MONGOLIA BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA, 1953-1965

by

Harvey Schneider

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Department of History
McGill University
Montreal
April, 1969.
I owe a debt of gratitude to several people for help in the preparation of this thesis: To Professor Paul T. K. Lin of McGill and Professor Joseph Fletcher of Harvard for their assistance in gaining me access to Mongolian and Chinese sources; to Messrs. J. Grant Purves, Ed Laine, and to Miss Wilda Lossing for having suggested many necessary corrections and improvements; to Mr. and Mrs. B. Schneider for having helped proofread and type this paper; to the staff of McLennan Library of McGill University for their innumerable services; and especially to Professor Miloš Mladenović, my thesis director, for his warmth and encouragement which proved invaluable during the writing of this paper.
Abbreviations used in the footnotes

CDSP - Current Digest of Soviet Press.
SCMP - Survey of China Mainland Press.
NCNA - New China News Agency.
RCAS - Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society.
FEER - Far Eastern Economic Review.

Footnotes for the CDSP

The CDSP has been published each week since 1949. Each year the weekly issues are bound into four books. The volume number for 1949 is I, and the numbers increase with each year of publication. I have used the same citations as are used by the publishers of the Digest. After each citation, the date and name of the newspaper or periodical appears in parentheses.

e.g.


XI is the eleventh year of publication, i.e. 1959.
13 refers to the thirteenth weekly issue of the year.
vol. 1 is the first of the four volumes for the year.
p. 21 refers to the page in issue thirteen.
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INTRODUCTION.

The purpose of this thesis is to study the ways in which Mongolia's political, economic and cultural ties with Russia and China were affected and changed by the fluctuation of Sino-Soviet relations between 1953 and 1965. This period was chosen to cover the time between Stalin's death and Khrushchev's removal from power in Russia, but it coincidentally marked the resumption, after a break of thirty years, and termination of Chinese activity in Mongolia. Thus these years witnessed one complete phase in the continuing historical process in this area of the world. As yet, however, there is no scholarly synthesis which considers these years as a completed phase in this process.

Few major works exist which treat the subject of twentieth century Mongolia. The period until 1946 is reliably reported by Gerard Friters in his excellent work, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position*. In it, he traces the history of Mongolia's relations with both China and Russia from the late nineteenth century until the end of World War Two. George Murphy provides an excellent

economic history of the country from 1921 to 1960 in his book, *Soviet Mongolia*. ¹ Robert Rupen's three articles in *Pacific Affairs*² offer the student both statistical information and personal views about Mongolia from 1945 to 1960. Rupen is the most prolific western writer of Mongolian affairs and has visited the country several times. Rupen's two volume work, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*,³ is an important addition to the English historiography on Mongolia. However, in presenting a wealth of information gleaned from Russian, Chinese, English and Mongol sources, Rupen arbitrarily divided the time period under discussion into decades rather than historical phases. His achievement was a work of encyclopaedic rather than interpretive value.

The traditional sources of historical information, such as diaries, personal correspondence, government and diplomatic documents, were unavailable for so recent a period of history. Since no Western journalists or observers reside in Mongolia, the student must rely on Soviet, Mongol or Chinese newspapers for knowledge of the


Mongolian scene. Reports by western visitors are enthusiastically greeted by scholars.

Russian newspapers and magazine articles are edited and compiled in the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, published by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies in Washington. Articles on Mongolia appearing in Russian publications are written by Russian journalists themselves or are reprinted from the Mongolian Party newspaper, Unen. The Survey of China Mainland Press, printed in Hong Kong by the American Consulate General is the Chinese counterpart of the Digest. The British periodical Far Eastern Economic Review, also published in Hong Kong, frequently prints articles reporting the progress of Mongolia's economic plans. The New York Times contains more information on Mongolia than any other western newspaper, although many of its articles are Russian stories paraphrased by Times' reporters. Two of the most valuable studies on Mongolia were written by correspondents Jack Raymond in 1956\(^1\) and Harrison Salisbury in 1959,\(^2\) both of whom visited and toured Mongolia.

This thesis treats the twelve years of 1953 to 1965 as a completed phase in the continuous struggle to control this area. Two conclusions may be drawn from

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this study. The first is that Mongolia's position between Russia and China was most acceptable when Russo-Chinese relations were friendly and the controls on Mongolia were relaxed. Second, the author contends that the international position of the Mongolian People's Republic underwent no change as a result of the history of this period.
CHAPTER 1.

THE SOVIETIZATION OF OUTER MONGOLIA

The problem of Outer Mongolia in international affairs is, historically speaking, of comparatively recent origin. When the Russo-Chinese frontier was delineated by treaties in the early eighteenth century, the Mongol lands were partitioned. The Buryat Mongols fell under the domination of Russia, and the provinces of Outer and Inner Mongolia remained Chinese. When, in the late nineteenth century, the interests of the eastward expanding Russian Empire and the northward retreating Chinese Empire began to coincide in Central Asia, the middle section of Outer Mongolia became contested territory.

Until the final decade of the nineteenth century, Outer Mongolia was free from foreign influences. Its size was that of present day Western Europe, and it was inhabited by less than one million people, mostly nomadic livestock breeders. It was ruled by an oligarchy of nobles and Lamaist priests. Although a Chinese province, Outer Mongolia was not threatened by assimilation. The Mongols were free to speak their language and to practice their religion. Colonization was forbidden in this area, so few
Chinese nationals resided there. The trading center of Urga, the Mongolian capital, attracted many Chinese merchants, but few signs of Chinese influence existed. The Government policy of non-involvement in Mongol affairs lasted until Outer Mongolia was threatened by Russian expansion. The scarcity of Mongols over such a large territory made it impossible for them to defend their land alone against foreign incursion.

While colonizing her Siberian lands during the nineteenth century, Russia acquired considerable areas of Chinese territory both in Central Asia and along the Pacific coast. By 1885, Outer Mongolia had become the next Chinese dependency to be coveted by Czarist Russia. Until the turn of the century, Russia's activities in Outer Mongolia were strictly commercial, but these interests grew to the point of challenging China's dominant position. China reacted by reversing her policy and encouraging colonization and intermarriage in Mongolia. ¹

The aim of the Czarist Government in Outer Mongolia was to protect Russian commercial interests and, at the same time, to weaken China's hold on her province. In view of the situation in Europe after 1900, however, Russia had no desire to become embroiled in a Far Eastern crisis. An independence movement emerged in Mongolia as a reaction to the

¹ Friters, op cit, p. 157.
new Chinese policies, and although the Defense Department in St. Petersburg secretly sent weapons to Mongol princes, the Foreign Office claimed to be officially neutral. When Outer Mongolia did declare its independence in 1911, it was due, not to Russian machinations, but to the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty in Peking.

Between 1911 and 1921, Russia was unable to pursue her interests in Outer Mongolia because of her preoccupation with World War I, the 1917 Revolutions and the Civil War. Meanwhile, a Chinese garrison reclaimed the province, but was soon forced to withdraw when defeated by White Russian Armies. In 1921, they were in turn driven out by the Red Army which established a new Mongol Government. It was led by the spiritual leader of all Mongols, the Living Buddha. When he died in 1924, the sovietization of Outer Mongolia began.

Soviet policy was far more active than that of the Czarist Government because the Soviet Union regarded the territory of Mongolia as strategic to her eastern defense network.¹ For this reason, Russian activity in Mongolia was

¹ T.J. Betts, "The Strategy of Another Russo-Japanese War", Foreign Affairs, vol.XII, no.4, (July 1934), "...the potential theatre of war is dominated by what is called the Baikal region."(p.593). He concludes that "For the Japanese, then, a successful war means the prompt capture of the Baikal region. For the Russians, the essentials of ultimate victory are contained in the defense of this territory. It is the decisive zone of a Russo-Japanese conflict."(p.594). Moreover, the Japanese interventionist troops left Russian soil as late as 1922.
aimed at the formation of a socialist state whose survival would depend on the Soviet Union. This was accomplished by first gaining control of the Government of Outer Mongolia by supporting the pro-Russian Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. This step preceded the inauguration of an economic development program closely patterned along Soviet lines, and the establishment of an education system staffed almost entirely by Russian teachers. The Russian maneuvers were facilitated by the total monopoly she enjoyed with regard to all forms of inter-relations with Mongolia. While China was preoccupied by Chiang's Northern Expedition and the attempts to unite the country in the twenties, all Chinese were expelled from Mongolia and Comintern agents became the power behind the Mongol Government.  

The formation of a planned economy was first attempted during the early nineteen thirties, the same time as the Russian drive towards industrialization and collectivization. The program, also in the form of a Five Year Plan, called for the rapid collectivization of livestock. This attempt was met with widespread nomad revolts and the slaughter of livestock. Since Mongolia's wealth was measured in terms of the numbers of animals she possessed, the collectivization experiment was called off. The threat posed after 1931 by an expansionist Japan sharing a border with Mongolia also encouraged a return to social and economic

1. Murphy, op cit, p. 117.
stability.

Despite the failure of collectivization, the policy of economic change was not abandoned, but took on a different direction. The attempt to collectivize revealed that Mongolia did not possess the chief prerequisites for its implementation. Wells and stables were unnecessary for the nomads. Farming and the production of fodder and hay were equally foreign to their way of life. The immobility of collective life, consequently, brought death to large numbers of livestock which were stranded in their unprotected corrals with no food or water during winter storms. The collectivization experiment pointed out these failings to the economic planners and it was postponed in 1932. Creating the base for a planned economy became the priority task of the Mongolian Government.

The Mongol leaders decided that the development of an educated class was the first prerequisite of a successful planned economy. Such a class did not exist in Mongolia before World War Two. Veterinarians, herders familiar with modern animal husbandry and other trained agriculturalists were necessary to increase the number and upgrade the quality of the livestock herds. Bookkeepers, statisticians and planners

were also needed to manage collectives and supervise the various aspects of a planned economy.

Producing skilled personnel was a difficult task for two reasons: the lack of teachers, and the monopoly of the Lamaist Church on education. These problems were solved when the Government turned its attention towards the elimination of the Church as a rival force in Mongol society. It was not only a competitive influence but also a source of resistance to advances in education. Tibetan was the language of the Church and since most schools in Mongolia were administered by Lamaist monks, students learned to read only this language.\(^1\) Mongol was the spoken language so the ability to read Tibetan had no application in daily life. In the nineteen thirties, the Mongol Government excluded the Church from the field of education. Church land was confiscated and monks were forced to labour as other Mongols did, for their livelihood. In 1937, the Army was used to destroy the monasteries.\(^2\) Boarding schools were set up to replace them and Russian personnel and teachers came to administer them. After World War Two, Russian-trained Mongol teachers became available for the early school grades and began to replace their Russian teachers.

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While consolidating her political position in Mongolia, Russia also strengthened her military posture in the face of Japanese expansion. When Japan emerged as a mainland power after 1931, Russia relinquished her interests in Manchuria and made Mongolia her military stronghold in the Far East.¹ A "Gentleman's Agreement" on defense, concluded in 1934, was formalized in March 1936, as the Soviet-Mongol Protocol of Mutual Assistance. This provided for the stationing of one country's troops on the other's soil "in the event of a threat of an attack on the part of a third state".² This Protocol merely legalized existing conditions since Soviet troops had been based in Mongolia since late 1934.³

Mongolia's strategic importance significantly grew after 1935 when border skirmishes were reported more frequently. Tensions were not reduced between Russia and Japan even after 1937, by which time the Japanese High Command should have been preoccupied with the war against China. The troops of the Outer Mongolian Army became part of the Soviet Far Eastern Army and defended the flank of the Russian positions along the Manchukuo-Mongolia-Russia border.⁴ In 1939, a railroad track was built for defensive purposes,

² Quoted in Friters, op cit, p. 143.
³ Erickson, op cit, p. 397.
⁴ Ibid, p. 397.
linking the Trans-Siberian Railway with Eastern Mongolia. From May to August 1939 fierce battles took place in which Soviet and Mongol troops, led by corps commander and future Marshall, Major-General Zhukov, drove the Japanese out of Mongolian territory after bloody fighting. In April 1941, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed, reducing Mongolia's military importance somewhat. Her support of Russia's military activity continued during the Russo-German War of 1941-1945, when Mongolia supplied Russian troops with horses, meat and leather goods from her vast livestock herds.

