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THE POLITICS OF IMAGINING NATIONS:  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY 
AND THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS SINCE THE 1960s

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
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ABSTRACT

In nationalism studies, there has been insignificant analysis of the politics of imagining nations. This thesis addresses this lacuna in an examination of the form and design of imagined nations in Scotland and Quebec. I argue that the Scottish National Party and the Parti Québécois have, since their advent in the 1960s, created a political-civic image of the nation that breaks with previous cultural conceptions. However, cultural images of the nation, propagated by centralist institutions, remain entrenched in contemporary Scotland and Quebec. The juxtaposition of centralist cultural images and nationalist political images of the nation have led to a dualistic, or what I have termed a 'Jekyll and Hyde', national consciousness in both countries. This exercise indicates that images of the nation are subject to multitudinous interpretations and (re)construction by various actors in the competitive state-nation political arena.

Au sein des études sur le nationalisme ce trouve un manque d’analyses importantes par rapport à la politique de «concevoir la nation». Cette thèse présente une examination de la forme et de la construction de nations imaginées, notamment au Québec et en l’Écosse. La thèse propose que le Parti National Écossais (SNP) et le Parti Québécois auront créé une image civique et politique de la nation, qui se qualifie comme différent des images culturelles de la nation qui auraient existés auparavant. Par contre, les images culturelles des deux nations persistent au Québec et en Écosse jusqu’au jour présent par le biais de leurs représentations au sein des institutions centralistes Québécoises et Écossaises. Cette juxtaposition d’images centralistes culturelles ainsi que celles politique et nationalistes, auraient menée à un dualisme dénommé ici comme une conscience nationale «Jekyll & Hyde» au Québec comme en Écosse. Ce projet nous démontre quel’image d’une nation est sujet à de nombreuses interprétations ainsi que de (re)construction par la main d’acteurs variés dans l’arène competitive et politique des états nationales.
INTRODUCTION

It is largely acknowledged that, in the social sciences and humanities in particular, people study subjects that figure personally in their lives. Nationalism is no exception, indeed its profuse emotional bonds often turn academics into fiery creatures. Thus, I have no qualms in admitting that the motivation of my research is to come to terms with how I feel about the country in which I was born, raised up, and fled from at the earliest chance. More than that – I seek to question what this mutable thing called the ‘nation’ is, which conjures up so many images in my mind. My own sense of identity has suffered the repercussions of ‘nation’, progressing as I have from being a ‘British Socialist’ to a ‘Scottish Sovereignist’ and finally, to a ‘European pluralist’. These political identities, as well as my feelings toward the ‘nation’, will surely shift again. This is indicative of how images of the nation must be flexible to allow for re- and de-construction by its members.

Yet this project does not concern itself with whether and why people are or are not nationalists, unionists etc. Rather, I address the more specific problem – as I see it – of accepting the ‘imagined community’ as a singular thing (in the way we imagine it, what we imagine, and at what level). “Scotland is a place of the imagination, what and where people want it to be,” says David McCrone.¹ Yet there has been little reference in nationalism studies to the dualism that is traceable in my sense of imagined self, and identifiable in that of my compatriots. Not, as commonly prescribed, as a simultaneous Briton and Scot. But as a person who sees Scotland in two very different lights.

To return to my ‘fleeing of Scotland’, I did so because I could no longer stomach the images of the town that I was brought up in. On one hand, propagated by the Scottish Tourist Board, was the image of a quaint fishing village of historical importance. On the other, espoused by classmates and neighbours, lay the less romantic and highly political image of the ‘Drugs Capital of West Lothian’, alcoholism and unemployment. There were two sides to imagining where I came from. Furthermore, it is apparent that this duality can be applied not only to microcosms of Scotland, but to the whole.

Certainly, my dual evaluation of the environment in which I grew up is not uncommon. But at a broader level, I wondered, is this collective feeling toward the nation unique? European examples are often discounted as comparable to Scotland, due to Scotland’s ‘partnered’ incorporation, imperialism and certain idiosyncrasies of the British State. This is when, in my early research, I came across the Quebec situation. As minority nationalism seeking to challenge the state, which maintains a strong cultural identity together with political national credence, I looked further (and had to travel 5000 miles to do so). My initial mind-wanderings were confirmed. The much-cited ‘schizophrenia’ of Scotland has a companion elsewhere: Quebec.

My objective in this thesis is to reach an understanding of how different images of the “nation” have come into being. From my own experiences, I was able to identify a romantic image of Scotland that contrasted sharply with a socio-political one. This realisation has caused me to probe more deeply into the underpinnings of these and other images. It has become apparent that there exists two dominant ways of imagining nations

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2 Christopher Harvie refers to the ‘fruitful schizophrenia’ of red (cosmopolitan) and black (parochial) Scotland. See Christopher Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism - Scottish Society and Politics 1707 to the Present, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 22. Tom Nairn speaks of the schizophrenia of
in the late 20th century, which are cultural and political respectively. My main question is how these cultural and political images function in modern nationalist movements.

As the title of the thesis suggests, I wish to evaluate ways of imagining the politicised nation, or the ‘politics’ of imagining nations. But I have three other research goals in mind. Firstly, I will assume an instrumentalist perspective in examining the imagined ‘nation’. That is, I will look at the role of political parties in shaping images of the political nation, and the role of national institutions – the tourist industries, mass media and local government – in creating cultural images of the nation. Leading from this, I will examine the interplay between culture and politics in the modern nationalist setting. I argue that in contemporary Scotland and Quebec, the entanglement of cultural and political nationalism has led to a ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ national psychosis.

I realise that my goals are ambitious. I am injecting an instrumental political perspective into a cultural theory of nationalism that lies in the realm of sociology - bordering on psychology. I rely on the belief that rigid ‘paradigm frontiers’ can be transcended. This project will therefore draw not only from historical, political and sociological works, but philosophical and psychological sources too. However, as the analysis of political parties is central to my research, this paper sits safely in the realm of political science. Moreover, many of the questions I raise have been addressed by other political commentators, in particular, the ‘cultural versus political nationalism’ debate. Yet I believe attention is lacking from a political analysis of imagining the nation.


As the topic of Quebec nationalism has generated a substantial amount of literature in the disciplines of Canadian politics and general theories of the nation and nationalism, the literature analysed herein is written in English. The regrettable anglo-centric bias of my research is thoroughly acknowledged. Efforts have been made, however, to obtain translations of important research documents written in French.
In this introductory chapter, I outline some preliminary information about the project. I begin with a brief preview of the argument I propose concerning the politics of imagining nations in Scotland and Quebec. I then explain the methodology I have chosen to employ, and elaborate key terms to be used or omitted. I also indicate what I will not be doing in this project. Following this, I sketch a more detailed outline of how the thesis is structured, and offer some closing remarks as to how this project may contribute to the study of nations and nationalism.

1. Preview of the Argument

The idea of conceiving the nation as an imagined ‘cultural artefact’ was introduced by Benedict Anderson in 1983, to widespread acclaim. However, one aspect of ‘imagining’ the nation has received scant attention – namely the role of politics in imagined communities. In accounting for the absence of a political perspective, I investigate the contribution of nationalist parties to creating a ‘landscape of the mind’ which acknowledges yet supersedes the cultural implications of imagining the nation. In an analysis of ‘imagined communities’, one must not only examine the process of imagining, but also who it is that is doing the imagining, and for what reasons.

A new ‘angle’ of approaching nationalism is developed here, which argues that (existing) imagined communities have been shaped by political parties, in order to create a politicised image of the nation. This differs from Anderson’s notion of imagining the nation, which attributes significance to ‘bottom-up’ socio-cultural practices of imagining communities. As political nationalism is largely identified with a single party – the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Parti Québécois (PQ) respectively – I focus on the
parties’ contribution to imagining the nation. At the same time, I examine the ‘pro-
nation’ stance of other political parties that have sought to affect the imagined political community, such as the Scottish Labour Party and the Quebec Liberal Party.

I will demonstrate that there are two streams of “nationalism” (or ‘processes’ of imagining) and two ways (and sets of protagonists) of “imagining communities” in Scotland and Quebec. I argue that modern political nationalism since the 1960s has been intentionally divorced from the cultural nationalism of previous years. The pre-1960s nationalism derived from a cultural and native-institutional perspective of nationality, which was largely insular. However, these inherited cultural images in the 1960s found a competitor. The advent of political parties advocating independence in Scotland and Quebec eschewed this method of imagining communities in favour of a civic nationalism that redrew the boundaries of the imagination, and changed the content from cultural to political. Their aim was and is to translate such imaginings into mass political expression. Parties’ politicisation of images of the nation also became a validating tool for the nationalist movement. Thus, imagining communities since the 1960s is better seen vis-à-vis the efforts of political parties to de-culturalise and politicise images of the nation.

An important point to make here is that although parties have moved away from cultural images of nationhood in favour of a political discourse, both forms of nationalism have emerged together in contemporary Scotland and Quebec. This implies that images of the nation are neither static nor homogenous. Cultural imaginings of the nation are widespread in both countries. Yet political parties have repudiated previous cultural nationalism in favour of a civic-political nationalist discourse. How do we reconcile the two? I believe this may be called a ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ phenomenon.
The ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ national situation may be analogised with two ideal types of nationalism: ethnic and civic. The former is supposedly based on irrational impulses, romanticism, and posits ascriptive criteria for belonging. The latter is allegedly rational, democratic and emphasises the associative qualities of membership criteria. These ‘ideal types’ of nationalism are often viewed as mutually exclusive. In Scotland and Quebec, however, I will demonstrate how the similar (but not the same) ‘ideal types’ of political and cultural nationalism co-exist. “Dr. Jekyll” may be seen as the cultural monster that we (the arts/tourist boards) have created and “Mr. Hyde” is the SNP/PQ politician. Each plays a very specific role in how we imagine nations. Their aims, motives and tactics must be identified in order to disentangle cultural and political meanings of the nation and to understand their interplay thereafter.

This work is an inevitably limited first attempt at grappling with a complex phenomenon. Yet it stakes out important questions: how do we imagine nations, which actors are involved in this imagining, what is the role of politics in a seemingly cultural realm, and how do we reconcile different images of the nation with the perceived reality? If we can get clarity on these matters, we will be better positioned to address why people feel attached to their nation, and why nationalism is such a potent mobilising force.

2. Methodology

The methodology employed here involves using a case-study approach to help understand images of, and attachments to, the nation. The contextual approach enables us to situate normative thinking in an empirical context. I begin in chapter one by examining

\[4\] At this point, I should mention that I take issue with the use of the word ‘ethnic’ in this context: ‘cultural’ better describes the nationalism of pre-1960s Scotland and Quebec. Definitions are explained below.
a selection of theories of nationalism, to determine whether they are adequate to account for the politics of imagining nations. Notably, I focus on works dealing with imagining nations, political nationalism and the contrariety of political and cultural nationalism. Having highlighted the main points of these theories, I show that some aspects of this research is found wanting. Following this, I draw on the most relevant parts of these theories to develop a new approach for understanding how nations are imagined.

In chapters two and three, I consider normative theories in relation to the conduct of cultural and political nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. Taking each case-study separately, I begin by analysing the pre-1960s cultural images of nation. Then, through historic research, I examine the advent of political parties since the 1960s and how this altered nationalism in both countries. A section is dedicated to imagining the political nation, which draws from my own approach. Lastly, I discuss the conflation of cultural and political nationalism, and how images of the nation are severely altered as a result.

Finally, I review from a normative perspective the casework results of cultural and political images of nation in Scotland and Quebec. I explain how my own perspective relates to and differs from existing theories, and consider whether the notion of 'imagined political communities' is a plausible explanation of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec.

3. Definitions and Terminology

The choice of terminology is a vital part of any argument. This is especially true when a new concept is being introduced and defined. I would like to outline how I understand a few of the basic, though often contentious, terms I employ.
The first word up for scrutiny is, of course, 'nation'. This term, I believe, has been subject to two serious misunderstandings. In much literature, a 'nation' is made synonymous with a named human population sharing a territory, common memories, a mass culture and common rights and duties for members. As I understand it, however, a nation is a recognised mental construct, not the 'named human population' to which it refers. Secondly, a 'nation' is often mistaken for a 'nation-state'. The latter, as I see it, is territory co-extensive with a single state, and exercises power in that state. As such, the term 'international relations' is misleading; it is interstate relations that allow the world's nation-states to associate with each other. In speaking of the 'nation', then, I am referring to a cognitive construct with tangible appearances, which members of a population with a set of selected knowledge regarding history, territory and society imagine they belong to.

Another way to explain this is to say that a 'nation' is imagined in the minds of its members. Benedict Anderson advocated this definition when he spoke of the nation as an imagined political community. It is imagined "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."5 Thus people imagine themselves as to form a nation. Moreover, they must form certain images of what that nation is. Leading from this, we surmise that communities are to be distinguished by the style in which they are imagined. But what style of imagination is this? And who is doing the imagining or creating the images? These questions leading from Anderson's definition of a nation will be dealt with throughout this thesis.

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The next basic term that I want to clarify is ‘nationalism’. This word has been subject to diverse and often competing definitions. Without going into detail here, nationalism has been associated with a doctrine, ideology, form of behaviour, political movement, ethnic mobilisation, collective sentiment, or a type of language, symbolism and mythology. As Cohen points out, nationalism has become an ‘ideological hat-stand’ for theorists. Yet, primarily, it is seen as a process (an outcome and a product) of the growth of nations, or ‘nation-building’. Furthermore, there is relatively widespread agreement that modernity and nationalism are intrinsically linked.

For the purposes of this paper, nationalism may loosely be described as a movement for attaining and maintaining common ideals of identity, unity and autonomy on behalf of a human population, some of whose members imagine it to constitute a nation, with the actuality or possibility of constituting a nation-state. The form it takes (political or cultural) depends on the development of its institutional framework, especially in relation to the nation-state. I concur with Ernest Gellner, in that nationalism was born of the modernising forces of urbanisation, industrialisation and mass communications. It is often driven by the images of nation, and any threats to their sanctity. I argue here that it may exhibit cultural or political traits, usually both. It may also be motivated for, and propelled by, cultural or political purposes and forces.

The final term I wish to qualify is the use of the word ‘cultural’ throughout this paper. I will often speak of cultural nationalism in contrariety to political nationalism.

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This is not a new idea. Its basic tenets rest on the contrariety of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civil’ nationalism, although my choice of words is somewhat less exciting and contraposed. I believe the word ‘civil’ can be correlated with ‘political’ nationalism. I refrain, however, from using the word ‘ethnic’, which cannot be correlated with culture. ‘Ethnicity’ implies something that may be found in cultural nationalism, but does not constitute the whole. An ‘ethnic’ group is often based on common ancestry, defined by ascriptive or exclusive criteria. This is more narrowly defined than ‘cultural’, which encompasses not only shared memories and values, but also common institutions, forms of behaviour and ways of life. Thus, I will take my chances with the flexibility that this word provides.

These, then, are the terms as I understand them in this discussion. I have only discussed a select few, those that are the most basic. Others I will elaborate as I proceed.

4. What I am not doing

As this is an ambitious project, I wish to make clear what I will not be trying to achieve in this exercise. As noted earlier, I do not seek to address the colossal question of why people are or are not nationalists. Neither do I consider whether nationalism is morally a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing, which I believe cannot explain why people feel attachments to a given nation. The omission of the question of the ‘ethics’ of nationalism allows me to assume a more clinical perspective of what nationalist parties and other actors are trying to achieve when they create images of the nation.

Regrettably, due to space limitations, I will not detail the contributions of political parties, other than self-proclaimed nationalist political parties, to the construction of national images. There is conceivably sufficient information regarding this issue with
which to comprise a thesis unto itself. Having said this, I will touch on the contributions of some centralist political parties to the ‘landscape of the mind’ and how this has created conflicting images of the political nation. But my main focus here is the performance of nationalist political parties and their efforts to shape the nation as a political construct.

5. Chapter Outline

The thesis is presented in three chapters. Selected theories of nationalism are critically assessed in the first chapter, from which I devise a new perspective to the topic. The next two chapters describe the experience of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec, thus providing the contextual content of the argument. In the conclusion, I return to normative arguments, comparing both the feasibility of the new account with existing theories, and the empirical examination of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec.

In the first chapter, I examine and critique a selection of theories of the causes of nationalism, and its relation to political power. The discussion focuses on theories that address the issue of ‘constructing’ national identities, and the involvement of actors in this construction. My main claim is that whilst these theories are empirically applicable in some parts, they prove unworkable on some other dimension. I then develop another perspective to nationalism, which addresses some theoretical gaps.

My second chapter addresses the experience of nationalism in Scotland. My main argument is that there have been two forms of nationalism in the Scottish case, which can be loosely described as ‘cultural’ and ‘political’. Importantly, I argue that certain actors contrived both cultural and political images. I feel that insufficient attention has been paid
to political images, so I concentrate on the role of the SNP in shaping the political nation. I then explain how cultural and political images of nation co-exist in Scotland today.

Chapter three examines the experience of nationalism in Quebec. I argue that we can see similar forms of cultural and political images of the nation in Quebec as were encountered in the Scottish case. In particular, the PQ has attempted to shape political images of the nation that are disassociated from cultural images of Quebec. These cases are not identical, of course. I show how the lack of a politicised civil society in Quebec before 1960 has, in contrast to Scotland, hindered civic conceptions of the nation. I also consider the uniquely linguistic dimension of political nationalism in Quebec.

In a concluding section, I return to normative accounts of nationalism. I review the two streams of imagining nations found in the casework exercise. I then highlight the main similarities and differences found in the experiences of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. Following this, I consider the implications of imagining the political nation, and offer some suggestions for future research.

