SOCIAL CONFLICT IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE
ABSTRACT

SOCIAL CONFLICT IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE

MA THESIS BY FRANS J. SCHRYER, DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY,
MCGILL UNIVERSITY.

In this thesis a case of social conflict in a Mexican village is presented and analyzed. Although the narrative of a longer history of family disputes and inter-village rivalry is included, the thesis focuses on a particular time period, that of 1960 to 1969. Two approaches are used: an anthropological analysis of peasant factionalism and a Marxist class analysis. The factional analysis examines the structure of temporary vertical segments engaged in horizontal competition and the Marxist analysis examines the representation of various economic classes on different factions. The latter approach indicates the presence of an element of vertical dispute, or class conflict, in a context of largely horizontal disputes, suggesting a model of social conflict in stratified peasant communities that should include both vertical and horizontal opposition and their possible transformation.

The case study is furthermore used to test the hypothesis that one strata of peasant society, commonly known as the middle peasantry, is the most actively involved in local political disputes and that it usually supports the leaders of that faction without access to formal political power. This hypothesis is verified by my data and is also discussed
in terms of underlying economic causes. It appears that a measure of economic independence also affords the middle peasants a measure of independence in the local political arena and that their militancy is related to strong economic pressures caused by fierce competition related to wider changes in the occupational structure on the national level. This implies that certain economic factors should be taken into account in the study of the composition and behaviour of political groups engaged in competition or conflict on the local level.
SOCIAL CONFLICT IN A MEXICAN VILLAGE

BY

FRANS JOZEF SCHRYER

MCGILL UNIVERSITY

A thesis submitted to the faculty of graduate studies and research of McGill University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Anthropology.

December, 1971

Montreal, Quebec.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Although I have been helped by the critiques and encouragement of many people, too numerous to name, I would like to mention two people who have assisted me in my work. Richard Frucht (my adviser from October, 1970, until the summer of 1971) greatly influenced my thinking and introduced me to Hamza Alavi's thesis concerning the middle peasantry during a seminar on "The Political Economy of the Rural Masses". Joanne Miller, my current adviser, has carefully and painstakingly read several versions of this thesis and did most of the editing of this final draft. To these and other teachers, I express my gratitude.

Most of all, I should acknowledge the help and cooperation I received from my informants in Pisa-flores, whose friendship will never be forgotten. It is proper that this thesis be dedicated to them:

Estra obra
se dedica a los
campesinos pobres y medianos que son
el proletariado de
Pisaflorast.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>THEORETICAL MATERIAL</td>
<td>4-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>The anthropological concept of factionalism</td>
<td>4-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>Class analysis</td>
<td>7-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C)</td>
<td>A thesis concerning the political behaviour of the middle peasantry</td>
<td>12-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>20-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>ETHNOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGICAL DATA</td>
<td>24-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>General description of the valley of Pisafloros</td>
<td>24-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>Economic history of the town</td>
<td>25-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C)</td>
<td>The economy of the Pisafloros Valley</td>
<td>31-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D)</td>
<td>Major institutions, systems of land tenure and sharecropping, and peasant organizations</td>
<td>38-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>The private union</td>
<td>47-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>The government union</td>
<td>48-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E)</td>
<td>The Class Structure of Pisafloros</td>
<td>50-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT</td>
<td>60-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>General outline of the social history of Pisafloros (1917-1971)</td>
<td>60-71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>The social conflicts of the 1960's</td>
<td>71-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>ANALYSIS</td>
<td>97-116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A)</td>
<td>Analysis of factionalism</td>
<td>97-104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B)</td>
<td>The class composition of various factions</td>
<td>104-112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C)</td>
<td>An economic explanation for the political behaviour of the middle peasantry</td>
<td>112-116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Contents (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION OF THIS THESIS FOR THE STUDY OF PACTATIONALISM</td>
<td>pp.117-119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td>pp.120-132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>pp.133-137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>pp.138-144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this thesis several disputes in a small Mexican town will be analyzed in order to substantiate a number of theories concerning the nature and causes of social conflict in stratified peasant communities. I will use two approaches in looking at this phenomenon; an anthropological study of village factionalism and a Marxist analysis of the countryside. The former approach generally examines the personal strategies and types of alliances that influence the composition of vertical segments of the peasant community involved in horizontal conflict, while the latter examines the economic basis of vertical conflict between horizontal segments, or economic classes. In this thesis a factional analysis will be used to examine the structure of temporary groups, formed over local political issues, and the Marxist analysis to examine the class membership of the various competing groups under discussion.

While social anthropologists, as well as Marxist sociologists, have looked at both vertical and horizontal conflicts, these cases have generally been treated as two very different phenomena, found in basically different situations. I will argue that social conflict in stratified peasant communities usually has elements of both horizontal factionalism, as social anthropologists have defined it, and vertical class conflict. Furthermore, the degree of vertical opposition between economic classes and the degree
of horizontal cleavage, crosscutting class boundaries, will vary under different conditions, within a single community. I will argue that my case study provides a good example of this process. In it, a horizontal conflict between the most powerful and wealthy members of the community, each supported by their relatives and economic dependents, was transformed into a class conflict involving at least two groups with very different economic interests and resources.

My thesis will be organized as follows: the second chapter will present and discuss the major theoretical models to be used in this paper. This will include a statement of my central hypothesis. My central hypothesis is that the members of one particular economic strata, occupying an intermediate and somewhat ambivalent position in the social structure of the community that I studied, consistently displayed a greater degree of militancy or involvement in political controversies than other classes. Moreover, apart from playing an active role in a basically horizontal, factional conflict, they also initiated a class conflict. Thus, the political behaviour of this economic strata, which I will label the "middle peasantry" was an important element in the development of a class conflict from a horizontal cleavage that had already existed in the community for a long time.

After the presentation of these theories, I will briefly
deal with the methodology of my fieldwork and mention some of the problems that I encountered. Chapter four presents an ethnographic survey and a class analysis of the village and the region I studied. My next chapter will deal with a series of social conflicts in the area over the past century, but specifically with the events of the last decade. I will then undertake a factional analysis of these events and examine the class composition of the leaders and members of the various factions. It will be argued that an analysis of the formation and composition of factions, along current anthropological lines, without reference to the class structure of the community, leaves out an important aspect of local politics, that of class opposition. Because of the importance of the opposition between the "middle peasantry" and the upper classes of the community, I will pursue in detail the economic reasons for this phenomenon. The last chapter will summarize my findings and outline the implications of this study for the anthropological study of peasant factionalism.
A) The anthropological concept of factionalism

The concept of factionalism, as an important aspect of peasant political behaviour, was developed by social anthropologists. These anthropologists worked primarily in societies with traditional, non-western institutions, undergoing rapid social change. Most of the literature deals with two aspects of this problem: the definition of factional disputes and the causes of this type of conflict. The various definitions have been remarkably similar. Most scholars accept the criteria characterizing factions first set forth by Ralph Nicholas (1965:27-9). According to him, factions are conflict groups, which have political functions, and are non-corporate. They are led by leaders who recruit their followers, on the basis of diverse principles, such as kinship, economic dependence and religious affiliation. However, authors who have written about the conditions under which factionalism develops and its functions present very different interpretations which vary according to the type of community in which they did research and their own theoretical orientation.

Some anthropologists have argued that factionalism is basically dysfunctional and disruptive. They point to the breakdown of cooperative activity and the generation of mistrust and tension (Siegel & Beals 1960). Others stress adaptative or functional aspects of factionalism and say
that factions may well serve a very useful role in organizing political life in the absence or breakdown of established institutions (Miller 1965, Bailey 1969, Swartz 1969). This aspect is particularly stressed in the case of immigrant communities where the political institutions of the home country may no longer be able to cope with new realities (Shokeid 1968), or in traditional communities undergoing rapid social change and exposed to strong external pressures. For example, in India the caste-system is no longer able to perform the necessary political functions associated with a changing economic structure and new national institutions (Bailey 1960, Firth 1957). Another view, often associated with this functional position, is that factionalism is a temporary affair, awaiting the development of local political parties, clothed in normative symbols, and clear-cut ideological issues (Bailey 1969, Boissevain 1964).

An underlying assumption in most models of factional politics is that factions are basically vertically integrated segments. That is, that they crosscut class or caste boundaries. Of course, the range of communities studied by anthropologists is varied and include those that have little or no differentiation. This is especially true for North American Indian communities (see Dozier 1966, Nicholas 1965: 47-58). However, in cases dealing with stratified peasant communities, one receives the impression that factional dis-
puter only take place between the more influential and wealthy families of the community. Poor, or lower caste families automatically support their employers and landlords (Miller 1965:27). Even where divisions at lower levels give rise to many small sub-factions, these tend to merge into two main factions, dominated by the upper class (Nicholas 1963, 1965).

Factional analyses are usually connected with studies of India or Indian overseas communities, although this approach has also been applied to other areas, including Malta (Boissevain 1964), Guatemala (Swartz 1969), Burma (Spiro 1968) and Taiwan (Gallin 1968). One reason for this is that factionalism, or the horizontal opposition between vertical segments, is a very common pattern of political behaviour in rural India. For example, even Ralph Nicholas, who has also written about conflict between castes (1968), claims that cases of vertical conflict are the exception, rather than the rule, in this cultural area, and only arise under certain conditions. 1

In Mexico evidence of factional disputes on the local level can be found in the works of anthropologists (Redfield 1950:90, Lewis 1951:250-2, Friedrich 1970) and other social scientists (Padgett 1966:chap.4, Simpson 1937:chaps.5,20,25). Nevertheless, very little research in Mexico has been oriented specifically to this problem. Perhaps one reason for
this lack is the presence of a predominantly one-party system which forces power seekers to secretly manoeuvre within a single hierarchial power structure, thus making it difficult to trace factions. Another reason might be the strong element of class conflict in political struggles between agrarians and landowners observed in rural Mexico throughout the last century. This latter aspect does not fit the factional model developed in Indian communities where one anthropologist was able to conclude that "class and economic interests appear irrelevant as yet" in local disputes (Miller 1965:30).

B) Class analysis:

The study of stratification in peasant communities provides another important contribution to an understanding of the social and economic factors underlying political conflicts on the local level. Anthropologists are aware that the peasantry is not a homogenous mass of traditional farmers, characterized by a single "Folk Tradition", as Redfield proposed in his studies of Tepoztlan (1930) and of Chan Kom (1934). Oscar Lewis (1951), for example, pointed out that Tepoztlan, even in the 1920's, was riddled with conflict and contradictions while Goldkind (1955, 1956) has recently demonstrated that even the remote community of Chan Kom was characteristic of what has been classified as the "open" or "centrifugal" community of Middle America (Wolf 1955, Camara...
1952). Although this same phenomenon has been observed in other cultural areas, little systematic examination of such class differentiation has been attempted by anthropologists working in small communities.

A Marxist class analysis is based on the criteria of differential access to the means of production, and has long been used to examine rural communities in other areas. For example, V.I. Lenin (1956) divided the rural Russian community into three classes: the "kulaks"; or rich peasants, who employed labour in the cultivation of commercial crops; the poor, landless labourers who primarily worked for the kulaks; and the independent peasants who had obtained legal title to their land after the great land reform or "emancipation" of 1861. Actually, the latter were still tied by all sorts of feudal obligations to the Russian landlords. Lenin observed that, as the process of class stratification continued within the previously undifferentiated peasantry, the independent peasants, attached to the "mir", or communal village, would disappear as a class (See also Alavi 1965:245-47).

Mao Tse Tung (1951:138-40; see also Schram 1963:172-7) refined this model in his analysis of rural China, where capitalism had not yet developed as much as in rural Russia. He names as many as eleven categories of peasants, including full-time labourers, sharecroppers, semi-landholders and
independent smallholders. These are compressed into four classes. In later articles: peasants who either own or rent land but exploit the labour of others, the middle peasants who do not exploit the labour of others, the sharecroppers who also work for other peasants and finally, the full-time wage labourers. The most important criteria here are access to land and labour.

Another aspect of the Marxist study of rural society is the identification of various sectors as well as classes. These sectors refer to different kinds of productive relationships rooted in co-existing economic systems. The following passage, which is based on the interpretation of the rural analysis of both Lenin and Mao, illustrates the sorts of sectors which might be found:

"The division of the peasantry into rich peasants, middle peasants and poor peasants suggests an array of the peasantry with the different strata arranged, one over the other, in a single order. This is misleading; the middle peasants, for instance, do not stand between the rich peasants and the poor peasants; they belong to a different sector of the rural economy."

"In the transitional historical situations we shall deal with, a distinction may be made broadly between three sectors of the rural economy. Firstly, we have the sector of which the essential distinguishing characteristic is that the land is owned by landlords who do not themselves undertake its cultivation. Their land is cultivated by landless tenants, mostly sharecroppers, who are classed as poor peasants. The second sector is that of the independent smallholders, who own the land they cultivate themselves. They are the middle peasants... The
third sector is that of the capitalist farmers, who are described as the rich peasants, who own substantial amounts of land. Their distinguishing characteristic is that their farming is based on the exploitation of wage labour; although they participate in farm work themselves on occasion. Unlike landlords, they undertake the business of farming on their own account and employ capital in it. The farm labourers, who are paid a contractual wage, are referred to as the agricultural proletariat and sometimes included with other sections of the exploited peasantry, viz. sharecroppers, etc., in the term poor peasants. We would prefer to use the terms capitalist farmers, independent smallholders and farm labourers, which are clearly more descriptive of their respective roles than the terms rich peasant, middle peasant and poor peasants... Thus we have one sector of independent peasants and two sectors characterized by a master and subordinate relationship." (Alavi 1965:244)

This scheme has been criticized by the Marxist anthropologist Kathleen Gough (1968) on the basis of her research in rural India. Although she admits that various features of feudal institutions remain in India, she also argues that only one economic sector can be found. For example, she provides evidence that all of the peasants she studied either work for someone else or hire others to work for them and that even the distinction between landlords and capitalist farmers has become obsolete since the former also undertake business enterprises, unlike the traditional landlords described by Alavi. Thus there is no independent sector composed of a "pure" middle peasantry.

I would suggest that the differences between Alavi's and Gough's models are due to the time period involved. It seems that the process of stratification and polarization
into landowners and landless, or employers and employees may well have blurred beyond recognition any distinctions that at one time existed in many areas between the various sectors of the rural economy.

My own class analysis of the area I studied in Mexico is based on a careful observation of the various types of land tenure and labour arrangements found in the region. Like Kathleen Gough (1968), I did not discern any separate sectors in the local economy. However, I did find some of the more standard terms for labelling classes useful in this area. Thus, I have divided up the community into landowners, rich peasants, artisans, middle peasants and poor peasants. The criteria upon which my analysis is based and a justification of these terms will be discussed in chapter IV, section E, pages 51-54.

At this point it is necessary to clarify my own use of the label "middle peasants", and how it differs from that of Alavi cited above. Since my study assumes that there is but one, integrated economic sector, the middle peasantry does occupy an intermediate level in the class structure. Another way of looking at this is to divide the agricultural population of the area I studied into two categories; those who employ wage labour and those who work for others. The latter may, of course, also work "for themselves" on tiny subsistence plots rented from their employers. The middle peasantry is hard to place in either of these broad
categories. This group sometimes hires other peasants to work for them during peak operations but at the same time themselves engage in wage labour for the landowners and rich sharecroppers who employ labour. Moreover, like the poor peasants, they rely heavily on migrant labour in other areas, in order to supplement their incomes. I will argue in my next section that the middle peasantry I have defined in my own research resembles that of Mao and Alavi as far as their position and economic interests vis-à-vis the other peasants are concerned.

C) A thesis concerning the political behaviour of the middle peasantry:

Traditionally, Marxists have been concerned with two aspects of peasant political behaviour: first, their opposition to the landlords or external financial agents as a whole, and secondly, class conflict within the peasantry as a result of internal stratification. The degree of politicization of any particular peasant community, of course, depends on many specific economic and cultural factors, such as the degree of exploitation, the availability of migrant labour, the strength of religious bonds and even family structures (Hindley 1965). Thus, the socialist literature on the whole focuses on the development of internal vertical conflict, especially after the break-up of large landed estates and under conditions of great external pressure. The major
theme is the latent or open hostility between employers, or capitalist farmers, and landless labourers.

However, in practice, the Marxists have had to take into consideration the significant political potential of the middle peasantry. For example, in their implementation of various cooperatives in Eastern Europe, the communists deliberately set out to gain the support of "both medium and poor peasants" (Mitrany 1951:209) while many Marxist theoreticians have stated that the middle peasants, also called "medium" peasants must be neutralized or won over (Kolarov 1931:265ff, Lenin 1971:441). The Pakistani scholar Hamza Alavi (1965) has further investigated this phenomenon and has proposed that the middle peasantry is actually the most militant or politically active during peasant uprisings. His thesis was further explored by the social anthropologist Eric Wolf in several lectures (1967) and in his book "Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century" (1969). Alavi also claimed that this class plays an independent role in local factional disputes. I will therefore briefly recapitulate his theory and show how I will apply it to my own data.

I have already shown (see page 9) that Alavi characterizes the middle peasantry as a class of independent smallholders, and distinguishes them from all other peasants as a separate, independent sector. However, although he says that "they own the land that they themselves cultivate and
do not exploit the labour of others" (p. 244), he qualifies this statement by pointing out that there is a great deal of overlap between his three categories and that the independent smallholder may employ some casual labour to cope with peak operation (Alavi 1965: 245). This seems to leave room for the inclusion of a larger number of "independent" peasants who do not primarily depend on wage labour.

In dealing with various historical cases, including the Russian and Chinese revolution and several peasant uprisings in India, Alavi gives several reasons why this class or sector is initially on the forefront of rebellion or political reform movements. First of all, they are often characterized by communal land tenure that is quickly disappearing, as in the case of the Russian "mir" in the beginning of this century. Or, they are the worst victims of excessive taxation, as in China, because they have some surplus but little protection from paternalistic landlords (1965). Eric Wolf (1969: 1) has shown that this was also true in the case of Mexico, where independent communal villages, a left-over from the colonial past, were losing their lands to large plantations while they were themselves undergoing a process of differentiation into classes with the introduction of private land tenure. Thus, the militancy of the middle peasantry is seen by both authors as a reaction to the spread of capitalism in the countryside, although Eric
Wolf (1957) also points out that the communal "mir" in Russia as well as the corporate peasant community in Mexico and in Java are themselves adaptations to an earlier period of mercantilist expansion.

Hamza Aali, (1965:277) in dealing with India, claims that the middle peasantry may also form an independent faction in local politics. This observation he drew from the anthropological studies on factionalism by Ralph Nicholas and Oscar Lewis.