Outer Mongolia again became a factor in international relations during the closing days of World War Two. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Russia insisted that the position of Mongolia between Russia and China be clarified and included in any post-War settlement in the Far East. Believing that Soviet military assistance was necessary for victory against Japan, President Roosevelt agreed to Stalin's demands in northeast Asia. The Soviet leader argued that he needed concessions before he could justify the committal of Russian troops for more fighting. Roosevelt raised no objections to Stalin's conditions and it was agreed that Russia would enter the Eastern operations within two to three months of victory in Europe. Russia was to be repaid by

1. Friters, *op cit*, p. 143.

2. Murphy, *op cit*, p. 156. During this period, Mongolian herds were reduced from 27.5 million head to 20.9 million.
leases to railroads in Manchuria and to the harbours of Port Arthur and Dairen, and by the guarantee that "the status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved". Roosevelt suggested that since these were specifically Russo-Chinese problems that they should be the subjects of separate Sino-Soviet negotiations.

Although not the sole source of friction between the two countries, the Mongolian question gave rise to new difficulties at the Sino-Soviet Conference in July 1945. The questions of Russian support for the Chinese Communists, Russian rights in Manchuria and Sinkiang, and cooperation between the Chinese and Russians against Japan were all important issues. Nevertheless, Mongolia became a special factor at these meetings because Russia called for Chinese recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent entity. This raised the question of the definition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia.

China and Russia had totally different views as to the existing status of Outer Mongolia. In demanding that the status quo in Mongolia be preserved, Russia referred to the de facto conditions, to the situation in existence. China's conception of Mongolia's status was based on de jure considerations, with legal treaties as reference. This wide divergence between the de jure and de facto interpretations

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of the status quo in Outer Mongolia caused an impasse during the July 1945 discussions.

As far as China was concerned, Mongolia's international position had been settled by the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924, article V of which stated:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes that Outer Mongolia is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China's sovereignty therein."¹

As an "integral part of the Republic of China", Mongolia had no right to sign treaties with other nations, nor to have foreign troops billeted on her land. Only the Nationalist Chinese Government had legal power to sanction such action.

In spite of her signature to this Agreement, Soviet policy toward Mongolia was based on treaties dating back to Czarist times. A 1912 Russo-Chinese agreement referred to a Mongolia with "autonomous rights".² In November 1913, a Sino-Russian declaration recognized Mongolian autonomy.³ The Soviet Union used these treaties as a guide in her dealings with Mongolia even after she had formally recognized Chinese sovereignty. Seven months after the Agreement of 1924, Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Chicherin enunciated Russia's

² Friters, op cit, p. 71.
³ Ibid, p. 75.
interpretation of the status quo in Mongolia:

"We recognize the Mongolian People's Republic as a part of the Chinese Republic, but we recognize also its autonomy in so far reaching a sense that we regard it not only as independent of China in its internal affairs, but also capable of pursuing its own foreign policy independently."

The reference to Mongolia as "the Mongolian People's Republic", moreover, emphasized that Russia considered her, in fact, an independent nation.

Soviet actions between 1924 and 1945 tended to disregard Mongolia's legal position as a Chinese province. In fact, their dealings suggested that Mongolia was a Soviet satellite or at least totally independent from China in spite of the 1924 Agreement. When Russia tried to have China accept her conception of the status quo in Mongolia at the 1945 Conference, China refused and the talks were postponed.

The delay in a Sino-Soviet agreement at this time created further complications. In return for the concessions made to Russia at Yalta, Soviet troops were to be committed against Japan by August 9, 1945. Chinese intransigence was blamed for the delay and the expected American pressure on Chiang produced no change in his attitude. The dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6th, however, foretold of a more imminent end to the fighting.

than anticipated by the military experts at Yalta.\(^1\) Russia therefore, became anxious to conclude a Sino-Soviet treaty. Fearful of losing the gains won at Yalta, the Soviet Union attacked Manchuria on August 8, 1945, despite the lack of an accord with China. The Soviet action placed China in the perilous position of having Russian troops on her soil without any guarantee that these potentially hostile forces would be withdrawn once the common enemy had been defeated. The sudden necessity for a treaty with Russia forced China to revise its position on certain issues. One such change was her consent to recognize Mongolian independence, but only on the basis of a plebiscite. The Russians found this acceptable and the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty was signed on August 14, 1945, the day Japan agreed to surrender.\(^2\)

The plebiscite was held on October 20, 1945. A vote on the question of independence was registered by a signature, or in the case of the sixty percent of Mongolia's population that was illiterate, by a thumbprint, in the "For" or "Against" column. There was no secret ballot. Of the eligible voters, 98.4% appeared at the voting stations, and everyone voted in favour of independence.\(^3\) In spite of the

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doubtful validity of the plebiscite, China had little choice but to accept its outcome and so recognized the Mongolian People's Republic on January 5, 1946. De facto independence from China became de jure independence.

The results of the plebiscite had no immediate impact on Mongolia. Her role in the Soviet Far East remained defensive. Although Japan had been removed as a threat, the American-Chiang Kai-shek alliance replaced Japanese imperialism as the new encroaching enemy. In this way, the maintenance of Soviet troops on Mongolian territory for an extended period was justified. In 1946, the ten year old Russo-Mongolian Protocol was renewed as the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. A year later defense expenditures of the Mongolian People's Republic amounted to 36.7% of her budget. Refugees from Mongolia who reached Hong Kong in 1948 revealed that the Mongolian People's Army might number as many as one hundred thousand men, more than one-tenth of her population, and that Soviet advisors and Army personnel were attached to it. Thus the plebiscite legalized Mongolia's separation from China, but did not guarantee her independence from Russia.

1. Table 22 in Murphy, op cit, p. 183.
3. This became a factor when Mongolia applied for acceptance into the United Nations Organization. In this Anglo-American dominated body, Mongolia's status as a Soviet
Russia continued to control events in post-War Mongolia. The chief manifestation of this domination was Russia's guidance of Mongolia's economic growth along Soviet lines. The most apparent feature of this influence was the return to the Five Year Plan system by Mongolia beginning in 1948. The year previously, the Soviet Union had resumed her Plans which had been interrupted by the War. The first Mongol Plan was exemplary because, although its quotas were very high and in some cases unrealistic, overnight social and economic changes were not forced on the people. This caution was the result of the unpleasant experiences of the original attempt to create a planned economy in 1930.

The goals for the first Five Year Plan were formulated at the Eleventh Congress of the Mongolian National Revolutionary Party in December 1947. Although the main objective of the Plan was to increase the livestock herds, little thought or energy was devoted to the problem of agriculture at this Congress. The reduction of defense spending after 1948 permitted the allocation of more money for the development of light industries such as handicrafts and meat-packing, and for social welfare, health and education.

satellite was detrimental to her case. Her first application in 1946 was deferred until more information was learned about Mongolia's capacity to function as an independent nation within the United Nations' charter. Little was known about her, her independence was recognized only by Russia and China, and only Russia was diplomatically represented in Ulan Bator. The next time Mongolia's application was reviewed the cold war polarization had taken place and she was again refused. Mongolia was finally accepted in 1961.
Collectivization was planned but soon abandoned, again because the necessary educational and other prerequisites had not been met. The building of corrals and wells, hay production and veterinary services received further attention between 1948 and 1953. Although none of the quotas were met and the number of livestock increased only by two million head in the five years, the Plan was noteworthy in that it was the start of controlled economic development in Mongolia. Many of the goals were totally unrealistic, creating an impression of overwhelming failure. Thus, in the second Plan of 1953 the quotas were substantially reduced.

Mongolia was able to reduce her defense expenditures after 1948 because of the growing success of the Chinese Communists in their battle to gain control of China. The increase in strength of Mao's forces meant that Mongolia's southern borders were safe from the threat of the Nationalist Chinese. This success was achieved despite the scarcity of help from the Soviet Union and ran contrary to Russia's predictions and advice.

The activity of the Soviet Union in the northern


2. The number of livestock, for example, was to have been increased from twenty one million to thirty one million head in five years.

provinces of China clearly revealed that Russia was not satisfied with the gains made at Yalta and during the negotiations with China in 1945. Russia had always been interested in the Chinese province of Sinkiang which she controlled between 1934 and 1943 and again between 1947 and 1949. As late as May 1949, when a Communist victory in China was all but assured, Russia sought a trade and mining monopoly in this province from the retreating but still recognized Kuomintang Government. ¹ In July 1949, the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement with the envoys of the "Manchurian People's Republic". ² The designation of Manchuria as a People's Republic extended de facto recognition of the independence of this province from China. Since at this stage in the Civil War, a Communist victory was unavoidable, such manoeuvres must have been designed to present the future Government of China with a fait-accompli of Russian control of these two provinces. Although these undertakings had no permanent result, they undoubtedly aroused suspicions of Russian intentions among the Chinese leaders. These suspicions assumed increased importance on the eve of the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet friendship treaty.

A new treaty between Russia and China was necessary for both countries. China had been a battlefield for twelve years. Reconstruction was the first item on the agenda of

1. Ibid, p. 74.
of the new Chinese Government. Financial aid was necessary and the Soviet Union was the only nation to which China could turn. The Chiang-American presence in Taiwan and Japan prolonged the military danger. China could not afford reconstruction and renewed hostilities at the same time. This forced her to depend temporarily on Russia. Furthermore, Russia still had thirty year leases on Manchurian railways and harbours by virtue of her 1945 agreements with the Kuomintang.\(^1\) China was anxious to terminate this situation.

For the Soviet Union, a Mutual Assistance Pact similar to those signed with all the East European satellites would mean that China recognized Russia's leadership of the Communist movement. This was of special significance because China had more than twice the population of Russia, since the Communist takeover had been engineered by a self-made revolutionary theorist and leader, and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union had contributed very little material help toward the victory.\(^2\) This was a direct contrast to the East European Communist leaders who had all been trained in, and received their orders from Russia. A treaty with China would signify Russia's unchallenged position in the Communist world, and would place a potential

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1. Maki, op cit, pp. 242-244.

rival on the same level as the other satellites.

China gained little from the Sino-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, signed in February 1950. It was agreed that the Changshun Railway and Port Arthur were to be returned to China by 1953, and that the issue of Dairen would be negotiated at that time.\(^1\) Russia also offered China a loan of three hundred million American dollars at one percent interest for five years. This was hardly enough to meet China's oppressive needs.\(^2\) Sinkiang was not mentioned in the Treaty but in March 1950, it was announced that joint-stock companies had been formed to exploit the oil and mineral wealth of that province. Profits were to be divided equally.\(^3\) By an exchange of letters between Foreign Ministers Vyshinsky and Chou En-lai, the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic was reaffirmed.\(^4\) Following the lead of the other Communist satellites, the Chinese People's Republic officially recognized Mongolia in 1950.

By mid-century, Russia's policies in Mongolia were beginning to make themselves manifest. Russian-trained

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1. Maki, op cit, pp. 248-249. The 1945 Treaty gave Russia half-interest in these areas for thirty years.\(\text{Ibid, pp. 242-244}\).  
2. Dallin claims that China asked for 2.8 billion dollars. \(\text{Dallin, op cit, p. 83}\). The Marshall Plan appropriations had included four hundred million dollars for China in 1947.\(\text{See Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, New York, 1950, p. 921}\).  
3. \text{The New York Times, March 29, 1950, p. 32.}  
4. \text{Dallin, op cit, pp. 80-81.}
Mongol teachers began to prepare native experts for leadership roles in Mongolia's economic and social development. The defense, growth and independence of the country was wholly dependent on Soviet aid and friendship. After Stalin died in 1953, the Soviet leaders were confronted by a united, reawakened and energetic China, at peace for the first time in more than twenty years. And although she recognized Mongolia's independence, China did not abandon all claims to her former province. The fact that China, Mongolia and Russia were all members of the Communist bloc governed the history of Mongolia between her giant neighbours for the next twelve years.
CHAPTER 2.