6. Conclusion

In this introductory chapter, I have outlined the framework of the discussion that proceeds in the next three chapters. I realise, as noted, that this is an ambitious project. Due to the required length, it also has limitations, and many aspects and approaches to nationalism are omitted. I hope, however, that this exercise clarifies particular approaches to nationalism in Scotland and Quebec, and also facilitates a discussion of alternative methods of studying the imagining of nations.
CHAPTER ONE: THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

The assumption that nation-building is a natural or inevitable process has been challenged by instrumentalist theorists since the Second World War. Instead of focusing on the organic or primordial character of nation, we are invited to consider how the nation is 'built', what is the role and activities of elites in this construction, what are the dynamics of class and politics at play, and for what purpose is the nation constructed. It is clear that there are a number of ways to approach the idea of nations and nation-building.

In this chapter, I mean to review a selection of theories which accord with the approach described above, and which aim to explain the role of agency, imagination and the interplay between culture and politics in building nations. I focus on three conceptual frameworks for thinking about nations. Each one makes some effort to address what Hugh Seton-Watson has coined as the 'design' and deliberation of nation-building. Importantly, all accounts refer to the impact of modernity. This indicates that the authors, to varying extents, concur with Gellner in that nationalism is a modern phenomenon. Yet, the nation is subject to competing definitions, and each reveals weaknesses. These weaknesses are addressed in a new approach presented at the end of this chapter.

I begin the discussion with a family of theories that addresses the 'contrivance' of nations and the use of imagery in their construction. The work of Benedict Anderson is primarily examined. This will indicate whether it is necessary to view nations as imagined political communities, and whether the roots of nationalism are cultural.

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Notions of the ‘invention’ of nations and traditions, expounded by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, are also considered within the scope of this analysis. The political limitations of these theories of nationalism are identified, and will be returned to later.

Secondly, I evaluate the political character of the nation and nationalism. John Breuilly’s argument is assessed to determine whether the ‘mission’ of the modern nation is political, and the primary goal of nationalism is political control of the state. This perspective will be complemented by an analysis of instrumentalist theories of nation-building. Hudson Meadwell, among others, provide arguments highlighting the role of intellectuals in mobilising support for political nationalism.

Thirdly, I contrapose theories of cultural and political nationalism, and consider their perceived mutual exclusivity within a wider theoretical and empirical framework. These ideal types differ on the question of who belongs to a nation and how the nation is legitimated. However, I aim to show that both types may exist at the same time, though at different levels of the imagination.

At the end of this section, I derive an alternative view to nation-building from previous theoretical analysis. The main weaknesses of existing theories examined in this chapter are addressed. I propose that too little attention has been paid to politics in theories of cultural imagination of nations, and too little attention has been paid to culture and imagination in theories of political nationalism. However, I do not merely wish to create a ‘hybrid’ approach to nation-building derived from these works. Rather, I aim to recast the notion of nations – as cognitive constructs – in a different light.

This chapter is by no means intended as a comprehensive reading or extensive critique of existing theories of nation-building. I do not presume to do them justice in the
limited space allowed. Rather, I concentrate on what each set of theories has to say about the construction of nations, and in which context it is said. Lastly, I consider the most relevant points and limitations of these theories in a new approach to nation-building.

I. IMAGINING NATIONS THROUGH CULTURE

In his book *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson examines the uses of imagery to explain the formation of nations. The nation is defined by its communal attachments, somewhat like kinship or religion: "it is an imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."\(^{10}\) Imagined, he explains, because the members of the smallest nation will never meet their fellow members, yet they believe themselves to be part of a larger collectivity. Limited, because the nation has finite, though elastic borders beyond which lie other nations. Sovereign, because the nation came to maturity at a stage of human history when self-determination was a vital concept. And imagined as a community, because it is conceived of as a deep, horizontal comradeship.

In short then, Anderson posits that a nation exists according to the style and perspective of a significant number of people in a community with limited (linguistic) boundaries, who imagine themselves, through a horizontal fraternity, so as to form a nation, or to behave as if they formed one. We are asked to look at the mental processes involved in nation-building. To say that a nation is a 'figment of the imagination', however, is not to say that it is 'false'. Rather, the nation can be interpreted as a set of ideas, or an aspiration, to be made and remade. It is a transcendent idea that moves 'up
and down history’ to fit the concerns of each present. The ‘style’ in which it is imagined distinguishes it from other communities. However, Anderson does not interpret ‘style’ as something to be purposely fashioned. There are no actors dreaming up the nation for the masses. Nations are unconsciously imagined in the minds of the members.

The reason why people imagine communities, Anderson argues, is because of two “fatalities” in human existence. First, the nation addresses the needs of individuals to overcome their fears of death, as it links time immemorial to a sense of shared destiny. Peoples are ready to “die for such limited imaginings” to be remembered by fellow members and to ultimately gain immortality. The other fatality is the Tower of Babel: the inevitable linguistic diversity of humanity made it possible for linguistic groups to imagine limited but sovereign nations. For Anderson, language is a crucial ‘cultural identifier’ (in Gellner’s phrase) which includes, and of course excludes, prospective community members. A sense of national belonging arose from a common language. But this depended upon some material conditions resulting from secular transformation.

Nationalism in the modern world, says Anderson, has to be understood in relation to the large cultural systems that preceded it. Anderson focuses primarily on the changes of the Enlightenment and rational secularisation. The removal of strong religious beliefs that provided answers to suffering, death, birth etc. were replaced by national

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10 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6.
11 We may translate that ‘fatality’ for Anderson does not mean ‘mortality’ (as in the inevitability of death), but rather the ‘fatedness’ or happenstance occurrences of human nature.
12 Anderson argues that five factors encouraged the rise of the nation as an imagined community. First, the decline of the universal Church and the growth of separate and largely autonomous national or state churches. Second, the invention of the printing press, which harnessed to capitalism, facilitated the transmission of novel ideas. Third, the slow but perceptible displacement of Latin in official communications by indigenous vernacular languages. Fourth, the gradual weakening of dynasticism and monarchy in the eighteenth century. And fifth, changing conceptions of time in which a concept such as a nation could be conceived as moving through empty time measured by clock and calendar, allowing one to imagine the community marching steadily through history.
beliefs. Nationhood, it was understood, existed beyond death and rests on historical continuity. As Anthony Smith posits, "the nation becomes the constant renewal and retelling of our tale by each generation."¹³ Anderson views the character of nationalism, not as a political ideology, but as a cultural system with religious/kinship characteristics. The glue which holds the imagined family together results from the impact of ‘print capitalism’ – the technology of communication – on the fatality of linguistic diversity. The mass production of books and newspapers ("one day best-sellers") created vernacular reading publics. This revolution in print capitalism gave a new fixity to language and created unified fields of communication. In these narrated texts, characters were seen as being members of a community without readers ever coming into contact with them. Moreover, reading newspapers resulted in an “extraordinary mass ceremony,” performed simultaneously by members who had never met their fellow-members. Print capitalism, then, initiated people into a fraternal community of the imagination.

Anderson therefore offers a structural reading of the origins of nationalism, differentiating between general conditions and specific historical factors.¹⁴ Cultural change, “the interplay between fatality, technology and capitalism,” unwittingly created the conditions that allow us to imagine nations. Print communities, based on a shared

¹⁴ Anderson’s structural account of the origins and ‘modular’ forms of nations are, it must be emphasised, entirely cultural: he correlates the rise of nationalism with the decline of religious and monarchical empires and the effects of print capitalism. There is no analysis here of either the structural or agency-motivated political conditions, i.e. the break-up or dissolution of political empires on the periphery of Europe or the Americas, through which nationalism emerged. This conspicuous lack of any state-centred or political analysis of the historic and cultural conditions of nation-building further fuels the argument that Anderson pays scant attention to the politics of imagining nations. This particular line of criticism is unfortunately outside the scope of this analysis. For an interesting rebuttal to Anderson’s proposed modular forms of the European and Creole imagined nations which are ‘transplanted’ to other social terrains, see Partha Chatterjee, “Whose Imagined Community?” Millennium, (Vol. 20, No. 3, 1991).
reading of literary products, exhibited the first form of modern national consciousness. This hypothesis raises a few questions.

According to Jacques Derrida, we must think about the "structurality" of structures, rather than searching for a non-existent centre of origin.\(^{15}\) An investigation of any collective identity, any attempt to define the mental processes of the print community, must necessarily bear in mind that knowledge is constructed, and this construction is endlessly renewed. My greatest criticism of Anderson, then, is that he does not explore the "structurality" of the structure – in other words, how the knowledge of nation in the imagined minds of its members is constructed. Anderson says that selective ‘historical’ memory and forgetting is an integral part of nation creation. But who is creating the nation? The only actor whom Anderson accounts for in this creation is the author of the novel or newspaper. These texts may be (de-)constructed, but how reflective is this of people’s images of the nation, and is it powerful enough to mobilise the community-members to fight and die for their imagined nation? The nation may exist in the subjective minds of its members, but there is more than one force at play – more than the text narrator – in the creation of the image of nation.

Smith, one of Anderson’s greatest critics, perceives the other forces at play as ‘ethnic origins’. In accordance with his own work, he argues that Anderson’s historical discussions tend to “relegate the presence or absence and nature of preexistent ethnic ties...a vivid sense of community which the creators of the modern nation took as the basis of their work of ‘reconstruction.’”\(^{16}\) The nation-narrating intelligentsia was building on previous attachment to ethnie. This argument lies outside the scope of this analysis.

Yet, what I believe is fascinating for Smith is that he criticises Anderson for not taking into account the context in which the print intelligentsia was writing the nation. Were they not, Smith argues, beholden to other political forces in order for their concepts to assume concrete shape? And were such forces in question not the ruling elites of the emergent nation? Did not other political actors comprise the structurality of the structure?

These questions bring us to an important point about why print intelligentsias narrate modern images of the nation. Smith proposes that any intelligentsia require either the organs of the state or a popular base with which to create its own social order. At the same time, the intelligentsia may be instrumental to the exercise of nation-building. Elie Kedourie concurs with this analysis, regarding the nation as an artificial construct of intellectuals. It appears, in Anderson’s account, that there is a missing link between the ‘unconscious imaginings’ of the community and the conscious narratives of image-makers. Motives are involved in the construction of such images. Smith argues that “the state and popular community typically reshape the intelligentsia’s images and narratives to accord with political and/or ethnic imperatives.” Let us look at another approach that addresses the role of political factors in modelling processes.

In The Invention of Tradition by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, we are told that many images of the nation that we assume to have existed since time immemorial are of comparatively recent origin and the product of conscious design. Hobsbawm argues, “the history which becomes part of a fund of knowledge or the ideology of the nation, state or movement is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected, pictured, popularised and institutionalised by those whose function it is

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Hobsbawm therefore focuses on state inclusion and elite control as the main processes involved in nation-building.\(^{19}\) This contrasts with Anderson’s hypothesis, in that state elites are accorded a seminal role in the construction of the nation.

Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices governed by accepted rules, and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms, and which automatically implies continuity with a selected past. Hobsbawm argues that these traditions were first invented by ruling elites at the onset of industrialisation. As social habits changed, and old traditions were being left behind, the state had to create new bonds of loyalty to create social cohesion and to win the support of the new citizenship.

This view accords with Poggi’s belief that the modern state is a “purposely constructed, functionally specific machine” and thus it must mobilise commitment to it through ‘national’ ideology.\(^{21}\) Historical continuity had to be created to legitimise the state, and thus old traditions were adapted to new situations through semi-fiction and forgery.\(^{22}\) Taken together, invented traditions constituted an ‘alternative civic religion’.

The state linked everything to tradition – the British Christmas, the Scottish kilt, the American national anthem, Bastille Day – and thus civil society and the state became inseparable. The idea was not only to turn ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ as Eugene Weber argues, but also to turn Frenchmen into Republicans.\(^{23}\)

\(^{20}\) For Hobsbawm, the invention of tradition is an act of social engineering from above that is designed to keep the masses, or more specifically the working classes, in check.
\(^{22}\) The various functions and roles they fulfill are categorised as follows: (1) those symbolising social cohesion or membership of groups; (2) those legitimising institutions, status and relations of authority; and (3) those intended for socialisation, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour.
For Hobsbawm, there is clearly a political side to inventing traditions. Yet he does not accord as much self-determination to the individual’s cognitive abilities. Ruling elites present images and inventions of the nation to a largely inert mass. Yet if traditions mean identity for each individual member, how easy is it to re-invent them? While Anderson assumes too little a role for political actors and interprets subjective images of the nation as narrative ‘givens’, Hobsbawm underestimates the power of the mind in accepting, rejecting or altering these images. It seems a balance between the two authors is necessary. And that requires finding the connection between politics, intelligentsia, and changing interpretations of the nation. Let us see where the gap lies in these theories.

Hobsbawm ties political motives to cultural artefacts of nation. He concentrates on how invented traditions played a part in elite attempts to manipulate and win the state-loyalty of the masses. The solution was found in the mobilisation of classes through ‘civic-religious’ national consciousness. However, Hobsbawm ignores how (invented) images of nationhood are constructed in the minds of members, and how they may change according to needs. Nationalism is directly correlated with ritualistic and culture-based social engineering from above. This pays little attention to subjective alterations of the national image and how nationalism is mobilised as a force against a nation-state.

Anderson’s focus is primarily on cultural analysis. He identifies nationality and nationalism as cultural artefacts. Culture enables individuals to share an imagined community with people whom they do not know. Yet, while his discussion of nationality as a cultural creation and abstracted form is convincing, it is difficult to argue that nationalism derives only from nationality. The cultural construction of nationality may be
a crucial basis for nationalism, but nationalism also seems to emerge in relation to the
nation-state. This is clearly true for political party nationalism.

From an analysis of the emergence of nationalist political parties, nationalism
takes place where and when a nation and a state come together. Supporters and
sympathisers of these parties have made it abundantly clear that they envisage a state of
their own. Anderson’s concept of imagined communities and Hobsbawm’s notion of
invented tradition, however, cannot explain the question of the state or the politics of
nationalism. Anderson does not address why people long for, or need, the state.
Hobsbawm does not consider why nationalism may be used as a force against the state. In
order to consider the state’s role in a nation as imagined community, therefore, we must
think not only about cultural spheres, but about political conditions as well.

II. POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS

In his introduction to Nationalism and the State, John Breuilly turns existing
cultural theories of nationalism on their heads. He boldly argues that “nationalism...is
about politics...is about power...is about control of the state.” Breuilly rests his theory
on the belief that nationalism is a modern form of politics. It is a political opposition
movement with a set of arguments for justifying possession of the state. As such,
nationalism must be examined in relation to the modern state, upon which it relies for
form and purpose. In a world of anarchy and competition, where the state is the
unchallenged building-block of international society, nationalism discovers its
fundamental objective: seizure and control of the state. Yet nationalism does not derive
from nationality, "if by nationality is understood an independently developed ideology or
group sentiment broadly diffused through the 'nation.'"\textsuperscript{25} Nationalism, as Breuilly
defines it, does not relate to history or culture. It is simply a modern political movement.

Breuilly takes early modern Europe as his starting point. He maintains that the
idea of the nation gained 'limited political relevance'\textsuperscript{26} with the decline of institutions
such as the churches, estates and guilds. At the same time, the idea of a sovereign state
emerged, to be later 'territorialised' in the eighteenth century. It is the modern state that
provided essential political concepts for national movements. Political nationalism, he
argues, depends on three assertions: that a nation seeks recognition of its uniqueness, that
the interests and values of the nation take precedence over all others, and that the nation
wishes to be independent. Nationalist oppositions — which may be separatist, reformist or
unifying in nature — seek an alternative political community that can replace the state, and
are identified as a form of politics. Leading from this, Breuilly posits that nationalist
movements are more developed where a modern state form is more developed, and thus
the state determines the nature of nationalist movements.

Breuilly acknowledges that a nation, as a culturally significant entity, must exist
to make political nationalism possible. But nationalism, it seems, does not grow out of
the nation. Contrarily, nationalism is divorced from any ideas or images of the nation.
Nationalist politicians merely use the excuse of representing the nation to make political
arguments. Nationalist 'mobilisation' is identified as the processes used by politicians to
appeal to the apolitical population. And nationalist success — the establishment of state —
turns its back on cultural (Breuilly speaks of ethnic) roots to define itself politically.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p398.
Why is nationalism a success? Because the nationalist movement fulfils basic needs and serves political functions – of mass mobilisation, political co-ordination and ideological legitimation. These functions are fuelled by the inadequacies of modern states to address the “age-old concern with the relationship between rulers and subjects.” It is out of the relationship between civil society (the private sphere) and the state (public sphere), that nationalism takes hold. Nationalism seeks to transform these relations and answer these concerns by melding the public with the private domains; in other words, entering the state in the interests of the civil society it claims to represent.

Breuilly concludes that nationalism has little to do with the existence or non-existence of a nation. Nationalism may just be the most appropriate and pragmatic form of opposition to take in the face of state power. Confined in the beginning to claiming the political rights of a core political community, nationalism gradually extended its claims based on cultural distinctions as the state monopolises arguments about political nationality. For Breuilly, these cultural characteristics exist in the sphere of civil society, and outside the parameters of politics, meaning they are not considered within the scope of his argument. Appeals to cultural identity only came after the establishment of a political claim to nationhood. This is when the political forces of state-seeking nationalism reintegrate civil society and state (culture and politics).

