society (Regime p 40). The third feature is language which "is conventional but has a basis in natural things" Al-Fârâbî’s attribution of the absolutely perfect human society to the world, by implication in *Regime* and explicitly in *Mabâdi’* (pp 228-229 ٤٢٤٢٤٨٧٩١٧٧١٠١٨٠) in a hierarchy where the decreasing order of perfection is "world", "nation" and "city", has given rise to a lively debate

[1] Fine’s (1986) article concentrates on the availability, to al-Fârâbî, of Aristotle’s *Politics*, based on evidence which includes the former’s tripartite division in *Mabâdi’ and Regime* A point of contact between the three texts in the
From the differences between the parts of the earth which face the First Heaven, the sphere of the fixed stars and the rest of the heavenly bodies arise the various vapours, soils, airs and waters. This gives rise to the different flora and fauna, hence the various diets which in turn results in different nations. The "cooperation and combination" of the above leads to further differentiation and from this arises the fabric and the hierarchy of the world. "And this is the extent to which the celestial bodies contribute to [the natural things'] perfection. The remaining perfections are not given by the celestial bodies but by the Active Intellect, and the Active Intellect gives the remaining perfections to no other species but man" (Regime, p. 41). The fundamental difference, seen in the last chapter, between man whose substance is constituted by the intellect and the rest of the natural world is again apparent here.51

As for the qualitatively different encounter between the Active Intellect and the human intellect,
al-Fârâbî writes, "it follows a course similar to that followed by the celestial bodies" (Regime, p. 41). The course of the Active Intellect takes the form of two interventions each of which alters profoundly the nature of the recipient. As far as the human intellect is concerned the first intervention can be conceptualized in terms of three kinds of will (irâdah) and the second intervention in terms of three grades or stages of intellect. Both interventions may be supplemented by changes, also attributed to the Active Intellect, to the faculty of imagination or representation.

In the first intervention al-Fârâbî writes that there are two kinds of will which man shares with irrational animals whereas the third, termed choice (ikhtyâr), is specific to man. The first will (irâdah) is the desire or the aversion of the appetitive faculty to the receipt of any information by the faculty of sensation. In an analogous manner the second will, also a desire or aversion, develops after the first and adheres to the (third) faculty of the imagination (Regime, pp. 41-42). Only then does the Active Intellect intervene in order to perfect the third will which adheres to the practical intellect (in Aristotle al-Fârâbî refers to the "human will" as comprising will, volition (mashi'ah) and choice all of which "adhere to the practical intellect" - p. 131).

In Regime (p. 41) this intervention is presented as giving man a faculty and a principle (yu'ūf

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52 It is pertinent to note here that intervention is not used in the sense of an event instigated by a supra-humane source in order to change the course of things but in the sense that the philosophers themselves used it i.e. its giving only becomes possible when things generated by the activity of the heavenly bodies are capable of receiving its effusion. To put it in other words - the Active Intellect does not will its giving, but gives because it is in its nature to give. al-Fârâbî even refers to this as a defect of the Active Intellect since it cannot produce all existents "there is not in its essence and in its substance sufficiency for producing the totality of things and there is then in its substance a defect in regard to the production of many existing things" (Letter 'Aql, p. 220)

53 Imagination and representation are used synonymously in this thesis both referring to the Arabic al-qûwah al-mutakhayyulah

54 In a tabular form the hierarchy of the five f. cults and the three wills would be represented as follows (the bottom three levels being common to man and animals)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculties</th>
<th>Wills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>theoretical-rational</td>
<td>third will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practical-rational</td>
<td>second will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imaginative</td>
<td>first will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appetitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensitive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3. al-'aqî al-faʿâl

Al-insâna ‑ awwalan qûwatan wa‑mabdaʿan). The principle comprises primary knowledge (al-ʿulûm al‑awal) and the first intelligibles (al‑maʿqûlât al‑awal) present in the rational part of the soul. In Mabâdî' (pp. 196‑197) al‑Fârâbî writes of intelligibles which are impressed (tartâsima) on the rational part of the soul. Subsequently, using the metaphor of light (pp. 44‑45; see also Davidson, 1972, pp. 138‑139), a metaphor first used by Aristotle and subsequently all his commentators (Rahman, 1972, p. 12), al‑Fârâbî writes that the "intellect in actuality conveys to the material intellect something (yufidu... shayʿan) which it imprints on it which is in relation to the material intellect the same as light in relation to sight".55

Sight is potential as are colours. Both can only become actual in presence of light from the sun. In an analogous manner things which were potentially intelligible and existed only as representations in the faculty of imagination can now become intelligible i.e. man can abstract concepts of material things around him via the senses and have the capacity to know the immaterial celestial existentia. In other words this intellect of man now becomes the point of departure for the procedure of investigation covered in the first chapter. Thus al‑Fârâbî writes that "the first intelligibles which are common to all men.... are of three kinds, [a] the principles of the productive skills, [b] the principles by which man becomes aware of good and evil in man's actions, [c] the principles which are used for knowing the existents which are not the objects of man's actions, and the primary principles and ranks: such as the heavens and the first cause and the other primary principles and what happens to come out to be out of those primary principles" (Mabâdi', pp. 202‑205).56

The remaining perfections now lie within man's grasp provided he so chooses since "by the virtue of it [i.e. the third will] man is able to do either what is commendable or blamable, noble or

55 The material intellect (al‑ʿaqî al‑hayûlânî) is also referred to as the intellect in potential (al‑ʿaqî bbl‑qûwah). It becomes actually intellect (al‑ʿaqî bl‑fîl) subsequent to the action of al‑ʿaqî al‑faʿâl (Mabâdi', pp. 202‑203). In reference to this transformation the material intellect is termed the Passive Intellect (al‑ʿaqî al‑munfaʿîl). In Madani (fs. 31), al‑Fârâbî writes, without any reference to al‑ʿaqî al‑faʿâl, of the transformation of the intellect in potential to the intellect in act when the first principles occur to the former.

56 This tripartite division refers to Aristotle’s division of the sciences into theoretical, practical and productive
3. *al-aql al-farāḍ*

base, and because of it there is reward and punishment... he is able to seek or not to seek happiness.... in so far as it lies in his power" (*Regime*, p. 42). The act of decision implied in the statement is the outcome not of this will by itself because in this case it would still remain the cause of "merely" sensation or imagination, two faculties which man shares with other animals. Rather it is the resultant of deliberation or rational thought in general and only in this instance can it be termed an act of choice (*Mabādi‘*, pp. 204-205; see also Aristotle, p. 131).

Al-Fārābī elaborates on happiness as it relates to the innate or positive dispositions of man to attain it in this context. In *Regime* (p. 42) he asserts that "happiness is good without qualification" and anything which is defined good is not for its own sake but for the attainment of happiness. From this it follows that whatever obstructs the path to happiness is "unqualified evil".\(^{57}\) He then writes that in the normal course of the creation it is entirely possible that natural good, i.e. whatever makes it easier to achieve happiness, and natural evil, i.e. whatever makes it easier to achieve misery or difficult to achieve good, will arise in the multiplicity of created things from the action of the celestial bodies. The created things of course include man and hence "the states of the soul by which a man does good deeds and fair actions are the virtues and the those by which he does wicked deeds and ugly actions are the vices, defects and base qualities" (*Madani*, fs. 2).

The quote from *Madani* is followed by a discussion on ethical virtues and vices (fs. 7-17) and one of the discussions relates to the improbability of the creation of a man inherently disposed to all virtues or disposed to all vices but stresses that possibility of the existence of both (fs. 10). The majority of cases however will be somewhere on a continuum between the two extremes and will have the innate dispositions for various types and levels of virtues and hence of the appropriate capacity for learning. This natural disparity, is also made clear in *Regime* (pp. 45-46) with reference to the above mentioned first intelligibles: some receive them as they are, some

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\(^{57}\) An almost identical explanation is offered in *Madani* (fs. 69) after emphasizing that evil has "no absolute existence" he continues that happiness is good and everything which facilitates it and evil is the misery "which is the opposite of happiness" and all that facilitates the attainment of misery.
not at all and some - the insane - not as they really are.

In contrast to natural good and evil al-Fârâbî also writes of voluntary good and evil (al-khayr al-irâdî wa'l-sharr aZ-irâdî) which arise specifically out of man's exercise of choice. This, as already mentioned, requires knowledge of what is true happiness and knowledge of the true way to attain it. It is here that the first intelligibles given by al-aql al-fa'âl play a crucial role. Having received the first intelligibles, man's primary objective must be the endeavour to perfect his theoretical-rational faculty (al-nâtiqah al-nazariyah), the only faculty which can perceive happiness with certainty. After which it is incumbent on man to marshal his other four faculties, i.e. the practical-rational (al-nâtiqah al-amaliyah), the appetitive (al-nuzû'îyah), the imaginative (al-mutakhayyilah), and the sensitive (al-hassâsah) to try and attain happiness. This is the only goal of any consequence and when man strives to attain this goal "everything that originates from man is good" (Regime, p. 43 and Mabâdi', pp. 208-211). In the event that man fails to perfect his theoretical-rational faculty, or fails to perceive true happiness, or desires some other goal apart from happiness, then "everything that originates from him is evil" (Regime, p. 44 and Mabâdi', pp. 208-211).

The function of al-aql al-fa'âl is by no means limited to the giving of the first intelligibles. There is a second intervention and in this case the man who has has striven to attain the certain knowledge on the basis of the first principles, as indicated in the first chapter, is once again made the recipient of its effusion. Al-Fârâbî conceptualizes this second intervention in terms of three grades or stages of intellect. The original disposition of man to the procurement of certain knowledge which becomes al-aql al-munfa'il is now like matter and substratum (shabahu al-mâddati wa'l-mawdû'î) to the higher grade of intelligence termed the acquired intellect (al-aql al-mustafâd). The latter in its own turn serves as matter and substratum to the Active Intellect (Regime, p. 49; Mabâdi', pp. 242-245).58

58 The manner in which each grade of intellect serves as a beginning for the next one higher in the hierarchy is analogous to matter being subservient to the soul and the soul in its turn serving the cause of the intellect described in the preceding chapter.
3. *al-aql al-fa'āl*

In the case of *Regime* (p. 50) al-Fārābī uses *ittasala* or joining. In *Mabādī* (pp. 244-245) he writes of *al-ifādah min al-aql al-fa'āl ilā al-aql al-munfa'il* i.e. the emanation from the Active Intellect to the passive intellect. This is followed by *huwa'l-insāну alladh'i halla fīhī al-aql al-fa'āl* i.e. the man on whom the Active Intellect has descended (on p. 410 of the English commentary Walzer writes of the "indwelling" of the divine in the (human) intellect). Walzer cautions against the interpretation of this situation in a mystical sense (p. 442) and here he concurs with Davidson (1972, p. 142) who also denies any suggestion of ecstasy in al-Fārābī's writings.

In any case al-Fārābī writes, as far as the recipient is concerned, that "the power that enables man to understand how to define things and actions and how to direct them towards happiness emanates from the Active Intellect to the passive intellect.... through the mediation of the acquired intellect" (*Regime*, pp. 49-50). After referring to this as revelation (*wahy*) al-Fārābī writes that because the Active Intellect in turn emanates from the First Cause the revelation in effect comes from the First Cause (*Regime*, pp. 49-50). Or, as the author puts it in *Mabādī* (pp. 244-245), also after a reference to revelation, the recipient is now transformed into "a wise man and a philosopher and an accomplished thinker who employs an intellect of divine quality".

To which is added "and through the emanation from the Active Intellect to his faculty of representation a visionary prophet: who warns of thing to come and tells of particular things which exist at present".59

The statement is made in a section in *Mabādī* on the ideal associations, the ideal ruler and imperfect associations. This section follows two chapters of a previous section on reason, and representation and divination. Hence it is pertinent to note that it is in the second chapter, 59

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59 The debate concerning the actual joining of the human intellect with the Active Intellect is not made easier when al-Fārābī seems to indicate that the former "becomes" the latter in *Arasole* (pp. 129-130) However it is important, simultaneously, to note that the Active Intellect itself is by no means perfect with regard to the production of many things. It has to "wait its turn" to intervene until the heavenly bodies have produced the requisite minimum requirements. Consequent with this insight therefore, is the limitation being imposed on the recipient with regard to its action in the infra-lunar world. In other words the horizon of the deliberative virtues is far from being unlimited.
which serves as a link between two discussions of individual and political man, that al-Fârâbî discusses the features of the faculty of representation (Mabâdi', pp. 208-227). Situated between the rational and the sensible faculties it is the faculty to which the second will or desire adheres. When one is awake and making use of all one's faculties it is constantly receiving sensibles and intelligibles which it preserves as they are or in the form of imitations of something else it has received prior to them and preserved. The latter is an outcome of the association and the disassociation which the faculty is capable of at the time one is asleep. Later, these images can activate the other faculties and limbs by reproducing the images of hunger, anger, intercourse, etc.

This procedure of imitation also applies to the immaterial celestial intelligibles received by the rational faculty and since the two faculties are situated next to one another the faculty of representation can imitate the intelligibles given by the Active Intellect to the rational faculty. As a consequence of this the man whose rational faculty has reached the state of al-\textit{aql al-mustafâd} and whose imaginative faculty has also reached perfection will receive the most perfect imitations possible when wide awake. It is in this sense that al-Fârâbî refers to the above mentioned receipt of revelation or the actualization of the visionary prophet. This is the most perfect individual who knows all the intelligibles as they actually are and in addition can formulate this knowledge and the actions leading to it for people of all intellectual capacities so that they can achieve the state of happiness of which they are capable. Here is al-Fârâbî's statement to this effect (\textit{Regime}, p. 49):

\begin{quote}
The supreme ruler without qualification,... who does not need anyone to rule him in anything whatever, but has actually acquired the sciences and every kind of knowledge, and who has no need of a man to guide him in anything. He is able to comprehend well each one of the particular things he ought to do. He is able to guide well all others to everything in which he instructs them, to employ all those who do any of the acts for which they are equipped, and to determine, define and direct these acts towards happiness. This is found only in the one who possesses great and superior natural dispositions, and when his soul is in union with the Active Intellect.
\end{quote}

The supreme ruler or the visionary prophet is the first prince who should be succeeded by others with the same attributes and qualifications and about whom al-Fârâbî writes in \textit{Enumeration}, or
the legislator who can bring into being the "city in speech" in Plato. He is also the philosopher-supreme ruler-prince-legislator-imâm of Attainment each of whose abilities al-Fârâbi interlinks so effectively with the others that he can conclude with the statement that each of them is representative of "one and the same idea" (pp. 42 and 45)

The term "philosopher" signifies theoretical virtues but their perfection implies all the other lower faculties. The term "legislator" signifies knowledge of the practical intelligibles (al-maqûtât al-amâlîtah) or voluntary intelligibles and the perfection of the deliberative virtues by which he can embody them in laws but the theoretical perfection is already implicit in these abilities. The term "prince" signifies superlative power in terms of his innate capacities of rulership which are nurtured by the theoretical and practical education. The term "imâm" signifies the one whose perfection and purpose are well received so that he can accomplish this purpose by using his capacities as the first three. All these terms, which signify one and the same idea, are synonymous with what the Greeks called, according to al-Fârâbi, the science of sciences, the mother of sciences, the wisdom of wisdoms and the art of arts (Attainment, p. 39).60

Not enough stress can be laid on the prior perfection of the theoretical-rational faculty. Nor can there be too much emphasis on the practical-rational faculty through which deliberation takes place to bring about the actual existence of the voluntary intelligibles. Nor can the fact of innate dispositions, the basis for any growth, be repeated often enough. Finally, nor can the correct aim be in any way undervalued. Without the presence of all these al-madînah al-fâdîlah cannot be established. Consider the manner in which al-Fârâbi judges the outcome when any one of these is missing in his enumeration of different kinds of philosophers (Attainment, pp. 39 and 45-46).

60 Ilm al-'ulûm wa 'umm al-'ulûm wa hukmat al-hikam wa sara'at al-sarâ'at Both "consummate and extreme competence in any art whatsoever" and "penetrating practical judgment and acumen" are rated lower in the scale when compared to the above "unqualified wisdom [which] is this science and state of mind alone" (Attainment, p 39). A similar statement is to be found in Aristotle (pp. 75-76)

Perhaps what al-Fârâbi says in the context of this discussion has validity regarding the ambiguity of the relationship between political science and political philosophy brought out in chapter one (p 18) the acquisition of the highest wisdom was called science and the scientific state of mind was called philosophy by the Greeks
First there is the defective philosophy (*al-falsafah al-naqisah*) of him who does not possess "the faculty for exploiting [the theoretical sciences] for the benefit of others according to their capacity" (p. 39). Then there is mutilated philosophy *al-falsafah al-batrâ‘* which comprises the following three kinds of philosophers. [a] The counterfeit philosopher (*al-faylasûf al-zawar*) who "studies the theoretical sciences without being naturally equipped for them" (p. 45) and therefore his education fights a losing battle with his lack of innate dispositions for this kind of study. In contrast to him is the true philosopher whose status as ruler is in part due to his natural aptitude (*Attainment*, p. 27; also *Mabûdi*, pp. 232-233). [b] The vain philosopher (*al-faylasûf al-bahraj*) who is not "habituated to doing the acts considered virtuous by a certain religion or the generally accepted noble acts [but] follows his own inclination and appetites" (p. 45). Hence his evil (in the sense used by al-Fârâbî) habits overpower the positive aspects of his education. [c] The false philosopher (*al-faylasûf al-bâtil*) who is not perfect his acquisition of the theoretical sciences and who aims at what is generally considered to be happiness. He achieves this false aim or if he is unsuccessful "holds the opinion that the knowledge he has is superfluous" (p. 46).

The above comparison of inadequate philosophers versus the true philosopher is made near the end of *Attainment* subsequent to the exposition of the perfect man who embodies the supreme ruler, the philosopher, the prince, the legislator (*wâdi‘ al-nawâmîs*) and the imâm.61 There seems to be no mention of the prophet or of revelation in this treatise. The same assertion is true for

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61 Al-Fârâbî's subsuming of what each of these offices represent under a single concept, and his emphasis on the perfection of the theoretical-rational and the practical-rational faculties do not seem any different from his assertion of the inseparability of the four perfect human things in *Attainment* (pp. 26) i.e. the theoretical, deliberative and moral virtues and the practical arts. Furthermore, it will be apparent that each of the three constellations has been the subject of elaboration after which al-Fârâbî has not failed to insist on the unity of the "compar ants" just analysed. This method of investigation of the three groups of concepts would seem to point to a confirmation of the analysis and synthesis technique noted in chapter two (pp. 25-26), in the context of the reluctance to differentiate or to coalesce metaphysics and politics, being and becoming, knowledge for its own sake and for pragmatic ends. The same dangers of reductionism inherent vis-a-vis these polarities are applicable to the constellations of intelligibles in the present chapter.