THE RESUMPTION OF SINO-MONGOL RELATIONS

By 1950, Mongolia's independence had been recognized both by her two neighbours and the East European satellites. Although other nations wanted to establish relations with Mongolia, it was still only Russia which engaged in any activity there. This monopoly continued until after Stalin's death, when Russia adopted a policy of conciliation in foreign and bloc affairs. The new policy altered existing relationships between Russia, Mongolia and China, by enabling China and Mongolia to engage in activities previously forbidden by the Russian Government. It seems that as long as China remained a Soviet satellite and was dominated by Moscow, she was not discouraged by the new Kremlin leaders from playing a role in Mongolia's economic development. Therefore it was with Soviet consent that China finally penetrated Russia's exclusive sphere of influence in Mongolia.

The Soviet policy of keeping Mongolia diplomatically and commercially quarantined began during the nineteen twenties. Nevertheless, even at that time, Grigory Zinoviev, as leader of the Comintern, had recognized that China had
legitimate claims to Outer Mongolia. Russia, he said, would discuss these claims only "when the Chinese will liberate themselves from their oppressors", that is, after a successful Communist revolution in China.¹ In his famous 1936 interview with Edgar Snow, Mao Tse-Tung gave Zinoviev's qualifications a tone of finality by remarking that

"When the People's revolution has been victorious in China, the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become part of the Chinese federation, at their own free will."²

Post-World War Two events removed the likelihood that these predictions would be realized. By 1950, China could only rely on the economic penetration of her former province to reverse the history of the previous twenty-five years. It was the effects of both the Korean War and Josef Stalin's death on Sino-Soviet relations which enabled China to take the first two steps toward resuming activity in Mongolia.

The hostilities in Korea involved China in a war she did not want or initiate. North Korea was a Soviet satellite and her attack on South Korea in July 1950 was planned by Russian advisors to fulfil Russian aims.³ It was only when her own security was threatened by a United Nations' victory that China committed her troops to battle.⁴

1. Quoted in Dallin, op cit, p. 75.
2. Quoted in Friters, op cit, p. 208.
Nevertheless, she was in effect salvaging Soviet foreign policy from a humiliating defeat.

The war in Korea had two major effects on the Chinese People's Republic. From the outset, it meant that Russia's use of Port Arthur and Dairen was prolonged, thereby maintaining Soviet presence in Manchuria. Only the Changshun Railway was returned to China as agreed in January 1953. Second, in order to wage war, China was forced to divert money, men and materials from her economic reconstruction which was necessitated by the Civil War. By accepting these burdens, China strengthened her bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

A more immediate result for Sino-Soviet relations was the reestablishment of contacts between China and Mongolia. Although reciprocal diplomatic recognition had taken place in 1950, activity was restricted to an exchange of ambassadors. The first direct Sino-Mongol negotiations in more than thirty years occurred in September 1952 and resulted in a ten year Cultural and Economic Agreement, which set the guidelines for future activities between the two countries.


2. CDSP, IV;40, vol. 4, p. 15. (Pravda, October 6, 1952). No clauses were made public at this time.
To be sure, the Agreement was concluded with the tacit approval of the Kremlin. Although the official signing took place in Peking on October 4, 1952, the meetings between Premiers Chou En-lai and Tsedenbal occurred in Moscow. And while cultural, assistance and friendship treaties were signed by the East European satellites with each other and with the Soviet Union within a year after each had become a People's Republic, it was three years after the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed, and two years after mutual recognition, before the Sino-Mongol Agreement was finally drawn up. This significant difference in time suggests a reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to permit such a breakthrough in Sino-Mongol relations. China's sacrifice in the Korean War and the consequent prolongation of the Soviet presence in Manchuria may have forced Moscow to grant this concession to the Chinese. Nevertheless, it was not until after Stalin died that China began to play any role in Mongolia.

After the death of Josef Stalin and the conclusion of the Korean War, the Communist bloc focused its attention on internal problems. The prominent issue aggravating Sino-Soviet relations was Russia's economic penetration of China. This was exemplified by the joint-stock companies established in accordance with the 1950 Mutual Assistance Treaty. These companies included a ship repairing company

at Dairen, a civil aviation enterprise and two Sinkiang based operations, one for mining rare metals and the other for extracting and refining oil.\footnote{J. M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, London, 1962, p. 146.} The existence of the Sinkiang companies was an especially sensitive subject for China. It signified the enforced renewal, in 1950, of Russian mining rights sold to Stalin in 1940 by the warlord of that province, Sheng Shih-t'sai.\footnote{Whiting, "Sinkiang and Sino-Soviet Relations", *China Quarterly*, vol. III, (1960), p. 30. General Sheng was also responsible for the execution of Mao's brother, Mao Tse-min. (Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-t'sai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot*, East Lansing, Michigan, 1958, p. 94, note 11.)} Moreover, Soviet occupation of Port Arthur and Dairen had persisted well beyond the agreed date of transfer.

The necessity of removing the obstacles to closer cooperation between Russia and China caused Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and a candidate for the leadership of Russia, to travel to Peking in October 1954 for the fifth anniversary celebrations of the Chinese People's Republic. He was at the same time seeking the support of the Chinese leaders for his political ambitions. Furthermore, Soviet relations with other bloc countries between 1953 and 1956 were marked by a policy of economic concessions as a means of maintaining political harmony.\footnote{Brzezinski, *op cit*, p. 157.} As a result, during Khrushchev's meetings with
the Chinese, all Russian holdings were ceded to China.\(^1\)

The Soviet Union agreed to vacate both Yellow Sea ports by
May 1955\(^2\) and to transfer the joint-stock companies entirely
to the Chinese People's Republic by January 1, 1955.\(^3\)
Also announced at this time was the planned construction of
two railroads, one through Sinkiang and the other through
the Mongolian People's Republic, shortening the travelling
distance between China and Russia.\(^4\) Direct financial aid
was also promised by the Soviet Union.\(^5\)

As Russia withdrew from Manchuria and Sinkiang
after 1954, she was replaced by China which assumed full
control of these areas. The new Sinkiang railroad made this
province more accessible to settlement and development. After
1955, its official name became the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous
Region of the Chinese People's Republic, a change calculated
to increase cooperation between the Chinese rulers and the
largest nationality residing in that province. The Trans-
Mongolian Railroad had a similar effect on Inner Mongolia

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1. John Gittings, "Cooperation and Conflict in Sino-Soviet
   Relations", *International Affairs*, vol.XL, (January 1964),
   p. 64.
3. CDSP, VI;41, vol.4, p. 6. (*Pravda*, October 13, 1954). Joint-
   stock companies were also transferred to the East European
   satellites at this time. (Brzezinski, op cit, p. 164).
which was rapidly becoming an industrial area.¹ Both rail lines were labelled "railways for uniting the minority peoples",² as they increased Chinese activity in these heretofore remote areas of her territory.

Although the Economic and Cultural Agreement of 1952 and the reclamation of the northern parts of her territory set the stage for the renewal of China's activity in Outer Mongolia, it was the similar and concurrent economic growth of both countries which led to direct Chinese involvement in Mongolian affairs. Both countries began Five Year Plans in 1953. Although Mongolia's main concern at this time was to increase the number of livestock, the Plan also called for the construction of buildings which would contain the future industries envisaged by the Mongol leaders.³ Similarly the Chinese had as their goal the transformation of China from an agricultural to an industrial nation.⁴ Her willingness and capability to help Mongolia achieve her goals was demonstrated by the rapid expansion of the scope of China's activities.

Assistance was offered in three forms: trade, labour and financial aid. In April 1954, the first trade agreement was signed between the two countries whereby China provided Mongolia with manufactured leather goods made from raw materials purchased from the Mongolian People's Republic. By 1956, the trade volume had been doubled. This form of economic activity was to outlast all other.

More essential to the industrial growth of the Mongolian People's Republic was a resource which China possessed in abundance. The scarcity of manpower in Mongolia was a chronic problem which had forced the Government to utilize foreign sources of labour on previous occasions. In 1926, when the anti-Chinese policy of the Mongolian Government led to the expulsion of Chinese merchants, an eyewitness wrote that Chinese labourers, especially skilled ones, would still be welcomed. Japanese prisoners of war were used on new building projects after 1945. Russian soldiers worked on the Trans-Mongolian Railway from 1954 to 1956. The nomad's objection to sedentary labour was gradually overcome by the spread of education and modernization,

but the fact remained that a population of less than a million people could not support at the same time, both the planned increase of livestock production and the transfer of men from the countryside to provide the labour necessary for Mongolia's industrial expansion. The continued inefficiency in livestock production prolonged the existence of this problem. When the Mongol Government complained that Mongolia lacked a sufficient supply of workers for her building programs, China offered assistance.¹

In May 1955, agreement was reached over the importation of Chinese labour into Mongolia. China had no engineers or technicians to spare so few skilled workers were among those who arrived. They were under contract for five years, but if they wished they could remain and become citizens of the Mongolian People's Republic. In 1956, there were ten thousand Chinese working in Mongolia, the largest number in the country in thirty years.² They were used to build agricultural projects and industrial and commercial buildings, many of which were also financed by the Chinese Government.

China's financial aid to Mongolia helped the latter to overcome the obstacle of a lack of capital needed for the intended industrial growth. In the first of a series

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of financial agreements announced in August 1956, China gave Mongolia one hundred and sixty million tughriks\(^1\) to be used over a three year period. The money was earmarked for the construction by the Chinese labourers of a textile and a paper mill, a plywood factory, glass works and a sports stadium.\(^2\) In 1957, it was revealed that as part of this agreement, China was training two hundred apprentices in the manufacture of textiles and paper, and in the techniques of prefabricated construction.\(^3\) In 1958, China granted a loan of one hundred million tughriks to be drawn over fifteen years. This money was to finance the construction of two electric power stations, three concrete bridges, an alcohol and starch factory, a metal workshop and housing developments.\(^4\) An additional loan of two hundred million tughriks was made part of the Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact signed in 1960.\(^5\)

Accompanying China's economic breakthrough into Mongolia was a simultaneous diplomatic courtship of that country. This policy was first revealed at the Twelfth

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1. The tughrik was at par with the ruble, which was worth one quarter of a dollar. (See *The Statesman's Yearbook, 1960*, ed. S. H. Steinberg, New York, 1960, p. 1471).
Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in November 1954. Russia was represented by P. T. Komarov, the Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Communist Party's Commission on Party Control, and V. I. Pisarev, Russia's Ambassador to Mongolia. China, on the other hand, sent Ulanfu, the leader of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, a sinicized Mongol and a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. His career illustrated how well treated the Mongols were in China, and that being a member of a minority group in China was no obstacle to a position of success and importance. At the Congress, Mongolia's Prime Minister Tsedenbal paid tribute to the "inviolable friendship" which was "steadily developing and strengthening between the Mongolian People and the great Chinese People."¹

The Congress was followed by increasingly frequent state visits by leaders of both countries. In March 1956, Chinese Minister of Defense, Chu Teh, spent four days in Ulan Bator visiting schools and factories.² A military delegation led by Mongolian Defense Minister B. Dorzh visited Peking in 1958, and representatives of the Chinese armed forces reciprocated the following year with a four

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² SCMP, no. 1261, pp. 33-38. (NCNA, Ulan Bator, March 29-April 1, 1956).
day trip to Ulan Bator.¹ In August 1959, members of the Chinese National People's Congress were beginning a six day tour of Mongolia, while Tsedenbal was being received in Peking.² The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, which included China's third financial grant to Mongolia, was signed in Ulan Bator by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi, who were completing a five day state visit.³ A 1957 cultural agreement for cooperation in science, education, health and communications,⁴ was followed by an accord to begin air services between both countries.⁵

Chinese ties with Mongolia were strengthened further as China encouraged closer relations between the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region and the Mongolian People's Republic. While all the Chinese people and the non-Chinese minorities living in the southern regions of the mainland were to change to the Latin alphabet in their language simplification programs, Inner Mongolia was to adopt the Cyrillic script which was in use in Outer Mongolia.⁶ This

⁴ SCMP, no. 1488, p. 29. (NCNA, Ulan Bator, March 9, 1957).
⁵ SCMP, no. 1696, p. 35. (NCNA, Ulan Bator, January 18, 1958).
facilitated journalistic exchanges and literary contacts across the border. Although the People's Republic prohibited emigration to the more populous and economically advanced Autonomous Region, the Sino-Mongol border was no longer guarded. As a result of the warmer relations between the two countries, agreement was reached whereby Chinese and Mongolian livestock herds could cross the Sino-Mongol boundary in order to escape winter storms. By January 1957, three hundred and fifty thousand cattle which belonged to China had crossed the border into eastern Outer Mongolia. That year, the Mongolian People's Republic received the approval of the Chinese Government for the establishment of a consulate-general in Huhéhot (Kukhe Khoto), the capital of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

China's economic activities in Mongolia helped the latter modernize within a very short time. The financial aid enabled the Mongol Government to undertake projects which it could not have afforded otherwise. The Chinese labourers were "to be seen working on any enterprise of.