Can nationalism be explained solely in terms of politics? By limiting nationalism to political movements, there is a misleading tendency to equate nation with state. We must bear in mind that some forms of cultural nationalism have never aimed at political control of the state. Instead of aiming at co-ordination, mobilisation and legitimacy,
nationalist movements desire unity, autonomy and identity — and these goals must emanate from the image of a nation. In fact, Smith argues that the nation is enduring because it was not simply founded on politics. Political ideology must emanate from a cultural core, and this cultural core — the nation — is shaped by the modern state. Breuilly seems unable to comprehend the psychological need of belonging. He also fails to address Hobsbawm’s concern of how the nation-state (through economic policies, political patronage and mass education systems) seeks to create the emergent nation, and how nationalism is appropriated as an official culture and ideology, to protect the state from the effects of mass movements. This points to some involvement from ruling elites and intellectuals. We must acknowledge that the state may shape images of the nation, just as the concept of nation is at the heart of the nationalist claim. And these images of nation, as Anderson demonstrates, may emerge outside the realm of politics.

Leading from this, it seems that we need to differentiate between nationalism (as emanating from the image of nation) and nationalist movements — terms that Breuilly seems to use interchangeably. If it is a desire for self-determination that lies at the core of nationalist movements, then there must exist a notion of the sovereign state to which the political nationalist can lay claim. But if the nation, and the images and constructions thereof, is seen to be at the root of nationalism, then it is to civil society that one must turn for cultural sources of explanation. In order to make this distinction we must examine how cultural images of the nation are reappropriated for political purposes, and how the population is convinced of the nationalist project.

Hudson Meadwell draws attention to the intelligentsia’s pivotal role in nationalist movements. Let us remember that, for Breuilly, nationalism is not the politics of
intellectuals, who may be swayed by any 'interesting ideologies'. Yet this, we have seen, cannot explain the catalyst for popular mobilisation, which comes from the melding of images of nation with a political goal of state-possession. Meadwell, contrarily, explains how the intelligentsia may endorse two strategies for popular nationalist mobilisation in a 'cost-benefit' or rational-choice approach to nationalism.

On one hand, intellectuals will pursue the resocialisation of the population to reflect their own cultural attitude, for instance though political education. Such a strategy involves a specific ideology (or image) of the nation-to-be. This answers Hobsbawm's concern of state construction of nations. On the other hand, the intelligentsia will advocate the substantial economic benefits of independence (such as increased trade in the interstate system). Nationalist leaders must offer incentives to the voter, and this may be the prospect of economic gain if the national group chooses sovereignty. There are thus elements of calculation and rational choice in the espousal of nationalist dreams of state possession, which Breuilly does not address.

The main point here is that cultural meanings of the nation have to be constructed or reappropriated by political elites to make the idea of a nation-state of one's own plausible. Donald Horowitz argues that elite-constructed nationalism "must strike roots in mass sentiments, apprehensions and aspirations in order to succeed." We cannot underrate the emotive power of cultural bonds, argues Walker Connor. And many of these sentiments are based around images of nationality -- which Breuilly from the start omits from his argument. Furthermore, these mass sentiments, based on social practices,

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28 Meadwell states that the resocialisation strategy develops "an ideology that justifies the future society...exhorting individuals to make sacrifices, and including romantic and magical themes." Hudson Meadwell, "Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 12, (1989), p. 321.
shared historic memory etc. “have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of [itself]”31 as well as the powerful political forces that influence them.

The findings of instrumentalist scholars indicate that culture may be manipulated, yet cultural identity cannot be eradicated through the forces of modernity precisely because it constitutes the psychological boundaries necessary to structure social interaction.32 The existence of political and economic interests does not automatically negate the continued existence of cultural interests. Nationality may thus be understood as a psychological phenomenon manipulated on an individual basis as Geertz believes, and reinforced by ‘transmitters’ of cultural identity – such as language, history, symbols. Yet if this is true, we must also consider whether interested leaders and elite groups can equally manipulate nationality for collective purposes, and how the transmitters may be used (or abused) to facilitate the development of a collective national identity. Kedourie argues that the intelligentsia form the cadres of cultural nationalist movements that seek to build, in antagonism to the existing state, a regenerated national community. Cultural meanings are essential for social interaction in the national community, whilst mass mobilisation is vital for the achievement of political goals. Elites may have the means to shape cultural images for political purposes, but the interests of the elites and masses must be harmonised if any mass-based nationalist goal is to be realised.

To elaborate, the cultural and political must be reconciled for the national image to be both a source of identity and a source of popular mobilisation. If nationalism

29 Donald Horowitz, quoted in Meadwell, Ibid., p. 135.
30 Connor, Ethno-Nationalism.
derives from the efforts of individuals and groups to mobilise masses for political purposes, and cultural groups are 'sites' for mobilising mass support, we need to examine the relationship between cultural images of the nation in accordance with the political goals of the nationalist movement. We may even consider that the culturally-defined nation and the politically-defined nation are separate entities. But we can infer from this analysis that nationalism as an allegiance to a particular cultural grouping, and nationalist movements as political action carrying the claim to statehood, must be distinguished.

III. CULTURAL VERSUS CIVIC DEBATE

John Hutchinson maintains that cultural nationalism is a movement independent of political nationalism.33 The former has its own goals that differ sharply from political nationalism as defined by Breuilly - the moral regeneration of the national community rather than the achievement of an autonomous state. Hutchinson, like others, therefore speaks of contrasting forms of nationalism. Michael Keating takes this further and suggests that 'ideal types' of nationalism can be juxtaposed in contexts other than those envisioned by Hutchinson and Breuilly - for example, the ethnic and civic, the continental and liberal, and the voluntarist and organicist. "They differ," says Keating "on the question of who constitutes the nation and on the basis for legitimacy of nationalist demands."34 These distinctions also aim to explain why nationalism is used to

legitimise or de-stabilise governments on bases of inclusion or exclusion. Let us look at one opposing set of nationalisms in more detail: the cultural and civic-political.

To begin with 'civic' or political-democratic nationalism, the criteria for membership in the national community is associative. This means that the individual can voluntarily consider herself to be part of a greater collectivity. Nation-building begins with the individual and her rights and interests, rather than the nation determining the individual’s rights and duties from common nationality. The national community of which one is a part is based on a common identity derived from shared value systems and institutions, and social and political interactions within a territorially-defined community. This type of national community is often associated with tolerance, openness and democracy. For instance, Miller believes that this type of common nationality must exist in a democracy to promote shared social trust and to foster a tolerant society.

The intermediary link between civic nationalism and democracy is the concept of ‘citizenship’. This idea emerged famously during the French Revolution. A sense of national consciousness was created when the initiative of nation-(state-) building was transferred from the government to the people, i.e. popular sovereignty. National membership was granted by state citizenship. This symbiotic relationship meant that nation-states were determined by and accountable to the popular will. Charles Taylor

35 These distinctions, it has been suggested, were created to account for why nationalism, and not liberalism, is the global norm in the twenty-first century. Nationalism, it was understood, should have been a ‘passing phase’ that would cease to exist when its causes were gone. This is clearly not the case and Isaiah Berlin believes that nationalism at its height became incompatible with certain liberal principles. He argues that incompatibility resides mainly in the fact that nationalist goals must necessarily conflict with the goals of other nations, nationalism sees the group as the basic moral subject, whereas liberalism enshrines the rights and interests of the individual, and nationalism is viewed as particularist, whereas liberalism is universalist. See Isaiah Berlin, “Nationalism, Past Neglect and Present Power,” in I. Berlin, ed., Against the Current, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 342. Others, such as David Miller, argue that liberalism and nationalism are compatible in preserving a national culture. David Miller, On Nationality, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
alludes to this notion when he states that “a nation can only ensure the stability of its legitimacy if its members are strongly committed to one another by means of a common allegiance to the political community.” Hobsbawm places this phenomenon of nation-building in the period 1830-70, when mass political nationalisms unified disparate cultures into a single national identity. This occurred classically in Italy and Germany. However, we need to examine what a ‘citizen-base’ means when viewing the connection between nationalism and democracy.

Rogers Brubaker is perturbed that “although citizenship is internally inclusive, it is externally exclusive. There is a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners.” Nationalism, even of the ‘civic’ type, needs to define itself in terms of the ‘other’. Maurizio Viroli articulates similar concerns in his distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Whilst the former is based on civic values leading to “common liberty”, nationalism “encourages contempt and intolerance of cultural, racial, and political diversity both at home and abroad.”

Michael Mann adds further nuances to the relationship between nationalism and democracy. He argues that an organic perception of the people, founded on democratic principles, has created a backlash of authoritarian statism that often involves ethnic and political cleansing. In colonial contexts, enhanced statism and the organic nationalism encouraged by local elites, was intended to mobilise the ‘people’ against the ‘imperial enemy’. Popular sovereignty became the basis of an ‘us versus them’ mentality, leading

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to national homogenising policies. As a result, "genocide (is) the most undesirable consequence of the modern practise of vesting political legitimacy in 'the people'".40

Mann's conception of the 'organic people' comes close to resembling the 'ethnic' breed of nationalism. It also resonates with Gellner's 'Dark Gods' theory that highlights the "atavistic forces of blood or territory" and Hobsbawm's definition of ethno-linguistic nationalisms 1870-1914, which were exclusive and divisive.41 To return to the definition of 'ethnic' nationalism, we may identify a form of ascriptive identity, often marked by religious or linguistic differentiation. This ideal type is often associated with intolerance, exclusiveness and fear of, or superiority over, 'the other'.

Yet, as I explained above, 'cultural' rather than 'ethnic' nationalism will be herein examined in contrast to political/civic nationalism. As such, we will need a definition of cultural nationalism to proceed with this analysis. Hutchinson and Kedourie offer some ways of thinking about the cultural nation. For Hutchinson, cultural nationalism is a movement of moral regeneration that seeks to reunite the different aspects of the nation by returning to the creative "life-principles" of the nation. The cultural nationalist perceives the state as accidental, for the essence of a nation is its distinctive civilisation, which is the product of a unique history, culture and geography.

Alternatively, Kedourie argues that nationalism is a political religion: politics replaces religion as the key to individual and collective identity. Nationalism is a secular ideology opposed both to traditionalism and to the bureaucratic state, somewhat reminiscent of Breuilly. Unlike Breuilly, Kedourie thinks that elements of cultural and

political nationalism can be combined. Drawing on the work of Kant and Herder, he argues that both voluntarist (political) and organic (cultural) nationalism flowed into a philosophy of the organic state, according to which individuals must find integration within their national polities defined by their objective cultural attributes.

Kedourie brings us to the crux of this discussion: more than one conception of nationality contributes toward nation-building. Political and cultural nationalism may diverge in their objectives and grassroots strategies, but they may also be two sides of the same coin. Cultural objectives shape the formation of the projected political community. Political objectives draw on a cultural base to achieve their goals. The problem lies in viewing them as mutually exclusive: either one or the other can exist in a given context. But Mann, Brubaker, et al try to bridge this conceptual gap and uncover an abundance of ‘grey areas’ that do not fit into either category.

Instead of identifying which type of nationalism exists where or juxtaposing the “rival theoretical models” of nationalist theory, perhaps the focus should be on whether different strands of nationalism can be identified in each case. It may be that each form of nationalism impinges on the other to fulfill the basic needs of the individual and society. Culture and politics are certainly distinct spheres of activity, but it may also be argued that they are interdependent in the context of nations and nationalism. For one, Christopher Harvie posits that two types of ‘Scots’ exist in Scotland: those who are cosmopolitan and forward-looking – “Red Scots” – and those who are parochial and

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obsessed with their history – “Black Scots”. The important thing is that many Scots will exhibit both traits of national identity. In the next chapter, I present a similar argument. Both cultural and political images of Scotland can be found in the subjective minds of members, as well as constituting an objective impetus for actors in different spheres of national activity.

IV. A NEW APPROACH

Here I wish to develop an account of nations and nationalism that: (1) addresses the politics of imagining nations; (2) considers the role of actors in the construction of nations; (3) distinguishes between forms of cultural and political nationalism and; (4) explains how cultural and political images of the nation may co-exist at the same time.

Anderson believes that the nation can be portrayed as a ‘landscape of the mind’. However, it is how the mind is used as a canvas, and which nation-as-landscape is painted that concerns me. Miller states, “nations are not things that exist in the world independently of the beliefs people have about them.” At the same time, national consciousness does not emerge unconsciously. Human beings cannot be understood exclusively as passive participants in a given ‘cultural’ collectivity. As Hobsbawm stresses, nationality may be deliberately impregnated with meaning by external stimuli, which establish continuity with a selected past and visions of the future. The task of the political party as I see it is to change the way in which we imagine nations, to allow for a

44 Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 22.
political dimension. This often means avoiding previous cultural methods of imagination.

More often than not, though, political images of the nation co-exist with cultural images.

George Schöpflin, for instance, argues that when ‘civic’ nationalism is strong, ‘ethnic’ nationalism will not threaten the survival of democratic government.\(^{46}\) This indicates that cultural and political forms of nationalism can exist at the same time, in competition with one another. Here, ‘ethnic’ nationalism is viewed in a negative, divisive light, while ‘civic’ nationalism is compatible with democracy. Yet in an analysis of cultural and civic/political nationalism, one deduces different conclusions. Cultural and political nationalism may compete to achieve different goals and values for society as described above, but self-determination is rarely a result of such contestation.

Contrarily, we may conceive that only collaboration between the two can result in political success and cultural protection. As Breuilly points out, “emotion alone cannot give rise to a specific political movement and ideology; pragmatism needs some emotional basis in which to root itself.”\(^{47}\) Perhaps electoral success only comes from melding both types of nationalism. Parties must monopolise political and cultural images of nation to ensure that the cultural nation becomes synonymous with the political state.

Therefore, political parties have sought to change the sphere in which we imagine our national communities. Their motives are underlined by Breuilly. “An opposition that wished to possess the [state had to] construct an image of the political community and of the society which could ‘match’ the state it would take over.”\(^{48}\) Political parties have broken with ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ images of nation, as they would be discredited if they


\(^{47}\) Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, p. 396.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., p. 377.
did not. Instead, they seek to create a new realm of how we view the nation: transferring the ‘cultural’ sphere of subjectively imagining the nation to an objective ‘political’ sphere. And in order to re-draw or re-imagine the political boundaries of the nation, parties must question the central state. However, the emphasis on civic nationalism may also mean not achieving electoral success or nationalist mobilisation. Political images of the nation may not “command such profound emotional legitimacy” ascribed cultural meanings. Whether or not parties need to fuse emotive cultural nationalism and pragmatic political nationalism to achieve success will be considered below.

V. CONCLUSION

The study of nations and nationalism has been accompanied by disagreement among scholars concerning the nature of the community, images, movement, and actors in question. In this discussion I reviewed three sets of theories regarding nation-building, that emphasise cultural and political processes. The conclusions drawn are manifold. Firstly, attempts to explain imagined cultural communities cannot explain allegiance to the state or the political actors involved in nationalism, whilst theories of nationalism as invented traditions cannot account for nationalism as a political opposition. Secondly, attempts to explain nationalism as a political opposition movement do not explain how cultural bases of the nation define the state, and the role of intellectuals in popular mobilisation is underrated. Finally, attempts to explain ‘civic’ and cultural nationalisms exclusively cannot explain how both forms may exist together.

At the same time, these theories have taught us that a nation is a subjectively constructed concept which has its roots in cultural communications, and this concept may

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*Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 4.*
be manipulated by elites to facilitate nation-building. Nationalism may also come in the form of a political movement that challenges the legitimacy of the state. Thus there is more than one form of nationalism that contributes to nation-building. Nationalism may exhibit either civic or cultural characteristics, or both. Finally, cultural and political nationalisms may possess different forms and objectives, but the input of both is required to achieve a popular nationalism founded on pragmatic considerations.

In this discussion of theories of nationalism, we have proceeded from thinking about nationalism as a result of cultural change to a movement with set political goals. We have also progressed from thinking about nationalism as a social ‘given’ to being constructed by actors to gain political and material resources. A considerable amount of ground has been covered, although it is by no means exhaustive. This exercise has been useful in suggesting ways in which we can consider the politics of imagining nations, and has also pointed to factors in nation-building that need more attention. In the final section, I suggested a new approach that considers points drawn from existing theories, and suggests ways of dealing with the weaknesses of some accounts. My main interest is to determine how culture and politics are used to the benefit of the nationalist project.

The next step of this thesis is to turn to real-life experiences of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. My objective is to see whether the hypotheses of scholars of nationalism, including my own, are applicable to, or feasible within, real-life cases. This will enable us to address the interplay of culture and politics in modern nation-building.
CHAPTER TWO: NATIONALISM IN SCOTLAND

My goal in this chapter is to expand and apply the approach of imagining political communities to the experience of nationalism in Scotland. I will explore how political and cultural images of nation are used in the assertion of modern Scottish nationalism, and determine the relationship between the two. In order to do so, I begin by looking at various expressions of cultural nationalism in Scotland before the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP). The next section scrutinises the political nationalism of the SNP, whose images of the nation are analysed in section three. Lastly, I consider how cultural and political images of the nation co-exist and compete with one another, and the effects this has had on the desire for Scottish independence.

In the first stage of the discussion, I investigate Scotland’s ‘national culture’. According to authors, there has been a long history in Scotland of inventing traditions, creating heritage and manipulating cultural artefacts. This amounts to what Tom Nairn has coined as Scotland’s “vast tartan monster.”50 I seek to explain the development of culture in relation to nationalism before 1960, in order to determine its inherited form in modern Scotland. This is linked back to normative theories of nationalism explored above, in particular, theories of image-making and cultural design.

In the second stage, I provide an account of the SNP’s rise to power. A brief overview of the group ideology, membership and organisation, leadership and electoral performance of the Scottish National Party will be offered. This will establish where the

SNP places itself within the national environment, and how it is able to adapt to changing political circumstances. In particular, I highlight the SNP's chosen 'break' with cultural images of the nation in order to create a new political sphere of imagining the nation. The popular success of the party indicates how well it is able to construct the political nation, and how convincing this is in the eyes of the population.