Regarding the practical arts from the point of view of inseparability it would seem as if al-Fârâbî is saying that the philosopher is also the supreme practical artist i.e. the best craftsman's work is inseparable from the perfection of his intellect. The important issue is where one decide, to place the emphasis - this applies to both writer and reader. For instance a writer's practical art is concrete local and (perhaps extremely) individual and his writings, in all likelihood, would express this. In a similar sense his utterances would be an expression of the same supremacy.
Plato and Aristotle. However in Regime (pp. 49-50) where al-Fârâbî writes of revelation, which in the final analysis, is the effect of the First Cause "through the mediation of the Active Intellect". Nevertheless the recipient is referred to as a supreme ruler rather than a prophet. Nor is there any discussion of the imaginative faculty. Though there is no explicit reference to this faculty in Attainment, al-Fârâbî's exposition of the pedagogical utility of images and similitudes is based on an appreciation of the faculty (see chapter four, pp. 52f; and chapter five, pp. 84-85 and 90f).

On the other hand imagination and prophecy, as mentioned previously, are the foci of Mabâdi'. Al-Fârâbî discusses various grades of this faculty in relation to the innate capacity to receive realities or imitations of such realities (pp. 214f); further differences are made on the basis of sleep or wakefulness, sanity, and changes for better or worse due to accidents (pp. 222-227).

Whereas for most people the faculty of representation is free from the other faculties only during sleep some people with a more powerful faculty have a surplus during waking hours. For them this faculty imprints its objects on the faculty of common sense (al-hâssah al-mushtarikah) and this affects the sight: things supplied by the Active Intellect are actually visible to them. In a state of utmost perfection the man will, in waking life, receive prophecy of the present and future events from particulars relating to the practical intellect and prophecy of things divine through the intelligibles relating to the theoretical intellect (pp. 224-225 - in both case al-Fârâbî writes of nûbûwah). This discussion of the faculty of the imagination is followed, in the next chapter, by a single paragraph comprising both the emanation to the intellect and the imagination - the outcome of the first being a philosopher and of the second a prophet (pp. 244-245). The religious tone of the passage is obvious from the emphasis on divine revelation coming from Allâh rather than the First Cause.\(^6^2\)

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\(^6^2\) A similar shift in vocabulary was evident in the manner in which al-Fârâbî wrote of the functions of fiqh and kalâm in comparison to political science (see chapter two of this thesis, p. 34). Also relevant is the use of conditional clauses regarding religion and related arts after the perfection of the syllogistic arts in Hurûf (mentioned in chapter one, p. 21).
These ambiguities have drawn comments from a number of writers. Rahman (1979, p. 31) for instance categorizes the event in *Regime* as an "intellectual revelation" which includes philosophers, mystics and prophets. On the other hand the situation in *Mabâdi'*, referred to as a "technical or the imaginative revelation" and this distinguishes the prophet from the other two (p. 36). Strauss (1987, pp. 92-94) differentiates between two accounts of the faculty of the imagination as follows: whereas the former is a perfection of this particular faculty alone, the latter is concomitant with the perfection of the intellect and thus it "stands on the highest stage of humanity"; whereas the former is restricted to practical but particular foretelling of future events, the latter, as a combination of the theoretical and the practical perfections, produces "a teacher and a leader of men" (p. 98).

Davidson (1972, pp. 145-146) also notes the two levels of prophecy and dwells on the enigmatic statements made regarding deliberation in the lower first level. On the one hand al-Fârâbî equates the representative knowledge of future events with the knowledge of the same achieved by deliberation of the practical intellect. The cause and effect reasoning seems to be thus replaced by this "given" knowledge without the mediacy of, or the discovery by, deliberation. But this is in conflict with al-Fârâbî's acceptance of the "Aristotelian epistemology which excludes knowledge of particulars by any intellect". The answer seems to lie in the statements immediately preceding the statement quoted above: the imagination has reformulated in images the inferences drawn by the practical reason (p. 146). This kind of prophecy is available to anyone with a strong imaginative faculty. The second higher level on the other hand effects the philosopher and the prophet "the only person qualified to govern the state" and whose "inspired imagination is able to frame the anthropomorphic descriptions of spiritual beings found in the Scripture" (p. 147).  

Lerner and Macy take a different approach from these three authors. Lerner (1987, p. 511)

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63 As far as the Active Intellect is concerned this might account for the reference to it in *Siyāsah* (p. 4) as *al-rûh al-āmin* and *al rûh al-quds* both terms being found in the Qur'an
notes al-Fārābī's "reinterpretation of revelation in strikingly secular terms", a point also made by Macy (1985, p. 192) writing of the phenomenon as "redefinition" in reference to the distinction between the recipient of emanation to intellectual faculty alone and the recipient to both intellectual and representative faculties (p. 191). Another author pertinent to this discussion is Merlan (1963, pp. 17-24). Though not writing directly of al-Fārābī, he takes up Madkour's use of the term "rationalistic mysticism" to distinguish al-Fārābī from Sufi mysticism and uses it as absorption into a "god different from the ineffable one" (p. 21). The consequence is a "flood of sheer light" or "absolute transparency" rather than any unknowing or opaqueness. In the discussion which centres on Ibn Rushd and Ibn Bājjah, Merlan traces the concept back to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* where the Greek philosopher expresses the desire to be omniscient. This would indicate an epistemological rather than an ontological identification.

It will be noted that al-Fārābī's endeavour to reinterpret revelation in more universal or abstract terms is in keeping with the attempts to make logic (more) formal and universal in comparison to grammar (chapter one, pp. 11f), and to give political science a theoretical dimension in order to broaden its scope to encompass *fiqh* and *kalām* (chapter two, pp. 34f). In the case of this chapter, the universal human intellect, a part of the eternal, supra-lunary world, triumphs over the particular imageries of culture-bound imaginations. Secondly as far as the relegation of prophecy to the faculty of representation is concerned, notwithstanding the importance of lawgiving that is the primary function, this position "detracts a good deal from the value of prophecy" (Davidson, 1972, p. 146) to say the least. Thirdly the stress on the naturalness of the universe where each thing actualizes or is given the choice to actualize its own potential, and the remoteness of the First Cause in the system of emanation which leaves it passive in relation to the world of man is one of the decisive factors dividing the *falāsifah* from the *mutakallimūn* and others who gave God a more active role in the world of man.

These, of course, are not the only points of contention. The limitation of the intellects, and by implication God, to knowledge of universals is another issue. The eternity of the same intellects
and the immortality which is concomitant with the higher level of prophecy are two further problems. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all these issues. What will be discussed is the philosophers' emphasis on nature as first it relates to the distinctions that al-Fârâbî makes in *Ihsâ'*, between the divine science, metaphysics, or natural theology which was incorporated into political science for the latter to subsume the revealed theology which comes after it. Second the emphasis on nature has its corollary in the freedom of choice to which al-Fârâbî repeatedly refers. Both the points discussed will bring to light the fundamental differences that separated the protagonists.

The naturalism of the *falâsifah* can of course be traced back to Aristotle. However in the world of Islam, once the ideas of this Greek made their appearance, the concepts of nature and convention had to undergo some semantic changes in order to be used to transfer the Aristotelian import of these concepts. This is the route that Mahdi (1982) takes to discuss the implications of the philosophers' conceptions of man and the world in relation to God. From a pre-philosophic lack of demarcation between words derived from the Arabic root *ibr* meaning imprint or impression and *sunna* meaning tradition or way, develops a more abstract usage of terms derived from the former like *tabî'ah* and *tabî'i* meaning nature and natural, and a new understanding of *sunna* as convention rather than the accepted way of the ancestors. Nature and natural are both seen as expressions of the way in which natural beings reveal themselves to sight, and intellect and convention becomes "a second nature as it were, indispensable if man is to achieve the ends intended for him by nature" (pp. 12 and 16). The demarcation is apparent in the distinctions al-Fârâbî makes between natural and voluntary intelligibles. The voluntary intelligibles created outside the soul through deliberation in order to achieve happiness are convention and these of course are subject to temporal and spatial variations.

This view is however not the least in accord with an omnipotent God, unrestricted by the nature of creation or knowledge of it promising rewards or punishment for obedience or the lack of it (pp. 13-14). In other words the natural view of the universe does not seem to have space for
divine favours of all kinds so essential for man to attain happiness. This difficulty is met by the philosophers by relegating such views as essential for the non-philosophical multitude. These views are the exterior meanings of things which can be understood by demonstration. And this leads to an investigation of things political, laws both divine and human and thence to the art of the lawgiver (p. 15) - ideas already encountered in the previous chapter and discussed again in the following chapters.

At the conclusion of this chapter, an exposition of the metaphysics of al-Fârâbi, it will be noted that the upward thrust of the philosopher to attain knowledge of the principles of all the beings has been complemented by the descent of revelation from the Active Intellect. The philosopher-prophet who has been made the recipient of divine effusion now is in possession of knowledge and not merely an assumption and is able to define this knowledge in a way that other ordinary men can assimilate in order that it will be a basis for their actions leading to happiness. The details of how he instructs others to lead them to the bliss that each one of them is innately capable is the theme of the next two chapters.

The situation, however, is quite different if nature itself and the laws of the cosmos (in al-Fârâbi’s time or at present, indeed especially at present) are viewed as divine favours. In other words, divinity is not limited to working by "miracles". Rather the organization and the regularity of the universe is miraculous. It is reason-able. One inference of this line of thought relates to the question of the religiousity of al-Fârâbi (and by implication others of the philosophical tradition). However, such an hypothesis can only be genuinely investigated if, as mentioned in the introduction (p. 3), al-Fârâbi is accepted on his own terms without prior categorization. Consider that he seems quite willing to posit revelation in *both* religious and non-religious terms. This would suggest that the explanatory power of the former position in terms of what is amenable to reason does not preclude the wondrous existence in terms of the latter, nor do these two apparently contradictory modes of human apprehension limit creativity in the universe. The coexistence of the "reasonable" and the "emotional" is forcefully brought out in the teacher’s ability to explain the world in terms of logic and poetry.
4. THE THEORY OF INSTRUCTION I: AL-MADINA AL-FAḌILAḤ

One of the elements of al-Fārābī’s theory of instruction appears both in *Regime* (p. 55) and *Mabâdî’* (pp. 278-279) immediately after the prescriptions of the curriculum content, a discussion of which began this thesis. In *Regime* al-Fārābī writes that instruction proceeds in either of the two ways that man can comprehend the principles: by intellection or by imagination - *anna al-insâna yatasawwarâh wa-yaqîlahâ wa-imnâ an yatakhayyalâh* (p. 55). According to the other treatise the curriculum prescriptions can be known "either by being impressed on their souls as they are (*tartasima* .... *kamâ hya mawjûdah*) or by being impressed on them through affinity and symbolic representation (*tartasima* .... *bi'l-munâsabah wa'l-tamthîl*)".

Another element is added in *Attainment* (p. 40). After repeating basically what has just been quoted above he writes that assent to either of these teachings should be elicited by use of certain demonstration or by persuasion. This gives a total of three methods the results of which are assigned the following names. The combination of perception by the intellect and assent by demonstration is philosophy (*falsafah*). In the case of the second combination of symbolic representation through the imagination and assent by persuasion "the ancients call what comprises these cognitions religion (*mû/ah*)". The third case is the receipt of the principles through the intellect but assent is by persuasion rather than demonstration: "the religion comprising them is called popular, generally accepted and external philosophy (*al-falsafah al-dhâ'ī'aḥ al-mashhûrah al-barrântyah*)".

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65 Al-Fārābī’s use of the term *taḥfil* is apparently synonymous with *taṣawwur* which is utilized in a narrower sense in formal logic in conjunction with *taṣdiq* (Mahdi, 1969b, p. 140, note (55) 1).

66 Mahdi (1969b) has corrected two words in *Tahsil* which read *malakah* instead of *mû/ah* and *al-barrântyah* instead of
A third element which builds on the first two is put forward in the context of realization of the four human things in nations and cities after they have been actualized in a certain man: "instruction and formation of character (ta'lim wa-ta'dib)" (p. 29). By "instruction" is meant the introduction of theoretical virtues, and by "formation of character", the introduction of moral virtues and practical arts: instruction proceeds by speech alone, the formation of character through habituation in the practical arts by speech or deed. It is the combination of these two methods that al-Fârâbî uses to bring into existence the three groups of people who will each preserve philosophy, religion and the popular, external philosophy. An added group of people arises from a fourth science which is the result of the application of these three universal sciences to the various nations "each containing everything by which a particular nation becomes perfect and happy" (Attainment, p. 35). A summary of these elements appears in the table below.

The combination of instruction and formation of character also appears in Plato (p. 22) where al-Fârâbî evaluates the ability of Socrates as being limited to "conduct a scientific investigation of justice and virtues". This must be supplemented by the method of Thrasymachus who possessed the ability "to form the character of the youth and the multitude". Al-Fârâbî concludes by emphasizing the capacity of the philosopher, the prince and the legislator to use both methods: the former with the elect and the latter for all else. The essence of these two methods of education to achieve happiness is put in different words in Regime (p. 48). Here al-Fârâbî writes about guidance: after referring once again to the natural limitations of most men he notes the differing levels of guidance which men need in order to achieve the goal. He then adds that "in the absence of an external stimulus and incentive" most men will not avail themselves of the guidance. The corollary is then posed: neither is it in the capacity of most men to guide and induce others. However grades of such men are evident and the one most capable is the supreme ruler.

*al-barrāniyah, see also al-Fârâbî (1981), Tahsil al-Sâdah ed with an Introduction and notes by Ja'far al-Yasin, p 90*
Table 1: MACRO-LEVEL SUMMARY

(I) The human things of four kinds through which happiness is attained are -

(1) theoretical virtues
(2) deliberative virtues
(3) moral virtues
(4) practical arts
knowledge of these is theoretical perfection

(II) They can be realized only in a certain man who already possesses the highest natural aptitudes for them

(III) In turn he can then realize them (as voluntary intelligibles) in nations and cities using his faculty of deliberation. He (A1) instructs and (A2) forms the character of each individual according to what his innate dispositions allow thereby bringing him to happiness

(A1) Instruction is the introduction of the theoretical sciences by intellect or by imagination and proceeds with the use of speech alone. This is knowledge or opinion for future action.

(A2) Formation of character is the introduction of the moral virtues and the practical arts and proceeds with the use of both speech and by deed. This is habituation of actions on the basis of the above knowledge or opinion which will lead to happiness

(B) He proceeds on the assumption that the principles of beings are comprehended either by -

(1) intellect or by (2) imagination
and conviction is elicited by --

(a) certain demonstrations or by (b) persuasion
the combinations of which result in three sciences --

(1) and (a) is philosophy
(1) and (b) is popular, generally accepted, external philosophy
(2) and (b) is religion

(IV) The combination of (A) and (B) leads to the formation of four groups each of whom is equipped with knowledge of a specialized kind and the faculty to discover what was not given to them but is of the same kind of which they are custodians. This enables them to instruct, defend and contradict what opposes that knowledge. The four specializations are -

(1) theoretical sciences
(2) popular theoretical sciences
(3) image-making theoretical sciences
(4) particular sciences from the application of these three in differing nations

In accordance with the "instruction/formation of character" melange each group possesses a deliberative virtue and a warlike virtue. These may be found in a certain man or be distributed in more than one each of whom would find an appropriate place in a hierarchy depending on his innate disposition.
The difference between the elect and the multitude is related to the differences between philosophy and religion. Two constellations of concepts are created as al-Fārābi pushes forward this trajectory of thought (*Attainment*, pp. 40-41). The first is philosophy with intellect, reality, demonstration and priority in time. The second is religion with imagination, imitation, persuasion and subsequence in time. Religion is an imitation of whatever in philosophy is real be it the principles of beings and their hierarchy, divine acts, natural powers or happiness. Each constellation, in its relation to the other, is the logical outcome of the division of labour between the intellectual and the imaginative faculties of which al-Fārābi writes when he describes the work of the Active Intellect. In this context the philosopher is the one who invents the images and the persuasive arguments, but not for the sake of establishing these things in his soul as a religion for himself. No, the images and the persuasive arguments are intended for others, whereas, so far as he is concerned, these things are certain. They are a religion for others, whereas so far as he is concerned, they are philosophy. Such, then, is true philosophy and the true philosopher (*Attainment*, p. 44).67

As far as the imitations are concerned they "differ in excellence" and thence arises the plurality of religions (*Regime*, pp. 56-57) which al-Fārābi arranges into a hierarchy. There are imitations which can be closer to the truth than the others and be freer of "points of contention" than the latter. The imitations of a superior quality should be preserved and the others discarded. The imitations, as a general rule, are needed because "the multitude (*jumhūr*)" find it difficult to intellect the realities as they are and the varieties of imitations arise from the circumstances which form(ed) the contexts of the teachings in comparison to "the meanings and essences which are one and immutable" (*Regime*, pp. 55-56).68

Between the two extremes al-Fārābi interposes the popular, external philosophy - a sort of

67 The subsequence of religion in time was clearly illustrated in the historical development of the arts delineated in *Hudâf* (see chapter one of the present thesis, p 21) Religion, jurisprudence and theology are the three arts which are needed with the giving of the laws, laws given by the philosopher who has knowledge of all the syllogistic arts

68 The relationship between philosophy and religion(s) is analogous to the relationship between logic and grammar(s) - which was dealt with in the first chapter (pp 11-13) Al-Fārābi's consistent emphasis would be on the universal rather than the particular Yet as was noticed in the chapter on *al-aql al-fā'āl* (p 48) the ambiguity vs. the eminences to the intellect and the imagination would point to the paradoxical nature of this relationship
"half-way house" for those who do not, or do not yet, belong to the elect but may have the innate dispositions for the exalted status. Consider *Mabādi* (p. 70) where al-Fārābī notes that "it is not impossible that among those who know these things through symbols" someone will find points of contention. One of the three kinds of such people are "those who seek the right path" and depending on the level of an individual’s potential and hence understanding he may be raised through the ranks to acquire philosophical wisdom. By and large however the division seems fundamental to al-Fārābī's thought. The theoretical sciences are for the "imāms, princes or else those who should preserve the theoretical sciences" (*Attainment*, pp. 29-30) and the images or the similitudes of the theoretical sciences are for the multitude.

Al-Fārābī has prescriptions for the education of the elite in *Attainment* (pp. 29-31), in *Aristotle* (pp. 78-80) where he depicts the training and investigating art, and in *Attainment* (pp. 44-45) and *Mabādi* (p. 59) where he enumerates the qualities which are prerequisites for their education. These qualities are to be found, as al-Fārābī notes in Plato's *Republic*. The (future) elite should be made familiar with the first premises and their arrangements and be habituated in using all the logical methods of the theoretical sciences (which were the subject of discussion of the first chapter of the present thesis). Initially these should be given to them via their similitudes and then as they are in reality. The students should be made to pursue their studies "in accordance with the plan described by Plato" (p. 30). The formation of character proceeds either by persuasion or by compulsion (which is to be used with those "who refuse to teach others the theoretical sciences in which they are engaged", p. 31) and the circumstances of the use of either requires the philosopher-ruler to employ his power of deliberation.

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69 Interestingly these three kinds of people whom al-Fārābī categorizes as being able to see the inadequacy of symbols in *Mabādi* appear as weeds (nawābu) within the virtuous city in *Regime* (pp. 74-75). See chapter five (pp. 75-76) for a further discussion.

70 From a neo-Marxist perspective the education of this group of individuals could be interpreted to be the recruitment of potential elites in order to perpetuate an existing social stratification.