5. SCMP, no. 1521, p. 35. (NCNA, Peking, April 29, 1957).
importance in Ulan Bator and elsewhere."¹ The appreciation of the Mongolian Government was expressed in the medals and honours awarded to the workers.² This rapid transformation of Mongolia could not have been achieved in so short a time without the aid of Chinese capital and manpower.

By 1957, Chinese involvement in Mongolia had reached its peak. Participation by China in Mongolia's development continued but did not expand. It was offset by renewed Russian concern for her oldest satellite, caused by the rapid growth of Chinese interest there and also by a shift in Sino-Soviet relations resulting from Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program. The Russian reaction effectively limited and ultimately reduced Chinese activity in Mongolia and inaugurated a new phase in Russo-Mongol relations.


CHAPTER 3.


Soviet policy in Mongolia was aimed at the control, but not the annexation, of the country. Her strategy in this regard was to modernize the Mongolian People's Republic along Soviet lines with the objective of having the Mongols themselves assume the leadership of the developing socialist country. Soviet influence would be present in the form of the institutions established during the modernization. The execution of this long term plan was carried out slowly and gradually, and was beginning to reach fruition at mid-century.

One of the most widespread manifestations of Soviet influence was in the field of education. The Russian imprint on Mongol education became evident very soon after the Communist takeover. It was a Russian, Ivan Korostovetz, who had established the first secular school in Outer Mongolia in 1913. After 1921, education became a major government concern. Although there were few pupils, education was free and resident students had their room and board paid
for by the State.\textsuperscript{1} The increase in student population over the years did not change this policy. The 1937 purge of the Lamaist Church erased its influence from the school system and gave total control of education to the Government.

The Russian educational system provided the framework for the Mongolian schools. As in the Soviet Union, there were "incomplete" and "complete" school programs. Four years of elementary school for the ages of seven to eleven were compulsory for all. Three more years of high school gave a student an "incomplete" seven year education, relegating him to life as an unskilled labourer. Those who qualified to continue through the last four years of high school and complete the ten year curriculum were entitled to enter Choibalsan University or Teachers' College. Trade schools, called Technicum, were also available to the high school graduate.\textsuperscript{2}

By the mid-fifties progress in education stood as the "major result of Communist rule in Outer Mongolia.\textsuperscript{3} The first Mongol teachers received their education in Russia or from the Russians residing in Mongolia. By the nine-

\textsuperscript{1} Ma Ho-tien, \textit{op cit}, pp. 82-94.


teen fifties, the first generation of Mongol-trained teachers were leading the drive toward modernization. ¹ Total literacy was accomplished in 1954.² While a shortage of university trained specialists did exist, past efforts in the field of education were vindicated somewhat during the second Five Year Plan, when a lack of labourers, rather than of experts, proved to be a major obstacle to its success.³

The second Five Year Plan begun by the Mongolian People’s Republic in 1953 turned out to be a two stage undertaking. The Plan was first formulated with the discouraging experiences of the previous Plan in mind. Few new enterprises were undertaken and the quotas were reduced. The livestock objectives were cut down to the more sober figure of twenty seven and a half million head, the number of animals in 1941.⁴ In the industrial sector, the Plan emphasized increased production from existing facilities, rather than embarking on new ventures. This was dictated by the Mongolian Government’s lack of investment capital. The general stress was again on the prerequisites of a planned economy, protection for animals during storms and drought, scientific stockbreeding, public health and education

⁴. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 169. See also Table 17, p. 164.
and a large public works program. When the first year of the Plan produced few of the improvements anticipated, objectives were reassessed and the Plan was overhauled.

The new elements of the Plan attested to the Russian influence in Mongolian affairs by their resemblance to the Khrushchev agricultural program of 1953-1954. The same methods and aims existed in both cases, except that the emphasis was on agriculture in Russia and on the livestock industry in Mongolia. Greater and more efficient production was the objective in both countries. After 1954, collectivization of the arats, or the livestock breeders, became a prime objective. Concessions rather than force induced the breeders to join collectives in this post-Stalin period. Taxes were lowered for the low and middle income arats and raised for the "kulaks," a policy directed toward the economic ruin of the latter while making collectivization more attractive to the former. As was begun in the Soviet Union after September 1953, Mongolia increased Government procurement prices in order to encourage greater production. Goods sold to the nomads, on the other hand, were cut in price.

The Soviet concept of otgonnyi was adopted after

2. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 172.
it had succeeded in Soviet Central Asia. This system united the essential elements of collectivization with nomadism. The collective centre functioned as a village, providing food and shelter for the nomad's family. The arat himself led the livestock to distant pastures, where he remained with his flock until new grazing land became necessary. Although this disrupted family life, the favourable economic results warranted its implementation.\(^1\)

To help institute these changes, members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party followed the example of their Soviet counterparts,\(^2\) and became collective directors and local administrators.\(^3\)

To ensure the success of the economic acceleration, Russia granted concessions to Mongolia. This aid took the form of agreements which were heavily balanced in the latter's favour. In 1954, Russia lowered the price of exports to Mongolia while paying a higher price for goods imported from there.\(^4\) Two years later, Anastas Mikoyan stopped in Ulan Bator during an Asian tour, and concluded a Soviet aid agreement. Russia was to provide the plans, machinery and advisors for public works programs, such as housing, water works and factories, heating and sewage

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1. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia*, pp. 149-150.
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systems for the modernization of Ulan Bator.¹ Long term credit was granted to help finance these projects.² In December 1956, a reciprocal trade agreement was signed whereby Mongolia would provide Russia with livestock products and receive in return consumer goods and machinery for industry and agriculture.³

The political repercussions resulting from Stalin's death in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also affected the leadership of the Mongolian People's Republic. In April 1954, Tsedenbal, successor to Khorloin Choibalsan as Party and State leader,⁴ was relieved of his position as First Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and replaced by Dordj Damba.⁵ Pravda announced that this was done at Tsedenbal's request,⁶ and ensuing events suggested that it was an administrative shakeup rather than a purge. No other officials lost their positions and Tsedenbal remained the most important figure on the Mongolian scene. It was his speech and not Damba's which was

¹. CDSP, VIII;15, vol. 2, p. 27. (Pravda and Izvestia, April 10, 1956).
². SCMP, no. 1267, p. 2. (NCNA, Peking, April 10, 1956).
⁴. Choibalsan was Mongolia's Stalin, having been both State and Party leader since 1939. He died in February 1952.
⁵. The New York Times, April 7, 1954, p. 28
debated at the Twelfth Party Congress in November 1954. He
gave the major reports and his name dominated the Soviet
press coverage of the event.

The accession of Damba to the post of First
Secretary of the Party has been attributed to the rising
influence of a pro-Peking faction in Ulan Bator. This is
supported by the coincidence of the period of Chinese strength
in Mongolia with Damba's tenure of office. It is quite
unlikely, however, that there existed so strong a Chinese
voice in Mongolia in early 1954. That Chinese influence
in the Mongolian People's Republic was never powerful
enough to influence political activity is proven by the
inability of Damba to retain his post in 1958, when China
was more firmly established there than in 1954.

The change in the leadership positions in Mon-
golia was in fact, linked to political events in Moscow.
The death of Stalin placed the Soviet Union in the hands
of a collective leadership. It soon became the practice
in Eastern Europe to separate the positions of State and

1. CDSP, VI:48, vol. 4, p. 5-9. (Pravda and Izvestia,

2. P. H. M. Jones, "Mongolia Between Two Fires," Far
(Hereafter cited as FEER); Richard A. Geisler, "Recent
Developments in Outer Mongolia," Far Eastern Survey,
Party leader and fill them with two people instead of one. Most leaders opted for the Party position because their power base lay there. Tsedenbal was one of the few satellite leaders who chose the Premierships of his country.

Tsedenbal's choice suggested that he considered his position to be secure, enabling him to relinquish, what was considered to be the most powerful office in a Communist country. Moreover, it was a politically adroit decision. Since the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party assumed direct charge of the economic acceleration in 1954, Tsedenbal ensured increased efficiency by giving up the position of First Secretary of the Party to a man who could devote complete attention to the execution of the Plan. In this way too, Tsedenbal shifted the responsibility for failure to Damba and retained the real power in Mongolia for himself.

As the extent and strength of Russian influence in Mongolia grew, the need for Russian nationals to protect Soviet interests was proportionally diminished. This led to a decrease in the number of Russians living in Mongolia and to their replacement by trained and skilled Mongols.

1. The policy of the separation of powers was especially intended to reduce the power of the Hungarian leader, Matyas Rakosi. (See Brzezinski, op cit, pp. 158-161).

2. For a list of leaders and their choices, see Ibid, p. 161 n.
In 1956, the Soviet-Mongolian Railroad was transferred entirely to the Mongolian Government, and the last of the Russian soldiers, who had been working on its construction, left Mongolian territory. There were no Russian settlements and technicians returned home when their jobs were completed. The bi-national companies came under Mongolian control by 1957. The British scholar, Ivor Montagu, visited Mongolia in 1957 and noticed almost no Russians during his trip, even at centres where advisors would normally be found.

Although the withdrawal of Russian personnel followed the increase in Chinese activity and the arrival of her workers in Mongolia, the former was not a result of the latter. The aim of the Mongolian school system was to train Mongols to perform the tasks being done by the Soviet advisors. The exodus of Russians, therefore, signified a measure of success of this objective, and displayed the confidence Russia had in the allegiance of the Mongols.

China's activities in Mongolia were nevertheless closely watched by the Kremlin leaders, who noticed that her importance was simultaneously increasing within the entire Communist bloc. By mid-1957 China could no longer be considered a Soviet satellite. This change in Sino-Soviet relations directly affected China's position in Mongolia. What had begun as economic assistance by one socialist country for another suddenly appeared as a challenge to Russia's long established position. In 1957, Mongolia was still no more than an area of Chinese interest, but the Soviet Union began to take steps to limit the extent and to reduce the importance of Chinese involvement in Russia's oldest satellite.

Russia's concern for her position in Mongolia did not stem from China's activities there, but rather from the shocks which emanated from Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1956. The events in Poland and Hungary caught Russia unprepared and forced her leaders to accept Chinese advice in dealing with the situation. Furthermore, by criticizing the Soviet Union for practicing "chauvinism by a big country" and sympathizing with the Hungarian and Polish demands during the crisis, China appeared to be

challenging Russia for leadership of the Communist movement. Although the Chinese emphasized their loyalty to Russia, the Poles continued to hope for Chinese support in their struggle against Russian domination.\(^1\) Chou En-lai travelled to Eastern Europe in January 1957 to help find a solution to the Russo-Polish impasse. In April 1957, Premier Cyrankiewicz went to Peking, where he and Chou signed a joint declaration on socialist solidarity.\(^2\) It was China's emergence from satellite status to a position of independence in the Communist world which prompted the Soviet Union to pay closer attention to Mongolia.