This last issue – of the credibility of the SNP's images of nation – is explored in the next stage of analysis. How has the political party changed the way in which we perceive Scotland as a nation? How has it changed the configuration of images of nation from cultural to political, and how has it changed the boundaries of political images of nation from the UK to Scotland? Importantly, I examine how devolved powers in Scottish society (the 'Holy Trinity' of educational, legal and religious systems, the national media and governmental bodies) benefit the national project. Lastly, I consider how the affluence of national institutions has become related to the health of the SNP.

Finally, I comparatively review cultural and political nationalism in Scotland. I argue that although political images of the nation have been separated from existing cultural images, each is dependent on the other for the realisation of national autonomy. The marked competition between cultural and political creations of the national image is akin to a 'Jekyll and Hyde' national consciousness. Scots have two separate concepts of what it means for Scotland to be a cultural nation and an imagined political community. I consider what needs to be done to overcome this sense of national schizophrenia.

In this chapter, I wish to use the experience of nationalism in Scotland as a means to clarify how images of nation are seeped with political as well as cultural meanings, and a way to test out this argument against nationalist conduct. This exercise suggests that
cultural and the political images of Scotland compete for the attention of members. Moreover, these images are shaped by actors for goals that relate to nation-building. The realisation of their aims depends on a combination of political and cultural images of nation, which ties emotive attachments to popular mobilisation.

I. CULTURAL NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 1960s

In Scotland there is an abundance of cultural images of the nation. One only has to walk down Princes Street, the main thoroughfare in Edinburgh, to be bombarded by bagpipers, kilts for hire, haggis teddies, and books about Scottish castles, Celtic myths and the Loch Ness Monster. Many would argue that this Highland Scotland iconography is on show only for tourists - external appearances, as it were. Yet we also have to consider how these images of nation gel with the Scottish people. Are such images accepted as part of a kitsch post-modern segment of Scottish popular culture? Or are there deep nationalist emotions lurking behind the pseudo-Braveheart, tartan-clad, Saltire-painted faces of Scottish football supporters?

David McCrone et al believe that there have existed two important cultural discourses in Scotland before the 1960s: Brigadoonery and anti-Brigadoonery. The former is based on the centrality of romantic Celticism (derived from Highland history)

51 *Brigadoon* was a famous Hollywood movie that was set in the Highlands of Scotland. Rather, it was set in a movie studio because the film director, upon visiting Scotland to get a gist of the misty landscape, returned home disappointed because he “went to Scotland but I could find nothing that looked like Scotland.” Quoted in David McCrone, Angela Morris and Richard Kiely, *Scotland – the Brand: The Making of Scottish Heritage*, (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1995), p. 49. Today’s equivalent of *Brigadoon* would likely be *Braveheart*, the story of the Highland rebel William Wallace, which was produced by an American film country, filmed in Ireland and Hollywood, led by an Australian film star, and consisted of only a handful of minor Scottish actors.
in representations of Scotland, and has come to stand for the Scottish stereotype and
tourist knick-knacks described above. Womack charges that

"we know that the Highlands of Scotland are romantic. Bens and glens, the lone
shieling in the misty island, purple heather, kilted clansmen, battles long ago, an
ancient and beautiful language, claymores and bagpipes and Bonny Prince Charlie
- we know all of that, and we also know that it's not real."\(^5\)

This tradition of viewing Scotland through a Gaelic light have also inspired two dominant
waves of ideological cultural formation: 'tartanism' and 'Kailyardism'.\(^5\) The anti-
Brigadoonery that McCrone refers to is, of course, a reaction to such 'unreal' sentimental
representations of Scotland, such as 'Red Clydesideism'. These three strands of Scottish
cultural formation are, of course, only a tiny glimpse of the larger picture. They are
chosen here because the images they conjure are focal points of discussion for scholars.

To begin with romantic images of Scotland, we can differentiate between the
usage of tartanism as symbols representing, and Kailyardism as narratives of, the nation.
Tartanism can be loosely defined as a set of symbols relating to Highland culture and
traditions that are considered to be overtly sentimental and superficial. Angus Calder, for
instance, derides this cultural phenomenon as a "celebration of non-existent nationhood
through bogus symbolism."\(^4\) Tartanism has it roots in eighteenth-century Scotland, when
Sir Walter Scott encouraged King George IV, in his visit to Scotland, to wear a kilt with

\(^{52}\) Peter Womack, *Improvement and Romance: Constructing the Myth of the Highlands*, (London:

\(^{53}\) "Kailyard" means cabbage-patch in Scots. Although the word 'tartanry' is commonly used by Scottish
scholars to describe a Scottish cultural phenomenon, I agree with Ian McKay in that the word 'tartanism'
better conveys the gravity of the impact of Highland Scotland images on the nation, and is somewhat less
flippant. See Ian McKay, "Tartanism Triumphant: The Construction of Scottishness in Nova Scotia, 1933-

\(^{54}\) Angus Calder, *Revolution Culture: Notes from the Scottish Republic*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris
pink stockings. This spurred a popular craze for the now ‘gentrified’ garment that was unrelated to the original incarnation of the kilt as a Highland military costume.55

This recreation of the kilt relates to the notion of ‘the invention of tradition’. In fact, Hugh Trevor-Roper deals specifically with the invention of tartan. However, he does not explain the crucial point of why this cultural invention has such powerful appeal.56 Traditions and myths are potent forces, argues Smith, being constantly reworked according to societal change. Furthermore, there was a need for Scotland to differentiate itself from England. Scottish Lowland culture, in its similarities to England, could not fulfil this task. As such, “the Highlands acquired the role of representing Scotland “for the English.”57 Highland tartans were to be reappropriated in different forms throughout the next two centuries. Of note is a 1920s phenomenon now referred to as ‘Harry Lauderism’. The original Lauder was a Music Hall entertainer in Glasgow, who bedecked himself in tartan and referred to life in the Highlands. His performances were a popular success not only within Scotland, but also across the UK. It seemed that one only had to put a piece of plaid on a person to create an instant symbol of kitsch Scottishness.

Another way in which Scottish intellectuals differentiated their culture from England was through a Lowland vernacular school of Kailyard-writing that emerged in 1880-1914. Kailyard writers are known for their idyllic country-village settings, ‘simple-minded’ characters, and religious idealism. The latter is especially important, as Ministers wrote most of these texts. Although the content of such novels seems harmless, critics decry such ‘narratives of the nation’ as a ‘hegemonic discourse’ which subverted the

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57 Womack, Improvement and Romance, p. 148.
Scottish mentality. These sentimental texts have infected Scottish consciousness with a narrow-minded parochialism, from which Scottish cultural forms have never recovered.

Tom Nairn, for instance, is scathing in his indictment of what he calls “sub-cultural Scotchery”. He claims that ‘Kailyardism’ does not represent a form of cultural nationalism, which could be used to develop national consciousness in relation to the state, but is an ersatz type of sub-cultural nationalism, whose romantic visions of Scotland were intentionally divorced from the modern reality. “Cramped, stagnant, backward-looking, parochial... deformed [as it is, the Scottish sub-culture] constitutes none the less a strong, institutionally guaranteed identity.” Here lies the problem, says Nairn. ‘Kailyardism’ and tartanism provided a bona fide identity for Scots, one in which images of nation were romanticised, de-nationalised and set apart from the state.

Fintan O’Toole agrees with this analysis, stating that “what is remarkable about Scotland is not that outsiders have made a dreamland of it but that Scots themselves sometimes see it in the same way.” The question here is why Scots are content with a romanticised, deformed cultural identity that is divorced from any modern reality. Cairns Craig tries to explain the non-nationalist character of Scottish culture:

“Tartanry and kailyard are the joint creations of an imagination which, in recoil from the apparently featureless integration of Scottish life into an industrial culture whose power and whose identity lies outside Scottish control, acknowledges its own inability to lay hold of contemporary reality by projecting itself upon images of a society equally impotent before the forces of history.”

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58 Nairn, _The Break-Up of Britain_, p. 158.
59 Ibid., p131.
The crucial question here is why Scottish society, the bearer of such unrealistic culture, is so "impotent". Craig alludes to the answer in his examination of the relationship between the hegemonic 'industrial culture' of the United Kingdom, and the stateless nation of Scotland. The latter is burdened with sub-cultural nationalism, that is, a deformation of Scottish culture, because there is no state to defend the nation from the industrial culture of the UK state, or to exercise control over the means of its own cultural reproduction.

We can take this further and argue that culture arising from civil society has been able to drift nationalist-less because there was no political conduit for cultural expression. Whilst cultural images of Scotland were apolitical, images of Scotland as a political nation were firmly subsumed by Scotland's place within the British nation-state.

There have been anti-Brigadoonery attempts to show the 'realistic' and political side of Scottish culture before the 1960s. For instance, 'Red Clydesideism' portrayed the rebellious culture of the working-classes in Glasgow during the politically heightened period of 1914-22. Glasgow was, and still is, a staunch socialist area, and this means that images of the Govan fraternity were entrenched in British (or international) socialism, and not framed in terms of Scottish nationalism. They too were adrift from images of the Scottish nation, that is, a cultural nationalism able to portray Scottish culture and its manifest problems in Scottish terms. As such, McCrone thinks that Brigadoonery and its antithesis were "simply two sides of the same coin... all contribute to the image of Scotland as a single theme park." And this theme park had, proverbially speaking, no nation-state to construct the shows, control the rides or collect the fees.

We can surmise that cultural nationalism in Scotland before the 1960s was not a mobilising force for the modern nation. Rather, it was an attempt to resurrect a non-
national image of Scotland from selected historical symbols and romantic narratives that became an ‘escapist’ cultural outlet from the political reality of statelessness. Authors argue that there is more to Scottish culture than the mythic structures of tartanism, the Kailyard and Red Clydesideism, however the search for a non-deformed national culture has been so dominated by such myths that they cannot be avoided. I will reconsider below whether cultural (sub-) nationalism has been altered by the efforts to obtain greater autonomy in political matters, which has a direct bearing on cultural production. But before doing so, we ought to examine the main bearer of the national ideal in a culturally inadequate and stateless nation – the Scottish National Party.

II. THE ADVENT OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY

The Scottish National Party’s origins may be traced to a number of organisations at the turn of the 20th century advocating independence. In 1934, the most successful of these groups, the National Party of Scotland, amalgamated with the pro-Home Rule Scottish Party, despite different political aims. The result was the establishment of the Scottish National Party (SNP), which remains to this day the leading nationalist party in Scotland. In this section, I will examine the rise of the SNP in British politics, its party platforms, membership, ideology, and electoral performance.

In the early years of the SNP’s existence, cultural symbols were used as a means for attracting public attention to the goal of Scottish independence. For instance, the William Wallace sword was stolen from Stirling Castle, Union Jack flags were removed,
with Saltires flown in their place, and the Scottish Stone of Destiny was ‘liberated’ from Westminster Abbey and hidden in Scotland. This tomfoolery was clearly a method of drawing media focus to the new political party. In reality, the SNP made its claim as an explicitly non-cultural organisation. Its purpose was to challenge the legitimacy of the UK State and restore to Scotland its state and Parliament.

The SNP won its first by-election in Motherwell in 1945. This was to be a short-lived affair, as Labour recovered the seat during the General Election that year. The SNP’s own electoral booty hovered around the 8-10% mark from 1945-1955, during which period “the party had changed little...[it was] a resilient little sect, rather than a political movement.” Yet political nationalism, if marginal and factional, was persistent. While electoral support began to rise in the 1950s, the SNP’s evolution as a national party fighting most Scottish seats occurred in the late 1960s. At the beginning of the decade, SNP membership totalled 1000, but by 1966 this figure had risen to 125,000. The SNP had the largest party membership in the UK. During this time electoral targeting and party political philosophy were honed in a bid to attract new voters.

The philosophy behind the SNP was and is to win self-determination for Scotland, whereby Scotland means ‘anyone living in Scotland’ and self-determination is to be of the decentralised, social democratic type. The SNP’s inclusiveness has a broad appeal across classes and transcends societal cleavages. In particular, first-time voters, the young, and socially mobile are sympathetic to the SNP’s vision of being a catalyst for democratic change. These goals were aided by the communications revolution in the 1950s and ‘60s. The new party did not have to tread the path through the ‘political

64 Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism, p. 169.
undergrowth" as did other established parties, as it obtained rapid prominence through the media. This was evident when an SNP candidate won a by-election in Hamilton in 1967 – a ‘safe’ Labour constituency. MP Winifred Ewing was signed up for a weekly column in the *Daily Record* whilst the *Daily Express* avidly covered her activities at Westminster.66

The real breakthrough in political nationalist consciousness, however, occurred in October 1974 when the SNP polled 30% of the General Election vote in Scotland. In the previous year, oil was discovered in the North Sea adjacent to Scotland. The new treasure was exploited brilliantly by the SNP during the election campaign. “It’s Scotland’s Oil” sang out the party’s propaganda machine. ‘Scotland’, which was then only a sub-cultural entity, could perhaps become a politico-economic entity. “The real purpose of the oil campaign was to convince Scots that oil made independence both economically possible and politically necessary.”67 The image of a self-sufficient nation was sealed with the reassurance of non-UK subsidised wealth. In an election survey published later that year, public endorsement of this image was confirmed. It was found that 76% of Scots believed that the existence of the SNP and its electoral victories had been ‘good for Scotland’.68

Yet the oil campaign was not the only basis for SNP success in the 1970s. As noted before, the party had augmented its political identity. The SNP portrayed itself as the voice of a Scottish community (under threat) as well as a political movement. The move to populist nationalism coincided with the party’s move to leftist politics. The SNP played upon anti-Tory sentiments, which was part of a larger strategy to fight Labour on the grounds that Scotland was a ‘working-class’ area. Party platforms stated “the SNP is

66 Harvie, *Scotland and Nationalism*, p. 179.
67 Miller, *The End of British Politics?* p. 60.
a democratic left-of-centre political party committed to Scottish Independence. The party was now located "on the left and the election of Alex Salmond as leader in 1990, the first self-professed socialist, symbolised this orientation." 

This fixed ideological stance rankled the Labour Party. Labour had been the dominant party in Scotland since the 1950s, and faced its greatest threat in the form of political nationalism. The SNP knew that to win seats in Scotland, it had to cast policy issues in a light that would appeal to Labour voters. But whilst the SNP fought Labour on the grounds of working-class support, Labour fought the SNP on the grounds of pro-devolution support. Historically, Labour has supported a measure of Home Rule in Scotland. With the rise of the SNP, devolutionary measures were strengthened to curb the nationalist challenge. Two devolution referendums were organised by Labour in 1979 and 1997, the latter of which overwhelmingly indicated that Scots wanted some degree of political autonomy. Devolution would "kill the SNP stone dead" said a Labour MP during the referendum campaign. But with the new Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh, and with the SNP as official opposition, it appears that the independence-as-next-step idea has gained ground, much to Labour's chagrin.

Having briefly examined the advent of the SNP as a major political player, let us now turn to the more normative questions of the SNP's character and purpose. In recent literature, attention has been paid to the overtly civic character of the SNP. Paul Hamilton argues that Scottish political nationalism is a model of associative identity-politics in

69 See the SNP's 2001 party platform at www.snp.org.uk.
70 Cunningham, "The Parties", in British Political Parties Today, p. 188.
72 The MP in question was George Robertson.
Europe, whilst Tom Nairn believes that the SNP has succeeded in recapturing the democratic voice of Scotland. Throughout its existence, the SNP has exhibited an 'incontrovertible rationality' in its civic breed of nationalism. The SNP cannot appeal to any one segment of the population at the risk of offending basic customs of liberal-democratic politics. For this, and for tactical reasons, it has avoided appeals to an articulated Scottish identity/experience in order to rise above various social cleavages.

This avoidance of pandering to social strata has paid off, as proven in the electoral coup in Glasgow Govan, the heartland of Catholic Labour, which voted in an SNP candidate in 1988. Therefore, the inclusive and unpartisan nature of the SNP means that the 'tariff' for being a nationalist is quite low. One does not have to speak a certain language, partake in a certain religion or culture to be a Scottish Nationalist. One only has to live in Scotland.

However, the exclusively 'civic' character of the SNP has weaknesses as well as strengths. In the last section, we outlined how culture in Scotland has been recently disassociated from politics. In an analysis of the SNP, we can detect that their brand of nationalism has been intentionally separated from culture. Beveridge and Turnbull state:

"Suspicious of concepts like 'tradition' and 'identity', many tough-minded left-wing nationalists were even prepared to abandon the cultural argument entirely. Scottish nationalism's cultural-intellectual base was therefore altogether too narrow for the nationalist challenge to be sustained over any extended period."

The SNP has distanced itself from cultural concepts of the nation to accord with the 'civic' brand of nationalism. This was done not because Scottish culture is 'deformed', but because the SNP intends to appeal to the widest voting electorate. This includes non-

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native born or blood descent Scots, which is demonstrated by the SNP’s recent coalition offspring: Scots Asians for Independence (SAI).

This is a reasonable strategy. Any hint of ‘ethnic’ nationalism would discredit the movement irrevocably. “Far from ethnic infatuation having informed the rise of Scottish political nationalism since the 1960s, the contrary is closer to the truth.” Cultural nationalism has been shunned by the SNP in a bid for civic inclusiveness. But one question remains. How does the SNP deal with cultural imagery of Scotland in relation to a political sense of Scottishness? This is important when cultural imagery, providing huge emotive appeal, is so embedded in the people’s psyche. Fintan O’Toole, for instance, believes that “the problem for political nationalism is that romantic notions of the country have become a crucial constituent of the way Scotland sees itself.” It seems that the SNP’s greatest challenge is to overcome the voter’s ambivalence between being a cultural nationalist and voting for the national party. David McCrone suggests that “one of the most interesting developments in the last two decades has been the way that the Scottish National Party has turned a rich and diverse cultural meaning of Scotland into a politically charged one. The party’s problem for long enough was that it could find no way of changing the idea of ‘Scotland’ into one of a politically independent nation. ‘Scotland’ remained associated with the music hall, tourism and cultural organisations.”