71 *Book IV* 484a-487a
The images or the similitudes of the theoretical sciences, not as a primary step to knowing them as they really are but permanently, are for the multitude. After producing these images and the persuasive methods for eliciting consent the philosopher-prince needs to devise methods of political oratory to arouse the resolution to carry out the acts of the practical arts and to inculcate the moral virtues in the nations and the cities (Attainment, p. 33). The orator needs to use one set of arguments to justify his own position, another set arguments by which souls "grow reverent, submissive, muted and meek" to execute the acts leading to happiness, and a final set that causes other souls who oppose him to grow confident, spiteful, insolent and contemptuous in order to contradict them and to reveal their acts as base and mean.

The arguments of a more permanent nature relating to the persuasions used to inculcate the images of the theoretical sciences and the acts of the practical arts are to be preserved in two books - a book of opinions and a book of acts - "so that they will not be forgotten" (Attainment, p. 34). Following this the philosopher-prince should repeat his deliberation for all the particular groups in every nation vis-a-vis the human nature common to all of them and vis-a-vis what differentiates them from each other. By drawing up "an actual - if approximate - list of the acts and states of character with which every nation can be set right and guided toward happiness and [specifying] the classes of persuasive arguments (regarding both the theoretical virtues and the practical arts) that ought to be employed among them [he] will thus set down what every nation is capable of, having subdivided every nation and inquired whether or not there is a group fit for preserving the theoretical sciences and others who can preserve the popular theoretical sciences or the image-making theoretical sciences".

It is obvious that the philosopher cannot do all this on his own (Mithlā, fs. 13 and Mabā‘īr, pp. 228-229). Hence, in accordance with the prescription that instruction proceeds by speech and formation of character by habituation, he employs two sets of people - one who will restrict
their persuasion to speech and the other who will have the power to compel. In short, to form the character of peoples al-Fârâbî will make use of teachers and wherever necessary soldiers (Attainment, pp. 31-32) : he draws the analogy of heads of households and superintendents of children except that the skills of the philosopher-prince are of a much wider scope.

These teachers and soldiers will be comprised by each of the four groups of people who will preserve their respective specialized sciences. There is the possibility that individuals in each group will possess both the deliberative virtue and the warlike virtue. The first will enable him to discover "what was not actually given.... but is nevertheless of the same kind for which [he] is custodian" thus facilitating his role as an instructor and a defender of his specialization (Attainment, p. 35). The second, warlike virtue will be at hand "in case there is a need to excel in leading troops to war" (pp. 35-36). If however the two cannot be found in one individual then there is always the possibility of finding two men one with each virtue (or even a group with these two virtues divided amongst them).73 The supreme ruler should then delegate the appropriate responsibilities. This division of responsibilities is the basis on which al-Fârâbî divides groups, nations and cities. In other words humanity forms a hierarchy and the position of each individual in it is dependent on the deliberative and/or warlike virtue he is capable of achieving, or on the level of guidance and incentive he is able to provide, thereby leading others less fortunate below him.

Al-Fârâbî depicts the hierarchy in other books apart from Attainment.74 For instance in Regime (pp. 54-55) the variation in the natural dispositions and the habits of character which are determinants of the ranking is repeated. He then explains how orders are transmitted down the ranks. Drawing the analogy between this order of things and the order of natural beings, between the prince and the First Cause, he explains that each rank is simultaneously ruler and ruled

73 See the glossary for various kinds of rulership - s.v. ra'îs and n'âsah.

74 He also briefly mentions in Plato (p. 22) that there are means by which the citizens of the city ought to glorify their princes and philosophers! No further details are added.
4. the theory of instruction I: al-madinat al-fādilah

except for the top and the bottom of the structure. The top is the First Cause - the cause of all else, and the bottom is likened to "prime matter and the elements that possesses no ruling element whatever, but [is] subservient and always exists for the sake of others" (p. 54). The hierarchy is explained in terms of the human body and its component organs in *Mabâdî* (pp. 55-56): the heart is the primary organ, the cause of all other organs, limbs, their faculties and the hierarchy inherent in the body. It is also the heart that provides the means to remove disorders when they appear in a manner similar to the ruler who possesses the capacity to transform the non-virtuous cities.75

To describe the same hierarchy in *Madâni* al-Fârâbi takes two routes. First (fs. 56) he notes the differences in people with regard to deliberative virtue, the power to produce similitudes for any particular end, and the power to employ others to realize that end. At the top (although the rank is not specified) is the one most proficient in all three. The next one down does not have the perfect deliberation, below him is the one who does not possess the requisite deliberation or the power of imagination and he is followed by the one who has none of the three requirements but "is always humble and obedient, swift to perform all that he is charged with" despite the fact that he might not know the end.

Secondly (fs. 57) he writes that the "parts of the city and the classes of its parts are united and bound together by love (bi'l-hubbah)" and "controlled and maintained by justice and actions of justice (bi'l-'adl wa-afâ'il al-'adl)". Love is explained as being of two kinds - natural and voluntary. The second kind is the outcome of sharing in a virtue, on account of advantage or of pleasure. It is, however, subordinate to the the former which turns out to be sharing in the four

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75 The reference to the human body is also interesting vis-a-vis the comparison that al-Fârâbi draws between the science of politics and medicine throughout *Madâni* beginning with an analogy between a doctor and a statesman in the third fasl. In *Enumeration* (p. 104) the nexus between theory and practice in medicine is referred to in a discussion of the virtuous royal craft which comprises the faculty of general rules and "practice in political deeds dealing with the morals and the individuals in actual cities" - just as a physician's perfection is the consequence of possessing two analogous faculties. This connection may be due to the search for respectability for the field of (political) philosophy since exponents of the subject seemed to derive their status from being practitioners of medicine rather than from being philosophers (Pines, 1970, pp. 784-785).
aims of the curriculum with which this thesis began. Justice, which follows love, is the division of the good things e.g. security, wealth, honour, dignities among the inhabitants of the city (fs. 58). Decrease or increase, whether voluntary or involuntary is subsumed under injustice unless followed by some kind of recompense. This then requires the need for commensurate pains and penalties. The concept of sharing in the virtues put forward in Madani is echoed in Millah (fs. 13) where the goal of happiness cannot be attained without the distribution of "the voluntary actions and dispositions" among individuals and groups of people.

The final aim of the city, irrespective of the analogy used to depict the structure, is of course earthly happiness in this world and supreme happiness in the next as it is put in Attainment (p. 1).76 Though exactly what al-Fârâbî is saying when he differentiates between the two kinds of bliss, or when he writes of the first life and the afterlife in Madani (fs. 25) is a matter of debate since he expresses views which are at variance with one another in his writings. Strauss (1945, p. 372) for instance, one of the authors commenting on this controversial issue, notes the differences between Attainment and Plato, the second treatise totally ignoring the question of life after death. Then there are the "simply orthodox views" of Mabâdî and the "heretical.... but still tolerable views" of Siyāsah. No less enigmatic is al-Pârâbî’s (lost or yet undiscovered) commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics in which he is reported, by Ibn Tufayl, to have written that there is no existence apart from that perceived by the senses. More precisely, statements implying any other kind of life apart from this life are "ravings and old women’s tales" (Strauss, 1945, p. 372; also Pines in Maimonides, 1963, p. lxxx).

This debate, connected with the question of immortality due to the final emanation from the Active Intellect, raises two questions which are relevant to the present thesis. Firstly the interesting way in which the two beatitudes are linked to the virtuous city and the city of necessity in Madani and secondly the ambiguity of the relationship between the theory and practice of education which is itself embedded in the question of al-Fârâbî’s style of writing. The

76 The two kinds of happiness mentioned at the outset of Attainment are not brought up again in the treatise
city of necessity (al-madinah al-darûrîyah) is defined as one of cooperation to attain what is "indispensable for the continuation of man, his livelihood and the preservation of life" (fs. 25). This is contrasted to the ideal city where cooperation is aimed at achieving "the most excellent things... which are the true existence of man" in addition to the what is merely indispensable. Both are then depicted, via Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, as the relation between the first life and the after life, a first and a last perfection: "the continuance (qawâmuḥâ) of the first is due to nourishment and other external things" in comparison to the latter which does not require the external things "for the continuation of its essence (qawâmu dhâṭîthâ)".

This presentation of the indispensable city is quite different from the description in Regime where it is merely one of the many divisions of the ignorant city (al-madinah al-ţâhîlîyah) which, together with the erring city (al-madinah al-dâllah) and the transgressing city (al madînah al-fâsqaq) are posed as opposite to the virtuous city (pp. 57-74). Madani makes no reference to any of the other cities except the two ignorant ones which accept what is thought to be the most excellent, or thought to resemble justice i.e. pleasures and riches (fs. 25). In the light of the differences this seems to present another perspective of the city of necessity.

The occurrence of Socrates in this contrast between the ideal city and the one of necessity in Madanî is illuminating when taken in conjunction with the description of his life in Plato (pp. 17f) where the question being discussed is whether, in the search for perfection, one should accept the ways of life one finds among the citizens of one's city. The response is negative: "one ought not to settle for them without investigating them and without seeking to arrive at the

77 The translation could also read "for what is constitutive of its essence". The sentence ends with "it is sufficient in itself for its continued preservation (huya mukaffiyatur benafshahu fi an tabqya mahfizatun)".

78 The glossary gives further definitions and divisions of all these cities and others, s v madinah. Some examples of the means by which to acquire the bare necessities as enumerated in Regime (p. 58) are husbandry, grazing, hunting, and robbery. The head of such a city is the one most proficient in obtaining the necessities for his city.

79 The point of view presented in Madani could be a re-evaluation of the same city in Regime or, without going into a debate over the chronology of the philosopher's writings, the detailed classification in Regime could be meant to disguise the more openly stated comments of Madani. However, it is also possible that the two expositions are analyses from different departures.
virtuous things that are truly virtuous, whether these things are the same as the opinions and the ways of life of his city or opposed to them...." (p. 17). The alternatives are a life of security but ignorance at best, and death at worst. Located in between the two extremes are existence within the city as a beast or isolation from the city and hence deprivation of perfection (p. 18). Plato's choice at this point in the treatise, according to al-Fārābī, is death.

The images of animal and/or isolation figure in other treatises of al-Fārābī. In Millah (fs. 14a) a man "who is part of the virtuous city" inhabiting an ignorant city is foreign matter or is analogous to an animal but with a limb from a lower animal. Contrariwise a man who is "part of an ignorant city" but inhabiting a virtuous city is also an animal but with head of a superior animal. The need to migrate to be with a similar kind is put forward only in the case of the virtuous man to the virtuous city. The existence of virtuous men in ignorant polities is attributed to natural or man made disasters (Regime, p. 50). The motive for migration to this city, provided the city exists, recurs in Madani (fs. 88). In the event it does not the preferred alternative is, as in Plato, death.

The impression of Socrates (and the virtuous men) as martyr(s) however will undergo a change: the subsequent investigation in Plato brings out the importance of true philosophy and the founding of a city different from the cities of injustice and evil (p. 20). Exclusively in the former city can "man arrive at the desired perfection". This is the city "rendered perfect in speech" and can only be "realized in deed" by the legislator (pp. 20-21). Finally the investigation of the methods of instruction and formation of character reveal that when "he [Plato] delineated again Socrates' method" it was found to be limited to the "scientific investigation of justice and virtues" (pp. 21-22). The additional element of the formation of character could only be provided by the method of Thrasymachus. The legislator should be endowed with both methods - the former with the elect and the latter with the youth and the multitude.

80 Rather than deprivation of happiness.

81 Both cities and the connections between them were discussed in the second chapter (p. 30).
What seems to emerge is a dual existence - a private life of investigation and teaching and a public life in conformity with the surrounding conventions. Whether the man is depicted in terms of a philosopher or a legislator, al-Fārābī is re-evaluating the character of Socrates with the criticism of the Greek philosopher's stand (Marmura, 1979, p. 311). The shift in emphasis from happiness for the inhabitants of al-madinah al-fādilah to the search of individual perfection is substantiated firstly by the statement from Attainment already quoted above relating to the difference between philosophy and religion as far as the true philosopher himself is concerned: the former comprises the essences of things as they exist in his soul and the latter is the similitudes of the same things for the multitude.

Secondly there is the conclusion of the same treatise where al-Fārābī writes that "if no use is made of him [the philosopher], the fact that he is of no use to others is not his fault but the fault of those who do not listen to him or are of the opinion that they should not listen to him" (p. 46). This statement "radically modifies the entire argument" of Attainment (Mahdi, 1969b, p. xxiv) whose aim was to bring into existence the four human things to achieve happiness for the world. However the shift in the emphasis is not to the other extreme which again would be the Socratic fate. It would be more true to conclude that in his depictions of al-madinah al-fādilah al-Fārābī is pointing out the contradictions which bedevil the relationship of theory

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82 As has been observed before (chapter three, p 46) the use of these two terms is no different from the emphasis on the oneness of the four human things, the theoretical- and practical-rational faculties. Nor as will be seen in the next chapter (pp 91f) is it different from the unity of the intellect, the imagination and the will.

83 Simultaneously he is also re-evaluating the character of Thrasymachus but in a positive sense which differs substantially from the portrayal in the Republic - this will be discussed in the following chapter (pp 77 and 88f).

84 Marmura's (1979) discussion focuses on the position that al-Fārābī and two other falsafah, i.e. Ibn Bājah and Ibn Tufayl whom Marmura classifies as Farabians, adopt in the debate of the relation of the philosopher to society (the same topic is also covered in two other papers by this author - 1983 and 1987).

85 It is pertinent to point out that the very seeds of the conclusion are laid in the exposition of deliberative virtues alluded to at the end of the first section of Attainment (pp 17f). The creation of voluntary intelligibles is partly a function of the will and al-Fārābī argues that because of wills other than that of the philosopher i.e. other voluntary obstacles, there is the possibility of not being able to realize any of the voluntary intelligibles of one's choice. In any case, the modification of the argument it is entirely in accord with the numerous assertions regarding the freedom of choice to strive for happiness which every human possesses and which has been referred to in the preceding chapters.
and practice in education (and by implication in other fields of human endeavour). And this ambiguity which arises from the very style of his writing has given rise to another debate relating to what he is saying, or rather to use al-Fârâbî's expression what he is truly saying.

Consider e.g. Strauss' writings where the argument is that individuals like al-Fârâbî are only too aware of the dire consequences ("ranging from the most cruel type, as exemplified by the Spanish Inquisition, to the mildest which is social ostracism" - Strauss, 1952, p. 32) facing the individual who questions accepted wisdom in speech or in writing. Al-Fârâbî, therefore, living in difficult times, and quite aware of the fate of Socrates, writes "between the lines" so that the essential message is restricted to friends and careful readers (Strauss, 1952, pp. 24-25; see also Mahdi, 1981, pp. 18-19). Yet further "he avails himself of the specific immunity of the commentator, or of the historian, in order to speak his mind" (Strauss, 1945, p. 375) thereby avoiding possible conflict and worse.86

The argument is centered on al-Fârâbî's Plato, a work which claims to summarize the Greek philosopher but where there is no mention of two central doctrines of Plato - immortality (Strauss, 1945, p. 372) and the Ideas (pp. 364 and 391), a work which emphasizes the political dimension of Plato by opposing the weight of the Neoplatonic tradition (pp. 362 and 377), a work which criticizes the religious investigation (al-fahs al-diyânî) and the religious syllogistic art (al-sanâ'ah al-qiyâsîyah al-diyânîyah) as incapable of providing the necessary knowledge or the necessary way of life (pp. 373-373). Strauss is thus led to the conclusion that Plato is al-Fârâbî's most esoteric work (pp. 375-376). He distinguishes between happiness and perfection87 and links this to the distinction between the royal art and philosophy; he distinguishes between the

86 Strauss has another perspective on al-Fârâbî's originality which is apposite to this thesis - "By transmitting the most precious knowledge not in 'systematic' works but in the guise of a historical account, Fârâbî indicates his view concerning 'originaly' what comes into sight as the 'original' or 'personal' 'contribution' of a philosopher is infinitely less significant than his private and truly original and individual understanding of the necessarily anonymous truth" (1945, p. 377)

87 Strauss' (1945, pp 363-385) exegesis concentrates on section no. 22 on page 13 of Plato (which corresponds to section 18 of Aflâun, p. 13)
virtuous way of life and the desired way of life and connects this to the difference in knowledge, on the basis of which one decides between the two. The desired way of life then turns out to be the contemplative way of life. Alternatively this is the perfection of the intellect since this is what renders man truly substantial.

What is conducive to rendering man truly human can also be conceptualized differently: one could say that the part of man which belongs to the genus having all four causes of existence, i.e. the body, belongs to the infra-lunar world. This would be yet another way of saying al-madinah al-datariyah, the city defined as one of cooperation to attain what is "indispensable for the continuation of man, his livelihood and the preservation of life" (Madani, fs. 25). Yet man comprises much more than this genus of beings which also makes him a part of the supra-lunar world. How one conceives of the other world is relative to the perfection of the intellect.

Hence knowledge of the distinction between the inquiries of the science of nature and the science of what is beyond natural things or ‘ilm al-tab‘ah and ‘ilm mà ba‘d al-tab‘ah.

This reference in Attainment (pp. 12-13 - discussed in chapter two of the present thesis, p. 31) is later followed by an ascent through the metaphysical beings but using the methods used in treating natural things (p. 14) the ultimate cause of which we have only the principle of instruction (p. 5). The descent or knowledge of the ultimate causes of the beings is termed the divine inquiry. The "descent" or the divinization of whatever is considered to be of ultimate value also corresponds to any one of the cities enumerated in Regime depending on one's present state of knowledge, or a transformation, or a perversion of it. At the lower end lies the city of absolute necessity - either due to a reversion of the state of one's knowledge or a resignation to the absolute limits of action. One may, of course, accept limits but not resignation. Furthermore the analysis leading to this insight may be conceived of in any number of rubrics which

88 The exegesis here (1945, pp 385-389) concentrates on the first four sections (pp 3-4) and sections 19-21 (pp. 12-13) of Plato.

89 As will be shown in the next chapter (pp 84f) this is concomitant with decreasing dependence on the imagination in one's interaction with the world. In other words greater understanding in terms of universals rather than particulars.
themselves are a melange of past and new concepts.

The question of the philosopher’s life has received attention from other authors as well. For instance Lerner and Mahdi present al-Fârâbî and other well-known medieval writers as creators of the enterprise of medieval political philosophy (1972, p. 1): each one of the Muslim, Jewish and Christian philosophers was forced to come to terms with the teachings of Greek political philosophy since it offered “the best if not the only way” to investigate the truth of the claims of religions. From this philosophy al-Fârâbî (249/870 - 339/950), Ibn Sinâ (367/980 - 416/1037), Ibn Rushd (505/11216 - 577/1078), Maimonides (514/1135 - 573/1204), Thomas Aquinas (604/1225 - 653/1274), Roger Bacon (503/1214 - 671/1212), etc., learnt how to “investigate divine and human things, how to reform beliefs and the way of life of his own community and how to act in a manner conducive to the common interest of his community and to his own interest as investigator” (1972, pp. 19-20).