The first act in this direction was a Joint Statement issued by Premiers Bulganin and Tsedenbal in May 1957.\(^3\) In it, the Soviet Union disclosed the extent of her aid to Mongolian economic development since World War Two, and also announced new agreements for financial assistance. It mentioned that it was Russian geological exploration which provided an oil industry for Mongolia. For the first time it was made public that during the period of her two Five Year Plans, 1947-1957, the Mongolian People's Republic received nine hundred million tugrikas.

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from the Soviet Union. Russia also announced that an additional two hundred million tughriks were to be loaned for the Three Year Plan of 1958-1960.

The Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement indicated a further withdrawal of Russia from direct participation in the running of Mongolian industries. Although three hundred million rubles were spent to set up the Mongolneft oil enterprises, they were to be given to the People's Republic "without compensation". Sovmongolmetal, the joint stock company for prospecting and mining minerals, was also transferred completely to Mongolia for an interest free sum to be paid over a thirty year period. Two Soviet airports located in Mongolia were also relinquished along with some planes and airport equipment "without charge". This was done "in order to help the Mongolian People's Republic establish its own civil aviation system".

Projects announced for the future included aid for coalmining, public works and agriculture. Equipment, financial and technical assistance was to be provided for these undertakings. Tractors and accessories, combines, trucks and generators were to be supplied in abundance. For livestock production, ten thousand purebred cattle were sent. Russian advisors and capital were helping to build flour mills, housing projects, sewage and heating

systems in Ulan Bator. The Soviet Union also agreed to pay for half the cost of public health measures called for in the Three Year Plan.

A very obvious feature of the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement was the omission of the role of the Chinese People's Republic in developing the Mongolian economy. The bulk of the capital, the majority of the blueprints and all the advisors for the projects under construction, were in fact supplied by Russia. Yet China's contributions of financial aid and labourers working on many of the structures mentioned in the Joint Statement were totally ignored. ¹ China's only recognized function was to have "created even more favourable conditions for the building of socialism in the Mongolian People's Republic", because being surrounded by socialist states ensured "peace and tranquility on the Mongolian People's Republic borders...".

The Bulganin-Tsedenbal Joint Statement was written to be read by the Chinese. It was not a declaration of agreement or policy, but rather a list of projects to be carried out with Russo-Mongol cooperation. The message, however, was directed at Peking. By omitting any reference to Sino-Mongol relations, the Statement wrote off any importance attached to them. The transfer of Russian holdings in the Mongolian People's Republic to its Government

¹ Above, pp. 27-29.
exhibited Russia's confidence in the allegiance of her satellite. Of greatest importance was the implication that Mongolia's interests were best served by Russia, and not by China.

The publication of the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement marked a new stage in Soviet policy to Outer Mongolia. The creation of a developing socialist Mongolia administered by her own people had been accomplished, albeit with some help from China. Minimizing China's contribution to Mongolia's growth was the first step toward aim. Russia's objective became closer cooperation and interdependence between Mongolia and the western sector of the Communist bloc.
CHAPTER 4.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW RUSSIAN POLICY.

The Bulganin-Tsedenbal Joint Statement of 1957 inaugurated a new phase in Russo-Mongol relations. Soviet aid was increased, contacts and visits between the two countries became more numerous, and the East European satellite countries began, for the first time, to send industrial equipment and geological exploration teams to Mongolia. Mongolia's economic development increasingly depended on the help received from the western sector of the Communist bloc.

One of the first manifestations of intensified Soviet interest in Mongolia was the appointment of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, former Premier and Foreign Affairs' Minister of Russia, as "Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary" to the Mongolian People's Republic in August 1957. Since this followed his removal from important Party and Government posts, the appointment to so remote a location was regarded as the traditional punishment of exile for Russian political undesirables. Nevertheless, consigning so renowned a diplomat to this office in Mon-

golia suggested a further Soviet effort to tighten her control over her oldest satellite.¹

Little is known of Molotov's role or actions in Mongolia. Coincident events hint that he may have been a factor behind the large purge of leading members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party between November 1958 and March 1959. Since scant evidence is available concerning this new power shift in Mongolia, it is difficult to assess Molotov's role. It is significant that this large scale purge, the first in the Mongolian People's Republic since 1939, occurred only one year after Molotov's arrival.

This political shakeup came in two stages. In November 1958, Dordj Damba asked to be relieved of his position as First Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.² He was replaced by Tsedenbal who once again assumed leadership of both the Government and the Party. In March 1959, Tsedenbal launched a general purge of the Party's Politburo, in which half its members lost their positions.³ Damba became "manager of a livestock breeding and tractor station in a remote northwestern

¹. His equally renowned colleagues, Kaganovich and Malenkov, also purged by Khrushchev in May 1957, were relegated to minor administrative posts in Siberia. (The New York Times, August 31, 1957, p. 2).
Scholars have pointed to two possible reasons for the purge of Damba. One was that he tried to set China against Russia in order to win more independence for Mongolia.² The fact that Damba was First Secretary of the People's Party while China's influence was at its height was cited as evidence. The lack of Chinese press coverage of this purge was seen as a sign of Chinese displeasure.³ If fear of China was the chief cause, however, then surely Damba would have been removed long before the end of 1958, at which time his position seemed to be rather secure,⁴ and after nearly two years had elapsed since the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement.

Other accounts suggest that Damba's removal resulted from a clash over economic policy with Tsedenbal.⁵ Again there are inconsistencies in this theory. By being labelled pro-China, Damba was said to admire the self-sacrificing zeal displayed by the Chinese in carrying out their economic development.⁶ Moreover, it was during Damba's

tenure of office that the industrial goals of the second Five Year Plan were met. Yet it was Tsedenbal who was given credit as being the driving force behind Mongolia's economic advances. Bawden interpreted the purge as "the victory of those who wanted to press forward with a Soviet-supported socialization at all costs." Harrison Salisbury described Tsedenbal's program as "full speed ahead in a plan to change a nation of nomads into a nation based on the agriculture of the plow and the industry of the production line." There could be little difference in economic policy, therefore, since both Tsedenbal and Damba espoused the same goals.

It seems that political rather than economic or diplomatic considerations were the prime factors in this purge. There was no disagreement over policy. The all-encompassing, unspecific crimes of which Damba was accused suggested a power struggle within the leadership, rather than a break over specific issues. He was purged

"for lack of principle and dishonesty to the Party, for profound ideological and political backwardness, for conservatism and inertia, for conceit and a lack of a critical attitude toward himself and for opportunistic tolerance of distortions and shortcomings in work."

The return of both the State and Party leaderships to

Tsedenbal marked the abandonment of collective leadership in Mongolia. Molotov's presence in Ulan Bator gives rise to the speculation that Khrushchev's termination of collective leadership in Russia was a major influence in the Mongolian purge.

The third Five Year Plan, begun in 1961, further strengthened Russia's role in Mongolia's economic development. While the goals for the industrial and livestock sectors of the economy remained relatively unchanged, new impetus was given to agricultural growth. Meagre attempts had been made to improve the agricultural situation in the past, but during the third Plan, the major emphasis lay in this direction. The sown acreage was to be trebled and more aid was given to state farms. A new industrial priority, electrification, was expected to accelerate agricultural growth by making the electrically serviced collectives more attractive to settlers.¹

Agriculture in the Mongolian People's Republic faced one serious obstacle, the shortage of water. No more than ten inches of rain fell in Mongolia annually,² and water found within its boundaries was generally salty and difficult to utilize as it was located in marshlands.³

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2. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 52.

The rivers were too few and far apart. The ever-continuing search for usable water encouraged nomadism, which was in direct contradiction to Government policy.

Connected with the new agricultural drive, consequently, was a search for water in the Gobi Desert. In fact, this area resembled a dry prairie more than a desert, and since archeological research uncovered traces of previous agriculture in Mongolia, the prospect of finding water underground was not as remote as had been believed. By 1965, one hundred and eighty wells had been discovered in the Gobi Desert, facilitating the reclamation of unused land and the settling of nomads close to steady, guaranteed water supplies.

The livestock industry, despite three economic plans over fourteen years, continued to fall below expectations. Added to inability to meet objectives was the failure to at all increase the total number of animals over this period. There were twenty three million head of livestock in Mongolia both in 1948, at the start of economic planning, and in 1961. The third Plan produced no improvement. The Mongol Government pointed to bad weather and careless administration as the chief

causes.\(^1\) Peasant discontent with collectivization and incentives also contributed to the ineffectiveness of the measures taken to increase the amount of livestock.\(^2\) Adverse weather continued to plague the economic plans of Mongolia as fierce widespread snowstorms in May 1962\(^3\) and early 1964\(^4\) were responsible for the deaths of several hundred thousand animals. This forced several readjustments in the goals for the Five Year Plan.\(^5\)

Augmented Soviet aid during this economic plan reflected Russia's increased concern for this area. The 1957 economic decentralization begun in the Soviet Union was designed to promote the role of the local Party functionaries and industrial managers in economic decision-making.\(^6\) This was especially significant in the areas east of the Volga River, which accounted for most of

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1. *FEER*, vol. XXXIV, no. 11, p. 492.


5. As early as 1951, the American economic geographer, H. J. Wiens, criticized the enlargement of livestock herds as an unreasonable aim in the first place. He argued that "the Mongolian grasslands have reached a point of saturation" and that "a reduction of the total number of animals, rather than the increased numbers" would serve Mongolia better. This policy was never adopted by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. (See Wiens, *op cit*, p. 361).

Russia's industrial production.\(^1\) By giving a greater voice in economic planning to the inhabitants of the Russian lands closest to the Chinese frontier, the Soviet Government intended to strengthen the allegiance of the people to their country. This was also Russia's aim in Mongolia. After 1960, the drive toward economic success in Mongolia was accelerated with the help of the Soviet Union. This was due to the further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations after the withdrawal of all Russian technicians and advisors from China that same year. Mongolia's lack of success in increasing her livestock herds and her first serious venture into the field of planned agriculture necessitated even more Soviet aid.

Soviet economic assistance took the traditional forms of outright financial aid, trade agreements balanced in Mongolia's favour, and technical aid of different kinds and in different fields. Loans totalling three hundred and fifty million dollars were granted to cover the new Five Year Plan, while the repayment of outstanding debts of sixty million dollars was deferred beyond 1965.\(^2\) Further agreements were announced in 1964, although no figures were released.\(^3\) By the middle of the Plan, Russian aid, according to published accounts, totalled nine hundred

1. Ibid, p. 265.
million dollars.

Trade increased during this period as well. Mongolia continued to receive material dictated by her economic needs, such as agricultural and industrial tools, transport equipment and electric power plants.\(^1\) In return she sold textiles and glass, which now joined leather by-products as Mongolia's chief export commodities. Toward the end of the Five Year Plan, much greater quantities of consumer goods were imported, indicating a certain measure of economic success.\(^2\)

Russia's technical aid was in the form of both men and materials. She provided the plans and the organizers to build grain elevators, oil pipelines and a furniture plant, in addition to the electrification undertaken during this period. The Soviet Union also provided agricultural equipment in the form of five thousand tractors and nine hundred combines.\(^3\) In 1962, there were three hundred combine operators and eight hundred construction specialists working in Mongolia. One thousand thoroughbred cattle were sent to improve livestock production. During this period fourteen hundred Mongols were in Russia

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3. FEER, vol. XXXIV, no. 11, p. 496.
57.

learning agricultural skills.¹

Following Russia's lead, the East European satellite states also began to do business with Outer Mongolia. The groundwork for economic cooperation was laid during the third economic Plan of 1958-1960 when the first trade agreements between Mongolia and East Europe were signed. The Mongolian People's Republic received little in the way of monetary grants from the East European satellites, but she was the recipient of much valuable technical assistance from these countries. Of all the satellites, only Rumania was not a participant in these ventures.