"The pattern of political behaviour of the peasantry is based on factions which are vertically integrated segments of the rural society, dominated by landlords and rich peasants at the top and with poor peasants and landless labourers, who are economically dependent on them, at the bottom. Amongst the exploited sections of the peasantry there is little or no class solidarity. They stand divided amongst themselves by their allegiance to their factions' leaders, led by their masters. Political initiative thus rests with faction leaders, who are owners of land and have power and prestige in the village society. They are often engaged in political competition (even conflict) amongst themselves in pursuit of power and prestige in the society. The dominating factions, who by virtue of their wealth have the largest following, back the party in power, and in return receive many reciprocal benefits. The opposition finds allies, generally, in factions of middle peasants who are relatively independent of the landlords but who find themselves in conflict with them. Many factors enter into the factional picture; kinship, neighbourhood ties (or conflicts) and caste alignments affect the allegiance of particular peasants to one faction or another. But broadly, it does appear that in one group of factions the predominant characteristic is that of the relationship between masters and their dependents. While other factions are predominantly those of the independent smallholders." (Alavi 1965:273-274)
During my fieldwork I deliberately set out to investigate Alavi's theory about the role of the middle peasantry in local factional disputes, as well as their high degree of political militancy. In the process of my research in a Mexican peasant community, I realized that independent smallholders, or middle peasants as Alavi described them, did not exist in that society. However, I did observe a political phenomenon very similar to that described by Alavi and Wolf; namely, a high level of political activity and militancy of a class of peasants faced with tremendous economic competition and the prospect of downward mobility. This class occupied an intermediate position in the social structure of the community. I therefore modified Alavi's thesis into a more general theory in order to deal with the data I collected in Mexico. I have since discovered that this had already been done, although not in an explicit manner, by Shepard Forman in his study of peasant leagues in Brazil. For, in a footnote, he supports Wolf's and Alavi's theory that the "middle stratum of peasant society, consisting of tenant farmers and sharecroppers, threatened with the loss of land" were the most likely to partake in radical peasant movements (Forman 1971:19). (emphasis mine)

I therefore formulated the following hypothesis: in the municipality of Mexico which I studied, an intermediate stratum of peasants which I will label the "middle peasantry", consistently participated to a greater degree than other social
categories in local political affairs. Moreover, their political behaviour changed from one of active participation in a horizontal dispute between two factions in the community to one of class conflict with the landowners and wealthy peasants. I will substantiate this thesis in the following manner.

The greater overall militancy or political activism of the middle peasants will be shown by looking at their representation, both as members and leaders, in several peasant organizations involved in the disputes under discussion. It will be shown that the middle peasants were over-represented in these organizations. Moreover, they were the only ones who managed to belong to two rival organizations at the same time.

I will also show that a vertical factional structure, involving competition between two major peasant organizations was changed into a class conflict when the members of one faction became neutralized as soon as an important source of outside support was withdrawn. This conflict was continued by the middle peasants who belonged to that faction.

It will be shown that the conflict that developed between these two rival peasant organizations represented a class opposition by examining the leadership of the organizations during this period. One organization was led by a group of middle peasants while the other was controlled by the land-
owners and rich peasants. In order to clarify this hypothesis, I include the diagrams below as illustrations of my theoretical models:

(1) Traditional Anthropological Model of Factionalism:

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>economic classes (or castes)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Upper class leaders

Sub-factions that align and support their upper class leaders.

Major conflict or dispute

Minor disputes and line of potential future conflict or cleavage

(2) Hamza Alavi's model of Factionalism:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>economic classes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rich peasants and landowners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle peasants (support faction leader A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poor peasants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```

Faction leaders (leader of faction B somewhat superior in strength)

Economic classes
(3) Model of what happens in my case study:

Alavi's Model of factionalism describes first stage of conflict.

When leaders of faction A withdraw, the conflict is continued by faction of middle peasants.

This may also be represented as follows -

neutralized leaders and members of faction A.

line of possible future class conflict, involving poor peasants.

vertical conflict
CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY

The data presented in this thesis was largely obtained through informal interviews and the study of various documents in the town of Pisaflores in the state of Hidalgo, Mexico. Although my fieldwork only lasted for two and a half months, I had already spent two previous summers in this village and had established good rapport with many of the inhabitants.

Although it was not possible to independently research the history of factionalism and the social structure of the community, I tried to keep these separate as much as possible so as not to bias my investigation in favour of my hypothesis about the middle peasantry. In fact, the discovery of overlapping membership in rival organizations and the complexities of sharecropping and land tenure sufficiently confused my expectations that I had to concentrate on gathering as many facts as possible, thus leaving my analysis until later.

My study of the local economy, especially the yearly work cycle and the milpa system, is based on extensive interviews with various peasants as well as actual participation in the work itself. My visits to the surrounding fields and other hamlets in the valley of Pisaflores with local informants, enabled me to ascertain who owned or controlled most of the land in the area. This information was then compared with official records on tax receipts.
The most difficult part of my research was gathering the necessary data for my class analysis. Since I was unable to conduct a house-to-house survey, I used the following strategy, in part suggested by Professor Richard Salisbury, one of my advisors. I obtained permission to copy the data of a survey done in the village in 1969 by a group of Mexican students under the supervision of the local pastor. Although this did not provide me with the information I wanted, it gave me a list of names of all the families of the town, broken down according to village sub-sections, known as "cuarteles". I did not think that the few changes of residence in the intervening period would seriously distort the overall picture.

I then picked several informants in each section of the town and asked each of them to provide me with several items of information about the people named in that section. I asked the following questions:

1. Does this person own any land? If so, how much and to how many people does he rent it out?
2. How many measures of corn does this person sow?
3. Does this person harvest any sugar cane and how much? If so, does he own the necessary equipment to process it?
4. Does this person employ workers, either full-time or part-time? If so, does he work along with them himself?
5. Does this person work for somebody else for a wage?

While asking these questions I also carefully noted any labels used for various individuals. Upon cross-checking
this information I discovered that there was little disagreement, except in a few cases and in these I went to talk with the individual himself. I also secured additional information, such as whether or not a person "had money", or received an advance payment for his harvest from a local money lender or whether he had moved from one house to another.

I assumed that those names which were unknown to my informants were either newcomers or people who had only come to live in Pisaflóres for a short time during the period of the survey and had since moved back to their own villages. For, in 1968 many people had come to Pisaflóres to seek wage labour when the coffee harvest in a neighbouring area was destroyed.

Since many of the wage labourers and sharecroppers who work on the land owned by people who live in Pisaflóres, themselves live in surrounding hamlets, I decided to include them in my survey. This was done in order to give a more balanced picture of the agrarian structure of the entire valley. I was able to obtain detailed information on two villages from actual residents. For the other hamlets I had to rely on the opinions of several peasants in Pisaflóres who had acquaintances there. The names and population figures of these places are listed in appendix III.

The historical events analyzed in this thesis are based
on personal accounts as well as local documentary evidence, such as letters, name lists and minutes of meetings. As far as possible I tried to obtain the complete story from people on both sides of the disputes. I also looked for good reasons for inconsistencies and omissions and sometimes went back and confronted an informant with such information. A list of all written documents I used can be found in appendix I and a brief description of my principal informants in appendix II. Their real names, as well as those of the characters mentioned in chapter V, have been replaced with pseudo-names.
CHAPTER IV - ETHNOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGICAL DATA.

A) General description of the valley of Písaflores:

The town of Písaflores is located in a semi-tropical valley of the Sierra Madre Oriental mountain chain. It is the cabecera (main town, or administrative centre) of the municipality of the same name which forms the point of contact of three states: Hidalgo, Querétaro and San Luis Potosí. The entire municipality is separated from the rest of the state of Hidalgo, to which it belongs, by the natural boundary of the Moctezuma river. This river prevents direct access to the central highway from Mexico City to Laredo, which runs along the tops of the mountains through the neighbouring municipality of Chapulhuacan. The only way across is by a small boat, although vehicles have come as far as the village of Písaflores when the level of water was sufficiently low. A dirt road descending from the highway to the valley is 1.8 kilometres long and sometimes impassable because of landslides and mud. This is especially true in the rainy season which lasts from mid-August until early November.

The town of Písaflores itself has a population of nearly 1000 people. It is divided into four administrative subsections which in this part of Mexico are called cuarteles. It is the site of the only six-grade federal school in the municipality and a parochial school with four grades. There
is also a municipal office building with a small jail, and a type "C" rural hospital (no beds) staffed by a local nurse. There is no sewage system, no telephone and no pavement on the central plaza. However, an electrical light system which operates several hours a day from a diesel generator was constructed in 1970. The town also has a network of water pipes which carry drinking water from a spring located in one of the foothills above the town. Unlike most Mexican towns, the church, built of wood, is located away from the plaza, up on a hill. The latter is also the site of the curato (priest's house) which includes the parochial school, and a casa de juventud (youth centre). (see map B, page 28)

Although most of my fieldwork was done in this town, the entire valley, but not the mountains located in the municipality will be included in this study. Several streams, originating from these mountains drain into the Moctezuma river through the valley. Two of these streams converge at Pisaflores and then continue alongside the car track to the river. This area includes about fifteen hamlets or rancherias, although the choice is somewhat arbitrary. A number of villages or hamlets outside of the valley are also mentioned in my paper. These are intimately tied to Pisaflores through social networks and ties of economic dependence. Map A shows the area delimited for study. (see page 27)

B) Economic history of the town:

The lands of the valley of Pisaflores were granted to
Don Gaspar Rubio of Zimapán, Hidalgo, in the eighteenth century by the Spanish colonial government. His descendants founded a hacienda called "San José Tampochocho" and established themselves in the valley in 1817. According to oral tradition, the few Nahua Indians who still lived there vanished shortly afterwards and were replaced by Spanish-speaking workers. The village of Pisafloréz was then only a residence for those who worked on the hacienda but soon attracted various outsiders interested in establishing trade and industry. These entrepreneurs asked the Rubio family for permission to start stores, to build roads and to introduce such enterprises as soap and candle factories. They even included several Italian immigrants who were skilled copper-workers and manufactured most of the equipment used to process sugar cane in the area and to distil a cane liquor called aguardiente. Most of these families also obtained land during the land reforms introduced by Benito Juárez in the 1860's, when the hacienda was partitioned. During this period the name Pisafloréz (literally to "step on flowers") also became accepted by common usage because of the abundance of huge flower-bearing trees found throughout the valley.

In 1870 the citizens of Pisafloréz formed a town council and started a campaign in order to wrest political control from a village called Xochicoaco, located in the mountains to the north of Pisafloréz. This village was at that time the cabecera. Their demand for independent status was
MAP A: Municipality of Pisaflorres, showing area investigated in this thesis.
MAP B: The Town of Pisafloros.

LEGEND
A - Youth Centre
B - Curato (priest's house)
C - Church
D - Plaza
E - Butcher's stand
F - Government building, jail
G - New Federal School
H - Old Federal School
I - Health Centre (Government)
J - Catholic "hospital"
K - Diesel Generator
L - Swimming Hole
M - Catholic (Private) School
--------------- Water pipes

Map according to Ron Greely

Chapulhuacan
met (see page 29) by the state governor only two years later, probably as a result of the economic importance of the town. All trade in the area at that time was conducted by barges along the Moctezuma river which flows towards Tampico, and Pisafloros had become an important commercial centre. In fact, it is reputed to have been about four times as large at the beginning of the century as it is today.

A general social development during this period, which reflects a wider trend in Mexico at the end of the 19th century, was the concentration of land ownership. Many of the smaller landowners sold their land or lost it as a result of the forfeiture of debts. Consequently, one family by the name of Alvarado slowly gained control over a large area of land, mostly along the Moctezuma river. They also built a huge stone mansion in the present hamlet of Plan de Ayala which became the residence for their hacienda, called Turin. Together with the Rubios, they were well represented on the municipal government during the last decade of the previous century and by 1900 Evaristo Alvarado had become a local political boss or "cacique" in a much larger region than Pisafloros itself.

The Mexican revolution of 1912 to 1917 brought the first bloody social conflicts to Pisafloros. Several armed bands, including the followers of Emiliano Zapata, the famous agrarian peasant leader, reached the valley of Pisafloros. However,
the first real military campaign occurred during the 1913 coup d'etat of General Huerta in Mexico City. Evaristo Alvarado of PisaFlores had supported the right-wing General Huerta, which brought him into direct conflict with those who supported the rebels under General Carranza. Nicolas Flores, a native son and future governor of Hidalgo returned to PisaFlores as a general of Carranza to oppose those who had supported Huerta. He burned down a large section of the town, including a sugar cane factory and the house of Evaristo Alvarado. With the eventual victory of Carranza in 1917, most of the possessions of the Alvarado family were confiscated and the hacienda of Turin was taken over by the state government for future donation or sale to political supporters or veterans of the revolution. This land is now the ejido, or state-controlled land for peasants in PisaFlores; and the management and distribution of it, up to recently, has been a heated issue in local politics.

After the armed conflicts and the consolidation of a new government which, up to today has continued to implement the so-called peaceful phase of the revolution in Mexico, PisaFlores entered a long period characterized by factional disputes or family feuding. Many of these disputes involved an opposition between agrarians and conservatives over the legal status of the confiscated hacienda and the conflict spread to many surrounding towns and hamlets. These same opposing fac-
tions also fought over several other issues, resulting, on two occasions, in the calling in of federal troops.

Throughout this century, the economic importance of Pisaflores declined and the population shrunk to almost half of its original size. This probably was caused by several factors; the destruction of the only small-scale industry during the revolution, the building of a highway along the tops of the mountains in 1934 which replaced the river as a channel of communication, and the disaster of heavy flooding in 1945 which destroyed many fine homes and a great deal of merchandise stored in these buildings. The resultant isolation was in part removed in 1958 when work was started on a dirt road that was to connect the town to the national highway. This road was completed in 1969 and has again stimulated the local economy.

C) The economy of the Pisaflores valley:

Most of the economy of the Pisaflores valley today revolves around the production of maíz (corn) and sugar cane. Little sugar cane or "caña" is grown outside of the valley while coffee, the second major cash crop of the municipality only grows well at higher altitudes, in villages not included in my study. In fact most of the produce of this coffee area is sold in towns along the national highway.

The level of technology in the region is very low. The more level, fertile bottom of the valley is cultivated with oxen and a wooden plow. Since there is very little pasture,
these animals are brought in from hamlets situated in the surrounding mountains. The rest of the valley, which has a very uneven surface, and the slopes of the mountains, are cultivated by means of slash-and-burn methods. The most common tool used for most of the operations involved in this process, as well as in the cutting of firewood, is the "wingaro", a short curved machete with a wooden handle. This is said to be particularly effective in uneven, rocky soils. The long machete is rarely used here.

Little of this rocky soil is suitable for frijol or beans, which are normally grown together with maiz and chile in other parts of highland Mexico. A type of squash, called calabaza, completes the three staples associated with the traditional Mexican subsistence complex. There is no irrigation or use of fertilizers.

Mules and horses are used for transportation and may replace oxen in plowing operations. There are few cattle, however, and for the most part they graze freely where they can. Every household is of course at some time or other provided with a few chickens or pigs. Human dwellings range from a simple stick hut with a thatch roof to adobe or cement structures with tin roofs. These may be surrounded by a stone patio used in the rainy season. Although many movable items are home-made, pottery, most clothing, and agricultural implements are imported from other areas and sold in the local stores or a weekly outdoor market.
The sugar cane grown in the valley is processed by passing the cane stocks through two metal wheels revolved by means of mules. The resulting sap squeezed from the stocks is boiled in a vat with a metal bottom and then poured into molds at the appropriate temperature. These contraptions, which represent a considerable capital investment by local standards, are called the *trapiche* (the cane squeezer), and *caldera* (the kiln and vat, covered with a thatch roof). Together they are referred to as the *molienda*, and the crude sugar that hardens in the molds is called *pilon*. Pilon is commonly used with boiled local coffee as well as in the preparation of sweets. It is also the main raw material used in the illegal distillation of cane liquor. There are several stills in the area although most of the *aguardientes* is bought from a government approved factory in another municipality. It should be noted that the making of pilon is a short period of peak employment requiring several days of 24 hours a day work.

Unlike many other areas in Mexico, corn can be harvested only once a year and must be carried out to other areas to be stored. In Pisaflorres it will turn to a powder after several months because of the very hot and humid climatic conditions of the valley, which is situated only 250 meters above sea level and is considered to be an extension of the coastal "Huasteca" region. Thus most of the corn produced in the valley is sold for cash, even if it is to be later
bought back for consumption. Needless to say the price of corn, as well as such other staples as beans and coffee, fluctuate considerably according to season and supply.

Because of the limited agricultural capacity of the valley as well as an absence of other forms of employment, many people migrate seasonally to find work in other areas. Only the very well-off and those who are engaged in such year-round activities as sandal-making, carpentry, mule driving or petty commerce stay at home all the time. The latter are all local handicraft occupations. Some men return from the city as bricklayers or masons and may find several years of employment in the locality in the construction of such government sponsored projects as schools, water tanks, or in the construction of houses or chapels. I have prepared the following chart in order to give some idea of the yearly cycle of work and migration in the Pisañores valley:

**June:**
From the 25th of June to the end of July maiz is sown, depending on the time of arrival of the first steady rain after the dry season.

**July and August:**
From about two weeks after sowing on, the milpas are weeded by hand (descardar), preferably twice. At this time there is also some work available in the cotton plantations on the coast. However, most peasants or "campesinos" alternate between working in their own milpas and doing the same work for others in order to earn cash.

**September:**
This is the worst part of the rainy season and the month when the river Moctezuma and the smaller streams in the valley flood, sometimes making it impossible to reach the
October: This is the end of the rainy season but still a slack period. Many leave to work on construction sites in Mexico City. Others pick cotton near the coast.

November: More work is now available in the Huasteca area of San Luis Potosi, a neighboring state, picking oranges. Others visit the corn fields to check that the crop is not being damaged by birds or insects.

December: In this month everybody is kept busy with the harvest, although this may be put off until as late as January.

January and February: After finishing the harvest, there is work to be done in the cane fields, cutting stocks. This may last for the following two months. Others start to clear new fields for corn by cutting down virgin forest. A special permit is needed in most cases from the forest inspector.

March: Some leave to find work in Mexico City, returning in May.

April and May: This is the period for work in the moliendas. Most of the campesinos, however, go to find work in other areas, including Valles and Tamaulipas or clear their milpas of brush and weeds, grown in after the last harvest.

June: This is the last month for preparing one's fields for the sowing of maiz. The level lands are ploughed (barbecho) while other fields may have to be further cleared of weeds and small saplings by hand.

Although several possibilities for migrant work are available, many people only leave the valley for one period of time, either just before or after planting and weeding their milpas. In some cases a person may decide to skip a harvest entirely in order to dedicate himself to full-time wage labour in the city for a longer period of time. If he is lucky enough to find permanent employment he may decide to move for good and send home money to his relatives.
Since there is a shortage of land and a hesitancy on the part of landowners to rent out land to sharecroppers, there is considerable pressure to leave the area, especially in the case of able-bodied young men. This tendency will probably increase as more landowners follow the example of those who have started to plant special grasses for pasture in order to invest in cattle.

One can also better understand the attraction of city life when one looks at the differences in salaries between the two places. Wages in the Pisafloros area have risen from 4 or 5 pesos ($0.40 US) to 8 or 10 pesos a day over the last ten years, partially as a result of shortage of labour associated with migration to the city. In Mexico city, on the other hand, an unskilled labourer can earn as much as 20 pesos a day ($1.70 US). Another reason is the low standard of living in Pisafloros. Apart from the inconvenience of numerous diseases in an area which lacks medical facilities, there is widespread undernourishment and inadequate housing, even by local standards. For instance a house-to-house survey done by a group of Mexican students in 1969 indicate the following facts:

In March, 1969, there were 102 men who earned from $6 to $9 pesos a day; 26 men who earned $4 to $6 pesos per day; 9 men who earned $2 to $4 pesos per day. Out of 141 men, 39 did not have fixed and daily work. Sickness was another problem investigated by this survey, enumerating the principal
diseases which were found to be; tuberculosis (10 cases), intestinal infections (30 cases), rheumatism (34 cases), colds and other sicknesses (74 cases). Thus out of a total population of 892 there were 148 visibly ill.