Another author’s conclusion is that “the true political and social function of the philosopher and of the duties incumbent on him in this field of action, if circumstances permit [was] the main topic of philosophical discussion from the time of al-Fârâbî in the first half of the fourth/tenth century till the end of the sixth/twelftenth” (Pines 1970, pp. 784-785). This was a consequence of the lack of “universities and other recognized institutions” which would have made possible the study of the subject and the lack of status for the teachers of the subject who derived their living and their recognition from the practice of medicine. Pines contrasts these with the situation in Christian Western Europe where Greek philosophy and its teachers were forced to conform to “the doctrine approved by the Catholic hierarchy”. Philosophers living in different circumstances were not subject to this form of thought control. It would then appear that the precarious existence was a corollary of this very freedom.

90 In chapter one (p. 12) it was noted that already by al-Fârâbî’s time Christians were not allowed to read the Posterior Analytics and the following treatises of the Organon. The situation worsened considerably with the passing centuries.

91 Regarding the analysis of the political fabric of man’s existence this gave rise to two contending theories: one took political philosophy as its point of departure and the other took political theology as a first principle (see Mahdi
The question which then arises is - what happens to the tradition of education of which al-Fārābī has been a recipient and which surely, if his literary output is any standard, he wishes to continue? Or from the point of a student desirous of studying philosophy, how does he learn it? Further, what is the manner of contact between the teacher and the student? And where is the space providing the necessary learning environment for the "courteous translation"?\textsuperscript{92} It is probably easier to answer these questions by beginning with what was not possible. In view of what has been said regarding al-Fārābī's milieu and the reception accorded to Greek learning in the general monotheistic context a public institution was hardly feasible. In the light of al-Fārābī's descriptions of the fate awaiting a philosopher who dares to question existing orders, any teaching would have to be highly circumspect. Taking into account the acute awareness of the injustice resulting from any attempt to impose new orders despite the imperative of desire for perfection, i.e. consideration for the will of other human beings, the reticence with active involvement for transformation seems not surprising.

Indeed at this stage it would seem that one would be hard put to fend off accusations of "woolly-minded liberalness" from al-Fārābī's detractors! Notwithstanding that precisely the opposite impression i.e. that of a power-hungry philosopher seemed to be the case in the depiction of the rigid hierarchy as a condition for universal happiness. It is at the point of this tension that one begins to realize the truth of Strauss' words that al-Fārābī knew his Plato well, that al-Fārābī was recovering the thought of the "mature Plato" (1945, p. 361). On the one hand there is a view of the Greek philosopher idolized to the extent that he is considered to be

\textsuperscript{92} This eloquent term referring to the manner in which an educator, and/or researcher pushing at the boundaries of knowledge, teaches a subject so as to manifest its power and its economy in being able "to explain" has been coined by Bruner. Evidence of other concepts from his writings will be evident in this thesis since there are a number of points of contact, however, their incorporation for the purpose of analyzing al-Fārābī's theory of instruction is not an attempt to prove that the latter's writings are in harmony with modern thinking in education and thereby lend an apologetic note to this thesis. Nor is it an attempt to prove the opposite thesis, Walzerian fashion via the invention of fictional intermediaries, that Bruner's ideas are "ultimately" to be found in al-Fārābī A probable explanation for the similarities is rather to be found in the common orientation that the writings of both humane exponents of education embody
sacrosanct. On the other is the view of Karl Popper that Plato set the stage for totalitarianism whose worst excesses are being played out in this century. And at first sight it would seem that al-Fârâbî is susceptible to the same devastating criticism Popper makes of Plato since al-Fârâbî accepts much of Platonic political philosophy.

Consider, however, Strauss’ insight that al-Fârâbî has ignored the metaphysics as well as the Ideas of Plato (1945, pp. 364 and 391). The treatment meted out one of the two Greeks whose writings are supposed to embody the revitalization of philosophy "when it becomes confused or extinct" is put into sharper focus when seen in the context of what has been alluded to previously in this thesis. First there is al-Fârâbî’s attempt, as illustrated in Hurûf and Ihsâ’, to integrate logic and grammar, philosophy and religion into one comprehensive system. This was was evaluated by Gutas as "a rare accomplishment in idealist philosophy" (chapter one of this thesis, p. 19). Yet when it comes to politics, i.e. the creation of voluntary intelligibles, Plato’s Ideas are deliberately ignored. This surely is some indication, at the very least, of al-Fârâbî having read "his master" with a critical eye.

In a deliberation on the Greek’s writings he has taken the implications to their logical conclusion. This conclusion is referred to in the distinction he makes between the city "perfected in speech" and the city "to be realized in deed" - the latter is put off to a time in the future when complete knowledge will be available. Yet in the introduction to the philosophies of the two Greeks al-Fârâbî can write that this knowledge has been available before Plato (Attainment, p. 38 and chapter two of this thesis, p. 29). Indeed in a sense it has always been available. A possible conclusion is that Plato did not reach this state of knowledge. If he had perhaps he would have known not to indulge in actual attempts to govern.\(^93\) Nor would he have

\(^{93}\) It is also likely that the awareness of the distinction between the possible and the ideal may have been supplemented by knowledge of Plato’s disastrous experiments to be the philosopher-king of his own writings. Whether this is then interpreted to mean that, because al-Fârâbî knew this, he could not possibly reach a similar conclusion from his own analysis is another question. Second, the criticism of Plato along this trajectory can be extended when seen in the context of the two works which sandwich Plato Attainment and Aristotle Al-Fârâbî’s exposition on deliberative virtues in Attainment has been discussed before as has the conclusion of the same treatise where the attainment of happiness is left to the decision of individuals rather than that of the philosopher. Freedom of choice
recommended exiling poets from the city. Rather, depending on the scope of their natural abilities, he would have integrated them at the level of the image-making theoretical sciences or the practical arts.

Concomitant with this conclusion is Strauss' second point regarding the silence over the metaphysics of Plato (and of Aristotle - 1945, p. 391). Circumstances have changed. The cosmopolitan, monotheistic culture of al-Fârâbî's era is far removed from the pagan Greek society with its plethora of all too human gods and goddesses. Plato's writings may well carry the capacity to say that Plato "foresaw" the revelation of laws. This is a universal phenomenon: each society has a founder (or a group of founders) who will formulate rules most appropriate for the situation and the ways of achieving the necessary ideals. However, the validity of the law of each polity is subject to evaluation. Hence Platonic concepts of political analysis are regarded as valid but Platonic myths are not. New myths have to be invented which too will have their own life span though the building blocks must, of necessity, be from the existing debris. Al-Fârâbî seems to have done this in an exemplary fashion although many of his modern commentators appear not to have noticed.

has also been given due consideration in Aristotle (pp. 124 and 131f). Nor are the philosopher's other works lacking in this respect. Yet no such discussion is to be found in Plato. Is then not possible that al-Fârâbî is implying that Plato did not consider the will of others to be very important vis-a-vis his own will? In the light of this, Strauss' claim that Plato is the most esoteric work of al-Fârâbî (1945, pp. 375-376) needs some re-thinking since this absence cannot be accepted as an esoteric interpretation of the oft-repeated expositions of the freedom of choice. Quite the contrary. Third, is it also not possible that al-Fârâbî is being supremely ironic since it is in his commentary on Plato that he chooses to state the philosopher's preference for death? In other words al-Fârâbî is implying that if the Greek philosopher could not live at the tension posed by the attitudes of Socrates and Thrasymachus he should have chosen death rather than attempt to be the supreme ruler.

The tensions posed here by the city in word and the city in deed, the possible and the ideal, knowledge to be sought in the future and the availability of such knowledge by reference to the past have bearing on what has been referred to earlier (in chapter two, pp. 25-26) as the ambiguity between being and becoming, theory and practice, as well as on what will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. That persistent emphasis on one of the two ends of such continuaums is damaging is perhaps clearer today than ever before in light of the universal conflicts between the rapidity of technological innovation and the limits of adaptability of human beings and the environment to such change.
5. THE THEORY OF INSTRUCTION II: SOCRATES AND THRASYMACHUS

Al-Fārābī's theory of instruction, like any other, may be interpreted as a focus for the organization of pedagogical variables. It is a prescriptive theory and therefore it builds on descriptive theories of learning, of knowledge, of motivation, etc. In effect it may be taken to be a simpler mapping of an intricate educational terrain which can be extrapolated and interpolated to attain the requisite aims. Therein, however, lies the danger for all such theories - simple may turn into simplistic, indeed reductionist, and normative projections may run the danger of becoming speculative rather than being a best possible balance between aims and realities, theory and practice. It is fascinating to investigate the manner in which al-Fārābī goes beyond the technicalities and envisages the tension at the human scale. The sophistication of his theory of instruction becomes apparent in the details relating to [A] the makeup of the student, [B] the qualities of the teacher, and [C] the process of courteous translation by which the student is brought into contact with the logical demands of the subject by the judgment of the teacher - in other words the deliberation by which voluntary intelligibles are made to exist outside the teacher's soul.

Many of the pedagogical variables to be discussed in this chapter have already been alluded to previously. The introduction put forward a prescription of the depth and the breadth of the curriculum content the primary aim of which was to achieve ultimate happiness at a universal level. The analysis of the nature of investigation clarified the centrality of logic in the historical and the ontological classification of the syllogistic arts. Nonetheless the repertoire of the five syllogistic arts was restricted to theoretical philosophy and due consideration was given to deliberation, the provenance of practical philosophy. Deliberation will now occupy a central
role in the discovery of the "accidents" by which voluntary intelligibles are made to exist outside the soul by the use of these syllogistic arts.

The procedure of investigation brought to light the hierarchy of the various genera of beings and the status of the human intellect as the efficient cause of man's ultimate aim. Further investigation of the operation of the intellect revealed a fundamental distinction between two kinds of royal craft vis-a-vis their capacities to establish virtuous cities or to transform non-virtuous ones. In the endeavour to achieve the requisite aim this was the distinction between those who possessed both theoretical and practical philosophy and those who lacked the former. Nonetheless the investigation of the voluntary acts and states of character, which would enable the formation of the virtuous city revealed, at the very least, the ambiguity of the theory and practice of political science.

The chapter on the Active Intellect depicted the hierarchy of the supra-lunary cosmos which was structurally similar to man with the Active Intellect posited as the interface for communication. It clarified the perspective that al-Fârâbî held regarding human nature. The first crucial point was that human nature embodied the potential for growth. A theory of instruction can only build on the positive dispositions but al-Fârâbî's insistence regarding the highest natural aptitudes as prerequisites was limited to the supreme ruler. The second point was that the decision to strive for happiness by harnessing all his faculties is left up to man.

The fourth chapter on al-madînah al-fâdilah put forward another of the pedagogical variables in the concepts of comprehension and conviction which were instrumental in creating the four cadres of elites who would preserve their respective specializations in the virtuous city. In other words create a totally harmonious cosmos with the duplication of the structural similarity of man and the universe in society. But the ambiguities and "contradictions" of al-Fârâbî's writings seemed to point to something more than this simplistic outcome giving rise to the questions of the limits of al-madînah al-fâdilah, the relationship of the individual (philosopher) to the society and the possibilities of innovation i.e. the sphere of operation of the deliberative virtues.
A discussion of Ḥurūf in the first chapter (pp. 19f) centered on the historical development of the syllogistic arts. It was a depiction of the ideal case of innovation in the development of logic. Consider now what our tenth century philosopher has to say on the situation of the philosopher in non-ideal cases (Ḥurūf, fs. 24 and Mahdi, 1972, pp. 12f). The investigation centres on the reversal of the ideal case i.e. religion and/or philosophy at stages other than perfect are “imported” into three given situations, and the subsequent relationships between philosophy and religion, and their adherents. [1] A religion based on a perfect philosophy is transferred to nation ignorant of the true relationship between the two followed by the transfer of the true philosophy. The philosophers and the multitude will be in contention due to a lack of understanding of the relationship between the two on the part of both. However once the philosophers learn of the imaginative composition of religion they will become more tolerant. The same will not hold true for the adherents of religion (millah): if it did it would depict the ideal situation of al-madinah al-fādilah following the appearance of the prophet-lawgiver and the education of an elite to govern after him, or the perfection of the syllogistic arts. The actual outcome on the other hand is that the philosophers are rejected as rulers and are in possible danger of their lives despite their efforts to teach that true philosophy does not contradict religion (Mahdi, 1972, p. 18).

Another situation is [2] the transfer of a religion based on a corrupt philosophy followed by the transfer of the correct philosophy. The consequent state of war has no possibility of peace without the elimination of one of the contenders. [3] The final case is the transfer of (a philosophy based on) dialectic and sophistic. The religion of a nation in receipt of this innovation will be threatened by these two syllogistic arts and recourse lies in either the growth of demonstrative philosophy which understands the limitations of the two arts or their legal exclusion from the milla. The former is not available since philosophy has been banned. For
two reasons: (a) in the lawgiver's judgment the nation is as yet only capable of understanding the 
realities by way of similitudes or that the nation will play a subordinate role in the universal 
scheme, or (b) the lawgiver has decided for ulterior motives\textsuperscript{94} that his inadequate law will be 
susceptible to criticism by those capable of demonstrating the truth.

The state of affairs for the former reason is not deemed to be permanent and al-Fârâbî requires 
the philosopher to deliberate on the changing circumstances, envision new possibilities and 
justify old rules - if the nature of change indicates a qualitative difference. Otherwise he "will do 
well to migrate or to remain silent and leave the nation at peace with its religion" (p. 22). Mahdi's 
comment on situation [3] above is that al-Fârâbî approves of the interdiction of rulers against 
 dialectic and sophistic since they understand the power of these two arts over rhetoric and 
poetic, and is proposing an alliance between philosophy based on demonstration and religion 
based on rhetoric and poetic against dialectic and sophistic (p. 21).\textsuperscript{95}

In contrast to the above changes as a result of exogenous innovations there also are cases of 
change from endogenous innovations: difficulties arise from the reversal of the ideal case when 
a lawgiver bases his laws on an existing or a previous philosophy. [4] The religion of an 
incomplete philosophy may, but does not necessarily, contain untrue opinions which are not yet 
perceived as such because philosophy has not yet reached the stage of verifying its opinions by 
demonstration. This may be unavoidable since a lawgiver cannot wait for the future. [5] If the 
opinions of this religion (which maybe true) are replaced by others the result will be "a corrupt 
religion and its corruption will not be perceived" (p. 13) Hence the onus is on the lawgiver: he

\textsuperscript{94} "...it does not serve his private interest" (Mahdi, 1972, p. 22). Further investigation of this situation is beyond the scope of this thesis

\textsuperscript{95} The discussion in the fourth chapter (pp. 52-55) alluded to the formation of this alliance from two of the three combinations of comprehension and conviction - "philosophy" and "religion". The third combination was the "half-way house" of the popular, generally accepted, external philosophy and the importance of this category will soon become apparent in the manner that the divisions between the syllogistic arts become fluid at the practical level of instruction of the "weeds". Especially significant is the ambiguity of the status of dialectic in its relationship to two other syllogistic arts - demonstration and sophistic, which lie, respectively, above and below dialectic in a hierarchical arrangement (this was alluded to in chapter one, pp. 18f; and will be discussed below, p. 79 and pp. 86f).
cannot appeal to an older philosophy, he is required to use the most recent version i.e. the one closest to demonstration to be the basis of his activity.

Both sets of opinions, true and untrue, would appear to lie somewhere on a continuum between the things themselves and similitudes farthest away from the truth in the manner al-Fārābī writes of the imitations which differ in excellence (Regime, pp. 56-57). Hence the degree of corruption is related to the distance from the truth in an absolute sense. This would be analogous to the good-evil continuum seen earlier (chapter three, pp. 41f) where increasing obstruction on the path to happiness was the equivalent of increasing evil which has "no absolute existence" (Madani, fs. 69). The degree of corruption would also seem to be related to the availability of the truth (Mahdi, 1972, p. 14) i.e. in a historical sense connected with the development of logic. This once again re-affirms the insistence on the prior perfection of the theoretical intellect so as to be capable of differentiating good from evil - for oneself at least in the case of the incumbent philosopher and for others as well in the case of the a possible lawgiver.96

Al-Fārābī is interested in the education of both. Two of the possible ways which may bring teacher and student into contact are alluded to in situations [1] and [3a]. Both are cases where the perceived inadequacy of contemporary similitudes by which the theoretical affairs are represented creates new learning situations. The same was true in a discussion of the previous chapter on the popular, generally accepted philosophy situated between philosophy and religions, where mention was made of the three groups of people who may be likely to object to the inadequacy and the falsity of symbols by which the immutable essences are represented (from

96 The two degrees of corruption are related to the natural and voluntary evils created by the heavenly bodies and man respectively. Keeping in mind al-Fārābī's awareness of former lawgivers who have endeavoured to achieve their ideals by "inquiring into everything given by the celestial bodies", then maintaining and emphasizing whatever was required, and destroying or reducing in power the rest (Regime, pp. 54-55), it would seem that he is pointing to inseparability of nature and culture. In other words it is not possible to return to a state of "pure nature" because no such thing exists. Such a situation may have existed when the creation was begun. But soon after the heavenly bodies made possible the Active Intellect's operation, i.e. once man had the power to choose from an infinite number of possible futures, the original situation no longer obtains. This, of course, does not even raise the question of how far back "in time" the original situation is - al-Fārābī's story of creation after all is a kind of snapshot which freezes a moment.
Mabâdi', pp. 280-285). One group comprises those with defective minds and sceptics. A second group is made up of those who would rather believe in the aims of the ignorant cities. But it is the third group which interests al-Fârâbi because they are those seeking the right path (mustarshidîna) and the route of their education is mapped out as follows:

When one of them rejects (tazayyafâ 'indahu) anything as false, he will be lifted (rufl'a) towards a better symbol which is nearer to the truth (aqriba ilâl-haqq) and is not open to that objection; and if he is satisfied with it (qunI'a bihi), he will be left where he is. When that symbol is also rejected by him as false, he will be lifted to another rank, and if he is then satisfied with it, he will be left where he is. Whenever a symbol of a certain standard is rejected by him as false, he will be lifted to a higher rank, but when he rejects all the symbols as false and has the strength and the gift to understand the truth, he will be made to know the truth and will be placed into the class of those who take the philosophers as their authorities. If he is not satisfied with that and desires to acquire philosophical wisdom (hikrâlî) and has himself the strength and gift for it, he will be made to know it (ullînâhâ).

Before discussing this route in greater detail it is significant to compare al-Fârâbi's portrayal of the same group of incumbents in Regime. The final section of this treatise (pp. 74-76) is given over to a description of the weeds (nawâbût) in the virtuous cities. Amongst these there are opportunists, misinterpreters, falsifiers, those with a defective cognition or imagination, etc. However, also among the weeds are inhabitants who, despite their use of arguments to falsify the representations they have acquired in their learning, "are not contending against the virtuous city; rather they are looking for the right path and seeking the truth" (mustarshidîna wa-tâhîbina li'l-haqq) (pp. 74-75). Al-Fârâbi continues almost in the words of the previously quoted text:

He who belongs to this class, should have the level of his imagination raised to things that cannot be falsified (rufl'a tabaqatuhu fi'l-takhayyul ilâ ashîyâ'â lâ tatazayyafü) by the arguments he has put forward. If he is satisfied with the level to which he has been raised, he should be left alone. But if he is again not satisfied, and discovers here certain places susceptible to contention, then he should be raised to a higher level. This process should continue until he becomes satisfied with one of the levels. And if it happens that he is not satisfied with any one of the levels of the imagination, he should be raised to the level of the truth and be made to comprehend those things as they are (rufl'a ilâ marṭabatih wa-haqq wa-fuhhima tilka al-ashîyâ'â 'alâ mà hîya 'alayhi) at which point his mind will come to rest.