Mongolia's relations with Eastern Europe began in 1958 and immediately expanded rapidly. After 1958, the number of Czech and East German technicians in Mongolia multiplied. Czechoslovakia furnished the Ulan Bator Hotel, supplied the machinery for tanneries and a shoe factory, and sent Skoda buses for use in public transport.² East Germany sent electrification equipment while her advisors gave instructions in operating a printing press.³ Polish cameras, Czech radios and German motorbikes were on

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2. FEER, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 496.
sale in the new Univermag Department Store.\textsuperscript{1} Poland lent Mongolia ten million dollars for geological exploration,\textsuperscript{2} and provided street lights for Ulan Bator. The reclamation of the Gobi Desert was being carried out under the guidance of Hungarian geologists, who hoped to find an additional two hundred and fifty wells between 1966 and 1970.\textsuperscript{3} Trade agreements were signed with each country during both the Three Year and the Five Year Plans.

Facilitating the growth of these ties was the Eastern European economic organization, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, more popularly known as Comecon. Organized in 1949, its purpose was

\textit{"to organize extensive economic, scientific and technical cooperation among member countries in order to make the most rational use of their natural and economic resources and to promote the growth of their productive forces."}\textsuperscript{4}

The Council coordinated economic activity in the same countries for which the Warsaw Pact organized defense. After attending Comecon meetings as an observer in 1958, trade relations between Eastern Europe and Mongolia were initiated. In 1959, the amount of exchange with this area

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} FEER, vol.XXXIV, no. 11, p. 492.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} The New York Times, July 16, 1961, p. 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} Bondy, \textit{op cit}, p. 12-13.
\end{itemize}
overtook the quantity of Mongolia's trade with China. The Chinese People's Republic had also attended meetings as an observer but withdrew in 1961. The benefits to Mongolia encouraged her to join the Council in June 1962.¹ She thus became the first Asian member of the organization.

This action has been called "a direct Russian slap at China."² Such an interpretation is extreme, since trade with China was not cut back as a consequence. Furthermore, items arriving from East Europe and China were not competitive. China was in no position to export cars and electrification equipment, while Czechoslovakia and Hungary could not supply labourers. Joining Comecon merely formalized for Mongolia the already existing business activity being carried on with Eastern Europe.

Politically, the desire of the Mongolian People's Republic to join the Council was indicative of the shift in Mongolia's position since 1957. At the time, China was her only other trading partner besides Russia. The Soviet Union had pulled out all but a skeleton staff of advisors from Mongolia, while China's economic influence was reaching its peak. By 1962, the Eastern European

countries had dislodged China from her favourable position and Mongolia had been drawn firmly into the western section of the Communist bloc.

To cement this new relationship, high level visits became more common between the two areas. In 1961, the Fourteenth Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was attended by Mikhail Suslov of the Soviet Politburo, and both the Communist Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Premier Joseph Cyrankiewicz of Poland. In July of the next year, President Z. Sambu of Mongolia visited President Leonid Brezhnev of Russia. In the autumn of 1964, Tsedenbal made an extended trip to the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. He made additional trips in the spring and summer of 1965. In 1965, Ulan Bator received visits from Alexander Shelepin and several generals of the Soviet Army and Air Force. The following January, Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev made Mongolia the first Asian country he visited since he assumed his new position.

During the early nineteen sixties, Mongolia also won increasing acceptance, even among non-Communist

countries, as an independent entity. The major step was the entry after five unsuccessful attempts, of the Mongolian People's Republic into the United Nations in October 1961.\(^1\) This was made possible only through Soviet diplomatic maneuvers, which succeeded in reducing Taiwan's veto to an abstention.\(^2\) The United States did not recognize the Mongolian People's Republic,\(^3\) but Great Britain and France did. In January 1963, the United Kingdom announced that relations would be established at the ambassadorial level, although the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking was to function for both countries.\(^4\) Credentials were presented on May 20. Canada extended recognition in 1964, and France followed in April 1965.\(^5\) This diplomatic activity occurred during the marked improvement in Soviet-Western relations following the Cuban missile crisis, and was accompanied by a similar increase in trade between Western and Soviet-bloc countries.\(^6\) By 1965, thirty two

\(^{1}\) Applications were filed in 1946, 1947, 1949, 1955, and 1960.


\(^{3}\) Although the United States did initiate recognition proceedings when John Kennedy became President, opposition by Taiwan and certain Congressmen led to their cancellation. Fear that Communist China would be recognized next motivated this opposition. (See *The New York Times*, June 10, 1961, p. 2; June 13, 1961, p. 2; June 17, 1961, p. 9).


\(^{6}\) C. L. Sulzberger, however, attributes the French move to General de Gaulle's geo-political views. "He indicates the belief that someday the Soviet Union is going to
countries recognized the Mongolian People's Republic, of which nineteen were non-Communist nations. ¹

This avalanche of economic and diplomatic activity involving Mongolia accomplished the result desired by the Soviet Union. China's activity there was diminished as was her influence. Mongolia became increasingly indebted to Russia and Eastern Europe for their economic assistance and progressively more independent of the Chinese People's Republic. Contacts with China were not cut off entirely. In spite of the rise of European influence in the Mongolian People's Republic, Mongolia continued to accept Chinese financial aid, to sign trade agreements with her, and to employ Chinese labour. It was the Sino-Soviet dispute which eliminated from Mongolia these remaining vestiges of Chinese influence, and provided the test which proved that Mongolia's allegiance was entirely to the Soviet Union.

be partitioned with its Slavic components reaffirming closer ties with Europe and with the vast trans-Ural area, including Siberia and the Turkmenian republics, eventually falling under Chinese suzerainty...It is thus indicated that in his long term view, de Gaulle seems to hold that China's destiny is to eventually amputate Asiatic Russia and thereby impel Slavic Russia westward toward the Europe which de Gaulle envisions as a vague but coherent future force." (See The New York Times, July 9, 1965, p. 28). France recognized the Chinese People's Republic in January 1964. (See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1964), February 1-8, p. 19877).

CHAPTER 5.

MONGOLIA AND THE SINO-SOVIEr DISPUTE.

The Sino-Soviet dispute, as far as the Mongolian People's Republic was concerned, went through two stages. The first consisted of a difference in the interpretation of Communist ideology by the two major Communist powers. This dialogue over the implementation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine was, after several years, replaced by the historical reason for disputes between these countries: conflicting claims to the territory that lay between them. Much of this disputed land, such as the provinces of Sinkiang and Manchuria, was now controlled and governed by China, but had for long periods been under Russian and Soviet economic and political domination. China was not satisfied that all the land she now ruled was all that belonged to her. Included in the territory she claimed was the Mongolian People's Republic.

Only the second problem was of any real concern to the Mongol Government. A threat to her borders could mean danger to her independence from both sides. Mongolia had no desire to return to Chinese rule, but at the same time feared that Chinese pressure might lead to outright
Russian annexation. The Mongolian People's Republic, virtue of her geographical position, was also threatened by the possibility of partition, the fate suffered by Poland in 1939.

The Mongols showed little interest in the ideological aspect of the dispute. They could contribute nothing to the theories of peaceful coexistence or wars of liberation. For as long as she could, Mongolia tried to remain silent about these questions. Her major worry was the danger inherent in her geo-political position, a position which had heretofore been very profitable. Before she was forced to take an open stand on the ideological issue, Mongolia's attitude was described by a Mongol diplomat this way:

"We don't want to get mixed up in what we don't understand. Anyway, both sides give us aid."

Even after Mongolia, not unexpectedly, stated her support for the Soviet Union, she avoided any discussion of ideology. Generally, Mongolia simply praised Soviet foreign policy, attacked the Chinese Communist leaders for splitting the world Communist movement, and emphasized the extent of economic aid she received from the Soviet Union. No independently conceived polemics against the Chinese People's Republic appeared in Mongolian newspapers. 2

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The period of increased Russian and East European activity in Mongolia, inaugurated by the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement of 1957, was motivated by the rapid growth of Chinese influence both in Mongolia and in the Communist world. The climax of this new Soviet policy came in July 1961, when the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party held its Fourteenth Congress in Ulan Bator. At both the Twelfth and Thirteenth Congress, China was represented by Ulanfu. Russia sent P. T. Komarov in 1954, and N. G. Ignatov in 1958. Both were relatively unimportant Soviet officials who were not calculated to make a major impression on the Mongols. Ulanfu came again in 1961.

On this occasion the Soviet Union sent Mikhail Suslov, the third most important man in the Kremlin and the acknowledged ideologist of the Russian Communist Party. This action was aimed, not so much at attracting the Mongols as at belittling the Chinese who were celebrating the fortieth anniversary of their Communist Party. There was no Russian representative in China for this event.¹ Russia published a letter of best wishes to the Communist Party of China,² but reported the celebrations on the back page of Pravda along with other news items of the

day. The Mongolian Congress was given front page coverage.¹

In his speech to the Congress, Suslov reiterated
the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement by emphasizing Russia's
role in Mongolia's economic development and he avoided any
reference to China's contributions. Tsedenbal's address
also neglected to mention China while it heaped praise
on the Soviet Union.

"In the hearts of the working people of
the Mongolian People's Republic...there
lives eternally a sense of deep and most
sincere gratitude and warm appreciation
for the glorious motherland of Lenin and
Leninism...for all they have done for the
liberation of the Mongolian people from
the yoke of national and social oppression
for the creation of a happy life..."²

He made no mention of the widening Sino-Soviet split.

Suslov significantly touched upon the dispute
in an oblique way. In their efforts to justify their respective
ideological positions, China and Russia tried to win the
support of the poor, uncommitted nations of the so-called
Third World. Suslov used this occasion to attack the Chinese
method of building socialism, not by direct reference
but by advertising that the Russian process, exemplified
by Mongolia, was the better one for emerging nations to
adopt and follow.

The use of Mongolia as an example to the Third

1. FEER, vol. XXXIII, no. 3, p. 87.
World suggested a new importance for the People's Republic, that of a lever in Soviet foreign policy. Suslov said in his speech that

"Mongolia's experience in building socialism acquires particular practical significance today when the face of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is changing, when all the large nations whose life is marked by feudalism or even a pre-feudal system are acquiring national independence and taking the destinies of their countries into their own hands..."

Russia could not point to her Eastern European satellites as examples of the success of her brand of socialism, since capitalism and industrialization were well advanced in these countries before the imposition of socialism. Mongolia closely fitted the pattern of the emerging nations and was therefore an asset to Soviet foreign policy during the dispute.

The Mongolian People's Republic sided openly with the Soviet Union later in 1961 at the Twenty Second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October. This was the first of the few times that the Mongolian leaders spoke out on ideological matters. At this conference, Chairman Khrushchev inaugurated the practice of attacking the Albanian Party of Labour when, in fact, he was criticizing the Chinese Communist Party. The majority of


Communist Parties represented at the Congress joined in the condemnation of Albania, and according to Harrison Salisbury of The New York Times, few did it more outspokenly than the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party through its leader, Tsedenbal.¹

Mongol support for the Soviet Union also extended to Party affairs at home. Between the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress of 1956, which had condemned the Stalin personality cult, and the Twenty Second in 1961, which added Voroshilov to the anti-Party group of 1957-1958, there was no independent condemnation of these crimes in Mongolia. Although Mongols had been purged during this period, it was not for these reasons. This situation was rectified soon after the 1961 Moscow Congress.

While reporting to the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in January 1962, Tsedenbal emphasized again that Mongolia gave Russia her unqualified support.

"We are in complete agreement with the frank and principled criticism of the anti-Marxist positions of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist Parties and cannot agree with the reservations expressed in this matter at the Twenty Second Party Congress by the Communist Party of China, for example."

Leaf 69 omitted in page numbering.
During this report, Tsedenbal launched his de-Stalinization campaign.

Mongolia's Stalin was Marshall Khorloin Choibalsan, who had been Premier of the Mongolian People's Republic between 1939 and his death in 1952, a year before Stalin died. At different times during his premiership, he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior. He was head of state longer than Stalin, who only assumed the title of Premier in 1941. Tsedenbal had served Choibalsan as a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party from 1940 to 1952.

At the Central Committee Plenum in January 1962, Tsedenbal accused Choibalsan of practicing the cult of the individual, and of terrorism and excesses. His crimes were not considered as grave as Stalin's, however, because

"Comrade Choibalsan felt responsibility to the Party for the errors he committed in the past and...he tried to learn the appropriate lessons from them."