III. IMAGINING THE POLITICAL NATION

By merely existing, the SNP has contributed to the political image of Scotland. And as David Miller points out, a majority of Scots have identified the Scottish National

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77 Nairn, *After Britain*, p. 244.
78 O’Toole, “Imagining Scotland,” p. 69.
The idea of Scotland as a nation has become politicised. Yet this distinct political image of Scotland has been created through no single deed of the SNP. The political differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK aids the development of the concept of Scotland as a political entity. However, we cannot correlate this political imagery with a developing sense of cultural nationalism. In fact, as McCrone states, “the (cultural) idea that Scotland is a land out of time chimes with its political status of a stateless nation.” This observation has been challenged by an image of Scotland that proposes that it is a modern nation, and that this nation requires a state.

Before the advent of the Scottish National Party, civil institutions contributed to a political image of Scotland, even if the national consciousness they fostered was divorced from considerations of challenging the state. Famously, Scotland retained a distinct civil society after the 1707 Treaty of Union which comprises the Church of Scotland, a separate educational system, and Scots law. These institutions differentiated Scottish political values and behaviour from those of the centre. The Kirk in particular advertised itself as keeper of the nation’s soul and has of late shown sympathy towards sovereignty. “Kirk, law, local government and education had traditionally protected the nation.” These core bodies were joined by an abundance of other institutional bodies, councils, boards, societies and committees that were explicitly ‘Scottish’ and thus furnished a distinct political identity. Of utmost importance, the Scottish Office (established in 1885) allowed people to imagine Scotland as a meaningful political unit. “The whole logic of the Scottish Office has made it a basis for separation, even nationalism.”

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80 Miller, *The End of British Politics?* p. 91.
Miller argues that there is another equally important set of 'separatist' national institutions in Scotland that have advanced the political differences between Scotland and the UK: the press. Scotland is famously a newspaper-reading country. The Scottish news media has differentiated Scottish politics – not because it is pro-independent, but because it reports largely on Scottish affairs and caters to a Scottish audience. This has enabled Scots to see their nation as a distinct entity, demonstrated during a campaign to install a 'six o'clock news' on BBC Scotland. This project gained overwhelming support from Scots, even resolute Unionists. But why has this taken so long to happen?

Nairn believes that the attainment of a Scottish Parliament in 1999, on a surge of popular nationalism, took so long to happen because of the Treaty's preservation of an institutional national society. "Nationalism was slow to evolve there for a perfectly obvious reason: in Scotland, there was no 'nation' to be built, redeemed, 'imagined' (etc.) by means of the usual formulae. The nation was there already." After 1945, however, a Scottish nation detached from political nationalism was no longer feasible.

Since World War II, Scottish politics and voting behaviour have diverged from the rest of the UK. In addition to the rise of the SNP, there has been a consistent decline in support of the Conservative Party. This came to a head during the 'Thatcher years' of 1979-1992. Many Scottish people saw "something fundamentally wrong with a system where there's been 17 years of Tory government and the people of Scotland have voted Socialist for 17 years and had a Tory government." Anti-Thatcherism crystallised during protests against the test introduction of the poll tax in Scotland. The poll tax debacle further indicated to Scots that the Tories are an 'English' party. For instance,

84 Nairn, *After Britain*, p. 140.
85 Sean Connery, interviewed in *Le Figaro Magazine*, (20th April, 1996).
Hobsbawm at the height of the Tory years believed that Scottish nationalism was "plainly a reaction to an all-British government supported by a modest minority of Scots, and a politically impotent all-British opposition party." This title, of an English Party that does not cater to Scottish needs, has been compounded by the Tories' consistent rejection of constitutional change. The 1997 general election was significant because the Tories – the only party to oppose plans for devolution – lost all their seats in Scotland. If we couple anti-Tory sentiment with a renewed political nationalism, we can say there is a considerable gulf between British and Scottish national consciousness.

The SNP, on the wave of this Scottish-UK political divergence, "has turned into a determinant of national existence...the artificer of statehood." In its 2001 party manifesto, the SNP stated 'We stand for Scotland'. This is not a 'Scotland' of Loch Ness monsters and Highland rebels, but a Scotland that wishes to have autonomy in its political affairs. This political message has been diffused through the Scottish media to voters, whilst "the political parties have used the media to reinforce the nation of a separate Scots politics." In addition to this, the SNP has benefited from the different political mechanisms in Scotland – of parties distributing separate election manifestos and broadcasts. The SNP battles on Scottish turf, where it has an intrinsic advantage of being the 'only real Scottish party'. This is compounded by the recent turn in ideology of New Labour. The party traditionally claimed the title of 'Scotland's Party' because of its disproportionate (working-class) support there. However, with 'New' Labour's centre-political agenda, it is now seen "by many Scots as an English phenomenon with no

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86 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1870, p. 179.
87 Nairn, After Britain, p. 117.
relevance to Scotland and also as the direct descendent of Thatcherism. These sentiments have cleared the road for the SNP to represent itself as being the only party in Scotland that caters to Scottish interests.

The Scottish National Party has disseminated a particular message to Scottish voters, which amounts to a ‘political image’ of Scotland. This image plays primarily upon the political gulf between Scottish and UK national consciousness. The message is that Scottish people need to imagine a national life and identity outside Britain. This does not equate to imagining a cultural community and civic institutions. Rather, the SNP’s main aim is to convince Scottish voters to imagine possible legal and political statehood. In sociological terms, this requires setting new boundaries of the imagination. Whereas the old boundaries rested on imagining culture in Scotland and imagining the political realm of the UK, these new boundaries require imagining a political life as well as a cultural identity within Scotland.

Indeed, Scotland has had no problem in imagining a national community in the past. But, as was pointed out previously, this imagined community rested on a dubious heritage, and its power lay in its historical and cultural appeal. The SNP proposes that we need to change the scope, content and limits of what we imagine, by adding a civic and political dimension. ‘Civic’ not in sense of the Holy Trinity, but in how we go about expressing nationalism. ‘Political’ in the sense that statehood is achievable, meaning Westminster is not where our politically imagined community should be. The SNP believes that our political community can be Scotland. In order to succeed in creating a political image of Scotland, support for the Union must be tempered, if not nullified.

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Polls on national identity preference, taken by the Scottish Election Survey in 1997, indicate that people living in Scotland give priority to being Scottish. In Scotland, there is also a belief that there is “a more collectivist political culture, compared with England.” This suggests that there is a cognitive bias amongst Scots that their identity lies in the image of “Scotland.” However, this unique Scottish political culture has always been a part of the UK political arena. For the SNP to succeed in its goals, Scots must imagine a political community within the limited, territorial boundaries of Scotland.

The SNP is not the only party in Scotland to realise that political images of the nation now resonate with Scottish voters, and pay off in electoral terms. In attempts to capture the ‘imagination’ of the Scottish national community, other political parties have been pandering to nationalism. This may seem tautological considering the new Scottish Parliament. But British parties have traditionally refrained from speaking of the defence of the Scottish nation. The Labour Party in 1997 posed a referendum question in favour of Scottish devolution. However, there are now hints that the Scottish Labour Party will separate from the main branch of Labour to fight on Scottish grounds in the Parliament. As for the Scottish Liberal Democrats, Home Rule has always been a policy item; in fact, they proudly state that their support of devolution predates that of the SNP.

90 A June 1998 poll by MORI found that 77% of Scots saw the Scottish National Party as standing for Scotland, compared to 43% only for the Scottish Labour Party. Quoted in The Scotsman, 5th June 1998.
92 Cunningham, “Political Parties”, British Political Parties Today, p. 188.
93 For an in-depth analysis of the Scottish Labour Party’s gradual transformation into a more nationalist party, see Jack Geekie and Roger Levy, “Devolution and the Tartanisation of the Labour Party,” Parliamentary Affairs 42 (July 1989). One may also refer to the SNP’s charges that the Labour Party has stolen their policies. In a campaign advertisement during the June 2001 General Election, Scottish National Party MSPs John Swinney and Fiona Hyslop declared that the New Labour government had “swindled” ten of the SNP’s policies. Information is taken from the SNP website: www.westandforscotland.co.uk.
94 Despite the fact that Prime Minister Tony Blair likened the Scottish Parliament to a ‘Parish Council’. 
It appears that almost all parties in Scotland, except the Conservatives, are now fighting among themselves to win the ‘national’ vote. Because of this, “in an important sense, we are all nationalists now,” says McCrone. However, this newly politicised image of Scotland has “brought into focus the problematic character of Scottish culture.”

IV. JEKYLL AND HYDE

Many Scottish writers make note of the ‘Jekyll-and-Hyde’ character of Scottish national consciousness. This term originated in the imagination of R. L. Stevenson, born in Edinburgh. Its meaning can be loosely translated into a mental state of schizophrenia – that one person has more than one identity – and these identities are harmful in their incompatibility. Recently, this term has been resuscitated by academics to describe elements of the Scottish national psyche. (Anderson, I’m sure, would be pleased to find that ‘narrators of a nation’ can have such long-lived resonance.) This may be explained by the fact that Scotland has recently seen a revival of both cultural and political nationalism. However, there is very little correlation between the two. The juxtaposition of cultural and political images of nation has created an irreconcilable dualism in Scottish nationality. In this section I examine the actors responsible for cultural and political images of nation, and consider the effects of their work on Scottish society. The main result of ‘Jekyll and Hydeism’ has been a fracturing of the will to statehood.

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96 *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1887) was inspired by Robert Louis Stevenson’s experiences in Edinburgh. He was interested in the juxtaposition of two areas in the city – the New Town, which was conventional, religious and civilised, and the Old Town, known for its brothels, shadiness and dark history – and how these contrasting images of Edinburgh represented the duality of human nature.
Before delving into this section, let us take a look at what Scottish scholars have been saying about Jekyll-and-Hydeism. William MacIlvanney thinks that there is an "ambiguity in the nation's sense of self" and a "dichotomy" that is both cultural and political in nature. He argues that this is because Scots are divided between materialist anglophone conformists and radical non-materialist separatists, of which he favours the latter. Christopher Harvie turns this concept upside down, and defines Scots as belonging to one of two camps – cosmopolitan or parochial, of which he favours the former. Thus, we have two scholars who have identified two similar traits in the Scottish character and who disagree with which camp is best: material/cosmopolitan or separatist/parochial. If we bring another view into the picture, more light is shed on the Scottish national duality. Tom Nairn thinks that Scots have suffered from two visions of Scotland, which constitute the drab poverty-stricken realism and the Highland fantasy. This reality/fantasy divide is closest to the original incarnation of Jekyll-and-Hydeism. It implies that there is a bipolar way of thinking about Scotland, which sets the realism of political impotency against the romantic cultural imagery of a stateless nation.

As Alan Patten aptly points out, one does not have to believe in the goals of cultural nationalism to believe in the goals of political nationalism, and vice versa. In Scotland, this is especially true. Images of nation are juxtaposed – the SNP has eschewed any cultural ‘roots’, whilst culture itself has been steadfastly non-political. This fits with the portrayal of Scotland as a schizophrenic country – a diagnosis advanced by Scottish

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psychiatrist Karl Miller when he theorised on the social origins of schizophrenia in relation to one’s native land.99 Let us examine the symptoms of this national duality.

Since the 1960s, people have been paying more attention to how cultural images of Scotland are constructed, and especially, who is involved in this construction. For instance, in an examination of the salience of modern ‘heritage’ in Scottish society and politics, McCrone et al describe the role of three major institutions in Scotland’s heritage industry – the Scottish Tourist Board, the National Trust for Scotland, and Historic Scotland. These players have benefited from cultural representations of Scotland since the 1970s and 80s, when tourism became the second largest industry in the UK, and Scotland was subsequently turned into a cultural ‘theme park’. But ‘heritage’ is not only materially driven. It is also used to bolster a faltering Brigadoon-esque image of Scotland for expatriate Scots as well as those living at home. As such, it has had a profound impact on the way Scots view their nation and their identity within it.

McCrone et al stress, however, that the revival of cultural imagery of Scotland by heritage bodies has not translated into support for Scotland as a political nation. In fact, it would seem that the contrary is true. The protection of Scotland’s ‘heritage’ in the British State is, for many cultural advocates, anathema to Scottish secession. This is more poignant considering that avid cultural connoisseurs are commonly Conservative voters. In a survey of the cultural and political values of Life Members of the National Trust for Scotland, it was found that whilst many considered themselves to be Scottish patriots, their greatest political antipathy was toward the SNP. A typical response was “Well [heritage is] not political, it’s not the SNP! I don’t like them but I think of myself as a

A cultural commitment to Scotland does not translate into a political one. Although the National Trust portrays itself as "a community [acting] ‘for the benefit of the nation,” its members distance themselves from the SNP. There are two bodies here – cultural and political – that claim to be the keepers of Scotland’s ‘national soul’.

Underlying McCrone’s analysis of the actors involved in the making of Scottish heritage is a very strong political argument. Culture, it is asserted, is deformed because Scotland is a stateless nation, with no control over its own cultural reproduction. The heritage industry, largely funded by the UK government, is reifying such a distortion of images of Scottish culture. By logical deduction, the existing English-dominated union, through centralist institutions, is carving out a financially profitable Scottish culture business that inadvertently shapes Scots’ sense of self-identity within the UK. The SNP aims to change this by gaining control of the state. However, the SNP does not control cultural images of Scotland in the way that government-funded heritage institutions can. Images of the nation are distorted between a centralist cultural realm and a Scottish party opposition based on civic/political images of what the nation is and ought to be.

The solution to this national conundrum, as common sense indicates, would be for the SNP not only to seek control of the state, but also to wrest control of Scotland’s national culture from centralist institutions. This would require the SNP to shape cultural images of the nation, and also for the SNP to convince cultural nationalists that a state is necessary to ensure full control over Scotland’s cultural production. However, there is a problem with this hypothesis. Whilst cultural nationalists in Scotland (if life members of the National Trust are any indication) appear to resent the separation-drive of the SNP,

100 McCrone et al, Scotland – the Brand, p. 169.
101 Heritage Scotland 10, (Summer 1993), produced by the National Trust for Scotland, p. 10.
Scottish nationalists have distanced themselves from the ‘deformed’ culture of Scotland. Further, the SNP’s main goal is to enable Scots imagine their country as a modern self-sufficient political nation, and not to glorify the cultural heritage (or baggage) of a suppressed state. It will therefore be no easy task to translate cultural nationalism into political nationalism because of wariness on both sides of the divide.

Kedourie argues that cultural nationalists are not hostile to independent statehood and are frequently driven into state politics to defend the cultural autonomy of the nation. However, the cultural autonomy of Scotland is not seen to be under enough threat for cultural nationalists to pick up the gauntlet. Despite academic efforts to raise awareness of the ‘bogus’ character of Scottish culture, resulting from its stateless character, many Scots understand that their ‘deformed’ culture is still markedly different from the rest of the UK. Perhaps the SNP need to facilitate a campaign about Scotland’s forged culture for cultural defenders to feel that the nation needs a state to remedy the tartan monster.

This discussion points to a crucial question in the crisis of national dualism. Is a possible means of nationalist electoral success the appropriation of cultural indicators by the SNP? How else can the SNP turn self-proclaimed Scottish cultural nationalists into SNP voters? “No one really thinks that the shade of William Wallace will reappear at Hollywood,” says Nairn, in defence of Scotland’s civic nationalism. However, Nairn has not considered that this might be a drawback. For if political nationalists in Scotland did situate their civic goals within a cultural setting, even if this does mean reminiscing about Scottish rebels of the past, SNP popularity would undoubtedly soar. It would also mean that the tradition of viewing Scotland in a bipolar light might be coming to a close.
V. CONCLUSION

What I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter is that there are two streams of nationalism in Scotland – cultural and political – that are not correlative. On one hand there exists a cultural nationalism that is divorced from any political will towards statehood. On the other is a political nationalism that has repudiated cultural images of the nation in favour of a civic approach. Both types of nationalism have drawn on the (re)-construction of images of Scotland as a nation, which have been facilitated by certain actors for either cultural or political goals. The conflicting images of what ‘nation’ means in Scotland have led to a polarised sense of national identity. I have equated this with a ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ national phenomenon. I have also made a suggestion that to overcome the national duality, cultural and political images of nation must be synchronised.

A crucial point of this discussion is that there exists in Scotland a political side to imagining the national community. This is evident in two ways. Firstly, there are actors involved in the construction of images of nation. Although their objectives may not be ‘political’ per se – that is, they do not want to achieve political power, the cultural hegemony created by their actions is political in nature and has political repercussions. Secondly, one set of these actors – the Scottish National Party – has tried to create a political image of the nation. Instead of imagining the UK as the basis of Scotland’s political arena, a new image has been presented that demonstrates how Scottish politics is distinct, and how Scotland is capable of obtaining its own political self-determination.

This political image of Scotland, however, owes much of its plausibility to civil society institutions that have long separated Scottish society from the rest of the UK.

102 Nairn, After Britain, p. 263.
Although these institutions helped to preserve a distinct culture in Scotland with non-political undertones, the fact that there existed a blueprint that illustrated how Scotland is ‘different’ has eased the transformation toward imagining that Scotland may also be politically different. Cultural images of Scotland have since 1707 remained distinct due to the autonomy of civil societal. The next step for the SNP is to construct a political set of national images in order to sever Scottish political identification with the UK State.