97 In order to categorize the weeds al-Fârâbi would seem to be following his classification of the cities opposed to the virtuous city.

98 The weeds have been anticipated earlier in Regime (pp. 56-57; see above and chapter four of the present thesis, pp. 55-56) where one reads of imitations which can be closer to the truth than the others and thus be more free from "points of contention" than others in a hierarchy below it. The very fact that the weeds exist in virtuous cities is yet
The weeds of al-Fârâbî have drawn comment from Marmura (1979, pp. 317-318) in a comparison with the weeds of Ibn Bâjjah (in Tadbîr al-Mutawahhid): the latter has followed the lead of the former writer in his use of this device to comment on the relation of the philosopher to society. Ibn Bâjjah, however, despite the agreement with his predecessor as regards the necessity of a community of other philosophers and the possibility of migration to achieve this, is not as pessimistic as al-Fârâbî in the event that it cannot be fulfilled. Ibn Bâjjah, according to Marmura, may be "saying that there will be times when the isolated philosopher in an imperfect state must act, must assume political power" to realize the virtuous city.99

Al-Fârâbî, as indicated earlier in Plato, by reference to Socrates would seem to prefer death. However, this would deny al-Fârâbî any opportunity of of raising a student from the jumhûr who are uncritical and do not ascend from the level of particular or generally accepted opinions, through levels of the popular philosophy to the truth. Even more, it would deny the philosopher any opportunity to keep alive the tradition he considers his heritage.100 It would seem then that once again al-Fârâbî is leading the reader to the human dilemma of either doing nothing or attempting to be the First Cause. He resolves this in the closing stages of Plato (pp. 21-22): the
discussion of the "city rendered perfect in speech" and the city to be "realized in deed" is concluded by reference to the legislator as the unique person capable of realizing the act. Its accomplishment requires utilization of two methods - that of Socrates and that of Thrasymachus:

Here he delineated once again Socrates' method for realizing his aim of making his own people understand though scientific investigation the ignorance they were in. He explained Thrasymachus' method and made it known that Thrasymachus was more able than Socrates to form the character of the youth and instruct the multitude; Socrates possessed only the ability to conduct a scientific investigation of justice and the virtues, and a power of love, but did not possess the ability to form the character of the youth and the multitude; and the philosopher, the prince and the legislator ought to be able to use both methods...

Using Plato as a mouthpiece al-Fârâbî summarizes the dual life style which the philosopher has to come to terms with and the pedagogy which is its consequence. Essentially, the method of Socrates is a restricted method. This was the subject of discussion of chapters one and two of the present thesis: the primary aim of the method is to teach the use of logic. The method of Thrasymachus\(^1\) is a pedagogy for the \textit{jumhûr}. This was discussed in chapter four: the method teaches the use of rhetoric and poetic. The two methods make use of the five ways the mind can accept new knowledge i.e. the five kinds of syllogisms.

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\(^1\) The character of Thrasymachus in Plato's \textit{Republic} has drawn comment from at least two authors - Popper and Voegelin. For the former author Plato depicts Thrasymachus as "a political desperado of the worst kind" through his "cynical and selfish" speeches and simultaneously identifies individualism with this character. The reader is thus misled into believing that the less obvious but just as barbaric totalitarian justice of the state is better than the similar justice of the individual (Popper, 1966, pp 105-106) For the latter author Thrasymachus is depicted as the youngest of three generations of a corrupt society in whom the "cynic becomes articulate as a sophist who proclaims his disease as the measure of human and social order" The order is the imposition of laws which are in a ruler's interest and therefore just Any transgressions of the law are then unjust. Admiration for the ruler is then directly proportional to the scale of the ruler's power (Voegelin, 1957, pp 71-72) The scene at the end of the Prologue of the \textit{Republic} where this sophist is silenced by Socrates sets the stage for the generation of Plato's \textit{polis}. Why al-Fârâbî has chosen this character in \textit{Plato} is open to speculation, nonetheless for him the two characters Socrates and Thrasymachus coexist in the person of the lawyer (\textit{al-wâdî al-nawâmîs}, in \textit{Plato}, p 21) who can speak to both the \textit{fallâsîfah} and the \textit{jumhûr}, who is both a thinker and a leader of men, who can adequately employ both demonstration and rhetoric. Once again we see the treading of a fine line wherein exists the balance between two extremes - one leading to "suicide" the other to despotism.
5.2 Courteous Translation

Consider now the make up of the learner mapped out in *Attainment* (p. 45) and *Mabâdi'* (pp. 246-251) who is likely to receive the restricted variety of education. The table below encapsulates some components of this pedagogy discussed earlier together with some newer thoughts relevant for the present chapter. In the former treatise the student should [1] excel in comprehending and conceiving that which is essential, have a good memory and an ability to endure the toil of study; [2] love truthfulness and truthful people, justice and just people, not be headstrong or be a wrangler concerning his desires, [3] not be gluttonous for food or drink and be naturally disinclined to monetary and material matters; [4] be highminded and avoid what is considered disgraceful; [5] be pious, yield to justice and goodness but not to evils and injustice, be determined to do the right thing; [6] be brought up according to the laws and habits that resemble his natural disposition; [7] have sound convictions regarding the opinions of the religion in which he is reared, hold fast to the virtuous acts of his religion and not forsake all or any of them, and hold fast to the generally accepted virtues and not forsake the generally accepted noble acts.

In the latter treatise the student should [1] be physically unimpaired to be able to act on his intentions; [2] have the ability to perceive and understand what is said to him according to the demands of the speaker and the logic of the statement; have an excellent memory; be intelligent, bright and able to pick up the slightest allusion; [3] possess a fine diction to explain what he

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102 The qualities of the (first) teacher have been discussed in chapter three (pp 43f) The summary below from *Mabâdi'* (pp 246-251) and *Madani* (54 – in some of the items enumerated below the relevant terms from *Madani* appear in brackets) have one additional quality not mentioned earlier - that of physical prowess To recapitulate, the teacher must [1] be a wise man, and a philosopher and an accomplished thinker who employs an intellect of divine quality (have wisdom), [2] be a visionary prophet who warns of things to come and tells of particular things which exist at present (have perfect practical wisdom), [3] have the knowledge of every action by which happiness can be attained, [4] be a good orator able to arouse the imagination by well chosen words (have excellence of persuasion and in producing imaginative impressions), [5] have the ability to lead people to the right path and to actions which lead to happiness; and [6] have a tough physique to shoulder the tasks of war (be without bodily impairments and hence capable of going to war)
5. the theory of instruction II: socrates and thrasymachus

Table 2: MICRO-LEVEL SUMMARY

(I) Instruction must build on existing comprehensions and/or convictions found in (A) common things perceived universally by the senses i.e. natural intelligibles, and (B) generally accepted opinions which vary with particular conventions i.e. voluntary intelligibles. These existing comprehensions and/or convictions are used in arrangements of premises to give conclusions. The conclusions can in turn be premises for new arrangements leading to new conclusions, the procedure being repeated in an ascending order to the complete knowledge and absolute conviction of the final causes of all things.

(II) The three processes by which instruction proceeds are -

1. Comprehension
2. Conviction
3. Memorization

(III) The five ways in which the intellect and the imagination can accept new comprehensions and convictions correspond to the following five kinds of syllogisms -

1. demonstrative - leading to certainty of conviction
2. dialectical
3. sophistical
4. rhetorical - leading to persuasion and belief of certainty
5. poetical - leading to similitudes and images of truth

(1), (4) and (5) correspond, respectively, to philosophy, popular, generally accepted, external philosophy and religion, or the theoretical sciences, the popular theoretical sciences and the image-making theoretical sciences.

(2) is a training and investigative art to approach (1)

(3) deflects (2) from its aim but it can be countered by "an art intermediate" between (2) and (3) which will repel and stop (3) (see pp. 86ff for a discussion).

At any given time, the choice of the most appropriate syllogistic art to utilize with the conditions and states of the premises known by a student depend on the teacher's judgment of the innate disposition, and the social and historical context which are partially responsible for the questions raised and the arguments put forward by the student. Instruction proceeds primarily by speech or conversation rather than by writing or through books. Both the latter are subordinate to conversation.

(IV) Individuals who perceive the inadequacy of existing symbols are raised from the lower level of the generally accepted opinions through levels of the popular philosophy (or levels of the imagination, or symbols of differing standards, or religions differing in excellence) to the truth. Their education, hitherto based on conviction of the reality of poetic images of the truth via rhetoric, is relegated to mere opinion, step by qualitative step, in the course of investigation.

This education in logic is a celebration of the triumph of the human intellect which lifts man to the supra-lunar world over the human (and animal) imagination which can tie man to one of the many cultures of the sub-lunar world. Vis-a-vis the world it is a lesson in rendering asunder any imagined relationship between the possibility of omniscience and a consequent omnipotence. The object lesson is one of the many in a curriculum devoted to the provocation of light into the perennial debates arising from man's existence.
intends; [4] be devoted to, and have the ability to endure the toil of, study; [5] be fond of truth and truthful men and hate falsehood and liars; [6] be naturally disinclined to food, drink, sex and gambling and the pleasures they provide; [7] be naturally inclined to the most lofty things, proud of spirit and honour and rise above the ugly and base; [8] be disinclined to monetary and worldly pursuits; [9] be fond of justice and just people, hate oppression, injustice and their practitioners; should urge others to do what is just and avoid injustice and evil, be reluctant to do the latter and lend support to what he considers beautiful, noble and just; [10] be decisive and carry out his convictions fearlessly.

There are obvious similarities e.g. [1] in Attainment corresponds to [2] and [4] in Mabâdi' - comprehension and memory also appear in Alfâz (p. 87) The occurrence of memory in the three treatises indicates the addition of this condition to the two which were encountered in the last chapter - comprehension and conviction - on the basis of which any instruction must proceed. Qualities [2] and [5] in Attainment correspond to [5] and [9] in the second treatise. However it does seem that Attainment places more emphasis on nurture rather than nature (Lerner, 1987, p. 512): [7] especially puts forward a condition for instruction - the present state of education of the student.

Al-Fârâbî is under no illusion that innovations can begin with square one. For this reason he compares human instruction with divine instruction in al-Mantik and asserts that the latter kind has no need of previous learning (Haddad, 1974, pp. 241-242). Human instruction is limited in comparison to divine instruction but it is qualitatively superior to any kind of "instruction" given to animals and al-Fârâbî stresses the difference between the two in for

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103 Haddad (1974, pp 245-246), Berman (1974, pp 511) and Dauber (1986, p. 136) discuss these three ideas

104 At mentioned in chapter one this is MS 812 of the Hamidiyyah Library of Istanbul comprising a series of prologomena and summaries of Aristotle's Organon. A major part of Haddad (1974) is based on this and any further quotations from the manuscript will be cited from this article

105 This would seem to be in conflict with one of al-Fârâbî's fundamental premises - that the prophet can only receive emanation from the Active Intellect after he has perfected his own intellect, the theoretical intellect which is the only faculty capable of knowing certain happiness (see the chapter on al-'aql al-fa'âl, p 42).
example teaching children and animals to utter certain expressions. Animals do not associate any meanings with sounds (Haddad, 1974, pp. 240-241). Thus what is needed in this case is a technical meaning of instruction so as to be able to distinguish between this restricted meaning and the meaning given to it by the general public.

The importance of nurture (rather than nature) is also evident in Madani (fs. 12-15) where the possibility is raised concerning the alteration and even the disappearance of innate tendencies to vices: whereas one who is naturally disposed to virtuous acts does them with ease and derives pleasure from them, it is difficult for one with contrary dispositions to do the same, the latter suffers in doing what is virtuous whether by self restraint or in obeying the law. This possibility of education being able to change human nature is substantiated in Regume (pp. 54-55): after inquiring into everything given by the heavenly bodies the supreme ruler should "maintain and emphasize" whatever assists the city in achieving happiness and "destroy or reduce in power" whatever obstructs this endeavour. On the other hand education is not made out to be a panacea. Subsequent to listing the learners' prerequisites as above in Atainment al-Farabi can only add that "if a youth is such, and then sets out to study philosophy and learns it, it is possible that he will not become a counterfeit or a vain or a false philosopher" (p. 45).

Human instruction, therefore, conducted in human discourse, must proceed on the basis of what

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106 In the investigation of the genera (in chapter two of this thesis, p. 25) it was observed that al-Farabi had used speech as a criterion to distinguish man from other animals and concluded that this faculty was a consequence of the intellectual principles and powers. It is also pertinent to repeat that good speech is a corollary of the perfection of the four human things.

107 These terms were discussed in the chapter on al-aql al-farāl (pp. 45-46) and are also to be found in the glossary - see falsafah. Since al-Farabi does not mention defective philosophy in this context perhaps the term is not as negative as it sounds in the first instance. After all though the defective philosopher does not have the faculty for exploiting the theoretical sciences for others (Atainment, p. 39) this does not preclude him for exploiting them for himself. He would thus not have a consultative deliberative virtue (al-fadilah al-fikriyah al-mashhīriyah). But once again how he exploited them would depend on the strength of his moral virtue. Perhaps it is also interesting that in Madani al-Farabi claims that compulsion will not alter a virtuous disposition. A virtuous man under duress to carry out actions contrary to his disposition will not be affected at all. He will not become another oppressor. In thus indicating that a virtuous disposition is inherently less liable to breakdown in comparison to its opposite, al-Farabi is alluding to the justice and goodness inherent in the cosmos. This is an ideal which human instruction should attempt to replicate but voluntarily and only within narrow limits, as this chapter tries to elucidate.
already exists. Whether the new learning confirms the old hence amplifying its sophistication, or
contradicts it thereby raising doubts about its validity, is another question - this point being made
for instance in "Plato (pp. 17-18) : in the context of investigation of the opinions of a given
situation al-Fârâbî emphasizes the importance of achieving the "things that are truly virtuous,
whether these are the same as the opinions and the ways of life of his city or opposed to them".
These opinions and acts (according to the final quality of the incumbent in "Attainment above)
may either be particular to a religion or belong to a more generally accepted category i.e. have
validity in more than one religion by being that much more universal.108

The insistence on the beginning with an existing tradition is reinforced by an earlier investigation
of deliberative and moral virtues in "Attainment (pp. 26-29). The main point here is that the
theoretical virtue enables the discovery of the moral virtue, which is then acquired by the
deliberative virtue. However, since the deliberative virtue is itself an acquired intelligible or a
voluntary intelligible this sets the stage for a dilemma: unless it is good itself its separation from
the moral virtue would lead to good and evil existing in the same person. This is resolved by
positing a (natural) deliberative virtue like cleverness, cunning, courage, etc., which man shares
with all animals coupled to an innate disposition for good (or evil). In the context of constant
practice the natural virtue is the basis of the acquired human deliberative virtue.

The debate arising from the priority of nature or nurture is here inseparable from the source of
the moral virtues. The importance of nature was evident from the activity of the celestial bodies
(see chapter three of this thesis, pp. 37f). This may give rise to dispositions which enable or
obstruct the goal of happiness A good tradition will nurture positive dispositions, just as an evil
tradition will reinforce negative dispositions. Evil dispositions, however, may be broken down by
a good tradition. The existence of a good tradition may not be discounted since men who

108 This categorization may well refer to contemporary existential circumstances - a meeting place for individuals born
into one of the diverse traditions constituting the social fabric of tenth century south-west Asia The distinction
between the two is not sharp, it is more more likely to be a continuum In other words, al-Fârâbî had access to a
greater variety of opinions than just Greek ones
perfected their intellect and were in receipt of the Active Intellect's effusion may have lived in the past. In fact it cannot be discounted since al-Fârâbi in his own words was heir to such instruction. Yet from the point of view of investigation one arrives at political science (Attainment, pp. 15-16 and chapter two of this thesis, p. 28) on the basis of intelligibles given by al-\textit{aql} al-\textit{fa'}âl, one kind of which was "the principles by which man becomes aware of good and evil in man's actions" (\textit{Mabâdr'}, pp. 202-205 and chapter three of this thesis, p. 40).\footnote{The other two kinds which were common to all men were the principles of the productive skills, and the principles which are used for knowing the existents which are not the objects of man's actions}

The debate can be extended yet further in the light of the investigation through the genera of beings in \textit{Attainment} which preceded the destination of theoretical perfection (see chapter two of this thesis). The ascent to theoretical perfection was devoid of reference to any cultural context. The descent whereby the investigator arrived at knowledge of the ultimate causes of the beings was categorized as a divine inquiry (chapter two of this thesis, pp. 27f). As a whole the research was focused on four human things. And yet it is these four human things which are viewed from the perspective of tradition and history in \textit{Attainment} itself, \textit{Hurûf}, \textit{Mabâdr'}, \textit{Plato}\footnote{It is ironic that, in the very work which is supposed to be a complete commentary on Plato's philosophy, al-Fârâbi has chosen to depict a Plato who seems to be increasingly similar to the Plato of Popper. Both are critical of the Platonic possibility of a new beginning by guardians whose education will enable a closer correspondence of society with the Idea of it. The style of the criticisms, though, could not be further apart. Possibly, harsh words were in order at that time of the twentieth century. No doubt that a greater freedom of expression was an incentive as well. Concerning the similarities between the these two authors it is possible to indulge in trivialities and claim that al-Fârâbi thus anticipated Popper. The question to ask in that case is whether such conclusions are research and if so by what stretch of the imagination? Would it not be more worthwhile to investigate the points of contact \textit{via}-\textit{via} the distinction that al-Fârâbi draws between natural and voluntary intelligibles, and the demarcation that Popper makes between nature and convention (1966, pp 57-85) the criterion of division for both philosophers being the freedom of choice?} and \textit{Regime}. Theoretical perfection itself is dependent on logic for which we have an innate and natural aptitude (\textit{Attainment}, p. 4) but which needs to be educat\text{-}ed. The result of this education is called the "logical faculty (al-\textit{qûwah al-mantiqîyah})" (Aristotle, p. 85). It would then seem that deliberative, moral and theoretical virtues are the outcome of a delicate balance involving, in the first instance, divinity, nature and nurture\footnote{It is somewhat difficult to say where divinity ends and nature begins but, on the other hand, no such doubt exists} the refinement of which is dependent on human
choice - which is the reason they are termed *voluntary* intelligibles.

It is also possible that, with the emphasis on prior practice in acquiring the virtues of a certain tradition, al-Fârâbî may be stating in a not too subtle manner what kind of "material" he is willing to work with. Since he has already indicated that the programme of study will be arduous he will not want to deal with adolescent behavioural problems, he would rather have them sorted out by the parents of the relevant student! However, it is more likely that al-Fârâbî's student would be older and perhaps having read his writing(s), more than a little aware of the level of commitment, the time span involved and the informality of the educational setting. The onus is thus on the student who ought to be internally motivated.