Tsedenbal took a certain measure of the blame for fostering the personality cult, citing a speech he made in praise of Choibalsan on his fiftieth birthday in 1945. The Party apparatus, he said, now guarded against the repetition of these crimes.

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1. Ibid, p. 29.
Criticism of Choibalsan was not as thorough as the de-Stalinization in Russia. Choibalsan's body was not removed from the mausoleum it shared with that of Sukhe Bator. Nor were place names in Choibalsan's honour changed. No widespread purge followed, and members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party who served with Choibalsan were not suddenly implicated and criticized. Choibalsan alone was charged with practicing the personality cult, and the condemnation was very mild in comparison with that delivered against his Soviet contemporary.

Tsedenbal accomplished three important things by launching this campaign. In the first place, he demonstrated his loyalty to the Soviet Union and to the Russian Communist Party policy. Secondly, he now had an available accusation to level at any rival for his position or at opposition to the Revolutionary Party's policy. Lastly, by chastising Choibalsan with relatively little publicity, the door was not shut to continued good relations with the Chinese People's Republic, although Mongolia sided with Russia in the dispute. A widely publicized attack on Choibalsan would have been interpreted as being specifically hostile to China, while the policy pursued appeared more as a token gesture to appease the Soviet Union without alienating China.

It seems, however, that appeasement of Russia was not enough. A more obvious commitment to Soviet
policy was necessary. In September 1962, Professor Daramny Tumur-Ochir, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, a member of its Politburo and Director of the Party's Historical Research Institute, was removed from all positions. His positions in the Party dated from March 1959.¹ No other Party members were involved in this purge.

The campaign against Tumur-Ochir was intense. On September 12, Pravda, in reporting the third plenary session of the Party's Central Committee, said that he was removed because "he has not justified the Party's high trust". The article noted that

"his dogmatic approach to Marxist-Leninist theory and such negative personal traits as conceit, vanity and rudeness contributed to his vicious actions."

The worst crime of all was that

"Comrade Tumur-Ochir attempted to use the Party's struggle against the consequences of the cult of the individual for his own far-reaching careerist aims and for undermining the authority of the Party leadership."

The condemnation at the plenary session was unanimous.

In November, Pravda reprinted a long editorial from Unen, the organ of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The article elaborated on the reasons for Tumur-Ochir's purge. His

crimes were threefold. As a Party leader

"his purpose was by playing up the fact of the Party's condemnation of some of the serious mistakes committed by Kh. Choibalsan...to achieve the removal from the Party leadership of older-generation cadres who had worked with Comrade Choibalsan, and to do so by using this device unscrupulously."

As the Party historian he expressed

"a nihilistic attitude that consisted in deprecating the role of the Party and belittling the successes and victories won by the Mongolian people during the years of people's rule...he depicted in dark colours the historical path traversed by the Mongolian people and engaged in slanderous attacks upon the Party and the working class of the Mongolian People's Republic."

The editorial elaboration of his third offense was aimed at China, which together with Inner Mongolia, was planning large scale festivities in honour of the birth of Genghis Khan. 2

"D. Tumur-Ochir supported nationalist efforts to glorify and idealize the role of Genghis Khan in Mongolian history and to play down and gloss over his reactionary role. He fiercely sought to have an elaborate celebration of the eight hundredth anniversary of Genghis Khan's birth."

Until this avalanche of criticism was published, Professor Tumur-Ochir was unknown. The only others implicated with him were fellow historians, whose names were not mentioned. Although his Party positions were

impressive, his name had rarely appeared in the news. Yet this relatively unimportant man was the object of a far more hostile campaign than was directed at the former General Secretary of the Party, Dordj Damba, in 1958.

Two inter-connected factors explain the intensity of the attack. First, since he stood for close relations with the Soviet Union, the weakening of Tsedenbal's position would loosen the Russian hold on Mongolia. Opposition to Tsedenbal was a threat to his control of the Party. During this period of tension with China, any undermining of his strength could not be tolerated by Russia. Mongolia's existence would consequently be jeopardized. Tsedenbal's actions took into account Russia's presence and dominance in his country, and he strove by insisting on total loyalty to him, to ensure Soviet trust and satisfaction with his policies.

Secondly, Tumur-Ochir was probably chosen because of his limited association with other important Party members, who would not be implicated along with him. This is suggested by the localization of the purge to him and to several of his historian colleagues. No other Party members were affected at this time. Purging people for having supported Choibalsan might have meant removing many men on whom Tsedenbal relied for support. Therefore the condemnation of Tumur-Ochir contained praise for Choibalsan in spite of his acknowledged practice of the
cult of the individual.

"...Our Party does not and never will forget the tremendous revolutionary accomplishments of Comrade Choibalsan, one of the founders of our Party and of the Mongolian People's democratic state, an ardent champion of internationalist friendship of peoples, a person who gave all his efforts to the struggle for the Mongolian People's freedom and independence, for the triumph of socialism in our country."¹

Advocating the policies of Tumur-Ochir - nationalism, ambition, and any opposition to the Party line - was a charge which Tsedenbal could level at his rivals without implicating himself or his supporters.

This becomes evident when one considers the reasons for two subsequent purges, one in November 1964, and another a year later. In 1964, one of the most important men in Ulan Bator, L. Tsende, was removed from the Politburo and from his position as Second Secretary of the Party. He was known to oppose China² and had made a speech in 1961 attacking her for slandering the Soviet Communist Party. Yet he was accused of having "conspired with D. Tumur-Ochir", of having spent "excessive sums on statues erected to commemorate the eight hundredth anniversary of the birth of Genghis Khan", and of having "sought his own aggrandizement."³ In December 1965, two

civil servants and one local Party leader were purged for being

"disguised supporters of Tumur-Ochir and Tsenda, who had earlier been exposed as violent nationalists and political intriguers."

Thus the Mongolian People's Republic displayed her allegiance to Russia during the Sino-Soviet dispute by attacking Albania from time to time and by keeping strict control over Party discipline. Prompted by Chinese statements about Russia's position in Asia, Mongolia finally raised the issue of territorial integrity in 1964.

During preliminary discussions and meetings to plan the March 1965 Afro-Asian Conference, Chen Yi and other spokesmen objected to Soviet participation on the grounds that she was essentially a European power. Although two thirds of her territory was in Asia, her population, they argued, was three quarters European. This made her a European and not an Asian power. Hence, she had no right to attend a Conference of African and Asian nations. The Bandung Conference of 1955, at which Russia was not represented, was cited as a precedent.²

The Soviet Union, of course, claimed that since

she was geographically an Asian country, she was entitled to attend a conference involving Asian countries. Here Mongolia supported Russia's arguments by calling the Chinese attitude "not only groundless" but "an extremely harmful one." A victory for the Chinese over this issue, would mean, in Mongolia's eyes, the reduction of Soviet influence in Asia, and the subsequent increase of Chinese domination of that continent. The likelihood of Russia abandoning Asia to China and turning her total attention to Europe was extremely remote. But a stronger Chinese position in Asia and a relatively weakened Soviet presence there would force Russia to redress the balance by enforcing stricter political and military control over her Asian possessions. This could become a threat to Mongolia's existence. The official attitude of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, therefore, was that

"...the Soviet Union, two thirds of whose territory is in Asia, has all grounds and an indisputable right to take part in the Second Afro-Asian Conference..."

An event which caused a fierce newspaper reaction in the Soviet Union and Mongolia was the interview granted by Mao Tse-tung on June 10, 1964 to a group of visiting Japanese socialists. During this meeting, Mao referred to Mongolia as being dominated by Russia, and discussed

historical Chinese claims to former territories, including the Mongolian People's Republic. This brought an immediate response from Unen, the Mongolian Party newspaper. It also touched off a series of anti-Chinese articles in Russian and other Mongolian newspapers which lasted from September to late October 1964.

The first Unen response avoided any mention of the Mao interview. Instead it attacked the Chinese for "their splitting activities among the fraternal parties," and because they were "in their own country developing a great-power chauvinism" marked by the oppression of minorities and especially of the Inner Mongols. Other articles described the ruthless establishment of communes and their detrimental effect on the Mongols of China, who were exiled to distant parts of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Until Moscow published her own official statement in Pravda concerning Mao's interview, Mongolia confined her polemics to the minority policy of the Chinese People's Republic.

On September 2, 1964, Pravda published a long article attacking Mao's statements point by point. Several paragraphs were devoted to the remarks about Mongolia. The Soviet Union denied that it dominated Mongolian affairs, calling the country "a sovereign socialist state" which

"enjoys all the rights of an independent country." It was the Chinese who voiced the complaints, not the Mongols.

"The whole point is that the existence of an independent Mongolian which maintains friendly relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other countries of socialism does not suit the Chinese leaders. They would like to deprive it of independence and make it a Chinese province."

This was revealed, the article said, during Khrushchev's visit to Peking in 1954, when the Chinese leaders raised the Mongolian question in order to conclude an agreement on it.

"Naturally, N. S. Khrushchev refused to discuss this question and told the Chinese leaders that the destiny of the Mongolian people is determined not in Peking and not in Moscow, but in Ulan Bator, and that only the country's working people themselves and no one else could decide the question of Mongolia's statehood."

Chinese designs on Mongolian territory were treated as serious but not unusual by Russia.

The Mongolian press stepped up its campaign after the Pravda article, and its attitude was similar to Russia's. The most prominent argument was that the "great-power chauvinism" showing its face in China's campaign against her minorities, could also extend to neighbouring countries. One article warned that "we have a friend who stands on guard with us in the defense

of the interests of our country."¹

This was further emphasized when a new Mutual Defense Pact was concluded between Mongolia and Russia in 1964. This renewed similar agreements signed in 1936 and 1946. In those years, the enemy had been Japan in the first case and the United States-Nationalist China partnership in the second. In 1964, Communist China became the target for a defense treaty between two other socialist nations. It was assumed that Soviet troops would be stationed on Mongolian soil in case of danger.

Mongolia's activity during the Sino-Soviet dispute suggested that she was trying to prevent increased Russian involvement in Mongolian affairs. There were no illusions about the necessity of dependence on Russia for economic and political survival, but as little Russian presence as possible was desired. The occasional anti-Albanian speeches and Party shakeups were thus designed to ensure Soviet confidence in the Mongol leadership. The progressive intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute made the success of that policy problematic.

For Mongolia the major results of the Communist split were a preliminary build-up of Russian defenses in the area, the exodus of Chinese personnel, and the overall deterioration of Sino-Mongol relations. Between 1957 and 1962, China's

influence was offset by the rise of Russian and East European activity. After 1962, Chinese activity was brought to a halt by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic.
CHAPTER 6.

THE TERMINATION OF SINO-MONGOL RELATIONS.

The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the nineteen sixties led to the systematic reduction of Chinese activities in Mongolia. In spite of the benefits of Chinese activity to her country's economic development, the Mongolian Government carried out this policy, responding to the possibility of Russian action if it did not. Between 1960 and 1965 Chinese contacts in Mongolia were severed one by one, until only a trade protocol for 1966 remained.\(^1\) Aid agreements with China were not renewed after 1965, leaving China's total in economic aid grants at one hundred and fifteen million American dollars.\(^2\) Trade with China declined in volume as business from Russia and Eastern Europe displaced it. The strained relations caused by Mongolia's support of Russia in the dispute were exacerbated by various diplomatic incidents between 1962 and 1965.

After having lost the trust of many Asian countries


due to her border clashes with India, China adopted the policy of settling border questions with other neighbours in order to reestablish good relations with them. Such border treaties were signed with Burma, Nepal and Pakistan. The purge of Tumur-Ochir gave further cause for such a treaty to be signed between Mongolia and China. While his removal was not directed specifically against China, it nevertheless resulted in the strengthening of Tsedenbal's policy of unquestioned allegiance to the Soviet Union. A natural consequence, therefore, was the weakening of Chinese influence in Mongolia. In order to regain some of that influence, China signed a border treaty with Mongolia on Christmas Day, 1962.