Yet, the problem identified here is that the proposed political imagery of Scotland has been divorced from Scotland’s distinct (although centralist-propagated) cultural imagery. This has hampered the collective will toward independence, as cultural nationalists have been divorced from the SNP’s electoral considerations. Furthermore, a purely civic-political nationalist movement in Scotland has not realised that cultural imagery provides popular emotive appeal. This cultural/political dichotomy needs to be addressed for the SNP to surpass its 30% share of the popular Scottish vote.

Tom Nairn thinks that “to make a new Scotland, the old one must be unmade.”\textsuperscript{103} This will require a political strategy to deal with cultural concerns. In other words, Scotland requires a ‘new’ political self-determination to overcome the ‘old’ deformed cultural imagery of Scotland by controlling the means of cultural reproduction. Nairn’s sentiments echo those of Quebec nationalists during the Quiet Revolution. The prevailing opinion of Jean Lesage and his colleagues was to erase the past traditions and institutions of Quebec in order to build a new modern nation. Yet whereas it is only now “certain...that Scotland is moving towards an imagined independence of the mind”\textsuperscript{104} in Quebec, this certainty became politically apparent at a much earlier stage.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 223.
CHAPTER THREE: NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC

In this chapter I investigate the politics of imagining the nation in Quebec. As with the Scottish case-study, I aim to explore whether the notion of politicised imagined communities is a realistic assessment of the impact of the national party on the 'nation as landscape' of the mind'. Furthermore, I seek to explain the relationship between political and cultural images of the nation, and their effects on the Québécois national identity.

The first stage of this discussion focuses on Quebec culture before the 1960s. Primarily, I focus on the role of the Church and traditional institutions in maintaining a distinct, yet insular, Quebec nationalism. The national culture advocated by these actors - the Catholic faith, the French language, love of the land - were framed within the dominant ideology of la survivance. I examine the impact of this ideology on Quebec society and politics. It is clear that these images were formulated to maintain the power of an entrenched elite, and can thus be interpreted as centralist or pro-status quo in nature.

In the second stage I examine the development of political nationalism in Quebec post-Quiet Revolution, in particular the spectacular rise to power of the Parti Québécois. The organisational characteristics of the PQ are analysed, as are its membership base, leadership, electoral history and party platforms. Significantly, I focus on the PQ image as a 'new party' that, in all appearances, jettisons links with pre-1960s traditional nationalism, yet still plays upon the French language as a political mobilising force.

In the third stage, I examine political images of the Quebec nation. Although Quebec has never possessed 'statehood' as Scotland once did, the political institutions in
Quebec have enjoyed far more autonomy after Confederation than Scotland after the Treaty of Union. With the metamorphosis of French Canadian to Quebec nationalism in 1960, Quebec can not only be addressed as a province, but as a nation with delineated (although highly contested) territorial and political borders. This image of Quebec as constituting a political entity has been advanced through the PQ’s period in governmental office and through its proposed civic-political images of possible statehood.

In the final stage of this discussion, I review the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ manifestations of nationalism in Quebec. Central to this discussion is the question of whether or not the Quiet Revolution was such a break with the past that it appeared to be. We learn that language has been seminal to both images of nation – it has been linked to cultural survival as well as political progress. Despite the PQ’s advocacy of associative civic nationalism, however, its failure to develop a multicultural vision of Quebec society, unilingual language policies and occasional ethnic references to ‘old stock Québécois’ have alienated many non-French speaking citizens in Quebec.

“Jekyll and Hyde” is a more complex phenomenon in Quebec than in Scotland, largely because of Quebec’s lack of a politicised civil society before 1960 and the ambiguous effects of the symbolic ‘revolution’ thereafter. Four paradoxes of national duality are explored, which can be related to the unclear relationship between language, politics and culture in Quebec nationalism since the Quiet Revolution. I argue that the PQ, in order to appeal to more Quebecers, must put less stress on linguistic and cultural elements of nationalism which have been carried over since 1960, and more emphasis on the political image of the nation in a modern multicultural setting.
I. CULTURAL NATIONALISM BEFORE THE 1960s

Traditional nationalism prevailed in Quebec with remarkable fortitude throughout the period 1840-1960. This has been called ‘French-Canadian’ nationalism, to distinguish it from post-1960s ‘Québécois’ nationalism. In this section I examine images of the nation propagated before 1960, which were cultural (expressed through religion and language) and non-political in form. Moreover, I look at the role of ‘traditional’ actors in constructing these cultural images, and their effects on French Canadian society.

Two features, according to authors, circumscribed pre-1960s French Canadian nationalism. The first, ‘la survivance’, was a notion grounded in the struggle of French Canadians to maintain their distinct ways of life following the British Conquest in 1759. It attributes a spiritual significance to the ‘miracle’ that French Canada narrowly escaped the perils of the French Revolution of 1789 and assimilating thrusts of the English, embodied in the Durham Report of 1841. The ‘overcoming’ of these threats generated the feeling that the French Canadian collectivity was the bearer of a blessed culture to be protected at all costs. This culture was comprised primarily of the Catholic religion and the French language, and augmented by a number of rural and conservative traditions.

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105 The Act of Union in 1840 marked the establishment of a single governmental authority for both Upper and Lower Canada, which thereafter became “Canada East” and “Canada West” (now Quebec and Ontario, respectively). The year 1960 marked the onset of Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution.”


107 For an excellent account of the clerical argument that French Canada had been preserved by divine providence first from the godless instigators of the French Revolution and second from the assimilation of the non-Catholic English, the plans for which were elaborated in Lord Durham’s Report, see Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec, (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1983).
Importantly, *la survivance* reflected a desire to protect French Canadian culture against the value systems of Anglo-Saxon ‘foreigners’, which implied a rejection of the forces of industrialisation that “embodied alien values and could only weaken the nation”.

The second premise of traditional nationalism, ‘anti-étatisme’, signified a strong distrust of the state, including the Quebec provincial government with its Anglo-Saxon heritage. Anti-étatisme deemed that the state must be restrained to secure the survival of traditional French-Canadian culture. Political modernisation was seen as the principle threat to *la survivance*. Furthermore, the state was considered an inadequate institution, as francophones defined the nation in terms of a French Canada that existed beyond the boundaries of Quebec. It was deemed safer to rely on French-Canadian institutions (the Church) to address social problems, whilst economic problems were to be managed through private sector growth as opposed to ‘corrupt’ state intervention.

As we can see, the two founding images of traditional national culture ultimately served to maintain the status of the Roman Catholic Church and dampen imperatives toward political modernisation. The Church proclaimed its role as guarantor and principle defender of French Canadian culture, language and values. It did so through its control of social services and unionisation. In particular, the Church’s ability to propound its ideology through public schooling and higher education was critical to its sustained authority. Civil society in Quebec was explicitly non-political, which would have been considered as a threat to the Church’s authority. These traditionalist beliefs, importantly the fear of making a break with the past, persevered for an astonishing duration despite intermittent attempts to assert a political nationalism against the state. As in Scotland, cultural nationalism in Quebec was not a mobilising force for the modern nation, quite

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108 McRoberts, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, p. 84.
the opposite. It was a method of preserving a profoundly anti-political image of Quebec to maintain the standing of the Church in French Canadian society. In its anti-political cultural images of the nation, we can surmise that the Church was politically pro-status quo, which can also be interpreted as pro-centralist. The Church, in its assertion of cultural nationalism, by no means sought political autonomy for French Canada.

It is necessary to dwell on how the Church was able to control French-Canadian cultural life. National identity was as closely linked to Catholicism as it was to language. The greatest protagonist of Church nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century was L'abbé Lionel Groulx. Groulx edited a popular review called *L'Action Française* in the 1920s, which propagated a nationalist doctrine based on the social teachings of the Church. In his essay ‘The First Obligation’ (1943), Groulx became one of the first historians to portray the French-Canadians as a potent national entity. He states: “In Quebec let us be strong with all our strength... Let us exact a just return from those who live and grow rich from our expense. Let us not abandon our workers to leaders from beyond our borders or elsewhere who ask nothing better than to sell us a Trojan horse”.

However, Groulx’s patriotic pleas were not political in nature – rather, they alerted French Canadians to the fragility of their culture and language. The primary culprits of minorisation – English-Canadian and American economic and cultural influences – were attacked by *L'Action Française*. The Church played upon French Canadian hostility to being “a permanent minority (in Quebec) where their rights and powers were subject to the actions of the Anglo-Canadian majority”. The solution was

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for French-Canadians to embrace Church philosophy and rescind the evils of politics and Anglophone-driven socio-economic change.

The resentment aroused by Church institutions against the anglophone 'Other' followed a line of thinking emulated in 19th century French Canadian literature. Writers such as Chaveau had compared Englishmen with disguised devils in their novels (*Charles Guérin*, 1853). Other writers, including Garneau and Crémazie, founded a literary salon in the 1850s that would enable them to “show at least the passionate resentment of a people anxious to redress the humiliation inflicted on them from an outside power”. The nationalist ideas of these authors gave the people of Quebec a vocabulary with which to describe a felt reality, in accordance with Anderson’s arguments, whilst their elaboration of old folk stories ensured the survival of Quebec culture. The Church and other conservative intellectuals would appropriate this vocabulary for the purposes of the traditional nationalist ideology of *la survivance* and *anti-étatisme*. Cultural nationalism here did not emerge with the decline of Church institutions and rational secularisation, as Anderson argues. Contrarily, the Church asserted itself as the prime bearer of the nation.

During the 1930s, another Jesuit organisation, *L'École Sociale Populaire*, assumed responsibility for disseminating the social doctrine of the Church. The group’s self-proclaimed task was one of “propaganda, education and social improvement”. Their activities included the distribution of weekly newsletters to all newspapers in Canada; the opening of a Jesuit school to train ‘speakers’ to spread their word; and the

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publication of the review *L'Ordre Nouveau*. By this, the ‘new order’ meant a Quebec state organised hierarchically according to the social doctrine of the Church.

The Church was, nevertheless, not completely divorced from politics in Quebec. In fact, the main reason why the Church was able to dominate French Canadian society was because of a backhanded ‘non-aggression pact’ with anglophone economic elites and francophone political leaders. The Church had always supported the Confederation process, and pledged loyalty to the British Crown. This garnered much respect amongst anglophone circles. Its primary interest was in preserving French Canadian traditions (i.e. itself), thus leaving the economic power of the province in the hands of the English and the political authority of the province in the hands of pro-centralist politicians. This ‘deal’ provided the key target for the newly emerging political nationalist movement.

The Church, because of its desire to maintain a privileged status through elite accommodation with (economic and political) centralist institutions and actors, inhibited the development of ‘positive government’ and a modern political nationalism. However, in the post-WW2 years, urbanisation, industrialisation and a concurrent decline in Church authority meant that French Canadians were no longer isolated from central political and social processes. The death of Maurice Duplessis in 1959, and thus the end of the pro-Church, pro-status quo *Union Nationale* regime, created an institutional void that was filled by the instigators of the Quiet Revolution. A fundamental tenet of this revolution was a growth in political national consciousness. As Meadwell states, this period saw “the end to the cooptive arrangement and ushered in a new bargaining relationship between state and cultural groups.”113 The new negotiators of Quebec’s state and culture

would be political nationalists, whose primary goal was to challenge the leverage of the Church, and to increase that of the Quebec State. The old values of an agrarian, conservative and Church-dominated society could no longer ensure their survival as a collectivity. The solution to French Canadian oppression was no longer *la survivance*, but assertive political action to maintain and develop their distinct sense of nationhood.

II. THE ADVENT OF THE PARTI QUEBECOIS

The Parti Québécois (PQ) was born in 1968, absorbing a handful of smaller nationalist groups. The PQ endorsed a secular and political nationalism aimed against the values of the Church. Yet, the civic-minded PQ did carry over one tenet of traditional cultural nationalism – the preservation of a French collectivity. The PQ’s linguistic absolutism, and the effects of this on the PQ’s claim to a territorial Quebec nationalism that has broken with traditional (and ethnic) conceptions of the nation, are examined.

The Parti Québécois was formed under the leadership of René Lévesque, a media spokesperson and former politician in Lesage’s Liberal government. Lévesque called for a ‘new society’: a form of participatory social democracy that would lead to a revolt against all outdated and rigid socio-economic and political structures. This vision of Quebec rejected previous cultural images of the nation. “None of Groulx’s ideas or writings find their way into Lévesque’s speeches. It is almost as if, as far as Lévesque is concerned, the thousands of books and pamphlets that have been produced by Quebec nationalists over the years had never been written.”

Lévesque argued that Quebec’s

survival depended upon its becoming a sovereign state within a Canadian Union, an option that ran counter to the anti-étatisme sentiments of traditional ideology. Independence with an economic union was the only solution for protecting the interests of the francophone collectivity. This new political agenda was well received by the Québécois. Soon after its incarnation, the PQ had an estimated 25,000 members.

The Parti Québécois had many attractions for voters dissatisfied with the Liberals. It was new, with no clear links to entrenched political parties. As in Scotland, the absence of a political nationalist tradition was a source of strength – the new movement was seen as a catalyst for change. It enjoyed a ‘social-democratic’ or at least populist social program. It was not beholden to any corporate interests, thus claiming greater credibility than most traditional political parties. It enjoyed the sympathy of Quebec’s media, and its leader had “a reputation as a sound and progressive politician.” As such, the PQ was to draw a broad range of social groups into its ranks.

The PQ came to represent not only a movement for Quebec sovereignty, but also a party of and for the Québécois people. Lévesque “united the Quebec separatist movement, gave it respectability, and brought it electoral success.” His popularity as a spokesman for the Quebeois hastened the triumph of his, and later the PQ’s, political philosophy in 1976 when the party assumed office. Its growth in support is astounding. The PQ rose from 24% of the popular vote in 1970, to 30% of the vote in 1973, to 41% in

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115 Lévesque said in a summary statement: “It is up to us to choose the political status which suits us best... First, we have to rid ourselves completely of the thoroughly-out-dated federal regime. The problem cannot solve itself by the continuance or modification of the status quo... That means that Quebec should become a sovereign state.” The speech was published in Le Devoir, September 1967, p19-21, quoted in John Saywell, The Rise of the Parti Québécois 1967-1976, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 11-13.


1976, and to 49% in 1981.\textsuperscript{118} Lévesque's emphasis on the 'mandate' which would be decided in a referendum assuaged Quebecers that a vote for the PQ was not automatically a vote for independence. Instead, PQ voters were led to believe that their vote was against the traditional (federalist) parties and their inability to solve Quebec's problems.

It has been generally agreed that the Parti Québécois emerged as a middle class party.\textsuperscript{119} The largest group - professionals - formed the basis for Quebec's francophone 'new middle classes'. This class played a key role in the PQ.\textsuperscript{120} At the same time, Daniel Latouche finds that the party "had a particularly strong appeal among the lower income groups".\textsuperscript{121} Furthermore, the PQ contained blue-collar workers who sought to strengthen the party's relationship with the unions, and francophone managers and administrators who supported the prospect of increased economic power in a sovereign Quebec. Thus, the Parti Québécois, somewhat like the SNP, espoused a populist social program that gained support from all classes in Quebec. The PQ "can best be characterised as a broadly based coalition of social forces, dominated by elements of the new middle class, which was united by the goal of Quebec independence along with an ideology combining belief in the technocratic state with a populist social program."\textsuperscript{122}

However, unlike the SNP, the PQ's appeal to all classes cannot be said of its appeal to all societal cleavages. Despite the PQ's emphasis on civic-political nationalism


\textsuperscript{119} This is evident in the social characteristics and occupations of its members: 37.2% were salaried professionals; 22.1% were 'white-collar' workers; 12.6% were 'blue-collar' workers; 14% came from students; and 8.9% were housewives. Statistics, released by the PQ in 1971, are taken from McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p. 242.

\textsuperscript{120} For example, travailleurs du langage strongly influenced PQ francisation policies to promote the prominence of French and French-language institutions.

\textsuperscript{121} Daniel Latouche, "The Independence Option: Ideological and Empirical Elements" in Thomson, Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the inside, p. 185.
and its claim to be blind to ethnicity, non-francophone groups were excluded from the new nationalism. The PQ's fight to ensure that French became the official language of Quebec resounded against the rights of anglophones, under the Official Languages Act, to communicate in English. The PQ also declared that immigrants would be required to attend French-language schools. This conflicted with the desire of allophones to assimilate into anglophone society, which culminated in a schooling crisis that divided English- and French-speaking communities in the heavily Italian-populated municipality of St-Leonard in 1967. Whilst the PQ opposed the clerical nationalism of the pre-1960s, then, it strengthened the linguistic element of nationalism. This strategy won the francophone vote, but to the anger of non-French speaking groups who have "begun to feel the same "siege mentality" as the white population in South Africa."

This brings us to a crucial normative point in the discussion of modern Quebec nationalism. How does the French language fit into the PQ's vision of associative, civic nationalism? If language can exclude some citizens of Quebec, does this imply that linguistic nationalism can be defined as an ascriptive type of cultural nationalism? And if it can, does this correlation undermine the PQ's claim to a civic-political nationalism? For many authors, language became the cultural identifier of Quebec after 1960. Yet we would be hard-pressed to conclude that this amounts to the ethnically defined French Canadian identity of the pre-1960s. In the PQ's White Paper, the nation is defined by political criteria: the residents of the province of Quebec are Québécois. The Quebec National Assembly furthermore defines the nation as "a modern, multi-ethnic

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123 Although it must be mentioned that the anglophone minority in Quebec enjoys a larger range of rights and services than any other minority in Canada.
community, founded on shared common values, a normal language of communication, and participation in collective life."^{125} It would appear that the PQ is trying to facilitate an ideological shift in national identity. The ethnic designation of French Canadian is being surpassed by a new identity resting on the territoriality of Quebec and its institutions.