This is well brought out in the stage by stage pedagogy for the weeds who do not fit in their society - *al-madinah al-fâdulah* or otherwise. A student who has perceived inadequacy of contemporary similitudes by which the theoretical affairs are represented is in a new learning situation. His understanding of the four causes of man's perfection can be taken a step further. However one cannot always rely on learning situations being thus accidentally created as a result of innovation. The student must willingly learn to step out from the comfortable world of the imagination where black and white categories are the norm, and inside and outside have clear boundaries. The particular or the generally accepted opinions of language and tradition must be subject to the icy logic of Aristotle in the best of human endeavours. In other words increasing emphasis on the intellect indicates further abstraction or higher levels of conceptualization with a concomitant decreasing of dependence on the immediate environment. 

regarding the distinction between these two terms and culture. Perhaps one can say that there is no choice in the matter!

112 Once again a reference to Bruner is appropriate. With his work in developmental psychology as a basis he argues that children pass through three modes of representation in their intellectual development: enactive, iconic and symbolise. The three stages represent growth in the manner of a child's interaction with the world (but in no way is this development related in deterministic manner to chronological age, nor does the later symbolic stage preclude the use of the two earlier modes). It is via actions in the first instance. This gives way to the ability to represent the world to oneself in terms of pictures. The third mode of representation is via abstract concepts which is a further step in freeing oneself from immediate surroundings. It is also an increasing capability to go "beyond the information given" to continually form and test hypotheses. With these and previously mentioned insights Bruner
pedagogy can be seen from the perspective of the imagination the result is another continuum with imagination and particulars at one end, and intellect and universals at the other.\textsuperscript{113}

The aim of the education then is to gradually replace knowledge based on imagination with knowledge based on the intellection. The former is knowledge but only from the point of view of instructed students who mistake their persuasion for it; as far as an investigating philosopher is concerned it is based on rhetoric and hence merely supposition (\textit{zann}). Only intellection is certainty (\textit{yaqîn}) since it is the product of demonstration. Interestingly both are subsumed under opinion (\textit{ra'y}) in the first instance\textsuperscript{114} indicating once again the willingness to accept the possibility of the existence of certainty in contemporary opinions. Yet in the absence of complete certainty these are susceptible to criticism. In other words persuasion is limited even though the possibility that it may reach truth is not discounted (Butterworth, 1984, p. 116). Contentions or the limits of persuasion arise partly from the inadequacy of rhetorical investigation noticed in \textit{Hurûf} with the evolution of the logical arts. The nature of the subject matter which has to be tailored for the present circumstances as well as to take account of nature of the listeners of differing capacities all impose further limits.

\textsuperscript{113} The difference in treatment given to the same subject in different treatises which is seen in this chapter regarding the weeds has already been encountered in the discussions of - [1] emanation from the Active Intellect in \textit{Regime} and \textit{Mabâdi'} (see chapter three, pp 37 and 47f), [2] the lack of references to creation by the Intellects in Aristotle when compared to \textit{Regime} and \textit{Mabâdi'} (chapter two, pp 27 and 32, and chapter three), [3] the depiction of the city of bare necessity in \textit{Regime} and \textit{Madani} (chapter four, p 61), and [4] different descriptions of the hierarchy of \textit{al-madinah al-fadilah} (chapter four, pp 58f). Is it then not possible that al-Fârâbi is writing from different perspectives, thereby revealing diverse realities rather than "contradicting" himself at best and prisoner of a single view of the world at worst? The hallmark of a thorough investigator is, surely, a multi-faceted analysis of any problem even though the methodology may not actually be stated. In other words to ex.\textit{nosc}, via demonstration, all contemporary opinions with the objective of making manifest implicit conclusions. Is it also not possible that the various treatises were written for "weeds" at levels such as those depicted above who would then be satisfied with the explanation of reality most congenial to their present understanding? That could of course change if and when the student was able to see any contradiction(s) - due to an inadequacy of the particular explanation rather than of the author. The latter could then invent another explanation closer to the truth depending on his judgment of the situation.

\textsuperscript{114} Butterworth (1984, pp 114-115) writes that this statement is without parallel in either Plato or Aristotle.
Contention is thus inherent in the nature of persuasion and "rhetoric's logical inadequacy is its very virtue" (Butterworth, 1984, p. 118). A student who sees through this inadequacy is freed to understand reality better yet this in no way disturbs the others who cannot or will not see any different. Al-Fārābī thus answers the question of how instruction itself can be the cause of a dilemma i.e. how does the teacher in the course of relegating the student's present convictions to the status of mere opinion not destroy simultaneously the basis of action in everyday living, unless he wishes to make a schizophrenic of the student? Finding the right route for any particular student hence depends heavily on the teacher's judgment, his deliberation on the circumstances and his prior search for the same goal i.e. his stage in the ascent from the jumhûr. This is not to forget the strength of his moral virtues.

Nor is the constant balancing act made easier by the method of investigation. It is also fraught with danger. The subject of the training art is brought up in Aristotle (p. 78). As mentioned in chapter one it is a preparation for the art of certainty. Two categories of rules for investigation and reflection are proposed - [1] some rules for investigation by oneself and [2] some rules for investigation with others. The primary aim of this art is to equip a student with the ability of finding the appropriate syllogism "quickly when he is investigating with others". The added benefit of this method is that the student internalizes the observer/interlocutor when he is working alone making him cautious and quick-witted. Practice in the training art (or the art of dialectic) is simultaneous with acquaintance of sophistry which is divided into two parts - [1] arguments used by a sophist to divert the student from the way to truth via the training art and [2] arguments to meet and repel the opponent (pp. 79f). The second part is an art "intermediate between the training art and the art of sophistry" (p. 80). Al-Fārābī's reluctance to reveal the truth in the refutation of the sophist leads him to divide the latter art into two kinds of arguments: the student "should aim at truly stopping and silencing the sophist, or at stopping him in the eyes of the onlookers and judges who are present!" (p. 81).

Obviously some kinds of opposition do not warrant the revelation of a higher level of
understanding especially when there happens to be an audience. The use of the training art to prevent the "preparation for truth from being dissipated" (p. 82), in the face of opposition from so base a source, would seem to another object lesson of the pedagogy. But this very training art received short shrift in Hurûf when dialectic and sophistic were posed as dangers to a millah and threatened with legal exclusion. Unless demonstration was present. The presence of this higher art is an effective control of the two lesser arts, without recourse to the law. Dialectic itself, therefore, the training art of an education in logic, must be supervised by demonstration if it is not to fall prey to sophistic.115

Thus the plea for understanding the differences between the methods involved in the "the situation in which we find ourselves.... we must know how to distinguish the various methods by means of specific differences and marks of each, and we must have our innate and natural aptitude for science developed through an art that can provide us with knowledge of these differences since our innate capacity is insufficient for differentiating these methods from each other" (Attainment, pp. 3-4). As mentioned previously (chapter one, pp. 10-13; and this chapter, p. 83) the result of the education in logic is called the "logical faculty" (al-qûwah al-mantiqiyyah - Aristotle p. 85) which is able to correct internal speech in the endeavour to investigate, evaluate or provoke insight into the intelligibles, natural or voluntary.

The method of Socrates however has one distinct drawback. This is revealed by deliberation upon the circumstances of his death i.e. the employment of demonstration to deduct the logical outcome of a way of life which makes manifest the superficiality of a life based only on imagination and persuasion. The ambiguities present in a private situation allow for the grey areas between black and white positions. There is more likely to be space for continuums and

115 That dialectic rather than demonstration may be used in conjunction with rhetoric as the method of instruction is a possibility in Plato (p. 16) This again indicates the problematic relationship between the two arts investigated in chapter one. It also corroborates Galston's conclusion (discussed in chapter one, p 16) that al-Fârâbî connects the more abstract conceptualization of demonstration to the everyday investigation which accepts generally accepted true and false statements and subjects them to inquiry in order to arrive at the truth. In other words the Popperian idea of falsification of hypotheses is opposite to al-Fârâbî's use of the syllogistic arts for the purpose of investigation and instruction.
for polarities. Words and thoughts which kill are less likely to be brought into existence. This fluidity, however, is not likely to prevail in a public situation with many actors. The " politicization" of private space is less likely to allow reasoned debate. The potentially life-threatening outcome\(^\text{116}\) can be avoided by migration. The ideal resort however, is to use the other half of the pedagogy - that depicted in the method of Thrasymachus.

Socrates died but the point is to live. Thrasymachus' method with the public then turns out to be a strategy of survival in a world hostile to any (political) investigation of contemporary regimes! However, this method too has dangers. Deliberation upon his character, and others like him, reveals the urge to invade private space, all space, to replace present regimes with others yet more powerful, desirous of yet more control, in the desire to fashion the world in the manner of his imagination. The logical outcome, and with empirical confirmation, is \textit{al-madīnah al-taghallubīyah} (the despotic city). In other words a desire to be omnipotent rather than omniscient. The science may be achieved if one is prepared for some sacrifice but not self-sacrifice. The potency cannot be achieved despite the sacrifice of many others.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into greater detail of all discrete methods that are used to establish communication between teacher and student thereby facilitating the courteous translation.\(^\text{117}\) The intent of the instruction is to enable the student to discern the depth and breadth of the debates arising from man's existence in this world, the very same debates that al-Fārābī has traced with such unerring delicacy. Subsequent to this will come the actions which

\(^{116}\) If the constant emphasis about the fear of death seems unwarranted due to the temporal remove of Socrates' death then perhaps al-Fārābī was also deliberating on the outcome of Mansūr al-Hallāj who was executed in 309/922 i.e. during his lifetime.

\(^{117}\) Haddad (1974, pp. 246-251) and Daiber (1986, pp. 136-137) discuss a number of these methods embracing definitions, concepts which subsume the problem under consideration or which it includes, things similar or opposite to it, a thing itself, etc., (see the glossary for a complete list - s.v. \textit{anāba al-`a`lim}). An important point brought up in Daiber's discussion (p. 137 - and here he refers to Mahdī in \textit{Alfāz} and Berman, 1974) for the purpose of this thesis is al-Fārābī's reluctance to indulge in reductionism (to which reference has already been made in chapter two, pp 25-26; and chapter three, p. 46 of the present thesis). The substitution of "extremely complete structures" by such simplifications which would mislead a student are rejected and the Pythagoreans, Plato and Empedocles are accused of employing \textit{such} teaching methodologies in philosophy when they should be restricted to rhetoric.
will facilitate the continuance of the tradition of education of which a student is the recipient. This relationship between knowledge and action was alluded to at the outset of this thesis. However it will be quite apparent that in the course of analysis leading to the present that the horizon of action has been severely limited. And this understanding of the desire to be omniscient but not omnipotent is one of the central issues of al-Fârâbî's philosophy of education. In other words one can understand that the aim of al-'aql al-fa-'âl is to lead man to bliss. The choice of the correct efficient cause is left to man. Yet there is no choice on this matter either. There seems to be just one way and the knowledge of this is not new either.\[118\]

Loss of this ancient knowledge can only imperil man. Hence each student's understanding of logic and the debates around which his teacher designed a curriculum has its practical aspect in his future: the investigation of all kinds of rulers - irrespective of the heritage they claim. To this end one finds al-Fârâbî's various taxonomies. They become criteria by which a judgment can be arrived at regarding the ruler or regime in question. A ruler's intentions may well be good. However, they cannot be seen. The knowledge on the basis of which a ruler is elaborating and acting may well be the true knowledge emanating from the Active Intellect. After all al-Fârâbî does, in his deliberation, accept that other opinions and ways of life may be correct. But this has not yet been demonstrated and hence remains open to doubt. One can of course wait and see the regime which will be constructed. Quite possibly there may not be any choice.

Nonetheless, whenever possible one can investigate a proposed institution, a voluntary intelligible to be acquired in the future, which will extend the capacity of the power in question. Just as one subjects a hypothesis to refutation. In this act of deliberation the criteria of the classifications are an asset. Al-Fârâbî recognizes this in Ihsâr (p. 44) where he writes that the

\[118\] Perhaps at this point, in light of the insights revealed at the human scale of al-Fârâbî's theorizing, it is pertinent to question Strauss' (1945) distinction between happiness and perfection (see chapter four of this thesis, pp. 64f) which was linked to the distinction between the royal art and philosophy. After all, if al-Fârâbî's theory of instruction is directed to individuals at the intimate level, rather than to the "operation of the royal craft" (which is politics, yâsah - Enumeration, p. 103) because he is well aware of the problems inherent of this course of action, then happiness and perfection would be equivalent terms.
treatise can be used to test others in their knowledge of the sciences enumerated. The same can be said of Regime and Mabàdi' with their depictions of cities. It is also true regarding the four causes, the types of deliberative virtues, the kinds of philosophers, the discussion of the syllogistic arts, the categorization of innovations in the same arts, the types of rulerships, etc. The criteria are part of the theory of instruction which teaches about acquiring knowledge of the perennial debates which are an inescapable fact of man's existence in the world. This will be supplemented by acquiring the wisdom of knowing how to live within life's limits. That both are voluntary intelligibles acquired willingly is the crux of al-Fârâbî's philosophy of education.

The tremendous output of literature regarding his pedagogy notwithstanding, written in the tradition of an endeavour to acquire hikmat al-hikam (Attainment, p. 39), al-Fârâbî has the final word on education through writing: "Then he explained the value of conversation and the value of writing, the extent to which instruction through writing is defective when compared to conversation, and what it is that writing achieves and the extent to which conversation fails in this respect; and how the method of writing is inferior. He explained what things a man ought to know in order to become a philosopher" (Plato, p. 16). Teaching through writing was surely limited by the fact of tenth century south-west Asia being far from a print culture. But there are even limitations on what can be written in any space-time disguised though it may be.
5.3 The Philosopher who Invents....

The concept of courteous translation takes on a new dimension in the context of al-Fârâbî's intriguing statement of the philosopher/teacher who invents images and arguments (*Attainment*, p. 44).¹¹⁹ A number of insights relate to this issue and taken together they reveal a side of al-Fârâbî which has yet to be plumbed. Consider that al-Fârâbî posits a supra- and an infra-lunar world. He would like to be as much like the divine creator as it is humanly possible. A solution is omniscience rather than omnipotence so as not to obliterate the distinction between these two worlds. Yet it would appear that man suffers a distinct loss of creativity arising from the extremely limited horizon of action in the infra-lunar world.

The loss is made up for - in the faculty of the imagination. It gives man (almost) infinite space to create (almost) infinite possible worlds. From the opinions one receives one can literally refashion the world of one's choice. Nor does one have to obey laws - natural or voluntary. One can imagine a beginning and even an end just as one can imagine one's personal end. One can imagine how one will live "in this life and in the life hereafter". One can imagine how all other existentia lived, live and will live. Al-Fârâbî does this and more. To put it in his words - if the faculty of the imagination is developed it is capable of receiving emanations from the Active Intellect. Another author (Steiner 1975, p. 216) formulating the same trajectory in the context of language writes:

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¹¹⁹ *Ikhtara' al-mukhayyalât wa'l-maqnû'âr ‘ichtara’* has the meaning of creating, inventing and forging. It was first mentioned in chapter four of the present thesis (p. 55) in context of the image-making theoretical sciences which could be utilized to guide the *jumhûr* to happiness. *Maqnû'âr* is derived from the same root as *qunûa* (bull) mentioned earlier in this chapter (p. 75) in connection with the weed who would be left at a stage he was "satisfied with". Unless, of course, he objected to whatever argument was presented - then or later. The intimate relationship of rhetoric and demonstration, or rhetoric and a dialectic which is subservient to demonstration rather than sophistic, is again made apparent here at the micro-level. Concomitant with this is the willingness to examine, continually, one's present state of understanding (i.e the process of falsification) - hence the myth-building discussed below; and in the light of the title of this chapter an awareness of the extremes posed by the personalities of Socrates and Thrasy machus - in other words the outcome of their use, or misuse, of the syllogistic arts.
Given a vocabulary and a set of procedural rules (both subject to change), given the limitations of comprehensibility and certain performance boundaries (no endless sentences), we can say anything.\textsuperscript{120} This latent totality is awesome and should be felt as such. It well-nigh precludes logic - the parameters are too unstable and too numerous, the possibilities of acceptable order too unstable and local.... But this instability is perhaps the most telling of evolutionary adaptations, of the reaching outward, that determine our humanity.

Steiner is an eloquent exponent of the intricacies of translation - between and within languages. He is here attempting to explain the multiplicity of languages through the idea of counter-factuals, hypotheticals, conditionals, future tenses and other related uses which designate the power to posit what the world is not. But precisely at this point lies the problem. He proposes the word "alternity" to try and overcome, the difficulty that the "cardinal terms are not only elusive; they are so obviously tainted with a twofold indictment, moral and pragmatic, Augustinian and Cartesian". Noting Augustine's stress on falsity being enacted through speech Steiner continues . "It is very nearly impossible to make neutral use of 'mis-statement', 'deception', falsehood', 'misprision', or 'unclarity', the latter being the special object of Cartesian criticism. The unclear, the ambiguously or obscurely stated is an offense to both conscience and reason" (p. 218).

It would seem that this is another route towards, once again, the centre of al-Fārābī's thought. The devotion to Aristotelian logic, the decisiveness of the ability to perceive happiness, the literal impossibility of separating the four human things from each other appear to point to the same conclusion. Al-Fārābī's goal is certainty. Yet one is never quite sure whether this has been achieved. The possibility seems remote. And this is the important issue - that truth itself would be limiting. If it was possible to say just "the truth" what would be the meaning of choice? Any utterance would be tautological.\textsuperscript{121} Steiner compares the animal tactics of deception with those of man and differentiates between instinctual reflexes and "wholly gratuitous, non-utilitarian and

\textsuperscript{120} Author's emphasis

\textsuperscript{121} The limitations of being human preclude the potency of making a thought or a word real. In other words, man does not possess the divine capacity referred to in the Qur'ān as \textit{kun fa-yakun} (be and it is). This, of course, has been yet another focus of debate and speculation over the centuries (see for instance Steiner, pp. 58f commenting on work in the Judaic-Christian tradition).
creative" un-truths. The unlimited number of false answers to any question are central to "human liberty and the genius of language" (pp. 222-223).

Consider that al-Fârâbî begins with the five faculties - sensitive, appetitive, imaginative, practical-rational and theoretical-rational, the first three of which man shares with other animals. The possibility of achieving what is human begins with the practical-rational and the third will - the power to choose. However it is only the theoretical-rational which will render man finally substantial. The five faculties operate in harness to in order to realize the necessary goal. The question is one of emphasis. It is entirely possible to limit one's horizon to the infra-lunar world and be led by the appetitive faculty. The imaginative faculty will provide all the necessary food for thought - be it in terms of power, wealth, honour, etc. The different cities are a few examples. They are items for the consumer's choice. Speech, thought, laws and action are now directed to enable a goal. Yet man has not risen above the level of animal.