China made every effort to reap as much benefit from this agreement as possible. Tsedenbal was invited to Peking where "hundreds of thousands of people of the Chinese capital came out on the streets to give a rousing welcome to Ujajin Tsedenbal." Peng Chen of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo, said that the treaty "signified a further strengthening and development of fraternal friendship between the peoples of China and Mongolia," and called it "a major task of historic significance."

The Chinese press praised the treaty as an example of socialist cooperation.¹

Instead of just echoing Chinese comments about the Treaty, Tsedenbal spoke of other areas of international cooperation. As an example he cited the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, which Mongolia supported.

"...the policy of peaceful coexistence has vital strength, fully meets the interests of the peoples and is finding warm support among all progressive mankind. This can be seen in the example of the recent crisis in the area of the Caribbean Sea."²

This policy, he proclaimed at a rally of ten thousand people in Peking, should be followed in other trouble spots, such as the Sino-Indian border dispute, which "should be settled only by peaceful means - that is, through negotiations." He went on to say that

"...the development of the Cuban event shows once again that it is possible and necessary to make wise compromise in our policies after objectively considering the whole situation and specific conditions in international life."³

The Soviet retreat from Cuba had been ridiculed and condemned by China. Tsedenbal's suggestion that China learn from Russia's actions, therefore, could only have irritated Sino-Mongol relations. Tsedenbal's performance, in addition,

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succeeded in minimizing the expected propaganda effect of the Border Treaty.

In September 1963, a new incident further aggravated Sino-Mongol relations. Chinese students, returning to Moscow for the school year, were given an armed escort out of Russia, after anti-Soviet documents and newspapers in their possession were confiscated by Russian border guards. The Russians claimed that the students and the Chinese crew of the train on which they were travelling had locked up the guards and prevented the train from continuing.¹ The Chinese blamed the Russians for detaining the Chinese for fifty hours before sending the train, crew and passengers back to China. The documents and newspapers, China protested, were on international Communist problems and were for personal use,²

This incident took place at the Nauski border railway station on the Russo-Mongolian frontier. The train involved was the Peking-Ulan Bator-Moscow line, and the whole affair was a source of embarrassment to the Mongolian Government because the Chinese had been permitted to travel through her territory carrying anti-Soviet propaganda. The next spring, Mongolia warned the Chinese Embassy and its officials to cease handing out anti-Russian

². SCMP, no. 3062, pp. 34-35. (NCNA, Peking, September 13, 1963).
material on Mongolian territory. This was a repeat of earlier warnings to the Chinese People's Republic about this same issue. Mongolia called it a violation of her internal affairs.\footnote{CDSP, XVI; 20, vol. 2, p. 14. (Pravda, May 16, 1964).}

Since this was not the first incident of its kind, one might have expected harsher measures from the Mongolian Government, such as the expulsion of Chinese personnel. That no such action followed the delivery of the note to the Chinese Embassy, is further proof of Mongolia's desire to maintain as good relations as possible with China while not inviting Chinese reaction. After March 1964, however, this policy became bankrupt. Sino-Mongolian incidents became too numerous and too serious for this double game to continue.

The first of these outbursts was a street brawl between Chinese and Mongols in Ulan Bator. This began when Mongols prevented the distribution of propaganda leaflets by Chinese workers. Two Chinese were jailed and tried, and fifteen men were hospitalized as a result of the clashes.\footnote{The New York Times, March 28, 1964, p. 4.} In July 1964, a Sino-Mongolian bicycle race was transformed into a riot when, according to the Mongols, the Chinese riders attacked both their competitors and
the officials. 1 The Revolutionary Party's newspaper, \textit{Unen}, printed an article by a Mongol student who had returned from his study in China. He revealed that the map of Asia used in Chinese history classes showed the Chinese People's Republic but not Mongolia, which had come into existence first. No one would answer him in China when he mentioned this discrepancy.\textsuperscript{2}

The deterioration in the relations between the two countries was revealed most vividly by the treatment of the Chinese workers in Mongolia. In 1959, they lived close to the centre of Ulan Bator in barracks, camps and in the buildings they were constructing. Two years later, they were housed in Stalin-like labour camps, with the "same high wooden fence, topped by strands of barbed wire, rows of small huts inside, and at each corner a high wooden watchtower with Tommygunners."\textsuperscript{3} The Mongols claim that this segregation was initiated by the Chinese themselves,\textsuperscript{4} but no matter who caused it, "an end obviously had come to free and easy mingling of the Chinese with the Mongols."\textsuperscript{5}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Bawden, \textit{RCAS}, vol. LIII, p. 296.
\end{enumerate}
The estimated number of Chinese workers in Mongolia at any one time varies from correspondent to correspondent. George Murphy, however, refers to conversations he had with Mongolian economists whereby he learned that fifteen thousand Chinese labourers were in Mongolia.¹ Jack Raymond had reported in 1956 that these workers had the right to become citizens when their term expired,² but this clause was revoked sometime later, probably in 1960.³ After 1961, only departures of labourers were reported, but this exodus only involved workers who had fulfilled their contract of three, five or six years.⁴ Until 1964, only those workers who had served the time of their agreements returned to China, after receiving heroes' sendoffs from the Mongols. The number of workers was thus gradually reduced since those leaving were not replaced after 1961.

After April 1964, there was little doubt that the Chinese, who were now leaving, were doing so at the request of the Mongolian Government. This action coincided with the street brawl, the distribution of anti-Soviet propaganda, and the newspaper campaign against

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1. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia, p. 177, note 92.
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Chinese policy in Inner Mongolia. By this time, Sino-Mongol relations had reached their lowest point since 1926, when the Chinese merchants were expelled by the Mongolian Government. There was no attempt to cover up the fact that the workers were not "sent home by the Mongolian Government in accordance with the desire of the Mongolian Government." 1

The workers had been China's strongest link with the Mongolian People's Republic. Although some groups remained to finish projects which had already been started, their importance was insignificant. The extent of the decline of Chinese influence in Mongolia was emphasized by the fact that Russian experts began entering the country again in 1965. Over a thousand were reported to have arrived by December of that year. 2

Besides losing an important segment of her labour force, Mongolia was denied other benefits from her relations with China. Mongolia conducted an appreciable amount of trade with three Asian countries, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Japan. To reach their destination, the goods had to cross Chinese territory. While Sino-Mongol relations were cordial, China freely gave permission for these goods to pass through her land. After the successful

Japanese-Mongolian trade talks in 1961, China offered the port of Tientsin as a transshipment centre between landlocked Mongolia and Japan. In May 1964, in retaliation for Mongolia's expulsion of the Chinese workers, China cancelled this service, forcing Mongolia to send her commodities through Russian territory.¹

This new arrangement was more expensive and reduced trade profits. Money was also lost on the Trans-Mongolian Railway. The Mongolia: People's Republic collected dues on the trains running through her land, but began to lose this revenue as the dispute between Russia and China intensified and the frequency of train trips declined. In the fall of 1964, Russia promised more economic support for Mongolia's victimized economy. The amount was not disclosed.²

The strengthening of Russo-Mongol military cooperation was made necessary by the deterioration of Sino-Mongol relations. The Russo-Mongol Mutual Defense Pact was renewed in 1964, and at the same time reports of border incidents reached the West. In 1962 and 1963, there were frequent warnings concerning frontier violations, but these were restricted to the Sino-Soviet boundary in Sinkiang. The next year, the Yugoslav News Agency cor-

respondent in Moscow wrote of Chinese troop movements along the Sino-Mongolian border. Military infiltration by Chinese troops was also reported. At a military parade celebrating the forty third anniversary of the Mongolian Revolution, the Mongolian Army's Senior Political Commissar warned China that she faced a Mongolian Army which collaborated closely with Russian troops. China's role as defender and protector of Mongolia's southern frontier from imperialist aggression, as stated in the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Statement of 1957, had been taken over by the Soviet Union.

After having been welcomed to the Mongolian People's Republic as liberated revolutionary Chinese people, as socialist comrades, and as contributors to Mongolia's economic development ten years earlier, the Chinese left as traitors to socialism, as oppressors of minorities, and as a threat to Mongolia's independence. China exhibited, in Mongolia's eyes, great power chauvinism and revanchism, as illustrated by Chinese claims to Soviet-controlled territory that once had belonged to China. Since Mongolia was included in this land, China was seen as a military danger. The final step in this turnabout was the renewal of the Mutual Defense Pact, which had

been aimed first against Japan and then at Nationalist China. When this alliance became directed against Communist China, the position of Mongolia reverted to its pre-1949 status.
CONCLUSION.

The period between 1953 and 1965 was one of the most eventful in recent Mongolian history. The prominent features of these twelve years were the attempts by China to regain a position of influence in her former province and the Soviet reactions to these efforts. The economic competition which characterized this struggle brought many benefits to Mongolia but also threatened to endanger her existence. The Mongolian leaders struggled to maintain friendly relations with China without incurring the wrath of the Soviet Union, Mongolia's chief benefactor.

Soon after recognizing Mongolian independence in 1950, the new Chinese Government embarked on a policy of economic penetration of Mongolia. This was facilitated by the latter's labour and financial needs and China's preparedness to satisfy them. A three decade lapse in activity across the Sino-Mongol border was replaced by a flurry of economic, cultural and political exchange. This did not concern Russia because Mongolian allegiance was assured by her reliance on the Soviet Union for economic development and defense. Mongolia's economic, educational and political institutions were patterned
closely on the Russian model. At the same time, China leaned heavily on Russia for technical advisors and industrial aid and was not expected to challenge Russia's entrenched position in Mongolia.

The cause of Russia's offensive in Mongolia did not result from China's actions there but rather from her activity in Eastern Europe. Although she enjoyed a preferred position relative to Russia within the Communist bloc, China was by no means Russia's political equal. Her subsequent role as mediator between Russia and Eastern Europe reduced Russia's importance in the Communist world and greatly augmented China's. Russia's position as undisputed leader of the Socialist camp was shaken. In her drive to regain her supremacy, the Soviet Union strove to minimise China's role in the building of Socialism.

The manifestation of this policy in Mongolia was the Bulganin-Tsedenbal Joint Statement of February 1957. In this review of Mongolian economic development and future plans, China's significant contributions were ignored while only Russian activity was acknowledged. China was credited with simply keeping Mongolia's southern borders safe from aggression, ensuring the safety and stability necessary for economic growth. The publication of the Joint Statement was followed by a rapid influx into
Mongolia of Eastern European technicians and commodities, which fortified the grip of the Soviet Union on the Mongolian People's Republic.

The ensuing Sino-Soviet dispute led to the end of Chinese activity in Mongolia. Although she tried to avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict, Mongolia feared that her own independence would be in jeopardy if she did not openly support the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, even after condemning China's position in the dispute, the Mongolian Government tried to keep Sino-Mongol relations as cordial as possible. This policy was continued until mid-1964, when the Mongolian People's Republic was implicated for the first time in the most hostile polemics exchanged between Russia and China. A series of violent street melées in Ulan Bator involving Chinese workers in Mongolia finally led to their expulsion. Although diplomatic relations were not severed, by 1965 trade was the only surviving activity between Mongolia and China.

Mongolia herself underwent many changes during these twelve years. The availability of Chinese workers and money enabled Mongolia to undertake an industrial development program which changed the face of the country. The increased Soviet aid at this time contributed to both accelerated economic growth and to social welfare. One
benefit of East European activity was the introduction of modern consumer goods into Mongolia. This period also witnessed the international acceptance of the Mongolian People's Republic as an independent entity and member of the United Nations.

Despite the many events of the years 1953-1965, the position of Mongolia between Russia and China remained essentially the same. In 1953, Mongolia was wholly dominated by Russia and dependent on her for defense and economic progress. Her only contact with China was an Economic and Cultural Agreement. In 1965, Mongolia's existence depended completely on the Soviet Union, and a trade agreement was all that remained of Sino-Mongol relations. The only difference was that in 1953 the Communist Government in China removed the necessity of the Russo-Mongol defense alliance. In 1965, that same Government was the cause of its renewal.
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