At the same time, it is generally accepted that the French language defines the Quebec identity and images of nation. Let us return to the National Assembly’s mention of “a normal language of communication” in Quebec. It was hoped, with the enactment of Bill 101, that non-francophone minorities would integrate into a French-speaking Quebec, as non-anglophone minorities integrated in English-speaking Canada Outside Quebec (COQ). The Québécois are multi-ethnic in composition, and would be able to participate fully in a ‘melting pot’ French-speaking community. Civic nationalism welcomes anglophones, native peoples and immigrants to participate in the Quebec nation, whereas an ethnically-defined nation could not. If one only learned the French language, one could subscribe to any aspect of Quebec life, including civic nationalism. Thus, language became the only barrier to becoming a Quebec political nationalist.

Of course, voting statistics indicate that this is more a hypothesis than a reality.^{126} Despite the existence of some non-French members of the PQ, non-francophones generally do not vote for the PQ, and Quebec nationalists have been “slow to open their

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^{126} In a survey published in 1992, it was discovered that no non-francophone Quebec respondents believed in independence, whilst only 6% would choose sovereignty-association. André Blais and Richard Nadeau, “To Be or Not to Be Sovereignist: Quebeckers’ Perennial Dilemma,” *Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politiques* 18 (March 1992), p. 91.
nationhood to anglophones and newly migrated people.”127 Also, the PQ has had to backpedal against cultural nationalists in the party. With the references to the Québécois’ long history of cultural oppression and ‘old stock’ Québécois, there is a smack of ethnic sentiments in PQ discourses. This exclusive notion of the French-Canadian/Québécois struggle to maintain a distinct identity, and the idea of Quebec as an exclusive ethnic “homeland” for all French-speaking Canadians, discourages non-francophones from supporting the goals of the PQ.128 So as Keating says, “while civic nationalism is the official doctrine of the political class and most intellectuals, it still competes with an ethnically-based form.”129 The idea of Quebec as a civic territorial nation, and not a cultural-linguistic one, still has a long way to go.

But to offset this argument, it is worthwhile looking at what culture means in modern Quebec. What has the PQ done to substantiate the claims of cultural nationalists? Let us bear in mind, with Meadwell, that (political) nationalists “might be contemptuous of those in the cultural group who do not share their values and disdain contact with them.”130 William Coleman argues that with the collapse of a clerically-defined French Canadian culture in 1960, successive Quebec governments have achieved little to fill the cultural vacuum left behind and, as such, “a new distinctive culture has not arisen to take the place of the old.”131 Although the Department of Cultural Affairs was established in 1965, its activities deal mainly with education and language. Culture was defined

128 Gertrude J. Robinson argues that the idea of the nation of Quebec as being a French Canadian “ethnic” homeland was spearheaded during the Parti Québécois’ campaign in favour of the referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980. Gertrude J. Robinson, Constructing the Quebec Referendum: French and English Media Voices, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 36.
129 Keating, Nations against the State, p. 73.
nebulously by the Department, as argued by Richard Handler, with the French language being the defining characteristic.\footnote{Handler states that “at the time of the creation of Quebec’s Ministère des Affaires culturelles, there was no consensus as to what constituted French-Canadian culture.” He goes on to highlight the weaknesses and disorganisation of the Department, which were in no way remedied by the PQ’s period in governmental office. The PQ’s Green Paper, he argues, “did not formulate a theory of Québécois culture.” Richard}

Few attempts have been made by the PQ to develop a cultural image of the nation that reflects the diversity of the Quebec population, and the modernisation of Quebec society. Quebec’s national culture continues to be promoted by traditional organisations such as the Société Saint Jean Baptiste, whilst attempts have been made to revive traditional folklore and customs, in other words, the “authentic” culture of Quebec. Handler argues that the failure of successive PQ governments to develop a modern post-1960s culture was masked by ‘empty’ definitions of the cultural nation, such as that in the 1978 White Paper, in order for nationalists to define the nation politically. Despite this, traditional cultural representations of the nation persist in Quebec, which have been divorced from the political realm. I argue below that this scenario is a result of the way in which the Quiet Revolution signified a departure from Quebec’s non-political image, but alas did not signify a break with the traditional cultural image of Quebec.

The PQ, we have thus seen, did not attempt to develop cultural nationalism to back up the political issue of language. Like the SNP, Quebec political nationalists have eschewed previous cultural representations of the nation and have not fostered the development of a modern national culture. It is now difficult to define Quebec’s modern national culture outside of language. Attempts to control cultural development have been half-hearted, in accordance with the PQ’s territorial definition of the nation. In this sense, the PQ is similar to the SNP – neither party developed a cultural image of the new nation.
they were seeking to build. Linguistic nationalism fell under an explicitly political, not cultural, image of the nation.

III. IMAGINING THE POLITICAL NATION

In order to examine how Quebec developed as a political nation, I will take the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s as my starting point. During this time, the Quebec Liberal Party, under Jean Lesage, succeeded in banishing the traditional clerical images of nation, and set Quebec onto the path of ideological and institutional modernisation. The Liberals pursued a strategy of moderate nationalism from a federalist perspective. The state assumed the responsibility of being guarantor of the Quebec nation. French Canadians defined themselves provincially – as Québécois. This was accompanied by a more radical set of political images of the nation propagated by the Parti Québécois. Quebec was no longer a cultural backwater – it was a highly modern state capable of self-determination.

“The term Quiet Revolution refers to a series of sweeping reforms legislated during the first half of the 1960s.”133 However, the importance of the Quiet Revolution cannot be reduced to effects of governmental policies, although they did encourage state-centred nationalist sentiments. Rather, the prominent outcome was an overhaul in the way French-Canadians viewed themselves. Kenneth McRoberts maintains that in order to understand the true meaning of the Quiet Revolution, we must look not to the state, “but

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to ideologies, i.e. beliefs about the purpose and character of society and polity."\textsuperscript{134} It is within this sphere, he argues, that we find the 'revolutionary' aspect of 1960s Quebec. "Francophones began to think of themselves not as a French-Canadian minority, seeking merely to establish equal rights for French alongside English, but as a Québécois cultural ‘majority’ with certain ‘normal’ majority prerogatives."\textsuperscript{135} These sentiments were captured by the Quebec Liberal Party slogan: "\textit{Maitres chez nous.}"

The years 1960-66 marked the massive expansion of the role of the provincial government in Quebec society, economy and culture under the Lesage administration. This was part of a strategy for the Quebec State to replace the Church as the bastion of francophone power, and to challenge the dominance of anglophone institutions. The Quebec State hastened the adoption of capitalist values to ensure that the francophone community would benefit fully from that system. Within the framework of the British parliamentary system, Quebec adopted its first set of political and administrative institutions, and the Liberals undertook sweeping reforms in education, health and government administration. They championed a new political vision of Quebec, which saw the state as an active, dynamic force in Quebec society. In Lévesque's words, who was a Liberal politician at the time, the state should be "one of us, the best amongst us."\textsuperscript{136} With major state innovations in the public sector, French Quebecers responded with "a spirit of collective strength, of cooperation, of a general will to move forward together."\textsuperscript{137} Importantly, this was a ‘move’ to political-linguistic definitions of the nation, and away from clerical-cultural nationalism. This is evident in three ways.

\textsuperscript{134} McRoberts, \textit{Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis}, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{135} Levine, \textit{The Reconquest of Montreal}, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{136} Quoted in McRoberts, \textit{Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis}, p. 173.
\textsuperscript{137} Coleman, \textit{The Independence Movement}, p. 218.
Firstly, French-Canadian nationalism was recast as a distinctly ‘Québécois’ nationalism. In a surge of reactionary ‘étatisme’, the boundaries of the province were to henceforth define the nation, whilst the provincial government of Quebec was to become the nation’s central institution. This line of thinking was spearheaded by Lesage when he proclaimed in 1964 “Quebec has become the political expression of French Canada and plays the role of a homeland for all those in the country who speak our language.”138

Secondly, Quebec could no longer be regarded as a province like all others, since the Quebec government saw itself as the new spokesman of the Québécois – a sentiment captured in Lesage’s statement above. The state’s primary mission was to ensure the survival of a francophone community through the exercise of its own jurisdictions. As such, the term ‘province’ fell subject into disrepute, as the Quebec government was viewed from the 1960s onward as a ‘national’ state. This was due in part to Quebeckers’ alienation from the federal government. By refusing to merge their identity with Canada, the Québécois rejected the term ‘French Canadian’.

Thirdly, the ‘conservationist’ conception of la survivance was replaced with a more radical conviction of rattrapage. Traditional Church-endorsed values surrounding the concept of an idyllic pastoral society were in sharp contrast to the reality of living in a highly industrialised society dominated by the anglophone economic establishment. The realisation of this required a new line in thinking. Rattrapage means the need for Quebec to ‘catch up’ with its North American counterparts, both socio-economically and politically. These goals of Quebec nationalism were to be achieved through the state.

As a consequence of étatisme and rattrapage, "Québec became the “focus” and the “locus” of French-Canadian assertion." The political activities associated with the Liberals during the Quiet Revolution were simultaneously the product of earlier attempts to challenge the status-quo, and the catalysts of further action. This action was initiated by a burgeoning political nationalist movement that aimed not only to wrest Québécois control of the provincial state, but also to pry the state away from Canada.

The Parti Québécois, as elaborated above, became the party of Quebec. Within its first term, the PQ implemented a series of reforms designed to preserve Quebec's unique cultural and linguistic identity. The French language became a sacrosanct element of Québécois nationalism. It was natural that, upon coming to power, the PQ government should initiate a policy to affirm the pre-eminence of French in Quebec.

The Charter of the French Language, or simply Bill 101, effectively brought the francisation principles and procedures of its precursor, Bill 22, to their conclusion. It dealt specifically with two core issues of the French language agenda: access of English-language schooling in Quebec, and the province's language of work and communication. The PQ government sought to make French the official language of Quebec. The new language policy would "accompany, symbolize and support a reconquest by the French-speaking majority". Bill 101's program for linguistic nationalism is now "perceived as the solid armour of a French Québec". Since the establishment of Bill 101, and with it

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139 Ibid., p29.
140 The PQ proclaimed that "there will no longer be any question of a bilingual Quebec ... The Quebec we wish to build will be essentially French. The fact that the majority of its population is French will be clearly visible - at work, in communications, and in the countryside." Gouvernement du Quebec, 'La politique québécoise de la langue française', 1977, p35, is quoted in Marc Levine, "Language policy and Quebec’s visage francais: New directions in La question linguistique," Québec Studies 8 (1989), p. 7.
141 Gouvernement du Quebec, 'La politique québécoise de la langue française', 1977, p. 34, is quoted in Levine, The Reconquest of Montreal, p. 112.
142 Balzahar ‘Quebec Nationalism’, Québec Studies, p. 37.
the curtailment of the threat to Quebec's main cultural asset, the nation has been portrayed by the PQ as a territorial collectivity, with many communities sharing the French language. The French language is central to a political definition of the nation.

However, the PQ's ultimate goal – the creation of a sovereign Quebec state – has not been realised. It is argued that the success of Bill 101 has contributed to a decline in nationalism. Now that French Quebecers can control their own political institutions, de facto independence is unnecessary. "Rather than providing the springboard to a resurgent nationalism, it has removed part of the spring which is its impetus."143 In the 1995 referendum, Quebecers narrowly voted against sovereignty. The final tally was 50.6% for 'No' against 49.4% for 'Yes'.144 However, with a difference of only 53,000 votes out of 4.8 million cast, and with 60% of French-speaking Quebecers voting 'yes' to sovereignty, the threat of separation has become a reality.

However, this possibility may be rendered impossible if the Parti Québécois does not heed the interests of all Quebec voters. Quebec is no longer the ethnically homogenous nation that was the focus of nationalists before and even during the Quiet Revolution. For instance, Claude Morin's assertion that "Quebec is the national state of French Canadians" must be nuanced in contemporary multicultural Quebec.145 With high numbers of immigrants, the decision to choose sovereignty rests in the hands of non-French non-English Quebecers. PQ leader Jacques Parizeau made the party's position regarding non-francophones in Quebec extremely precarious when he said that the 1995 referendum failed because of 'money and the ethnic vote'. It will require a great deal of

appeasement to bring Quebec's 'ethnic voters' into PQ ranks. As Taylor warns, such comments reflect a "blind commitment to the Jacobin model, according to which 'ethnics' are considered Québécois to the extent that they vote for 'our' national dream. Their only role in this dream is to sing along in the chorus."\(^{146}\) It is necessary for the PQ to cleanse itself of such ethnic sentiments. Otherwise, its version of civic nationalism in Quebec will lose all credibility.

III. JEKYLL AND HYDE

Modern Quebec nationalism is not a singular movement. Rather, it is a multi-faceted phenomenon that takes as its base a political definition of the nation. However, this over-arching politicised image of Quebec is circumscribed by contending notions of what it means to be Québécois, ranging from the linguistic and ethnic to the ideological. Of interest here is that cultural nationalism is not prevalent, despite incessant references to 'Quebec culture'. In each attempt to define the political nation, there are anomalies that undermine the claim in question. In this section, I look at four paradoxes present in definitions of the modern nation. I argue that such inconsistencies are present because the Quiet Revolution was not the break with the past that it appeared to be. These paradoxes amount to a multitude of 'Jekyll and Hyde' methods of trying to imagine the nation.

The first paradox we can identify surrounds the place of ethnicity and language in a civic-based nationalism. J.W. Berry posits that "while some claim that a 'Québécois'

\(^{145}\) Claude Morin, adviser to Premier Jean Lesage, drew up the Quebec Yearbook (1963) from which this statement is taken, quoted in Peter Desbarats, *The State of Quebec*, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1965), p. 181.

\(^{146}\) Charles Taylor, "Sharing Identity Space," in John E. Trent, Robert Young and Guy Lachapelle, eds.
identity is in essence a pluralistic ‘civic’ or ‘territorial’ identity, and not limited to a single (i.e., French) ethnic-origin, it is not clear that this transition from an ethnic to a civic identity has yet been accomplished. The Parti Québécois advocates a territorial conception of the nation, whereby anyone living in Quebec is a part of that nation. However, the party has exhibited a tendency toward an ethnic definition of the ‘Quebec’ people that involves more than speaking French and living in Quebec. Nationalists often refer to their historic struggle against assimilation, symbolised in the province’s slogan ‘Je me souviens’. This ethnic identity is tied to a linguistic identity. The “survival of a national identity became identified with the survival of the French language in Quebec.” However, language and ethnicity are exclusive. Nationalists in Quebec tend “to exclude, in deed if not in word, those not considered as real French Canadians.”

The Quiet Revolution, which precipitated Quebec’s transition to political national consciousness, was “launched and led by francophone Quebecers: Anglophones did not take an active part.” The French language became the principal ‘carrier’ of Quebec identity and the PQ’s political nationalism. The ascriptive linguistic backdrop of the PQ’s claims undermines its civic-political image of the nation. This has created problems for immigrants, native peoples and anglophones who are excluded from the linguistic definition of the nation, and for Quebec federalists who believe that a bilingual Quebec can exist in a multinational Canada. It is argued that “this new nationalism may be seen...”

as a continuation of the traditional French-Canadian ideology. It is dedicated, as much as
the latter if not more, to the preservation of a francophone nation in North America.”

This leads us to the second paradox, which amounts to the correlation between
French unilingualism and Quebec independence. Conceptions of the sanctity of the French
language were tied to the need for political statehood. If the French language – the
determining characteristic of Quebec ‘culture’ – came under threat, there was an upturn
in political nationalism, signified in the overwhelming francophone support for Bill 101.
If it is not threatened, i.e. through advancements in making French a permanent fixture of
the province, it becomes questionable whether sovereignty is necessary. For example, one
voter in the 1995 referendum intimated that he voted ‘no’ to the pursuit of independence
“because I no longer feel that my French culture is threatened”.

This implies that only
a crisis in linguistic/cultural security can secure a majority ‘yes’ vote for sovereignty. A
recent report of the ‘estates-general’, however, indicated that this required ‘crisis’ might
be far off: it concluded that the French language is no longer under threat in Quebec.

The third paradox is the capability of Quebecers to be both Quebec patriots and
Canadian federalists. For Kellas, the Quiet Revolution represented a ‘regime change’, an
act of Liberal state-building, which intended to keep Quebec firmly within Canada. More
recently, the federalist-driven ‘No’ campaign during the 1995 referendum was carefully
worded to suggest that a vote against sovereignty was still a vote for Quebec: “Mon NON
est québécois.” In political rhetoric, everything is now couched in Quebec terms. “Other
political parties can capitalise on nationalism and engineer regime changes which satisfy

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150 Rocher, “Beyond the Quiet Revolution,” in Meisel, Rocher and Silver, As I recall – Si je me souviens bien, p. 206.
152 André Leroux, Quebec businessman, quoted in Time magazine, 13th November, 1995.

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moderate nationalist feeling and keep the nationalist parties out of power." This has contributed to competing visions of the nation. One can be a federalist and still be a Quebec nationalist. An interesting aspect of this duality is that some civic nationalists, who have been influenced by the political images of nation, are too civic to vote PQ. Daniel Poliquin, for instance, argues that many political nationalists are “too independent to want the independence of Quebec” whilst cultural nationalists do not necessarily vote for the PQ. The PQ’s vision of the civic-political nation may be considered as anathema to their cultural attachments to the nation, which are traditional in scope.