On the other hand the power of choice can be so educated that the faculties are directed to acquiring the truly human things. This requires verticality, clarity of thought and morality of choice. The imagination is once again directed but by the intellect and the metaphor of "quantum leap" (quantum meaning a "packet" of light) is apposite to denote the difference in direction. It does not stop one from inventing all possible worlds but one can make responsible choices, and a student can be taught to do the same because the teacher has acquired the capacity for discernment between demagogy and myth, between propaganda and a story or a (fairy) tale which provokes adequate understanding of the human predicament. The positive power of the imagination is emphatically made manifest in

the thesis that what is most characteristic of the human language is the possibility of story telling. It may be that this ability too has some predecessor in the animal world. But I suggest that the moment when language became human was very closely related to the moment when a man invented a story, a myth in order to excuse a mistake he had made - perhaps in giving a danger signal when there was no need for it; and I suggest that the evolution of specifically human language, with its characteristic means of expressing negation - of saying that something signalled is not true - stems very largely
from the discovery of the means to negate\textsuperscript{122} a false report, for example a false alarm, and from the closely related discovery of false stories - lies - used either as excuses or playfully (Popper in Steiner, 1975, p. 224, note 1).\textsuperscript{123}

Underlying counter-factuals then is the motive for play which will create space "because the enemy is 'reality'" (Steiner, p. 226). However the source of the motivation, the intention becomes the issue - hence the perfection of the moral virtues. The aim is to lead a student to explore the frontiers of his own mind rather than inherit the teacher's intelligible of its perfection, much less an imposition of the teacher's will. The path to relativism lies open at this point and at its extreme end are possibly the portals of another ignorant city (of the imagination). Countering this is clarity of internal speech enabled by logic.

Any analysis, any fragmentation of reality, any conceptualization in terms of the other than what is carries an incipient divinization. Hence al-Fārābī's reticence to stop at analysis so as to include synthesis. Hence his reluctance, perhaps his refusal, to divinize demonstration, deduction or the axiomatic method. The idolization of temporary ideas can be prevented by the simultaneous awareness of analysis, of the consistent reference to the empirical reality, perhaps the chores of daily living too (al-Fārābī after all was also Abū Nasr), which will confirm or deny the universals, the opinions of the contemporary city. However, induction is a capacity also possessed by other animals. Humans on the other hand can begin anew with an hypothesis, an invention, a story.

\textsuperscript{122} Author's emphasis

\textsuperscript{123} Perhaps it is not impertinent to note that Muḥam Mahdi, a foremost exponent of al-Fārābī, is also working on the Thousand and One Nights! The tone of a paragraph too where he makes out al-Fārābī's works as "letters to the folks back home" (1961, p 19) is suggestive of a story-telling function. It would seem, further, that Davidson may be alluding to this myth-making activity as well since he opens his (1972) article with "The tale of the active intellect begins..." What is especially significant is that two foremost physicists, exponents of the "hard science" of quantum mechanics which explains the behaviour of matter at the infinitesimal level, also arrive at the relationship of thought and play. "The essential point is that we must admit that when thought is playing false, it's playing, but when it's not playing false it's also playing " Einstein emphasized that, thought is free creation, thought is play. And you have to play with thought to discover to what extent it has any significance, rather than to say you're grasping the truth. " (Bohm, 1982, p. 363)
CONCLUSION: PERENNIAL DEBATES

Four questions have been the leitmotif of this investigation of a probable trajectory into pedagogical space envisaged by a teacher of the tenth century - what should be taught to whom, how and why. The investigation has tried to come as close as possible to this teacher's point of departure - the four Aristotelian causes i.e. formal, material, efficient and final. It is possible to do this by accepting the philosopher as an intelligent teacher who has thought about the human predicament and used the traditions at his disposal to construct a responsible architecture of the imagination. With these analytic myths he is then exploring the possibilities and the limits of the universal debates of mankind. His writings are one outcome of these voyages. The discussions he must have had with colleagues and students are another.

One can, of course, begin with the categorization of the teacher as a Neoplatonist, an Aristotelian, a Shi'i, etc. Equally, one start with the facile notions, at best, of his beliefs, his contradictory thought, or his status as a glorified porter who transferred the Greek tradition back to Europe. That is a matter of choice. No doubt al-Fārābī's taxonomy of cities opposed to the virtuous city provides space enough to accommodate such imaginative journeys. However, one may ask: where is the responsible architecture of which the instruments are theoretical and moral virtues? Surely these are what the teacher used when he read past the apparent silence of former authors' works, and in the light of what he observes about conversation in comparison to writing, his discussions must have encompassed far more than he wrote.

Possibly what his colleagues and students did not say to each other was significant too. The reference to arguments which aim at stopping a sophist in the presence of an audience, for
instance, is paradigmatic of such explorations regarding the ambiguity bridging public and private spaces: the extent to which one "reveals" oneself in company depends, at least, on the radius of the circle of trust in any given situation. One can imagine the delicacy with which debates were handled. Perhaps one can say the delicacy of a surgeon - to use a metaphor from a profession to which al-Fârâbî made reference. Both teacher and surgeon are consummate practical artists. The "surgeon", were he alive today, would have been aided enormously by the availability of technological diagnostic tools which have been made possible by the application of an understanding of the universe in terms of Newtonian and Einsteinian laws of physics. The teacher would not have been surprised to learn that despotism was still alive but perhaps he would have been taken aback by the extent of it in cultures mesmerized by power of technology to enhance the capacity for evil.

On the other hand he may not have been too surprised to learn of the exploitation and the manipulation of a large number of natural beings. No doubt he would have attempted to explain, again, the limited horizon of deliberative virtues knowledge of which is available solely in the investigation of the genus of beings above the natural being in the order of existence. Perhaps he would have spoken about it in terms of a lack of verticality and alluded to the awareness of limits being forced on man by a nature which refuses to accept more abuse. No doubt he would also have will-ingly discussed the responsible architecture of the imagination guided by the education of man's natural aptitude for clarity of thought and of the freedom of choice.

The demands of his theory of instruction would indicate that any seminar focussed on the subject would have few students. Investigations of modern myths and generally held opinions would then have the de-limited space made possible by the compact circle of trust. The motivation and the present state of learning of each student would be two further "variables" on the basis of which the teacher would have decided which possible combination of dialectic allied to demonstration, and rhetoric was the best possible teaching procedure so as to make the myth(s) questionable without disorienting the particular student. The fine line between the
Socratic method and sophistry in this situation and its dependence on the moral virtues of the participants would, no doubt, be related to the age old debate on the same issue.

In what appears to be almost an universal agreement on the present dearth of moral virtues the question would probably have been hotly debated by representatives of different cultures in the seminar. Points of contact between different traditions would have brought the participants closer just as points of friction would have created distance. Apart from the trust, tolerance for differences would have depended on the respect for human rights and free speech accorded within the wider context of this educational encounter. Perhaps participants who had migrated, were forced to flee, or had otherwise moved would be more accepting of the status of others as weeds.

It is possible to extend this line of thought and bridge the ten century gap via universals. The point being made is that if one reads al-Fārābī responsibly, one is in the presence of a humane philosopher of enormous depth and breadth, one who dissects the human condition with a finesse that is breath-taking. Any dissection of man, the world and knowledge depends on a conceptualization, a fragmentation, a reduction which is susceptible to divinization. Hence it is one's responsibility to put the pieces back together again in order to visualize the relationships with oneself, with the world and with the ultimate cause of both. Immediately the question arises: how does one know? Endless others follow.

One builds worlds and more worlds - fragmenting and building in the imaginary and the real worlds. Each time one can only begin with one's inheritance but in no way is one limited by this. The possibilities are vast. Natural and voluntary creations, however, may not be amenable to one's intention. The efficient cause is a matter of choice. So is the horizon of intention. In this sense al-Fārābī can be termed a pragmatic idealist. But what is far more revealing is the myth-making function of the teacher who knows that the truth would reduce his humanity to the

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124 The dilemmas posed by research in medical fields would have aroused the "surgeon's" interest too.
genus of matter or elevate him to the status of the metaphysical beings. Neither have any choice. Both belong to a cause and effect category even though the former is created and the latter creating.

The genus of the human being is somewhere in the middle - an ambiguous position of which the possibilities and limits are always being re-searched. The extent to which each one is naturally capable, can be instructed, is willing to be educated and acquires the wisdom to foster discernment, is a matter of debate. The inventions, therefore, cannot stop. This "toying" with reality would seem to indicate al-Fārābī to be an iconoclast. Perhaps, one of the best exponents of the shahādah.
APPENDIX 1: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

125

a

al-afāl wa'l-malakāt - the acts and states of character i.e. the acts of choice which build upon innate dispositions and which are instrumental in the striving toward perfection (Attainment, pp. 14.15, 34.11-12 and 34.16).

al-afāl wa'l-malakāt al-irādiyāh - the voluntary acts and states of character leading to happiness on the condition that they are distributed in the city (Millah, fs. 13).

Alternatively al-afāl wa'l-sīra al-irādiyāh - the voluntary actions and ways of life; together with the positive dispositions (malakāt), states of character (al-shyam), morals (akhlāq), inclinations (sajāyat), which lead to these actions and ways of life they are one of the major areas of investigation of political science (Khāmis, pp. 69.3-4).

al-ajsām al-samāwīyah - the celestial bodies (e.g. Siyāsah, p. 4.13).

anīhā' al-ta'lim - methods of instruction (Alfāz, p. 87) or the means by which a teacher can establish communication with a student who will be able to comprehend, be convinced of and commit the new learning to memory. Among these are:

: al-fāz dāllah 'alā al-shay' - expressions designating a thing
: hadād al-shay' wa-'ajzā' hadīthi - definitions or parts of the definition of the thing
: istiqrā' - induction
: muqītiyyāt aw kułiyāt al-shay' - particulars or universals of the thing
: khawāṣṣ - a characteristic or attribute of it
: miḥāl - example
: qismah - division; this is also encountered as one of the two methods that the man who aims at philosophy should use in his investigation - s.v. ṭariq al-qism.
: qiyās - syllogism
: rusūm al-shay' - its descriptions, specific qualities or accidents
: wadā' al-shay' - biḥadhā' al-'ayn - placing the thing before the eyes

al-'aql al-fa'āl - the Active Intellect, the last in the series of ten intellects acting as a "mediator" between the supra- and the infra-lunary worlds.

al-'aql al-'amāl - the practical intellect (e.g. Aristotle, p. 124.3).

al-'aql al-haŷālātī - the (inborn/innate) material intellect (Mabādī', pp. 200-201).

al-'aql al-munfa'āl - the passive intellect i.e. the material intellect in relation to the Active Intellect (Mabādī', p. 201.10).

al-'aql al-mustafaftād - the acquired intellect (Regime, p. 49.10).

al-'aql bi'il-fi'il - the intellect in actuality/actual intellect (Mabādī', p. 200.13).

al-'aql bi'il-qawwāh - the potential intellect (Mabādī', p. 200.3).

al-'aql al-naẓārī - the theoretical intellect (Aristotle, p. 124.4).

a'rād - [1] accidents which accompany the voluntary intelligibles when they are made to exist in reality (Attainment, p. 17); or
[2] attributes which give descriptions in addition to the description of what a thing is (Aristotle, p. 87).

125 As indicated earlier in the technical details the citations refer to the page or the faṣl number of the edited Arabic text. Wherever appropriate the number following the page number and period is the line number. However, for reasons of clarity the titles of the publications in this appendix have not been italicized.
al-ashya’ al-insâniyâh al-arba’ – the four human things by which happiness is achieved in nations and cities (the leitmotif of Attainment). These are:

: al-fadâ’il al-nazârîyâh – the theoretical virtues
: al-fadâ’il al-fikriyâh – the deliberative virtues
: al-fadâ’il al-khuluqîyâh – the moral virtues
: al-sanâ‘î al-amalîyâh – practical arts

b

bâ‘ith min khârij – external stimulus; together with encouragement/incentive (munhid) it is a supplement to guidance with which to motivate actions leading to happiness (Regime, p. 48.7).

burrâ’n (burrân) – demonstration(s)

f

fadâ’il – used in the sense of [1] the states of the soul by which a man does good deeds as contrasted to those states by which he does bad deeds (Madani, fs. 2); and [2] the human deliberative virtue (al-fadîlah al-fikriyâh al-insâniyâh) which is an acquired intelligible formed by constant practice out of a natural deliberative virtue like courage in a lion, cunning in a fox, etc. (Attainment, pp. 27-28). It is also referred to as the deliberative faculty (al-qûwah al-fikriyâh) (Attainment, p. 20.12).

al-fadîlah (fadâ’il) al-fikriyâh – the deliberative virtue(s) (Attainment, pp. 17-29; compare with al-ta’aqquf). Among the various kinds of deliberative virtues are the following:

: al-fadîlah al-fikriyâh al-jihâdîyâh – the military deliberative virtue (Attainment, p. 22.8).
: al-fadîlah al-fikriyâh al-madanîyâh – the political deliberative virtue (Attainment, p. 21.14). This category has an infinite number of subdivisions related to the time and space which each particular voluntary intelligible is supposed to embrace: at the superior end of the continuum it is made analogous to a legislative ability (qudrah ‘alâ wad‘ al-nawâmîs) (Attainment, p. 22.2).
: al-fadîlah al-fikriyâh al-mashûrîyâh – the consultative deliberative virtue (Attainment, p. 22.8) which is employed in the discovery of what is most useful and noble to be attained by somebody else. It may exist separately from the deliberative virtue employed in the discovery of what is most useful and noble to be attained by oneself.

al-fadîlah (fadâ’il) al-khuluqîyâh – the moral virtue(s), one of the four human things through which happiness is achieved (Attainment, pp. 23-29).

al-fadîlah (fadâ’il) al-nazârîyâh – the theoretical virtue(s), one of the four human things through which happiness is achieved (Attainment, pp. 2-16).

falsafah – two kinds of philosophy are counter-posed to al-falsafah (al-faylasûf) brîl-haqîqah (the true philosophy or the philosopher who is an embodiment of the qualities of a philosopher, a legislator, a prince and an imâm – Attainment, pp. 39 and 44-46):

[1] al-falsafah al-bâtrî – the mutilated philosophy which subsumes vain, false and counterfeit philosophers:

: al-faylasûf al-bahra – the vain philosopher or the philosopher who learns the theoretical science but is not habituated to doing the acts considered virtuous by a certain religion or the generally accepted noble acts. His own habit thus overpowers him and he is unable to retain the education of his youth.

: al-faylasûf al-bîttî – the false philosopher or the philosopher who acquires the theoretical sciences either without achieving the utmost perfection or without being aware of the true purpose for which philosophy is pursued. Hence he is unable to introduce others to what he knows insofar as their capacity permits and merely leads others to kinds of happiness which are believed to be so.
: al-faylasūf al-zawar — the counterfeit philosopher or the philosopher who studies the theoretical sciences without possessing naturally dispositions for them.

[2] al-faylasūf al-nāqisah — the defective philosopher or the philosopher who does not possess the faculty for exploiting his knowledge of the theoretical sciences for the benefit of all others according to their capacity.

al-hayât al-ākhirah — the after life related to kamâl al-ākhirah (the last perfection) (Madani, fs. 25)

al-hayât al-ālâ — the first life related to al-kamâl al-awwal the first perfection (Madani, fs. 25)

hikmah — wisdom; also used as hikmat al-hikam (the wisdom of wisdom), or al-hikmah ‘alâ'l-ilâq (unqualified wisdom) which is philosophy (Attainment, p. 39).

ifâdah — emanation: the process whereby the created things, of both the eternal world above the moon and the world of generation and corruption below the moon, come into existence. The term is also used in connection with revelation from the Active Intellect to the intellectual and the imaginative faculties.

ihsâ’ al-ulûm — the taxonomy of sciences exhibiting diachronic elements of classification. In the order of their enumeration the sciences are:

: ‘ilm al-lisân — science of language
: ‘ilm al-mantlq — science of logic
: ‘ilm al-tabî‘ah — natural science
: ‘ilm al-ilâhî — divine science
: ‘ilm al-madanî — science of politics
: ‘ilm al-fiqh — science of jurisprudence
: ‘ilm al-kalâm — science of dialectical theology

ijtimâ’ — association, a term often used in conjunction with or instead of madînah.

al-ikhtiyâr — choice (or the third will) which adheres to the practical intellect and which is particularly human rather than animal (Regime, p. 42.9-10; Aristotle, p. 131.8).

‘ilm mā bâ’d al-tabî‘ah — science of metaphysics

‘ilm al-yaqîn — the certain science. One of the two approaches, the other being dialectic (al-jadal) which is used to inquire into natural science (Aristotle, p. 92.1).

al-irâdah — used in the sense of shawq (desire) of three kinds of will (Regime, p. 72.5-14). In the order of their appearance in man (or the world) they are:

: al-irâdah al-ûlâ — the first will, a desire of the appetitive faculty
: al-irâdah al-thâniyah — the second will, a desire of the imaginative faculty
: al-irâdah al-thâlithah — the third will, a desire of the intellect

al-irâdah al-insâniyah — the human will made up of irâdah (will) masa‘î‘ah (volition) and ikhtiyâr (choice) which adhere to the practical intellect. The three are in contrast to desire, things adhering to the sense perception and discernment common to all animals (Aristotle, p. 131.2-3). Volition and choice are also referred to as an intellectual faculty by which what has been acquired by the practical intellect can be made to exist in natural things (Aristotle, p. 124.5-6).
al-jadâl – dialectic. One of the two approaches, the other being the certain science ('ilm al-yaqîn), which is used to inquire into natural science (Aristotle, p. 91.22).

jins (ajnâs) – genus (genera). Three genera of beings are identified, the principle of their classification being the number of causes comprised by each (s.v. mabâdi' al-ta'lim and mabâdi' al-wujûd). In a descending hierarchy they are:

: having no cause for its existence but the ultimate principle (mabda' al-aqsâ) for the being of all other beings.
: comprising only three causes i.e. not the material.
: comprising all four causes i.e. the material, formal, efficient and final.

jins al-a'dild wa'l-a'zâm – the genus of numbers and magnitudes which is the first stage of the inquiry into the beings. The principles of being and the principles of instruction are identical for this genus of beings since it employs on the formal cause, the only category for which this is true (Attainment, p. 8.11).

kamâl aqsâ – (the) ultimate perfection
kamâl al-âkhlrah – the last perfection related to al-hayât al-âkhirah (the after life) (Madani, fs. 25).

al-kamâl al-awwal – the first perfection related to al-hayât al-ûlâ (the first life) (Madani, fs. 25).
kamâl nazari – theoretical perfection comprising knowledge of theoretical virtues, deliberative virtues, moral virtues and the practical arts (Attainment, p. 16.1).

kurah – sphere. The nine spheres of the supra-lunary world, emanating from their nine respective intelligences (which comprise the Second Causes of the six highest principles of the beings) in a descending hierarchy are (Mabâdî', pp. 100f):

: al-samâ' al-ûlâ – the First Heaven
: kurat al-kawâkib al-thâbuah – the sphere of the fixed stars
: kurat zahl – the sphere of Saturn
: kurat al-mushtari – the sphere of Jupiter
: kurat al-murrîkh – the sphere of Mars
: kurat al-shams – the sphere of the Sun
: kurat al-zahrah – the sphere of Venus
: kurat al-utârid – the sphere of Mercury
: kurat al-qamar – the sphere of the Moon

mâ ba'd al-tabî'ah – metaphysics
al-mabâdî' al-'aqlîyah – intellectual principles
al-mabâdî' al-ilâhîyah – divine principles (Attainment, p. 15.16)
al-mabâdî' al-jîsmâniyah – corporeal principles
al-mabâdî' al-nafsâniyah – psychical or animate principles
al-mabâdî' al-nutaqîyah – rational principles
al-mabâdî' al-tabî'iyah – natural principles
mabâdî' al-mawîdât al-aqsâ – the six highest principles of the beings (an exposition of which comprises the first part of Siyâsa). In a descending hierarchy they are:

: al-sabab al-awwal – the First Cause
: al-asbâb al-thawânî – the Second Causes (i.e. the nine intelligences which give rise to the nine spheres)
: al-'aql al-fa'il – The Active Intellect
\textit{mabādī' al-ta'īlīm} – principles of instruction which give knowledge "that" something exists and which comprise the following three causes (Attainment, pp. 5-6):

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{al-mabda' al-fā'īl} – the efficient cause
  \item \textit{al-mabda' al-muddī} – the material cause
  \item \textit{al-mabda' al-sūrī} – the formal cause; also \textit{al-māhīyah} (whatness - Aristotle, p. 93.2)
\end{itemize}

\textit{mabādī' al-wujūd} – principles of being which give knowledge of "why" something exists comprising the formal, material and efficient causes of the principles of instruction as listed above and in addition:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{al-mabda' al-aqsā} – the final cause; also \textit{ghāyah} (end - Aristotle, p. 93.2).
\end{itemize}

\textit{al-mâddah al-ûlā} – the prime matter common to everything in the infra-lunar world.