The same study also included various statistics on the diet of the people, the general standard of dress and types of housing. Out of 163 families, 69 had an adequate food intake of coffee, tortillas, chile and beans every day as well as supplements such as milk, eggs or meat from time to time; 73 had a "regular" intake of only coffee, tortillas, beans and chile; 15 had a poor diet of only tortillas with chile and did not always drink coffee; and 6 families sometimes did not eat for several days at a time. Out of 166 families, 56 had complete clothing, consisting of shirt, pants, sandals and a hat, all in good condition; 79 had "regular" clothing of pants, shirt, sandals and hat, but with patches or signs of wear and tear; 28 had insufficient clothing (they lacked one or more of the above items); and three families wore nothing but rags. Out of 168 families, 32 had good housing (made of adobe, with a cement floor and tin roof); 69 had regular housing (adobe walls, dirt floor and thatch roof); 59 had poor housing (stick hut with thatch roof); and 8 lived in huts in extremely bad conditions. Many of these dwellings only had one room where two or three families might be
living together with their household animals and poultry.

Unfortunately this survey did not provide any information on the cost of living. In my own interviews I found that the price of corn that year varied from $1.20 to $2.90 pesos per "doble"\(^{17}\) and frijol from $2.50 to $6.00 for the same quantity. At that time chicken cost 7 pesos per kilo. These prices were somewhat higher in the surrounding hamlets. A doble per day for a family of two adults and two small children was considered an average consumption of maiz with a great deal of variation in the estimation of other items. One peasant with two very small children actually made an account of all his expenditures on frijol, chile, coffee and pilon in a whole year. He told me that this came to about $1,700 pesos. He had produced enough corn in his own milpa to meet this need and probably had something left over on the side. This means that if a family of that size were to have to buy all of their corn, as well as the other staples, and have no expenditures for clothing, entertainment or medical expenses, the head of the family would not even be able to meet his subsistence needs through full-time wage labour.\(^{18}\)

D) Major institutions, systems of land tenure and sharecropping, and peasant organizations

The first institution that one should mention in dealing with rural Mexico is the Catholic church which has a great deal of informal control over most of the middle
and lower range of community members. However, there are still traces of church-state conflict from an earlier period of Mexican history. The importance of this fact for our study is that anti-clericalism can, on occasion, become an aspect of factional disputes between those formally in power and their opponents, when a priest becomes politically involved. For the most part the church, at least in Pisaflores, is supported by outside funds and acts as a type of relief service for the poor of the parish, apart from its more ritualistic functions.

The municipal government, consisting of a president, five council members and their respective suplentes or place-takers are elected every three years (formerly annually). Since there is only one official party in the area, as in most of Mexico, it would be better to classify this as an appointment by the state government with some feedback from the most influential citizens on the local level. The municipal president, whose suplente usually acts as vice-president, has most of the administrative or executive powers as well as some minor judicial functions. Other important officials, all directly appointed in Pachuca, are the tax collector (recaudador de rentas) and the local judge (for criminal law). In Pisaflores these roles are performed by a single official who has his own separate office. A minor judge, who takes care of most civil cases, the police, and the secretary, as well as other minor officials are all
chosen on the local level. The most important posts are
normally rotated among the most prominent families of the
area and it has not been uncommon for these officials to
enrich themselves through the collection of bribes or the
confiscation of properties from persons in debt.

Two types of taxes are collected in Pisaflores. One
tax, for the ownership of rural and urban property is col-
lected in the municipal office in Pisaflores itself. This
office also charges a standard fee for certificates
of birth, marriage or death. Another payment on cash crops,
such as sugar cane and coffee is handled by another office
in a different town outside of the municipality. It used
to be located in Pisaflores but was changed to another
location when an official in Pisaflores failed to perform
her obligations in time. This enables many cultivators to
make false reports on the sale of their crops since it is
very hard to verify or check such reports. Moreover, a
legal dispute over the exact state boundaries provides an-
other excuse for not making this payment at all.

Rules concerning ownership, usufruct or rental proced-
ures are not as straightforward as other aspects of economic
des in Pisaflores. Differences in official rules, embodied
in written laws, and local customary procedures sometimes
create contradictions and both systems can be manipulated to
a certain extent to serve self-interests. I will briefly deal
with land tenure, sharecropping arrangements and several local customs concerning the use of labour or harvests as collateral for monetary loans.

There are basically two types of land tenure in Pisa-flores. I will first deal with communal tenure in the form of the ejido. The ejido is an institution modelled after the Indian community and forms the basis of Mexico's agrarian reform. The ejido of Pisa-flores comprises about 1605 acres created through the expropriation of the hacienda of Turin. Officially this land belongs to the town of Pisa-flores and all landless families are eligible to use it by joining the ejido. In fact only about 70 families are members of the ejido and some of these own private property elsewhere. The allocation of land is very inequitable for those who control the administration of the ejido have appropriated the best areas.

The rest of the valley is private property, officially known as _pequena propriedad_. Legally, ownership is indicated through land titles or deeds and such owners are taxed every year, according to assessment. However, most rural properties are not well documented, resulting in much ambiguity and inaccuracy. Furthermore, many properties are registered under several names in order to remain within the legal limits of size per family. According to local custom, fruit trees and certain permanent crops, such as coffee, may be
owned apart from the land on which they are grown. To make matters even more complicated, there are properties whose titles are in the name of persons long since dead but whose taxes are still being paid by a third party.

In attempting to discover who owned various pieces of land, I found that it was much easier just to ask the neighbours who owned them. The owner, according to local informants is he who pays the taxes on a property and therefore also has full rights to use it or to rent it out. This belief is the result of a widespread practice, whereby the person who has a legal title sells his property without proper documentation. In many cases the new owner simply receives the old title and continues to pay taxes in his name. Such properties are even bequeathed together with the original titles. Such contracts, simply based on good faith are made in this manner because the official transfer of titles and re-registration should be done in Jecala, in another municipality. Both the legal costs and the transportation involved are costly, and thus dispensed with.

These practices result in great discrepancies between legal ownership, according to official records, and actual ownership, as recognized in the community. Such discrepancies become heated issues in cases where the ownership is in dispute. The following anecdote provides a good example: "A" legally owns a certain property. In 1960 he is fined a
large sum of money by the local authorities for some misdemeanor. "A" cannot raise the money and a local judge, "B", offers to pay it for him and accepts the title to the property as collateral. "A" dies before being able to pay back his debt and "B" continues to pay the taxes on the property in "A"'s name and actually takes possession of the land. Seven years later "A"'s son, "C" decides to claim the property and accuses "B" of theft. However, "C" cannot afford a lawyer and "B" simply destroys the original title and prepared to have the property registered in his name on the basis of long-term occupation. "C" then attempts to shoot "B", but fails and leaves town.

There is one restriction to the use of land, however, that applies to all properties, no matter who owns them. Pisaflor es is a region with many forests that are rapidly being depleted because of overcultivation by slash-and-burn methods as well as the cutting down of trees for local building materials and firewood. The federal government has therefore assigned a forest inspector to regulate the cutting down of virgin timber as well as the clearing of new brush. Each landowner must obtain special permission to have part of his land cleared for cultivation and pay a small fee. More trees can be cut down, however, for a handsome bribe.

Private property may be rented from the owner for a flat rate of 100 pesos per doble of corn sown, if the area rented is fairly large. However, most peasants must share-
crop for one fifth of the harvest. This system is called la quinta (the fifth). Since one doble of corn seed produces two cargas of ears of corn (called mazorcas) on the average, the rental fee for sowing five dobles of corn would be two cargas of corn.

The renting of oxen and plough is another matter. Only the rich can afford such an arrangement since the oxen are usually hired by season. They must be fed and cared for apart from the fixed payment of rent of 300 pesos or 6 fanegas of corn. Such a capital investment is only possible in the case of a fairly substantial cash crop; at least 40 or 50 dobles must be sown. At certain times, these oxen may be sub-let to another person for a single day, even if they are to be used in fairly inclined land. Whoever is using the oxen is responsible for any maltreatment or the cost of an ox should one die under his supervision. This is a commonly accepted local custom.

Another important aspect of the local economy is the earning of interest on liquid capital, or money. Monetary loans from outside sources are almost impossible to obtain, even for the rich, because of a lack of credit facilities in the area. However a person with some cash can obtain lucrative returns if he lends it locally in the form of advanced payments. This may be done in two ways. First of all, a merchant or landowner with extra cash may offer to buy someone's corn crop, long before the harvest is collected.
Many peasants are forced to do this when faced with an unexpected cash expense. This advance payment, however, is usually less than half of the lowest market price of corn, for a doble of corn cannot be sold in advance for more than $0.50 (pesos) or 50 pesos per hectolitro. In some cases this same corn may be bought back for three times that price.

Another way of investing one's money is to offer to enter a joint venture with a peasant who has no money, in the cultivation of a corn crop. The peasant invests all the necessary labour in the milpa and the other person advances him enough money so that he can feed his family. This may take the form of a wage, to be paid back later. If necessary, the money lender may also pay an extra labourer during peak operations. At harvest time, the produce of its monetary value is equally divided between the peasant and his partner. However, the peasant must use his share to pay for half of the cost of renting the land, half of the cost of labourers and half of the credit that he has received in the form of a wage. This arrangement may also be made with the owner of the land himself. In this case no rent is charged, since the land itself is part of the landowner's contribution. However, this rarely happens, since sharecropping on a regular basis is a better deal for the landowner than forming such a partnership with the
peasant. In fact a landowner will only do this as a
favour. 29

Such joint-ventures are called **mediera**. One can also
say that the two partners go "a medias", which means half-
and-half. The underlying principle is that each party pro-
vides half of the costs and receives half of the harvest.
This is in fact so when two peasants of approximately equal
social standing actually share the physical labour, the
cost of an extra labourer during peak operations and other
costs. However when a money lender or any well-off person
cooperates in this manner with a person who can only offer
his own labour, the former always ends up making a profit
at the expense of his partner. 30 The same system is used
in the processing of sugar cane. A peasant who has managed
to grow some sugar cane, but lacks the necessary capital
equipment and money to process it, may have his cane stocks
processed into pilon for half of the pilon made. The owner
of the equipment will only do this if his share can be sold
for a value higher than the cost of processing twice that
amount. 31

Two organizations represent the interests of the pea-
sants in Pisafl ores and offer alternative ways of production.
One is the government controlled agrarian league which is
closely connected with the ejido administration. The other
is a private union, although its membership overlaps with
that of the first. Because these organizations were involved in most of the factional disputes that I will analyze in this thesis, I will describe them in more detail here:

(i) The private union:

The private union is officially an organization formed for the purpose of raising agricultural productivity through cooperative projects as well as improving the living standards of its members. It is legally known as the *Unión de Campesinos de la Huasteca S.A.* and has loose connections with a Latin American Christian peasant organization called the *Confederación Latinoamericana Sindical Cristiana.* It also belongs to the *Movimiento Social Campesino,* a type of radical Christian organization founded in Mexico City in 1969. The local union was started by Jesús Sanzch, a Catholic priest, who used the organization both as a means of implementing his various community projects and also as a source of support in his struggle with local municipal authorities, who did not agree with his plans.

At the beginning the union counted almost fifty members in Pisaflores alone, as well as many smaller groups in the surrounding hamlets. The majority of these union members were simply supporters or friends of padre Sanchez. They were given preference in working on a farm he had bought and were also given food rations provided by several outside organizations in return for voluntary labour on the road and other public projects. At one time the union was also in-
volved in a type of credit union and a cooperative house-
building project, both of which were complete failures.32

Apart from these more general projects, an agricultural
cooperative, especially for the campesinos, was formed in
order to make cash production more profitable. This co-
operative is supposed to work as follows: Unlike individual
enterprises, a common plot of land is cultivated by all of
the members of the cooperative. Each member contributed
his own labour and, in some cases, cash payments. One may
also send a paid worker as one's share in the labour. The
harvest is then supposed to be sold and the profit invested
in fruit trees, irrigation or another crop. In the case of
the Pisaflores cooperative, however, the harvest has usually
been divided among its members according to their investment.
Only about twelve members of the union ever had sufficient
resources to join this venture. On several occasions they
worked this way on Padre Sanchez' land and more recently, on
a property lent to them free of rent by a lady from Guadala-
jarara. The cooperative has continued to operate even when
most of the other members of the union left the organization.

(ii) The government union:

The government union or agrarian league of Pisaflores
is the official organization of those peasants who are
given the right to work without paying rent in the ejido.
This land is administered by a special committee, consisting
of a president or *comisariado*, a secretary, and a treasurer as well as a vigilance committee which is supposed to keep its eyes on these executives. All of the members of the ejido (ejidatarios) automatically belong to the Federación Nacional de Campesinos (CNC), a peasant league closely connected with the official party of Mexico, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI). Unlike most other ejidos in highland Mexico, individual family plots have never been measured and given titles, partially because of the legal costs involved and in part because of the variety of terrain. It has also not yet been completely arranged in its other legal requisites, although the land has definitely been granted to the town by presidential decree.

Another ejido, within the district, called Garbato, was formed at the same time as that of Pisaflores. It has a completely independent executive. Although Garbato is also situated in the same municipality and was carved out of the same hacienda, it lies outside of the scope of this thesis, because it is located outside of the area delineated for this study and has little contact with Pisaflores.

All of the ejidatarios pay a flat rate fee of five pesos a month for administrative costs, regardless of how much they produce, even if they just use the ejido in order to collect firewood for their personal use. Although specifically designed for the landless peasants, many of the members of this ejido also own private land in other locations.
In fact, of the 70 odd members, many are relatives of these landowners while the actual number of poor, landless peasants is only about thirty. The official representative of the CNC in Pisaflores, who also helped to legalize the ejido and still exercises a great deal of influence over its affairs, is Leopoldo Rubio, who is now 80 years old.

F) The Class Structure of Pisaflores:

Because of the complicated nature of sharecropping arrangements as well as the coexistence of two types of land tenure, I will base my class analysis solely on the criteria of access to labour. I found that this was particularly useful for distinguishing class differences among those peasants who do not own private land. However, I will also show that this criteria is related to access to various means of production, including land, money, capital equipment and animals. Access to labour includes the following three possibilities:

1) The hiring of labourers, primarily for a contractual wage.
2) Self-employment.
3) Participation in wage labour, either in the local area or outside of Pisaflores on a migrant basis.

On the basis of these three criteria, I assigned the population of Pisaflores to the following six classes. The term "work" refers to participation in productive activities.

1) Those who regularly hire workers but who do not
regularly work themselves and never work for a wage.

2) Those who regularly hire workers but also themselves work on a regular basis, but never as wage-labourers.

3) Those who are basically self-employed and do not engage in wage labour but sometimes use hired help.

4) Those who are primarily self-employed in the valley but also engage in wage labour, mostly outside of the area on a migrant basis. This class may sometimes hire some part-time labour.

5) Those who basically work for a wage, both in the valley and outside of the area. This class, however, may also work for themselves on a part-time basis.

6) Completely full-time wage labourers.

Since I could only assign a few cases to the last category of full-time wage labourers, I decided to combine categories 5 and 6. For, nearly all of those agricultural workers who worked as wage labourers, also grow some corn, however little, on the side for subsistence. Because of the practice of advanced payments and the high rate of rent for land, I think that one could argue that such peasants are actually a disguised proletariat.

I found that the following features of land ownership or access to other types of capital were associated with each of these categories, giving a clearer picture of the economic basis of the class system of the region:

My first class (1) is characterized as follows: they rent land to at least 15 sharecroppers if they own land and if they do not, as I found in two cases, they themselves rent
more than 124 acres. Their own harvest, apart from that of their tenants, is more than 80 fanegas of corn on the average. Most of the members of this class also have investments in sugar cane or coffee (outside of the valley) or in such capital goods as moliendas, cattle and stores. A few also own trucks and use them to make a lucrative business from transportation along the dirt road and between the small towns along the main highway.

My second class (2) displays the following features; some members of this class own land, but not enough to rent it out to more than ten sharecroppers. Others sharecrop themselves but with the aim of selling their harvest for a handsome profit. Many of this class also grow sugar cane, with hired help, and own most of the necessary equipment to process the stocks into pilon. They also process sugar cane grown by other peasants. Many also have invested in small commercial ventures.

My third class (3) is highly correlated with a certain number of local occupations. For they include most of the local artisans, such as sandle-makers (huaracheros), mule-drivers (arrerios and fleteros), carpenters (carpinteros), bakers (panaderos) as well as some petty merchants, all of whom have access to the means of their own production. This includes such capital equipment as a workshop, tools, a bread kiln or mules. Some of these artisans also make a
milpa, for which they usually hire some seasonal help. This class also includes master masons (albaniles) since they receive money for their work sufficient to hire helpers, thus more resembling contractors than labourers. However, part-time shoe-makers or mule-drivers who do not own any of their equipment or animals, and who work for other artisans during peak periods as well as working as day-labourers in the fields, are not included. Most of the members of this class are found in the main town of Pisafloros and only rarely in the surrounding hamlets.

My fourth class (4) for the most part includes campesinos, or peasants, that is, people who make their living by working on the land. Almost all of them are sharecroppers who dedicate most of their time during the corn season to working in their own milpas. Many have pigs as well as chickens and grow some sugar cane or some beans as well as corn, or have done so in the past. They may participate in a form of cooperative labour, measured in monetary terms, although it is equally possible that they may work for a few days for a rich man and then hire a poor man themselves. They generally sow between 10 and 15 dobles of corn. In two cases, members assigned to this class actually owned a very small plot of land themselves, but worked there completely by themselves and did not rent it out at all. Most of them also work outside of the area.34
My fifth class (6 and 5 combined) own nothing apart from the most basic household necessities, and usually only sow between 2 and 8 dobles of corn. A few members of this class also have other part-time occupations, apart from working in the fields, but most of them must migrate to find work in the off-season, as well as spending more than half of their time in the valley working for others. I never met anyone in this class who had not, or was not planning, to grow some corn on a tiny plot, rented from a local landowner.

Thus, although my class analysis was solely based on labour, I hope that I have shown that this criteria relates to access to land or other forms of capital, which enable one man to hire workers and forces others to sell their own labour. A close examination of the characteristics of these class categories also shows the economic basis for the differences between two classes of employers and two classes of largely self-employed persons. For the differences between class (1) and class (2) seem to be largely related to the different scale of their operations, while class (3) and (4) are distinguished by access to the means of production, in turn related to type of occupation; which enables the artisans to work for themselves year-round in their home town but obliges the fairly independent share-croppers to seek work outside of the area.