This brings us to the fourth paradox, which lies in the realm of Quebec culture. Many Quebec nationalists take as their starting point of the defence of the nation Quebec ‘culture’, as indicated in the voter’s comments above. However, national culture in Quebec is poorly defined, and some have argued, poorly developed in the face of increasing threats of Americanisation. Coleman, for example, believes that “as Quebec’s francophone community has come to participate more fully in the continental economy, its culture has become more similar to others active in that economy. In the view of many, this had led to a situation where that inner quality burning in the hearts of Quebecois will soon be extinguished. If this does happen, then the nationalist movement in Quebec will have failed and may itself die.”

Thus, whilst the sanctity of Quebec culture is often used to justify nationalist arguments, a new cultural definition of Quebec has not been developed since the Quiet Revolution. Political parties have not advanced cultural development. This is not to say

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155 Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, p. 118.
that Quebec does not enjoy impressive cultural achievements. From the mid-1960s onwards, Quebec began to produce a relevant and consciously Québécois art and music of its own. However, this culture has not been framed in national terms, which could replace pre-1960s traditional culture and to satisfy the ‘inner quality’ of Quebecers.

The PQ refused to endorse the old culture of Quebec; however, it also refused to develop a new cultural definition of the nation. As such, many individual beliefs of Quebec culture “fall back on the traditional ethno-linguistic definition of who the collective ‘nous’ includes,” 157 which also helps to explain the ethnic strand of Quebec nationalism. “Where we expected a cosmopolitan pluralism, we have seen the resurgence of the old fleur-de-lis banner, seized by young hands and waving in thousands. Some will say that we are still repeating old forms of nostalgia.” 158 This indicates that it is important for Quebec to develop a pluralistic culture in conjunction with its political nationalism.

V. CONCLUSION

This discussion demonstrates that there are a number of contradictory images of the Quebec nation within the post-1960s political nationalism of the Parti Québécois. I have suggested that one explanation for the plurality of images was the failure to make a certified break with some elements of pre-1960s cultural nationalism, over and above the continuation of the French language as Quebec’s cultural identifier. This analysis concurs with Dumont’s observation that “radical breaks occurring in the history of cultures never

156 Coleman, The Independence Movement, p. 228.
take the form of a total winding up followed be a fresh departure.\textsuperscript{159} In particular, an ethnic conception of Quebec persists, and is occasionally evident in the unofficial rhetoric of the PQ. This ethnic conception has skewed images of the modern nation, which have resulted in a Jekyll and Hyde national psyche. In theory the PQ is a civic-associative national party, but in reality its support base is primarily linguistic-ascriptive.

These findings indicate that Quebec political nationalism is often exclusionary. PQ supporters have a strong ethno-linguistic (i.e. French Canadian) dimension, regardless of the party’s official ideology. This goes back to the political nationalism that emerged in the 1960s, which was facilitated almost exclusively by French-speaking Quebecers.

Protection of the French language is correlated with Quebec nationalism. Despite this, the PQ officially welcomes all ethnic groups to participate in Quebec nationalism. The extent to which the linguistic factor of Quebec nationalism undermines the civic-associative philosophy of its PQ proponents must be addressed to secure the non-francophone vote.

There is nevertheless a strong political image of the nation of Quebec. In fact, this political image takes precedence over all others. This is principally due to state-building efforts of the Liberal government in the 1960s and success of the PQ as a significant political force. Most Francophones view Quebec as their primary political community, and as an eminently French society.\textsuperscript{160} We can read from this that PQ nationalism is linguistically political. The party’s success rests on its ability to secure strict policies to protect the French language (although this success has also precipitated a decline in the will towards independence). The PQ does not appear to be cultural-minded

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} A survey in Le Devoir in April 1991 showed that 62% of Francophones in the province consider themselves to be “Québécois.” Hudson Meadwell, “The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec,” World Politics 45 (January 1993), p. 218.
at all – the traditional cultural nationalism of the Church has been rejected, whilst there are very few modern cultural images of Quebec that reflect its diverse population.

During the Quiet Revolution, the object of Quebec nationalists was to build a modern, secular, urbanised society which broke with the past traditions and culture of the Church. In other words, for the new nation to be built, the old Quebec had to be remade. The political nationalism of the new nationalist party seemed to encompass this vision and these modern nation-building goals. However, there were two strands of the old Quebec that were not ‘remade’, officially and unofficially. The first was the French language, which united French-speaking Quebecers in a push for institutional linguistic security, and excluded non-francophones from the new vision of Quebec. The latter was an ethnic conception of the Québécois, which spoke of their collective memories, of the Conquest and their struggle to survive as a linguistic minority in North America.

These two elements of pre-1960s cultural nationalism continue to hamper the civic-associative goals of the PQ, which are to include every citizen living in Quebec under a sovereign nation-state. Dumont has acknowledged this problem: “since we have defined ourselves as Québécois a new responsibility has become ours: that of entering into a new kind of dialogue with other Québécois who are not French-speaking.”¹⁶¹ In order to realise the goal of political nationalism, that is, for the ‘old’ Quebec to be unmade and a new modern nation built, there is an urgent need for Quebec nationalism to be more territorial and less ethno-linguistically based.

¹⁶¹ Dumont, The Vigil of Quebec, p. 48.
CONCLUSIONS

This project has outlined an instrumentalist and contextual approach to the politics of imagining nations in Scotland and Quebec. I have focussed on the role of nationalist political parties in shaping images of the nation. My goals, as admitted at the outset, are ambitious in scope. Yet I hope they provide a reasonable attempt to consider how political nations are constructed in the eyes of members, what agents are involved in this construction, and how political images differ from cultural images of the nation.

To conclude this discussion, I offer a brief synopsis of the main points of the argument laid out in the preceding chapters, and evaluate the comparative case-studies of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. I also consider the implications of this account and how this project may contribute to the study of nations and nationalism.

1. Review of argument

I would like to review the main points of this discussion to see how I reached an understanding of imagined political communities.

I began with a critical review of normative approaches to nation-building. A focal point of this discussion was the ‘imagination’ of nations, a concept first elaborated by Benedict Anderson. I found that this and other cultural theories could not account for the role of actors in nation-building or explain the need of nations to have a state. Contrarily, political approaches to nationalism examined here overlooked the emotive appeal of cultural attachments to nation. An evaluation of instrumentalist theories indicated that
cultural images of nation might be manipulated for political goals, drawing elements of
cultural and political approaches together. Lastly, an analysis of the civic-cultural
dichotomy demonstrated that these concepts, and thus approaches to nations and
nationalism, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The findings of this discussion
implied that a new ‘holistic’ angle to the question of creating nations would not be amiss.

In identifying the weaknesses of these sets of theory, I suggested that a new
approach that accounted for the politics of imagining nations. This perspective differs
from existing theories, in that cultural conceptions of the nation are acknowledged in a
political analysis, elements of ‘design and deliberation’ in national image-construction
are considered, and both cultural and political images of the nation are seen to exist
together (which I have termed a ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ phenomenon). Yet my over-arching
claim is that prevalent images of the modern nation are civic-political, not cultural.

This approach to nation-building was then considered in relation to some specific
cases involving nationalism. A standard methodology was employed to examine the
experiences of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. Taking each case-study separately,
the discussion proceeded in four sections. I began by evaluating cultural images of the
nation before the advent of political nationalist parties. I then examined the performance
of the Scottish National Party and the Parti Québécois, and how their representations of
the nation differed from those of cultural nationalist institutions. Following this, I
considered how modern political images of the nation are constructed. Finally, the
relationship between political and cultural images of the nation in Scotland and Quebec
was posited to have created a ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ national consciousness.
The experience of nationalism in Scotland and Quebec provided an opportunity to assess ideas about imagined political communities in actual nationalist conduct. In the Scottish case, the SNP proposed an inclusive civic-political type of nationalism that rejected previous ‘deformed’ representations of the nation. However, this strategy came at the expense of cultural nationalist support and thus is considered to lack emotive appeal. In the Quebec case, the PQ similarly proposed a civic-political nationalism that was aimed against the traditional nationalism of the Church. However, the maintenance of ascriptive linguistic elements of cultural nationalism prohibited actual associative nationalist claims, i.e. excluding non-francophones from the political-linguistic nation. At the same time, the failure of cultural development in Quebec after the 1960s enabled traditional cultural images of nation, divorced from politics, to persist. In both cases it was found that contending images of the nation have resulted in a dualism or pluralism of national identity. This means that cultural national identity does not necessarily translate into a political national identity that aims at state control.

In this discussion my principal aim was to assess how national political parties portray themselves as bearers of the ‘national project’, what this national project means, and how it differs from other conceptions of the national project. It was discovered that there is more than one actor vying for the attention of the nation’s imagination. Other political parties have framed their arguments in a nationalist vein, as have government and civil society institutions. The images of nation they present are competitive – be they cultural, linguistic, myth- or memory-based, unionist or federalist. This competition has weakened national political party attempts to create a purely political image of the nation.
The conclusion, to which my research on imagined political communities has led me to, is that images of nation may be political as well as cultural in scope and form.

 Neither set of images occurs unconsciously in the minds of members, but are constructed and propagated by actors for political or cultural goals. Both sets of images and ways of imagining may exist together, but as they differ in objectives, their rivalry has hindered a general will toward statehood. It has also created more than one way of imagining the nation, which authors have termed as dualistic or schizophrenic, and I have dubbed ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ in my own Scottish narrative tradition. To overcome this duality or plurality of national consciousness, certain strategies may be undertaken by nationalist political parties. These proposed strategies differ in the cases of Scotland and Quebec.

2. Comparing Scottish and Quebec nationalism

I noted at the outset that Scottish and Quebec nationalism were not considered to be the same. Important differences in the images of nation led to different conclusions in each case. I would like to briefly outline the different contexts and forms of cultural and political nationalism in Scotland and Quebec. Next I evaluate how the objectives of nationalist political parties correspond. I then contrast how party strategies, obstacles to political goals, and methods of overcoming the ‘Jekyll and Hyde’ complex differ.

In each of the case-studies, I was interested in the relationship between cultural and political images of nation; how they are used to further the goals of modern nationalist movements and how they affect national identity. In Scotland, cultural images of the nation rested on Highland iconography – presented here in the forms of tartaniam and ‘Kailyardism’ – which was propagated by British government-funded bodies such as
the Scottish Tourist Industry, and conservative institutions such as the National Trust for Scotland. The centralist orientation of actors involved in the construction of cultural images determined the non-political value of such images of Scotland. The SNP intentionally separated its goals from these images, which are considered 'deformed' due to the fact that Scotland had no means of control over them as a 'stateless' nation.

In Quebec, cultural images of the nation before the Quiet Revolution were shaped by traditional institutions such as the Church. The vision they propagated of Quebec society – religious, linguistic, conservative and rural – amounted to an ideology of la survivance. An important part of this ideology was a refusal to change the status quo (which kept the Church in power and federalism unquestioned) and a distrust of politics. Thus, cultural images of nation promoted not only a non-political image of Quebec, but rather a steadfastly anti-political one. Again, the new nationalist political party broke with, in fact, challenged such cultural images of nation by its mere existence. Both the SNP and PQ, in turning their backs on the cultural nation, sought to present a new political image of the nation. This involved attempts to change the national thinking of the population from cultural (and centralist) to political (and sovereignist).

The political images proposed by the SNP and PQ had in common an interest in fostering a civic nationalism, based on constitutional grounds, for separating the nation from the central state. Both political parties characterise the nation territorially - anyone can consider himself or herself to form that nation by living in it and sharing in its institutions and society. The SNP and PQ therefore officially eschewed any cultural or ethnic definitions of the national community. The applicability of this definition, however, was subject to different degrees of legitimacy in Scotland and Quebec due to
different socio-economic and political contexts. In Quebec, the maintenance of particular cultural traits after the Quiet Revolution, primarily language but also an underlying collective memory of ethnic struggle, was an obstacle to espousing a purely associative version of nationalism. Although language became the prime carrier of political nationalism, then, it still had its roots in pre-1960s cultural/ethnic nationalism. In Scotland, this was not a problem as English is now overwhelmingly the dominant language of the nation. Language was not a ‘barrier’ to being a nationalist and thus the SNP could promote civic-associative nationalism without the threat of ostracising English settlers in the nation.

Language, then, is the main factor differentiating the political goals of Scottish and Quebec nationalism. However, there are other considerations in this divergence. Scotland, since the Treaty of Union and aided by the Scottish Enlightenment, has benefited in its political images of the nation from a strong and politicised civil society. Scotland’s ‘Golden Age’ occurred during its partnership in the UK State, at which time Scotland was at the centre of the industrial revolution. In Quebec, the institutionalisation of a political civil society occurred during the ‘Golden Age’ of the modernising Quiet Revolution in the 1960s, when ‘rattrapage’ became a central concern of nationalists. Previously, politically centralist institutions such as Church dampened any impetus toward political modernisation. However, the Quiet Revolution, in its break with the political and socio-economic past, did not constitute a break with Quebec’s cultural past. The result of this was a plurality of national paradoxes of how cultural, linguistic and political images of Quebec fit into the modern nationalist project. Therefore, whilst both Scotland and Quebec have witnessed the development of political nationalism since the
1960s, the “Jekyll and Hyde” national duality in Quebec is more complex than that of Scotland because of the unclear relationship between this modern political nationalism and traditional cultural nationalism since the Quiet Revolution.

Whilst the goals of the SNP and PQ coincide, then, the political contexts of Scotland and Quebec have necessitated different strategies to achieve these goals. In Scotland, I suggested that a method of overcoming national duality is the appropriation of modern cultural images of nation, which reflect the population, to give emotive appeal to the civic goals of the party. In Quebec, I see an opposite problem. The emphasis on the French language is a barrier to civic nationalism, and must give way to a stronger associative territorial nationalism that can serve the needs of non-francophone minorities. In either case, each party has to propose a vision of the nation that is pluralistic and multicultural, and which rests on the common institutions and society within the territory to make self-determination a credible option for all voters.

This comparative evaluation thus indicates that the two constructions of political images of nation in Scotland and Quebec are not so much distinct types as mirror images – the SNP and PQ aimed at the same end, i.e. political control of the state, but pursued different means to achieve this end. The proposed image of nation no longer rests on a culturally imagined community bound by a vernacular language, but by a civic and territorial definition of nation in which all ethnic groups can participate and that aims to achieve self-determination for that nation.
3. Implications of imagining the political nation

I would like to consider the implications of acknowledging nations as political as well as cultural constructs. This leads me to contemplate where further research is needed to complete this account of the politics of imagining nations. In particular, the difficult matter of applying this normative argument to other cases must be addressed.

The principal implication underlying this research is that nations are remade and reconstructed to suit the interests of national members and institutions in changing political contexts. Images of the nation cannot be seen as static or entrenched – either culturally or politically. For instance, the nations of Scotland and Quebec have progressed from an ethnic characterisation of the nation to a territorially defined one. Furthermore, political images of the modern nation have been developed to legitimise claims to independence. Nations can be construed in different lights by different peoples and actors. Thus, we must account for the array of images that constitute the nation.

This discussion also implies that national members may have more than one sense of national consciousness. We cannot write off nationalists in any given community as a homogenous mass, with only one set of ideas about the nation. It has been demonstrated that there is a multitude of conflicting images of the nation, propagated by different sets of actors for different purposes, which vie for attention in the mind of national members. Thus, members may have a dualistic or pluralistic sense of national identity that does not simply correspond with an attachment to the nation and an attachment to the state.

To consider the implications of this research more substantially, further work is needed in two areas to complete this account of the politics of imagining nations. First,
the contribution of political actors other than nationalist parties must be examined, and secondly, the feasibility of general application of these arguments must be dealt with.

I noted at the beginning of this thesis that due to space limitations, I would not be evaluating the contribution of ‘non-nationalist’ political parties to the political images of nation. I have increasingly realised throughout this research that this important issue must be addressed to explain the unionist/federalist-propagated images of nation. I have touched on the role of other political parties in shaping images of the political nation here, yet I believe this subject of a thesis unto itself. Therefore, we need a more precise examination of how all parties differ in their elaboration of the national community. This is no inconsiderable task, and goes beyond what I set out to do in this project.

This account of the politics of imagining nations also calls on us to consider terms of application. To be complete, we would need to be able to say with more precision what indicates the existence of political images of the nation. I have examined to what degree political images of nation differ from cultural images of nation, but more attention must be paid to how these images, and others, co-exist. We should also be able to articulate how political and cultural images of nation are in tune with the population’s circumstances. For instance, in the case of Quebec more attention is needed to explain native peoples’ images of Quebec as a nation. And in Scotland we have to contemplate how people living in the Orkney and Shetland Isles, who have threatened separation from an independent Scotland, view the nation and their place within it.

There is considerable scope for further research on the topic of imagined political communities. This research is by no means complete. However, I would like to think that
a better understanding of the politics of imagining nations could at least provide a starting point for further efforts.

4. Conclusion

I began this project with an inclination that more than one image of the Scottish nation existed in my mind. This duality, I assumed, was the result of competing cultural and political images of the nation. I have since learned that this dualistic sense of national identity was not confined to the wanderings of my mind or to the nation of Scotland itself. Rather, I have discovered that the 'Jekyll and Hyde' national mentality is a tangible concept, and can be explained through detailed examination of the interplay between culture and politics within the modern nationalist setting. In the case of Quebec, dual national consciousness seems to have been transcended by plural national consciousness due to a variety of conflicting images of the nation.

These findings indicate that nations are protean creatures – they readily adapt their shape to fit the circumstances. But such a metamorphosis does not occur without the help of interested actors in the construction of images of the nation. In order to realise the full implications of this we must hybridise our approaches – cultural, political, sociological, historical and psychological – to nations and nationalism. A refusal to acknowledge the interdependence of different aspects of the nation may invariably undermine the building blocks upon which the nation rests. As argued throughout this exercise, I believe that the politics of imagining nations is one such building block.
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