\textit{madînah} – three categories of cities opposite to the virtuous city (\textit{al-madinah al-fādilah}) are enumerated in \textit{Regime} (p. 58.5) - erring, immoral and ignorant cities, but four in \textit{Mabādī'} (252.15-16) the additional one being the falsifying city.

\begin{itemize}
  \item [1] \textit{al-madinah al-dâllah} – the erring city or the one which has missed the right path through faulty judgment.
  \item [2] \textit{al-madinah al-fāsiqah} – the wicked, the immoral or the transgressing city which has the views of the virtuous but the actions of the ignorant. There are as many subdivisions of it as of the ignorant city.
  \item [3] \textit{al-madinah al-jâhilîyah} – the ignorant city; according to \textit{Madanî} (fs. 84-86) the ignorant cities (and by implication all the other kinds of cities) are pure types only from a theoretical point of view whereas in practice such cities comprise all other types as well. The divisions of this city are:
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{al-madinah al-dârâ'īyah} – the indispensable city or the one of necessity; in \textit{Madanî} (fs. 25) this city appears to be the city opposed to the ideal city which is the virtuous city or ones presumed to be virtuous in the sense that the latter all attempt to fulfil aims which encompass more than the basic necessities.
  \item \textit{al-madinah al-jamâ'îyah} – the democratic city
  \item \textit{al-madinah al-kal'âmîyah} – the timocratic city
  \item \textit{al-madinah al-khasîsah} – the base city or \textit{madînat al-khâssah wa'l-suqût}, (the city of depravity and baseness).
  \item \textit{al-madinah al-nadhâlah} – the vile city
  \item \textit{al-madinah al-taghallubîyah} – the despotic city
  \item \textit{madînat al-ahrâr} – the city of the free
  \item \textit{madînât al-musâlimah} – cities of peace (\textit{Mabādī'}, p. 312.16).
  \item [4] \textit{al-madinah al-mubaddilah} – the falsifying city or the one which has deliberately altered its previous excellent character
\end{itemize}

\textit{al-maqûlât al- rivals} – the first intelligibles
\textit{al-maqûlât al-râdîiyah} – voluntary intelligibles (Attainment, p. 17.16) i.e. those acquired by an act of the will.
\textit{al-maqûlât al-tabî'iyah} – natural intelligibles (Attainment, p. 17.16) i.e. those which exist in nature.

\textit{matâlîb} (\textit{matlîlbah}) – problem(s) (Attainment, p. 3.2)

\textit{mawjûdât tabî'iyah} – natural beings not existing by the will of man (Aristotle, p. 89.12-13).
\textit{al-mihna al-malikîyah} – the royal craft which is divided into two on the basis of what is conducive to, or obstructs, the attainment of happiness:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{al-mihna al-malikîyah al-fâdilah} – the virtuous royal craft (\textit{Khâmis}, pp. 71.6 and 73.7). This is further divided into two, one of the divisions comprising knowledge of all the sciences of \textit{ihsâ' al-ullūm} (see also \textit{rrâsah} and \textit{madînah}).
\end{itemize}
al-mihna al-malikîyah ghayr al-fâdilah — the non-virtuous royal craft (Khâmis, p. 72.7).
mudabbir — governor i.e. prince (Regime, p. 54)
al-mudrakoût — apprehensions, which are of three kinds in both theoretical and practical sciences (Aristotle, p. 63.1-10):
: al-mahsûsât — sense perceptions.
: al-ma'âlûmât al-uwal — primary cognitions, alternatively called : al-ilm (al-ulûm) al-uwal (primary knowledge in Attainment, p. 2.7 and Regime, p. 41.11).
: al-ma'âlûmât 'an al-fažs wa'l-rawîyah wa'l-ta'ammul — cognitions from investigation, deliberation and consideration. Three other methods are listed in Attainment (p. 2.3) as means to acquire these "secondary" cognitions : istinbât, ta'llîm and ta'allum (inference, instruction and study). In Plato (p. 6) there are fahs, ta'allum and ta'llim. Use of these methods to investigate problems or questions involves the accepting of primary cognitions as muqaddamât (premises) to yield natâ'ij (conclusions).
mukhtalaf al-ajzâ' — heterogeneous bodies made up by the four elements (Aristotle, p. 108.10).
mutashâbih al-ajzâ' — homogeneous bodies made up by the four elements (Aristotle, p. 108.11).

al-nawâbî — the weeds (Siyâsah, pp. 104-107).
al-nazar al-llâhî — divine inquiry. This gives knowledge of the ultimate causes of the beings - the first principle being divinity and others below which are not bodhic or in bodies are divine principles. (Attainment, p. 15.14).
al-nutq al-dâkhil — interior speech (Risâlah Logic, fs. 4)
al-nutq al-khânj — exterior speech (Risâlah Logic, fs. 4)

qiyyâs (âr) — syllogism(s)
qîwah — natural or acquired faculty (see below)
qûwah 'alâ al-qawânînâ al-kulliyah — faculty for general rules (Ihsâ', p. 104).
al-qûwah allât yastafiduhâ al-insânu bu'dî muzâwâlah al-aml al-madanîyah — the faculty that man acquires through long practice in political deeds (Khâmis, p. 71.1).
al-qûwah al-ghâdiyâh — the nutritive faculty (Siyâsah, pp. 4 and 43).
al-qûwah al-hassâsah — the sensitive faculty (Siyâsah, pp. 4 and 43).
al-qûwah al-nuzû'îyah — the appetitive faculty (Siyâsah, pp. 4 and 43).
al-qûwah al-mantqîyah — the logical faculty which is the outcome of training or being trained in the use of all the five syllogistic arts of demonstration, dialectic, sophistic, rhetoric and poetic (Aristotle, p. 85.19).
al-qûwah al-mutakhayyîyalah — the imaginative faculty (Siyâsah, pp. 4 and 43).
al-qûwah al-nâtiqah — the rational faculty is divided into two:
: al-qûwah al-nâtiqah al-'amalîyah — the practical rational faculty
: al-qûwah al-nâtiqah al-nazarîyah — the theoretical rational faculty. This is the only faculty which can know happiness with certainty which can then be achieved by marshalling the sensitive, the appetitive, the imaginative and the practical-rational faculties to the aim of the theoretical faculty (Regime, p. 43; also Madañî, fs. 6).
al-qûwah al-rajibiyyâh — the experiential faculty (Madani, fs. 88).

ra'is al-awwal (âlâ'l-illâq) — the supreme ruler
ra'is al-ma'mûruh kullihâ — sovereign of the universal state (Mabâdi', p. 246.7).
ri'âsah — rulership of which there are two kinds in Ihsâ' (p. 103):
: al-ri'âsah al-fâdilah — the virtuous rulership. In Madañî (fs. 54) this is the rule of one person who has all the necessary qualities or a group with all the same qualities
distributed amongst them, the latter are al-ru'asâ' al-akhyâr (the best chiefs). In Millah (p. 56.13-14) the virtuous rulership is of two kinds: the first type which establishes, or converts an ignorant rulership into, a virtuous one and a subsequent one named al-ri'âsah al-sunnîyah (the traditional rulership). In Madani (fs. 54) this type is again divided into two, the rule of one person or more i.e. malik al-sunnah (king according to the law) or ru'asâ' al-sunnah (the chiefs according to the law). Regime also refers to malik al-sunnah (p. 51)

: al-ri'âsah al-jâhilîyah -- the ignorant rulership (see also al-mihna al-malikîyah ghayr al-fâl/ilâh and al-madînah al-jâhilîyah).

al-ri'âsah al-âlâ -- the supreme rulership (Regime, p. 55).

al-sa'âdah -- happiness, where the central distinction is between (e.g. Risâlah Logic, fs. 3):

: bi't-haqiqah (true happiness) and
: bi't-zann (that which is believed to be happiness)

sa'âdat al-dunyâ -- earthly happiness (Attainment, p. 2.3).

sa'âdat al-qiswâ -- supreme happiness (Attainment, 2.3); also al-sa'âdah al-qiswâ al-haqqiyah (the true and supreme happiness) which is "the purpose of the Active Intellect" (Regime, p. 52.10).

al-samâ' al-ûlâ -- the First Heaven. One of the five simple bodies, the others being the four elements (al-ustuqusât) The First Heaven is the cause of the latter's existence, their constitution, the continuity of their being and hierarchy. As the outermost body it is also the cause of the circular motion of all within it. (Mabâdi', 19 and Aristotle, pp. 97-99).

al-sanâ'ah al-amaliyâh -- practical arts, the fourth human thing through which happiness is achieved (Attainment, p. 2).

al-sanâ'ah al-riyâdiyâh -- the training and investigating art (Aristotle, p. 79.3).

al-sanâ'ah al-yaqînîyah -- the art of certainty (Aristotle, p. 78.)

al-sanâ'ah allâtî hlya mashhûrah 'zîlmîyah aw na~ariyah -- the generally accepted scientific or theoretical arts which do not supply the required knowledge or the required way of life (Plato, pp. 6-9. In contrast to these arts are the methods of division and bringing together - s.v. tariq al-qism and tariq al-tarkîb). The order of investigation of the generally accepted arts is:

: al-na+ar al-dîyânî -- religious speculation and al-fahs al-dîyânî (religious investigation)
: 'îlm al-lîsân -- science of language
: sanâ'at al-shirr -- the art of poetry
: sanâ'at al-khatâbah -- the art of rhetoric
: al-sanâ'ah al-sûfzstâ'îyah -- the art of sophistry
: al-sanâ'at al-jadalîyân -- the investigations of the dialecticians and al-fahs al-jadalî (dialectical investigation)

sanâ'î qiyâsîyah -- syllogistic arts i.e. those which when their parts are integrated and perfected have as their action thereafter the employment of syllogism (Risâlah Logic, fs. 2).

sanâ'î ghayr qiyâsîyah -- non-syllogistic arts i.e. those which when their parts are integrated and perfected have as their action and end the doing of some particular work such as medicine, agriculture, etc. (Risâlah Logic, fs. 2). This category would seem to include all the arts i.e. other than logic elevating the latter to a unique category.

al-sîra al-fâdilâh -- the virtuous way of life (Plato, p. 4.8).

al-sîra al-matlûbah -- the desired way of life (Plato, p. 12.13).
al-ta'aqqul – practical wisdom which the common people (jumhūr) know as ‘aql (intelligence) (Madani, fs. 38; compare with al-fadîlah). It is subdivided into:

: al-ta’aqqul al-makhsûs – special practical wisdom
: al-ta’aqqul al-madanî – political practical wisdom which is excellence of deliberation on the most effective method of ruling cities.
: al-ta’aqqul al-manzîlî – domestic practical wisdom
: al-ta’aqqul al-mashûrî – consultative practical wisdom

ta’dîb – formation of character. Two kinds of people are employed by the prince to form the character of nations and citizens of cities: [1] for those who are susceptible of having their character formed willingly (tawan) and [2] for those who are such that their character can be formed only by compulsion (karhan) (Attainment, pp. 31.14-15). The first group is ahl al-fadâ’îl wa-l-sanâ’ir al-nâ’tiqiyah or the people who possess the rational virtues and arts (Attainment, pp. 32.18-30).

tahîl – analysis
ta’îm – instruction
al-tarîq al-aqnâ’iyah – the method of persuasion
tarîq al-qism – the method of division; one of the two methods the other being tarîq al-tarkîb that the man who aims at philosophy should use in his investigation.
tarîq al-tarkîb – the method of bringing together (see also tarîq al-qism).
tarîq suqrâf – the method of Socrates i.e. the ability to conduct a scientific investigation of justice and virtues (Plato, pp. 21-22).
tarîq irûsâmâkhus – the method of Thrasymachus i.e. the ability to form the character of the youth and instruct the multitude (Plato, pp. 21-22).
tarkîb – synthesis

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al-‘ulûm al-nazariyyah – the theoretical sciences (Attainment, pp. 34-35 and Aristotle, p. 63.4).
al-‘ulûm al-nazariyyah al-dhâ‘i’ah the popular theoretical sciences (Attainment, pp. 34-35).
al-‘ulûm al-nazariyyah al-mukhîlah – the image-making theoretical sciences (Attainment, pp. 34-35).
al-‘ulûm al-uwal – the “given” primary knowledge, the first intelligibles or the primary cognitions (Attainment, pp. 4-5 and Aristotle, pp. 63 and 75); compare al-mudrakât, al-ma’lumât al-uwal (primary cognitions).
al-ustuqsâr – the four elements which in hierarchical order from the top are al-nâr, al-hawâ’, al-mâ’ and al-ard i.e. fire, air, water, and earth respectively. They are different in form but share a common material. The four elements are four of the five primary simple bodies that constitute the world, the fifth being the First Heaven (Aristotle, p. 99.12).
al-usûl al-kullîyah – universal rules or the principles of being i.e. the four causes relating to the fact and the reason of a thing’s existence (Aristotle, p. 92.10).

w

wa’d al-nawâmîs ra’îsah – legislative craft
wâdi’ al-nawâmîs – the legislator (Plato, p. 21). Also sâhib al-nawâmîs (Laws, p. 40.21).
APPENDIX 2 : SHORT TITLES FOR AL-FARABI'S TREATISES

The following are short titles used for al-Fârâbî's treatises, cited by the author of the present thesis or in the works of other authors cited in this thesis. Except for Aflâtun and Nawâmîs all the complete titles in the bibliography are under: al-Fârâbî, Abû Nasr (date of publication).

Aflâtun -- Plato Arabus (1973), (2) De Platonis Philosophia.
Alfâz – (1968a), Kitâb al-Alfâz al-Mustamal hīl-Mantiq....
Aristotle -- (1969b), The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, (3) The Philosophy of Aristotle....
Aristatâlis – (1961a), Falsafat Aristatâlis....
Enumeration – (1972b), "Enumeration of the Sciences".
Fusûl Logic – (1955), "Al-Fârâbî's Introductory Sections on Logic".
Hurûf – (1969a), Kitâb al-Hurûf....
Ihsâ’ – (1949b), Ihsâ’ al-‘Ulam.
Interpretatione – (1981), Al-Fârâbî’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.
Jam‘ – (1958 and 1959), "Al-Fârâbî’s Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle".
Khâmil – (1968b), Kitâb al-Millah wa Nusûs Ukhrà, (2) Al-fasl al-khâmil fi’l-îm al-Madâni....
Laws – (1972c), "Plato’s Laws".
Mabâdî' – (1985), Alfarâbî on the Perfect State....
Madânî – (1961b), Fusûl al-Madâni....
Maqâlah – (1976), Maqâlah fi’il-jihatî....
Musterstaat – (1895), Alfârâbî’s Abhandlungen Der Musterstaat.
Nawâmîs -- Plato Arabus (1973), (3) Compendium Legum Platonis.
Nujûm – (1890), Alfârâbî’s philosophische Abhandlungen, (8) Fîmâ yasihhu wa lâ yasiljhu min Ahkâm al-Nujûm.
Plato – (1969b), The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, (2) The Philosophy of Plato....
Qâdîhûryâs – (1958 and 1959), "Al-Fârâbî’s Paraphrase of the Categories of Aristotle".
Qiyâs – (1963), Al-Fârâbî’s Short Commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics.
Regime – (1972d), "The Political Regime".
Risâlah ‘Aql – (1938), Risalah fi’l-‘Aql.
Risâlah Logic – (1956b), "Al-Fârâbî’s Introductory Risâlah on Logic".
Siyâsah – (1964a), Kitâb al-Siyâsah al-Madâniyyah....
Tahsîl – (1344-1364 AH), Rasâ’il, (3) Tahsîl al-Sa’âdah.
Tanbîh – (1344-1364 AH), Rasâ’il, (5) Kitâb al-Tanbîh ‘atâ Sabîl al-Sa’âdah.
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al-Fârâbî, Abû Nasr (1963). *Al-Fârâbî's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics*, tr., from the Arabic with an Introduction and notes by N. Rescher. Pittsburgh : University Press. [A translation of *Kitâb al-Qiyâs al-Saghîr* - one of the several names by which this treatise is known].


1. *The Attainment of Happiness*, pp. 11-50 [the editor notes that his translation is a result of the collation of al-Fârâbi (1344-1365), *Rasâ'il*, (3) *Tahsîl al-Sa'âdah*, which is a printer's copy, with two manuscripts of the same treatise from London and Istanbul, a Hebrew paraphrase of it, and al-Fârâbi (1961b), *Fusûl al-Madallî*].
2. *The Philosophy of Plato*, its parts, the ranks of the order of its parts from the beginning to the end, pp. 51-67 [a translation of *Falsafat Aflâtun wa-ajzâ'uhâ wa-marâ'ib a/za'lah min awwa/lîhâ ila âkhrîhâ in Plato Arabus* (1973), (2) *De Platonis Philosophia*].
3. *The Philosophy of Aristotle*, the parts of his Philosophy, the ranks of order of its parts, the position from which he started and to one he reached, pp. 71-130 [a translation of al-Fârâbi (1961a), *Falsafat Aristîtalîs wa-ajzâ'uhâ wa-marâ'ib aza'lah wa'l-mawdî alladhi minhu ibtâda'a wa-llayhî intâhâ*].


al-Fârâbi, Abû Nasr (1344-1364 AH). *Rasâ'il*. Hyderabad : Dâ'irat al-Ma'ârif al-'Uthmânîyah. This volume is a collection of 11 treatises individually paginated. Works relevant for this thesis are:


Plato Arabus (1973). London: Warburg Institute. A single volume Kraus Reprint by Kraus-Thomson Organization, Nendeln/Liechtenstein of 3 previously published volumes the second two of which are:
(2) De Platonis Philosophia, ed. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, 1943. [Comprises the Arabic text and a Latin translation of Falsafat Aflâtun wa-ajzâ‘uhâ wa-marâtib ajza‘ihâ min awwalihâ ilâ âkhirihâ].