For the sake of simplicity, especially in referring to
these classes in the rest of my thesis, I have labelled these classes of Pisaflures as follows: landowners (1a), the rich peasants (1b), the artisans (2a), the middle peasantry (2b) and the poor peasants (3). I have assigned the numbering system, 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b and 3 for use on my statistical tables. This at least roughly indicated the three main divisions on which my class analysis is based.

Apart from these classes, there is another residual category which I have decided not to include in my class system. These are a few merchants who do not own land or engage in agricultural activities in the Pisaflures area. They have all come from elsewhere and may own land or employ labour elsewhere. However, they only live and conduct part of their business in Pisaflures. I will refer to these in my charts as simply "M".

Since the model of the social structure, abstracted from reality by the social scientist, should have some bearing to the way that the people investigated themselves perceive their society, it is useful to analyze the way in which various folk concepts prevalent in Pisaflures, correspond to the different social classes, which I have outlined above.

In general, the people of Pisaflures use a rather loose and ambiguous set of categories for defining different economic groups. Elements of both occupation and stratification were included in many concepts. In many cases people were
named by occupation, regardless of whether or not they worked for themselves or for somebody else. At the same time class differences were distinguished by the use of the adjectives poor or rich. However, most of the classes I described were designated by local terms.

The landowners were locally known as terrenientes (landholders) or as grandes agricultores (big cultivators). Some of the poor peasants even called them puros ricos (completely rich). The rich peasants were labelled pequenos agricultores (small cultivators) or campesinos ricos (rich peasants). Some of my informants mentioned that members of both of these upper classes have "capital" or that they have something left over after their work ("los sobras"). The artisans were called "los que tienen su oficio" (those who have a trade) or as "campesino-ruarachero" or "campesino-arrriero", etc. Those who work primarily for a wage (class 3) were commonly referred to as "campesinos pobres" (poor peasants) or as "peones del campo" (labourers of the land) or simply as "peones" and "puros pobres" (completely poor).

However, I could find no separate label for the middle peasants. They were also generally referred to as simply "campesinos", but not "rico" (rich), since they were definitely distinguished from the rich peasants. When I pointed out the differences in class, I was only told that they were not "peones del campo", like the other peasants. The closest
to a separate term that I heard from one informant was that they were "buros campesinos" (pure peasants). In fact I was also given contradictory answers on members of this class in my survey. Some said that they worked for a wage, others claimed that they did not and still others used the expression "trabajan puro proprio" (they work completely by themselves). Estimates of the amount of corn grown also varied to a great extent from one informant to another. It is therefore interesting that the class which, according to my thesis, is the most actively involved in local politics and the most militant in terms of class conflict, should be so invisible as a class in their own community. I think that this can be explained by an important ideological factor that overrides such small, but important differences of class within the landless rural population.

The word campesino, in Pisaflres, as in other parts of Latin America, has many emotional and political connotations. In my own case study all of the poor and middle peasants, as well as a few rich peasants and full-time labourers identified themselves with this term. This may be deeply rooted in a common situation of low standards of living, urban discrimination and the problem of too little land. I found that the ideal image of the campesino has two faces; he is poor, exploited and defenseless yet at the same time thrifty, independent and hard-working. Both of these facets are probably based on some aspects of reality.
This symbol can become a powerful slogan in local politics and is often exploited by a large variety of political leaders. The middle peasant who is faced with tremendous pressures, as I will show later, yet not completely resigned to his fate, is more likely to respond to such slogans and to identify with the poor and oppressed campesino image in his own political actions. The really poor peasant, on the other hand, tends to stress his independence as one who makes a milpa, when, in reality, he is hardly different from a full-time rural labourer.

The number of people who belong to the various socio-economic classes discussed in this section are shown on the following chart I. Since the real unit of class is the family, rather than the individual, only the heads of families are included. These are usually male but include widows and single adult females who manage their family estate. In the following chart, I have shown the breakdown of the Pisaflares population into classes. The total of the column for pueblo, together with the rancherias or hamlets, make up the total for the entire valley of Pisaflares of family heads.
CHART I: NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES OF MEMBERS IN EACH OF THE ECONOMIC CLASSES IN THE VALLEY OF PISAFLORES, HIDALGO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Pueblo of PISAFLORES</th>
<th>Rancherias (hamlets)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ib</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIb</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9% 5% 11% 5% 16% 11% 10% 11% 50% 76% 62% 100% 100% 100%
CHAPTER V - A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT

My thesis is primarily concerned with a series of disputes in Pisaflories that lasted from 1960 to 1969. However, in order to link these disputes and some of the issues that gave rise to them, to earlier events, it will be necessary to present the larger context of social conflict in the Pisaflories area since the end of the violent revolution at the beginning of this century. This will provide a background to more recent events and introduce some of the major families prominent in local politics. A general outline of the history of social conflict from 1917 up to the present (1971) will first be presented. This will be followed by a more detailed account of the actual case study of social conflict in Pisaflories from 1960 to 1969. Several charts will also be included in order to clarify this narrative.

A) General outline of the social history of Pisaflories.

(1917-1971)

I have already mentioned that the large hacienda of Turin, which had belonged to the Alvarado family before the revolution, was expropriated in 1917. This land was then used as a type of communal property of the town, until the state government of Hidalgo sold the hacienda to an outsider by the name of Francisco Nieto in the early 1920's. It was not surprising that the people of Pisaflories resisted
this outsider in his attempts to occupy this property. Francisco Nieto turned for support to Porfirio Rubio (not of the same family as the founders of Pisaflores), who was an army general, influential in the town of Agua Zarca, a village in the neighbouring state of Queretaro, and sold him part of the hacienda located near the hamlet of El Coyol (see Map C, page 144).

This event initiated a series of conflicts between Agua Zarca and Pisaflores that lasted for several decades. On the one side was Don Porfirio Rubio, who lived in Agua Zarca. Porfirio Rubio was interested in extending his influence over the entire area, including Pisaflores, and already had many political supporters in villages located within the municipality. In fact, he even had some followers in the town of Pisaflores itself. Most of his followers belonged to the legion of veterans of the revolution, an organization that he had started in the region.

The other side was represented by the defense committee of Pisaflores, a body organized for the defense of the local government and the communal lands of the village. In 1934, the politicians of Pisaflores, together with an agrarian politician from outside of the area, petitioned the government to turn the land officially owned by Francisco Nieto into an ejido. It must be noted, however, that these "agrarians" included several small landowners. The two opposing groups engaged in several armed clashes, resulting in the
assassination of Francisco Nieto and much killing. This led to the calling in of federal troops.

In the meantime, several other events helped to shape the form of a political cleavage in Pisaflores that came to a head in 1945. First of all, Leopoldo Rubio, descendant of the family that founded Pisaflores and owner of most of the flat land in the valley, became governor of the state of Queretaro. He had been a close friend of Porfirio Rubio of Agua Zarca, whose recommendation helped him to obtain this appointment. However, Leopoldo Rubio, who supported the implementation of the agrarian reforms of president Cardenas, turned against Porfirio and supported the agrarian leaders of Pisaflores.

At the same time another political development on the national scale had repercussions in the remote municipality of Pisaflores. A Catholic right-wing movement whose members called themselves sinarquistas gained the support of peasants in several villages of the Pisaflores area, especially in Xochicoaco, the former cabecera. The sinarquistas were very critical of the government that had come to power after the revolution in the 1910's and especially opposed agrarian reforms, now being implemented on a large scale under president Cardenas. Their demonstrations in the plaza of Pisaflores were dispersed by Reyes Patulli, at that time the municipal president. However, although their organization was repressed in the area, several sympathizers of
this movement in Pisaflres later became supporters of
Porfirio Rubio.

The conflict between Pisaflres and Agua Zarca,
carried over from the 1930's was re-activated by the elec-
tions of 1940 which saw a contest between Juan Andreu
Almazan and Avila Comacho on the national level. The lat-
ter, who won, was supported by Leopoldo Rubio and the
agrarians of Pisaflres. The former was backed by Porfirio
Rubio, the legion of veterans and some of the former simar-
quistas. The disagreements brought into the open by these
elections finally resulted in several assassinations in
1945.

A special government committee was sent in to keep
order and formed a provisional local government, headed by
a new president, appointed by the state governor. One of
its first acts of administration was the implementaion of
a decree from the national president, Comacho, to disarm
all civilians. The decree was very unpopular in Pisaflres
and only those opposed to the agrarians helped the committee.

A local government was again appointed in 1947 and a
relatively peaceful period ensued. Although Leopoldo Rubio
continued to play an influential role in local politics, the
old issue of the legal status of the hacienda of Turin re-
mained unsettled. This issue was resurrected by an out-
sider, approximately a decade later.
In 1958, the same year that work on the new dirt road was started under the sponsorship of Leopoldo Rubio, a photographer called Carmen Nira came to Pisaflores and decided to settle there with his wife. He came into contact with a group of landless peasants who were interested in starting up the ejido again and he decided to help them. By this time the hacienda of Turín had passed into the hands of two female relatives of Francisco Nieto. Both were widows who lived in the state capital of Pachuca, and their land was being administered by Alberto Martinez, a friend of Leopoldo. Alberto Martinez only charged rent for the cultivation of sugar cane in the hacienda and allowed a number of peasants who had been working there ever since the days of the earlier conflicts to grow corn with his permission. Carmen Nira and a small group of followers, including about ten peasants from the hamlet of El Rayo (see map C, page 144), formed a new agrarian committee and wrote letters to the department of agrarian affairs in Pachuca. They then illegally cleared part of the virgin brush in a corner of the hacienda called "La Gallería" and started to sow corn without Alberto's or the owners' permission until a forest inspector was sent to evict them. Many of the peasants who were already working practically rent-free in the hacienda were probably sympathetic to Nira and might have joined his group. However, they could
not themselves take part in this struggle because they were compadres of Alberto Martinez and afraid of losing access to their own plots.

Several years later Carmen Nira left town. Some say that he was threatened, others that he had to take care of some personal matters. In any case, the control of the new agrarian group which he had formed passed into the hands of Graciano Patulli, the son of a local agrarian politician of the 1930's, called Reyes. Sometime during this period, Leopoldo Rubio decided to support the new agrarian committee. He ordered Alberto Martinez to stop paying taxes or collecting rent for the hacienda and took the case to the government department involved in order to legalize the ejido. All of the peasants who had been working under Alberto Martinez' direction thus automatically became new members. However, all but three of the original group who had cleared the Gallera with Carmen Nira, had since left the committee and no longer took part in the new provisional ejido.

The new ejido was legalized and fully implemented during the 1960's. In the same decade, a new spurt of political activity and feuding erupted, this time largely concerned with several public work projects. This factional dispute, which is the subject of this thesis, gave rise to a political cleavage within the community similar
to that of the 1930's and 1940's. The disputes were again activated by an outsider, a strong-willed priest by the name of Jesus Sanchez, who came to Pisaflres as pastor in 1959.

With financial aid from his own family as well as various other sources, padre Sanchez started various community projects and for all practical purposes performed many of the functions usually associated with the local government. He started a model farm on some land that he bought in the area, founded a private Christian peasant union and established a parochial school, a medical dispensary, a caja popular (credit union), a water project and continued the work initiated on the new dirt road from the highway. He was warmly received and gained the support of many landowners as well as peasants in the region. Several acts, however, lost him the support of the local government officials and made him the mortal enemy of Leopoldo Rubio.

First, padre Zapada took away a great deal of prestige and influence from Leopoldo Rubio. This resulted in a confrontation with Roberto Rubio, the son of Leopoldo and municipal president from 1959 to 1964, and also led to several threats and an anonymous letter to the office of the chief of police in Mexico city. Another action that antagonized his opponents was padre Sanchez' proposal to buy part of the hacienda for his private peasant union, even though
the hacienda was legally in the process of being turned into an ejido.

Since padre Sanchez had established some close connections with several leading families in the area, an opposition between these families and a core group of supporters of Leopoldo Rubio was created. The latter, who for the most part controlled the legal offices and the ejido committee in Pisaflores, tried to oust the priest and directed all of their political energy against the peasant union started by him. They also tried to undermine the public projects associated with padre Sanchez and built by members of his private union.

Padre Sanchez was finally transferred to another parish in 1966 and replaced by another priest called Fermin Medina. Apart from the friction generated by his presence, he had antagonized higher officials in both church and state with his plans to establish a birth control centre in Pisaflores with the financial backing of the American embassy. He has periodically continued to give council and administer medicines, however, from his farm below the dirt road on the other side of the river, called "El Campoline" (see map C, page 144).

When padre Sanchez left in 1966, a bitter conflict between the private union he had started and the local government and ejido officials ensued. Between 1967 and 1969, the
membership of this union dwindled down to a mere handful. It is still operating and has continued to keep in contact with several outside organizations.

After 1969, when Graciano Patulli's term of office as municipal president ended, things more or less settled down, although a few dissident families are still very critical of the local government. That same year a change of government on the state and national levels brought several concrete benefits to Pisaflores. Several crucial projects, including the completion of the road to the river, the construction of new classrooms for the federal school and a small diesel generator for electricity have been built with their assistance. These were in part made possible through the personal intervention of Manuel Sanchez Vita, ex-governor of the state of Hidalgo and today president of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PAN). The water system and a new parochial school are also being worked on with the approval or cooperation of local government officials, with funds made available by an international development agency and personal friends of the town priest. However, underlying tensions and hostilities, as well as the economic impact of the recent introduction of cattle in the valley, may well lead to a new upsurge of social conflict.

In order to give a clearer image of the succession
and form of various cleavages throughout the century, the following chart is added. I have added a few names in this chart, not already mentioned in the above account, in order to illustrate the general continuity of family alliances in local politics. These will be dealt with later.43

**CHART SHOWING STAGES AND COMPOSITION OF POLITICAL FACTIONS IN THE VALLEY OF PISAFLORES (1917-1971)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I - 1925-1935:</th>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Defense committee of Pisaflores (agrarian)</th>
<th>Legion of veterans of the revolution (anti-agrarian)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members:</td>
<td>- Leopoldo Rubio (of Pisaflores)</td>
<td>- general Porfirio Rubio (of Agua Zarca, Cto.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reyes Patulli (president of the defense committee)</td>
<td>- Severino Carrazoo (member of legion of veterans, later its president)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Segundo Maton (recaudador de rentas)</td>
<td>- Graciano Morelos and other members of the legion from the hamlet of El Bonigu.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Luis Flores (brother of general Nicolas Flores)</td>
<td>- Francisco Nieto, owner of the hacienda of Turin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- other supporters, including agrarian peasants.</td>
<td>- other supporters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II - 1934-1940:</th>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Partido Nacional Revolucionario (official government party of president Cardenas)</th>
<th>Sinarquismo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members:</td>
<td>- same as above (Reyes Patulli is now municipal president)</td>
<td>- most of the members are peasants from hamlets outside Pisaflores, especially Xochicoco, the former cabecera.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## II (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Partido Nacional Revolucionario (official government party of President Cardenas)</th>
<th>Sinarquismo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members</td>
<td>-Joaquin Cadena and a few other supporters of Pisaflorases.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## III - 1940-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Comachistas (supporters of national candidate Avila Comacho)</th>
<th>Almazanistas (supporters of national candidate Juan Andreu Almazan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members</td>
<td>-Leopoldo Rubio and his supporters (same as above)</td>
<td>-Porfirio Rubio (of Agua Zarca) and members of the legion of veterans (same as above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Francisco Mendoza*</td>
<td>-Alfredo Mendoza*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-many former sinarquistas including Joaquin Cadena.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## IV - 1960-1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Local government (PRI-linked)</th>
<th>Catholic Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members</td>
<td>-Leopoldo Rubio</td>
<td>-padre Jesus Sanchez (pastor of Pisaflorases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Graciano Patulli (son of Reyes Patulli and until 1965 president of the agrarian committee)</td>
<td>-Alberto Lopez (his father supported Porfirio Rubio in earlier conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-local federal school teachers</td>
<td>-Francisco Mendoza*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Francisco Mendoza was the nephew of Alfredo Mendoza. This is an interesting case of two members of the same family opposing factions. Francisco Mendoza later supported padre Sanchez in the 1960 conflict against Leopoldo Rubio.
### IV (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Local government (PRI-linked)</th>
<th>Catholic Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members</td>
<td>- other supporters</td>
<td>- Alfredo Trejo and his brother Rudolfo Trejo*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NB some of the former agrarian peasants now support the private union)</td>
<td>- members of the private union - other supporters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### V - 1966-1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outward form of opposition</th>
<th>Local government and Ejido administration</th>
<th>Private union (Union de Campesinos de Las Huastecas)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leading members</td>
<td>- Graciano Patulli (now president of Pisaflores as well as ejido treasurer)</td>
<td>- Pablo Covarrubias (spokesman for the private union and at the same time member of the ejido and representative on the town council)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Teodoro Sulquero (ejido comisariado)</td>
<td>- other members of the private union, including those living in surrounding hamlets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- other Leopoldo supporters with government positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the new pastor, padre Fermín Medina also supported the local authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B) The social conflicts of the 1960's:**

The appointment of Padre Zapeda as pastor of Pisaflores in 1959 set the stage for the involved set of events that I will now outline in more detail. Because of the complexities of overlapping membership on the two peasant organizations that were involved in these disputes, as well as the numerous characters that will be mentioned, I will first present two additional charts. The first chart intro-

* There is some possibility that the Trejo family had earlier supported Porfirio Rubio.
duces the major antagonists and provides some background information on them. The second chart lists the major events that took place in chronological order.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHART OF MAJOR ANTAGONISTS INVOLVED IN THE 1960-1969 CONFLICTS (paternal family name listed first)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alvarado, Ernestino</strong> - grandson of the landowner by the same last name whose land was expropriated during the violent revolution at the beginning of the century. He is a salaried official of the municipal government, and his half-brother Armando, owns land in the valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amador, Lamberto</strong> - was a small landowner from one of the surrounding hamlets of Pisaflores. He was elected vice-president of the municipality from 1964-1967, and became a strong opponent of padre Sanchez' Catholic schools in the area. Lamberto Amador died in 1966.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Carillo, Joaquin</strong> - is the postmaster of Pisaflores and an important storeowner. He is an active member of the local parish and has also served on several committees as treasurer or secretary. At present he is treasurer of the water committee. Joaquin Carillo married the eldest daughter of Alberto Martinez and through her, inherited quite a bit of land when her father died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chavez, Fausto</strong> - was a sandale maker in Pisaflores. His mother owns a house there, in which she runs a small restaurant, and his sister works as a secretary in the local municipal office. Fausto was very active in the private union until he moved to Mexico city where he now works full-time in a factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covarrubias, Pablo</strong> - is a predominantly self-employed sharecropper. He has been the main spokesman for the private union since 1965</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as well as belonging to the ejido and serving as vice-president of Pisaflores from 1967 to 1969. His career perhaps best illustrates the political activity of the middle peasantry.

Garcia, Avel
- has a large tin-roofed house in Pisaflores but spends a great deal of his time in his brother's mansion in a small hamlet just across the river Moctezuma. He owns the boat that provides the only means of communication between the town and the dirt road and also rents land from the Rubio family in Pisaflores to cultivate corn with hired help. He has been president of the PRI, Mexico's official party, for the area since 1965, and also became treasurer of the ejido in 1969.

Hernandez, Isabel
- is a very wealthy spinster who lives in Guadalajara, Jalisco. She supported both padre Garcia and padre Velasquez in their various community projects with financial aid.

Lopez, Alberto
- who died in 1966, owned a great deal of land in various places in the municipality of Pisaflores. His family is actually from the hamlet of La Pechuga, near Pisaflores. He married the daughter of Porfirio Rubio and she now lives with their son in a large house that Alberto built in Pisaflores.

Martinez, Alberto
- was municipal president from 1952 to 1954 and again from 1964 to 1967. At one time he also managed the estate of the hacienda of Turin for its absentee owners. Alberto was once a shoemaker, who suddenly became very wealthy. He was a close friend of both Leopoldo Rubio and padre Sanchez and generally seemed to have taken a somewhat neutral role in local politics. One informant even claimed that Alberto Martinez had once been a sinalquista.
Medina, Fermin - was pastor of Pisaflores from the end of 1966 until the summer of 1968.

Morelos, Juan - is a sandle-maker who has several relatives in the area who own small properties. He sometimes plants corn but never works in the fields himself and sometimes has enough corn left over to sell. He was a close friend of Padre Sanchez and served as secretary of both the private union and the credit union.

Olvera, Abraham - is another independent sharecropper and member of the ejido who played an important role in the private union.

Patulli, Donaciano - is a member of the ejido and was elected its comisariado in 1969. Denaciano is a self-employed peasant and a part-time bricklayer, unlike his cousin, Graciano, who owns some land and operates a store and a small bar.

Patulli, Graciano - the Patulli family originally came to Pisaflores as copper-workers in the 19th century, and slowly rose to prominence in local political affairs. For example, Graciano's father, Reyes Patulli, had been an active agrarian politician in the 1930's and occupied a number of important positions, including that of municipal president, until his assassination in 1943. Graciano became involved in the ejido administration in the 1960's and was elected municipal president in 1967.

Patulli, Maria - is the president of the local water committee. She is the sister of Graciano.

Resendiz, Jose - was the first president of the private union. He also belongs to the ejido. Through a lifetime of exceptionally hard work, he has managed to become a rich peasant, employing wage labour and he has recently built a house with a tin roof.
Rodriguez, Fausto - was a newcomer to Pisaflores who had managed to save up quite a bit of money by working in the United States. He opened a store in Pisaflores and brought in an old truck. His primary business, however, was the cultivation and processing of sugar cane on rented land. He left Pisaflores in 1970 but his brother, Alfonso has taken his place.

Rubio, Leopoldo - was born in the hamlet of Pie de La Cuesta, fifteen minutes on foot from Pisaflores. He entered local politics and managed to ascend to some very important state positions, despite his lack of formal education. He became governor of the state of Queretaro in the 1930's and later occupied two other prominent positions; director of the Ejidal bank of Selaya and director of the "Patronate de Maguey", a position he still held in 1971. He is a descendent of the Rubio family that founded Pisaflores and owned a considerable amount of land throughout the valley, although much of that has recently been repartitioned or sold. He is also president of the National Peasant League on the local level.

Rubio, Lucio - is the younger brother of Leopoldo and sometimes takes care of his brother's estate in Pisaflores.

Rubio, Roberto - son of Leopoldo Rubio and municipal president from 1951-1954.

Sanchez, Jesus - was appointed as pastor of Pisaflores in 1959. He still owns land in the valley today, as well as in the neighbouring municipality of Chapulhua (under other peoples' names).

Sulquero, Teodoro - is a descendent of a prominent local agrarian politician, active in the 1930's. His father fought with Reyes Patulli against Agua Zarca and was subsequently shot. Teodoro has occupied several posts in the 1960 ejido admin-
istration and was its comisariado from 1966 to 1969. He was also municipal president in 1944. Teodoro is a rich peasant who also owns a small property in the hamlet of El Alamo.

Trejo, Alfredo — is a part-time carpenter and rifle repairman (I counted him as an artisan). His brother Rudolfo runs a small local industry; he makes cement blocks and operates a small popsicle stand in his house. Alfredo served as municipal president from 1959 to 1957 and became the official representative of the private peasant union in 1965.

Velasquez, Miguel — was assistant pastor of Pisaflores from 1967 until 1968 and pastor from 1968 until the present. During that time he has initiated a number of community development programs, though on a smaller scale than those of padre Sanchez.

LIST OF MAJOR EVENTS — 1960-1969

1959 — Padre Sanchez comes to Pisaflores as pastor.

1960 — Leopoldo Rubio orders Alberto Martinez, administrator of the hacienda of Turin, to stop collecting rent or paying taxes on behalf of its absentee owners. He also brings in an engineer to measure the boundaries of this property.

1961 — Roberto Rubio, son of Leopoldo, becomes the new municipal president.

1962 — Padre Sanchez buys a property called the "Cameline" from Alberto Lopez and tries to introduce a new breed of cattle to the area.*

1963 — Leopoldo sends petitions on three occasions to the federal department of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization, asking that the hacienda of Turin be recognized.

- Confrontation between Roberto Rubio and padre Sanchez, instigated by the school teachers; Roberto and the padre are called before the state governor.*
Padre Sanchez obtains a legal charter for his private peasant union on October 10 and the first officials are elected; Jose Resendiz, president; Joaquin Carillo, treasurer and Fausto Chavez, secretary. They organize their first cooperative.

1964 - Alberto Martinez. is elected municipal president and Lamberto Amador becomes his suplente, or vice-president.

- Padre Sanchez is host to the first group of Canadian student volunteers, who help him build a parochial school in the main town.

- The cooperative formed by the union sows a corn crop in the "Campoline". The harvest, at the end of the year, is very poor due to bad weather.

- Lamberto Amador goes to the hamlet of Rancho Nuevo to shut down a Catholic chapel which used to be a government building. (This is later reopened)*

- Padre Sanchez hears about an anonymous letter, sent to the Chief of Police; A union committee goes to Mexico city to defend him.*

- Soldiers are stationed in Pisaflores. (They are withdrawn in 1967)*

1965 - Pablo Covarrubias is elected president of the private union and Juan Morelos becomes his secretary.

- During the summer, the Canadian volunteers help to build a water system and work on the construction of the road, in cooperation with the union.

- The private union holds a meeting in the new parochial school on November 21 and appoints Alfredo Trejo as its external representative, specifically to look into the possibility of buying or renting part of the hacienda of Turin on their behalf.

1966 - On May 24, the official newspaper of the state government announces the donation of the hacienda of Turin to the town of Pisaflores by presidential decree.

- During the summer the Canadian volunteers help to build a "model house", in cooperation with the union.

- In the fall the ejido of Pisaflores is officially handed over to the municipal president, Alberto
Martinez; at the same time a new ejido administration is elected. Teodoro Sulquero becomes the comisariado, and Graciano Patulli the new treasurer.

- At the end of the year padre Fermin Medina is sent to Pisaflores to replace padre Sanchez.* The latter refuses to leave town and stays around until the following spring.

1967 - Graciano Patulli becomes the new municipal president. Pablo Covarrubias, a private union member, becomes his vice-president.

- Padre Medina improves relations with the local government, takes over the supervision of the summer program of Canadian student volunteers, and refuses permission for the private union to hold their meetings in the Catholic school.

- Abraham Olvera becomes the new president of the private union. Juan Morelos remains secretary.*

- A special meeting is held on October 1 in the house of one of the union members in order to discuss their difficulties with the local authorities and the conflict in El Caracol.

1968 - Padre Medina closes the Catholic chapel in the hamlet of Rancho Nuevo and hands over the building to the local authorities. During the summer he leaves town and is replaced by his assistant, padre Miguel Velasquez.

- Padre Velasquez begins his own projects, including the youth centre and asks the Canadian volunteers for financial aid. The union also tries to obtain financial help from the Canadians but fails.

- An attempts to improve the water system fails because of a lack of cooperation.

1969 - Padre Velasquez agrees to help the union by asking the lady from Gaudalajara to provide them with some land.

- At the end of the year, a new municipal president is elected. Graciano Patulli breaks his friendship with Leopoldo, disagreeing with the new nomination and leaves town to seek work in Mexico City. Donaciano, his cousin, is elected comisariado and Avel Garcia, treasurer of the new ejido administration.

*The exact date (year) that these events took place is conjectural.
Narrative:

The agrarians or ejidatarios of Pisaflores for the first time received some form of legal recognition at the same time that padre Sanchez informally organized his private peasant union in 1960. That year Leopoldo Rubio ordered Alberto Martinez to stop paying taxes for the absentee landowners of the hacienda and brought in a surveyor to measure the boundaries of the property, as a legal procedure necessary for obtaining an ejido. Some of my informants claimed that Leopoldo Rubio took such an active interest in the ejido at that time as a means of countering the influence exercised by padre Sanchez. This seems unlikely since the priest was also reported to still be on fairly good terms with the Rubio family at that time. However, it is possible that this did later become a consideration for speeding up the legal process. For, no less than three petitions were sent to the department of agrarian affairs in Mexico City in 1963, the same year that padre Sanchez obtained a legal charter for his private union.

According to another person I spoke to, padre Sanchez at first tried to persuade Graciano Patulli to cooperate with him in forming a private union, since he was head of the local agrarian group. This organization, at that time, did not include more than thirty members, some of whom were rich peasants or storekeepers, like Graciano himself. Graciano Patulli did not want to have anything to do with
the proposed Christian union, although a few ejidatarios
did become very interested in Padre Sanchez' proposals.
One of these was a peasant by the name of Pablo Covarrubias,
who later became the main spokesman for the private union
and a rival of Graciano Patulli.

The private union started by padre Sanchez contained
an odd assortment of peasants, storekeepers and artisans,
who were all interested in carrying out the plans that he
proposed for the material improvement of the community and
possible cooperative experiments. The group included at
least one prominent member of the community, Joaquin Car-
illo, the post master who was also a practicing Catholic.

They were not able to put their ideas into practice
until 1963 when padre Sanchez obtained legal documents for
the union, under a twenty-five year charter. One of their
first projects was a cooperative to grow beans on land
rented in the hamlet of El Coyol. This cooperative in-
cluded Fausto Rodriguez, a new-comer who had managed to
save up quite a bit of money by working in the United
States. Although they could not afford to join the coop-
erative, the poorer peasants were also attracted to the
union because of the better wages paid by padre Sanchez to
union members on his own farm, as well as the promise of
food rations and other forms of aid.

Padre Sanchez had bought two farms in the Pisafloros
area which he planned to use as models for the cultivation
of new crops and the raising of cattle. No doubt, they were also a source of earnings to cover the many other expenses he would incur. One of these farms was called the Camelina and was sold to him by a local landowner called Alberto Lopez. Padre Sanchez imported some fine cattle during the first few years of his experiments at the Camelina but most of them died because they were unable to adapt to the change of terrain and climate.

The next project of Padre Sanchez was to establish Catholic schools throughout the area. These schools were supposed to "wake up" the peasants and better their way of life. In carrying out these ideas, including the appropriation of unused public buildings in the hamlets, Padre Sanchez antagonized the federal school teachers, as well as Leopoldo Rubio, who had himself never had any real education. These tensions led to a direct confrontation.

The municipal president Roberto Rubio, accused Padre Sanchez of illegally holding religious processions, meddling in local politics and committing other sorts of misdemeanors. He then filed an official complaint with the governor of the state, leading to a summons for both of them to appear before the governor in the state capital of Pachuca. Padre Sanchez went to Pachuca and waited for the arrival of his accuser. However, Roberto Rubio didn't show up and Padre Sanchez was able to return to Pisaflor.
after several days. It appears that the former was persuaded to make trouble by the principal of the federal school. He had promised to help Roberto in his political aspirations to become local deputy, but Roberto failed to carry out his plans. The school teachers then found another supporter for their cause in the person of Lamberto Amador.

Lamberto Amador became suplente or vice-president in 1964, the same year that Alberto Martinez entered the office of municipal president. Although Alberto Martinez took a more or less neutral role in the conflict between Padre Sanchez and his opponents and was even sympathetic towards his work, his vice-president created several direct confrontations. Two of these involved violent conflicts in several of the more distant hamlets of the township, particularly in Rancho Nuevo and in El Caracol (see map C, page 144).

In the case of Rancho Nuevo, for example, the hamlet was divided into two opposing factions, those for and those against Padre Sanchez. This conflict took the form of competition between rival Catholic and government-linked schools. Since the Catholic school was built and maintained by local branches of the private union of Pisasflores, the local juez, or mayor, supported by Lamberto Amador, was pitted against the union president of that particular hamlet. Several attempted assassinations were involved.
In the summer of 1964, Padre Sanchez also invited a group of Canadian university students to visit Pisaflores and they helped to finance and build a Catholic school in the main town of Pisaflores. This project was closely associated with the union whose members had done most of the physical labour involved. That summer the union cooperative also sowed its first crop of corn, although most of the harvest was lost in December due to bad weather. Since this venture took place on the farm that Padre Sanchez had bought on the other side of the river, some of the union members had to leave the ejido, since the distance between the two properties was too great to work in both places at once.

The following year, Pablo Covarrubias, who was still an ejidatario, was elected president of the private union. He succeeded Jose Resendiz, an illiterate but well-off peasant, who had been appointed by Padre Sanchez. Juan Morelos, a sandal-maker, who also took an active role in the administration of a credit union started by Padre Sanchez, became the new union secretary. In 1965 they built a water system with help from the Canadian volunteers. Padre Sanchez also obtained food rations and tools for work on the dirt road, which had only been completed as far as the Campoline (see map C, page 144).

Around this time, another attack was made on Padre Sanchez in the form of an anonymous letter sent to the
chief of police in Mexico City. It had been sent from a rancheria called Las Moras, another place where Padre Sanchez had started a branch of his union (rumours are that the letter really came from Lamberto Amador). The private union immediately sent a committee of six members to Mexico City to counteract the slander and clear Padre Sanchez's name. This committee included the postmaster, Joaquin Carillo, Fausto Chavez and Pablo Covarrubias.

Although many townsmen tried to stay clear of the conflict between Padre Sanchez and his opponents, by remaining on friendly terms with both sides, the continuing conflict led to the demarcation of certain well-defined lines of cleavage. Apart from Leopoldo Rubio, Lamberto Amador and the school teachers, the following people became opponents of Padre Sanchez and his peasant union:

1) Graciano Patulli, comisario of the ejido and potential candidate for the coming term of office.
2) Avel Garcia, president of the local PRI and owner of the boat that crosses the Moctezuma River.
3) Armando Alvarado, landowner and political ally of Leopoldo.
4) Ernestino Alvarado, half brother of Armando, and municipal treasurer.
5) Teodoro Sulquero, agrarian and close political ally of Graciano Patulli.
6) Eutiquio Lazaro, local sheriff.
7) Several muledrivers, whose business was being threatened by the quick completion of the dirt road.

It is probably impossible to establish who else be-
longed to this faction since political alliances over local issues are largely a matter of secret alliances, personal connections and family ties.\(^{51}\) This is even more true in the case of trying to establish who were Padre Sanchez' allies. The pastor no doubt had many close friends and supporters in Pisaflores, as well as in outlying villages. However, many of these people did not publicly acclaim their allegiance for fear of the powerful Leopoldo faction and the municipal authorities. We do know that the Trejo family, and Alberto Lopez, who sold Padre Sanchez the Camelinia, were on his side.

In 1965, a union meeting was held in the Catholic school of Pisaflores in order to discuss the various problems faced by the organization. It was decided that the union needed a person to represent it to outsiders and to look for new contacts and sources of outside support. The appointment fell on Alfredo Trejo. Alfredo Trejo is a part-time carpenter and mechanic (he repairs rifles) and had once served on the town council and acted as an original promoter for the road project. Upon Padre Sanchez' suggestion, and apparently with the advice of a political opponent of Leopoldo Rubio in another region, Alfredo was charged with the task of investigating the possibility of either buying or renting the property of Maria Jesus de Garcia, one of the owners of the hacienda of Turin, on behalf of the union. This was an unfortunate manoeuvre as:
this land was donated to Pisaflores by presidential decree shortly afterwards. The matter apparently never went beyond the stage of discussion and was later dropped.

On May 24, 1966, the official newspaper of the government of Hidalgo published an announcement that the hacienda of Turin had been officially granted to the ejido of Pisaflores. Several months later the documents were officially handed over to the municipal president, Alberto Martinez, during a short ceremony that included the signing of a contract between the town and the government. About 55 people put their signature on this document, including Pablo Covarrubias, Alfredo Trejo and several other members of the private union. In this way, they showed that they supported the principles of agrarianism and the acquisition of communal land by their town, even though they were not in agreement with the policies of the actual ejido administration or the local government. On the same occasion, a new ejido administration was formed. Teodoro Sulquero became the new comisariado and Graciano Patulli, the new treasurer.

From 1966 the private union experienced one stroke of hard luck after another. They got together to build a model house which fell into disuse and gave rise to a series of legal disputes over the plot on which it was built. The credit union went bankrupt, and there were no more cooperative ventures. Many of the peasants lost both
money and labour in these ill-fated projects and grew discouraged with the organization. Only their personal loyalty to the charismatic Padre Sanchez as well as the benefits of his occasional hand-outs kept them in the union. However, Pablo Covarrubias, one of their members, did receive the nomination of municipal vice-president for the next term of office, probably as a result of the pressure exerted by the Sanchez faction. This appointment may also have been an attempt to appease the private union and Padre Sanchez. At the end of the year, however, Padre Sanchez was replaced by another pastor because of his plans to establish a birth control centre in Pisaflores, thereby removing an important source of outside support.

Padre Fermin Medina, the new pastor, was deliberately appointed in order to improve relations between the church and the local government. His arrival to town led to a personal conflict with Padre Sanchez, who refused to let the new priest take over. When Padre Sanchez finally left town, a rapprochement took place between Padre Medina and the new municipal president, Graciano Patulli. Padre Medina discouraged the participation of the church or the private union in public works and soon afterwards broke off all contact with the union by refusing to let them use the Catholic school for their meetings.

In the meantime the private union leaders clashed head on with Graciano Patulli. According to several union mem-
bers, Graciano Patulli, who was at that time treasurer of the ejido as well as municipal president, threatened to expell Pablo Covarrubias, Jose Resendiz and Fausto Chavez from the ejido and ordered them to perform twice the normal feena, or road work. The authorities, in turn, claimed that the union leaders refused to cooperate with the local government and that Pablo had tried to discredit Graciano and petition for his removal.

Padre Fermín Medina maintained the parochial school in the town but did not support the separate schools in the rancherias and even suggested that they be incorporated into the federal system. When the Canadian student volunteers, unaware of the new political situation, came to the municipality that summer, Padre Medina offered to be their host and then suggested that they should first present their credentials to the municipal president. He also received the representative of the American Embassy very coldly when this official came to check up on the progress of the local birth control centre, which the people of Pisafloros up to today only know as the "hospital up on the hill".

As a result of these political problems and the withdrawal of Padre Zapeda's support, some of the better-off citizens of Pisafloros left the union, including Fausto Rodriguez and Joaquin Carillo. Many of the poorer peasants then also quit. The private union, thus much reduced in
size and officially ignored, tried to consolidate its position by increasing its contact with members in the outlying hamlets. For example, Fausto Chavez, one of the Pisaflores members, regularly made the rounds of the rancherias with union groups.

The Pisaflores union now held their meetings in the unfinished "hospital", a cement structure of two rooms with a tin roof, and started to work together in the planting of a vegetable garden with a primitive irrigation system. This garden project lasted for two years and gave some good results. That year (1967) Abraham Olvera, an ejidatario, was elected president of the private union. Pablo, however, continued to play an influential role in the private union. On October 1 they held a special meeting in the house of Fausto Chavez to discuss their difficulties with the local authorities, and the bitter factional conflict then waging between union members and their opponents in the hamlet of El Caracol. On October 8, the union president received a letter from a Sr. Gutierrez, representative of the larger organization (CLASC) with which the private union had been affiliated under Padre Sanchez. (see page 47) He had apparently heard about some of the difficulties experienced by the local union and asked them to arrange a meeting with him in Pisaflores. I do not know if he was able to help them with anything but moral support.

Several disputes between the union and the authorities
continued in 1968, especially in the outlying hamlets. One of these involved the resurrection of the earlier conflict in Rancho Nuevo (see page 82), involving a chapel that had once been built as a federal school hut. This time the priest, Padre Medina, went to the hamlet and handed the building over to the local government. He admonished the union for their unpatriotic behaviour in criticizing the government authorities.

In the meantime, the new assistant priest, Miguel Velasquez, had started a youth centre with grudging approval of Padre Medina. As soon as Padre Medina left to serve another parish, sometime during the summer of 1968, Padre Velasquez became the pastor and initiated a program of community development projects (with the approval of the local government). That summer he also collaborated with the Canadian student volunteers. One of the projects in which they became involved was that of improving the water system. Since this project involved a factional dispute, operating within a diversified committee, I will present this case in greater detail.

The water project of Pisaflóres illustrates how any issue can become a pretext for political manoeuvring by members of the opposing factions. I have already mentioned how this project was started by Padre Sanchez in the early sixty's. It consisted of the construction of a cement tank on the side of one of the foothills surrounding the
town in order to collect clear water from a natural spring which was then sent down to the town by gravity in a series of plastic and metal tubes. Most of the physical work was originally done by members of the union. Upon completion in 1964, Padre Sanchez had formed a water committee which consisted of both union members and non-union sympathizers. The composition of the committee was as follows: Maria Patulli, the sister of Graciano became president; Juan Morelos, who was the secretary of the private union, also became secretary of this committee; and Francisca Luna, the wife of a local pig dealer, assumed the role of treasurer. Apparently the opposition between Graciano Patulli, (Maria's brother, and at that time president of the ejido committee,) had not yet fully developed. The new water system was inaugurated by a state representative and blessed by the bishop of the diocese several days later.

In 1967, when Padre Medina came to Pisaflores in order to replace Padre Sanchez as pastor, the water committee changed hands. Ernestino Alvarado, a strong supporter of Leopoldo, became the new secretary; Joaquin Carillo, who had left the private union, became the new treasurer and Maria Patulli whose brother was now the new municipal president, remained president of the water committee. Alfredo Trejo, also continued to serve as a minor official. This change took place during a meeting when several officials were absent. Juan Morelos and Francisca Luna were
terribly insulted and to this day claim that they do not know why they were ousted. The new water committee also became more closely connected with the local government due to the policy of Padre Medina, who did not think that the church should become involved in affairs other than religion. One of the first acts of this new committee was to impose a tax, according to legal procedures, on those who had had the water line connected to their houses. The tax was very high and one of the houses affected by this legislation was that of the treasurer of the former union-linked water committee.

However, the water pipes had never been put underground and they quickly deteriorated with frequent ruptures and other technical problems. (The water that came out of the taps was often hot because of expose of the pipes to the sun, and sometimes the pressure was not sufficient to bring the water up to the higher section of town, where the church and the priest's house were located.) This was the situation in the summer of 1968, when the Canadian student volunteers entered the community. Their main goal became to improve and extend the water system. It seemed like a good idea because most of the poorer people, who had done the physical work on the original project, lived on the outskirts of the town and had to walk a considerable distance to the nearest public tap at the far end of the plaza.
Shortly after the arrival of the Canadians, a meeting was held in the youth centre built by Padre Miguel Velasquez, and the president of the municipal water committee was invited to attend. During the meeting an argument broke out between Maria Patulli and Francisca Luna, the former treasurer. Thus it became apparent that the water project was a source of tensions and hostility rooted in past political events. The project was further complicated by the fact that the union, now only represented by a militant group of peasants, out of favour with Padre Medina, did not attend the meeting. In the course of the discussion about this project, it was discovered that a list of all the labour and money contributed to the original project was "lost" (but probably in the hands of the union or the old water committee), which made any kind of further cooperative work on the project almost impossible.

At this point a social promotor of the state health department visited Pisaflores. Since the community development group from Canada was supposed to collaborate with him, they attended another meeting the promotor had with the municipal president, Graciano Patulli, in the municipal building. He explained that the government of Hidalgo was willing to provide extra tubing and food rations in order to finish their water project. However, he expected the people to make up a plan and send a representative to his office in a larger town along the highway. Disagreements
between the various members of the water committee and a failure to call another general meeting prevented this proposal from ever being carried out.

The community development group from Canada, stationed in Pisafloros for the summer, then suggested a new tactic; forming a new committee with broader support. This was a touchy issue, however, since it would have meant getting the president's sister, Maria Patulli, voted out of office. The Canadians were asked to bring this proposal up at the next town meeting but they refused, pointing out that this was the responsibility of the people themselves. In the meantime the municipal president made a separate petition to the federal government for aid for the project. This, too, came to nothing. Thus, the whole subject was dropped and the water pipes deteriorated even further, well illustrated by several broken taps that sent little streams of spray into the hot, empty plaza.

In 1969, Padre Miguel Velasquez started to take an interest in the small private union and decided to correspond with Sr. Gutierrez, their only outside contact after Padre Sanchez left the area. Padre Velasquez investigated their program and discovered that the union had no clear titles to its properties, including several house-sites. Moreover, several properties lent to them by Padre Sanchez had been put in the name of other people and had now passed into the legal status of a security for his many debts.
Padre Sanchez therefore got into contact with a wealthy spinster from Gaudalajara, called Isabel Hernandez, who had been one of Padre Sanchez' principal donors. He persuaded her to rectify some of the legal matters concerning these properties since she had originally financed many of them. This especially applied to a piece of land on the other side of the river called the "Pena Colorado", which was soon registered in her name.

This land became the site for the next experiment in cooperation for the union. A meeting was called and the lady of Gaudalajara agreed to sign a contract with the union, giving them full rights to the use of her property under the condition that they work equitably. About twenty men, some of whom had already left the union, joined this project which resulted in some bitter disputes among its members. These disputes, concerning the division of the harvest, resulted in the quitting of Jose Resendiz and Juan Morelos, two long-standing members of the private union.

The following year the contract between the union and Isabel Hernandez was renewed for a five year period, although only about ten members remained in the cooperative. This contract was suddenly revoked at the beginning of this year (1971), because they failed to show up at a meeting she had called when she came to town. Today Padre Velasquez administers this land and cultivates corn with
hired help for the upkeep of the church. Several of Padre Velasquez' workers also work a part of the Pena Colorado under a contract of medieria with the owner herself.

About seven of the remaining union members have continued to work as a cooperative on land that they rent from Lucio Rubio. Padre Velasquez has discontinued his contacts with Sr. Gutierrez, the CLASC representative and no longer acts as an adviser for the union. However, one of its members, Alejandro Azuela, who brings the mail to Pisafloros from Chapulhuacoan by mule twice a week, has continued to visit the rancherias and attended a large meeting of the Movimiento Social Campesino, in the spring of 1971. Nevertheless, many people in Pisafloros, including some prominent citizens, swear that the private union has finally broken apart.
CHAPTER VI - ANALYSIS

The complex series of events narrated above will be analyzed in the following manner. I will first examine the disputes in PisaFlores during the 1960's from an anthropological perspective and relate them to the earlier factional disputes. This will include an investigation of the role of kinship alliances and personal motivation in the formation of informal, temporary political groups. I will then analyze these events at a more abstract level, in terms of the interaction of various economic classes. I will especially focus on the development of an open class conflict between 1966 and 1969. This will involve using statistical data on the class composition of the private union and the ejido in order to substantiate my hypothesis about the role of the middle peasantry in social conflicts.

I believe that both approaches have their own value and throw light on different aspects of the situation. However, I also feel that a social anthropological approach, based on the study of short-term events in small-scale societies, does not take into account the dynamic inter-relationship among different economic classes on a wider scale.

A) Analysis of factionalism:

Various factions, based on different types of alliances, can be discerned at various stages of the conflict that lasted from 1960 to 1969. The most powerful and long-lasting
faction was that led by Leopoldo Rubio. This faction was well represented on most of the important local government positions during this period and controlled the local government party. The core group of this faction consisted of the Rubio family and a number of affinal relatives of Leopoldo who also owned land in the valley. They were also supported by the Patulli family and various other individuals or groups. For example, in the early stage of the dispute, Leopoldo Rubio was backed by the federal school teachers because of a common grievance against the Catholic schools started by padre Sanchez. Many artisans and peasants were also bound to Leopoldo or to his allies by ties of economic dependence, often reinforced by ties of compadrazgo.

Most of the agrarians or ejido officials also supported Leopoldo Rubio because of his long reputation as an agrarian politician and, specifically because of the role he had played in helping to legalize the ejido. In fact one could say he was a "broker", representing the community to the department of agrarian affairs and other higher echelons of the Mexican government. (Wolf 1956) A value publicly espoused by the followers of Leopoldo Rubio was that of loyalty to the revolutionary government of Mexico, although many of their opponents accused them of betraying patriotic ideals. Nor were they always united. For, in 1969
Graciano Patulli broke his friendship with Leopoldo and left town soon after. This rift was caused by a disagreement between the two men over the appointment of municipal officials for the new term of office.

From 1960 until 1966 the Leopoldo faction was opposed by padre Sanchez and his followers. This opposition involved a series of direct confrontations. As an outsider, padre Sanchez had no relatives to support him, although his brother often came to Pisaflores to manage his various farms, especially the Campolíne. Padre Sanchez' strongest allies were people who belonged to the union that he had organized. In his disputes with Leopoldo and the local authorities, he also received support from various families with long-standing grievances against the agrarian group, as well as persons with local political ambitions. These included the Trejo family and a man by the name of Alberto Lopez.

For example, Alberto Lopez was the son of Rosalindo Lopez, who had once brought part of a property near El Coyol (once part of the hacienda of Turin) from Porfirio Rubio of Agua Zarca. His father had therefore belonged to a powerful faction opposing Leopoldo Rubio in the 1930's. It is no coincidence that Alberto Lopez married the daughter of Porfirio Rubio, and later supported padre Sanchez in his disputes with Leopoldo Rubio and other agrarians.

Not all of those who joined padre Sanchez' side, how-
ever, were motivated by old family rivalries. Joaquin Carillo, the postmaster, probably supported the priest because he was a practicing Catholic as well as a prominent member in the community. He could never have entered any influential political position in the town because of his religious convictions, which would conflict with the anti-clerical philosophy espoused by the Mexican government. On the other hand, some of the rich peasants who did not belong to the ejido probably joined padre Sanchez's union because of the prospects of higher profits offered by his cooperative. For example, Fausto Rodriguez, who joined the cooperative in 1963, hardly ever went to church. Many other peasants were probably attached to the union solely as nominal members for the hand-outs provided rather than any ideological considerations. Whatever might have been the self-interest of each person who joined this faction, they all tended to espouse the ideals of community development and Christianity.

Apart from those who were clearly allied to padre Sanchez or to Leopoldo in the various conflicts, many people took a more or less neutral role and probably had connections with both of these factions. For example, Alberto Martinez, a long-term ally of Leopoldo Rubio, also tacitly supported padre Sanchez while he was president of Pisafloros from 1964 to 1967. Such overlapping allegiances, together with isolated cases of persons who change
sides, give the factionalism its fluid appearance and indefinite boundaries (Friedrich 1970).

In fact, one could say that the Sanchez faction contained several core groups or sub-factions, held together by their common opposition to the local authorities and their common friendship with padre Sanchez. It was therefore not surprising that these various groups split apart when their leader left. Joaquin Carillo, as well as several other members who were devoted Catholics, did not want to antagonize the new priest, padre Medina. These people therefore quit the union. Several other prominent families who had supported padre Sanchez because of longstanding grievances with Leopoldo Rubio, withdrew from active participation in local politics for the time being, presumably waiting for some new source of outside support.

In 1966 a new faction, opposed to the local government authorities and the Leopoldo faction, was then formed around Pablo Covarrubias, the sole representative of the private union on the local government. The members of this faction were predominantly people who had remained in the union and sought new support from the various union branches scattered throughout the municipality. However, this new faction did have a well defined core group, including Pablo Covarrubias, Abraham Olvera, Romaldo Romero (a peasant who later became president of the union) and several other union members, bound by ties of friendship.
This network of friends, within the union, was formed after padre Sanchez founded the union, and became the basis of this new faction, led by Pablo Covarrubias.

If we look at the earlier political conflicts in the Pisafl ores valley, as well as the events of the 1960's, it becomes apparent that factions in Pisafl ores have strong elements of what Boissévain has called "parties" in his study of a Maltese village (Boissévain 1964). There has existed a lasting cleavage between "agrarians" and various opposing groups over a period of about fifty years. The different interest groups involved in this conflict have appealed to wider ideological labels and have expressed themselves through various organizations. I have already shown how this opposition took the form of rival branches of the official government party and, before that, as the armed conflict between two para-military organizations.

In the decade under discussion we have the private union and the local political party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), even though the union is not officially a "political" organization.

However, the underlying current of factionalism or non-ideological and temporary conflict, in Pisafl ores is shown by the presence of oppositions within local organizations. First of all, the ejidatarios were divided between those who also belonged to the private union and those who sided with Leopoldo. The latter included all
of the administrative officials of the ejido. Secondly, the personal rivalry between Pablo Covarrubias and Graciano Patulli within the local government council of 1967-1969 represented a division within a theoretically united and PRI-controlled town government. Finally, the division between the followers of padre Sanchez and those who supported Leopoldo Rubio had repercussions on the operation of several committees locally elected to serve the common interest of the community, such as the water committee, responsible for the maintenance and expansion of the water system of Pisa Flores.

The case of the water system of Pisa Flores, as well as some of the other projects started by padre Sanchez, is particularly interesting. I think that it is symptomatic of how the increasing penetration of community development projects in peasant villages throughout the world, has provided a new context for factional disputes. Although such projects are generally seen as important for the benefit of the entire community, the political functions that they take on may well prevent the implementation of their hygienic or economic goals. In other words, they can almost be regarded as a type of "ritual" expressing social opposition, much in the same manner as religious affiliation or political parties, resulting in the frequent failure of so many community development programs in rural areas. 61
The factional disputes I have studied in Pisafloros thus resemble those observed by anthropologists in other peasant communities. They are largely based on personal interest and temporary alliances and involve a wide range of issues, from national election to local community projects. Sometimes the participants may appeal to wider ideological labels, although these labels generally become distorted or receive new interpretations on the local level. The factional structure may also change when one of the main leaders withdraws, resulting in the recombination of alliances around new leaders and along other principles. In any case, the process involves a complex network of personal ties and common interests, sometimes extending over a large area. In general, moreover, the various interest groups tend to merge into two opposing factions.

B) The class composition of various factions:

A superficial examination of the data on factionalism in Pisafloros reveals the image of two vertically integrated segments, as described by Alavi (1965:273). The factional dispute between Leopoldo Rubio and padre Sanchez cross-cut class lines; both factions were led by landlords and rich peasants and supported by a wide spectrum of community members. A closer analysis, however, reveals that the factions led by Pablo Covarrubias in 1967 consisted primarily of middle peasants, who were well repre-
presented on the private union. (This conclusion is based on an examination of the data on class membership of those who supported Pablo.) This faction was formed several years before as a militant core group within the union who supported the local opposition, led by padre Sanchez, against Leopoldo Rubio and the local municipal authorities. They were also a majority of those who remained in the union after padre Sanchez left and led a struggle against the local government, which lasted from 1967 to 1969, albeit in haphazard fashion. This conflict was basically a class conflict of the middle peasantry against the landowners and rich peasants, both within the ejido and within the local government. It also had parallels in 1969 and in 1970 within the union itself, during the disputes concerning the harvest of the cooperative in the Pena Colorado. For, in this latter dispute, a rich peasant and a well-off artisan, who also produced a surplus corn crop with hired labour, both left the union. The poor peasants, on the other hand, did not take an active part in these conflicts, although both padre Sanchez, and later the union under Pablo Covarrubias, claimed that they were fighting for their interests.

In order to give some concrete evidence for these conclusions I have compiled the following charts, showing the class composition of the ejido and of the private union. I have chosen these two organizations because they were both
directly involved in the various conflicts throughout the
decade and because they represented all of the different
social classes on their membership. I will thus be able
to make some more general conclusion about the political
behaviour of these different classes, as shown by their
representation in these organizations. I have also in-
cluded the cooperative, which is really a sub-branch of
the private union, because it represents a stronger com-
mmitment to and involvement in the union. For, those who
joined the cooperative had to invest both labour and a
certain amount of capital, while many of those who only
belonged to the union were merely nominal members who
supported padre Sanchez. Some of these nominal members
did not go to the meetings and were the first to leave
when padre Sanchez left Pisafleres.

The following charts therefore show how many members
of each organization belonged to the different class cate-
gories. I have also calculated the number and percentages
of each class belonging to both the ejido and the union at
the same time and to the cooperative and the ejido at the
same time, as well as those who did not belong to any of
these organizations throughout the period under discussion.
Table II shows the numbers and percentages of each organ-
ization that belong to each class while table III indicates
the number and percentages of each class that are repre-
sented on each organization. (see pages 108 to 109)
A chi-square test on the numbers of individuals in columns d and e showed that class membership definitely determined whether or not a person was likely to also be represented on a peasant organization. ($X^2 = 25.99$, when significance is 13.28 when $df = 4$ & $\alpha = .01$) Class III, who are the most numerous, are the most under-represented in all of the peasant organizations, while the landowners (class Ia), who in most cases are also merchants and storekeepers, are slightly over-represented in membership even though they are not really peasants. Their representation is especially strong in the ejido (8% of total membership). This figure, however, is underestimated since a large number of relatives of these landowners, who nominally belong to the ejido and pay dues, are not included in this chart, which only includes heads of families, upon which my class analysis is based. When we compare the poor peasants (class III) with those of class Ia and Ib, both of which are basically cash cultivators and employers, we can see that 25% of the latter belong to various organizations while only 17% of the former belong to anything, although they make up 62% of the population (see chart III). Thus representation on two organizations involved in the political life of Pisaflores shows that the poor peasants were least involved in local politics, especially concerning issues directly related to agrarian affairs.

The most startling and unexpected information, how-
CHART II

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a + e)</td>
<td>(a + b)</td>
<td>(a + c)</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notes:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>These columns refer to those members who belonged to both of the organizations mentioned at the same time, even if they later quite one or the other.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>These totals are smaller than the actual number of ejidatarios or cooperative members who ever joined these organizations. In the case of the former, this is so because only heads of families in the ejido appear on this chart. In the case of the latter, I have excluded those who only entered the 1969 cooperative in Pena Colorado and didn't receive part of the harvest (see also footnote 34).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>†</td>
<td>See note under chart III, p.109.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ia</td>
<td>Ib</td>
<td>IIa</td>
<td>IIIb</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a</strong> Those who belong to the EJIDO</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b</strong> Those who belong to the UNION</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c</strong> Those who belong to COOPERATIVE</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a + b</strong></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d</strong></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a + c</strong></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e</strong> Those who belong to ANYTHING</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL (d + e)</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

* See notes under Chart II, p.108

** See notes under Chart II, p.108

† These numbers are obtained by subtracting the number of members belonging to both the Ejido and the union at the same time from the total of the combined membership of the two organizations.
ever, is revealed by looking at the representation of the middle peasantry, class IIb. They represent 27% of the ejido membership, 40% of the union membership and 60% of the cooperative. They are also a large majority of those who belong to both the cooperative and the ejido (67%). Their overall representation on any organization shows that they form 26% of all memberships. If their representation were only randomly determined by their size we would expect them to form only 11% of this category. A chi-square test on the numerical figures comparing the middle peasantry with the rest of the community according to overall representation on peasant organizations, shows this correlation to be highly significant, in other words, not determined by chance. ($X^2 = 24.61$; when $df = 1$ & $\alpha = .01$, significance is 6.64) These figures tell us that the middle peasants are more likely to be members of peasant organizations, involved in factional disputes, and also indicate that they are practically the only ones who joined not just one but two organizations, even if these organizations are in opposition. These facts support my hypothesis that the middle peasantry participated to a greater degree than other social classes in local political affairs.

We can now compare the class composition of the union and the ejido, in order to see if there is any significant
correlation between class membership and membership on these two organizations, which were in opposition throughout most of the period of factional disputes which lasted from 1960 to 1969. An examination of chart II shows that class I (a + b) represents 23% of the membership of the ejido but only 8% of that of the union, while Class IIb (the middle peasants) represent 27% of those who belong to the ejido but 40% of those who belong to the union. A chi-square test on the numerical figures did not reject the null hypothesis that this correlation was caused by chance. Thus we cannot conclude that these two organizations represent a difference of interest of the two classes examined.

However, an examination of the classes represented in the various executive positions, or the leadership of these organizations does indicate that these organizations were controlled by very different classes, especially in the later period of 1967 to 1969. The following chart is based on a list of all the terms of office of the ejido and the private union administration from 1961 to 1971:

**CHART IV: Breakdown of all important executive positions (president or comisariado, secretary, treasurer and representative) according to class and organization. Note: some of these positions were filled more than once by the same person.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ia</th>
<th>Ib</th>
<th>IIa</th>
<th>IIb</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union de campesinos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de las Huastecas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité Edjidal de</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisafloros</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chart shows that class Ia. and Ib (the landowners and rich peasants) completely controlled the ejido during this period, while the leadership of the union have, to a large extent, been dominated by the middle peasants (IIb) and the artisans (IIa). The only representative of class Ia on the union administration was Joaquin Carillo, the postmaster. He was only the treasurer for the union in its first two years, when padre Sanchez played a much more direct role in its affairs. The only representative of class Ib was Jose Resendiz, who was also appointed by padre Sanchez in the early part of the history of the ejido. Jose, as well as some of the artisans, have also since left the union. Thus we can say that the conflict between the union, dominated by a faction of middle peasant, led by Pablo Covarrubias, and the ejido, which was controlled by rich peasants and landowners who also ran the town government, did represent a conflict between these two classes between 1967 and 1969.

C) An economic explanation for the political behaviour of the middle peasantry:

The political behaviour of the middle peasantry, along the lines observed by Hamza Alavi and Eric Wolf in their broader studies, suggest that certain economic factors, which are interwoven with such elements as kinship, neighbourhood ties and other principles of group formation, are an important basis for the forms of social conflict that
develop in predominantly peasant communities. I will therefore complete my analysis of social conflict in Pisaflóres by looking at the economic reasons for the political behaviour of the middle peasantry. I think that this analysis will reinforce my claim that the middle peasantry of Pisaflóres strongly resembles the middle peasants described by Alávi, even though they do not constitute a separate sector in the local economy.

In the first place, the middle peasantry of Pisaflóres is in a very weak position vis-à-vis the rich peasants and landowners in the competition for labour during periods of peak operations. This especially applies to the weeding and harvesting of corn but may also crop up in the spring when sugar cane is being processed. Since the day labourers are already hard pressed in these periods to finish both their own milpas as well as those of their employers, they may not be able to put in an extra day for one of his fellow peasants. A poor peasant will naturally choose to work for those who provide him with credit or rent him some land. This competition for labour has increased over the last ten years because of larger migrations to the city and other areas during certain times of the year. This alternative source of cash income has resulted in a rise in wages which the middle peasants could not possibly afford. Thus a scarcity of labour forces the middle peasant to cut down his own pro-
duction, unless he can rely for labour on a number of unmarried sons. This in turn will force him to find additional sources of income.

The second, and even more important, economic problem faced by the middle peasant is the scarcity of available arable land. Since he is basically a sharecropper (or ejidatario), he will be adversely affected both by the increasing rise in rents and the growing influence of rich peasants and small landowners in the ejido. For, as the latter feel the need for more land in order to increase production or to invest in pastures, they will try to gain access to more communal land available in the ejido or make use of land otherwise rented out to various tenants.66 Since the middle peasant does not make his labour available in return for land, he will be the first target of these actions. This pressure also operates on the poorer sharecroppers; but since they grow very little and only as a part-time occupation, they are more likely to migrate or to switch to full-time wage labour. Since they already work a great deal of their time for others, and usually have financial debts to their patrons, this would not be a drastic change.

In fact the only thing that really makes the middle peasant of Pisaflres in any sense "independent" is his ability to grow enough maiz to feed his family as well as to meet at least some of his cash expenditures. Another
source of extra income available to the middle peasant, apart from migratory labour, is the cultivation of sugar cane. Although a small quantity of the pilon that he himself obtains from his harvest may be consumed, this is basically a cash crop. Now, although he can afford to invest his own labour and perhaps the cost of an extra helper at times, the middle peasant does not have sufficient capital to invest in a trapiche or a calders, not to mention the full cost of labour involved in the four day operation of the molienda. As a result he has to have his meagre harvest processed by another person and ends up losing a large part of his investment. In the past few years even those who cultivated sugar cane on a full time basis and owned all the capital equipment have found out that the declining price of pilon, as well as increasing labour costs, have made this venture a risky business. Therefore some of them have shut down their operations completely and many others now refuse to process cane stocks grown by other peasants.

Thus while the middle peasant is not hopelessly in debt or dependent on employment in the valley, as in the case of the poorer peasants, he nevertheless faces tremendous pressures from competition and the real possibility of downward mobility. This is not as true in the case of the artisans who own their own means of production. For
Despite the market system and the importation of clothing and other factory-made goods, their own services are not being threatened by competition. The sandals made in Pisaflores from leather and old rubber tires are so much more practical than city shoes and so much cheaper than heavy working boots, that the average peasant would not dream of buying the latter articles in the market place. The same is true for home-made bread and pastry, consumed on all special occasions. Carpentry, masonry and woodcutting are also indispensable services in the local economy so long as the mountainous terrain and the absence of proper channels of communication make it impossible for certain aspects of modern technology to penetrate this region.

It should not be forgotten, however, that many artisans are also part-time campesinos, usually dependent on hired helpers. Thus, they too may in part be affected by the same pressures enumerated above. This may account for their active participation in the private union. Another exception is that of the mule drivers who have been made obsolete, at least in part of the valley, by the introduction of roads and trucks. It is therefore relevant that of the several mule drivers in Pisaflores, one has now taken an active role in the small union while another is a member of the ejido executive.
CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION

OF THIS THESIS FOR THE STUDY OF FACTIONALISM

In this thesis I have refined the factional model of horizontal disputes in stratified peasant communities and examined the process whereby a horizontal dispute was in part transformed into a class conflict. I have tried to show that the distinctions between factions and parties, between horizontal and vertical cleavage and between economic and non-economic factors are by no means permanent or well-defined. In focusing on the role of various economic classes in a basically horizontal (factional) dispute, a prior theory concerning the role of one of these classes, the middle peasantry, has been tested and revised.

This phenomenon should have implications for the anthropological study of social conflict in peasant communities. If a category of peasants that may be designated as a "middle peasantry" does display the type of behaviour suggested in this paper, then it may well be worthwhile to pay more attention to the part that this class may play in other factional disputes. This can only be done by taking into consideration the class structure of the community and the position of such classes in the wider economic system.

For example, one might investigate whether the political behaviour of the tlacolol peasants described by Oscar Lewis in his study of Tepoztlan, resembles that of the
middle peasantry in Pisaflores (see Lewis 1949). Another important topic related to the form of factionalism in local politics is the influence of outside leaders and the involvement of different types of political organizations in local peasant disputes. Such studies should also be compared with cases where a more clearly defined and permanent vertical conflict has developed, involving a large segment of the poorer peasants. I suspect that such class conflicts are more prominent in areas where a large number of full-time wage labourers have developed, such as in Southern India (see Gough 1968).

At present a large gap exists between large-scale studies on the political behaviour of different social classes and small-scale research on individual manoeuvres in small communities. I believe that anthropological case studies can be used to test hypothesis developed on a wider scale. Since the publication of Nicholas' work on factionalism in rural India, many social anthropologists have been preoccupied with the testing and validity of his five criteria for defining factionalism and revising his model to fit an immensely varied number of cases. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to develop a theory that deals with horizontal disputes as only one aspect of social conflict that may well display elements of class opposition. It would then be possible to study under what circumstances
the degree of class conflict and the degree of vertical cleavage in the community is enhanced. It has been the goal of this thesis to show that the political behaviour of the middle peasantry in factional disputes is only a starting point in tackling this problem.
1. In this article (1968), Nicholas argues that whether conflict is horizontal or vertical depends primarily on the local caste demography. He states that "in situations where the dominant caste is the largest single caste group in the community, although it makes up less than half of the village population, subordinate castes have great difficulty in organizing against it and factions are the most frequent mode of political organization" (p. 318).

2. After the Russian Revolution, the spontaneous attacks by peasants against the large estates and the subsequent redistribution of land by the Bolshevik government, increased the number of independent, small peasant family farms, which Lenin called the middle peasants. Although he adhered to his model of the differentiation of the peasantry into "peasant capitalists" and rural proletarians, Lenin devoted considerable attention to the persistent middle peasants, who, according to him, "have strong economic roots owing to the lagging of agricultural techniques" (Lenin 1971a:209; see also 1971b:441).

3. The theory that the independent peasant household economy constitutes a separate economic system from capitalism has been dealt with at length by the Russian economist Chayanov (1966).

4. I was involved in a community development program with a group of Canadian student volunteers in Pisaflora in 1968, and visited the village on several occasions during the summer of 1969.

5. About 15 out of 170 names listed on the Mexican student survey were unknown to any of my informants. This means I was unable to account for 9% of these cases. I subsequently included some of these as "poor peasants", in order to compensate for the large number of families largely composed of widows as well as any later in-migration from surrounding hamlets for other than economic reasons.

6. A cuartel is the same administrative division of a village as a barrio, a term more commonly used in Mexico.

7. The hacienda is a form of agricultural estate with both capitalist and fuedal features that developed in colonial Mexico (Chevalier 1963).
These were the "Liberal reforms" of 1856 and 1862. Although meant to create a large class of small property owners, they resulted in a further concentration of ownership as a result of the break-up of communal corporation and the sale of church lands (Bernstein 1952; chap. 5, Bazam 1971).

Caciquismo or caciazgo is a political phenomenon of strong, semi-legal rule by a charismatic individual in more remote areas in Mexico and other Spanish-speaking countries. The word cacique has a negative connotation in Mexico. (Friedrich 1965 & 1968).

Nicolas Flores was descended from an Italian family who came to Pisaflores as copper-workers. He was governor of Hidalgo from 1919 to 1921. His brother, Luis Flores, later came to Pisaflores as tax-collector and one of his sisters, age 82, still lives in the town (in 1971).

The Mexican revolution began when Morelos started an armed revolution against Porfirio Diaz, dictator of Mexico since 1884, over the issue of re-election. The resulting social conflicts, rooted in a variety of economic grievances caused by industrialization and the rapid polarization of rich and poor, involved a powerful peasant movement with a sindico-anarchist ideology. After a series of internal disputes between rival generals, Venustiano Carranza emerged victorious, even after Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, two peasant leaders turned against him. One interpretation of the Mexican revolution is that it broke the power of the large, semi-feudal landed "aristocracy". (Wolf 1969).

Mexico has been ruled by a single political party since the victory of Carranza and the formation of the constitution of 1917. This party is today called the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI (Institutionalized Revolutionary Party). Its main goal is the development in Mexico through the implementation of its peaceful, "revolutionary" program.

Milpa is the name given to a corn field, whether or not the land is owned by the cultivator. Similarly, a sugar cane field is called a cañal and a vegetable garden a horteliza.
14. Wages also used to be paid in kind (corn, beans, coffee) as few years ago as 1965, on a fairly regular basis.

15. Sometimes Pisaflores is assigned a doctor by the government for a one-year period. Such doctors must do one year of social service for completion of their studies. However, the obligatory nature of such assignments, as well as a lack of confidence on the part of the people in young doctors are not conducive to the best of service. There are no doctors in any of the surrounding hamlets. Here as well as in Pisaflores, folk medicine, based on herbs and religion are substituted or complement scientific medicine.

16. This survey was done under the direction of Padre Miguel Velasquez in March, 1969. Various households were missed and the differences in totals tabulated indicate that a) not all of the questions were answered, b) that some parts of the survey were based on adults, some on family heads and others on employable males. The data on income or salary is very ambiguous since both landowners and peasants who depended largely on wage labour reported that they earned the minimum daily intake of 8 pesos. However, the survey does give a good overall picture of the social conditions of the country.

17. A doble or quartillo is a measure of corn or beans, equal to two liters. It is measured out in a small, square wooden box, known by the same name. For larger measures, various local quantities are used. The most accurate is the hectolitre which contains exactly 50 dobles. A hectolitre can also be referred to as a fanega or carga ("load") but these measures vary from region to region depending on the size of the bag used to store and transport produce. A carga in Pisaflores generally contains 70 dobles.

18. Working full-time, or 300 days for $8 (pesos) a day would give a person a total income of $2400. The cost of staples, other than corn, would come to $1700 (my informant considered what he had bought an adequate amount). If we add the price of a doble of corn per day, ranging in price from $1.20 to $2.90, this would add a cost ranging from $438.00 to $1058.50 per year. This brings the total cost of food alone up to $2138 (minimum) to $2758.50 a year. Since other expenses as clothing, housing and emergencies have not been included, we cannot expect this person to be able to
provide his family with an adequate amount of food. This example should clarify the low standards reported in the survey.

19. Officially this judge is known as "subagente del ministerio publico".

20. Both the size and the value of properties are greatly underestimated for fiscal purposes by the owners themselves.

21. The ejido was originally created in order to restore the communal lands illegally taken from peasant communities. Under the Calles government (1924-1926) the ejido was declared as a temporary institution, leading to the full development of petty private property. Under this regime a law was implemented allowing for the parcelization of ejido lands into individual plots. Later, especially under Cardenas, a large number of new ejidos were created, on the basis of need as well as legal rights. Several large expropriations even gave rise to a collective type of ejido, resembling large cooperative farms. Since 1940 this type of ejido has been discouraged in favour of capitalist enterprises and the redistribution of small ejidos to communities has also been slowed down. (Simpson 1937, Silva-Herzog 1959) Today the ejidos for the most part represent impoverished farms in densely populated parts of Mexico, whose function is more that of political control than economic development (Chevalier 1967, Stavenhagen 1970).

22. In Mexico land is measured in hectares. One hectare equals approximately 2.47 acres.

23. Literally "small private property." According to Mexican law, a person is not allowed to own more than 150 hectares or 370.50 acres of arable land.

24. All land is officially registered. However such registration is rarely based on accurate measurements obtained by surveillance. Often, a property is simply described according to outstanding features in the landscape that more or less correspond to the boundaries. Such features are usually named by some locally accepted term, such as "coloured rock", "rose-bushes", "palm grove", etc.

25. One small landowner told me that he had paid 300 pesos to the forest inspector in 1970. He rents land to about nine tenants and owns 17 hectares (41.99 acres), of which he works part himself. This did not include permission to cut down old trees.
26. The worst offenders of the forestry laws, who employ bribes, are lumber or charcoal-making companies. They also cut down large numbers of trees at night with chain saws. This has happened along the river below the highway in Pisas Flores on several occasions. In this case the bribe was paid to a special inspection office located along the highway, used by trucks transporting such trees.

27. In rural Mexico, both land rents and productivity are generally calculated as so many bushels per double sown, rather than so many bushels (or rent) per acre.

28. This is locally known as buying, or selling a tiempo (in time).

29. Let us compare two cases. In both of them a peasant sows 5 doubles of corn and harvests 10 cargas (or 700 doubles). The cost of seed at sowing time is $14.5 (at $2.9 per double) and the value of the crop at harvest time at $1.2/doble is $340.00

   case (1) The peasant himself invests all his labour and provides the seeds. The landlord makes no investment and collects two cargas of corn as rent. This rent is worth $168 when sold.

   case (2) The landowner forms a partnership (mediata) with a peasant. He pays the peasant a daily wage of $10/day and provides him with the seeds. At harvest time the crop is shared half and half and the peasant pays back half of the cost of seed and labour paid out by the landlord.

   The profit made by the landlord = his income in the form of half of the crop minus his costs (seeds at sowing and wages). His costs are $14.5 and wages ($550.00, based on the average of 11 man-days per double at $10/day for one labourer), totalling $564.5 pesos. His income = half of the value of the harvest ($420) and the repayment of half of his monetary investment $282.25.

   Total income is therefore $702.25. Profit = $702.25 - $564.5 = $137.75.

   The landowner under this system therefore makes less money than if he had simply rented out his land for one fifth of the crop and thus earned $168.

30. Let us assume that a peasant has 55 days available to work in the fields. If he can afford to also invest
in seed and feed his family during these days, when he is working for himself, he can make $657.50 (based on the same figures of cost, rent and labour investment as the previous example).

If he can only afford to spend half of this time (27.5 days) working in his own milpa, he might share half of this cost and labour of making the same size milpa with another peasant, who also puts in 27.5 days. If he spent another 27.5 days working for a wage at $10/day, he would end up with a total income of $603.75.

However, if he decided to cultivate the same milpa, in partnership with another peasant who advanced him the cost of the seed and paid him while he was working (for 55 days), to be paid back half of the advance ment and the total cost of labour (55 days' wages), he would only make $519.25.

These differences represent the surplus value appropriated by the owner of the means of production.

31. Apart from owning the trapiche and caleders, the person who wants to process sugar cane must also rent the mules (if he has none), pay the workers, pay for re-pairing any damages or breakdown in the equipment and firewood used to keep the area lighted at night.

32. The credit union or "caja popular" was started around 1956 with a loan of about 2000 pesos from a development organization. Several better-off families, including those from a large village not included in my research, borrowed money and did not repay. Consequently, the credit union went bankrupt and everyone else lost their investment, including many of the poor peasants who had been persuaded to contribute a few pesos each.

33. This only refers to people who are employers, engaged in wage-labour, or owning land but living in the valley. Thus children, housewives and relatives of landowners living permanently in the city are not included.

34. It would be interesting to look at how this class of peasants manages to avoid becoming fully dependent on wage labour in Pisafloros. It has been suggested that age, position in the family cycle and past work history might be related to their economic position. Although I did not investigate this problem in detail, I know that many individual cases indicate that no single one of these factors nor all of them combined fully account for this class. For many people of the same age, the same family position and the same history of migrant work (e.g. employment in the United States) belong to classes 5 & 6. I will therefore
take these figures as an indication of class, rather than any temporary phenomenon related to changes of fortune or age.

35. According to my informant an adult male can sow and harvest between 10 and 15 dóbles of corn by himself, if he works very hard. The help of unmarried sons may raise this figure to as high as thirty dóbles. This is rarely the case however, since at least one member of the family is usually engaged in wage labour, and also, because only a limited amount of land is available.

36. The idea that the family, rather than the physical person should be treated as the unit of class has been proposed by Schumpeter (quoted in Wolf 1966).

37. The narrative presented in this chapter is as accurate a reconstruction of historical events as possible, given the few available documents and a short period of fieldwork. It should be kept in mind that the exact chronology may not be completely accurate.

38. Lazaro Cardenas, president of Mexico from 1934 to 1940, nationalized all foreign oil companies in Mexico at that time and implemented the largest agrarian program of land redistribution since the end of the revolution in 1917.

39. Sinarquismo (literally, "without anarchy") was a political movement that developed in Mexico around 1935. Its ideology could be roughly described as nationalistic, anti-American, anti-communist, pro-Catholicism and somewhat right wing. It was related to the Cristero rebellion of Catholic elements in an earlier period. Sinarquismo seemed to be especially strong in those areas where the land reform implemented after the revolution had experienced the greatest difficulties (Whetten 1948:484-522).

40. Called Junta de Administracion Civil (Council of Civil Administration).

41. Compadres or "co-parents" are ritual sponsors on important religious occasions. In Latin America, the relationship between the sponsor and the parents of the child is more important than the relationship between the god-father and the godchild (Mintz & Wolf 1950). Such ties of ritual co-parenthood may reinforce class and ethnic lines (Van den Berghe 1966).
42. Whether or not Carmen Nira was the instrument of some political interest outside of the area is a matter of speculation. The archives of the department of agrarian affairs and colonization in Mexico City do not contain any records of the correspondence of señor Nira and one of the campesinos of Pisaflorres claims that these were confiscated by the local municipal authorities.

43. There is more continuity and overlap than indicated in the following chart. For example, the legion of veterans was still operating in 1940 and campaigned for the Alamananistas.

44. Padre Sanchez bought various properties in the Pisaflorres and Chapulhuacan area. On one of these which included a small rancheria known as the Campoline, he installed a sort of irrigation system and built a house which also served as a medical dispensary. Here, he tried to raise chickens and rabbits and sow new types of crops as an example to the people of the area. At one point he even set up a sort of agricultural school for boys from different villages in order to teach them some of these techniques. Most of these projects failed, however, and Sanchez lost a large amount of money. His brother also spent some time as manager of the Campoline. Padre Sanchez still owns cattle in the region today but one cannot say that his relation to the peasants who work his land is anything but that of a generous but paternalistic landlord who charges rent like anyone else.

45. According to laws enacted during a period of bitter church-state conflict in the 1920's, religious processions in public as well as the wearing of priestly garb on the streets is forbidden. However, these laws have not been enforced since the thirty's.

46. According to one rumour, Alberto Martinez was sympathetic to Padre Sanchez in spite of his connection with Leopoldo Rubio, because he was in debt and Padre Sanchez lent him a considerable sum of money.

47. Lamberto Amador actually went to Rancho Nuevo himself and ordered that the saints (statues) be removed from a chapel that had originally been built as a community school until padre Sanchez had a new and bigger school structure built. He kicked open the door with his foot and later developed a bad case of gangrene in the same foot and had to have it amputated. This was interpreted by the peasants as a sign of God's anger at a case of sacrilege.
This Canadian group, from various universities in Eastern Canada was part of a larger North American organization known as the "Conference of Inter-American Student Projects". In fact I first came to Mexico under the auspices of this organization, which is an amateur, student-run program that sends students to different parts of Mexico to "live with the people and collaborate on various community projects during the summer." I spent the summer of 1967 in Coatzamitla in another part of the state of Hidalgo and came to Pisa Flores in 1968. In 1969 I was coordinator for Canadian CIASP in Mexico City and only came in for occasional visits to Pisa Flores. During this summer the organization of CIASP was officially disbanded and the office in Mexico City liquidated, due to a declining membership and internal conflicts over priorities. It has since been resurrected under a slightly different name. In 1971 they did not send a team to Pisa Flores.

See footnote 32.

This control of the boat not only gives a handsome income to Avel (anywhere from 1 to 3 pesos per passenger one way, depending on the state of the current) but also enables him to know exactly when and who is coming and going to and from the town. In fact part of the political strength of the Leopoldo faction lies in the isolation of the town which enables them to hold a virtual monopoly on transportation, communication and prevents the entry of such outsiders as merchants and truckers.

Many of these alliances are made during Carnival, a huge week long festival in the spring when Leopoldo and other political figures are always present in the town and buy beer for their friends.

The publication of such a list is the first step in the full legalization of an ejido after it has been granted to the town by presidential decree.

Padre Sanchez obtained about five plots of land for the union to build houses. The idea was that the peasants would take turns helping to build houses for those who did not have any at that time. One of these plots was used to build a model house with the help of the Canadian students and another to build the house of Covarrubias. Lots were drawn to allocate these houses as well as the remaining plots but only one other house was ever built and the model house
fell apart in 1970. In fact the peasant who obtained the model house rented it out to someone else and completely neglected the property. To make matters worse, Jose Resendiz built a very nice adobe house with a tin roof near the old model house even though he left the union, giving rise to another dispute. All but one of the plots were not officially registered under the union's name, and are now in the process of being reoccupied by Isabel Hernandez from Gaudalajara who plans to have her own houses built and rent them out.

54. The faena used to be a type of obligatory service that every member of the community had to perform on public works, such as the clearing of roads. Although it is now officially a purely voluntary service, rewarded by food payments by the government, it still retains many of the old aspects of forced labour in small, remote villages.

55. Zeferino Luna, the pig leader, also used to cultivate a very large corn crop (40 dobles) on rented land but claims that it is more profitable to buy pigs from outlying hamlets and sell them in Pisaflores and larger cities. He was vice president of Pisaflores in 1944, just before a special government council was sent in.

56. A year earlier father Sanchez had persuaded a large number of peasants from the union and also a few newcomers to clear this land in order to sow pasture. They ended up not receiving any wages or other benefits but he did later donate four cows to the union, of which three died and one has recently given birth to several calves.

57. This contract of arrendamiento or rental gave the property to the union for a nominal fee under certain conditions, primarily that they would work together as a cooperative. One of the clauses in the contract, however read; "por incumplimiento o no llenar los requisitos de estas clausulas, ambas partes pueden dar por rescindido este contrato" (in the event of failure to fulfill the clauses of this contract, both parties may declare this contract null and void).

58. About half of the twenty peasants involved in this project only worked for several days in the clearing and planting of the field, or sent their workers. Since they had invested in the crop they expected a return of the harvest in proportion to their investment. However, the ten remaining peasants thought that those who
did not continue to weed and harvest had no right to any dividends since the whole crop would have been wasted if everyone had stopped working after the first stages. They therefore did not even notify the others and divided the harvest among themselves. However, Jose and several other members who did remain in the cooperative until the end, had also been given permission by the others to sow some pasture of vegetables apart from the common field. Jose tore out some of this pasture in order to plant chiles and Pablo and Abraham then put up a fence around his chiles in order to let some cattle graze there. This would have destroyed his chile crop and Jose went and complained to padre Velasquez who then discovered that the union had lent part of this pasture land to father Sanchez. Isabel Hernandez told them she did not want padre Sanchez' cattle on her land and Jose's harvest was saved.

59. Some of the union members live in small hamlets, about fifteen to twenty-five minutes on foot from the town of Pisaflores. A meeting would have to be announced ahead of time by messengers sent by the president, who was sick on this occasion. Another reason for the cancellation, according to padre Velasquez, was the fact that he has discovered that Pablo Covarrubias had rented out a small piece of the property to some outsiders without the knowledge of the other members.

60. It is ironic that the union ended up working on land belonging to the brother of the man who tried so hard to destroy their organization. I am not sure whether he is aware that they are operating as a cooperative there or whether this is a new development in the balance of power within the community.

61. Norman Swartz (1969:1088) has suggested that factionalism may actually "promote the achievement of collective as well as sectarian goals" on the basis of his case study in Guatemala. However, he adds that this result was helped by an adequate supply of funds by the local government. I would argue that a more "negative" evaluation of the functions and consequences of factional disputes is closer to the truth, precisely because such disputes seem to be more prevalent in villages characterized by economic stagnation and fixed resources, giving rise to fierce internal competition (Nicholas 1968:58).

62. The conflict between the union members and Jose Resendiz
has already been mentioned in footnotes 53 and 58. The artisan is Juan Morelos, who served for several terms of office as secretary of the private union. He too, was involved in the cooperative of 1969 in the Pena Colorado, and had invested in this harvest by sending a worker for several days. He quit the union after the conflict concerning the harvest and sent a letter to padre Velasquez, accusing Pablo Covarrubias of being a crook. When I spoke to him, he said that the idea of the union was good but that it was run by a small clique of friends who did not treat the others fairly.

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a) Hypothesis H.: Class and membership in peasant organizations is related.

b) Null Hypothesis H.: There is no association between class membership and membership in organizations.

c) Test: The $X^2$ test may be employed; this is a problem involving a set of independent frequencies, more than one degree of freedom and no expected frequencies below 5. There are 4 degrees of freedom.

d) Significance level. Let $\alpha = 0.01$.

e) Rejection Region. The region of rejection consists of all values of $X$ which are so large that the probability associated with their occurrence under the null hypothesis is equal to or less than 1 in 100. We shall reject the null hypothesis if $X$ is equal to or greater than 13.28. (cf chart D, page 248 Freeman:1965).

f) Decision. $X^2$ was calculated according to the formula $X^2 = \sum \frac{(fo - fe)^2}{fe}$ our observed value of $X^2$ is 25.99. The null hypothesis may therefore be rejected and we conclude that there is a significant association between class and membership on organizations in Pisafloros.

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<td>259</td>
<td>290</td>
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$X^2 = 25.99$

$\alpha = 6.64$
Using the same test as above, we found that this correlation between membership in organizations and membership in one particular class, as opposed to other classes was highly significant. I justify combining the other class categories in this chart because I am only comparing them to IIb.

65. See footnote 63 for type of test used.

66. A response by the better-off members of the community to rising wages and lower prices for corn and sugar cane.

67. I do not exclude other possible explanations, such as incongruent status or downward (generational) mobility. However I think that these are also indirectly related to wider economic changes or else pay a much smaller role in the formation of political phenomena on a large scale.
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APPENDIX I - LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. Municipal Offices of Pisaflores, Hdo.
   a) Expediente Que Contiene Asuntos Historicos de Pisaflores de Zaragoza de Hidalgo 1817 - 1964
      (Short history of the town, written by the municipal secretary in 1964, upon request by the state government).
   b) Taxation Records of all Rural and Urban properties in Pisaflores and surrounding hamlets - shows legal owner, fiscal value and record of payment of taxes. (Office of Recaudacion de rentas)
   c) Copia de Acta de Elecciones de Autoridades Ejidales y Posesión y Deslinde con motivo de Declaración de Ejidos de Pisaflores, Hdo. 1966. (Copy of official declaration of ejido or Pisaflores with list of outgoing and incoming administration)
   d) Periodico Oficial, Gobierno de Hidalgo, May 24, 1966. - An official government newspaper (bulletin), giving a brief legal history of the petitions for an ejido for Pisaflores and a list of potential members.

2. Ejido documents in possession of the treasurer.
   a) Lista de Cooperación de los Ejidatarios "Ejido Pisaflores". - A list of all the ejido members of 1971 and the cuotas they had paid so far that year.
   b) Notebook containing list of membership, attendance at meetings and payment of cuotas from 1966 to 1968. (Ejido)

3. Parish documents.
   a) Statistical charts and individual questionnaires of the survey done by Mexican group of students in March, 1969.
   b) Personal files of the town priest on "Campesinos" - includes copy of correspondence with officials of the Movimiento Social Campesino during 1969 and 1970; copy of "Contrato Privado de arrendamiento de Inmuebles" one for March 27, 1969, the other for October 1, 1970, containing conditions for rental of Pena Colorado by the Union de Las Huastecas from the owner, copy of "Estatutos que deberán regir en la Union de campesinos S.A.", 1969 (Statutes regulating operation of private union); and a small notebook with lists of private union members, meetings held in the parish hall and some financial records.
Appendix I - documents (continued)

4. Documents of Union Campesina de las Huastecas S.A. in possession of the president of this organization.
   a) Copy of legal charter establishing the union on the 19th of October, 1963, with list of names of all committee members in the different villages of Pisafloros.
   b) Union de Campesinos de las Huastecas, Psa., Hdo - Libro de Actas I Union de Campesinos de las Huastecas, Psa., Hdo - Libro de Actas II - two notebooks containing minutes of meetings of this union from 1965 to 1967. Also contains financial records and list of work contributed to Pena Colorado cooperative venture in 1970.

   a) File of correspondence between CIASP executives and the three pastors of Pisafloros from 1963 to 1970.
   b) Project reports for Pisafloros from 1964 to 1969, giving information on geography, people, community projects, hygiene and contacts in various villages of the municipality, including Pisafloros itself and a short description of the activities of the student groups stationed for the summer in these villages.

6. Mexico City: Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonizacion (Oficina de Estadistica) - two small file cards on the ejido of Pisafloros and that of Garabato, showing dates of petition of land and dates of donation of lands to the community by presidential decree.

7. Personal Correspondence and other private documents.
   a) Correspondence of Alfredo Trejo, showing his appointment as representative of the water committee in 1958 and official representative of the Alliance for Progress in Pisafloros in 1965.
   b) Correspondence of Severino Carrazoo, showing the role he played in the legion of veterans in the 1930's when he lived in the hamlet of Bonigu.
APPENDIX II - LIST OF PRINCIPAL INFORMANTS

Arevalo, Jose (a young man studying to be a certified school teacher through correspondence courses, also a part-time sandale maker and teacher of literacy) - provided information on the history of the town, helped me to make a map of the town and its surroundings and accompanied me to several hamlets and fields. He also cross-checked data on class.

Azuela, Alejandro (Mule driver, peasant and mail carrier) - provided information on the private union and the local economy, as well as the history of the ejido from the point of view of someone suspicious of agrarianism.

Cadena, Pedro (poor peasant) - provided me with valuable information on family consumption patterns and household expenditures.

Cadena, Severino (an old peasant who used to be a sandale-maker and was one of the few ejidatarios who had opened the Gallera with Carmen Nira in 1958) - provided me with history of the re-establishing of the ejido and much of my data on the class membership of those who belong to the ejido and in his neighbourhood, as well as economic data.

Cadena, Samuel (sandale-maker) cross-checked some of the data on class.

Carrasco, Severino (now retired, used to be a small cultivator in the hamlet of El Bonigu) - recounted the story of the conflict between Agua Zarca and Pisaflores from the viewpoint of a supporter of Porfirio Rubio. He also gave me data on class membership and cross-checked other figures.

Chavez, Fausto (former sandale-maker, now works in a factory in Mexico city) - told me about the history of the cooperative and provided some interesting information on migration to Mexico city of people from Pisaflores.

Covarrubias, Pablo (a middle peasant) - made available several documents of the private union and told me many details on the history of the private union and their conflicts with the local authorities. He also provided me with data on class membership of all the people in his section of the town as well as all those who belonged to the union. I also obtained a personal history of his economic activities over the past two years.
Cruz, Fausto (secretary in the municipal office) - provided me with a great deal of information on the history of Pisaflores and land tenure. He also wrote down all the names of all the major cultivators in the area, the names of past officials (secretaries, vice-presidents, etc.) and made available many documents of the local government, including a short history he had written himself.

Flores, Irene (mother of Armando Alvarado and sister of Nicolas and Luis Flores; she is now over 80 years old) - provided information on the history of the Flores and Lamerca families.

Juarez, Celio (a poor peasant) - provided me with information on class membership in his section of the town as well as some general economic information.

Lorena, Guadalupe (small landowner) - cross checked some of the data on class and provided me with data on the role of the forest inspector and the fractionalization of small landholdings through inheritance.

Medina, Fermin (pastor of Taman, SLP, former pastor of Pisaflores) - gave some interesting information on the 1966 to 1968 period.

Morelos, Juan (saddle-maker and peasant) - gave me some valuable information on the private union, the history of the water project and the credit union.

Rivera, Moises (poor peasant) - provided information on economy and class.

Rojo, Juan (middle peasant) - gave me some date on the economy of the region and the history of the conflict between the union and the ejido.

Sulquero, Teodoro (rich peasant) - provided information on the history of the ejido, the local government and the conflict they had with padre Sanchez.

Trejo, Alfredo (rifle-repairman, carpenter) - gave me a lot of information on the political events in Pisaflores over the last fifteen years, especially the activities of padre Sanchez and the involvement of outside politicians.

Velasquez, Miguel (pastor of Pisaflores) - made available all the records he had in the curate, including the 1968 Mexican student survey, and told me about many interesting incidents involving the parish.
I also spoke to numerous other people, all of whom in one way or another helped me with information, opinions or personal anecdotes.
**APPENDIX III - LIST OF HAMLETS INCLUDED IN MY STUDY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hamlet</th>
<th>Number of Families</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Lechugilla</td>
<td>3 families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan de Ayala</td>
<td>8 families</td>
<td>(population of 30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Zancudo</td>
<td>5 families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poza Amarilla</td>
<td>8 families</td>
<td>(population of 43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Escondida</td>
<td>16 families</td>
<td>(population of 69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lo Verde</td>
<td>5 families</td>
<td>(population of 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pie de la Cuesta</td>
<td>14 families</td>
<td>(population of 65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuamirro</td>
<td>4 families</td>
<td>(population of 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Cedral</td>
<td>2 families</td>
<td>(population of 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higueron</td>
<td>5 families</td>
<td>(population of 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacatal</td>
<td>13 families</td>
<td>(population of 64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerro del Carmen</td>
<td>24 families</td>
<td>(population of 135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmitas (&amp; La Lagunita)</td>
<td>16 families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Durazno</td>
<td>5 families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miraflores</td>
<td>4 families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Pescadito</td>
<td>3 families</td>
<td>(population of 18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MAP OF HAMLETS INCLUDED IN MY STUDY AND OTHER VILLAGES MENTIONED IN MY THESIS.